Bonnaz, Hand Embroiderers, Etc.

82 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD weight of the evidence tends to support the conclusion that this state- ment was made. It is clear from the record that the Petitioner filed a petition on May 3, 1954, after an initial request for recognition and bargaining, and withdrew that petition on May 18, 1954. The present petition was filed on June 14, 1954, and hence more than 10 days after the Peti- tioner's initial request for recognition and bargaining. It was, there- fore, untimely under the General Electric X-Ray 1 rule with respect to the contract executed on June 11, 1954. The Board has on occa- sion suspended the operation of this rule where extenuating circum- stances were present .2 It may be asserted that in view of the Em- ployer's promise to bargain without an election among its employees, extenuating circumstances exist which justify obviating the applica- tion of the 10-day rule. While the Board has normally regarded a factual situation such as this sufficient to come within the exception, the evidence at the hearing in the present case indicated that the Pe- titioner by its conduct encouraged the Employer and the Intervenor to execute the very contract it now contends should not bar its petition. Under the circumstances, particularly in view of what transpired at the meeting of the representatives of the parties on June 11, 1954, we find no warrant for suspending the operation of the General Elec- tric X-Ray rule. Indeed, it is precisely situations such as the present one that illustrate the salutary effect of the rule requiring petitions to be filed within 10 days after the initial request for recognition and bargaining. Failure to conform to this well-established Board re- quirement frequently lead, as it did here, to factual disputes that would otherwise not have occurred. Accordingly, we find that the contract of June 11, 1954, is a bar to the petition filed June 14, 1954, and therefore precludes a present de- termination of representatives. We shall therefore dismiss the petition. [The Board dismissed the petition.] 167 NLRB 997. 9 Arrow Candy Co., 100 NLRB 573 ; Chicago Bridge & Iron Company, 88 NLRB 402. BONNAZ, HAND EMBROIDERERS, TUCKERS, STITCHERS, PLEATERS UNION, LOCAL 66, INTERNATIONAL LADIES' GARMENT WORKERS' UNION, AFL ; ZACHERY L. FREEDMAN AND GEORGE TRIESTMAN , AGENTS and GEMSCO, INC. Case No. O-CC-293. January 6,1966 Decision and Order On August 27, 1954, Trial Examiner Arthur Leff issued his Inter- mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Re= 111 NLRB No. 11. BONNAZ, HAND EMBROIDERERS, ETC. 83 spondent Union and Respondent Triestman had engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sec- tion 8 (b) (4) (C) of the Act, and recommending that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. The Trial Examiner also found that Respondent Freedman had not engaged in any alleged unfair labor practices and recommended that the complaint be dis- missed as to him. Thereafter, the Respondent Union and Respondent Triestman filed joint exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a brief.' The Company filed a memorandum in support of the Inter- mediate Report. -The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Interme- diate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner.2 Order Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondents, Bonnaz, Hand Embroider- ers, Tuckers, Stitchers, Pleaters Union, Local 66, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL, and its officers, representatives, suc- cessors, assigns, and agents, including George Triestman, shall: 1. Cease and desist, during the effective period of the certification issued by the Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board on October 15, 1953, in Case No. 2-RM-535, or any other certification by the Board of a bargaining representative other than the Respondent Union for employees of Gemsco, Inc., from inducing or encouraging the employees of Gemsco, Inc., or of any other employer, to engage in a strike or concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, ,materials, or commodities, or to perform any services, where an object thereof is forcing or requiring Gemsco, Inc., to recognize or bargain with the Respondent Union as the representative of any em- ployees in the collective-bargaining unit covered by such certification. 2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : 1 The Respondents also requested oral argument This request is hereby denied as the record, the exceptions, and the brief, in our opinion, adequately present the issues and the positions of the parties. 2 However, we find it unnecessary to consider the Trial Examiner's finding that Sec- tion 8 (b) (4) (C) would be violated even if the object of the Union's picketing were to seek only future recognition when authorized by law. 344056-55-vol. 111-7 84 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (a) Post in conspicuous places in the business office in New York City of the Respondent Union, including all places where notices or communications to members are normally posted, copies of the notice attached to the Intermediate Report marked "Appendix." I Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Second Region, shall, after being duly signed by an official representative of the Respondent Union and individually by the Respondent Triestman, be posted immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained for a pe- riod of sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the said Respondents to insure that such notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director for the Second Region, in writ- ing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the said Respondents have taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dis- missed insofar as it alleges that Zachery L. Freedman violated Section 8 (b) (4) (C) of the Act. 3 This notice shall be amended by substituting for the words "The Recommendations of a Tiial Examiner" the words "A Decision and Order " In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the voids "Pursuant to a Decision and Oider" the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order " Intermediate Report STATEMENT OF THE CASE A charge having been filed by Gemsco, Inc., herein called the Company, against the above-captioned Union and agents thereof, herein called the Respondents, the General Counsel issued a complaint alleging that the Respondents had engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) (C) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136, herein called the Act. The Respondents filed an answer denying the commission of the alleged unfair labor practices. A hearing was held on June 21 and 22, 1954, at New York City, before Arthur Leff, the Trial Examiner duly designated by the Chief Trial Examiner. All parties were represented at the hearing by counsel and were afforded full opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to present oral argument, and thereafter to file briefs as well as proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. At the close of the hearing, ruling was received on a motion of the Respondents to dismiss the complaint for failure of proof. The motion is now disposed of in accordance with the findings of fact and conclusions of law made below. Briefs were received from the General Counsel, the Respondents, and the Company on July 23, 1954. Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY Gemsco, Inc., a New York corporation with its principal office and place of busi- ness at 395 Fourth Avenue, New York City, is engaged in the manufacture and sale of insignia, regalia, industrial emblems, and related products . During 1953 the Company's purchases of materials exceeded $1,000,000 in value, and the value of its sales of finished products also exceeded that amount . Over 66 percent in value of the materials purchased was transported to the Company's New York plant in interstate commerce from States of the United States other than the State of New York. Approximately 75 percent of the Company 's finished products was trans- ported in interstate commerce from its New York plant to States of the United BONNAZ, HAND EMBROIDERERS, ETC. 855 States other than the State of New York. It is found that the Company is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED It is agreed by all parties, and it is found, that Bonnaz, Hand Embroiderers, Tuck- ers, Stitchers, Pleaters Union, Local 66, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, i3 a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. It is also agreed that the individual Respondents, Zachery A. Freedman and George Triestman, are respectively the pres- ident and the business representative of the said Local 66, and, as such, agents thereof within the meaning of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Events preceding the picketing The Company occupies the sixth and seventh floors of a loft building located at 395 Fourth Avenue, New York City, where it employs approximately 135 employees, of whom about 85 are in the bargaining unit referred to below. The principals of the Company also own and control a number of other companies-among them, Benson Manufacturing Company-which share the same space. The other com- panies are used, however, primarily for selling purposes. They do not have any employees of their own. On October 15, 1953, the Board certified Ann Sabino, an individual employed by the Company, as the collective- bargaining representative of the Company's employees in a unit composed of its production, processing, maintenance, shipping, receiving, and factory clerical employees. The certification was issued following a consent- election agreement and a Board-conducted election in a representation proceeding instituted by petition of the Company in Case No. 2-RM-535. It appears that about the time the petition was filed, or shortly before, the Union had engaged in picketing another concern in the same business-the Mars Corporation-as a prelude to securing recognition and a contract from that Company. Before Sabino's certification, the Union engaged in no effort to organize the Com- pany's employees. The Union first appeared upon the scene on November 24, 1953, when George Triestman, business agent and organizer for Local 66, called on Louis Elkies, the Company's president. Triestman advised Elkies that his local had entered into collective-bargaining contracts with a number of other companies in the same line of work; stated that his local considered it its duty and obligation to make con- tracts with all companies that employed bullion workers; 1 and indicated that his local was interested in obtaining a contract with the Company covering employees in that category. Elkies informed Triestman that only a small portion of the Com- pany's employees fell in that category, but made no mention of the existing Board certification which covered such employees among others, a fact of which Triestman was then unaware. Elkies told Triestman that he would have to take up the matter with his labor relations consultant. He suggested that Triestman communicate with him again in about a week.2 Up until the time of Triestman's visit, no contract had been executed between the Company and Sabino, although negotiations for a contract had been going on since October, according to the Company. On December 3, 1953, the Company and Sa- bino entered into a collective-bargaining contract covering the employees in the unit for which Sabino was certified for a term beginning January 1, 1954, and ending December 31, 1955. When Triestman again communicated with Elkies about a week after his initial visit, Elkies referred him to Leopold L. Balleisen, the Company's labor relations consultant. Triestman called on Balleisen on December 17, 1953. To some extent 1 Bullion workers make gold or other metallic embroidered emblems and insignia. 2 There is a conflict between the testimony of Elkies and Triestman as to exactly what was said at their meeting on this occasion. In the main , I have credited Elkies' version which seems to me the more plausible one . According to Triestman , he merely Informed Elkies that he was there on a good-will visit to acquaint Elkies with "the kind of a union that is about to attempt to induce his workers to become members thereof ," and asked Elkies not to interfere with the Union 's organizational efforts Triestman denied that he requested or suggested recognition or a contract On cross-examination , however, Triestman conceded that Ellaes told him he would have to consult his labor relations con- sultant before giving Triestman an answer . From this alone I am satisfied that Triestman must have at least by clear implication , if not expressly , indicated a request for recognition and a contract. 86 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the testimony of the two is in conflict as to what was said. Balleisen testified that Triestman demanded recognition by the Company and a contract, explaining that when the Union had signed up others in the industry, it had pledged itself to organize the remainder of the industry so that labor costs might be fixed and business con- ditions stabilized. Triestman denied making any such demand. According to him, the purpose of his visit was simply to advise Balleisen that the Union was about to induce the Company's employees to join and wanted the Company to refrain from interfering with its efforts-and that is what he told Balleisen. Triestman's testimony as to the purpose of his visit impresses me as implausible . I am satisfied from all the evidence I deem credible that his real purpose was to enlist the Com- pany's cooperation in obtaining recognition and a contract for the Union. It may be that he avoided expressing in precise words a demand to that effect, but, if so, it was unnecessary for him to do so, for he was dealing with a person who was equally sophisticated in the field of labor relations. Regardless of the precise words he used, I have no doubt that such was the thought he intended to convey, and that Balleisen correctly so understood it. As to the remainder of the conversation, Balleisen's testimony is substantially uncontradicted. Balleisen informed Triestman of the existing certification and contract, but refused to supply the name of the certified bargaining agent. The information, conveyed to him for the first time, that another bargaining agent had been recognized, apparently angered Triestman. He told Balleisen that his organization did not "recognize" the jurisdiction or cer- tification of any bargaining agent other than one affiliated with the Union's Inter- national. He reminded Balleisen that another company in the industry-the Mars Corporation-which had initially resisted the Union had begged to recognize the Union after a picket line had been placed about its place of business. And when Balleisen continued to insist that the Company could do nothing to impair the existing certification and contract, Triestman stated that if that were the Company's attitude, he would have to accomplish his objective "the hard and the tough way." Before leaving, Triestman proposed to make a "deal" with the Company, suggesting that if the Company would give him the bullion workers, embroiderers, and bonnaz workers, totaling about 12 employees, he would forget about the rest of the shop. When Balleisen refused, Triestman walked out, reiterating, "Well, we will have to do it the tough way." B. The picketing During the next 2 months, the Company heard nothing further from the Union. In the meantime, so far as appears, the Union engaged in no organizational efforts among the Company's employees. On February 15, 1954, the Union began to picket the entrances to the loft building in which the Company is housed. Picketing thereafter continued on every business day, at least until June 22, 1954, when the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, in a proceeding instituted by the Board under Section 10 (1) of the Act (Civil No. 93-47), granted the Board's petition for a temporary injunction restraining the Respondents from engaging in such conduct pending final adjudication by the Board of the issues of this case. Pickets were stationed at each of the two entrances to the buildings, one leading to the regular passenger elevators, the other to the freight elevator, but both used by the Company's employees. The picketing was not confined to the hours when the Company's employees ordinarily enter or leave the building. The Company's regular working hours are from 9 a. in. to 5:25 p. m., with staggered lunch periods between noon and 2 p. in., and, except for errand boys, employees remain in the building during working hours. Picketing was, however, conducted con- tinuously between the hours of 8:30 a. in. and 5:30 p. in. The pickets, none of whom were company employees, carried signs which initially read as follows: This is Organizational PICKETING We appeal to the workers of GEMSCO to join our union & enjoy our benefits Collective Bargaining will be requested when authorized by law Embroiderers Union Local 66 135 W., 33 St. I. L. G. W. U. A. F. of L. BONNAZ, HAND EMBROIDERERS, ETC. 87 At about the end of the second week of picketing , after the Company had instructed its vendors to address shipments intended for it to Benson Manufacturing Co., or one of its other affiliated companies, the picket signs were revised to add immedi- ately after "Gemsco," "Also Benson Mfg. Co., 391-401-4th Av." Although he did not himself engage in picketing , Triestman, one of the individual Respondents, was admittedly in charge of the picketing activities of those who did. During the first 2 days of picketing , the pickets handed out to employees entering and leaving the building leaflets and circulars explaining the benefits of unionization. Such individual employee solicitation, however, was thereafter discontinued. So far as appears , none of the Company's employees ceased or suspended the per- formance of their work as a result of the picketing. The picketing, however, did have an impact on shipments and deliveries to and from the Company 's place of business. Truckdrivers and deliverymen with orders to pick up or deliver merchan- dise at the Company's place of business found it necessary to cross the Union 's picket line. The record shows that in many instances they refused to do so. As a result, the Company experienced numerous difficulties and delays with that part of its busi- ness operations. The pickets made no effort physically to interfere with truckdrivers and delivery- men who called at the Company's premises to receive or deliver merchandise, and in the main relied on the picket signs to induce a refusal on the part of such truck- drivers and deliverymen to cross the picket line. There is testimony, however, that I find credible though disputed by the pickets, reflecting that the pickets on frequent occasions supplemented their picketing by oral appeals to truckdrivers to refrain from making deliveries to the Company. Thus, four different Company employees testified to a like number of specific instances where they had observed pickets accost truckdrivers and urge them not to make deliveries to the Company. Moreover, another witness, Lewis Grey, a delivery boy for a concern with which the Company did business, and a clearly disinterested witness, also testified to a specific incident in which he had been stopped by a picket on his way to the Company's premises, had been told the Company was on strike, and had been requested (successfully) not to make his delivery. The testimony of these witnesses is credited. Thus, too, Daniel Tehan, the head of a small trucking company with offices adjacent to the place of picketing, and a disinterested witness, testified credibly as follows: From his place of business Tehan was in a position to observe the picketing through- out its duration. On numerous occasions he overheard pickets ask truckdrivers and deliverymen whether their shipments were for the Company. Upon receiving an affirmative answer, the pickets would point out that they were engaged in organiza- tional picketing or an organizational strike against the Company . On occasions when a deliveryman or truckdriver nevertheless insisted upon completing his ship- ment, the picket would ask him for his name and the number of his local, and would note that information, if supplied, on a slip of paper. Tehan's testimony concerning the requests made of truckdrivers for their names and union affiliations is substantially corroborated by two of the employee witnesses referred to above, whose testimony reflects that that was done on the occasions of the specific incidents described by them. Though various witnesses for the Respond- ents denied generally that pickets had been authorized to, or did, ask for names and local numbers of Teamsters crossing the picket line, I do not credit their denials. Tehan and the witnesses testifying concerning specific incidents impressed me as tell- ing the truth. Their testimony, moreover, is bolstered by other record evidence indi- cating that the Union succeeded in obtaining official cooperation in respecting its picket line from at least one Teamster local. William J. Cahill, New York manager of Midwest Freight Forwarding Company, the common carrier that had handled a substantial portion of the Company's ship- ments for at least 12 years, testified credibly, and it is found, that after the picket line was established his drivers refused to cross it, and that he was advised by a rep- resentative of the Teamsters' local with which his company was under contract that the Union's picket line was a bona fide one. As a result Midwest suspended its busi- ness dealings with the Company. Cahill explained that under his company's col- lective-bargaining agreement with its employees' bargaining representative, it could not require its truckdrivers to cross a picket line approved by such representative as a bona fide one, and that a stipulation in his company's tariffs also excused the company from any obligation to accept shipments from a place of business being picketed. According to Cahill, the determination of whether a picket line is a bona fide one is normally made by the Central Trades Council. 88 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Analysis and Conclusions Section 8 (b) (4) (C) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport , or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services , where an object thereof is : forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or bargain with a particular labor organization as the representative of his employees if another labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section 9. The position of the General Counsel and the Company is that the Union's picketing and related activities described above constituted conduct within the interdiction of Section 8 (b) (4) (C). With that position the Respondents take issue. They contend the Union was engaged merely in organizational picketing . Such picketing, they say, neither had the object of forcing the Company to recognize or bargain with the Union, nor was it of a kind that might be said to constitute inducement and encouragement of employees to engage in strike activity. The Respondents contend, moreover, that Section 8 (b) (4) (C) is inapplicable to this situation in any event, because the certified representative here is an individual and, as such , according to their view, not "another labor organization " within the meaning of that section. The fact that the picketing was labeled by the Union as "organizational" is, of course, not dispositive . Cases are not decided by symbols . There is obviously no merit to the Respondent's claim that all organizational picketing, regardless of its character and the circumstances in which it is conducted , is immune from restraint both under Section 7 of the Act and under the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Section 8 (b) (4) (C) in situations where it is applicable pro- vides an express limitation on Section 7 rights3 And the Supreme Court has ruled that picketing is not entitled to constitutional protection where it is conducted in furtherance of an unlawful objective . International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. N. L. R. B., 341 U. S. 694, Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U. S. 490. When in conflict with Section 8 (b) (4) (C ), organizational picketing may be en- joined in the same manner as other illegal conduct. The only question here is whether the Union's picketing was such as to constitute an unlawful inducement and encour- agement within the ban of that section . On the facts of this case, I am satisfied that that question must be answered in the affirmative. Though in form the picket signs simply appealed to company employees to join the Union, and though there is no independent evidence that company employees were otherwise ever specifically requested to engage in a strike or a concerted refusal to work, established Board authority nevertheless requires the conclusion that the picketing in itself constituted an inducement and encouragement to the employees of the Company to engage in a strike or other concerted refusal to perform services for their employer. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. (Union Chev- rolet Company), 96 NLRB 957; Brewery and Beverage Drivers, etc. ( Washington Coca Cola Bottling Works, Inc.), 107 NLRB 299. In the words of the Board in the Coca Cola case, the "broad argument, that picketing . . . is aimed only at publiciz- ing a labor dispute and not at inducing work stoppage by employees who are re- quired in their regular employment to cross the picket line, has been too often rejected to require further elaboration here." In any event, it is to be noted that the inducement and encouragement of which Section 8 (b) (4) (C ) speaks is not confined to employees of the particular em- ployer from whom bargaining recognition is sought , but extends "to employees of any employer." Thus, even if it could be said that the picketing in the form con- ducted here was not such as to induce and encourage strike activity by the Company's employees , the conclusion is nevertheless inescapable from the record facts that the picketing was calculated and designed to, and had the effect of, inducing and encour- aging employees of other employers-to wit, trucking companies-to refrain from servicing the Company . The fact that the picketing was not confined to hours when the Company's employees ordinarily enter and leave the building ; the fact that the picketing was supplemented by oral appeals to truckdrivers to refrain from making deliveries to the Company; the fact that the cooperation of at least one Teamster local was enlisted to respect the picket line; and the fact that the name of Benson Manufacuring Co. was added to the picket sign , though Benson had no separate 8 See Section 13 of the Act. BONNAZ, HAND EMBROIDERERS, ETC. 89 employees of its own-all are consistent only with that conclusion. On the facts of this case, I find no merit to the Respondent's argument that the pickets acted out- side the scope of their agency in attempting to induce truckdrivers not to make de- liveries to the Company. Nor am I able to agree with the Respondents that Interna- tional Rice Milling Co. v. N. L. R. B., 341 U. S. 665, 671, precludes a finding that the solicitation of individual truckdrivers to refrain from crossing the picket line constituted an inducement and encouragement of concerted conduct within the ambit of Section 8 (b) (4). In the International Rice Milling case, the picketing directed against the primary employer was entirely legal, and the isolated inducement and en- couragement of individual employees not to pass that picket line, present in that case, was merely incidental to the legal picketing. In the instant case, as found below, not only does the record establish that the primary picketing had an illegal objective, but it shows that the inducement and encouragement of employees of other employers not to cross the picket line, far from being an incidental effect of the picketing, consti- tuted the very means by which the Union sought to accomplish its illegal objective. As the Board stated, in rejecting a similar contention in Direct Transit Lines, Inc., 92 NLRB 1715, 1721, While it is true that only one driver figured in each incident, it would be mani- festly unrealistic not to take into consideration the total pattern of conduct engaged in by [the Union] in connection with this controversy. . On the contrary . . . each incident was ... "part of those total activities." See also Capital Service, Inc., 100 NLRB 1092, 1098, decided since the Rice Milling case, where under comparable circumstances the Board rejected an argument akin to that made by the Respondent here.4 As for the objective of the picketing, I reject as implausible Triestman's testimony that the Union's sole purpose was to persuade employees to become members with a view toward seeking decertification of Sabino and eventual certification of the Union after a majority had been secured. I think it clear from all the record circumstances that at least one of the primary objectives of the picketing was to impose economic pressure upon the Company in order to force and require it to deal with the Union. That such was the Union's plan was clearly enough indicated by Triestman before the picketing began, when, following the Company's refusal to make a "deal" with the Union, Triestman warned the Company that the Union then "would have to do it the tough way." The Union's failure-except for its circularizing of employees on the first 2 days of picketing-to accompany its picket- ing by other efforts to organize the employees is scarcely consistent with its claim that its conduct was aimed at employee persuasion rather than employer coercion. Moreover, if the Union's sole purpose, as it insists, was to enlist employee support for a future election, and no more, it is hardly likely that it would have engaged in such activity at a time when, as it undoubtedly knew, no new election could be held for a considerable time to come. On the other hand, the record is replete with evidence to reinforce the conclusion here reached that the picketing was designed to have as its main thrust the imposition of economic pressures-in the form of inter- ferences with deliveries and pickups-from which the Company could extricate itself only by capitulating to the Union and dealing with it. Certainly, if the Union was concerned only with appealing to the Company's employees to join, little pur- pose would have been served by picketing the freight entrance throughout the day though company employees were in its vicinity only during restricted hours; there would have been no need for oral appeals to deliverymen not to cross the picket line; and the addition to the picket sign of Benson Manufacturing Co., which had no employees of its own, would have profited the Union nothing. There is no merit to the Respondents' argument that no unlawful objective may be found because the picketing was unaccompanied by any current demand for recognition and the signs stated that "collective bargaining will be requested when authorized by law." The fact that the Union may have masked its action behind innocently worded signs does not render it immune from liability under Section 8 (b) 'Relying on Conway's Express. 87 NLRB 972, affil 195 F 2d 906 (C A 2), and Pittsburgh Plate Class Company, 105 NLRB 740, the Respondents also contend that there could have been no illegal inducement and encouragement of employees of Midwest Freight Forwarding Company because the employees of that company were privileged under their collective-bargaining contract with their employer to refuse to cross an authorized picket line It is unnecessary to pass on the validity of that contention. For even if valid, it would not negate a finding of unlawful inducement and encouragement of employees of other tiucking companies with respect to whom the record here contains no evidence of any similar contractual privilege 90 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (4) (C) if in fact its objective was an unlawful one. On the basis of the record as a whole, and considering the sequence of events preceding the picketing, as well as the character of the picketing and related conduct engaged in by the Union, I think it no less clear in this case than in International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Union Chevrolet Company), 96 NLRB 957, 958, that "a demand for recognition of the [Union] by the Company was implicit in the [Union's] conduct in picketing the Company's premises, and that the picketing, therefore, had as an object requir- ing the Company to recognize the [Union] as [such] representative.. . .. More- over, and other considerations aside, it is plain even from the Union's own picket signs that the ultimate object of the picketing was to require the Company at least at some future time to bargain with it. The Board has held that the prohibited object set out in Section 8 (b) (4) (A ) is not limited with "the qualification of immediacy." And where a union's ultimate object is to secure recognition and bargaining by an employer, its picketing to obtain that ultimate object in the face of an existing certification of another is no less illegal than if accompanied by an express immediate demand. See Union Chevrolet Co., supra. That brings us, then, to the Respondents' final and most seriously urged conten- tion, that Section 8 (b) (4) (C) is inapplicable here because Sabino, the certified representative, is an individual and therefore, according to them, not "another labor organization" within the meaning of the Act. The Respondents argue in substance that an individual representative is not a "labor organization " within the statutory definition; that Section 8 (b) (4) (C) was designed primarily to meet the evil of interunion warfare, that is, the raiding by one union of another union; and that it was not intended, and cannot be construed, literally or otherwise, to cover a situa- tion where an individual is the certified representative . To bolster their position, the Respondents point to the fact that various sections of the Act involving aspects of representation refer to individual representatives and labor organizations in the disjunctive.5 They also stress that in construing Section 9 (f) and (h) which impose certain filing requirements upon "labor organizations " but make no refer- ence to individual representatives, the Board has held that "an individual (unlike a labor organization ) is not required to comply with [such ] filing requirements." Campbell Offset Printing Co. Inc., 92 NLRB 1421 . See, also, Hofmann Packing Co., Inc., 87 NLRB 601. They argue, therefore, that since Section 8 (b) (4) (C) refers only to a certified "labor organization " and does not refer to a certified indi- vidual representative, consistency demands that the reference to a certified labor organization in that section be construed as excluding a certified individual representative. After carefully weighing these arguments, I have reached the conclusion that to uphold the Respondents' construction of Section 8 (b) (4) (C) would do violence to the statutory intent, and for the following reasons: To begin with, I find no support in the legislative history for the Respondents' assertion that Section 8 (b) (4) (C) was intended to deal solely with the problem of inter-union raiding and of jurisdictional disputes between formally organized labor organizations. On the contrary, a reading of the committee reports and the debates leaves no doubt that Section 8 (b) (4) (C) was basically designed to protect Board certifications from attacks by strikes, boycotts, and related activities, and, as a corollary, to protect employers from activities by labor organizations that would compel them to violate the law by disregarding their statutory obligation to bargain with a duly certified representative.6 Clearly, if the reference in Section 8 (b) (4) 5 Thus, Section 2 (4) defines the term "representative" to include "any individual or labor organization" , Section 8 (d) (4) refers to intervening certifications "under which the labor organization or individual which is party to the contract has been superseded"; Section 9 (c) authorizes the filing of representation petitions by "any individual or labor organization" acting on behalf of employees, and Section 9 (c) further provides for decertification where "the individual or labor organization which has been certified . . . is no longer a representative " e Thus, in Senate Report No 105, 80th Cong, 1st Sess , at p. 8, it is stated Both witnesses and committee members were in substantial accord that many union practices, especially secondary boycotts, jurisdictional disputes, violations of collec- tive-bargaining contracts, and strikes and boycotts against ceotcfications of the Na- ttional Labor Relations Board should be subject to Federal Regulations At p 8 of the same report, it is stated : Strikes and boycotts having as their purpose forcing an employer to disregard his obligation to recognize and bargain with a certified union and in lieu thereof to bar- BONNAZ, HAND EMBROIDERERS, ETC. 91 (C) -to a certified labor organization is read as excluding an individual representative it would at least in part thwart Congress' design to give protection to Board certifica- tions. And certainly an employer under a statutory duty to bargain with a certified individual representative is no less in need of protection against coercion aimed at compelling him to commit an unfair labor practice than is one whose duty runs to a certified union Moreover, a construction of Section 8 (b) (4) (C) that would in ef- fect give greater force to a certification of a union than to that of an individual would impair the statutory policy of affording employees full freedom in the designation of representatives of their own choosing, whether or not formally organized labor unions. Such a construction should not be presumed in the absence of clear evidence of such legislative intent, and there is none to be found in the legislative history. Further, I am unable to agree with the Respondents that to encompass an individual representative within the term "labor organization" as used in Section 8 (b) (4) (C) would be to indulge in judicial legislation. Section 2 (5) of the act defines "labor organization" as including "any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." Congress intended that defi- nition to be construed broadly,7 and it has been interpreted by the courts and the Board to include even the most informal type of employee representation arrange- ment.8 It imposes no strain on the statutory definition to read it as including an indi- vidual representative-in substance an employee representation committee of one-in whose agency employees participate by dealing through that representative, as they did through Sabino, with regard to their grievances, wages, and working conditions. A certified individual representative, like Sabino, functioning as such, stands in the same relationship , both to employees and employers, as any other certified labor organization, and, in my opinion, may not, at least for purposes of Section 8 (b) (4) (C), be distinguished from any such other labor organization. The cases relied upon by the Respondents, that construe the filing requirements of Section 9 (f) and (h) as not applying to individuals, do not hold that under the Act individual representatives may not be regarded as labor organizations for any purpose, but merely rule that the particular compliance requirements imposed upon labor organizations by those specific sections are inapplicable to individuals.9 Neither the fact that "individuals" and "labor organizations" are referred to in the disjunctive in other sections of the Act, nor the fact that elsewhere distinctions may have been drawn between them, compels a determination that Congress intended to differentiate between the two for all purposes. The language of Section 8 (b) (4) (C), including the term "labor organization," is to be construed in the light of the statutory purpose sought to be achieved by that particular section, regardless of any meaning or con- struction that may be given the same term in other sections of the Act. Cf. Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers Inc. v. United States, 286 U. S. 424, Helvering v. Stockholms Enshilda Bank, 293 U. S. 84; Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U. S. 253. As stated by the Supreme Court in the Atlantic Cleaners case, supra' Undoubtedly, there is a natural presumption that identical words used in dif- ferent parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning. . . . But the gain with or recognize anothei union, are made unfair labor practices by paragraph [8 (b) (4)l (C). To the same effect see House Conference Report No 510, on H R 3020, 80th Cong, p 44. For comments to comparable effect made during the course of the congressional debates, see Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Government Print- ing Office), at pp 912, 1012, 1455, 1646 Though in the debates, as in the committee re- ports, the term "union" was frequently used, rather than the term "representative," to describe the certified agent, that was not always so Thus, Senator Murray, who approved of Section 8 (b) (4) (C) although he opposed the bill generally, stated (Legis- lative History, p 1455) : I am therefore peifectly willing to concede that strikes or boycotts are completely unjustified where their purpose is to secure recognition of a union other than the certified collective bargaining representative, thereby inducing an unfair labor practice ' See S Rep No 573, 74th Cong 1st Sess, p 7 s See, e g, N. L B B v Iiennametal, Inc, 182 F 2d 817 (C A 3) , Smith Victory Corporation, 90-NLRB 2089, Mountain States Power Company, 62 NLRB 119. 9 And not without reason ; for the character of the information required by such- sec- tions is for the most part such as to supply internal evidence that Congress intended them to apply only to formally organized membership bodies. 92 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD presumption is not rigid and readily yields whenever there is such variation in the connection in which the words are used as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they were employed in different parts of the act with different intent. Where the subject matter to which the words refer is not the same in the several places where they are used , or the conditions are different . . . the meaning may well vary to meet the purposes of the law, to be arrived at by a consideration of the language in which those purposes are expressed and of the circumstances under which the language was employed. When the language of Section 8 (b) (4) (C) is,read in the light of the objects sought to be accomplished by that section, and when the definition of "labor organi- zation" appearing in Section 2 (5) is taken into account, the only reasonable con- clusion that can be reached is that the term "labor organization " as there used was intended to include an individual bargaining representative duly certified by the Board. Accordingly, I find that Ann Sabino, the certified representative in this case, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) (C) of the Act. On the basis of the entire record , and for the reasons stated above, I reject the Respondents' various defenses , and conclude and find that the Respondent Union violated Section 8 (b) (4) (C) of the Act by inducing and encouraging employees of the Company to engage in a strike or other concerted refusal to perform services for the Company, and by inducing and encouraging employees of other employers to engage in a concerted refusal to transport or handle commodities or to perform services for the Company, an object thereof being to force or require the Company to bargain with the Respondent Union as the representative of employees of the Company, where another labor organization had been certified as the representative of such employees. There remains the question of whether the individual Respondents, Zachery L. Freedman and George Triestman , who are named in the complaint as agents of the Union, are likewise liable for the conduct found illegal . As to Triestman, the record shows that he, as business agent and organizer for the Union , was in charge of the picketing activities and otherwise participated as agent for the Union in the conduct here condemned . It is accordingly found that he along with the Union violated Section 8 (b) (4) (C). As to Freedman, the complaint alleges and the answer admits that he is and was at the times material herein the Union 's president. There is no record evidence, however, to connect him personally with any of the Union's illegal conduct. Accordingly, I shall recommend dismissal for want of proof of the allegations of the complaint as they relate to him. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent Union and Respondent Triestman , set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of the Company de- scribed in section I , above, have a close, intimate , and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent Union and the Respondent Triestman have engaged in certain unfair labor practices , I shall recommend that they be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and that they take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Bonnaz, Hand Embroiderers , Tuckers, Stitchers , Pleaters Union, Local 66, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union , AFL, is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act, and George Triestman is an agent of said labor organization. 2. Since October 15, 1953, Ann Sabino has been the exclusive bargaining repre- sentative , certified by the Board, of Gemsco , Inc., in an appropriate unit, in accord- ance with the provisions of Section 9 of the Act. 3. The said Ann Sabino as such certified exclusive bargaining representative is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) (C) of the Act. 4.. From on or about February 15, 1954, until at least on or about June 22, 1954, the Respondent Union and its agent, George Triestman, by inducing and encouraging employees of the Company to engage in a strike or other concerted refusal in the IDAHO EGG PRODUCERS 93 course of their employment to perform services for the Company , and by inducing and encouraging employees of other employers to engage in a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to transport or otherwise handle commodities or to perform services for the Company , an object thereof being to require the Company to recognize and bargain with the Respondent Union as a representative of com- pany employees in an appropriate unit, notwithstanding the fact that Ann Sabino had been certified by the Board as the exclusive representative of all employees in said appropriate unit , engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sec- tion 8 (b) (4) (C ) of the Act. 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. 6. The allegations of the complaint that Zachery L. Freedman , as agent for the Respondent Union, engaged in unfair labor practices , have not been sustained. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] Appendix NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF BONNAZ , HAND EMBROIDERERS, TUCKERS, STITCHERS, PLEATERS UNION , LOCAL 66, INTERNATIONAL LADIES' GARMENT WORKERS' UNION, AFL Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Re- lations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that: During the effective period of the certification issued by the Regional Director for the National Labor Relations Board on October 15, 1953, in Case No. 2-RM-535, or any other certification by the Board of a bargaining represen- tative, other than the undersigned labor organization , we will not engage in, or induce or encourage the employees of Gemsco , Inc., or of any employer, to engage in, a strike or concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on , any goods, articles, materials, or commodities, or to perform any services , where an object thereof is to force or require the aforesaid Company to recognize or bargain with the undersigned Union in the collective-bargaining unit of employees cov- ered by such certification. BONNAZ, HAND EMBROIDERERS, TUCKERS, STITCH- ERS, PLEATERS UNION, LOCAL 66, INTERNA- TIONAL LADIES' GARMENT WORKERS' UNION, AFL, Labor Organization. Dated---------------- By---------------------------------------------- (Agent or representative) By---------------------------------------------- (George Triestman) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. IDAHO EGG PRODUCERS and TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS UNION, LOCAL 983, AFL. Case No. 19-CA-924. Jan- uary 6,1955 Decision and Order On March 23, 1954, Trial Examiner Martin S. Bennett issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and 111 NLRB No. 12.