Better Monkey Grip Co.

938 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD contracts of complying unions and thereby obtain therefrom benefits which the statute, would not otherwise permit. Since the Intervenor does not meet the'requirements here established, we find that the union- shop contract does not bar the petition herein.' Accordingly we find that a question affecting commerce exists con- cerning the representation of employees of the Employer within the meaning of Section 9 (c) (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. 4. The following employees of the Employer constitute a unit ap- propriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act : All employees at the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, plant of the Em- ployer, excluding truckdrivers, office employees, plant guards,. garage mechanics, garage mechanic helpers, research technicians, and all supervisors as defined in the Act .4 [Text of Direction of Election omitted from publication.] CHAIRMAN FARMER took no part in the consideration of the above Decision and Direction of Election. ' In view of our disposition of the contract-bar issue, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the merit of the various other contentions made by the parties with respect to that issue: 'This unit is the historical bargaining unit and is in accord with the, stipulation of the parties. Better Monkey Grip Company and Upholsterers' International Union of North America, AFL. Case No. 16-CA-742. Attgust 25,1955 DECISION AND ORDER REMANDING CASE TO REGIONAL DIRECTOR On August 27, 1954, the Trial Examiner issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain 'affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. There- after, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief. The Respondent also filed a motion to reopen the record to receive additional testimony. On December 31, 1954, the Board issued an Order' granting the motion, remanding the case to the Trial Examiner for further hearing, and directing that a Supplemental Intermediate Report be prepared. Pursuant to this Order, a further hearing was held before the same Trial Examiner; and, on February 9, 1955, he issued his Supplemental Intermediate 1 Not reported in printed volumes of Board Decisions and Orders. 113NLRB No. 110. - BETTER MONKEY GRIP COMPANY 939 Report. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Supple- mental Intermediate Report .2 The Respondent contends that the Intermediate Reports should be set aside and that the Board should substitute therefor its own find- ings and conclusions because the Trial Examiner demonstrated preju- dice against the Respondent. After carefully examining the entire record, we are of the opinion that certain aspects of the proceedings were such that it at least ap- pears Respondent did not have a complete and impartial hearing. Thus, in cross-examining witnesses the Trial Examiner at times ap- peared to assume the role of an advocate in attempting to impeach their prior testimony.3 Throughout the hearings, and particularly 9 The Respondent's request for oral argument is hereby denied as the record, exceptions, and brief, in our opinion, adequately present the issues and positions of the parties, s The following excerpts from the record give the impression that the Trial Examiner was determined to believe the crucial testimony of witness Whaley and to break down the testimony of the witnesses who had testified that Whaley's reputation for truth and veracity was bad : (Examination of Respondent's witness Clarence Brewer by the Trial Examiner.) Q. (By Trial Examiner.) Do you ever go fishing? A. Yes, sir. Q. Do you ever tell about going fishing after you got back? A. I suppose so Q. Did you ever exaggerate about the size of the fish that got away? A. No. Q. Never did? A. No. Q. Did you ever go hunting? A. Yes, I have been hunting. Q. Did you ever make a lucky shot? A. No. Q. Did you ever shoot birds? A. No. Q. Did you ever tell about it when you got back? A. No, sir. Q You never told anybody about going hunting when you got back , about your experiences while hunting? A. I suppose I have talked to my wife about it. Q. Never exaggerated about anything that you saw happen while you were hunting? A. No, sir. Q. You are married then, you say? A. Yes. Q. Did you court the gal before you married her? A. Yes, sir. Q. You never exaggerated about your own abilities before you got married? A. I don't think so. (Examination of Respondent 's witness Ralph Briggs by the Trial Examiner.) Q. (By Trial Examiner.) Just following up the line that you abandoned there, how old are your youngsters? A. I have one daughter four. Q. Does she believe in Santa Claus? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did you ever talk to her about Santa Claus? A. Yes, sir. Q. Do you believe in Santa Claus, do you? A. No, sir. Q. Well, then , you have talked to her about something that isn't so, haven't you? A. Doesn't all parents talk to their children about Santa Claus? Footnote continued on following page. 940 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD during the presentation of the Respondent's case-in-chief, the Trial Examiner, in attempting to expedite the hearing, cut off lines of in- quiry and limited the response of witnesses to'such an extent that the development of the case may have been hampered' Also, some of the gratuitous comments of the Trial Examiner would better have been left unsaid.' Moreover, perhaps because of an ambiguity in the word- ing of our Order remanding the case for a second hearing, it is evident from the Trial Examiner's statements made at that hearing that he was uncertain as to the purpose and scope of the second hear- ing, with the result that confusion was injected into the hearing.' s--Continued. Q That's what we are getting at, it is normal and natural for people to exaggerate in many respects. A. It's a fairy tale. Q. Fish stories very often are, are they not? A. I don't know about fish stories. Q. Do you want me to sincerely believe that you consider that the telling of a fish, story and an exaggeration of that sort has any bearing on anybody's reputation for truth and honesty? A. No, sir. Somewhat similar cross- examination appears of other witnesses who testified concerning Whaley's reputation. Also in connection with the appearance that the Trial Examiner attempted to impeach witnesses, we note the following exchange between the Trial-Ex- aminer and the Respondent's president, L. M. Everett : TRIAL EXAMINER : You mean to tell me that as an employer since 1932 that you thought you could fire people for belonging to the union? Have you ever heard of the Wagner Act, Taft-Hartley Act? The WITNESS : Yes, sir, I had heard of it, but I wasn't familiar with it. TRIAL EXAMINER: You knew you couldn't fire a man for belonging to a union? The WITNESS : I didn't know it was illegal, or anything like that. TRIAL EXAMINER: Do you want me to seriously believe that? The WI1 NESS. I always thought you could fire a man that worked for you for cause TRIAL EXAMINER: I didn't think there was a literate adult in the United States, that didn't know that. The WITNESS : I might say, if I may add something? TRIAL EXAMINER: This thing has been certainly before the public since 1935. The WITNESS: We never had any experience before. TRIAL EXAMINER : All right, if that is your testimony, it 18. For example, the Trial Examiner interrupted to prevent witness Ross Whitmore, the Respondent's plant chemist, from explaining the consequences of permitting a batch of rubber to drop on the floor, although Whitmore appeared to be qualified and this was the alleged cause for dismissing one of the dischargees, because Whitmore was not the dis- chargee's immediate supervisor. Also, the Trial Examiner interrupted during the exam- ination of Maurice Wilder to prevent him from testifying as to whether the son of one of the alleged discriminatory dischargees was retained although he was also known to have engaged in union activities. Other unwarranted interruptions also occurred resulting in curtailment of testimony. G For example, at the conclusion of his above-quoted examination of witness Clarence Brewer, after attempting unsuccessfully to induce the witness to admit that he exagger- ated on occasion, the Trial Examiner stated : "Well, this is the man that Diogenes was looking for, I can see that." 8 Shortly after the second hearing began , the Trial Examiner stated, in ruling on an. objection : Well, I'll tell you what I am going to do ; since this is an unusual proceeding anyway, and I don't quite understand'why the Board should have ordered the reopening any- way, but since that's not for me to question, I am going to permit it over my own better judgment, . . . Well, I am going to put it in. This Is for the Board, not at my request , and I am just simply unable to determine just what it is the Board wants here . If there's anything that may bear on this issue-I am not clairvoyant, I don't know what the- Board wants, so we'll let it in. BETTER MONKEY GRIP COMPANY 941 As the Board stated in Indianapolis Glove Company ° "we feel that it is essential not only to avoid actual partiality and prejudgment, and intimidation of witnesses in conduct of Board proceedings, but also to avoid even the appearance of a partisan tribunal." Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, in order to serve the interests of all parties, and to effectuate the policies of the Act, we shall set aside the Inter- mediate Report, Supplemental Intermediate Report, and the hearings herein and shall remand this proceeding to the Regional Director for rehearing upon the complaint herein, or for such other disposition as the Regional Director may determine to be advisable under present conditions. -ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Intermediate Report, the Supple- mental Intermediate Report, and the hearings herein be, and they hereby are, set aside, and that the above-entitled proceeding be, and it hereby is, remanded to the Regional Director for the Sixteenth Region for rehearing before a different Trial Examiner to be duly designated by the Chief Trial Examiner, and for the preparation of a new Inter- mediate Report containing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations with respect to the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint herein, or for such other disposition as the Regional Di- rector may determine to be advisable under present circumstances. MEMBERS MURDOCK and PETERSON, dissenting : On August 27,1954, the Trial Examiner issued his Intermediate Re- port, finding the Respondent had engaged in unfair labor practices violative of Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of the Act. On December 31, 1954, the Board issued an Order remanding the case to the Trial Ex- aminer, the necessity of which we questioned, but to which we did not dissent. The basis for, and scope of, this Order are best expressed in the,order itself, as follows in part: Upon the conclusion of the hearing in the above-entitled pro- ceeding, the Respondent and the General Counsel stipulated that had certain witnesses, Everett and Tally, been questioned about a conversation testified to by another witness named Whaley, they would have denied that any such conversation took place. This stipulation was incorporated in the record and referred to in the Intermediate Report by the Trial Examiner who, after weighing the testimony of all three witnesses, credited Whaley for reasons as stated in the Report. Thereafter, some three weeks following the issuance of the Intermediate Report, the Respondent moved to reopen the record for additional evidence on the subject of the conversations previously referred to in the stipulation. The Gen- 7 88 NLRB 986. 942 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD eral Counsel filed a reply opposing the motion to hear-additional evidence upon the ground that the motion was untimely. The Board has considered the Respondent's motion and the General Counsel's reply thereto. Because the Board is of the opinion that the testimony is material and might well have in- fluenced the Trial Examiner in his finding on this issue, the Board decided to grant the Respondent's motion for further evidence. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this proceeding be remanded to the Trial Examiner for the purpose of taking further evidence on the issue of the conversation testified to by witness Whaley. The supplemental hearing was held and the Trial Examiner issued his Supplemental Intermediate Report on February 9, 1955. In that report the Trial Examiner reaffirmed his previous finding that Whaley credibly testified that Respondent's vice president, Jack Everett, had made a statement that he would "fire everybody that signed a union card if it took ten years to do it and he had a good memory"; and that he knew "there were six of the leaders that helped start the Union and he knew of three of them and if he knew the other three he would let them go." Obviously such a statement if made by Everett would be of significance in determining the motivation for the alleged dis- criminatory discharges. The majority now has decided that the case should be heard de novo by another Trial Examiner on the ground "that certain aspects of the proceedings were such that it at least appears Respondent did not have a complete and impartial hearing." Such a conclusion must be based upon the record of the supplemental hearing, for, as evidenced by the Board in its Order of December 31, 1954, the Board was then con- cerned only with the taking of further evidence regarding the con- versation between Jack Everett and Tally by the'same Trial Ex- aminer. Had the Board then felt that it appeared from the record of the first hearing that the Respondent did not have an impartial hearing it plainly would not have remanded the case to the same Trial Examiner. For the reasons discussed below we believe that the present remand by the majority is not justified. We agree with the majority that in the conduct of a Board proceeding even the appearance of a partisan tribunal must be avoided. We also note, however, that, as a Trial Examiner must make credibility resolutions, it is not only appropriate but incumbent upon him to question witnesses so that their credibility may be ascertained or their testimony clarified. Section 7 (a) of the Administrative Procedure Act provides : "The functions of all presid- ing officers and of officers participating in decisions ... shall be con- ducted in an impartial manner." In explanation of this provision, it BETTER MONKEY GRIP COMPANY 943 is stated in Senate Document No. 248, 79th Congress, 2d sess., and quoted in the Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Pro- cedure Act, "They must conduct the hearing in a strictly impartial manner, rather than as the representative of an investigative or prose- cuting authority, but this does not mean that they do not have the authority and duty-as a court does-to make sure that all necessary evidence is adduced and to keep the hearing.orderly and efficient." [Emphasis supplied.] Section 102.35 of the Board's own Rules and Regulations specifically provides that Trial Examiners shall have authority ". . . (j) To call, examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce into the record documentary or other evidence." Further- more, we would be less than alert were we to ignore the fact, pointed out by the Supreme Court of the United States, in reversing a court of appeals decision that the Board should have substituted a new Trial Examiner in N. L. R. B. v. Donnelly Garment Co., 330 U. S. 219, at 237, that ". . . defeated litigants, no matter how fairly treated, do, not always have the feeling that they have received justice." The real issues on the question of this second remand, as we view them, are : (1) Was any party prejudiced as a matter of law by the Trial Examiner's conduct of the proceeding? (2) Was there even the appearance of a partisan tribunal? and finally, (3) Was confusion injected into the second hearing by ambiguity in the remand order?' We have personally read the transcript of both the original and sup- plemental hearings. We would be less than frank if we did not agree with the majority's statement that "some of the gratuitous comments of the Trial Examiner would better have been left unsaid." It would be more circumspect to refrain from spontaneous statements or ques- tions indicating incredulity when a corporation president testifies he didn't know it was illegal to fire a man for joining a union, or possible exasperation with witnesses who solemnly testify that a man's reputa- tion for truth and veracity is bad because he has told "fish stories" or similar "tall tales." But the issue of a remand does not turn on circumspection but on the presence or appearance of lack of impar- tiality justifying a de novo hearing. In our opinion, the record con- sidered as a whole does not show that any party was prejudiced by the Trial Examiner's conduct of the hearing, that the Trial Examiner conducted the proceedings in a manner giving the appearance of a lack of impartiality, or that confusion was injected into the second hearing. Accordingly, we would not remand the case for a new hearing before another Trial Examiner. In view of the seriousness of the action taken by the majority and its impact upon the conduct of hearings by the Board's Trial Ex-' aminers, and in fairness to all parties, we are impelled to analyze critically the basis for the majority's action rather than to limit our- selves to a simple statement of dissent. Although the majority, now '9944 ' DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD finds that the Trial Examiner at the original hearing "in attempting to expedite the hearing, cut off lines of inquiry and limited the re- sponse of witnesses to such an extent that the development of the case may have been hampered," as we have already noted, this charge can- not be very serious or the majority would not earlier have remanded the case to the same Trial Examiner for the taking of additional testimony on one issue. The majority disapproves of certain questioning of witnesses by the Trial Examiner, principally at the supplemental hearing. Ex- cerpts from the record are quoted out of context in footnote 3 of the majority decision with the statement that they ". . . give the impres- sion that the Trial Examiner was determined to believe the crucial testimony of witness Whaley and to break down the testimony of the witnesses who had testified that Whaley's reputation for truths and veracity was bad." It is true that some of the witnesses did state early in their testimony that Whaley's reputation for truth and veracity was bad, and others testified that he "exaggerated." Upon further exami- nation, some of it direct, however, these witnesses showed that they were basing their opinions not upon general reputation but upon specific instances of "tall tales" which they had heard Whaley-tell. In fact, with one exception they testified that to their 'knowledge Whaley never actually lied. Although the full record, therefore, does not bear out the majority's statement, the very fact that the majority has made it demonstrates that the early testimony of the witnesses needed clarification and that the Trial Examiner did have a legitimate purpose in cross-examining these witnesses in the course of which the questions quoted in footnote 3 were asked. As stated in its Order, the Board limited the taking of additional testimony to the "issue of the conversation testified to by witness Whaley." In the face of denials that the conversation occurred, the credibility of Whaley would appear to be a crucial element in that issue, and the Trial Examiner permitted testimony upon the reputa- tion of Jack Everett, Tally, and Whaley. In our opinion, he was correct in so doing. Generally, with each of six witnesses for the Respondent the testi- mony contains in somewhat the same sequence the statement that Whaley "exaggerated" or that his reputation for truth was bad, that he had told a "tall tale," but' finally (with one exception, discussed later) the admission that Whaley was not known by the witness to have ever actually lied. The examples- of "tall tales" given by the wit- nesses, as the basis for their belief his reputation for truth was bad or that he exaggerated, included reputed statements that Whaley had said that-his son got 24 miles to a gallon of gasoline: from his new car, that he had a squirrel dog that could climb trees, that he had told BETTER MONKEY GRIP COMPANY 945 them about firewood that cost $74 a cord, that he had dug potatoes :8 feet from the vine, and that -the Union would get the employees a raise. Only 1 of the 6 witnesses testified that Whaley "lied." The follow- ing is the story attributed to Whaley, which-this witness characterized to the Trial Examiner as a "lie": Well, one I can think of, he told me one time that he'd gone fish- ing and broke the ice and fished through the ice and took his fish home and they were frozen, I believe, and he hung them on the clothes line and they stayed there three days and the sun came out and the fish thawed up and started flopping on the line. Viewed in its most favorable light, the testimony of the witnesses :mentioned above is opinion testimony; it was, therefore, proper to inquire into the bases for the opinions and into the frame of reference in which the witnesses used certain terms, such as "exaggerate" and "lie." To assist the Trial Examiner in evaluating such testimony, cross-examination was not improper. Note, for example, the final question in the quoted portion of the record in footnote 3 of the majority opinion : "Q. Do you want me to sincerely believe that you consider that the telling of a fish story and an exaggeration of that sort has any bearing on anybody's reputation for truth and honesty? A. No sir." Viewed in its most unfavorable light, the testimony described above appears to be at least frivolous, suggesting that counsel for Respond- ent was "scraping the bottom of the barrel" in his effort to dredge up support for his theory that Whaley's reputation for truth and veracity was bad. Even if the cited instances of the-Trial Examiner's examina- tion may be deemed to involve some elements of flippancy, or exaspera- tion, they should not be ripped from context and held to be cause for remand. Nor do we believe that "confusion was injected into the second hearing" by the Trial Examiner's statements to the effect that he didn't understand why the Board had ordered the reopening anyway. We Ao emphatically disagree that the second hearing resulted in any con- fusion. Not only does a careful reading of the transcript compel that conclusion, but the Trial Examiner at the conclusion of the hear- ing clearly stated that in his opinion the remand was limited to "... this one conversation, the one issue as to whether or not it actually occurred...." Surely this interpretation of the Order is reasonable. Finally, we note that the Order issued by the majority herein pro- vides for alternative action. It remands the case to the Regional Director for rehearing before a different Trial Examiner "or for such other disposition as the Regional Director may determine to be ad- visable under present circumstances." The alternative is broad enough 946 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD to permit a withdrawal of the complaint and dismissal of the charge- There is no justification for such breadth. The only alternative which should be suggested or authorized to the new hearing is a satisfactory settlement of the case with Board approval. We cannot understand the failure of the majority so to limit the Order. Our review of the record has led us to the conclusion that the General Counsel established by a preponderance of evidence that Respondent discriminatorily discharged six employees, spied on union meetings (one incident being admitted by Vice-President Everett), solicited the withdrawal of employees from the Union, and sponsored and dominated the "Em- ployee Committee," and we would affirm the Trial Examiner's con- clusions to this effect instead of ordering a new hearing. We view a second remand of this case in which the unfair labor practices occurred more than a year ago as justice unnecessarily delayed. SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT The undersigned employer (herein called the Employer ) and the undersigned charging party (herein called the Charging Party), in settlement of the above matter, and subject to the approval of the Regional Director for the National Labor Re- lations Board (herein called the Regional Director ), HEREBY AGREE AS FOL- LOWS: POSTING OF NOTICE-Upon approval of this Agreement, the Employer will post immediately in conspicuous places in and about its plant , and maintain for a period of at least sixty (60) consecutive days from the date of posting, copies of the notice to all employees attached hereto and made a part hereof. COMPLIANCE WITH NOTICE-The Employer will comply with all the terms and provisions of said notice. BACK PAY-The Employer will make whole the employees named below by payment to each of them of the amount set opposite his or her name. Nannie Bell Sparks - ------------------------------------------------ $650 Irene B.Stone ------ -------------------•--------------------------- 1,200 J. V. Stone -------------------------------------------------------- 40D James Clark--------------------------- -----------------------=--- 650 The execution of this settlement agreement by Better Monkey Grip Company does not constitute an admission that it has violated the Act. WITHDRAWAL-The Charging Party hereby requests the withdrawal of the charge in this matter , such withdrawal to become effective when the Regional Di- rector is satisfied that the provisions of this Agreement have been carried out. At the same time likewise the complaint issued herein on June 10, 1954, will be con- sidered to be automatically withdrawn. REFUSAL TO ISSUE COMPLAINT-In the event the Charging Party fails or re- fuses to become a party to this Agreement, then , if the Regional Director in his discretion believes it will effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, he shall decline to issue a complaint herein and this Agreement shall be between the Employer and the undersigned Regional Director . A review of such action may be obtained pursuant to Section 102.19 of the Rules and Regulations of the Board if a request for same is filed within ten (10) days thereof . This Agreement is con- tingent upon the General Counsel sustaining the Regional Director's action in the event of a review. PERFORMANCE-Performance by the Employer with the terms and provisions of this Agreement shall commence immediately after the Agreement is approved by the Regional Director, or, in the event the Charging Party does not enter into this Agreement, performance shall commence immediately upon receipt by the Employer of advice that no review has been requested or that the General Counsel has sus- tained the Regional Director. NOTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE-The undersigned parties to this Agree- ment will each notify the Regional Director in writing what steps the Employer has taken to comply herewith . Such notification shall be made within five ( 5) days, and again after sixty (60) days, from the date of the approval of this Agreement, LOCAL UNION NO. 9 947 or, in the event the Charging Party does not enter into this Agreement, after the receipt of advice that no review has been requested or that the General Counsel has sustained the Regional Director . Contingent upon compliance with the terms and provisions hereof, no further action shall be taken in the above case. BETTER MONKEY GRIP COMPANY, UPHOLSTERERS' INTERNATIONAL Employer. UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, AFL, (S.) HERBERT S. BONNEY, Jr., Atty. Charging Party. ( Name and Title ) (S.) D. H. WOODALL, Reg. Dir. Date executed : Nov. 4, 1955 ( Name and Title) (S.) EDWIN A. ELLIOTT, Recommended: Regional Director,, (S.) H. C. Thompson, Jr. National Labor Relations Board . H. C. THOMPSON, Jr. Attorney, Nat'l. Labor R. B. Date Approved : 11-4-55 NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to a Settlement Agreement approved by the Regional Director for the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the Na- tional Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT sponsor or recognize the Employee Committee as the repre- sentative of our employees for the purpose of dealing with us concerning grievances, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment. WE WILL NOT discourage or encourage membership in the Upholsters ' Inter- national Union of North America , AFL, or any other labor organization of our employees by discriminating in regard to their hire or tenure of employment, or any other condition of employment. WE WILL NOT engage in surveillance of the union activities , if any, of our employees at meetings with union representatives. WE WILL NOT conduct any poll among our employees to determine their union affiliation. WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self -organization, to form labor organizations, to join -or assist Upholsterers' International Union of North America, AFL, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection , and to refrain from any or all of such activities. All our employees are free to become or remain members of this Union, or any other labor organization. WE WILL compensate the following named employees for their loss of earn- ings, if any, suffered by reason of discrimination , if any, against them: J. V. Stone Irene B. Stone Nannie Bell Sparks James Clark BETTER MONKEY GRIP COMPANY, Employer or Labor Organization. Dated Nov. 4, 1955 By HERBERT S. BONNEY, Jr., Atty.- (Representative ) ( Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Local Union No. 9, Wood, Wire, and Metal Lathers International Union, AFL and A. W. Lee, Inc. Case No. 5-CD-14. August 25, 1955 ' DECISION AND ORDER QUASHING NOTICE OF HEARING This proceeding arises under Section 10 (k) of the Act, which pro- vides that "Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an 113 NLRB No. 108.