Coats & Clark, Inc.

COATS & CLARK, INC. . 237 Under .the hook tender, there is a head rigger and head loader, each of whom works with 3 or 4 other employees. They have no authority to hire or fire or effectively to recommend, and-their direction of the men working with them is routine in character. As they neither ex- ercise nor possess the statutory duties of supervisors, we therefore find that they are not supervisors, but employees, whom we include in the unit. Accordingly, we find that all employees of Clackamas Logging Com- pany, at Estacada, Oregon, including the tractor driver, the time- keeper, head riggers, and head loaders, but excluding office clerical employees, guards, professional employees, the superintendent, con- struction foreman, side foremen, the shop foremen, bull bucks, hook tenders, and all other supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act. [Text of Direction of Election omitted from publication.] s' Miami Paper Board Mills, Ino., and Simco Waste Paper, Inc., supra; Houston Term4gsal Warehouse & Cold Storage Company, supra. I Coats & Clark, Inc. (Clarkdale Plant) and Textile Workers Union of America, CIO. Case No.10-CA 1958. July 22, 1955 DECISION AND ORDER On November 3, 1954, Trial Examiner Eugene F. Frey issued his Intermediate Report in the above -entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Inter- mediate Report attached hereto . The Trial Examiner also found that, the Respondent had not engaged in 'certain unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommended dismissal of those allega- tions. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter- mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda- tions contained in the Intermediate Report only to the extent that they are consistent with the following : 1.. We agree with the Trial Examiner's finding that the Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (1). Specifically we find that, in the context of the threats uttered by several of Respondent's supervisors, all the 113 NLRB No. 29. 238 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD acts of interrogation listed by the Trial Examiner as violations of Section 8 ( a) (1) were in fact coercive. 2. We do not agree with the Trial Examiner 's finding that the Re- spondent constructively discharged Marie Barron and thereby violated Section 8 ( a) (3) and ( 1) of the Act. An employer violates Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act with respect to an individual employee only if, by some action , it discriminates against. that employee . Therefore, if an individual quits his job, the employer is not legally responsible for that action , unless it can be shown that the quit was the culmination of a plan or scheme on the part of the employer to force such action. ' In that case, the quit is not really voluntary, but is the equivalent of a discharge. In the present case, during the 4-month period from November 1953 to the date of the representation election on March 2 , 1954, Bar- ron was questioned and threatened , as detailed in the Intermediate Report, on at least 8 separate occasions either by Bowen or Jordon, the supervisors on Barron 's shift. She was also unjustifiably ridi- culed and criticized for her failure to keep up with her work . If this were all the evidence , we should have strong basis for a finding that Barron's quitting was the result of harassing tactics adopted by the Respondent to force such action . However, other evidence casts doubt on such a theory . Thus, from the day of the election until her quit- ting 4 days later, Barron was not subjected to any interrogation, threats, or general harassment by the Respondent . The immediate in- cident which led her to quit was the poor condition in which she found her spinning frames when she reported for work on March 6 and her difficulty in getting the frames to operate properly . There is no evi- dence that the conditions she thus faced were unusual , that the Re- spondent was responsible for them, or that it could reasonably have anticipated Barron's reaction . In these circumstances , a finding that the Respondent constructively discharged Barron is not justified, al- though the Respondent's unlawful conduct directed at Barron was unquestionabiy one of the predisposing factors which led her to quit. Accordingly, we shall dismiss the allegation in the complaint that the Respondent discriminatorily discharged Marie Barron. TIIE REMEDY Although we have found that a preponderance of the evidence does not establish that the Respondent constructively discharged Barron, we are nevertheless satisfied that its harassment was a psychological factor which entered into her decision to quit. The immediate inci- 1 The J. C Hamilton Company, 104 NLRB 737; St Joseph Lead Company, 65 NLRB 439. Cf. Glass Fibre Moulding Company, 104 NLRB 383, 404-6; Saxe-Glassman Shoe Corp., 97 NLRB 332, 349-51; Palm Beach B?oadeaslmg Company, 63 NLRB 597, 608-13 COATS & CLARK, INC. 239 dent leading to her quitting was the difficulty she experienced with her frames the night of March 6, but it is likely that she would not have felt that the job was too much to bear if she had not also been harassed by the Respondent during the course of the Union's organiz- ing campaign. Under these circumstances, our usual cease and desist order would not completely remedy the effect of the Respondent's coercive conduct, since it would not fully rectify the consequences of the Respondent's intimidation of Barron. Because a violation of Sec- tion 8 (a) (3) has not been adequately proved, Barron is not entitled to the normal remedy provided for in such cases, namely, reinstate- ment with back pay. Our choice of remedial action is, however, flexi- ble enough to order reinstatement without back pay where, in our opinion, it would effectuate the policies of the Act. Barron had the right to work during the Union's organizational campaign free from the abnormal strain imposed by the Respondent's harassing tactics, and we find that it will serve to dissipate Respond- ent's coercive conduct toward its employees and thereby effectuate the policies of the Act to provide Barron an opportunity to work under the same conditions available to all other of Respondent's employees. Our dissenting colleague believes that an order to reinstate Barron is punitive because the Board has never in the past ordered an employee's reinstatement on similar grounds, and because no court has said that the Board has such a power. This is to mistake lack of precedent for lack of power. "But in the nature of things Congress could not cata- logue all the devices and strategems for circumventing the policies of the Act. Nor could it define the whole gammut of remedies to effectuate these policies in an infinite variety of specific situations. Congress met these difficulties by leaving the adaptation of means to end to the empiric process of administration." 2 The issue is not whether a remedy is punitive because it is novel, but rather whether reason and Board experience indicate that Barron's reinstatement will serve to remedy the Respondent's interference and coercion of its employees' protected activities.' We believe it will. In addition to the customary cease and desist order, we shall, therefore, direct the Respondent to reinstate Barron, but without back pay, if she requests reinstatement to her former job within 10 days of this Decision and Order. 2 Phelps Dodge Co) poi ataon v AT L R B , 313 U S 177, 194 3 For additional examples of the use of a remedy normally associated with a particular type of violation for a related violation see, Talladega Cotton Factory, Inc , 106 NLRB 295, enfd 213 F. 2d 209 (C A. 5) (discharge of supervisors considered as coercion of nonsnpeivisony employees , reins tatenment and back pay ordered for supervisors whose dis- charge was not a violation of Section 8 (a) (3)) , Sawyer Downtown Motors, Inc, 103 NLRP, 1135 (reinstatement and back pay ordered without regard to whether violation is of Section 8 (a) (3) or (1)) , D H Holmes Company, Ltd v N L R B, 179 F 2d 876 (C A 5) (order to bargain for violation of Section 8 (a) (1)); The Carey Salt Com- pany, 70 NLRB 1099 (iernstatement without back pay for violation of Section 8 (a) (3) ). 240 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ORDER Upon the entire record in the case and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Coats & Clark, Inc. (Clark- dale Plant), Clarkdale, Georgia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall : 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Interrogating its employees concerning their membership in, or their activities on behalf of, Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, or any other labor organization, in a manner constituting inter- ference, restraint, or coercion in violation of Section 8 (a) (1). (b) Soliciting or attempting to induce employees to refrain from union affiliation by promises of benefits and adjustment of grievances; or threatening employees with loss of employment, reduction of the workweek, the shutdown or removal of the plant, blacklisting by re- fusing to give them recommendations for other employment, or other reprisals, if they affiliate with, or refuse to withdraw from, a union, or if a union organizes the plant. (c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and to refrain from any or all of such ac- tivities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condi- tion of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Offer to Marie Barron immediate and full reinstatement to her former or a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges, if she requests rein- statement within 10 days from the date of this Decision and Order. (b) Post at its plant at Clarkdale, Georgia, copies of the notice attached hereto and marked "Appendix." 4 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Tenth Region, shall, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it for a period of sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily 4 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words "Pursuant to a Deciee of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order." COATS & CLARK, INC. 241 posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for the Tenth Region in writing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the Re- spondent has taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges that Respondent discharged L. E. Davis, Kermit Pierce Hurst, Fannie Louise Hurst, and Ceab Smith, or has by various means forced Marie Barron, Opal Hollingworth, and Kathleen Streeter to quit their jobs, in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act, or engaged in acts of interference, restraint, or coercive conduct other than those specifically found by the Trial Examiner to be violative of the Act. MEMBER RODGERS, dissenting : I do not agree with my colleagues' decision to direct the Respondent to reinstate Marie Barron. As my colleagues find, Barron was not discharged in violation of the Act, either actually or constructively, but voluntarily quit her employment. With the dismissal by the Board of the charge of un- lawful discrimination as to Barron, the only unfair labor practices remaining in this case involve illegal interrogation, threats, and prom- ises. Heretofore, the Board, on the basis of 20 years' experience, has considered a broad cease and desist order sufficient to redress such unfair labor practices and to restrain the future commission of them. Indeed, in the St. Joseph Lead Company case,' the facts of which are substantially the same as those herein, the Board expressly refused to go beyond a broad cease and desist order and require the reinstate- ment of an employee who like Barron had voluntarily quit his em- ployment. The Board did so on the ground that under the circum- stances a reinstatement order was not necessary to effectuate the poli- cies of the Act. Cf. Fulton Bag and Cotton Mills, 75 NLRB 883, 887. My colleagues adduce no facts, nor do they offer any explanation, why a broad cease and desist order would not also suffice in this case or why the reinstatement of Barron is necessary to effectuate the poli- cies of the Act. They merely state that "reason and Board expe- rience" indicate that Barron's reinstatement will serve to remedy the Respondent's unfair labor practices. But none of the cases cited by my colleagues as illustrative of "Board experience" is apposite. Un- like here, in each of the instances they cite wherein reinstatement was ordered, in addition to the customary cease and desist order, there in fact was a discharge which was violative of the Act. The Holmes 6 65 NLRB 439 , 440-441 242 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD case is simply an application of the familiar principle that a bargain- ing order may issue where an employer's unfair labor practice dissi- pates a union's majority standing. And a mere appeal to "reason" can scarcely establish the need for a reinstatement order in this case,, particularly when the Board's experience for 20 years is to the con- trary. It is well settled that orders of the Board may not extend further than necessary to redress or restrain the unfair labor practices found.6 Since the need for a reinstatement order, in addition to the customary cease and desist order, has not been shown in this case, the Board's order, I believe, is a clear abuse of its discretion and therefore illegal. Indeed, in the absence of a showing that the Board's order is necessary to effectuate the Act's purposes, the Board's order can only be regarded as a punitive, and not remedial, measure. Moreover, apart from the foregoing considerations, the Board, in my opinion, does not have the power under the Act to require an em- ployer to reinstate an employee who has voluntarily quit her employ- ment. Section 10 (c) of the Act, in pertinent part, provides that "No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged . . . if such in- dividual was suspended or discharged for cause." The purpose of the Congress in inserting this proviso was to bar the Board, in express terms, from interfering with the normal right of the employer to dis- charge and select employees, as it wishes, when the right is exercised for reasons other than those proscribed by the Act.' If, therefore, in the instant case the Board has found that Barron was discharged for cause, the Board would have been precluded by the Act itself from ordering her reinstatement. It follows, a fortiori, that the Board may not direct Barron's reinstatement when under the Board's own find- ings she was not discharged in violation of the Act but voluntarily quit her employment. Under the circumstances, I am compelled to conclude that on the basis of their introspective conclusion that the Respondent's harass- ment of Barron was a "psychological factor" in Barron's decision to quit, my colleagues are accomplishing under the guise of a remedy what they themselves recognize cannot be justified in law. I believe that there is here but one alternative open to the Board: Either find that Barron was constructively discharged in violation of the Act and U See May Department Stare Co v N L R B , 326 U S 376, 390-392 , N. L P. B. v Crompton-Highland Mills, hic, 337 U S. 217, 226 7The proviso wrote into fhe Act (-,-sting law for the courts had alioady ruled prior to the amendment of the Act , that the Board could not compel an employer to reinstate employees who had been lawfully discharged . See N L R B. v Jones Ct Laughlin Steel Corp, 301 'U S 1 45-46, N L R B v Superior Tanning Co, 117 P 2d 881, 891 (C A 7), cert denied 313 U S. 559 See also H It No 245 or H R 3020 , pp. 42-43 IT R No. 510 or H. R 3020, pp 38-39 ; Cong Record for June 6, 1947 , pp. 6677-6678. COATS & CLARK, INC. 243 ,order her reinstatement, or deny Barron reinstatement since she vol- untarily quit her employment. I would do the latter. MEMBER LEEDOMI took no part in the consideration of the above De- cision and Order. APPENDIX NOTICE To ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees concerning their mem- bership in, or their activities on behalf of, Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, or any other labor organization, in a manner constituting interference, restraint, or coercion in violation of Section 8 (a) (1). WE WILL NOT solicit or attempt to induce our employees to re- frain from union affiliation by promises of benefits and adjust- ment of grievances; or threaten our employees with loss of em- ployment, reduction of the workweek, shutdown or removal of the plant, blacklisting by refusing to give them recommendations for other employment, or other reprisals, if they affiliate with, or re- fuse to withdraw from, a union, or if a union organizes the plant. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organiza- tion, to form labor organizations, to join or assist Textile Work- ers Union of America, CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos- ing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and to refrain from any or all of such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring member- ship in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. WE WILL offer to Marie Barron immediate and full reinstate- ment to her former or a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges, if she requests reinstatement within 10 days from the date of the Board's Decision and Order. All our employees are free to become, remain, or to refrain from be- coming or remaining members of Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, or any other labor organization, except to the extent that this 244 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD right may be affected by an agreement authorized by Section 8 (a) (3)r of the Act. COATS & CLARK, INC. (CLARKDALE PLANT), Employer. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Repiesentative ) ( Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. INTERMEDIATE REPORT STATEMENT OF THE CASE The issues in this case are whether Coats & Clark, Inc., herein called the Respond- ent, has on various dates since November 1953, at its Clarkdale, Georgia, plant, interrogated its employees, threatened them with reprisals and offered them bene- fits, solicited them to withdraw from Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, herein called the Union, and to engage in surveillance of union activities, discharged cer- tain employees and by various means forced others to quit their jobs, all because of and to discourage their concerted activities and adherence to the Union, in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 136, herein called the Act. The issues arise on a complaint issued June 14, 1954, by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, herein called General Counsel and the Board, through the Board's Regional Director for the Tenth Region (Atlanta, Georgia), on the basis of charges and amended charges filed by the Union, and the answer of Respondent denying the commission of any unfair labor practices.' Pursuant to notice a hearing was held at Marietta, Georgia, on August 23, 24, and 25, 1954, before the duly designated Trial Examiner, at which all parties were represented by counsel or other representatives and were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce evidence bearing on the issues, to make oral argument, and to file briefs and pro- posed findings of fact or conclusions of law, or both. At the outset of the hearing the Trial Examiner, on motion of General Counsel, dismissed the complaint as to L. E. Davis with prejudice At the close of General Counsel's testimony in chief, the Trial Examiner granted Respondent's motions to dismiss the complaint insofar as it charged Respondent with violations of the Act through conduct of Foreman Dorris Anderson and Supervisor Guy Hamrick, but denied its motions to dismiss in other respects. At the close of the case, Respondent's motions to dismiss the complaint on the merits were taken under advisement, and are now disposed of by the findings and conclusions in this report. General Counsel's motion to conform pleadings to proofs in matters of minor variance was granted without objection. All parties waived oral argument. General Counsel and Respondent have filed briefs with the Trial Examiner. Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT; THE STATUS OF THE UNION Respondent is and has been at all times material herein a Delaware corporation engaged in the manufacture of thread and textile products. It has its principal office and place of business in New York, New York, and maintains and operates plants in several of the United States, including one in Clarkdale, Georgia, which is the only plant involved in this proceeding. In the calendar year immediately preced- ing the issuance of the complaint herein, Respondent purchased raw materials valued in excess of $500,000 which were shipped directly to its Clarkdale plant from points outside the State of Georgia, and in the same period it manufactured, sold, and shipped from that plant to points outside the State finished products valued in ex- cess of $800,000. Respondent admits, and I find on the basis of the above facts, that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. 'The various charges, the complaint, and notice of hearing thereon, were duly served on Respondent and the Union COATS & CLARK, INC. 245 The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act which admits to membership employees of Respondent. if. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The union campaign and Respondent's knowledge thereof The Union began an organizing campaign among employees at Respondent's Clarkdale plant about January 1, 1953, when an organizer appeared in Clarkdale, distributed union authorization cards, and held a few meetings with employees. At this time some employees, notably Marie Smith Barron and Opal Hollingworth, signed cards, and Barron was active in soliciting other employees to sign cards. After several weeks of activity the campaign died down, but was revived about July, when new organizers came to town and thereafter conducted an active cam- paign up to a Board-conducted election held on March 2, 1954, which the Union lost.2 During the revived campaign, the Union held six mass meetings for em- ployees, solicited employees at their homes in the company village of Clarkdale and nearby areas to join the Union, and openly distributed literature at the plant gates. In the 2 months preceding the election, the Union on Saturday of each week ran movies and recreation programs for children of employees and bingo games for adults. It also distributed white T-shirts, caps, and buttons containing the name of the Union and CIO insignia and slogans to employees at a final mass meeting on February 28, 1954, and at the plant gates the day before the election. Many employees openly wore these articles at work in the plant on those dates and the day of the election. Some employees, notably Barron and Hollingsworth, actively assisted the union organizers by accompanying them to homes of employees, driv- ing employees to meetings, distributing union authorization cards among employees on and off plant piemises, and attending the union meetings and recieational activi- ties outlined above. From September 1953, onward, employees brought union literature into the plant, and fieely discussed the union campaign pro and con among themselves and with their supervisors, particularly Second Shift Over- seer Valentine and Third Shift Overseer Bowen, both during and outside work- ing hours. The above findings are based on credited and mutually corroborative testimony of Barron, Hollingwoith, Charles F. Allen, Gertrude Cole, Mary Lucille Ellis, Kermit P. Hurst and Overseers John Morgan Davis, Toss R. Valentine, and Philip S. Bowen. I find on the above facts that Respondent was fully aware of the Union's campaign and its progress at least from September 1953 onward. The extent of Respondent's knowledge of the union activity of particular employees named in the complaint will be discussed in my consideration of the termination of those employees B. Alleged interference, restraint, and coercion A stipulation of the parties, and uncontradicted testimony in the record, shows that the following management personnel named in the complaint and the record are supervisors within the meaning of the Act: On first shift, General Overseer John Morgan Davis; Robert Carl Rogers, second hand in the twister department; James Perkerson, foreman in the winding room; Tom Ellerbee, second hand in caid room; and George Cauble, supervisor in card room. On second shift, General Overseer Toss R. Valentine and J. M. Cash, second hand. On third shift, General Overseer Philip S. Bowen and John Sanders, second hand in card room. The record also shows that Carl Jordon is second hand in the spinning room on third shift, and I infer and find from the stipulation as to second hands Cash, Ellerbee, and Sanders, that Jordon is likewise a supervisor. 1. Conduct of first shift supervisors On an unidentified date in late January or early February 1954, Supervisor George Cauble approached Ernest James Gordon, who worked under him in the card room, and asked Gordon how the Union was coming on. Gordon's answer is not stated in the record. Cauble advised Gordon to go to a union meeting to be held at Powder River, Georgia (a nearby town), the coming Saturday, to "get my union card," and to work there for the Company and against the Union. Gordon refused, saying he had friends "on both sides of it," union people and nonunion, and he did not want 'Case No. 10-RC-2563, 107 NLRB No 248 (not repoited in printed volumes of Board Decisions and Orders), in which the Union filed a petition for certification on October 19, 1953 246 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD anyone mad at him, that it was none of his business, that he "could not dictate noway, I wasn't representative, I wasn't going to tell the people what to say." He also told Cauble that he had been there almost 12 years, and that he had told Johnson (plant manager) that if he would give him a job he would stay with the Company, would not quit. He further said that if the Union came in and pulled a strike, he could not afford to walk out because he did not have long to stay there. Cauble replied that "if you joined them, you would have to walk out with them if there was a strike." This finding is based on credited and uncontradicted testimony of Gordon, as Cauble did not testify. Gordon also testified that he had worked for the Company since 1942 and retired on February 27, 1954. Gordon's testimony was offered in support of paragraph numbered 22 of the complaint which alleged that Respondent, through Cauble, solicited an employee to attend union meetings "and report back to Respond- ent all information concerning the number and identity of the employees in attend- ance, and any other information which he obtained concerning the union member- ship and activities of Respondent's employees." At most, Gordon's testimony shows that Cauble tried to persuade an old employee who had many friends among the plant workers, to sign a union card and attend union meetings and work there "for the Company" and against the Union. This proof, however, does not support the quoted portions of paragraph numbered 22 which in effect allege a solicitation of an employee to act as a spy or informer for Respondent at union meetings; Gordon does not state in what manner, or by what acts or conduct, Cauble wanted him to work "for the Company and against the Union"; "work" with that objective in mind could encompass many types of activity, some unlawful, others perhaps lawful, but the Board is not required to speculate as to what type was intended, and there is nothing in Gordon's testimony to warrant, much less compel, the inference that Cauble asked or even desired him to perform the acts of espionage alleged I con- clude that General Counsel has failed to prove a prima facie case as to paragraph numbered 22 of the complaint, and I therefore grant Respondent's final motion to dismiss that portion of the complaint. I also grant its motion to dismiss as to para- graph numbered 20, insofar as it alleges that Cauble (erroneously called "Coble" in the complaint) solicited employees in December 1953 to withdraw their union c rds, as Gordon's testimony provides no support for those allegations. Gordon also testified that about the first of February 1954, Cauble asked him again in the plant how the Union was "coming on," and told him that "the Union don't pay you, the Clark Thread Company does," and that at some later date Cauble asked him in a genial way how the Union "came out up there Saturday." These interrogations by Cauble are not alleged in paragraph numbered 17 of the com- plaint which specifies the agents of Respondent charged with unlawful interrogation, nor are they covered by any broad, catch-all language in the complaint. I therefore make no finding or recommendation on the basis thereof I find from credited and uncontradicted testimony of Eugene Griffith that on Mon- day, February 15, 1954, Second Hand Ellerbee asked Griffith, one of his employees in the mill, if Griffith had gone to the union meeting the previous Saturday. Griffith said he had not Ellerbee asked him if he had a union card Griffith's answer does not appear. Ellerbee then told Griffith to "go out to the office and call for your union card, or see a union man and get your union card," adding "we could have fired you before now, but we have been good to you" and that Respondent had kept him, Ellerbee also advised him not to "mess up" with the Union. He also asked Griffith if employee Clyde Bracket, who worked next to Griffith, had joined the Union. Griffith said he did not know. Ellerbee's suggestion that Griffith recall his union card, and he should not "mess up" with the Union, when coupled with the reminder that Respondent had been good to him and could have fired him before, comprised a plain solicitation of an employee to withdraw from the Union under pain of possible loss of employment or other reprisal from Respondent, and was cal- culated to discourage union affiliation of employees and coerce and restrain them in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. I conclude that Respondent thereby violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.3 When Ellerbee prefaced this unlawful conduct with queries as to Griffith's union affiliation, and his and Bracket's attendance at union meetings, such interrogation clearly had an illegal motive, was without justification, and likewise violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. On one occasion in January or February 1954, Ellerbee asked Gordon at his machine how the Union was "coming on." Gordon replied, "I guess all right." Eller- 3 Tennessee Eqq Company/ 93 NLRB 846, 848, enfd 201 F 2d 370 (C A 6) , National Biscuit Company. 83 NLRB 79, 80, 86-88, enfd as niod 1855 F 2d 123 (C A 3) ; Binpire Pencil Company, 86 NLRB 1187, 1190, enfd 187 F 2d 334 (C A 6) COATS & CLARK, INC. 247 bee also asked if there was a good crowd at the union meeting on Saturday. Gordon replied it looked like there was a pretty good crowd. I find these facts from un- contradicted testimony of Gordon. Since Ellerbee engaged in similar interrogation of, and solicitation accompanied by threats to, another employee in this preelection period, which were unlawful and plainly demonstrated his antiunion animus, it is clear that his interrogation of Gordon was not an isolated, perfunctory, or casual incident, but had the same illegal motivation, and was therefore violative of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. I find no violation of the Act in (1) Ellerbee's equivocal suggestion to employee Jeff Hicks about a week before the election in the hearing of Griffith, to "keep on talking about the Union," after Hicks had told him he had talked until his throat was "wore out"; and (2) Ellerbee's reading to Griffith about the same time of a magazine article relating to violence during strikes and indicating that unions caused such disturbances; this was a legitimate exercise of free speech within Section 8 (c) of the Act. I consider within the same protected category the remark of Supervisor Cauble to Griffith (as stated by the latter), at a time when a union organizer was distributing leaflets outside the plant, that Griffith looked like "one of them old union men down there." I find from credited and uncontradicted testimony of Ada Lou Clark and Ora Tillery that on or about February 1, 1954, Foreman James Perkerson asked Clark, who worked under him in the plant, if she did not want to go and get her union card back. She replied that she did not and would sign a couple more if it would do any good. At that moment employee Ora Tillery came up Clark told Tillery that Perk- erson wanted them to get their union cards back. Perkerson then asked Tillery, "How about you going and getting your card back?" and she replied that if she had one "down there," she would not be so yellow as to go and get it back Clark and Perkerson then had a discussion about the advantages of the Union and Perkerson's antagonism to it, in which he stated his reasons in terms which I do not find violative of the Act. However, Perkerson's request to both employees that they get their union cards back, though unsuccessful and unaccompanied by any threats of reprisal or promises of benefit, are unlawful solicitations of employees to withdraw from the Union, which violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act 4 I find from uncontradicted testimony of Clark that: About the middle of February, her overseer, John Morgan Davis, asked her in the plant if she had got back her union card. She said she did not. He then said it would not do any good, that the em- ployees who had asked for the return of their cards had not received them. Clark told him it was impossible to get them back, as they had been sent to Washington. Davis said it was a "pretty dirty trick" because they did not let the Company know they had been sent to Washington, and that it would not do any good to get them hack after they had "come back from Washington." Coming shoitly after his subordi- nate's solicitation of Clark to withdraw from the Union, Davis' remarks further demonstrate that Respondent was engaging in a deliberate campaign by unlawful means to induce employees to resign from the Union.` I find from uncontradicted testimony of Fred D. Cunningham and Esmer McMichen that on an occasion about the middle of February, while they were discussing union cards in the plant, Perkerson walked up and suggested that it would be a good time for them to "go get your union cards." This was an unlawful solicitation of with- drawals from the Union, and violated Section 8 (a) (1 } of the Act. On Saturday, February 13, 1954, Second Hand Rogers had a talk about the Union with Cecil Meeks, who worked under him, while Rogers was driving Meeks in his car to his family's home in Rockmart, Georgia. During the trip, Meeks remarked that he was glad his family had moved from Aragon, Georgia, because of the way people in that town were divided about the union in a cotton mill there, and that there had been a lot of trouble over the union there. They also discussed the fact that the mill at Aragon had closed down. Rogers remarked that workers in that mill did not "lay around and smoke" like those at Clarkdale did, and opined that if the workers at Clarkdale got a union, it would not better things for them. Meeks asked why, and Rogers replied that if the Union came into the Clarkdale plant, and made all the demands that its literature promised, the Union might call a strike, the mill would shut down, the workers would be out of work for a while, and there would be "See footnote 3, above, and Phillips cC Buttorff dfanufactuiing Company, 96 ALRB 1091, 1092 &As Davis is not charged in the complaint with unlawful interrogation, I make no finding thereof on the basis of his interrogation of Clark, nor his repeated interrogation of Fred D Cunningham in the same period about the progress of the union campaign. 379288-56-vol. 113--17 248 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD trouble in Clarkdale. I find the above conversation upon the credited testimony of Rogers, as corroborated in part by that of Meeks. I do not credit Meeks' testimony about the incident, except as consistent with the above findings, for Meeks' testimony on it was rather disjointed and not impressive, and it seems more likely that he, rather than Rogers, would have opened the talk about union troubles in Aragon, where he and his family had lived, and would be more familiar with them. 1 conclude and find that Rogers' replies were legitimate expressions of opinion as to the differences be- tween conditions in the Aragon and Clarkdale plants, and as to possible economic con- sequences of unionization of the Clarkdale plant, and did not violate the Act. I hereby grant Respondent's final motion to dismiss paragraph numbered 18 of the com- plaint insofar as it alleged that Rogers made the threats stated therein. 2. Conduct of second shift supervisors In December 1953, about 2 weeks before Christmas, Overseer Valentine ap- proached Mary Lucille Ellis, a second shift employee who worked near his desk, and stated he had heard that a Miss Maloney, a union organizer, had been in the plant. Ellis replied that Maloney had come to see her. Valentine asked if Ellis had signed a union card, and she replied, "No," that she did not have to. Valentine then said that if the Union came into the plant, and demanded the things they promised in its literature, the Company might not be able to meet those demands, and would not sign a contract with the Union, and the mill might close down due to a strike and there would be a lot of people out of work, but that he was not worried about himself. Valentine also mentioned that her two brothers, who worked in the plant, were for the Union. She replied she and her brothers did not discuss their affairs with each other Valentine also said that her brother-in-law ran the best set of twister frames in the mill, and his wife made more money on the reels than any other girl, and he did not see why they should be for the Union. He also told Ellis he had heard that Organizer Maloney was an alcoholic, and that the organizers fixed drinks in their motel headquarters. Ellis disagreed with these statements. These findings are based on credited and uncontradicted testimony of Ellis, as corroborated in part by testimony of Valentine. His interrogation as to Ellis' union affiliation was illegal under Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act, but I find no violation of the Act in his statements of the possible economic consequences of union- ization of the plant. His remarks about Ellis' brothers, sister, and brother-in-law indicated Respondent's knowledge of their union affiliation, but contained nothing coercive, and the same is true of his disparaging remarks about the union organ- izers. I grant Respondent's motion to dismiss for lack of proof paragraphs num- bered 18 and 24 of the complaint insofar as they charge an unlawful threat through Valentine that the mill would be shut down and moved elsewhere before Respondent would deal with the Union. On an occasion in January or February 1954, while the Union's Saturday parties were being held, Valentine asked Ellis at her work if she got any of the "free sausage." She said, "No." He then said he did not want anything that "those sons- of-bitches have, and you can quote me as saying sons-of-bitches." He also asked Ellis if she was an organizer, and she replied "You don't know, do you?" Ellis had signed a union card some months before Valentine first questioned her, had been visited in her home by Organizer Maloney, and had also had lunch once with Maloney in the motel where the latter resided. These findings are based on credited testimony of Ellis, as corroborated in part by admissions of Valentine. I make no finding of violation of the Act on his reference to the "free sausage," which was apparently given out with other items as prizes at the Union's Saturday bingo games, or his disparaging remarks which were apparently directed at the Union or those affiliated with it, but since he already knew from prior interrogation of Ellis that Maloney had visited her, his present query as to whether Ellis was an organizer was clearly coercive, unlawful, and violated Section 8 (a) (1), for his attendant remarks indicated his antiunion animus and that he already knew a lot about the Union, its activities, and those affiliated with it, and thus his interrogation could not have been prompted by idle curiosity, but only by a definite desire to add more information about the union campaign to the facts he already knew.6 U I make no finding of violation of the Act on • (1) Valentine's undenied query of em- ployee Chalks F Allen one Monday in February 1954, whether lie got any doughnuts and Coca-Cola at the union meeting the previous Saturday ; the mquuy was made in a jocular way, and nothing else was said, see Beaver Machine and Tool Co , 97 NLRB 33, (2) Valen- tine's remarks to employee Joseph A. Thackston in November 1953, about the amount of money the Union would take from the workers and out of Clarkdale in union dues, and COATS & CLARK, INC. 249 I find from uncontradicted testimony of Allen that second hand J. M Cash asked Allen in the plant on several occasions in January and February 1954, if the employees were getting a "good bit of members," if "they" had any members coming in, if there was a good crowd at the Saturday union meetings, and what Allen thought about the Union. Allen told him they were getting lots of members, many were still signing up, and there were good crowds at the union meetings. Although the conversations were short, and at times Allen himself brought up the subject of the Union, and Cash never offered any comments or expressed senti- ments for or against the Union in response to Allen's replies, I consider the re- peated interrogation as violative of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act, for it was clearly part of the pattern of similar interrogation and other unlawful conduct of Respondent's supervisors in the last weeks of the campaign before the election as found in this Report, and cannot be said to have been a casual or isolated incident. 3. Conduct of third shift supervisors I find from uncontradicted testimony of Gertrude Cole that: On a date in De- cember 1953, her overseer, Philip Bowen, approached her at work and asked her how she felt about the Union. She replied that she was not going to "mess with it." Bowen then asked, "How about going and getting your union card?" She re- plied that if she did, her husband would "have a fit." At the time, other em- ployees had recalled their cards from the Union. Cole attended the final union meeting of February 28, 1954, and secured a T-shirt with a union insignia, but did not wear it. When she went to work that night, Bowen greeted her as she passed him in the plant, and said he had heard she had a union shirt. She denied she had one. He said, "That is not the way I heard it." She then admitted, "Well, I had one, it was too big and I gave it to another party." He then said he heard that she tried to tear down a sign which had been posted nearby. She admitted she did it to tease her sister who had told her to look at a "vote no for the Union" sign posted there. Bowen asked what she would do if he put up a sign there. She laughed and said she would put another on top of it. This discussion was carried on in a laughing, friendly way in the presence of another supervisor, Guy Hamrick, and another employee. Bowen's first query as to Cole's feeling about the Union was clearly a deliberate probe to ascertain her sentiments, for when it elicited an apparent antiunion attitude, he at once suggested that she get her authorization card back from the Union. It is obvious that the interrogation did not stem from idle curiosity or innocent motives. That it was in fact coercive and induced her to falsify as to her union sentiments is established by Cole's admis- sion on cross-examination that she lied when she told Bowen she was not going to "mess with" the Union, and her testimony that she in fact attended several union meetings including the last one before the election. I find that the interrogation was unlawful and violative of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. Bowen's solicitation of her withdrawal from the Union was likewise in violation of the same provision of the Act, as were his statements to Cole the night of the union meeting whicn were in the nature of questions designed to elicit an admission of her union affilia- tion and the way she intended to vote in the coming election. It is immaterial that the talks were friendly and accompanied with laughter, and that Cole still works at the plant and has apparently not been subjected to any personal discrimina- tion. I find from uncontradicted testimony of employee Nell C. Wilson that: On an occasion in January 1954, about 6 weeks before the election, Overseer Bowen ap- proached Wilson at work and asked, "What is this I hear about you signing a union card?" She replied that it did not mean anything. Bowen said, "I hope you feel that way about it because the Union does not cause anything but trouble." About mid-February, a week or so before the election, Bowen again approached Wilson at her work and asked if she would be willing to "go get my union card with some of the others." She replied, "I don't know, I guess so." The record does not show whether Wilson in fact tried to withdraw her card. I conclude that Bowen's first query was unlawful interrogation of an employee, and his second discussion con- tained an unlawful solicitation of her withdrawal from the Union, in violation of Sec- tion 8 (a) (1) of the Act. On Saturday, January 9, 1954, employee Floyd Jimmy Landers attended a union meeting. On Monday, January 11, about 11 p. m., as Landeit was walking down- (3) his remarks to the same employee somewhat later indicating that he had heard two other employees might become leaders of the Union The second incident is clearly priv- ileged fiee speech, and the third would at most raise a suspicion of surveillance of em- ployees' protected activities, which is not charged in the complaint. 250 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD stairs in the plant with Overseer Bowen, the latter asked Landers what he learned at the union meeting. Landers replied he had learned a lot. Later in that shift, Bowen came to Landers and asked why he denied going to the union meeting with employee Gordon. Landers said that if he denied it, he told a lie. Bowen said he heard employee Marie Barron was at the meeting; Landers said he did not see her there. Bowen then asked if employees Roy Crowe and Bobby Givens had at- tended the meeting, and Landers said he knew they were not there. Bowen asked how many workers had attended the meeting and Landers told him. These findings are based on credited testimony of Landers, which is corroborated in part by ad- missions of Bowen. I do not credit Bowen's denials of the inquiries as to the three named employees. Bowen's interrogation of Landers regarding the union meeting was in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. I find no violation of the Act in Bowen's equivocal statement to Landers in January that Landers would not be there long enough to see the Union come into the plant. I find from uncontradicted testimony of employee Emmett Russell Bowman that: Late in February 1954, a few days before the election, Overseer Bowen approached Bowman at his work and asked him to go down to the Union and get back his union card. Bowman asked Bowen how he knew he had signed a union card. Bowen re- plied, that Bowman was going to the meetings. A few nights later, Bowen ap- proached Bowman again and asked him to get his union card, stating he "had several to go down and get their cards," and if he could get enough to "come out of the Union, it would not come to a vote." Bowman asked Bowen again if he knew that Bowman had signed a union card, and Bowen said, "You are still going to the meet- ings." Bowman retorted that he thought it was his (own) business to go where he pleased when he was not on the job. Bowen "flew off the handle," and replied the mill might go on 3 days a week, but it would not make any difference to him, he was drawing $125 a week straight time and he would draw his pay right along. Bowen's suggestions that Bowman withdraw from the Union were unlawful solicitations in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. His final comment that the mill might shut down to 3 days a week, but his own pay would not be affected, considered in the context of his solicitations of Bowman, his admission that he had similarly solicited others to try to prevent an election, and Bowman's rebuff of the solicitation, in my opinion constituted an oblique but nonetheless clear threat that the employees' work- days would be reduced if the employees did not withdraw their cards or the Union came into the plant, which was coercive and violative of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. Considering that numerous employees on all shifts were subjected by their super- visors, from the general overseers down, over a period of 4 months preceding the election, to a variety of interrogations about their progress of the campaign, their activities therein and sentiments toward the Union, to solicitations of withdrawal from the Union (under pain of reprisal in some instances), and threats of plant shutdown and loss of employment if the Union organized the plant, and that the overseers, particularly Bowen, admitted their antiunion animus, it is clear that Respondent engaged from November 1953, onward in an active, aggressive campaign involving unlawful interference, restraint, and coercion of employees, of which the various interrogations found above and hereafter were an integral part,7 to discourage membership in the Union, induce those who had already signed up with it to with- draw their authorization cards, and thus pave the way for the defeat of the Union at the coming election. In reaching this conclusion I have also considered instances of similar coercive interrogation and threats to which employees Barron, Holling- worth, Streeter, and Smith were subjected in this same period, and Bowen's and Jordon's remarks to Barron as detailed below, which clearly indicate the widespread and effective campaign of the overseers and their subordinates to induce employees by various means to withdraw from the Union. It is against this background of interference, restraint, and coercion that the Board must assess Respondent's conduct and motives in connection with the discharges and other separations of employees which I now consider. C. The alleged discriminatory discharges 1. Marie Smith Barron Marie Smith Barron worked for Respondent at Clarkdale from 1947 until March 6, 1954, when she quit her job under circumstances set forth below. In the first 3 7Syracuse Color Press, Inc., 103 NLRB 377, enfd 209 F 2d 596 (C. A 2) ; Blue Flash Express, Inc., 109 NLRB 591 ; and see General Motors Corporation, Cadillac Motor Car Division, 109 NLRB 1429, footnote 4; The Dalton Company, Inc., 109 NLRB 1228. COATS & CLARK, INC. 251 years of her employment she operated a winder, and thereafter until she quit she was a spinner on the third shift, working in 1953 and 1954 under Overseer Bowen and Second Hand Carl Jordon. Barron signed a union authorization card January 1, 1953, and thereafter was active in the union campaign, attending all the union meetings held in 1953 and 1954 before the election, and accompanying a union organizer in soliciting other employees at their homes in the company-owned village and elsewhere to join the Union. She passed out union cards in the mill to employees in her own and other departments, mostly outside of working hours, and also to a few employees who came to her machine during working hours. Between January and August 1953, she signed up a dozen or more employees, some in her home, some at their homes, and others in the plant. She continued her solicitations in the mill throughout 1953 both during working and nonworking hours. The complaint alleges that Respondent, through Bowen and Jordon, caused Barron to quit by (1) frequent transfers from job to job, and (2) subjecting her to unreason- able and incessant criticism, cursing, interrogation and threats concerning her union activity, and harassment, and that Respondent exerted such pressures to make her quit because of her union activity, and to discourage affiliation with and assistance to the Union, in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act. In effect, a dis- criminatory constructive discharge of Barron is charged. Respondent contends that she quit her job voluntarily after refusing to cooperate with Respondent in its efforts to correct production difficulties caused by a change in operations in the course of business. The issue thus raised requires a review of Barron's relations and discussions with her supervisors before she quit. On an occasion in the early part of November 1953, Bowen came to Barron at her workplace and said he wanted to ask her something. He said, "I know you have been going around with union organizers." Barron asked permission to get a witness, if he was going to talk about the Union, and Bowen agreed, saying he would get one, too. He called Jordon into the discussion, and Barron procured employee Roy Crowe. Bowen said, "Marie, we know you have been going around with the Union organizers out in the country and around the village. We know one of them is a woman, we even know what kind of a car she drives." Jordon asked Barron, "You don't think it is any secret, do you, the way you have been sneaking around down there?" Barron denied she had been sneaking around, and said she did not care if they knew it. Bowen said one could go through the mill and tell from people's faces who had signed with the Union and who had not. Barron said she did not see how they could tell that, and admitted she had signed workers up on the job, and they did not see her do it, and she did not see how they found out. Bowen replied, "We have ways of finding out things you don't know about." Bowen then asked her what she expected to gain if she got her Union in the plant. She replied she expected more pay, better working conditions, and to get the number of "sides" cut down to a point where the spinners could "run" them. Bowen reminded her she was only running 14 sides at the moment, that 16 was supposed to be the allocation in the plant, and other mills were running 28. She claimed no employee there was able to run 16. He asked her what the Union had promised her, and she referred to a contract drawn up for Respondent's Pawtucket, Rhode Island, plant, saying "we" expected to get as much as they got. Bowen said, "If you do, the first thing you will do is go out on strike; the company is not going to stand for any such demands as that." He then referred to the Pawtucket and Newark, New Jersey, plants, saying "as soon as they tried to get a union up there, they shut the mill down, they haven't got a spindle up there, they moved out all the machinery." He then said he did not think the workers would get a union in the plant, and Barron disagreed. Jordon then drew from Barron the fact that she had been there only 6 years, and told her that 20 years before (apparently during a strike) many workers had to leave the plant, and he had given one a ride who was "pitiful, had patches on his knees, was looking for a job." Jordon said he could have told that worker "it would be like that," that the man had told him the workers were "misled." Jordon told Barron there were going to be others coming to him that were "misled." Barron retorted that she never misled anyone, the workers had signed with the Union of their own free will, and that "anyone who wants their card back from me can have it." Bowen then said, "I want you to think this over. If you get a union in here, you will be out of work." Later that night, Bowen brought Barron a paper on which he had figured out the union dues which the employees would have to pay, and asked her if she was going to let that money "get away from here for nothing." She replied it would not be for nothing. Bowen said the Union had lied to her, that it "won't be like you think it will, the first thing they will do will be go out on strike." He asked her "How long do you think you can live on strike?" She replied, as long as any of the rest could. 252 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD He then referred to the Simmons Mattress plant, saying he could get 300 hands in the plant tomorrow. At quitting time that night, Bowen came back and asked Barron if she would still be "for them" if "we can convince you they have lied " She said if he could, she would think it over. I make these findings on credited testimony of Barron, who testified in a clear, straightforward manner on this subject. Her testi- mony is corroborated in part by admissions of Bowen. Jordon did not testify about the conversation; Crowe did not testify at all. I do not credit Bowen's denial of the threats of mill shutdown and loss of jobs, and that he had ways of finding things out. Bowen's antiunion animus, as shown by his repeated unlawful interrogation of other employees and solicitation of their withdrawal from the Union, and his simi- lar threat to Bowman of a reduction of the workweek if the Union came in, coupled with the fact that he initiated the talks with Barron, and the aggressiveness of his attempts to turn one whom he knew to be an active worker for the Union, against that organization, all make it more likely that he resorted to blunt threats rather than a mere, dispassionate expression of opinion as to the probable consequences of a strike (as he testified) in his efforts to overcome her arguments and resistance and undermine her loyalty to the Union. In resolving this issue, I have also considered carefully Bowen's demeanor, appearance, and manner of testifying on the stand, the fact that in his second talk with Barron that evening he did mention the probability of the Union calling a strike if it came into the plant, and his general testimony that he expressed similar opinions to other employees who sought his views on the Union. I conclude that Respondent engaged in independent violations of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act by (1) Bowen's recital of Barron's union activities, which drew from her admissions as to those activities, (2) his query as to what she expected to gain through the Union, and what it had promised to her, and (3) his statement that the Company would not stand for the Union's demands, and mention of the shutdown of other plants of Respondent and removal of machinery therefrom when a union tried to organize them. On an occasion in the latter part of November, Bowen again approached Barron in the plant, and asked her to tell him what employees had signed up with the Union. She said she thought he had ways of finding that out. He said "they" would not tell him, and she said she would not tell him either. Bowen then said, "Marie, you know before they will get a union in here they will shut this mill down, and the Union, the CIO, the Government and nobody else won't open it up." She replied, "Well, let them shut the damn thing down." I find this conversation from credited testimony of Barron, as Bowen did not specifically deny the discussion, except by his general denial of threats to employees which I do not credit for reasons set forth above Bowen's interrogation as to the membership of the Union, and threat of a mill shutdown if the Union came in, were further independent violations of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. A few days before Christmas 1953, Bowen came to Barron at her work and asked what she thought about "your union organizers." She asked what it was about. He said the workers that went to the Union to get their cards did not get them, that "they ran." Barron asked "how come" the workers went to get their cards back, and Bowen said they did not want "any part of it," and did not want "it to come to a vote," and that if she was not so stubborn, she would not want it either. While Bowen was talking, Barron was working on a frame. Bowen remarked that she had only 14 sides to handle. Barron said, "Yes," that she could run 16 sides about as good as other workers could, that she could do as they did, "let them roll out on the floor what she could not keep up." Bowen then said she could not run 16 sides and "talk like you have been talking." She replied, "How can I talk? You stopped me from talking." He said, "you can't run around talking, you can't keep your job up talking like you have been. As long as I am running this shift you are going to stop that talking. I am going to see that you stop that talking." Later in that shift Bowen called Barron away from her work and said, "Marie, I have warned you and Mr. Jordon has warned you. Now, By God, this is a Government order, By God, it is going to run. Now, if you can't run it, I will send you home and put somebody on it that can " Barron replied that she thought she was keeping it up. Bowen re- plied, "By God, what does that look like to you over there? Now, you go over there and clean them goddam frames " Barron walked over to the frames he indicated, and showed Bowen they were not her frames, but others across from hers, and said, "Now, you are the boss, if I don't do things to suit you, you can run me off, why in hell don't you do ito" Bowen replied, "That is what you are wanting me to do so you can haul me down to your Labor Relations " He then said, "By God, you have been talking too much, you are going to cut this talking out and as long as I am run- ning this third shift you are going to run your job right." The above conversation is found on credited and uncontradicted testimony of Barron. I find that Bowen's COATS & CLARK, INC. 253 initial interrogation as to Barron 's thoughts about the union organizers was an inde- pendent breach of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. That same night, near quitting time, Barron sought out Jordon and asked him if Bowen had told him about his criticism of Barron's work. Jordon said Bowen had told him that he had seen Barron talking at least 16 times that night. Jordon ad- mitted he had not been around that much, but told Barron he had been "on to" her about talking. Barron denied that Bowen criticized her talking, but admitted he had "cussed" her out about her job She told Jordon that if Bowen was going to fire her, she wanted him to do it, and to leave her alone, and threatened to hit Bowen with a guideboard if he bothered her again. Jordon told her, "Marie, you stick to your job, and I will stick to you." I find this conversation on credited and uncon- tradicted testimony of Barron. On an occasion in the early part of 1954, a month or so before the election, Jordon approached Barron near her work and told her to "get the chip off" her shoulder, get over being mad at "whoever I was mad at, get on the band wagon and go with the rest of them and get my card back." Barron refused to get her card back, saying she was "not that darn two-faced," did not want to "let the people down." In the discussion, Jordon said he was afraid the Union was promising the workers more than they would ever be able to receive, and if the Union "required the things they say they will," the Company could not grant them, there would probably be a strike, and everybody would be out of work, but if he lost his job he could live. Barron replied that she had lived before working there, and had a husband to make a living for her. Jordon concluded by saying that, after "this is all over with, what- ever happens, don't lay it on me " This finding is based on credited and mutually corroborative testimony of Barron and Jordon. I find on the credited and uncontradicted testimony of Barron that during Jan- uary and February 1954, Bowen often made disparaging remarks to Barron about the Union's Saturday parties. He met Barron shortly after the first party at which prizes of food were given away, and told Jordon in front of Barron that Barron got some of the "old rank sausage." He made similar remarks to Barron after other union bingo parties. Barron attended the final union meeting of February 28, 1954, where she se- cured a T-shirt and cap or button with union insignia, which she wore in the plant that night and on March 1 and 2, 1954. While she was at work the night of February 28, but before she put on the union regalia, Bowen came to her and asked, "How was your union meeting?" She said, "All right." He asked if she was going to wear "one of those T-shirts," and said, "You had better get you a tail and pin on it because you are going to look like a jackass." I find this con- versation on credited and uncontradicted testimony of Barron, and conclude that Bowen's interrogation about the meeting and her intent to wear the union T-shirt was an independent violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. About 4 a. m. on March 2, 1954, Bowen and employee Emmett Bowman came to Barron's workplace Bowman said he and Bowen wanted to prove something to her regarding what she had told Bowman that Bowen had said about him.8 Bowen asked her, "What is this I hear about you running around here telling things that are not so9" Barron denied that she had done so. Bowen accused her of telling Bowman that he had said Bowman would be fired, and denied he had said that. Barron insisted that he had. Bowen then said, "No wonder you can't run this job, you run around here talking all the time." She said she had not been off her job. Barron and Bowen then started talking at once, and Bowen told her to "shut up." She refused to do so, saying "I can't run this stuff up here and you know it. Why don't you put me back on my main job?" Bowen re- plied, "As far as I am concerned you haven't got a job down here. If you keep this up, you won't have a job here or nowhere." Bowen then told Bowman they would go to see Jordon and "straighten this out," and they walked over and talked to Jordon at his desk. Barron's machine had in the meantime become "stuck up," 9 so Barron stopped the machine and went over to Jordon's desk. Bowen asked her if she had permission to be off her job. She said, "No," but "since this concerns $Bouuman isas iefeuing to an instance in November 1953, when, according to Baiion's uncontradicted testimony, Bo«en had told her at hei machine, while Bowman was repair- ing a belt on it, that if the Union got into the plant, it would not permit an old man like Bowman to work these, but would have him flied Barron disagreed, saying Bowman was not too old to wwlc Baiion appaiently iclated this to Bowman later. °- 1, flame will get "stuck up ' and a tangle of yarn will develop whenever the yam breaks, and an end of yarn falls to the floor and piles up these, or becomes twisted around a rollei, as the machine ions 254 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD me and you accused me of lying I am going to see it through." Bowen told Jordon the dispute was over Bowman's report of what Barron told him about Bowen's remarks. Barron again accused Bowen of making the remark about Bowman, and Bowen denied it. Barron also accused Bowen of telling her the mill would shut down, and then denying it, and they argued over whether he had said that. Bowen finally said it was "her word against mine, I guess we will fight it out over Labor Relations." He then told Barron to forget about it, and go back to her job. The above findings are based on credited testimony of Barron, as corroborated in part by that of Bowen Jordon did not testify about this incident, nor did Bowman. Barron quit her job about 5 a. m. on Saturday, March 6, 1954. When she came on the job at the beginning of the shift, she found her frames already "stuck up" and dirty, not in running condition. Her job as spinner was to keep the frames running by putting up ends,10 cleaning the frames, and running a guideboard across the frame to clean lint and dirt out of the yarn. That night she had trouble keeping her frames going from the beginning, and after a few hours she had to request help from a Miss Smith, an instructor who assisted learners and other workers when they had trouble with their frames. Smith started to work on a few frames, putting up ends, etc., when Barron told her she was quitting, that she could not "take this any more." Smith urged her to stay, saying "it might get better." Barron disagreed, saying the job would not get any better, and "they won't never lay off me after this is all over, I might as well quit now, I can't stay here any longer " Barron then cleaned the frame she was working on with her guideboard, which she had not done all night, and then sought out Second Hand Jordon and told him that if he wanted anyone on her job, he should put her on it if he did not want to stop off the frames, as she (Barron) was going home. Jordon laughed but said nothing. When Barron went to Jordon, she left her frame running, and Smith was still working on other frames to put them in running order. Barron walked back to the end of her frame to get her personal belongings and comb her hair. Jordon came over to her and said, "Marie, if you walk out you know what this means, it means you are through." She replied, "Well, if I hadn't been through, I wouldn't be walking out." At that moment Overseer Bowen walked up, and asked Barron what was the matter She said, "I just can't run this damn job. I never have been able to keep it up. You knew I could not keep it up when you put me up here; I am quit- ting." Bowen said, "I am sorry, but we haven't got anything else for you to run." He asked her "Have you got a way home?" and she replied she did not. Barron then left the plant. She has not since applied for work with Respondent or else- where. The above findings are based on credited and uncontradicted testimony of Barron Barron testified that she quit because she "just could not take it any more," with the "bosses breathing down your neck all the time," i. e., when Jordon was not criticizing her work, Bowen was "on me" about the Union Barron's actions and remarks on the night she quit, if considered alone, would indicate that she had so much trouble with her frames that she quit in disgust, and that dissatisfaction with her job was the motivating reason Adding to this her own testimony that Jordon had constantly criticized her work for the past year, and her complaint to Bowen on March 2 that she could not run those frames and desired to be transferred to her former work, it can be said that her own testimony furnished cogent support for Respondent's claim that she refused to handle her work properly, was criticized for it, and finally quit voluntarily rather than cooper- ate. However, the events of March 6 cannot be considered in vacuo, and all her complaints about her work must be appraised in the light of her prominent union activity, Respondent's knowledge thereof and prior coercive actions toward her, and against the background of its clear antiunion animus and unfair labor prac- tices in the months before the election The chronology of events found above discloses various facts and circumstances which throw light on the cause of her dissatisfaction and furnish substantial support for the charges in the complaint. First of all, the record shows that Barron was probably the most prominent employee in assisting the Union, both in and out of the plant, in its membership drive, and the most outspoken in her advocacy of the union cause. The remarks of Bowen and Jordon to Barron in the first November talk demonstrate that Re- spondent was fully aware of the details and extent of her union activity almost from the inception of the campaign. Bowen's remarks to her and to Opal Hollingworth (as found hereafter), that Respondent "had ways of finding out things" about the union activity, were clearly calculated to give employees the impression that Re- 10 "Putting up ends" is the process of clean ing tangles of yarn after a break and piecing the ends together so that a continuous thread is wound on the bobbin. COATS & CLARK, INC. 255 spondent was keeping the employees' union activities under close surveillance. It is clear from all this that Bowen's discussions with Barron were motivated by more than a casual interest in the union campaign and her participation in it. The second significant circumstance is, that Bowen and Jordon, either singly or together had at least eight separate discussions with Barron about the Union between Novem- ber 1953, and the election, far more than they or supervisors on other shifts had with any other single employee, according to this record. Five of these instances involved unlawful interrogation, solicitation of her withdrawal from the Union, and threats of reprisal if the Union organized the plant. The frequency and nature of these discussions indicates that Respondent was concentrating its antiunion efforts, both legal and illegal, on Barron as the outstanding union adherent on that shift, if not in the whole plant. This special attention in itself was bound to have an effect on Barron. Bowen's two talks with her in November involved interrogation and threats of plant shutdown and loss of employment, which were clearly calculated to coerce and upset the employee who heard them. After Barron's answers in both discussions indicated her continued adherence to the union cause, Bowen changed his attack in the two discussions before Christmas when, after commenting about her stubborn refusal to withdraw from the Union, he suddenly criticized her work and her continued talking in the plant, and threatened to send her home if she did not stop talking and tend to her job. It is clear from Barron's testimony that in this period she had been talking to other employees in the plant about the Union, that both Bowen and Jordan observed this activity, and that Bowen could only have been referring to her union activity. In making this charge, Bowen became blunt and threatening, resorting to the use of "By God" and cursing to emphasize his threat that she would have to stop talking and perform her work on the Government order properly, or be sent home. The argument obviously became heated, and Barron became angry and agitated, challenging Bowen to discharge her, and later complain- ing to Jordon about Bowen's treatment of her and even threatening violence to Bowen if he continued to bother her. The record convinces me that Bowen's charge of failure to do her work because she talked too much was something new, was unjusti- fied in fact, and did not have an economic motivation. I find from Barron's uncontra- dicted testimony that: Before she joined the Union (January 1953), she had been able to keep her frames running properly, and had time to visit the restroom and take lunch in the normal course, after automatic cleaners were installed on the flames (Jordon testified this occurred about April 1952), the frames frequently became "stuck up," necessitating more frequent cleaning and stoppages to put up ends of yarn, this required Barron to devote more time to the frames, curtailing her lunch- time and restroom visits, during 1953, Jordon criticized her work more frequently when it became stuck up, often standing over her an hour at a time and giving her specific instructions on running and cleaning the frames. This testimony tends to indicate that Barron's inability to keep up her work during 1953 was traceable directly to mechanical trouble with the frames, and not to her admitted talking about the Union, most of which occurred outside working hours and away from her frames. There is no substantial proof in the record that Barron's talking in 1953 affected her work; neither Jordon nor Bowen testified as to the extent of her talking on the job or its effect, if any, on her work; the most that appears is her admission that, when she complained to Jordon in December about Bowen's harsh criticism of her, Jordon merely told her he had been "on to" her about her talking, and merely told her to "stick to her job"; I do not consider this substantial evidence that she could not do her work because of talking. Again, Barron testified credibly, and I find, that before she joined the Union, she had talked freely with other employees at work without criticism or hindrance. It is signficant that it was not until December 1953, after both supervisors began their efforts to persuade her to abandon the Union, that she was suddenly criticized and told bluntly to stop talking and tend to her work. Another indication that the December criticism was not justified by her work lies in Bowen's admission that the employees' excessive talking occurred only in the last 2 weeks in February 1954, and that he had to put a stop to it by ordering them to stay on their jobs and in their departments. Still another indication is the fact that Bowen tried to support his criticism by erroneous reference to the dirty condition of frames not handled by her. It is also noteworthy that Bowen had never resorted to cursing in talking to her prior to the December argument. Considering all of these circumstances, I am satisfied and find that Bowen's criticism of her work was un- justified, was prompted by her union activity in the plant, and his threats were de- signed to compel her to cease that activity. His efforts succeeded, for Barron testi- fied credibly that after this discussion she curtailed her talks with others about the Union. Notwithstanding, the supervisors maintained their pressure on her, Jordon by his efforts in January or February to get her to withdraw from the Union, and 256 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Bowen by his frequent disparaging remarks to her about the Union's Saturday affairs, by his illegal interrogation and crude "jackass" remark of February 28, and his at- tempt on March 2 to make her appear as a liar in front of Bowman, his further criticism of her talking and accusation of failure to keep up her work, which pro- voked an acrimonious argument which he tried to stop by telling her to "shut up" and threatening her with loss of her job. This upset her so much that she indignantly tried to continue the discussion at Jordon's desk to "see it through" and overcome Bowen's charge that she told an untruth. After a short argument, Bowen terminated it by saying they would fight it out "over Labor Relations," and sent her back to her job 1 am convinced that Bowen confronted Barron on the last occasion in order to shift the onus of his prior coercive remarks to her and to disparage and humiliate her in front of Bowman, for I have found above that Bowen in fact told Barron of the probability of Bowman's discharge and threatened a plant shutdown if the Union organized it, and that Barron discussed his remarks with other em- ployees; I do not credit Bowen's testimony that Barron started the rumor of a shut- down, and that he confronted Barron with Bowman in order to deny that he started them, after other workers questioned him about them, especially since he admits that when they reported the rumors to him, he never denied to them that he had made the statements Barron attributed to him. I am convinced that by the above course of conduct, which started in November 1953, involved numerous remarks and threats violative of the Act, and culminated in the heated argument of March 2, Respondent through its supervisors so affected and upset Barron that, when she was confi onted at the start of work 3 or 4 nights later with dirty and unworkable frames which she had great difficulty in restoring to work- ing condition even with help, this became the "straw that broke the camel's back," so to speak, and she quit in disgust, dissatisfied with the job and the way she had been treated. Although her final remarks to Bowen on quitting indicate that one im- mediate reason for quitting was her inability to keep up her work, and she accused Bowen of having put her on that work knowing she could not handle it, it is significant that neither he nor Jordon made any effort to find out the reason for the trouble she encountered that night, to straighten it out, or to induce her to remain. Con- sidering Barron's prominence in the union campaign, Respondent's knowledge thereof, Bowen's clear hostility to unionization, and his increasingly harsh treatment of Bar- ron, in the light of Respondent's antiunion animus and contemporaneous unfair labor practices toward other employees in this period, I am satisfied that General Counsel has sustained the ultimate burden of proving by a preponderance of credible evi- dence in the whole record that, as part of its antiunion measures, Respondent first attempted by illegal means to persuade Barron to withdrawn from the Union and, failing in that attempt, it then subjected her to repeated and unjustified criticism of her work, threatened her with discharge if she did not cease her talk about the Union, and other abuse, which made her job so unbearable that she quit on March 6, 1954, and that Respondent forced her to resign because of her continued adherence to the Union, and thus rid itself of a prominent union organizer. By such conduct, Respondent constructively discharged Barron in order to discourage membership in the Union, in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act, and thereby further inter- fered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act, in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act 11 In addition, Bowen's threats in the first December talk and the March 2, 1954, argument that Barron would be sent home and lose her job if she did not stop her talking about the Union, were independent violations of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act In reaching this conclusion I do not rely upon the allegation that Respondent induced Barron's discharge in part by frequent transfers from job to job, as I find no substantial evidence to that effect in the record Barron testified that Respond- ent moved her around "right smart" after she joined the Union, more than they had done before. However, the only changes in her work shown by the record were a transfer from winding to spinning in about 1950, and another transfer from a Government order to other work after Christmas 1953. There is no charge or proof that the first transfer, long before the advent of the Union, was in anywise dis- criminatory. As to the 1953 transfer, the credible testimony of Barron, Bowen, and Jordon shows that: Barron and 12 or 14 other spinners had been working during 1953 on a Government order for "23 sateen" thread, the order ran out in December 1953, and as each spinner finished her portion of the order, she was transferred '1Cf Class Fiber Moulding Company, 104 NLRB 383, 404-406; Chicago Apparatus Co, 12 NLRB 1002, 1020. enfd 116 F 2d 753 (C A 7) ; Reliance Manufactarcng Company, 60 NLRB 946, 951, 952, Palm Beach Broadcasting Corporation, 63 NLRB 597, 608-613, enfd as mod , 155 F 2d 805 (C. A 5) COATS & CLARK, INC. 257 in the normal course to other work. When Barron finished her part of the order shortly after Christmas, she was shifted to frames turning out another yarn and continued on that work until she quit. There is no substantial testimony that Barron was treated any differently in this transfer from other spinners, or that it was moti- vated by her prior union activities or her discussion with Bowen and Jordon found above. 2. Opal Hicks Hollingworth Hollingworth was first employed by Respondent in 1943 as a magazine winder. After working at that for 2 years, she was transferred to the spinning room where she worked 4 or 5 months until she quit in 1946. She returned to work in 1948 and worked steadily until she quit on March 24, 1954, under circumstances described below. Duiing most of her last employment and at the time she quit, she was a spinner on the third shift under the supervision of Overseer Bowen and Second Hand Jordon. On January 8, 1953, Hollingworth signed a union authorization card which she had received fiom Marie Barron in the mill. Thereafter, she assisted the Union by attending union meetings, driving other employees to meetings, and soliciting them in and out of the plant to join the Union. She signed a second union card on August 18, 1953, after the union campaign was revived After she signed the first card, she told other employees in her neighborhood and in the plant that she had done so. She openly wore a union cap and button in the plant February 28 and March 1, 1954. The issue and contentions in Hollingworth's case are the same as those involved in Barron's case, and the same review of her relations with her supervisors is re- quired. Bowen first talked to Hollingworth about the union campaign one night in February 1954, 2 or 3 weeks before the election. He came to her machine and asked, "Opal, what is this I hear about you being for the Union" She asked him, "Am I for the Union?" and he said, "Yes, you are " She asked who told him she was for the Union, and he replied, "I have ways of finding out," that he had already spoken to her before, and said "I knew you were going to be a hard one to change." He then asked, "Why do you want a Union2-I want you to tell me plain." She complained about an overload of work, frames running bad, and unequal pay for the same work. He admitted that was not right, and said, "Give us a little time to straighten this out." She commented he had had months, and asked how much longer he wanted . He repeated "We will get it straightened out if you will just give us time." He then asked her, "How about changing your mind about the Union?" She replied that she did not sign a card to change her mind, she knew what she was doing before she signed it. Bowen then said, "Well, you had better change your mind. If the Union don't go in, you won't have a job up here, or you won't be able to get a job anywhere else No other textile mill is going to hire you to work. You are going to call up here for a recommendation , we are not going to give them a good one." He also said that if the Union came into the plant, "they" did not have to agree to their terms, that "they" could shut the mill down. He added that, even though Hollingworth did not need her job, there were other women there whose families needed theirs, and asked her to think about them. He closed by telling her to "get your job up now," and stating he would talk more to her later. I find these facts on credited testimony of Hollingworth, which was undenied by Bowen except the statement "I have ways of finding out," and the threat to refuse her a good recom- mendation for another job. I do not credit these denials, both because of his anti- union animus demonstrated by his unlawful conduct toward Barron and others found above, and because, although he testified on direct that job recommendations were handled by the "front office" and he was not consulted on them, he admitted on cross-examination that he would have to be consulted by management on whether a spinner under hint was doing a good job, but during his 2 years as overseer he had not yet been consulted about that. He did not deny the threat of a plant shutdown except by his general testimony that in all discussions with employees he made no threats but stated only his opinion of the possibility of a plant shutdown in the event of a strike by the Union to enforce its demands on the Company, I do not credit this general testimony for reasons stated above. I find that Respondent on this occasion violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act by (1) Bowen's interrogation of Hollmgworth as to hei union adherence and her reasons therefor, (2) his suggestion that she change her mind about the Union, after indicating that Respondent would "straighten out" her complaints shortly, which amounted to a solicitation of with- drawal from the Union accompanied by a promise of adjustment of grievances, (3) his threat that it the Union did not come into the plant, she would lose her job and would be prevented from getting employment elsewhere for lack of recommenda- 258 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tion by Respondent, which was in effect a threat of economic reprisal if the Union failed in the election and was not in the plant to protect her, and (4) the threat that if the Union organized the plant and made demands, the Company would shut down the mill in reprisal. It is clear that in the above conversation, if not sooner, Bowen became aware of Hollingworth's adherence to the Union. Two nights after the above discussion, Bowen showed Hollingworth a poem indi- cating the possible consequences of joining the CIO, such as a strike and difficulties employees might have in paying bills if they were not working. Hollingworth read it without comment. Bowen told her to think about it, saying there was "a lot of truth to that." Thereafter up to the election, Bowen frequently talked to Holling- worth about the Union, pointing out various disadvantages of union membership. One night shortly before the election, Bowen and Jordon brought to Hollingworth and other workers a company letter indicating some of the possible consequences to the workers if the Union won the election, and alternative consequences if it won. The letter itself is not in evidence. When Hollingworth finished reading it, Bowen asked what she thought of it. Her answer was to pull her CIO cap down lower on her head. Bowen said she had "better wait until after the election to holler." On another night, while employee James McDonald was showing Hollingworth an article out- lining trouble which had occurred in unionized plants, Jordon came up and showed them a sample election ballot, and explained how they should be marked by the workers properly to indicate their desires. He told Hollingworth she could vote the way she wanted, but he pointed to the "no" printed on the ballot and said that the Company wanted them to vote "no," and he hoped she would vote the "right way." McDonald told Jordon he could not convince Hollingworth about the article they were reading, and that Hollingworth had told him nothing like that would happen at Clarkdale. Jordon said, "She had better believe it, I am afraid she is going to be sorry " On February 28, 1954, when the workers got their union T-shirts, caps, and buttons, Bowen asked Hollingworth at her machine where her button was, and she said she would have one, to give her a little time. She secured and wore a cap and button at work shortly after. The above findings are based on credited testimony of Hollingworth, as corroborated in part by that of Bowen and Jordon. I do not credit testimony of those supervisors inconsistent therewith, in view of their unlawful conduct toward other employees found above. McDonald did not testify. I find that Bowen's interrogation of Hollingworth about her union button February 28 was violative of Section 8 (a) (1), but I find no other independent violations in his other remarks or those of Jordon. Jordon's remark that "she is going to be sorry," on which General Counsel relies heavily, clearly referred to the article stating some consequences of unionization of plants, with which Hollingworth had disagreed, and was obviously an expression of his opinion to the contrary. On March 16, 1954, Hollingworth was laid off by Bowen. That night she had trouble keeping up her production on 14 sides; her work constantly became "stuck up" or torn up, and her machine did not run. When Jordon noticed this, he at first told her that he would have to cut her to 12 sides, and reduce her pay accordingly, if she could not handle 14 properly. Hollingworth replied that she would not run sides for less than $48 per week, and said "If you want to get shet [rid] of me that bad, why don't you just fire me9" Jordon did not answer. Hollingworth became upset when told of a probable pay cut, left her work, and went to the restroom for a Coke and a cigarette to calm her nerves. In her absence, Bowen and Jordon came back to inspect her work and found it torn up again. When she returned to her machine, Bowen told her she must operate her job more efficiently and keep the machines running in order to maintain the required production, and that they were not going to discharge her, but would have to reduce her allocation to 12 sides if she did not do better, although they did not want to reduce her unless they were forced to Bowen said they would lay her off for 4 days to give her a chance to make nn her mind to do better work, as they were sure she could do better work than she had been doing. Hollingworth was sent home for the balance of that week, and returned to work Monday, March 22, 1954. Jordon put her to work on 14 sides, to see if she could handle them, but she failed to do so, and he at once cut her back to 12 sides with a corresponding reduction in pay.12 On receiving this cut, Holling- u The exact amount of the pav cut is not clear in the record Hnlhngwoith said it amounted to $8 per week, and reduced her nay to $40 per week Holhngworth received $52 86 per week for handling 16 sides in 1953 ; when she received her first pay cut In March 1953. as found hereafter, she was cut by $4 86, to $48 per week; and the reduction of 2 more sides, to 12, involved a similar cut in pav, but not exactly the same, for she testified that her guaranteed hourly rate for 14 sides was somewhat less than that for 16 sides, COATS & CLARK, INC. 259 worth told Jordon that if they were not satisfied with the way she did the job, they should give her the "little slip," meaning a discharge notice. Jordon replied that they would not discharge her but would continue to lay her off to give her a chance to "straighten out" and prove she could do the work, and if she did not, they might discharge her Hollingworth worked on 12 sides that night and part of March 23, but without improvement. On the latter night her supervisors found her work torn up again, and Bowen mentioned to her the previous layoff because her work was torn up, told her that her work was torn up again, that she could not handle 12 sides properly, and that they were going to lay her off for a week, and would continue to lay her off a longer period each time, until she determined to do the work right. Hollingworth went home about 4 a. m. (March 24), returned to the plant office later that morning for her pay, and quit her job. These findings are based on credited testimony of Hollingworth, Bowen, and Jordon, which is mutually corroborative in material aspects; testimony of any of these witnesses at variance with the findings is not credited. Hollingworth testified that she quit her job because of the pressure her supeivisor put on her, and that she could not stand the criticism, the layoffs, and the corre- sponding cuts in her pay. To show the pressure on her, General Counsel relied on her testimony that: After she joined the Union, the spinners had too much work to do, were not able to "keep it up," and received many complaints from Jordon about it, Jordon often watched Hollingworth at work for long periods, giving her detailed orders on how to handle the frames and pull out "chokes" or snarls, and ordering her to run the guideboard (for cleaning out lint) three times a night. His complaints were frequent until Bowen tried to persuade her to vote against the Union (which must have been about mid-February, the occasion of his first talk with her as found above), then they "slacked off," but after Hollingworth indicated she would not change her mind about the Union, Jordon's complaints increased. General Counsel claims that the real reason for this "pressure" was her refusal to abandon her adherence to the Union as shown by her statements to Bowen in their first talk in mid-February, which prompted his warning to "change your mind" under pain of loss of a favorable recommendation for another job, and the later warning that she had better believe the printed article about the trouble caused by unions in other plants, otherwise "she is going to be sorry." The above testimony, in the light of Respondent's clear autiui..un animus, its other unfair labor practices, and its discriminatory treatment of Barron, another spinner, raises at least a strong suspicion that Respondent was following the same plan of harassing another active union adherent until she quit her job. However, other facts and circumstances shown by the record militate against a finding to that effect. I find from credible testimony of Hollingworth and Joidon that Hollingworth le ai ned to spin sometime in 1949, and after she became an "allocation spinner," she was assigned to handle a specific number of spinning frames; at first she started with 10 sides 13 and, as she grew more proficient, the number was increased until in 1952 she was running 16 sides, which she continued to handle until about March 1953. Jordon testified that Hollingworth handled 16 sides satisfactorily for a while in this period, but she admitted she started having trouble in keeping up her work when she received 16 sides. Bowen testified that she had not been running her job properly ever since he became overseer on third shift (about November 1952), in that she did not patrol her frames regularly and keep them clean, and for that reason he reduced her allocation to 14 sides in March 1953 with a pay reduction. Bowen's testimony on this point is coiroboiated by admissions of Hollingworth. She also admitted that management started to criticize her work only after she became an allocation spinner and before she was reduced to 14 sides Jordon testified credibly, and I find, that when spinners were unable to handle 16 sides satisfactorily, it was Respondent's practice to reduce their sides to 14, with a corresponding cut in pay, and try them at that amount; if they could not handle 14, they were further reduced in sides (and pay) until they reached a figure they could handle. If spinners improved after such reductions and pioved they could handle more sides, Respondent promptly increased their allocation, for the plant always had more work than the spinners could handle, and was constantly seeking new help. I find from credible testimony of Bowen and Jordon that, following the March 1953 reduction, Hollingworth's work only improved sporadi- cally and gradually grew worse from about August or September 1953 up to "larch 1954, when it reached the point where her frames were often stopped 4 or 5 hours out of an 8-hour shift; in the latter part of this period, Hollingworth continually refused to obey Jordon's orders about regular patrolling of her frames, prompt 13 There are apparently two "sides" to each fiame. 260 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD handling of snarls, and frequent cleaning with the guideboard, with the result that the yarn was often mixed with lint which causes it to break, requiring frequent stoppages to clear the snarls; 14 Jordon often had to assign other spinners to assist Hollingworth in clearing the snarls. Then came the layoffs of March 16 and 23 and Hollingworth's quitting on the 24th. It is clear, and I find, from all of the above testimony that long before the advent of the Union Hollingworth began to have trouble keeping up her work, which prompted Jordon to watch her oper- ations and coach and admonish her constantly as to the proper method of doing it, and resulted in the first reduction in sides and pay in March 1953, the first layoff of March 16, 1954, the second reduction in sides and pay on March 22, and the second layoff of March 23. There is no substantial proof that the layoff of March 1953 was caused by the advent of the Union or Hollingworth's signing of a union card in January 1953. It is also evident from the remarks of both supervisors at the time of the layoffs as found above that each was imposed as a disciplinary measure based on Hollingworth's apparent inability or refusal to follow orders and maintain production. While the interrogation and threats to which Holling- worth was subjected on two occasions about mid-February were clearly coercive and undoubtedly had some effect on her state of mind and inferentially on her work, the facts that both instances occurred almost a month before she quit, that the coercive threats occurred in the first, and longer, conversation, and that no similar coercive conduct was directed toward her again before the election, militate against the inference that these two instances of coercion were the proximate cause of her quitting. The inference is further weakened by Hollingworth's own testimony that she quit because she could not stand the way she was being criticized, laid off, and reduced in pay, and the preponderant credible testimony noted above that such criticism, layoffs, and pay cuts were caused by her long-continued inability or refusal to follow orders and keep up her production. This testimony alone appears to be sufficient to overcome any suspicion or even inference that Hollingworth was sub- jected to this treatment because of her union activity. The discriminatory inference is further negated by the uncontradicted facts, which I find from credited testimony of Bowen and Jordon and admissions of Hollingworth, that: Between January 1953 and the time Hollingworth quit, other spinners had trouble handling 16 sides and were reduced, some from 16 to 14 sides, others from 14 to 12, and even 12 to 10, with corresponding cuts in pay; at least 4 spinners, Mar- garet Parsons, Nell Wilson, Mattie Powers and Mary Brown, were cut from 16 to 14 sides (with a pay cut) about December 1953 on a changeover from the Government "23 sateen" order to other work when they experienced difficulty in maintaining pro- duction on a different weight of yarn; these workers were criticized and coached to improve their work, like Hollingworth; Parsons and Wilson were further cut from 14 to 12 sides and both were laid off on the first layoff, with Hollingworth, for failure to do their work efficiently; when Wilson came back, her work did not improve and she was laid off again, but on her return she improved and at the time of the hearing was handling 16 sides satisfactorily; Parsons was out sick for awhile, but on her return was restored to 14 sides which she handles without trouble. Although it appears that both Parsons and Wilson were union adherents, there is no charge or proof that their pay reductions and layoffs were discriminatorily motivated. The similar treatment of all five employees further impels the conclusion that Hollingworth's layoffs and pay cuts were due to her poor work and not her union adherence. After careful consideration of all the above facts, in the light of the opposing con- tentions of the parties, I am satisfied by a preponderance of credible evidence in the record that Hollingworth quit her job on March 24, 1954, because she felt she could not afford the loss of pay involved in her recent layoffs, and could not stand the criticism of her work which led up to those layoffs, and that such criticism and pay cuts were caused by her inability or refusal to follow orders and handle her work properly I am constrained to find and conclude that General Counsel has failed to sustain the ultimate burden of proving by a preponderance of credible evidence in the record as a whole that Respondent compelled Hollingworth to resign her job by im- proper criticism or unceasing harassment because of her union adherence and activity, or that Respondent's unlawful conduct toward her on two occasions were the proxi- l4 When a snarl or tangle of yarn develops through a breakage of the yarn, the longer the broken end "stays down," i e , winds around a roller or piles up on the floor, the worse the snail gets, and the longer it takes to fix it If the frames are regularly and properly patrolled , a snarl can be caught and cut out before it gets bad , thus avoiding a long stoppage of the machine to correct the trouble. COATS & CLARK, INC. 261 mate cause of her resignation.15 I therefore grant Respondent's motion to dismiss paragraphs numbered 11 and 13 of the complaint insofar as they relate to Opal Hollingworth.16 3. Kathleen Streeter Kathleen Streeter worked for Respondent as a spinner on second shift under the supervision of Overseer Valentine from May 1953 until she quit on Friday, March 26, 1954. She signed a union card on October 8 or 9, 1953, and attended one union meeting on October 17, 1953, but did not engage in any other union activity in or out of the plant. On a Monday shortly after the October union meeting she attended, Streeter had a talk with Valentine at her workplace, in which he asked if she had attended the meeting. She asked what meeting and he said, "You know what meeting I am talking about." She said she did not know; and he said "That damn union meeting." She replied that she did not go and asked if he had. He replied, "Hell, no," and said "I thought you turned and go in with the rest of them sons-of-bitches." I find this con- versation from credited testimony of Streeter; Valentine denied only that he used the last-quoted obnoxious term, but I do not credit his denial in view of his use of similar terms in remarks to Ellis found above. Valentine's interrogation was a violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act His disparaging remarks about union adherents are reprehensible but not violative of the Act. On an occasion about Christmas time 1953, Valentine asked Streeter in the plant if she had signed a union card. She said, "No." He then said that if she did not sign a card, she would have a job there as long as she wanted it. I find this con- versation on credited testimony of Streeter; I do not credit Valentine's denials there- of, as he admitted he may have on occasion questioned Streeter jokingly about the progress of the Union. I find his interrogation and implied offer of indefinite job security in the plant if she did not sign a union card, as independent violations of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.17 Streeter quit her job on Friday, March 26, 1954. At the start of her shift, she told Valentine, when he assigned her to certain frames, that she could not run them. She had told him the same thing when he assigned her to them the day before. Valen- tine told her on Friday that she would have to operate them. She did so until about 5:30 or 6 p. m., and then told a fixer nearby that she was quitting, and left the plant. Streeter testified that she quit because "I could not iun my job" and "I was talked to so dirty down there" and "I couldn't get any help." With respect to the "dirty" talk, Streeter testified that Second Hand Shuler talked "dirty" to her, but she does not elaborate on what he said, and I consider it insubstantial testimony. She also testified that after the election, Valentine criticized her work, told her nearly every night that she was not trying to keep up her work, and that he did not know what had "got into" her. She says that no one had ever criticized her work before she got sick in January 1954, and no one has done so since she returned to work in July 1954. I am unable to conclude, however, that Valentine's remarks were "dirty" or harassing talk or unwarranted or discriminatory criticism, for several reasons. Streeter testified, and I find, that: She became sick January 21, 1954, and was out of work until March 1, 1954. When she returned she could not handle 14 sides, and started by operating only 8, but increased the number until she reached 14, the same number she had been handling without trouble since about October 1953 and until' her sickness. She handled 14 sides for about a week before she quit; the only difference was in the type of thread, and the frames she operated were not the same as those she had run when she returned from the illness, because upon her return, Valentine had shifted her around somewhat, and she had worked on her final frames only once or twice before she quit. During her employment, Streeter was 71 There is no substantial proof that Hollingworth was discriminatorily transferred from job to job 16Tn ieaclung the above conclusions, I have considered uncontradicted testimony of Hollingworth indicating that after she joined the Union, the workload was so heavy that the spinners had no free time, as previously, to go to the restroom or eat lunch, but had to take time out at the expense of production to do it, and that they could not get as much help as formerly. This testimony indicates that the increased workload and lack of help caused the workeis some inconvenience, but there is no proof that Respondent created that situation delibeiatcly in older to harass workers or force them to quit because of union activities. W I find no violation of the Act in Valentine's remark to Streeter the night before the election that the union caps, etc , would not bring the Union into the plant, and that "I hope your heart is set in the right way for tomoirow " 262 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD paid a guaranteed salary, regardless of whether she handled 14, 12, 10, or fewer sides. These facts indicate clearly that Streeter had trouble handling her work after she returned from her illness, but suffered no loss of pay. Whether her trouble was due to her illness, or Valentine's shifting of her from job to job, is not clear from the record; but there is no proof that her illness was caused by Respondent, nor that her transfer from job to job was unjustified or discriminatory, on the latter point, to the contrary, Jordon testified credibly, and I find, that in this period all spinning machines in the plant were not operated due to lack of experienced help, and the overseers moved spinners from one set of machines to another as required to meet production quotas on different types of yarn. Whatever the reason for Streeter's inability to do her work, her sudden reversal of working form was clearly the reason for Valentine's concern and complaints about her work, and his inquiry as to what had "got into" her. In view of working conditions in the plant, the complaint and inquiry was clearly justified, and Valentine would probably have been remiss in his duties if he had not looked into her situation. The fact that he did so after he had interrogated her about the Union, disparaged that organization, and offered her a benefit if she left it, several months before and in a period when Re- spondent was indulging in other unfair labor practices, raises a suspicion that his criticism and transfers of Streeter might have been motivated by Respondent's anti- union animus. But that suspicion is weakened by the lack of substantial proof that Respondent knew of her union adherence; her own testimony indicates that she concealed it from Valentine. Further, the economic necessity for the transfers is clearly shown by Jordon's testimony stated above. The suspicion arising from the mere timing of Valentine's criticism will not support a finding of discrimination. The salient circumstance is that, after she returned from her illness, Streeter just could not handle her work efficiently as before, a development which was bound to cause Valentine concern and induce him to inquire into the reason for it. Streeter's testimony indicates that she probably resented his criticism of her poor work, and the form of his inquiry as to its cause, but his remarks about her work, as stated in Streeter's testimony, do not contain any promises of benefit of threats of reprisal, nor any mention of the Union or her adherence thereto, and I cannot conclude that they were actually "dirty" or harassing, or intended as such, to an extent which would warrant a conclusion that they were discriminatory and made for the purpose of forcing her to quit her job With regard to the lack of help, Streeter testified that before her illness her work ran well and she could get help when she needed it, but after she returned to work, she could not get help, and when she asked Valentine for it, he told her that there were no spare hands on second shift who could help her, as those hands were supposed to act as cleaners. There is no proof that Valentine's explanation was false or given as a pretext, or that he deliberately deprived her of help At most, Streeter's testi- mony raises a suspicion that she might have been told this, and deprived of help, in the period after the election in older to make it more difficult for her to keep up her work and induce her to quit, this suspicion is consistent with Respondent's concomitant unfair labor practices, and particularly its discriminatory treatment of Barron. But even a strong suspicion is not proof which will support a finding of violation of the Act. At most, it can be said that the lack of help made Streeter's work more onerous and was a factor in her decision to quit, but there is no substantial proof that Respondent deliberately created this situation from discriminatory motives to make her quit. The remaining, and only substantial, reason for Streeter's quitting was her admit- ted inability to do the work last assigned to her. As there is no proof that the assign- ment was discriminatory and for the purpose of inducing her to quit, I am com- pelled to conclude and find that she resigned voluntarily because she could not handle that work This conclusion is strengthened by her credited testimony that: She later applied for work at the plant, advising management she would take any job; she returned to work July 19, 1954, in response to a written offer of employment, and was assigned to the same work, with the same pay, that she had handled before she quit, except that on her return she handled 12 frames on the average, as against 14 before she quit; later she was transferred to cleaning work, which she was handling contentedly and without trouble at the time she testified. On the entire record relating to Streeter, I conclude that General Counsel has failed to establish by a preponderance of credible evidence the allegations of para- graphs numbered 12 and 13 of the complaint as to her, and I therefore grant Re- spondent's motion to dismiss those paragraphs insofar as they relate to her. COATS & CLARK, INC. 263 4. Kermit Pierce Hurst Kermit Hurst worked steadily for Respondent from 1937 to his discharge on March 26, 1954. In that period he handled various jobs, but from 1945 onward he was a regular doffer.18 At his discharge, he worked on first shift under Overseer Davis and Second Hand Rogers. Hurst signed a union authorization card August 1, 1953, and thereafter was active in the organizing campaign, soliciting other employees to sign cards outside the plant, discussing the Union openly outside the mill and at change of shifts inside, and attending all union meetings but one, including the Saturday parties. He procured a union T-shirt, cap, and buttons on February 28, 1954, and wore them openly in the plant March 1 and 2, and at times after the election. Overseer Davis admitted he saw Hurst wearing them in the plant on March 1 and 2. 1 find that Respondent was aware of Hurst's union adherence at least from March 1 onward. The doffer's duties are to remove or "doff" bobbins filled with twisted yarn from the twister frames as the bobbins become full, load them on racks, and push the loaded racks to the "spare floor," an open area between the twisting department and the reeling department, whence they are taken to the reeling department where the yarn is removed from the bobbins on the reeling machines. The doffer brings empty racks from the spare floor to the twisting department, where he loads them with empty bobbins of the required size from bins lined up in the aisles between the twister frames. He takes the rack to the next frame to be doffed, doffs the full bobbins, replaces them with empties from the rack, loads it with full bobbins and pushes it to the spare floor in the usual manner. About 8 a. in. on Friday, March 26, 1954, Hurst found frame No. 31 ready to doff. He needed size 41/2 bobbins to doff it, but found none in the bins, so he walked to the spare floor, got a Coca-Cola from a vending machine, and then walked into the reel department to collect bobbins. There he met Cecil A. Meeks, who was acting as bobbin boy that day.10 Hurst asked Meeks to help him collect size 41/2 bobbins and load them on an empty rack. They proceeded to collect bobbins which were scattered in various places in the reel department and load them on the rack, Hurst drinking his Coca-Cola as he worked. As they were loading, Overseer Davis came up to Hurst with Cliff Hunter, an overhauler who was acting as second hand in the twister department that day in the absence of Rogers.20 Davis asked Hurst if he was not off his job. Hurst said he was not, and that he had come to get bobbins and racks to doff a frame Davis reminded Hurst that he had previously been ordered to stay out of the reel department. Hurst replied that he had promised to do so, provided Davis would keep him supplied with bobbins and racks, but that he had no "goddam" bobbins, that Davis knew it but hadn't done a "damn" thing about it, and had not kept him supplied with the "damn bobbins and racks," so he went for them himself. Davis asked Huist if he had not been told to see his second hand if he needed bobbins, and Hurst replied that "we have been out of bobbins for two goddam months and you haven't done a goddam thing about it." Davis then told Hurst to "slow down and stop cursing," that he (Davis) did not use that kind of language and was not going to have Hurst use it to him. Hunter also asked Hurst to quiet down. Hurst said he was getting "goddam" tired of the way he was being treated, and repeated that Davis did not furnish him with any bobbins. Davis then told Hurst that if he did not stop curs- ing, he would have no further use for him. Hurst continued cursing, saying, "God- dam you, you have come down here to show your damn authority." Davis then said he did not need him any more, and told him to report to the office for his money. Hurst told Davis to go ahead and fire him, cursing further. As Davis started to walk off, Hurst swore again, and said Davis was going to bring him his money. Davis said he did not pay off discharged employees, and that Hurst would have to 18 Hurst called himself "head doffer," but there is no such position In the plant. The teen only meant that if the amount of doffing required the services of more than one dotter, IIuist would be guaranteed his full production of 12 frames , and the spare doffer would handle the ieniaindei Doffers were paid by spindle production , I. e , according to the numbei of spindles they doffed is The bobbin boy collects empty bobbins and takes them in boxes to the bins in the to istei depai tment 20 Slim tly before, Davis had noticed Hurst standing about the middle of the reel depart- ment, some distance from his place of work, so he went to the twisting depaitinent and asked Iluntei if he knew Hurst was in the ice] depailinent hunter said lie did not, and that Hurst was supposed to be doffing frame No 31 . Davis then asked Hunter to accom- pany him and they walked omei to talk to Hoist 379288-56-vol. 113-18 264 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD go to the office for it. As he again started to walk off, Hurst blocked his way, shook the empty Coca-Cola bottle at him, and said, "You are going to pay, damn you, and pay dearly." Davis then walked away. Hurst went to the office where he was paid off about 9 a. m. and left the plant. The argument took the better part of 10 minutes. These findings are based on credited testimony of Hurst, Davis, Meeks, and Hunter which is mutually corroborative in the essential aspects of the argument. Although there is a conflict of testimony as to the length of time Meeks and Hunter were present during the argument, I am satisfied from all the testimony and find that both were present and overheard most of the conversation. There was a wide divergence between the testimony of Hurst and Meeks on one hand, and Davis and Hunter on the other, as to the extent of Hurst's use of profanity. The former admitted Hurst said "damn bobbins and racks" once during the argument, and the latter said he used profanity liberally. After careful observance of Hurst's appearance and demeanour, and noting his rather blunt, emphatic, and at times defiant maner of testifying on the stand, and considering the credible testimony of Calvin Thomason, a spare doffer, who said Hurst used profanity in the mill over a period of 10 or 12 years past, even using it in "bawling out" Second Hand Rogers when things did not run to suit him and he got angry, I have credited Davis' and Hunter's version of the argument as to its length and the extent of the profanity used by Hurst. Testimony of Hurst and Meeks at variance with the findings is not credited. Respondent contends that Hurst was discharged for (1) insolent insubordination and insulting behavior to his supervisor, and (2) violation of an established plant rule against leaving the lob without permission, after receiving notice of the rule and prior warning. General Counsel claims both reasons are but pretexts used by Respondent to rid itself of an active union adherent In his brief, General Counsel argues that Respondent's second defense has no merit because Davis' own testimony about the argument with Hurst clearly shows that Hurst's absence from his job to get supplies was not the reason for the discharge. Considering the nature and course of the argument which immediately preceded the discharge, I agree with General Counsel that Davis' testimony shows the reason for discharge, and for that reason deem it unnecessary to consider Respondent's second contention or to make findings on the conflicting testimony bearing on Respondent's prior enforcement of plant rules prohibiting absence from one's workplace without permission, and the reasons for Hurst's alleged violation of the rule. This leaves only General Counsel's contention that Hurst's abusive language was not the true reason for the discharge. I consider this argument unsupportable for several reasons. It is clear from the nature of the discussion and the manner in which it started that Davis approached Hurst in a normal manner to inquire about his absence from his job and talk to him about his alleged violation of a plant rule. Regardless of whether Hurst's absence from his job was justified or not, Davis' reason for talking to Hurst obviously stemmed from considerations of plant discipline; there is no allegation in the complaint, claim by General Counsel, nor proof, that Davis had been keeping Hurst under surveillance from ulterior motives, nor that Davis sought out and taxed Hurst with a rule violation to provoke Hurst or force a situation which might serve as a pretext for discharge. There is nothing in Davis' remarks or attitude during the discussion as shown by the record which can reasonably be said to have provoked, much less justified, Hurst's sudden and extensive cursing and abuse of his superior, and his final threatening attitude and remarks to him, all of which occurred in the presence of three other employees. General Counsel argues from Thomason's testimony noted above that Hurst had used profanity in the plant for many years, even toward his supervisors, without criticism or discipline, intimating that Davis seized upon a not unusual in- stance of Hurst's profanity as a convenient pretext to discharge him. The answer to this is that, according to Thomason, Hurst had used profanity in the past only within the hearing of Thomason and a few times toward Second Hand Rogers, there is no proof that Davis had ever before been subjected to it, or had even heard Hurst use it to others. Thus, it cannot be maintained that Davis was suddenly discharging Hurst for conduct he had previously condoned. It seems clear to me that, when Davis was subjected, for the first time in his 2 years of supervision of Hurst, to an outburst of unwarranted cursing and personal abuse in front of witnesses, he reacted normally by first ordering Hurst to cease the profanity and, when Hurst did not comply, discharging him on the spot. The most that can be said for General Coun- sel's "pretext" argument is that the combination of Hurst's union activity, Respond- ent's admitted knowledge thereof, and Respondent's other unfair labor practices, raise a strong suspicion that Davis seized upon Hurst's intemperate language on this occasion as a pretext to rid the plant of an active union adherent (who was also a regular doffer of nearly 10 years' service, and presumably a valuable employee), but COATS & CLARK, INC. 265 that suspicion is weakened by the complete lack of proof that Hurst's supervisors men- tioned the Union or his adherence to it on March 26 or at any time previously, and it is overcome by the preponderant proof that Hurst, though long addicted to pro- fanity in the plant, used it for the first time toward Davis on March 26 without provocation or justification and was at once discharged therefor. I find that the proximate and efficient cause of the discharge was Hurst's cursing and insolent be- havior on that occasion, and not his union adherence or activity. It is well settled that an employee's known prominence in union or concerted activity does not afford him the right to any special consideration or immunity from discipline. Republic Cotton Mills, 101 NLRB 1475, 1479. I conclude that General Counsel has not sustained the ultimate burden of proving that Hurst was discharged for his union activity, and I therefore grant Respondent's motion to dismiss the complaint insofar as it relates to him. N. L. R. B v Union Mfg Co., 124 F. 2d 332, 333 (C. A. 5); Fariners Cooperative Company v. N. L. R. B., 208 F. 2d 296, 303, 304, (C. A. 8). 5. Fannie Louise Hurst Fannie Louise Hurst is the wife of Kermit P. Hurst. She was first employed by Respondent in 1938, worked a short while, and was laid off. She was rehired in 1940 and worked steadily, except for a maternity leave of 51/2 months in 1947, until July 3, 1953, when she again took maternity leave. Davis was her overseer. She joined the Union in August 1953 and attended several regular union meetings with her hus- band and the Saturday recreational affairs with her children. The issue as to her is whether Respondent discriminatorily refused to reinstate her after her maternity leave expired because of the union activities of herself and her husband. The record shows that it was Respondent's long-established policy to grant 6 months' maternity leave to female employees; if they return to work within that period, they are automatically reinstated to their old jobs, but if they do not, they are written off the payroll and are required to apply for employment thereafter as new employees. As Mrs. Hurst took maternity leave on July 3, 1953, her 6 months' period expired January 3, 1954. When she did not return to work on or before that date, she was written off the payroll on January 6, 1954, as having "left," the reason being stated as "out over 6 months." The Hursts were unable to secure someone to take care of the new baby before the 6 months expired, so about the middle of December Hurst told Overseer Davis that his wife was ready to return, but could not do so because they did not have a housekeeper to take care of the baby. Hurst asked Davis to extend his wife's maternity leave beyond the 6 months until they found a housekeeper, but Davis said he could not do that because it would be against company rules, and that if she did not return before the end of the 6 months, she would be written off the payroll as having quit, as that was company policy. Davis also told Hurst that when his wife found a housekeeper she should send word to Davis when she would come back. The above findings are based on credited testi- mony of Robert H. Causey, Davis, and both Hursts I do not credit Kermit Hurst's testimony that Davis said it would be all right for her to come back after the 6 months and in effect extended her leave, because Davis testified credibly that he had no such authority, there is no substantial evidence that Respondent had ever given extensions of maternity leave before,21 and Office Manager Causey testified without contradiction on the basis of company records that Respondent had early in 1954 written off the payroll 3 other female employees for overstaying maternity leave, and 1 man likewise for staying out more than 6 months, all of which testimony satisfies me that Respondent was not in the habit of waiving the 6-month rule. The Hursts finally secured a housekeeper on February 27 or 28, 1954. On March 3, 1954, Mr. Hurst told Davis that they had a housekeeper and his wife was ready to return to woik. Davis reminded Hurst of the 6-month rule and said Mrs. Hurst was no longer an employee because she was out more than 6 months. Hurst asked Davis if his wife could not be rehired, and Davis said he could do so if there were any openings, but that he could not use her, and he had no openings on the first shift; he suggested that if she applied at the office for work, there might be vacancies on the second or third shifts. These findings are based on credited testimony of Davis and Kermit Hurst. I do not credit Hurst's testimony that Davis told him he could not use Mrs. Hurst "now or ever," for several reasons Davis denied specifically that he said this to Hurst. Mrs. Hurst testified without contradiction that she had been a winder hand about 11 years at the time of her second maternity leave, and that both Overseer Davis and Plant Manager Johnson 21 Ili, Hurst testified that there had been prim extensions of maternity leave, but could not giie any naives or dates, and I do not consider this vague testimony as substantial 266 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD had told her she was one of the best winder hands, and it strains credulity to say that Davis would have abruptly told Mr Hurst on March 3 that Respondent had no further use for a valuable, highly satisfactory employee, even assuming he knew of or suspected her union affiliation on the basis of his knowledge of her husband's union adherence. There is no proof that Davis or any other supervisor ever talked to Mrs. Hurst about the Union, so that there is nothing in the record which will support an inference that Respondent was looking for a chance to get rid of her because of her union activity. At the very most, Respondent's antiunion animus and unfair labor practices in this period, plus the fact that Davis knew of Hurst's union adherence, lend some support for Hurst's version of the conversation and raise a suspicion that Davis was acting from discriminatory motives, but that sus- picion cannot prevail against the substantial facts noted above. It is thus much more likely that Davis advised Hurst, as found above, that his wife was technically off the payroll by operation of the 6 months' rule, but that she might be rehired on some shift upon application at the plant office; he did not rule out any reem- ployment of Mrs. Hurst, but only indicated he had no opening for her at that time on the first shift. General Counsel offered no contrary proof to indicate that the first shift did have openings for winders at the time. General Counsel argues that Davis' suggestion that Mrs. Hurst apply at the office was a rejection of her application through her husband for reinstatement, contrary to past practice of Re- spondent under which she had twice been returned to work through the agency of her husband, and that the sudden requirement of a personal application for re- employment after the Hursts' union activities became known requires a finding that she was refused employment because of their union activity. This argument is without merit because the record does not show that Respondent had ever re- hired her in the past, after separation from the payroll, through application of her husband. Mrs. Hurst's testimony shows that, after an economic layoff in 1940, Respondent called her back to work by sending her word through her husband to report for work; in this instance she did not apply for rehiring but was recalled by Respondent. She also testified that, toward the close of her 1947 maternity leave but within the 6-month period, she sent word to the plant through her hus- band that she would return on a certain date, and she came back to work on that date within the 6-month period without further application; in this case, it is ap- parent that she was still carried on the payroll as an employee during the 6-month maternity leave and obviously it was not necessary for her to make formal appli- cation for her job within that period. It follows that neither instance would justify her reliance upon application for work through her husband after she was off the payroll. I find nothing discriminatory, therefore, in Davis' suggestion on March 3 that Mrs. Hurst should apply at the plant office for work, for this was apparently normal plant practice where an employee had been separated from the payroll for any reason. On all the above facts and circumstances, 1 am satisfied and find that Mrs. Hurst was separated from the payroll on January 6, 1954, in the normal operation of Respondent's 6-month maternity leave rule, that Davis did not waive that rule as to her in his talk with her husband in December, and that Davis did not refuse to rehire her on March 3, 1954, but merely suggested that she make application for work in the normal course as a separated employee. I find no substantial proof that Davis' conduct toward her was discriminatory or arose from discriminatory motives. I conclude that General Counsel has failed to sustain the allegations of the complaint as to Fannie Louise Hurst by a preponderance of credible evidence, and 1 theretore grant Respondent's motion to dismiss the complaint insofar as it charges a discriminatory refusal to reinstate or reemploy her. 6. Ceab Smith 22 Ceab Smith was first employed by Respondent in 1940. He worked about 5 years, running cards about 3 years and tending a lapping machine for 2, and then quit. He returned to work in 1951 and thereafter tended a lapping machine until his discharge on March 30, 1954, 23 in this period, Smith worked on third shift under the supervision of Overseer Bowen and Second Hand John Sanders. As a lap tender, Smith's duties involved feeding cotton fibre into the machine, doffing it 22 Eri oneously called "Scab" Smith in the complaint. zR A lapping machine is fed cotton fibres as they conic in rough form from the carding machines, and rolls them into a sheet of fibres 12 or 14 inches wide, called a "lap," which is mound on a large bobbin Thence the lap is taken to a comber Where the fibres are fur- ther tieated preparatory to spinning. COATS & CLARK, INC. 267 periodically by removing full lap rolls, and cleaning all parts of the machine to keep it free of cotton lint or waste. Smith signed a union authorization card about February 1, 1954, and thereafter actively supported the Union by attending five meetings and soliciting other em- ployees to sign cards He persuaded 12 or 15 to sign up. He secured a union cap and badge at the February 28, 1954, meeting, and wore them openly in the plant on his shift on March 1 and 2, 1954. About a week before the election, while Smith was doffing his machine, Overseer Bowen came up and asked what Smith was going to do when the employees voted the Union in. Smith replied he would do as he had done one time before. Bowen asked what that was, and Smith said when he had come back to work he had found a Negro on his job, that "we" gave him 3 minutes to get out, and the Negro left. Smith attended one Saturday union meeting, and when he went to work the following Sunday night, Sanders came to him and asked if he attended the union meeting. Smith said he did. Sanders asked how many were there and Smith replied he did not know, but estimated around 150 or 175. Sanders then walked off. The above findings are based on uncontra- dicted and credited testimony of Smith I find therefrom that Respondent was aware of Smith's union affiliation and sympathies at least on and after March 1, 1954, and probably in February. Sanders' interrogation as to Smith's attendance at the Saturday union meeting and the number of workers there (which must have occurred sometime in late January or during February) was an independent viola- tion of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. The issue as to Smith is whether he was discharged on March 30 because he cleaned his machine while it was running, in violation of a plant rule prohibiting such practice, or (1) whether the violation actually did not occur but was a pure fabrication by Respondent to justify the discharge, or (2) assuming it did occur, whether it was a discriminatory enforcement of a previously unenforced rule used as a pretext to get rid of an active union adherent. Smith testified that about 4 a. in., on the night of his discharge, he stopped his machine and started to clean the rollers 24 when he saw Second Hand Sanders standing near the elevators, behind another lapper, more than 50 feet away. Sanders walked down an aisle some distance from Smith and then came over to his machine. As he did so, Smith finished his cleaning, started his machine running again, and was standing there with his cleaning brush in his hand as Sanders walked up. Sanders asked Smith why he had cleaned the machine while running. Smith denied that he had and Sanders insisted he did. Smith said, "All right, just have your way about it." Sanders said he was going to get Overseer Bowen and see what he said about it. Sanders shut down the machine and walked off. As he did so, fixer Lloyd Duncan came up to Smith. Sanders returned shortly with Bowen, who told Smith that Sanders had told him Smith had cleaned the machine while running. Smith replied, "That is what he says, and he will have his way about it." Bowen then said "For my part, we are through with you down here," and told Smith to draw his pay at 9 a. m. Smith said, "0. K., that suits me if it does you," and walked off to wash up and smoke a cigarette in the restroom. Sanders came in and ordered him to leave, so Smith left the plant. Respondent's version of the incident comes from testimony of Sanders, Duncan, and Bowen which is mutually corroborative in essential aspects. The gist of it is: Sanders was walking down the side of the mill about 50 feet away from Smith when be saw Smith standing at his lapper, cleaning the under portion of some slides at the front of the machine with a brush while it ran ; he could tell from the rolls of cotton turning on top of the machine that it was running. He walked down the cross aisle toward Smith's machine while Smith continued to clean it. When Sanders was about 25 feet away, Smith saw him and stopped cleaning. Sanders came up and stopped the machine. Sanders does not deny the conversation as outlined in Smith's testimony above, and I credit Smith's testimony to this extent. Sanders walked over to Duncan, the fixer, told him he had caught Smith cleaning his machine while running, and said he was going to get Bowen. Sanders walked off and Duncan walked down to Smith's machine, on the way saw Bowen coming off the elevator, and called to Sanders to tell him Bowen was there. Duncan called Bowen over and told him Sanders wanted to see him as he had caught Smith cleaning the lapper. Sanders then told Bowen he had caught Smith cleaning his machine a second time, and recommended he be fired. Both then walked over to Smith. Bowen mentioned 4 The rollers, some of them called "clearers," are moving parts in the center and fore- part of the machine, over which the cotton fibre passes ; some of them roll against each other under pi essure, and the yarn passes through them, making the "lap " The rollers are cleaned by sweeping waste from them by hand when the machine is stopped. 268 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD what Sanders had said and asked Smith if he had been cleaning the machine while running Smith admitted he had done so. Bowen asked if he had not been warned not to do it and Smith admitted he had been. Bowen then said that so far as he was concerned, "you are through," and that if he could not get cooperation from an employee on his shift, he did not want that employee around. Smith denied that he admitted to Bowen that he had been cleaning the machine while running, or that he had been warned against it before. There is a direct conflict of testimony between Smith and Sanders on the crucial issue whether Smith was actually cleaning his machine while in motion and Sanders caught him at it. After observing both witnesses and their manner of testifying, I am inclined to credit Sanders' version and discredit that of Smith. Sanders testified in a straightforward and impressive manner on this point. Smith's testimony was far from impressive. At first, he volunteered on direct that Sanders could not tell from his stance near the elevators whether Smith's machine was running. Yet he was very vague about the exact location and position of his machine with respect to the elevators, and could only place his machine near the center of the mill and the eleva- tors in a corner; he was positive he could see the elevators fully from his machine, and equally sure Sanders could not observe from that point whether the machine was running. However, he admitted the top of his machine with the laps of yarn was visible across the mill. He was very vague about the exact route Sanders took down to his machine, but admitted Sanders could come right down an aisle to the machine from the elevators, and that Sanders could see the top of his machine from that point. Sanders testified credibly that Smith's machine and two others were lined up "crossways" of the mill floor, and that he came down a side aisle running the length of the mill from the elevators until he came to the line of lappers where Smith worked and saw him cleaning the front of his machine, and then walked over to him. It is clear from Sanders' testimony and Smith's admissions that Sanders saw Smith's ma- chine running from the elevator, that as he walked toward Smith's machine, he saw him in the act of cleaning the slides in the front of the machine with a brush while the machine ran, and that Smith continued to do so until Sanders was about 25 feet away. Another set of facts likewise convince me that Smith was cleaning it while running: I find from testimony of Smith, Bowen, and Sanders that Smith was paid on a piecework basis, by the number of hanks of yarn that went through his machine when his machine was stopped for cleaning, his production was stopped, and he was not earning money; prior to Bowen's advent as overseer, Smith stopped and cleaned his frames twice a night, but after Bowen took over the third shift, he was required to clean them every hour. Obviously hourly cleaning would require stoppage of the machine and production 7 times a night instead of 2, with a resultant reduction in his daily production A fair inference is that Smith on this occasion was trying to offset some of the loss of production entailed in hourly cleaning by trying to clean the slides while the machine was running Another circumstance militating against Smith's denial of a violation is the fact that he did not protest very strongly against Sanders' accusation after his first denial of it, and when Bowen taxed him with Sanders' accusation, according to his own admission he merely said, "That is what he says, and he will have his way about it," which does not sound like the remark of one who knew he was innocent of wrongdoing. This brings me to a consideration of the plant rule which Smith violated, the seriousness of his violation, and Respond- ent's prior enforcement of the rule. I find from admissions of Smith, and credited testimony of Fixer Duncan, Lap Tender Joseph A. Thackston, Sanders, and Bowen that: For many years past there had been a plant rule prohibiting the cleaning of lapping machines, especially the moving parts, while running. The rule was based on considerations of safety and work quality. Rollers in the front part of the machine, called "clearers," continually collect cotton lint as the yarn passes between them, and one of the tender's duties is to stop the machine periodically to clear cotton waste off the clearers by hand, if he put his hand or a brush on the rollers while running, his hand or the brush, or both, might get caught in the machine, involving serious personal injury and possibly dam- age to the machine. The tender is also required to clean off with a brush certain slides adjacent to the rollers over which the yarn passes; this must be done while the machine is stopped, otherwise lint brushed off the slides will fall on and become im- bedded in the yarn as it passes over the rollers. If the cleaning is not done regularly and while the machine is stopped, lint and waste becomes enmeshed in the yarn in the lap, reducing its quality and causing more breakages The lap tenders were warned continually by management to clean their machines properly and regularly, and Dun- can, the fixer, constantly cautioned them about proper cleaning and against cleaning them while in motion, because he was required to repair and adjust machines to make COATS & CLARK, INC. 269 sure they handle the yarn properly, and if a machine was cleaned while running, a brush might get caught in it, causing damage he would be required to repaii. From the above facts, there can be no question as to the existence and validity of the rule prohibiting cleaning of lappers while running. It is also clear that Smith had long been aware of the rule and the reason for it, and that he violated the rule on the night of his discharge, and that such violation was the ostensible and immediate cause of his discharge. The remaining question is, whether his discharge was a sudden and dis- criminatory enforcement of the rule. 1 find from credited testimony of Sanders, Duncan, and Bowen that: About 2 or 3 weeks before Smith's discharge, Bowen received a complaint from top management about the poor quality of work on his shift. Bowen knew that poor quality can re- sult if machines are cleaned while running, due to lint and dirt falling on the yarn, so he at once told Sanders to warn all hands in his department about proper clean- ing of the machines. Sanders made the rounds of his employees with Duncan, tell- ing them to clean the machines properly, not to clean them while running, and try to improve the quality of their work. Smith does not specifically deny this warning. About a week before the discharge, according to credited testimony of Sanders, he found Smith cleaning the slides of his machine with a brush while it was running, and warned him not to do it stating he might get hurt, the machine might be damaged, and the quality of the yarn would be affected by lint falling on it. Smith said nothing. I do not credit Smith's general denial of any criticism or reprimand by management for this practice, at one point he testified merely that he could not remember any reprimand by Sanders, and for reasons which I have outlined with respect to his violation of the rule on the night of discharge, I believe and find that Smith was violating the rule on this occasion and was caught by Sanders Then came Sanders' observance of the second violation by Smith on March 30, his recommendation of dis- charge to Bowen, and Bowen's prompt discharge of Smith, as found above. The existence of a valid plant rule, Smith's long-time knowledge of it, his violation of it the week before discharge and Sanders' warning against its repetition, and his discharge immediately upon management's discovery of his second violation a week later, are cogent facts which support a finding of discharge for cause That finding is also supported by the facts (established by credited testimony of Eugene Griffith, Bowen, Sanders, and Duncan) that Eugene Griffith, who operated a waste machine on first shift, was discharged on March 29, 1954, by Supervisor Cauble because Cauble believed Griffith had improperly handled and seriously damaged the machine, which cost about $3,100; that Bowen learned of the incident when he came to work that night, and at once told Sanders about it, warned him to watch out for that and make sure nothing like it happened on the third shift, and told him to warn all oper- ators against cleaning machines while running The Griffith incident obviously alerted both Bowen and Sanders to watch for any improper handling of machines on their shift which might result in damage, and it furnishes a ready explanation for Sanders' concern when he caught Smith for the second time violating the company rule, for his prompt report to Bowen and recommendation of discharge, and the latter's piompt discharge of Smith when the latter admitted the offense, that it was his second and that he had been warned about it before There are some facts and circumstances that tend to support a finding of discrimi- natory discharge First of all, although the employees were kept advised of the rule against cleaning machinery while running, there is no substantial proof that other lap- per hands had ever been discharged or even laid off for violation of the rule. Bowen, Sanders, and Duncan admitted no discipline had been imposed for that cause on the third shift prior to Smith's discharge in the 2 years Bowen supervised the shift, and that Smith's case was the first such instance The significance of this is weakened by the testimony of Sanders that he had never found anyone but Smith violating the rule, and the lack of credible proof that the rule had been continually or openly violated by the workers to the knowledge of management.25 Another suspicious circumstance ' Smith testified generally that he saw othei s cleaning their machines while running, but without criticism or discipline , However, he does not cite instances, and theme is no proof that the supervisors were aware of such instances Smith and Thackston testified that they often cleaned weights undet their machines with blushes while iunnmg, and that others had done it openly, without criticism fiom management, and Davis admitted he had seen this piactice, but since the weights were andci the machines and not near moving pacts, it is obvious drat management did not considei this piactice a violation of the rule because there was apparently no risk of peisonal injury to the opeiatoi nor danger of lint falling on the yarn in cleaning those parts I do not consider this proof of lack of enfoi cement of condonation of violation of the rule Duncan testified that on at least two occasions befoic the discharge lie caught Sinith cleaning rollers and other 270 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD is that in advising and warning employees about the rule, management had never apprised them of any definite discipline, much less discharge, for its violation. Sanders admitted he knew of no penalty fixed for its violation. Thackston, a lap tender for nearly 2 years, testified that when he was advised of the rule, he asked about the penalty for violation, and was told management would "probably hold you off a day without pay." Duncan testified that he knew of some layoffs for violations of the rule in his 14 years at the plant, but he did not give any names, dates, or other details, and Respondent offered no other substantial proof that any other employee had been discharged or otherwise disciplined for such violation.26 Moreover, when Smith received his first warning from Sanders about violation of the rule, he was not told that repetition of the offense would result in any penalty. Lacking a definite and publicized penalty for violation of the rule, the sudden discharge of an active union adherent therefor raises a suspicion of discriminatory motive; and the same suspicion arises from Thackston's testimony that management policy, if any existed, called only for a penalty of a short layoff. However, lacking proof of a definite dis- ciplinary policy and the past application thereof, with which Smith's discharge can be compared, I am unable to find or even infer that his discharge for a second viola- tion of a well-known rule, after prior warning on first offense, and immediately following a nondiscriminatory discharge of another employee for damaging a machine through improper handling, was an unusual, harsh, or unwarranted punish- ment such as to impel the conclusion that it was imposed from discriminatory motives. Any suspicion of discriminatory action is further negated by the complete lack of proof that Smith's supervisors ever commented on his union adherence or made any remarks to or about him which could indicate that they intended, or even desired, to get rid of him because of his union activity. Sanders' lone interrogation of him, while being an independent unfair labor practice, is not enough to support such an inference. After careful consideration and balancing of all the facts and circumstances which bear on both sides of the issue, I am constrained to conclude that those which sup- port a conclusion of legitimate discharge for cause clearly outweigh those tending to support an inference of discriminatory discharge. I therefore conclude that Gen- eral Counsel has failed to sustain the ultimate burden of proving by a preponderance of credible proof in the whole record that Respondent discriminatorily discharged Smith. I therefore grant Respondent's final motion to dismiss the complaint insofar as it charges that his termination was discriminatory. I grant Respondent's final motion to dismiss paragraphs numbered 18, 19, and 24 of the complaint for lack of proof insofar as they charge that Respondent illegally threatened employees through remarks of John Sanders. 111. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth in section II, above, occurring in connection with its operations described in section 1, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. IV. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in certain unfair labor practices affecting commerce, I shall recommend that it cease and desist there- from and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. I have found that Respondent constructively discharged Marie Smith Barron be- cause of her union affiliation, thereby discriminating against her in respect to her hire and tenure of employment in order to discourage membership in the Union, in viola- tion of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. I shall recommend that Respondent offer to her immediate and full reinstatement to her former or a substantially equivalent moving pai is on his machine while it was in motion, and warned him to stop it, and that lie had caught and waived other iioikers about similar violations in the past, but lie also testified that lie never told management about the violations, so that these instances do not indicate management knowledge or condonation of violations. 261 rejected testimony offei ed by Respondent through its office manager, Causey, to the effect that 18 persons, including Kermit IIurst, Smith, Cecil Meeks, and Eugene Griffith, had been discharged in 1954 for violation of plant rules or other seasons, as insubstantial and not probative of any enforcement of the rule here involved. Aside fiom Causey's testi- mony, the record shows that IIurst, Mocks, and Griffith iiere discharged for causes en- tirely unrelated to the cleaning rule, and Causey could not state the exact nature of the violations involved lit cases of the other 14 employees, and the records from which he testi- fied were vat produced in court LE ROT DIVISION, WESTINGHO JSE AIRBRAKE CO. 271 position , without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges , and make her whole for any loss of pay she may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against her, by payment to her of a sum of money equal to that which she would normally have earned as wages from the date of her discharge to the date of a proper offer of reinstatement , less her net earnings during said period ,27 such sum to be computed according to the formula set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, 291-294. Respondent should also be required to make available to the Board or its agents such reports and records as the Board requires in accordance with the foregoing decision. In view of the nature, extent , and variety of the unfair labor practices committed by Respondent , including the discriminatory discharge of an employee , the commis- sion by Respondent of similar and other unfair labor practices in the future may reasonably be anticipated . The remedy should be coextensive with the threat. I shall therefore recommend that Respondent be ordered to cease and desist from in- fringing in any manner upon the rights guaranteed to employees by Section 7 of the Act Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is engaged in and has been engaged in commerce within the mean- ing of Section 2 (6) of the Act. 2. The above-named Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. 3 By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of Marie Smith Barron , thereby discouraging membership in the above labor organization, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the mean- ing of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. 4. By such discrimination , and by interrogation, threats of reprisal , promises of benefits, and other conduct found above, thereby interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the mean- ing of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and ( 7) of the Act. 6 Respondent has not violated the Act by its discharge of Kermit P. Hurst , Fannie Louise Hurst, and Ceab Smith, nor by acts or conduct of Robert Carl Rogers , Dorris Anderson , or Guy Hamrick , nor by threats of discharge or other reprisal uttered by John Sanders . It has not violated Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act in connection with the voluntary termination of employment by Opal Hollingworth and Kathleen Streeter. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] 27 Crossett Lumber Company, 8 NLRB 440 Le Roi Division, Westinghouse Airbrake Co. and Sam C. Corso, et al., Petitioners and International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, CIO, Case No. 13-RD-2.98. July 25, 1955 DECISION AND DIRECTION OF ELECTION Upon a petition for decertification duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before Joseph Cohen, hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hear- ing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed. Upon the entire record in the case, the Board finds : 1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. 113 NLRB No. 32.