110 NLRB 651
Jackson Chair Co., Inc.
JACKSON CHAIR COMPANY, INC.
651
IV. THE REMEDY
Having found that Plant has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall recom-
mend that it be ordered. to cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action in order to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that Plant has discriminated in regard to the hire and tenure of
employment of Maxie Beardon and Claude Van Vlack, I shall recommend that Plant
offer to each of them immediate and full reinstatement to his former or substantially
equivalent position as insulation mechanic, without prejudice to his seniority or other
rights and privileges, and make each whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result
of the discrimination by payment to him of a sum of money equal to the amount he
would have earned as an insulation mechanic from April 17, 1953, to the date of
the offer of reinstatement, less his net earnings during that period.
The computation
shall be made on a quarterly basis in the manner established by the Board in F. W.
Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, 291-294. Earnings in one particular quarter
shall have no effect upon the back-pay liability for any other such period. It will
also be recommended that Plant make available to the Board upon request payroll
and other records to facilitate the checking of back pay.
Having found that the evidence does not establish that the Respondent Union and
Hutchinson caused or attempted to cause the discharge of Beardon and Van Vlack,
and as there is no evidence that the Respondent Union and Hutchinson restrained
or coerced Reardon or Van Vlack in respect to rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the
Act, it will be recommended that the complaint against the Respondent Union and
Hutchinson be dismissed in its entirety.
As the evidence does not establish any violation of the Act by the Incorporated
Association, it will be recommended that the complaint against the Incorporated
Association and the Association be dismissed in its entirety.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and the entire record in the case,
I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Local 5 of the International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators and As-
bestos Workers, AFL, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5)
of the Act.
2. Albert E. Hutchinson is the agent of the above-named Union.
3. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of Maxie
Beardon and Claude Van Vlack, thereby encouraging membership in and approval
by the Respondent Union, Plant Insulation Company has engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
4. By thus interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in the exercise
of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, Plant Insulation Company has engaged
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
6. The evidence does not establish any violation of the Act on the part of Insula-
tion Contractors of Southern California, Inc., Insulation Contractors of Southern
California, Local 5 of the International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators
and Asbestos Workers, AFL, and its agent, Albert E. Hutchinson.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
JACKSON CHAIR COMPANY, INC. and INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED
AUTOMOBILE
WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL.
Case No. 9-CA-746.
October 29, 19541
Decision and Order
On June 3, 1954, Trial Examiner C. W. Whittemore issued his In-
termediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
110 NLRB No. 102.
'652
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Inter-
mediate Report attached hereto.
Thereafter, the Respondent filed ex-
'ceptions to the Intermediate Report 1 and a supporting brief.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed.
The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the
.case, and hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner.'
Order
Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of
the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations
Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Jackson Chair Company,
Inc., Danville, Kentucky, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Interrogating its employees concerning their union member-
ship in, or their activities on behalf of, International Union, United
Automobile Workers of America, AFL, or any other labor organiza-
1 The Union moved to strike Respondent's original exceptions because they did not desig-
nate the page and line of the portion of the record relied upon , as required by Section
102.46 of the Board 's Rules and Regulations.
The Union also moved to deny the oral
argument requested by Respondent
Respondent thereafter filed amended exceptions add-
ing page and line citations and renewed its request for ori1 argument
The Union there-
after filed a motion to strike the amended exceptions as untimely and to deny oral argu-
ment
The Respondent filed a response to the Union's motion and a formal request to
extend time for filing its amended exceptions
The Union's motion to strike Respondent 's exceptions is denied.
These exceptions, as
originally filed, constituted substantial compliance with the Board's Rules and Regula-
tions and the error was promptly corrected
Gulf Coast Oil Company, 97 NLRB 1513.
However, Respondent's request for oial argument is denied because the record , the ex-
ceptions and brief, in our opinion , adequately present the issues and positions of the
parties.
2 The Trial Examiner , while stating the jurisdictional facts which disclose that the
Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act, inadvertently failed
to make a specific finding to this effect
We so find
3 We do not adopt a subsidiary finding of the Trial Examiner that a "serious conflict"
exists in the testimony of President Hughes Jackson and Foreman Shelby Basham con-
cerning Basham 's request for permission to discharge employee Mobley. Jackson testi-
fied that Bashani had come to him 1 or 2 days before the actual discharge to request per-
mission to discharge Mobley
Although Basham testified lie had not requested such
authority , it appears , in context , that he may have intended to refer specifically to any
request which he may have made the day of the discharge .
Under these circumstances,
we are not peisuaded that any conflict necessarily exists in this testimony .
However, this
finding does not alter our concurience with the Trial Examiner 's ultimate conclusion, for
the reasons fully set forth in the Intermediate Report , that the discharge of Mobley was
violative of Section 8 (a) (3) and (1).
Also, in view of our adoption, on other grounds referred to in the Intermediate Report,
of the Trial Examiner 's finding that by November 12, 1953 , the Respondent was aware
of Mobley's union activity, we likewise find it unnecessary to draw any inference from
the fact that the Respondent employed a small number of employees in a small community.
In view of our agieement with the Trial Examiner that Respondent's other conduct vio-
lated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act, we find it unnecessary to pass upon whether Respondent
also violated the Act by Forelady Devine 's alleged instruction to employees to throw away
union leaflets.
JACKSON CHAIR COMPANY, INC.
653'
tion, in a manner constituting interference, restraint, or coercion in
violation of Section 8 (a) (1).
(b) Threatening its employees with reprisals because of their
union membership or activities.
(c) Discouraging membership in International Union, United
Automobile Workers of America, AFL, or in any other labor organi-
zation of its employees, by discriminating against any employee with
respect to his hire or tenure of employment, or any term or condition,
of employment.
(d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
its employees in' the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form
labor organizations, to join or assist the above-named or any other
labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and
to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that such
right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor-
organization as a condition of employment, as authorized by Section,
8 (a) (3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Offer Harold L. Mobley immediate and full reinstatement to his
former or substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his
seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and make
him whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of the
discrimination against him, in the mariner set forth in the section of
the Intermediate Report entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Upon request make available to the National Labor Relations
Board or to its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll rec-
ords, social-security payment records, timecards, personnel records
and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of
back pay due and the right of reinstatement under the terms of this,
Order.
(c) Post at its plant in Danville, Kentucky, copies of the notice.
attached hereto marked "Appendix."' Copies of such notice, to be-
furnished by the Regional Director for the Ninth Region, shall, after
being duly signed by the Respondent, be posted by it immediately
upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for a period of sixty (60)
consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees customarily are posted.
Reasonable steps.
shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that such notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
4In the event that this order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals„
there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words
"Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order.'
654
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(d) Notify the Regional Director for the Ninth Region, in writing,
within ten (10) days from the date of this Order what steps Respond-
ent has taken to comply therewith.
Appendix
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that :
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees concerning their mem-
bership in, or their activities on behalf of, International Union,
United Automobile Workers of America, AFL, or any other labor
organization, in a manner constituting interference, restraint, or
coercion in violation of Section 8 (a) (1).
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with reprisals because of
their union membership or activities.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in International Union,
United Automobile Workers of America, AFL, or in any other
labor organization of our employees, by discriminating against
any employees with respect to their hire or tenure of employment,
or any term or condition of employment except to the extent per-
mitted by Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
AVE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or
coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self -organi-
zation, to form labor organizations, to join or assist the above-
named or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing or other mutual aid or protection, and to refrain from any or
all of such activities, except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organi-
zation as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8
(a) (3) of the Act.
WE WILL offer Harold L. Mobley immediate reinstatement to
his former or a substantially equivalent position without preju-
dice to his seniority or other rights and privileges and we will
make him whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result of the
discrimination against him.
JACKSON CHAIR COMPANY, INC.,
Employer.
Dated----------------
By-------------------------------------
(Representative )
(Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
JACKSON CHAIR COMPANY, INC.
655
Intermediate Report
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A charge having been duly filed and served, a complaint and notice of hearing
thereon having been issued and served by the General Counsel of the National Labor
Relations Board, and an answer having been filed by the above-named Respondent,
a hearing involving allegations of unfair labor practices in violation of Section
8 (a) (1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, (61 Stat. 136)
herein called the Act, was held in Danville, Kentucky, on April 19 and 20, 1954,
before the duly designated Trial Examiner.
In substance, the complaint alleges and the answer denies that the Respondent
through its officers and agents has interrogated and threatened its employees regard-
ing their union activities and sympathies; on November 12, 1953, discriminatorily
discharged employee Harold L. Mobley because of his activities on behalf of the
Union; and by such conduct has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its em-
ployees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
At the hearing all parties were represented, were afforded full opportunity to be
heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce evidence pertinent to
the issues, to argue orally upon the record, and to file briefs and proposed findings
and conclusions.
Briefs have been received from the Respondent and General
Counsel.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from his observation of the witnesses, the
Trial Examiner makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent is a Kentucky corporation, with its principal office and place
of business at Danville, Kentucky, where it is engaged in the manufacture and
sale of upholstered chairs and similar products.
During the year preceding the hearing it purchased supplies and equipment valued
at more than $200,000, of which about 98 percent was transported into Kentucky
to its plant from other States of the United States. In the same period it manu-
factured, sold, and shipped products valued at more than $650,000, of which about
98 percent was shipped directly from the plant to points outside Kentucky.
The Respondent concedes that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning
of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
International Union, United Automobile Workers of America, AFL, is a labor
organization admitting to membership employees of the Respondent.
III.
THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The discharge of Harold Mobley-the major issue in this case-followed his 3-day
effort to obtain signatures of fellow employees upon authorization cards in the
Charging Union.
Other events in issue occurred within a few days preceding or
following his summary dismissal on Tuesday, November 12, 1953.
At the time of his discharge Mobley had been serving the Respondent for about
a year as its truckdriver.
His major duties were to haul chair frames from the mill
to the upholstering plant, a distance of 2 or 3 blocks, but he was also required to
do various odd jobs, such as hauling trash, running errands, and for a period doing
inspection work.
It is undisputed that he was subordinate to 3 or 4 supervisors,
each of whom gave him instructions.
Sometime in September 1953, and several weeks before his discharge Mobley
queried several other employees as to their desires about forming a union.
After
one of such employees warned him that he had better keep quiet about organizing,
Mobley asked Hughes Jackson, Sr., head of the concern, if he had been "asking
about me having anything to do with the Union." Jackson said he had heard rumors.
Mobley told him to pay no attention to them, and said he had nothing to do with
the Union. Jackson replied that he did not think he did.'
Apparently Mobley discontinued his efforts to arouse interest in organizing until
November, when he received some cards from a union representative.
On Monday,
i The quotations are from and the findings based upon the credible testimony of Mobley,
which is in substance corroborated by Jackson
656
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
November 9, he sought and obtained signatures to these cards, as he also did ocr
the following Tuesday and Wednesday, while at the factory.
On Thursday he was
summarily discharged by Foreman Shelby Basham.
According to Mobley, Basham
told him when giving his pay check: "I am going to have to let you go, you lied to
us."
Basham, as a witness, denied telling the employee he had lied.
According
to the foreman, "wasn't nothing said in that manner at all; I just said to him here
was his check and we dissolved partnerships."
Since the motive precipitating the discharge is the crucial point at issue, and'
because of the conflict in testimony as to the reason advanced by the foreman at
the time of the dismissal, it is necessary to appraise evidence as to other factors
which are asserted by the Respondent to bear upon Basham's action.
Turning first to the claims themselves-as to the reasons for Mobley' s dismissal.
The Respondent's answer itself contains no "short and simple statement of the facts
which constitute the ground of defense," as required by the Board's Rules and Regula-
tions,2 but merely denies the allegations of the complaint as to Mobley.
Hughes Jackson, the head of the Company, and the first management witness
to give reasons for the discharge, said that while he did not direct the action, he
agreed to and authorized it.
He said that Foreman Basham came to him just
before the discharge and said he "wanted to get rid of" Mobley, because he was.
"not keeping the frames in the plant for the springers, and that he was wasting his
time at the mill with horseplay, and just plain loafing, and he was not doing
his-he was not attending to his job...... Later in his testimony he amended
his original statement by saying, "As I remember it, Basham did not tell me of
the horseplay.
One or more of the men at the mill told me about him."
Basham himself, however, also a witness for the Respondent, flatly denied that he
asked Hughes Jackson for permission to fire Mobley-thus immediately posing what
appears to the Trial Examiner to be a serious conflict in the defense evidence which
may not be ignored in attempting to resolve other confused and conflicting testi-
mony given by management witnesses on the matter of Mobley's discharge.
Basham testified that he never warned Mobley of discharge if he did not "get to,
moving," and that nothing was said about "firing Mobley at any time" until the
morning of November 12, when General Manager James E. Jackson called him by
telephone and told him to get Mobley "rolling or get him out, or do something with
him."
James E. Jackson, as a witness, said : "I was the one that told them they had
to discharge him or one way or another, just get him busy or discharge him .. .
I emphasized getting rid of him."
Despite the somewhat equivocal nature of Jackson's "instructions" to Basham,
revealed by their above-quoted testimony, other facts make it reasonable to con-
clude that Basham accepted them as a direct order to fire Mobley. In a sworn
statement to a Board agent on January 7, 1953, Basham said that Jackson called
at 8.30 a. m. on November 12 and told him "to get shet" of Mobley. Basham
further testified, at the hearing, that after being called by Jackson he "went up to
the mill" and found Mobley "loading chairs as fast as he could," that he observed
him the rest of the morning, and that he did not see Mobley loafing at all.
Never-
theless he gave the employee his check and fired him at noon. Thus it appears,
from the testimony of the foreman who both observed and fired Mobley, that
Mobley performed his work satisfactorily from 8:30 on, and provided no occasion
for his selection from alternate instructions.
From the time of Jackson's call
until the actual discharge, Mobley was "moving" or "rolling," according to the
foreman.
It is plain, furthermore, that such satisfactory activity was not the result
of fear of discharge-since Basham testified that he never warned the employee
of dismissal if he did not "get to moving."
The responsibility for ordering Mobley's discharge thus seems to be fairly fixed
upon James E. Jackson.
His real motive should next be determined.
At one point in his testimony he said:
Mobley was discharged for loafing, poor work. He had been continually
warned by myself and others to get his work up and the day he was discharged
he had gotten away behind in hauling frames from the mill building to the
upholstery plant, production had practically stopped over there for the
springers because they didn't have the frames, so I contacted Mr. Basham
who was superintendent of upholstery, and told him he either had to get rid
of Mobley or get him moving, one way or the other, either get him out of the-
plant, fire him, or see that frames were put into the upholstery plant.
2 See. 102.20.
JACKSON CHAIR COMPANY, INC.
657
In passing, it should be noted that Jackson's testimony: "production had prac-
tically stopped
. because they didn't have the frames," is flatly contradicted by
Basham, who said that "that morning he filled the place full of frames."
The "poor work," Jackson went on to explain, "had been going on for, I would
say, a month, two months."
He was then asked by his own counsel:
Now, relate to the Examiner whether or not that poor work was anything in
addition to the fact that he was falling down on his job in getting frames up
to the upholstering department?
Jackson's reply was an unmodified "No."
After some prompting by his counsel, Jackson described other claimed faults
and derelictions of the employee.
Such testimony was general and indefinite.
For
example, he said:
He also was supposed to haul trash out of the plant, cinders and such.
And
I think for several weeks up to then he hadn't hauled anything out of there,
trash had accumulated. [Emphasis supplied.]
He also described an incident occurring many weeks before, when he had seen
Mobley's truck stopped between the mill and the plant while the employee spoke
to high school girls.
According to the foreman's subsequent testimony, Basham
himself was on the truck with Mobley that morning, and the incident was not of
sufficient importance for him to speak to the employee about it.
In any event, the nub of Jackson's claim, it is clear, is that he ordered the dis-
charge on the morning of November 12 because "production had practically stopped
over there for the springers because they didn't have the frames."
The merit of
this claim is directly refuted by Basham's testimony to the effect that before the
discharge, Mobley had delivered enough frames to last the upholsterers 2 days. Thus
it is plain, and the Trial Examiner concludes and finds, that credible evidence does
not support Jackson's claim that at the time of the discharge Mobley was "behind"
in his delivery work.
Construing Jackson's testimony to mean that before he ordered the discharge,
on the morning of November 12, Mobley was derelict in delivering chairs entails
appraisal of other testimony.
The following colloquy occurred between Jackson
and General Counsel:
Q. All right, then, on the morning that Mobley was discharged did you
call the plant and ask them if there were frames ready?
A. I went up there.
Q. You went up there and there were frames ready, is that correct?
A. Plenty of frames.
This testimony that he went to the mill, himself, to check on the supply of
available frames is in serious conflict with his own sworn statement given to a
Board agent on January 28, 1954, in which he said:
I don't recall if I was at the mill the morning that Mobley was discharged. .
I checked with Montgomery [foreman at the mill] that morning and he said
that plenty of frames were available and I thought it was Mobley' s negligence
accounted for the lack of frames at the plant. . . . I don't think I talked
with Mobley the morning of his discharge. I saw him around but it was
in the course of his regular duties.
[Emphasis supplied.]
Of Jackson's two opposing statements: (1) That he went to the mill himself
that morning, and (2) that he did not go to the mill but called Montgomery-neither
finds credible corroboration in Montgomery's testimony.
According to that fore-
man, Basham's assistant-one Singleton-called him that morning, as he usually
did, to have frames sent down.
Tracing the matter still further-to Singleton, his testimony leads to the belief
that he made no call to Montgomery. For at one point he said:
the day he [Mobley] was discharged, I would be at the back some place
else, the day he was discharged.
Later in his testimony he said:
I told you before I was in the back of the building and I didn't know anything
about the frames, if you recall that.
He further said that he could recall no conversation with Basham that morning either
about Mobley or chair frames-until after Mobley had been discharged.
338207-35-vol. 110-43
658
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Thus one reaches the dead end of a futile effort to find credible facts to support
Jackson's claim as to events causing the dismissal of Mobley.
The Trial Examiner
is unable to find from Montgomery 's testimony that Singleton , Jackson, or anyone
else checked with him as to the availability of frames on the morning of November
12-for on other matters his testimony is stretched by extravagance to a point beyond
credence.
For example, he said Mobley was a good worker only for the first 2
weeks of his employment , and that he loafed from the time he started to work
until he was fired .
His description of Mobley is far from consistent with that given
by Hughes Jackson. Jackson said Mobley's "efficiency " did not begin to "decline"
until "about beginning at the time that he came to see me"-denying that he was
interested in the Union.
Even that, he admitted, "was not alarming.
Employees
do that.
I was a boy once, myself, and my efficiency declined every once in a while."
In the year of his employment, Mobley was given two raises-the latter one in Sep-
tember or October, a few weeks before his dismissal.
Far more credible is the testimony of Lawrence Engle, the one inspector at the mill
whose duty it was to check the frames before Mobley transported them to the plant.
He said that he was out ill the day Mobley was fired-a statement unchallenged by
the Respondent.
Not only does this fact present a reasonable explanation for what-
ever short delay there may have been early in the morning of November 12 in deliv-
ery of frames , but his credible testimony , supported by that of the driver who took
Mobley's place , is to the effect that such delays were frequent-not only because the
frames ordered were not ready for his inspection , but also because sometimes he
had not sufficient time to inspect them.
In short, the Trial Examiner finds that the preponderance of credible evidence
fails to support the Respondent's claim that Mobley was discharged for good cause.
The continuity of other events immediately preceding the discharge leads to the
conclusion that Mobley actually was dismissed because of his union activities and
to discourage membership in that organization .
As previously described , he openly
solicited signatures to union cards during the 3 days before November 12.
A com-
paratively small number of employees are employed by this enterprise in a small
community.
Mobley worked under the supervision of 3 or 4 management repre-
sentatives.
It is reasonable to infer, and the Trial Examiner so concludes , that by
November 12 management had become aware of Mobley's organizing leadership
and that his activities were contrary to his voluntary statement to Jackson as to his
state of mind regarding the Union in September .
Other facts, some undisputed,
support not only this conclusion but a finding that management was concerned in
an effort to prevent such self-organization of its employees.
From the credible testimony of three employees 3 it is found, despite Mont-
gomery's denial , that shortly before November 12 he warned them , in effect, that they
had better keep their "union talk quiet," for if Jackson discovered it they would lose
their jobs.
A day or so before Mobley's dismissal, Montgomery told employee
Wofford and others that he knew someone was passing out union cards and , if "caught
up with," would be fired.
At about the time of the dismissal Basham asked em-
ployee Holt, also a witness for the Respondent, how "he felt about the union."
And it is undisputed that on the same day and immediately after Mobley's discharge,
employee Leffew , assigned to the trucking job, was asked by Montgomery to tell him
if he heard anything about the Union .
The Trial Examiner specifically finds that
Basham told Mobley, upon discharging him, that he had lied, and that the intent
of this claim referred to his union activities.
In summary, the Trial Examiner concludes and finds that the preponderance of
credible evidence sustains the allegations of the complaint as to Mobley, that he was
discriminatorily discharged in order to discourage membership in a labor organ-
ization, and that by such discrimination and by threats and interrogations of Mont-
gomery, above found, the Respondent has interfered with, restrained , and coerced
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Act.
A few days after Mobley's discharge events occurred involving another small
group of employees, in the sewing room, which are also in issue. Several employees
testified concerning their forelady , Blanche Devine, and remarks attributed to her
a few days after Mobley 's discharge when he and a union representative distributed
leaflets to employees as they left the plant .
Devine denied such remarks and the
Respondent called other employees who said they had not heard them made.
With-
out here making an extended analysis of each witness' testimony, but having both
observed their demeanor on the witness stand and appraised inconsistencies in their
3 Wofford , Honaker, and Engle
JACKSON CHAIR COMPANY, INC.
659
testimony and in statements given to a Board agent before the hearing , the Trial
Examiner finds that. 4
(1) On the evening Mobley was distributing leaflets, a group of female employees
went by and Devine told them , "You don't want that old thing , throw it down." 5
Employee Goode and Devine went on to a street corner , where Devine repeated her
instruction .
Goode gave the leaflet to her, and Devine threw it away.
(2) The next morning, during a break, Devine asked employees in a nearby group
"who took the papers9" s
When two admitted it, Devine said she was ashamed of
them.
On this and later occasions the forelady told sewing room employees that
if the Union got in the older women would lose their jobs.
Once she said, "See
where it got Harold." 7
(3) At a later date Devine told employees nearby that "anybody who mentioned
the union down there was on their way out." 8
(4) Somewhat later , the day after employee Goode had been interviewed by a
Board agent , Devine queried her as to what she had told him .
Goode told her, "I had
to tell him, Mrs. Devine. that you told me to throw it down ."
When Devine rebuked
her and said , "You could have evaded it , the others did," Goode replied , "I am not
going to lie to any Government man, or anybody else."
The Trial Examiner concludes and finds that the foregoing interrogations. threats
of reprisal , and rebuke for telling the truth to a Board agent investigating the case, on
the part of Devine, a responsible agent of the Respondent, constitutes interference,
restraint , and coercion of employees ' rights under the Act.9
IV.
THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above , occurring in con-
nection with its operations described in section 1, above, have a close, intimate, and
substantial relation to trade , traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend
to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of
commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices the Trial
Examiner will recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirma-
tive action to effectuate the policies of the Act.
It has been found that the Respondent discriminatorily discharged Harold L.
Mobley. It will be recommended that the Respondent offer him immediate and full
reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent position , without prejudice
to his seniority or other rights and privileges , and make him whole for any loss of
pay he may have suffered by reason of such discrimination , by payment to him of a
sum of money equal to that which he normally would have earned from the date of
such discrimination to the date of the offer of reinstatement .
Computation of back
pay shall be in accordance with the policy set out by the Board in F. W. Woolworth
Company, 90 NLRB 289. It will also be recommended that the Respondent make
available to the Board on request payroll and other records necessary to the determi-
nation of the back pay due.
In view of the nature of the unfair labor practices committed , the commission by
the Respondent of similar and other unfair labor practices may reasonably be antici-
pated.
The remedy should be coextensive with the threat .
It will therefore be rec-
ommended that the Respondent cease and desist from infringing in any manner upon
the rights guaranteed employees by Section 7 of the Act.
4 In finding that certain things were said which some witnesses said they did not hear,
the Trial Examiner is not thereby , as is intimated in the Respondent 's brief , holding that
such witnesses were "testifying falsely under oath "
The statements were made at rest
periods or at lunch , and they well may not have been present-or their recollections may
have been faulty yet honest.
i The quotations are from the credible testimony of Elizabeth McGee Goode
6 The quotations are from the credible testimony of Effie Kennedy
4 The quotations are from the credible testimony of Catherine Bicknell
B The quotations are from the credible testimony of Goode
9 The Trial Examiner finds that the evidence is insufficient to make a specific finding
that Devine voiced piomises of benefit if employees would keep the Union out
While
Goode's testimony is credited to the effect that Devine told her there would l •e holidays
and vacations with pay , while at the same time pointing to a union paper, it is not clear
that the promise, if it be so construed , was provisional upon keeping the Union out.
660
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the
case, the Trial Examiner makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. International Union, United Automobile Workers of America, AFL, is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2. By discriminating in regard to the employment of Harold L. Mobley, the Re-
spondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning
of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
3. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
WILLIAM D. GIBSON Co., DIVISION OF ASSOCIATED SPRING CORPORATION
and DIE AND TOOL MAKERS LODGE No. 113, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIA-
TION OF MACHINISTS, AFL and UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA,
CIO, AND UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, CIO, LOCAL UNION
No. 3485. Case No. 13-CA-1256. October X9,1954
Decision and Order
On September 15, 1953, Trial Examiner Robert E. Mullin issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondent had not engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in
the complaint, except for two minor instances of interrogation not
warranting a remedial order, and recommending that the complaint
be dismissed in its entirety, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate
Report attached hereto.
Thereafter, the General Counsel and the Ma-
chinists filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and supporting
briefs.
The Respondents and the Steelworkers filed briefs in support
of the Intermediate Report.'
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed.
The Board ha considered the Interme-
diate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the
case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner insofar as they are consistent with this
Decision?
1 In addition, the Respondent also filed a brief in reply to the General Counsel's and the
Machinists' exceptions and briefs.
The reply brief is hereby accepted.
2 The Intermediate Report contains certain minor misstatements or inadvertencies, none
of which affects the Trial Examiner's ultimate conclusions.
Accordingly, we note the
following corrections :
The Board held a hearing on the petition in the representation case involved herein
on September 22 and 23, 1952.
After receiving the Steelworkers' telegram dated September 19, 1952, the Respondent's
general manager, Goff, called a meeting of the employees named in the said telegram on
September 23, not on September 21.
110 NLRB No. 88.