Robbie Shoe Corp.

314 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD V. THE REMEDY As it has been found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that the Respondent cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. It having been found that the Respondent discriminatorily discharged Archie T. McLean on June 10, 1953, the Trial Examiner will accordingly recommend that the Respondent offer said McLean full and immediate reinstatement to his former or a substantially equivalent position 11 without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and make him whole in conformity with the Woolworth formula 12 for any loss he may have suffered by reason of the discrimination by the payment to him of a sum of money equal to the amount he normally would have earned as wages from the date of the Respondent's discrimination against him to the date of the offer of reinstatement, less his net earnings during said period.13 It is recommended fur- ther that the Respondent make available to the Board upon request payroll and other records, in order to facilitate the checking of the amount of back pay due.14 It is further recommended that the complaint in Case No. 1-CA-1435 be dismissed in its entirety and that the complaint in Case No. 1-CA-1515 be dismissed insofar as it alleges that the Respondent violated the Act except as herein specifically found. Upon the basis of the above findings of fact , and upon the entire record in the case, the Trial Examiner makes the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Eastern Massachusetts Street Railway Company, herein referred to as the Respondent, is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. 2. By discharging Archie T. McLean the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) and (4) of the Act. 3. By engaging in conduct violative of Section 8 (a) (3) and (4) of the Act the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of 8 (a) (1) of the Act. 4. The foregoing unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices within the mean- ing of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] 11 See The Chase National Bank of the City of New York, San Juan, Puerto Rico, Branch, 65 NLRB 827. 12 F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289. 18 Crossett Lumber Co., 8 NLRB 440; Republic Steel Corporation v. N. L. R. B. 311 U. S. 7. 14 F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289. Robbie Shoe Corp. and Eugene Pepin and United Shoe Workers of America, CIO, Party to the Contract United Shoe Workers of America, CIO and Eugene Pepin. Cases Nos. 1-CA-1779 and 1-CB-294. July 26,1955 DECISION AND ORDER On April 28, 1955, Trial Examiner James A. Corcoran issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondents had engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that they cease and desist there- from and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Exceptions to the Inter- mediate Report were thereafter filed only by the Respondent Union, 113 NLRB No. 35. ROBBIE SHOE CORP. 315 not by the Company. A brief in support of the exceptions was filed by the Union, and a brief in support of the Intermediate Report was filed by the General Counsel. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Intermediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom- mendations of the Trial Examiner, with the modifications set forth below. 1. The essential charge in this case is that the Employer and the Union, both named Respondents, executed a collective-bargaining agreement containing a union-security provision despite the fact that a majority of the employees covered by that contract had not at the time authorized the Union to act as their bargaining agent. The Trial Examiner found, as alleged in the complaint, that the Union in fact did not represent such statutory majority. He concluded that by such action the Respondent Employer violated Section 8 (a) (1), (2), and (3) of the Act. The employer filed no exceptions to this conclusion of the Trial Examiner and we, accordingly, therefore adopt it. 2. Based on the same finding of the absence of the required majority, the Trial Examiner also concluded that the Respondent Union vio- lated Section 8 (b) (1) (A) and 8 (b) (2) of the statute. We find no merit in the Union's exceptions to these findings. The Employer's production and maintenance employees total ap- proximately 575. The Union's attempt to organize these employees, first started in 1950 and actively resumed towards the end of 1953, produced no more than a handful of authorization cards.' It does appear, however, that the cutters-about 20 in number-did all join the Union. Represented by the Union, they struck on May 25, 1954, to enforce economic demands. Using these cutters and nonemployee union officers, the Union established a picket line in furtherance of the cutters' strike and maintained such picketing to June 8, when the strike was settled by the Employer's yielding to the Union's demand for a signed union-security contract covering all the employees in the plant. Never, during the approximately 2 weeks of picketing, did more than a very few workers other than cutters either join the pickets or refuse to cross the picket line. Despite this fact, while the parties were attempting to negotiate a contract on behalf of the cutters, the Union claimed to represent a majority of all employees. Through- out the meetings, the Company repeatedly disputed the Union's claim 1 Pursuant to subpena obtained by the General Counsel for trial purposes , the Union produced 165 cards at the hearing Of these, only 44 bore names of employees working for the Company in June of 1954 , when the contract in question was signed. 316 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD of overall majority and pleaded that the Union agree to a consent election in order to resolve that critical question. The Union instead swept aside these requests, explaining that it had a "successful strike" going, and that in view of such "golden opportunity" majority rep- resentation did not have to be proved by secret ballot. The record shows clearly, as the Trial Examiner reported, that the cessation of work by the cutters made continued operation of the plant as a whole a virtual impossibility for any extended period of time. The Company capitulated to the Union's demand and signed the contract on June 8, thus settling the strike. Significantly, however, so far as this record shows, the rank-and-file employees affected by the union-security provision were not advised of its existence or its effect upon them until a speech by a company representative on Sep- tember 3, 3 months later. The immediate reaction of the bulk of the employees was to protest the Union's action. A majority of the employees forthwith signed a petition asserting that the Union was not their bargaining agent. Somewhat later, one of them filed the charges in this case. Neither the Company nor the Union disputed any of the foregoing facts. In our opinion, they constitute clear evidence that the Union did not in fact represent the majority in a plantwide unit when the contract was made. The Union nevertheless attempted to prove that it had been authorized by a majority of the employees to sign a contract on their behalf in oral statements made by employees to union organ- izers. Five union representatives testified that during the strike they interviewed employees outside the plant, often in groups, and secured favorable reaction to their question as to whether the employees wished the Union to represent them. However, these same witnesses admitted that they were largely unfamiliar with the employees and were unable to eliminate the strong possibility of duplications in the employee re- sponses either to the other organizers or even to themselves. They also admitted that they interviewed employees in groups as large as 25 and considered favorable responses by some, or even by a single employee in the group, as proof that the silent remainder of the en- tire group also wished to designate the Union. No records were made at the time of these alleged interviews; the testimony by which the Union attempted to prove majority was thus entirely a matter of rec- ollection, in addition to being extremely vague and general. The Trial Examiner correctly appraised the Union's testimony re- garding these interviews as failing entirely to show majority author- ization of the Union. This very weak attempt to justify the execution of the union-security contract, when coupled with the positive evidence pointing to the absence of proper and sufficient authorization, leads inescapably to the conclusion that on June 8, the Union was not in fact the majority representative of all the employees in the plant and that ROBBIE SHOE CORP. 317 both the parties to the contract were aware of that fact. If anything, the record as a whole indicates most strongly that the Union seized .the economic advantage arising from the strike of the cutters to force the Employer into extending a plantwide recognition which the Union had been unable to achieve in its extended organizational campaign. Similarly, it is quite clear that the Company, despite its conviction, as evidenced by its repeated protests, that the Union did not represent the employees, nevertheless agreed to subject all its employees to a form of compulsory union membership in order to protect its own economic position against the damaging effect of the concerted activi- ty of the cutters. In these circumstances, we find, like the Trial Ex- aminer, that the Respondent Union violated Section 8 (b) (1) (a) and 8 (b) (2) of the Act when it executed the June 8, 1954, contract with the Respondent Company.' The record as a whole showing so con- vincingly that a majority of the employees had not designated the Union as their representative, we find it unnecessary here to pass upon the Trial Examiner's further reasoning that oral designations of a .collective-bargaining representative may in no event support the exe- cution of a union-security collective-bargaining contract. ORDER Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that : A. The Respondent, Robbie Shoe Corp., Lowell, Massachusetts, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall : 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Recognizing United Shoe Workers of America, CIO, as the 'exclusive representative of the Company's employees for the purposes ,Of collective bargaining, unless and until said labor organization shall have been certified by the National Labor Relations Board as' such rep- resentative. (b) Giving effect to the agreement with the Union dated June 8, 1954, or to any extension, renewal, modification, or supplement, or superseding agreement, unless and until said Union shall have been certified by the National Labor Relations Board, and then only if the agreement otherwise conforms to the provisions of the Act; but nothing herein shall be construed as requiring the Company to vary or abandon the wages, hours, seniority, or other substantive features of any such agreement. (c) Giving effect to any checkoff cards authorizing the deduction of periodic union dues from wages for remittance to the Union, prior to the date of compliance with this Order. 9 Internattional Metal Products Company, 104 NLRB 1076. 318 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (d) Encouraging membership in the Union or in any other labor organization of its employees, by conditioning the hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment upon member- ship in, affiliation with, or dues payments to the Union, or to any other labor organization, except where such conditions shall have been law- fully established by an agreement in conformity with the Act. (e) Sponsoring, assisting, or contributing support to the Union, or to any other labor organization. (f) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in the Act, except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement requir- ing membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Withdraw and withhold recognition from the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of its employees , unless- and until said Union shall have been certified by the National Labor Relations Board as such representative. (b) Refund forthwith to all employees, from whose wages it has withheld or deducted funds for transmittal to the Union, the amount of any and all such deductions and withholdings, to the end that each such employee shall be promptly, fully, and completely reimbursed for all monies so deducted or withheld. (c) Upon request make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll and other records necessary for a computation of the sums to be refunded under the terms of this Order. (d) Post at its plant in Lowell, Massachusetts, copies of the notice attached to the Intermediate Report marked "Appendix A." a Copies of such notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the First Region, shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent Company, be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, in- cluding all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent Company to insure that such notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. $ The notice , however, is hereby amended by striking therefrom the words "The Recom. mendations of a Trial Examiner " and substituting in lieu thereof the words "A Decision and Order," In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be substitifted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order." ROBBIE SHOE CORP. 319 (e) Notify the Regional Director for the First Region in writing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps it has taken to comply herewith. B. The Respondent, United Shoe Workers of America, CIO, Lowell, Massachusetts, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall : 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Giving effect to its agreement with the Company dated June 8; 1954, covering the Company's employees, or to any extension, renewal, modification, or supplement or superseding agreement, unless and until it has been certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of such employees, and then only if the agreement otherwise conforms to the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. (b) Causing or attempting to cause the Company or any other em- ployer to discriminate in any manner against employees in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. (c) Restraining or coercing employees of the Company or any other employer in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agree- ment requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Post in conspicuous places at its business office and union hall in Lowell, Massachusetts, and at all places where notices to its mem- bers are customarily posted, copies of the notice attached to the Inter- mediate Report marked "Appendix B." 4 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the First Region, shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent Union, be posted by it imme- diately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it for sixty (60) con- secutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Steps shall be taken by the Respondent Union to insure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Mail to the Regional Director for the First Region signed copies of the notice for posting, the Company willing, in places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the First Region shall, after being signed as provided above, be forthwith returned to the Regional Director for said posting. (c) Notify the Regional Director for the First Region in writing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps it has taken to comply herewith. * See footnote 8, supra. 320 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE Charges and amended charges having been filed by Eugene Pepin against the Rob- bie Shoe Corp., herein called the Employer or Company, and against the United Shoe Workers of America, CIO, herein called the Union, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, hereinafter referred to as the General Counsel and Board, respectively, on November 1, 1954, issued and served upon each of said Respondents a complaint together with a notice of hearing thereon and a notice con- solidating both cases. The complaint alleged that the Respondent Company had engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1), (2), and (3) and that the Respondent Union had engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) and 8 (b) (2), and in each instance also within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136, herein called the Act. With respect to the Employer's unfair labor practices, the complaint alleged in sub- stance that the Respondent Company: 1. Assisted the Respondent Union in violation'of Section 8 (a) (2) and interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of their self-organizational rights in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) by: (a) Recognizing the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of certain of the Respondent's employees at a time when the Union did not represent a majority of said employees. (b) Executing and continuing in effect a written exclusive recognition agreement at a time when the Union did not represent an uncoerced majority of the employees in the unit covered by the agreement within the meaning of Section 9 (a), and which agreement required as a condition of employment, membership in the Union by_the employees in the unit covered by the agreement. 2. Discriminated in regard to the hire, tenure, and terms and conditions of employ= ment of its employees in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) and 8 (a) (1) of the Act, thereby encouraging membership in the Union, and in contravention of the provisions of said Section 8 (a) (3), by reason of the acts and conduct stated above in paragraph numbered 1 (a) and (b). With respect to the Union's unfair labor practices, the complaint alleged in sub- stance that the Respondent Union violated Section 8 (b) (1) (A) and 8 (b) (2) of the Act by: 1. Requiring the Company to recognize it as the exclusive representative of cer- tain of its employees at a time when it did not represent a majority of such employees. 2. Executing and continuing in effect a written exclusive recognition agreement with the Company at a time when the Union did not represent a majority of the employees in the unit covered by the contract. 3. Requiring the Company to execute and continue in effect a written exclusive recognition contract agreement with the Company, which required as a condition of employment, membership in the Union by the employees in the unit covered by the agreement, at a time when the Union did not represent a majority of said employees. 4. Causing the Company to discriminate against its employees and prospective employees in regard to hire, tenure, and,terms and conditions of employment, by the execution of such written agreement requiring membership in the Respondent Union as a condition of employment. 5. By engaging in a strike and inducing and encouraging employees of the Com- pany to engage in a strike, for the purpose of forcing the Company to enter into a contract containing a union-security clause, at a time when Respondent Union did not represent a majority of the company employees in the unit sought by the Respond- ent Union. The Respondents in their answers denied generally all material allegations of the complaints imputing to them the commission of unfair labor practices. The Re- spondent Union contends the contract obtained from the Company resulted solely from a strike of the employees and was not willingly given by the Respondent Em- ployer, and was so given without any intent to help the Union, and that the Com- pany since the signing of such contract has acted adversely to the interests of the Union, eventuating in collusion in the filing of the charges herein, with the purpose of relieving the Respondent Employer of any obligation under the signed and existing contract. The Respondent Company sets forth alleged extenuating circumstances requiring the entering into and execution of the agreement by it. - Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held on November 22 and 23, 1954, at Lowell, Massachusetts, before James A. Corcoran, the Trial Examiner duly designated ROBBIE SHOE CORP. 321 by the Chief Trial Examiner. The General Counsel, the Company, the Union, and the chargee, Pepin, were represented by counsel and participated in the hear- ing. Full opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses and to introduce evidence bearing on the issues was afforded all parties. A motion to conform the pleadings to the proof with regard to minor variances was granted. Oppor- tunity to present oral argument was waived by all the parties. Well planned and stated briefs were filed by the General Counsel and Respondent Union and have been carefully read and considered. Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY Robbie Shoe Corp. is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the Com- monwealth, of Massachusetts, having its principal office and place of business in Lowell, Massachusetts, engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of ladies' shoes and related products. In the course and conduct of its business the Company purchased annually raw materials in excess of $500,000, of which approximately 90 percent is shipped directly to the plant in Lowell, Massachusetts, from points outside the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Annual sales of finished products exceed $1,000,000, of which in excess of 90 percent is shipped directly to points in States located outside the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. It is stipulated by all parties that the Company is engaged in interstate commerce. I find that the Company is so engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED United Shoe Workers of America, CIO, admits persons employed by the Re- spondent Company to membership, and is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. General-Chronology Since 1950, the Union had engaged in an unsuccessful attempt to organize the workers of this Company. An active campaign was under way since December 1953, under direction of Organizer Smith. He had distributed leaflets, contacted workers outside the plant and at their homes, and secured the signing of authori- zation cards by some workers designating the Union as their collective-bargaining representative. The Company had materially altered the production procedure in the spring of 1954, and in the changeover and experimental stage most employees were paid on a time-work basis to insure against any great diminution of wage earnings. A grievance of the cutters as to piecework rates under the new system came to a head on May 7, 1954, and following a conference with the management, a 2-week trial test period from May 7 to 21, 1954, was agreed upon, at the conclu- sion of which the work and performance were to be reviewed and new piece prices computed and agreed upon. On May 21, at midday, the cutters left the plant, visited the union headquarters, informed Organizer Smith of the cutting piece- work price controversy still continuing, but informed him they were going back to work, and returned to the plant at 2:15 p. in. At that time they indicated to the cutting room superintendent (Riley) that they wanted to discuss immediately the price-matter adjustment. Stern, president of the Company,'when he learned of this, canceled a certain midwestern engagement he had for Monday, May 24, in order to review the trial period work performance (ending May 21) and partici- pate in a conference with the cutters on May 24. On such date he conferred with his superintendent about 10:30 a. in., concluding the discussion about midday. The superintendent in going to make an appointment with the cutters for a joint conference to be held at 1 p. in. of that day, found that they had all again gone to the union hall. Smith says that when they came to the Union at midday, he was informed by them that the cutters of this Company were "out on strike" and they asked him for union support which he assured them. The cutters did not return to the plant and no direct information was apparently given to the Company of their strike intentions and decision. The facts of this situation were communi- cated by Smith to Georgian (national territory director for the Union), a hasty meeting of all union organizers in the vicinity was held that evening, and a decision made to turn the cutter strike situation into a general union organization strike directed to all the plant workers. On May 25 a picket line composed of some 322 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD cutters, together with union organizers and officials , appeared in front of the- cdni- pany plant entrances, carrying signs and banners proclaiming the organizational strike.' On May 26 Stern addressed the assembled workers in the plant, explaining the cutters' strike, and the Company's intention to' exert every effort to straighten the matter out, to get the cutters back at all costs, and to work to the best interests of everybody. On May 27 the city manager and a labor mediator arranged a joint meeting of company and union representatives at his office.2 These meetings continued daily and culminated in terms of an agreement accepted on June 5, covering and applicable to all production workers. Certain further conferences followed with some change of details, reaching final agreement terms of a contract of June 8, with the actual final document being completed about July 1, 1954,E al- though being dated June 8, becoming effective August, 1, 1954, and expiring on December 31, 1955.3 Such contract contained a union-security clause and dues checkoff provisions . After consummation of an agreement on June 8, the peace- fully conducted strike ended, the cutters returned, and all work was resumed. ' On September 3 Stern made an address to the assembled workers in the plant relative to the negotiations, the contract provisions , the now required union-mem- bership provisions of the contract, and the union dues payment-deduction provision to be made from wages, if individually authorized. Immediately thereafter, a peti- tion was circulated by certain workers in the shop indicating opposition to being represented by this Union.4 This petition was filed with the Board on September 8, 1954, but subsequently withdrawn; the unfair labor practice charges herein were filed against the Company on September 20 and November 1, 1954, and against the Union on October 20 and November 1, 1954. B. The issue of majority representation of the workers in the plant production unit by the Union at the time of signing of the contract on June 8, 1954 I find and it is conceded by the parties that this is the fundamental factor involved in the consideration of the issues set forth in the complaint. Prior to inception of the strike on May 25, 1954, it is clear that by ordinary organizing methods and the securing of signed cards designating the Union as the collective-bargaining repre- sentative of the workers in the plant production unit, the Union had not succeeded in attaining such majority. Out of a total of 576 employees, the Union possessed signed cards of 165, as produced at the hearing. Of this number, it is asserted that only 44 names of persons signing the cards appeared on the payroll of the Company for the week in which the contract was signed.5 Georgian testified that as to all such designation cards when received (from all firms), they were kept for possible use at such time as the Union might determine to ask for an election, when it be- lieved it might have "an even chance" of success in such an election.° When he learned of the cutters going on strike (the cutters had just allied with the Union), Georgian decided to turn the situation into an organizational strike for recruiting the necessary number of adherents to show union representation of a majority of the plant workers, and adopted the unique and unusual method of having a so- called "fast poll" to ascertain the sentiment of all the workers in the plant, thereby securing "oral" designation of the Union as the bargaining representative of all the plant production employees. To accomplish the purpose, on May 25 about 17 union organizers and representatives took up work on the picket line (supplementing approximately 20 cutters also picketing and allegedly 1-2 production workers) and, under detailed orders and instructions from Georgian as to procedure, allegedly each one interviewed daily about 10 nonstriking workers entering or leaving the i During the entire course of the strike it appears only a few other plant workers joined the pickets. The Union disclaimed any efforts to have the remaining plant workers pulled out and contends it advised them to continue to work 3 The Union was represented by Georgian and certain officials with a committee of cut- ters present. The balance of plant workers were not directly represented. 3 On June 5 the Company had 576 employees in the production unit defined in the con- tract, exclusive of supervisory and other employees held excluded. A It is stipulated that a majority of the 597 production employees then in service signed such petition. 5 Perhaps in the contraction of production-work activity due to the strike, some em- ployees may not have been working. No evidence of such fact was offered however. One worker testified as to her signed card , that • she had signed it at the time of starting work in 1950. 9 The procedure of seeking and securing signed authorization cards from workers in the plant was discontinued by Georgian with the advent of the strike. ROBBIE SHOE CORP. 323 plant premises. Such union representatives consistently reported to Georgian at night staff meetings the results of their daily activities, always shown as securing favorable reaction to the question allegedly asked the employees as to whether they wished the Union to represent them as their collective-bargaining agency and nego- tiate a contract to apply to all workers in the plant .7 These additional organizers and representatives were largely strangers unacquainted, personally, with the workers. They were unaware if the persons asked in any instance were persons who had previously signed authorization cards. The probability that they had asked the question of the same person on various days could not be eliminated by them, or that they were reporting favorable contact with persons who were also being reported as contacted by another representative on that same day or another time with equally favorable results. No notations were made by them at the time of inquiry. The number reported as being interviewed and the results thereof was made entirely from recollection. Where more than one was interviewed in group questioning, any favorable response by one or more was interpreted as conveying the unanimous viewpoint, agreement, and consent of the whole number present .8 It is clear from the testimony given as to the negotiating sessions initiated on May 27 and continuing to the signing of the contract on June 8, that the question of majority representation was at all times in issue and in dispute. The Board over the years has always considered that the best and only adequate and proper safe- guarded procedure to insure free and untrammeled indication of choice by workers as to their preference in the selection of a bargaining representative is effected through the means of a secret ballot election. It has, however, also recognized in instances the majority being proven by signed workers' authorizations. In any method per- mitted or accepted, the alleged claim as to representing a majority as asserted should be subject to definite objective proof, and indisputably established. The Union herein claims that the oral questioning method used here by it is permissible, thor- oughly adequate, reliable, and dependable, although no proof of the alleged results secured, other than self-serving statements of its own organizers, has been presented. In addition, it urges that the results claimed must be accepted as being psychologically sound, on the assumption that the "gimme" acquisitiveness of human nature would not permit these ordinary human beings to reach any other conclusion as to their reply and position, to be entertained and expressed. To accept such theoretical latter reasoning and basis, it would appear would clearly destroy any factual objective basis of ascertaining in any instance the question of representation, make any carefully de- termined and safeguarded procedure unnecessary, and clearly operate to deprive an individual of the rights distinctly set forth for him in Section 7 of the Act. The method used of public oral interrogation, often in the presence of others, is cer- tainly one not conducive to the securing of free expression by all individuals ques- tioned, and one not free from an element of coercion and duress, as any person so questioned, reasonably fearful of possible results of an adverse answer, can hardly be expected in all instances under such circumstances in full faith to record publicly his actual beliefs or position.9 At best, even if the Union assertions and testimony offered were to be accepted regarding the claimed majority representation, it must be based on oral designations. The Board has long since decided that oral promises to vote for the Union in an election do not constitute a designation of a representative within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act.i° I see no substantial difference in the oral promise to vote for and the alleged oral designation as bargaining representative herein. In a recent representation case, clearly more factually accurate on the question involved and the method utilized than the method used and advocated herein (Interboro Chevrolet Co., Inc., 111 NLRB 783), the Board has refused to even accept the results of an 7 In some instances however, their testimony indicates they did not always secure any response or committal by all asked. 8In one instance, Georgian revealed talking to 25 persons in a group, and on another occasion to a group of 15-20 of whom 8-10 indicated their acceptance of the Union, and the silence of the others present was accepted by him as favorable assent also ' B The following taken from an address by Board Member Rodgers (New Orleans, March 15, 1955), seems appropriate for quotation: It is to safeguard that individual in rights of free association that this statute is permanently aimed. And this statute in keeping with American precepts, holds that individual to be capable of deciding•for-himselfall questions which closely and mate- 'rially affect him. Given that opportunity, without coercion or'ifuress,from any quar- _tet, tlie, individual employee will' decide those questions for himself. [Emphasis supplied.] 10 Bird Machine Co., 65 NLRB 312 (footnote 2), 161 F. 2d 589 (C. A. 1). 324 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD election jointly conducted by the union and employer, as having sufficient safeguards to protect the employees in the exercise of their choice of a bargaining representative or to reflect with a high degree of certainty the true desires of the employees with respect to representation." The cutting operation in this factory is concededly the key factor in production and the halting of it slows down the entire and continued operation of the plant. Obviously, a successful strike in it must eventually bring the employer to terms, if he expects or wants to stay in business without continued strained relations with some employees and the union, with possible continued harassment and inconvenience. The Union asserts that here this strike (in inception that of cutters) gave the Union a golden opportunity to organize all production employees and to force the Company to recognize it and deal with it for all such employees. To the extent that the first of such objectives was accomplished is the gist of this case. The Union relies solely on the results of the "fast poll" previously discussed, the claimed almost certain nonfailing of it as an effective procedure to support what must flow as an assured result therefrom, and certain indications of other circumstances to indicate that the Union did in fact represent a majority on June 8, 1954. It is undisputed that in the negotiating meetings the company representative repeatedly asserted his doubt of the union representation of a majority of the workers and, as constantly requested, the holding of an election to determine the question of majority representation. It is equally clear that the Union uniformly rejected any such suggestion of going to an election. There is some dispute in the evidence as to whether at the first negotiat- ing meeting Georgian advised the company representatives of the union position and claim of representing a majority of the workers, as being based on the poll of the workers indicated. I do not regard it as important, as the record clearly shows not only the brushing aside of any election suggestions, but the reiterated firm declara- tions and reliance throughout by the union representatives on the power aspect of their position in having a "successful strike" going, which at all-times they intended to utilize to achieve the fulfillment of the second objective presented, i. e., of forcing the Company to recognize it and deal with it for all employees.12 I am convinced that the stark aspects of such position are really what prevailed in the signing of the contract-that the Company yielded primarily under union pressure to preserve its business life and future. I am certain from my hearing observations and reading of the record that neither the Union nor the Company, in the conduct or termination of the strike and signing of the agreement, was moved to any great or even appreciable extent by the position or desires of the bulk of the workers herein or through any great concern for them, but that each was dominated by and proceeding from purely selfish motives, an extension of union jurisdiction and control on one hand, and continued business existence on the other.13 I therefore do not afford any great significance or weight to the lack of initiative of the Employer in the circumstances in not petition- ing for an election, or interpret the capitulating and signing of the agreement by the Company under the circumstances as any tacit dispensing by joint consent of the parties with the need for ascertaining the actual fact of majority representation, or any waiving conceding or accepting by the Employer that such disputed majority representation claims of the Union were validly based in any respect. The claimed right of the "Union alone to make the decisions" as to the procedure it will follow is recognized, but that also entails the consequences of an unfortunate choice. I find that the oral "fast poll" method relied on by the Union did not in fact provide a substantial, objective, and provable basis of ascertaining the intent, desires, and will of the majority of the workers in the plant, and was not such a method as to provide "sufficient safeguards to protect the employees in the exercise of their choice of a bargaining representative as to reflect with a high degree of certainty the true desires of the employees with respect to representation " 14 In addition, considering all the circumstances connected with the events of the strike, the oral poll solicitation u The Union cites N, L R B. v. Corning Class Co., 204 F 2d 422 (C. A. 1), and N. L. R. B. v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 210 F. 2d 501 (C. A. 7) (in each of which cases prior Board ruling was overruled) for the premise that a secret election is not the exclusive method of ascertaining expression of opinion of workers It is noted, however, that in each case indisputable evidence of the claimed union majority choice was pre- sented. Such latter factor is absent here. 'a "In effect, the Union is seeking to force the employer to bargain with it . without regard to the question of its majority status." Witwer Grocer Co., 111 NLRB 936. 'S Undoubtedly Stern was not entirely oblivious to the anxiety expressed by some of the workers from the beginning as to their jobs and continued livelihood, but I do not credit it with the extent of pressure on Stern as attributed by union counsel. 14 Interboro Chevrolet Co., supra. ROBBIE SHOE CORP. 325 of employees and joint signing of the agreement, I find that such circumstances do not indicate that the Union in fact represented a majority of the workers in the plant work unit on June 8, 1954.15 I consider the General Counsel has sustained the burden of proof in this matter regarding lack of proof of majority representation of the workers and that the refutation testimony offered as to the oral poll method and the circumstances attendant to the signing of contract, do not suffice to destroy his contention, or in themselves provide credible basis of proof to place any further burden on him requiring the offering of any additional testimony. C. The alleged violations 'The agreement signed by the Union and Company on June 8, 1954, effective as of August 1, 1954, afforded exclusive recognition to the Union as the bargaining repre- sentative of its plant workers, contained a union-security provision effective Septem- ber 15, 1954 (the validity of which has not been questioned), and a checkoff clause permitting the Employer to deduct dues from earnings, when properly authorized in writing to do so. The rights of employees stated in Section 7 are restricted by an exception relative to the right to refrain from joining or assisting labor organizations, where such right is affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organi- zation as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3), and pursuant to the provisions of such latter section, one of the main requirements of which is that such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in Section 9 (a). This latter section demands that any such representative in collective bargaining must be designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate unit. These three sections must be read together. It has been previously found herein, that the Union had not been validly designated by the majority of the employees in the plant unit as their collective-bargaining representative, and did not in fact represent such a majority on June 8, 1954, when the agreement with the Com- pany was signed. The employees involved had not been afforded the proper oppor- tunity under appropriate safeguards to record their wishes. The company representa- tive had a continuing, asserted, and what appears to be a reasonably based doubt of the Union actually representing in fact such majority of the plant workers. Never- theless, under the urge of economic circumstances the agreement negotiated was ac- cepted by the Company and entered into (I accept crediting the assertions in testimony of both company and union representatives) with full intent to carry it out. Such agreement gave exclusive recognition as bargaining representative to the Union and did require all employees on and after September 15, 1954, to become members of the Union, pay dues, and continue in good standing to remain in employment. In the absence of clear definitive proof of majority employee-representation designation resident in the Union, the contract agreement containing such clauses, I find, becomes an illegal and discriminatory one. The Employer Company in granting such exclusive bargaining recognition to the Union, and entering into such type of bargaining contract at a time when the Union was not in fact the majority representative of the employees involved, as demon- strated by any proper legal device of designation, and when such Employer had rea- sonable grounds for so believing, I find violated Section 8 (a) (2) and Section 8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (3) of the Act.16 The entering into the agreement, containing the union-security and checkoff clauses, under the circumstances here, by the Employer, interfered with the rights of the employees under Section 7 to refrain from engaging in collective-bargaining activities in violation of Section 8 (a) (1). 1 so find. By so doing, I also find that the Employer clearly assisted and contributed such "other" support to the Union as to constitute a violation of Section 8 (a) (2). By the grant- ing of exclusive recognition to the Union, and executing this kind of agreement re- quiring as a condition of employment membership in such Union and the payment of union dues, at a time when the Union did not in fact represent a majority of the workers, I find the Employer further discriminated against the employees in regard to the terms and conditions of their employment, thereby encouraging membership in the Union, and with such action also being in direct contravention of the terms of Section 8 (a) (3), and thereby violating Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. The lack of any enforcement of the provision regarding union membership, in view of the ex- ',An employer, cannot by cleating with a union, constitute it the lawful representative of employees who have not chosen it to represent them. Dickey v. N. L. R. B., 217 F. 2d 652 (C. A 6) 10 lntet national Metal Products Co, 104 NLRB 1076; John B. Shriver Company, 103 NLRB 23, New York State Employers Assn., Inc., 93 NLRB 127, 196 F. 2d 78 (C. A. 2). 326 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD pressed intention of the parties to comply with the agreement, does not operate to mitigate or lessen the effects of the original action and the violations so found.17 The execution-of the contract by the Union, at the time lacking the legal designa- tion of bargaining agent by a majority of the employees in the unit, and requiring union membership and payment of dues to remain employed, I find also operated' to interfere with, coerce, and restrain the employees herein in the exercise of their rights under Section 7, in violation of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act, as under the circumstances present here the action clearly presents a definite threat of loss of employment to any employee desiring to exercise a protected right of refraining from joining a labor organization. More than ordinary persuasion was exercised by the Union in securing the concur- rence of the Employer to the union-security provision and the execution of the agree- ment containing it. Clear exercise of economic power by the Union was presented, and forcefully explained to the Company in pointing out the significance of their "suc- cessful strike" and their intentions in regard to it. This constituted an element of pressure, through indicating clearly to the Employer practically the sole choice of continued business existence involved, sufficient I believe to establish that the recogni- tion of the clear alternative faced, and requiring submission in the acceptance of the agreement for all employees with such union-security clause, cannot be considered entirely a voluntary action by the Company. In such action the Employer necessarily discriminated against his employees. It is clear that the Union, while not having in fact a majority representation of the workers involved, joined with the Company in creating a condition by such agreement provisions, which would result in future dis- crimination, and by such action, I find the Union attempted to cause the Employer Company to discriminate against employees in violation of Section 8 (a) (3), thereby violating Section 8 (b) (2) of the Act.18 D. Allegations of collusion The Union emphatically contends that the Board should dismiss all consideration of this complaint based on an inference of collusion between the Charging Party and the Company in the filing of the charges herein. It contends the speech of Stern on September 3, 1954, not only encouraged the employees to file the charges herein in order to seek their release from payment of union dues but was aimed at securing nullification of the agreement.19 Gladys Watson testified that after listening to the speech she started a petition (repudiating the Union ) and secured signatures on it of all employees in her department. Pepin (Chargee) also took a petition around in the factory the following day and secured signatures. It was done openly, and both the foreman and Stern were aware of the activity. No proof was offered as to the existence of any rule forbidding solicitation. No evidence was produced as to any contact of these employees with Stern prior to his speech or after in regard to instituting such petition, or any consultation with him, or advice received from him regarding the content of it, or of the procedure in passing it out or in later filing it at the Board. When completed the petition was presented to Stern by a committee of workers, allegedly protesting that he had not acted in their best interests in signing the agreement . Stern told them there was nothing he could do about it, he had signed the contract and intended to live up to it, and Pepin testified he did not say it was a matter for the Board . The suggestion to file with the Board was made later by Gladys Watson.20 The employees secured and furnished their own transportation to Boston in filing it. Pepin, whose testimony I credit, states he did not consult with Stern about going to the Board on September 8, 1954. He did not go to the plant on that day, having told his foreman on the previous day that he was taking the 17 Julius Resnick, 86 NLRB 38 ; C Hager & Sons Hinge Mfg Co , 80 NLRB 163. 19 Acme Mattress Company, Inc, 91 NLRB 1010, 192 F. 2d 524; The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, 81 NLRB 1052; New York State Employers Assn., Inc, supra. 191 find such speech did not go beyond the limitations of free speech permitted under the Act In passing, it seems remarkable that with the strike ending with the signing of an agreement on June 8, 1954, with full work resumption immediately after the agree- ment was signed, that no announcement of the terms of the agreement effective August 1, 1954, was communicated to the bulk of the employees who remained at work and were vitally affected, apparently by either the Union or the Company prior to the occasion'of this speech. The record is silent on the matter. 20 Such petition filed on September 8, 1954, was withdrawn , and subsequently Pepin filed his charge against the Employer on September 20, his charge against the Union was filed October 20, and an amended charge against each filed on October 29, 1954. ROBBIE SHOE CORP. 327 morning off and the purpose thereof.21 However, his timecard was punched in, showing that he was at work though actually absent previous to the midday when he returned from Boston and actually punched his timecard. He specifically denied making the time clock punches on the card prior to his midday return, and also disclaimed noticing their appearance on the card when he handled it. No evidence was produced as to who did punch his card. However, he did receive payment for the time he was away because of the time being punched thereon.22 Subsequently Pepin also collected money openly from persons in the shop (with knowledge and no objection from the foreman or Stern) for payment of an attorney fee to an attorney engaged to file the charges herein. Such attorney was not suggested or sponsored in any way by the Employer, and had represented Pepin previously in private matters. The Union contends these acts and circumstances support an irrebuttable pre- sumption of collusion. I do not agree. Irrespective of what benefit , if any, might ensue to the supposed advantage of the Company in the filing of the charges herein, nevertheless private rights of the employees had been invaded by the joint action of Company and Union in the June agreement. Pepin, as an aggrieved employee, therefore had a legal right to seek redress. In addition, it does not seem that events of several months later can alone be utilized to destroy any consideration of the situation and events of June 1954. The charges as filed only set in motion the investigative processes of the Board. The complaint issued is not that of the indi- vidual, but the action of the Board under the law in seeking to effect the righting of a public wrong perpetrated. In such circumstances, the estoppel claim also alleged could not be entertained or exist. Considering the testimony presented and all the circumstances, I do not find the alleged collusion to be established. The processes of the Board have not been abused or obstructed and the Board has not been ousted from jurisdiction in consideration of the complaint. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE • The activities of the Respondents set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of the Respondent Company set forth in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondents have engaged in certain unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that they cease and desist therefrom, and that they take cer- tain affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act. It having been found that the Respondent Company unlawfully assisted and con- tributed support to the,Respondent Union in violation of Section 8 (a) (2), by rec- ognizing the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the production em- ployees in the factory at Lowell, Massachusetts, and entered into an agreement with such Union covering said employees, which among other things, required all em- ployees to join and pay dues to the Union, at a time when such Union had not been legally designated as such exclusive collective-bargaining representative by a majority of such employees, it will be recommended that the Respondent Company cease giving effect to such agreement, or to any extensions , modifications, or supple- ments thereto, or to any superseding agreement with the Respondent Union , unless and until the Union shall have been certified by the Board as the representative of the Respondent Company's employees in an appropriate unit . Nothing herein, however, shall be construed as requiring the Respondent Company to vary wages, hours of employment, rates of pay, seniority, or other substantive provisions in its relations with the employees themselves , which the Respondent Company has estab- lished in the performance of said agreement . To the extent, if any, that the Re- spondent Company had deducted periodic dues from their wages for remittance to the Union , under signed authorization cards authorizing the procedure , it will be recommended that the Respondent Company be ordered to make whole each of its employees for the full amount of dues deducted from his wages . It will further 21Re states that on his return he said nothing to the foreman regarding what was done in Boston. 22 Admittedly, punching a timecard to show work presence when actually absent is a violation of company rules meriting discharge. No action in regard to the matter was taken by the Company against Pepin or any other person. 379288-56-vol. 113-22 328 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ,be recommended that the Respondent Company, if it has followed such practice and procedure, shall cease giving effect to any such checkoff authorizations executed prior to the date of its compliance with the recommended order.23 The Respondents' illegal activities were such as to indicate a purpose to defeat the Company's employees in the exercise of basic rights under the Act. The unfair labor practices found to have been committed are potentially related to other unfair labor practices prescribed by the Act, and danger of their commission in the future is to be anticipated from the Respondents' conduct herein. The preventive purpose of the Act will be thwarted unless the remedial order is coextensive with the threat. In order, therefore, to make effective the interdependent guarantees of Section' 7, and thus effectuate the policies of the Act, the recommended order will provide that the Respondents cease and desist from in any manner interfering with the rights of employees guaranteed by the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. United Shoe Workers of America, CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. 2. The Robbie Shoe Corp. is, and at all times material herein has been, engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. 3. By assisting and contributing other support to the Respondent Union, and thereby also interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent Company has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (2) and 8 (a) (1) of the Act. 4. By entering into and giving effect to agreements conditioning the hire and ten- ure of employment of employees of the Respondent Company upon membership in and dues payments to the Respondent Union in contravention of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act, the Respondents have engaged in and are engaging in unfair labor prac- tices, the Respondent Company within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) and 8 (a) (1) of the Act, and the Respondent Union within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) and 8 (b) (2) of the Act. 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] 23 The record is not clear as to any deductions having been so made, therefore the pro- visional nature of the statement In his talk to workers on September 3, 1954, President Stern stated he already had 34 such checkoff authorizations filed with him by the 'Union and indicated to the workers his desire of their utilizing the procedure and his having the cards available for them. However, the parties stated at the bearing that no steps to enforce the union-membership provision had been undertaken. APPENDIX A NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the Labor Management Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT recognize the United Shoe Workers of America, CIO, as the exclusive representative of the production employees in our plant for the pur- poses of collective bargaining, unless and until said organization shall have been certified by the National Labor Relations Board as such representative. - WE WILL NOT give effect to our agreement, dated June 8, 1954, with the United Shoe Workers of America, CIO, or to any extension, renewal, modifica- tion, or supplement thereof, or to any superseding agreement with the said Union, unless and until said Union shall have been certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the bargaining representative of employees in an appropriate unit, and unless said agreement shall conform to the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. WE WILL NOT give effect to any checkoff cards, heretofore executed by our employees, authorizing the deduction of periodic union dues from their wages for remittance to the United Shoe Workers of America, CIO. ROBBIE SHOE CORP. 329 WE WILL NOT encourage membership in the United Shoe Workers of America, CIO, or in any other labor organization, by conditioning the hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment upon membership in, affiliation with, or dues payments to said Union, or any other labor organiza- tion, except where lawful provision therefor shall have become established by an agreement in conformity with the provisions of the National Labor Rela- tions Act. WE WILL NOT sponsor, assist, or contribute support to the United Shoe Workers of America, CIO. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement made in conformity with the provisions of the Na- tional Labor Relations Act, requiring membership in a labor organization as authorized by Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. WE WILL refund to all our employees and former employees from whose wages we have deducted or withheld funds for transmittal to the United Shoe Workers of America, CIO, the amount of all such deductions and withhold- ings to the end that such employee shall be reimbursed for all monies so de- ducted or withheld. ROBBIE SHOE CORP., Employer. Dated---------------- By---------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be .altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. APPENDIX B NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF UNITED SHOE WORKERS OF AMERICA, CIO, AND TO ALL EMPLOYEES OF ROBBIE SHOE CORP. Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, we hereby notify you that: WE WILL NOT give effect to our agreement with Robbie Shoe Corp., dated June 8, 1954, and will not enter into, give effect to, or enforce any extension, renewal, modification, supplemental, or superseding agreement, unless and until we shall have been certified by the National Labor Relations Board as repre- sentative of the employees of Robbie Shoe Corp. in an appropriate unit, and unless the agreement that may subsequently be entered into conforms to the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. WE WILL NOT cause or attempt to cause Robbie Shoe Corp., its agents, suc- cessors, or assigns, to condition the hire or tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment, upon membership in, affiliation with, or dues pay- ments to our labor organization, except where lawful provision therefor shall have become established by an agreement in conformity with the National Labor Relations Act. WE WILL NOT in any other manner cause or attempt to cause Robbie Shoe Corp., its agents, successors, or assigns, to discriminate against employees in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. WE WILL NOT in any manner restrain or coerce employees of said Company in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized by Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. UNITED SHOE WORKERS OF AMERICA, CIO, Labor Organization. Dated---------------- By---------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.