Krambo Food Stores, Inc.

-KRAMBO FOOD STORES, INC.. 241 -tioneering, if such it was, consisted solely -of individual interviews with employees at their places of work. The interviews- were, brief, in, most instances apparently not more than 3 to 5 minutes.- As it does not appear that Jordan's activity contravened the Board's Peerless Ply clod 4 or other rules governing election campaign activity, we 'shall also overrule this objection of the Petitioner.5 Accordingly, as the UE has received a majority of the valid ballots cast-in the-election, we-shall certify it as bargaining representative. [The Board certified United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers -of,America, Local 419, as the collective-bargaining representative of the employees of the Employer in the, unit found appropriate.] APeerless Plywood Company, 107 NLRB 427, 430. 5 The Board-has recently, held that an Employer's conduct of individual interviews with employees at their ,places of work is not ground for setting aside an election . Mall Tool Company, 112 NLRB 1313. See also Pkelps-Dodge Copper Products Corporation, 111 NLRB 950; Comfort Slipper Corporation, 112 NLRB 183. But cf.: Oregon Frozen Foods Company, 113 NLRB 881; Riblet Welding and Mfg. Corp., 112 NLRB 712; Econommic Machutery company, Division of George J. Meyer Manufacturing Co., 111 NLRB 947, Krambo Food Stores, Inc. and Dorothy L. Grantham and Maxine Lightner Allied Independent Union, CUA and Dorothy L. Grantham and Maxine Lightner. Cases Nos. 13-CA-1639 (a) and 13-CA- 1639 (b);13=CB-181. (a) and 13-CB-I84 (b). October 7,1955 - - DECISION AND ORDER, On October 18, 1954, Trial Examiner Arthur E. Reymanissued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondents had engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommending that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Interme- diate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, both Respondents' filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report'and supporting briefs. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Intermedi- ate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this case, and- finds merit in the exceptions filed by the Respondent Company, and,, accordingly, adopts the, Intermediate Report only to the extent consistent herewith. 1. We find that the Respondent Company is engaged in commerce within' the meaning of the Act and that it will effectuate the' purposes of the, Act for the Board to assert jurisdiction over its operations. - In asserting jurisdiction, however, we do not, adopt the reasons urged 114 NLRB No. 55. 242 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD therefor by the Trial Examiner. Since the date of the Intermediate Report, the Board has set forth the criteria to be used for the assertion of jurisdiction over intrastate retail chains, such as the Respondent, in the case of Hogue and Knott Supermarkets, 110 NLRB 543. In that case the Board announced that it would assert jurisdiction over such a business when, inter alia, the annual indirect inflow of all stores in the chain amounted to at least $2,000,000 in value. A stipulation executed by the parties to this proceeding on September 29, 1954, establishes that the Employer's entire chain makes total purchases of goods com- ing ifidirectly from outside the State in an aiihouilt exceeding $2,000,000 a year.' Accordingly, as 'the total indirect inflow of the chain meets the Board's standard for asserting jurisdiction, we assert jurisdiction herein. 2. We agree with the Trial Examiner that the Respondent Union violated the Act in causing the discharge of the complainants Doro- thy L. Grantham and Maxine Lightner. The 2 complainants were admittedly discharged by the Respondent Company at the request of the Respondent Union upon the Union's representation that the 2 were not members in good standing. As fully discussed in the Intermediate Report, the complainants paid dues three times after the Respondent Union was restored as bargaining representative of the Company's employees in August 1953, and their dues cards showed the months of October, November, and December, 1953, either punched or initialed by the union steward. The issue arises as to whether the payments made by the complainants satisfied the dues requirements of the Respondent Union or whether the com- plainants had lost their good standing in the Union for failure to make required dues payments when the Respondent Union demanded their discharge. The Trial Examiner sets forth in detail the pertinent evidence as to the dues requirements of the Respondent Union. Of particular im- portance are the articles of the Union's constitution and bylaws, quoted in the Intermediate Report, which require the payment of "monthly" dues and provide that members who have become delin- quent in the payment of dues "for a period exceeding 30 days shall be considered not to be in good standing in the Union." Significant, too, are the portions of the minutes of the Union's meeting of October 6, 1953, quoted in the Intermediate Report, when the Union took action concerning the pattern of dues payments to be followed. At the hearing, the president of the Respondent Union stated that the 3 dues payments which the complainants had made were for the months of September, October, and November, 1953; that the appli- I A further stipulation of the parties , executed on June 23 and 24 , 1955 , concerning the gross receipts of the Employer's chain of stores is hereby made a part of the record in this proceeding KRAMBO FOOD ,STORES, INC. 243 cable 30-day grace period for December dues had expired at the time of the demand for their discharge on- December 31; and, accordingly, the following discharge was proper. However, in its brief, the Union urged that the dues payments made by the complainants were for the months of October, November, and December, 1953; that dues for a particular month were due prior to the first day of the preceding month, at which time the 30-day grace period started to run; and, since the complainants' dues for January had not been paid prior to December 31, 1953, the Union was warranted in demanding the dis- charge of the 2 complainants on December 31. The General Counsel's position, on the other hand, is that the Re- spondent Union required dues only for the month of October 1953 and thereafter; the 30-day grace period granted members ran during the calendar month for which dues were payable; and employees, therefore, had the full calendar month which dues covered in which to pay the dues. The Trial Examiner accepted, substantially, the General Counsel's theory as to the dues requirements of the Union and found that the complainants had paid dues for October, November, and December, 1953; that January dues were due prior to the 31st day of December, but that the 30-day grace period permitted union members by the con- stitution extended this period for paying January dues. We agree with the Trial Examiner's conclusion that the complain- ants were not subject to discharge for delinquency in their dues pay- ments at the time the Respondent Union demanded their discharge. The Board finds from the minutes of the October 6 meeting of the Union that the Union did not require members to pay dues for the month of September 1953, but required them to resume payments with the October dues. The Board further finds from the October 6 min- utes that the Union required dues to be paid by the first of the calendar month they covered and that payments for a particular month were therefore due the last day of the preceding month. Finally, it is the Board's opinion that according to article IX of the Union's constitu- tion and bylaws, members were allowed a 30-day grace period after the due date in which to make payment. This is the usual manner of ap- plying a grace period. Therefore, we conclude that the 3 dues pay- ments made by the complainants covered the months of October, No- vember, and December, 1953; January dues were due on December 31, 1953, and the complainants were entitled to a 30-day grace period after that date within which to pay their January dues? As the com- plainants were discharged during the 30-day grace period at the re- quest of the Union, their discharge constituted a discriminatory denial 2 We do not adopt the Trial Examiner's interpretation that the 30 -day grace period allowed by the Union's constitution ran until the last day of any month rather than for only 30 days 387044-56-vol 114-17 ,244 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD to the complainants of the grace period allowed them for the payment of dues by the Union's constitution 3 Accordingly, we find the Respondent Union violated Section 8 (b) (2) in that it did cause the Respondent Company to discriminate against employees Dorothy L. Grantham and Maxine Lightner by terminating their employment on some ground other than the failure to tender the periodic dues uniformly required as a condition of retain- ing membership in the Union. We further find that this conduct amounted to restraint and coercion prohibited by Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act. 3. We do not agree with the Trial Examiner that the Respondent Company violated the Act by effecting the discharge of the two com- plainants. The notice of December 31, 1953, which the Company re- ceived' from the Union stated that Maxine Lightner and Dorothy Grantham were not members in good standing in the Union and re- quested that the Company discharge them pursuant to the existing bargaining agreement. The Company had no dues checkoff policy. Somewhat reluctantly, on January 4, 1954, it removed the timecards of the two employees from the clock. At the time of the discharge, the Company indicated to the complainants its willingness to keep them as employees if they paid their dues and were reinstated as members in good standing with the Union. The record does not indicate that either of the charging parties protested that the discharge was im- proper. In fact, Grantham admitted her delinquency and asked for advice as to what to do. Both complainants immediately went to the home of the Union's president and sought to pay dues and be rein- stated. No doubt both complainants knew they were delinquent and, as both testified they knew nothing of the 30-day grace period, thought that they had also lost their good standing with the Union. On the facts of this case, we are persuaded that the Company under- took only to carry out its obligation under the union-security clause of the bargaining contract. There was nothing to indicate to the Company that the Union had any ulterior motive for requesting the discharges. Accordingly, as the Company had no reasonable grounds for believing that the Union's discharge request was motivated by reasons other than the Charging Parties' failure to tender periodic dues, we find the Company did not violate Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act by discharging Maxine Lightner and Dorothy L. Grantham. ORDER Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent Union, Allied In- 8 In view of our decision herein, we find it unnecessary to consider the Trial Examiner's statements concerning the effect of the tender of dues made by the complainants. KRAMBO FOOD STORES, INC. 245 dependent Union, CUA, its officers, representatives, agents, succes- sors, and assigns, shall : 1. Cease and-desist from : .(a) Causing'or'attempting to cause Krambo Food Stores, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, or assigns, to discriminate against its em- ployees in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. (b) In any other manner restraining or coercing employees of Krambo Food Stores, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, or assigns, in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement requir- ing membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized by Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Notify the Krambo Food Stores, Inc., and Charging Parties Dorothy L. Grantham and Maxine Lightner, in writing, that it has no objection to the Company's employment of Dorothy L. Grantham and Maxine Lightner. (b) Make whole Dorothy L. Grantham and Maxine Lightner for any loss of pay either may have suffered as a result of the discrimina- tion against her by payment to each of a sum of money equal to that which she would have earned as wages from the date of her discharge to 5 days after the date on which the Respondent Union notifies the Respondent Company and the complainant, in accordance with this Order, that it no longer has objection to her reinstatement, less her net earnings, the loss of pay to be computed on a quarterly basis. (c) Post in conspicuous places at the business office of the Respond- ent Union, and in all places where notices or communications to its members are customarily posted, copies of the notice attached hereto and marked "Appendix."' Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Thirteenth Region, shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent Union's representative, be posted by the Respondent Union immediately upon the receipt thereof, and main- tained by it for a period of sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent Union to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other ma- terial. '(d) Mail to the Regional Director for the Thirteenth Region signed copies of the notice attached hereto and marked "Appendix" for post- ing, the Company willing, on the bulletin boards of the Company at its store at 5020 West North Avenue in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, where notices to employees are customarily posted. + In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order." 246 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (e) Notify the Regional Director for the Thirteenth Region in writing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent Union has taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dis- missed, insofar as it alleges that the Respondent Company violated Section 8(a) (3) and8 (a) (1) of the Act. APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF ALLIED INDEPENDENT UNION, CUA, AND TO ALL EMPLOYEES OF KRAMBO FOOD STORES, INC. Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify you that : WE 'WILL NOT cause or attempt to cause Krambo Food Stores, Inc., to discharge or in any other manner to discriminate against its employees in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. WE WILL NOT restrain or coerce employees of Krambo Food Stores, Inc., in the exercise of their rights to engage in or to re- frain from engaging in any or all of the concerted activities guaranteed to them by Section 7, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized by Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. WE WILL notify Krambo Food Stores, Inc., in writing, and Dorothy L. Grantham and Maxine Lightner that we have with- drawn our objections to the employment of Grantham and Lightner. WE WILL make Dorothy L. Grantham and Maxine Lightner whole for any loss of pay either may have suffered because of the discrimination against them. ALLIED INDEPENDENT UNION, CUA, Union. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative ) (Title) This notice must remain posted for sixty (60) days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE After the filing of separate charges by Dorothy L. Grantham and Maxine Lightner on January 15 and February 1, 1954, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, by the Regional Director for the Thirteenth Region, on March 31, 1954, issued a consolidated complaint against Krambo Food Stores, Inc., a Wis- consin corporation, and Allied Independent Union, CUA, a labor organization, to- gether with an order consolidating cases and notice of consolidated hearing to be held on May 4, 1954. KRAMBO FOOD I STORES, INC. 247 The consolidated complaint sets forth in substance that Krambo Food Stores, Inc., Respondent in case No. 13-CA-1639, hereinafter sometimes called the Company, on or about January 4 , 1954, discriminatorily discharged Dorothy L. Grantham and Maxine Lightner for the reason that each of them refrained from assisting Allied Independent Union, CUA, hereinafter sometimes called the Independent , in that each of them refused to tender periodic dues prematurely and in a manner-not uni- formly required by the Independent as a condition of retaining membership therein, and that these discharges constituted contraventions of Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended , 61 Stat. 136, herein called the Act. The General Counsel in the consolidated complaint further alleges that the Inde- pendent, Respondent in case No. 13-CB-284, attempted to cause and did cause, on January 4, 1954, the Company to discriminatorily discharge Dorothy L. Grantham and Maxine Lightner and to refuse to reinstate them , in contravention of the provi- sions of Section 8 (b) (1) (A ) and 8 (b) (2) of the Act. These alleged acts and the asserted refusal of the Company to reinstate these individuals are said to be in violation of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. Each Respondent by written answer denies the essential allegations of the consolidated complaint concerning the com- mission of any unfair labor practice by either of them. Pursuant to notice , a hearing was held at Milwaukee, Wisconsin , on May 4 and 5, 1954. The hearing thereafter was reopened by appropriate order, and further testimony and proof taken at Chi- cago, Illinois, on August 18, 1954. At the hearing, the General Counsel and each Respondent were represented by counsel , and each Charging Party appeared and testified. Full opportunity to be heard , to examine and cross-examine witnesses and to introduce evidence bearing on the issues ,, to argue orally upon the record, and to file briefs , proposed findings of fact, and proposed conclusions of law were af- forded all parties. Upon the entire record in the case , and from his observation of the witnesses, and after careful consideration, the Trial Examiner makes the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT KRAMBO FOOD STORES, INC. Krambo Food Stores, Inc., one of the Respondents herein , is and at all material times hereto has been a Wisconsin corporation having its principal office and place of business located in Appleton, Wisconsin, and an office in Milwaukee , Wisconsin. This corporation is engaged in the business of operating some 26 retail food stores located in Wisconsin cities and communities , including stores in Milwaukee County. In the course and conduct of its business , its purchase of food products annually is in excess of $2,000,000 , of which amount food products costing in excess of $ 1,000,- 000 are received at its stores through 1 company -operated warehouse which receives these commodities from points outside of the State of Wisconsin ,' and food products in amount exceeding $500,000 annually are shipped directly to the above-mentioned retail food stores from places outside of the State of Wisconsin . This Respondent has no stores, nor does it conduct business , outside of the State of Wisconsin.2 Purchases of commodities delivered to the Respondent Company's store at 5020 West North Avenue, in the city and county of Milwaukee, were reported by the Respondent's comptroller to be: Source 195$ First half, 1,954 Total _______________________________________ $764,908 .34 $441, 028.23 Purchases made directly by manager *--------- 258, 746. 80 136, 232. 80 Produce purchased from Milwaukee produce houses -------------------------------- 85 , 076. 46 51, 603. 51 Frozen food products purchased from Wiscon- sin Cold Storage Co., Milwaukee---------- 22, 148. 75 13, 521. 36 Delivered from company warehouse to store--- 398 , 934. 50 239, 670. 80 *Included in this amount is $41 ,548, the value of goods shipped from outstate. to the store without a break in transit at the warehouse 'These purchases are direct purchases. The temporary halt in the movement of the commodities so handled does not constitute a break of their flow in the stream of inter- state commerce Walling v Jackson i,ille Paper Co, 317 U. S 564, 565. 569; A. H Phillips, Inc. v Walling, 324 U S 490 , 494; Memphis Cold Storage , 91 NLRB 1404. 2 It appears that the Board heretofore has assumed jurisdiction in matters involving this Respondent Case No 13-RC-2379 , 98 NLRB 1320 , and Cases Nos 13-CA-986 and 13-CB-180, 106 NLRB 870; also Case No. 13-RC-3564, 107 NLRB 1544, and 108 NLRB 1656. 248 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Counsel for the Company and counsel for the General Counsel have offered, and the Trial Examiner has accepted, a stipulation dated September 29, 1954, as follows: It is hereby stipulated, by and between respondent, Krambo Food Stores, Inc., by its attorney, Charles F. Nolan, and by the counsel for the General Counsel, Edward T. Maslanka, that in response to Paragraph 2 of the consolidated com- plaint in the above entitled matter, dated March 31, 1954, respondent Company admitted the fifst Paragraph and denied the balance of said Paragraph; that the store involved at 5020 West North Avenue, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, has pur- chases as heretofore appear in the testimony of R. M. Ballou , given in Chicago on August 18, 1954; that without admitting the Company to be engaged in inter- state commerce, or affecting commerce within the meaning of the Act, it is stipulated that while the store at 5020 West North Avenue does not have pur- chases exceeding $2,000,000 a year coming to it indirectly from outside the State, that the seven stores operated by Krambo Food Stores, Inc., in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, have total purchases exceeding $2,000,000 a year coming to it indirectly from outside the State, and that the twenty-six stores operated by Krambo Food Stores, Inc., have total purchases exceeding $2,000,000 a year coming to the total of such stores indirectly from outside the State; that the Respondent Company reserves all of its rights to its answer denying that the store involved, or the Respondent Company is engaged in interstate commerce. No statistics are available showing the dollar volume of business done by the other six stores of the Company doing business in Milwaukee County. Counsel for the Company takes the position that under the "new standards for exercise of jurisdic- tion" announced by the Board on July 15, 1954, the Board will not take jurisdiction here because the Charging Parties herein, Lightner and Grantham, were, prior to their respective discharges, employed at the store at 5020 West North Avenue in Milwaukee, and consequently that is the only store involved in this case. The Com- pany likewise has refused to furnish any dollar value of purchases other than com- modities sold by it at this store (except in general terms according to the overall business of the chain of 26 Wisconsin stores) such as equipment and machinery and other commodities necessarily used by it in the transaction of its business at these stores. However, it is abundantly clear that the Board will assert juridiction herein, since under its standards as announced on July 15, 1954, it will take jurisdiction if "(1) the store involved in the case has anuual purchases amounting to at least $1,000,000 coming to it directly from outside the State, or (2) the store involved has annual purchases of $2,000,000 coming to it indirectly from outside the State. . As will be pointed out below, at least the stores of the Company which it operates in the county of Milwaukee are involved herein, since the Charging Parties and alleged discriminatorily discharged employees were members of a certified bargaining unit, including employees in that unit in the Company's stores in the county of Milwaukee. It is settled law that the Board's determination of a bargaining unit is conclusive un- less affirmatively shown to be arbitrary or capricious. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. N. L. R. B., 313 U. S. 146, 152, 153, 165, affg. 113 F. 2d 698, 701 (C. A. 8); May Department Stores Co. v. N. L. R. B., 326 U S. 376, 380, affg. 146 F. 2d 66, 68 (C. A. 8); N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U. S. 416, 422. The Trial Examiner finds that more than a single store is involved here, and that the to- tality of dollar volume of business done in the other stores of the Company which are involved more than meet the jurisdictional requirements of the Board. The Trial Examiner finds that this Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. It. ALLIED INDEPENDENT UNION, CUA, THE RESPONDENT LABOR UNION INVOLVED Allied Independent Union, CUA, is and at all times material hereto has been a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act, admitting to member- ship and having as members employees of Krambo Food Stores, Inc. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background In December 1950, the Company and the Union became parties to a 2-year col- lective-bargaining agreement, renewable January 15, 1953. At a time when this agreement still had a year to run, Retail Grocery and Food Clerks Union Local 1469, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL, hereinafter called the Retail Clerks, filed a petition with the Board for an election in the same unit. The Board directed the holding of an election, holding that the Independent's contract was not a bar be- cause the union-security clause was unlawful; as a result the Retail Clerks won the di- KRAMBO FOOD STORES, INC. . 249 rected election, and after certification as bargaining representative for the employees in this unit, entered into a collective -bargaining agreement with the Company in Feb- ruary 1953.3 Subsequently the Retail Clerks charged the Company and the Inde- pendent with discriminatory treatment against certain employees , and on August 25, 1953, the Board issued its Decision and, Order in that case ( 106 NLRB 870) and reversed its holding in'-the representation case (98 NLRB 1320 ) that the union-se- curity clause in the Independent 's contract was illegal; the Board also held that the election which the Retail Clerks had won should not have been directed and that its certification should no longer be considered as operative or be accorded any further force or effect. After the decision of the Board ,( 106 NLRB 870), the Company and the Independent reinstated their original contract, adding thereto a new wage supple- ment, to be effective until January 15, 1954. ' . On September 8, 1953, the Retail Clerks filed a petition for certification and after a hearing held on October 13 , 1953, the Board, on March 11, 1954, issued its Decision and Direction of Election directing an immediate election (Case No. 13-RC-3564, 107 NLRB 1544 ) among employees employed in the following unit: All employees of the Employer employed at its stores in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, excluding meat department employees, managers, assistant mana- gers, casual part-time employees working less than 15 hours per week, profes- sional employees , and supervisors as defined in the Act. It appears from the Decision and the record in that case , which this Trial Examiner has officially noticed, that after November 1951, when the Retail Clerks filed its first petition, up until September 21, 1953, the employes in this bargaining unit were not represented by the Independent.4 B. Independent's dues requirements Article IX of the constitution and bylaws of the Independent provides: Sec. 5 Members of the Union who have become delinquent in the payment of their dues , initiation fees, fines and/or assessments for a period exceeding 30 days shall be considered not to be in good standing in the Union. Section 2 of that article provides: Monthly dues , of the Allied Independent Unions, CUA, members shall be one dollar and 50 cents ( 1.50) subject to change by a majority vote of the executive board. Prior to the decision of the Board on August 25, 1953 ( 106 NLRB 870), employ- ees had been paying dues to the Retail Clerks. The Independent again was recog- nized on or about September 21, 1953, as the bargaining representative of the em- ployees. The Independent took formal action looking toward the collection of dues after the decision of the Board in August 1953, at a meeting held October 6, 1953, at- tended by Arthur Sorenson , president, who presided, the secretary-treasurer of the Union , and the stewards with the exception of one absent person . The minutes of that meeting reflect the following: Chairman-It is a pleasure to report that all eligible employees of the Krambo Grocery Department have paid their dues during the month of September 1953. In this connection allow me to remind you that this Union had no intentions of collecting dues for the period during which the AFL grocery clerks were errone- 3 The Decision and Direction of Election of the Board in this case , No 13-RC-2379, is reported in 98 NLRB 1320 4 In brief , with reference to Case No . 13-RC-3564 , the General Counsel says : The Board arrived at this conclusion [ that September 21, 1953 , was the date when the Company again recognized the Union as bargaining representative ] from the testimony at the representation hearing At, that hearing, Sorenson, president of the Independent , testified that Krambo suspended bargaining with the Independent until sometime in the late part of September 1953 (Transcript of Representation Proceeding 13-RC-3564 , pgs 63-64) In that case the Board said in part In the present case, the Independent was the recognized bargaining representative from December 1950 until at least April 29, 1952 , when the Board directed a new election , and from August 1953 to the present . During this entire period of time, a period of approximately 2 years , the Independent has had the benefit of a collective- bargaining agreement. 250 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ously granted rights by the National Labor Relations Board. In view of the NLRB's directive of August 25th 1953, in which an earlier decision was re- versed, this Union had an absolute right to insist on the payment of dues for the months of August and September 1953. However, we felt that since so much confusion existed because some members may have paid dues to the AFL gro- cery clerk's union, it would be advisable to insist on the payment of dues on or before the last day of September and that membership dues cards be punched for October 1953. I, therefore, recommend that this pattern of dues pay- ments be continued and remain in effect as long as the Allied Independent Unions, CUA, continue as your bargaining agents, and that this pattern of dues pay- ments be made a part of the records. A motion was made to adopt the above pattern of dues payments and that it remain in force as long as the Allied Inde- pendent Unions, CUA continues to represent us as bargaining agents. The mo- tion was duly seconded and passed without a dissenting voice. It would seem , therefore, that a proper construction of the language of the resolu- tion or part thereof above quoted would be that the Union intended to collect October 1953 dues on or before the last day of September, and that this had been done as of October 6, and that all eligible employees had paid their dues for the month of October during the month of September 1953. This construction is supported by the list of names of the employees of the Company at the store where Maxine Lightner and Dorothy Grantham were employed which shows dues payments be- ginning October 1953 and running through June 1954. . The Independent contends that language of the resolution and the exhibit showing dues payments of the employees do not tell the whole story, because the Union customarily granted a 30-day grace period for the payment of dues and that when dues were paid the subsequent month was checked or punched on the member- ship dues cards of each employee, credit being then given for the 30-day grace period in advance. It argues that by reason of this alleged fact, a check showing the payment of October dues checked the grace period for 30 days after the last day of September, so that the payment actually was for September dues and not for October, and so on for subsequent months. For the reason stated below the Trial Examiner rejects this contention of the Independent and finds that the meaning of the resolution and the records produced at the hearing show that the dues collected by the Union prior to the last day of September 1953 were dues for the month of October 1953. C. The discharges of Dorothy L. Grantham and Maxine Lightner On December 31, 1953, by letter dated that day, Arthur Sorenson, president of the Independent, notified the Company that Maxine Lightner and Dorothy Grantham were not members in good standing in the Independent and requested that the Com- pay terminate their employment. This letter reads as follows: DEAR SIR: Please be informed that of this date employees Maxine Lightner and Dorothy Grantham employed by your company at the store located at 50th North Avenue are not members in good standing in the Allied Independent Unions, CUA. In accordance with Article I of our agreement we respectfully request that you terminate the employment of the above mentioned employees. On January 4, 1954,5 the employment of these two employees was terminated. Each of them was told by the store supervisor that they would have to pay their January dues before they could continue work. On the same day the two girls called at Sorenson's home and spoke to him and requested that they be reinstated. Ac- cording to them Sorenson admitted that he knew Lightner had paid her dues but that there was "no such a thing as reinstatement" and that nothing could be done to return the girls to work. On January 5, each of these two employees sent identical letters to Mr. Sorenson, as follows: DEAR SIR: Enclosed herewith you will find a money order in the amount of $1.50 which is to cover my dues in the Allied Independent Union for the month of January, 1954. I request that you notify my employer, Krambo Food Stores, Inc. that I have paid my regular monthly dues and that I am entitled to retain my employ- ment with Krambo Food Stores, Inc. 5 Unless otherwise shown all dates hereinafter mentioned are for the year 1954. KRAMBO FOOD STORES, INC. - 251 Each of them subsequently received a letter from the Independent Union, signed by Sorenson as president , dated January 7, as follows: DEAR MADAM: The tender of your dues at this late date, following your dis- charge from employment, appears to the Allied Independent Unions, CUA to be improper. To permit periodical dues uniformly required as a condition of maintaining Union membership, members must tender dues within proper time. We are sorry but under the circumstances of this office can do nothing to assist you. Your failure to pay dues has caused a hardship on all the other union members and it would not be fair to them to utilize their time and money on your behalf in view of your flagrant disregard of the Allied Independent Unions, CUA financial operations. We hereby return your money order of January 5, 1954. The Respondent Union contends that the grace period for the payment of dues for any month expires on the 30th of that month , and that since neither Lightner nor Grantham had paid December dues on December 30 they were in arrears for that month.6 This, the Independent contends, is without regard to the number of days in any given month. No records were produced to show how the Union could be apprised on the 30th day of any given month that an employee would be in arrears on the 31st day of that month. The Trial Examiner believes, and finds, that the only reasonable construction to be given to the provision of the union constitution and bylaws governing the payment of dues shows that the last day of the month , that is, of any month, would be the day on whicht the grace period would expire for the payment of the dues for that particular month. To accept the argument of the In- dependent would mean that employees would have had to tender January dues on or before December 30, 1953, in order to remain in good standing-a plain distortion of the governing laws. At the hearing , the Trial Examiner accepted testimony under an offer of proof made by the General Counsel to show that the Independent, by notices posted on store bulletin boards , advised members of the Independent employed by the Com- pany that payment of October 1953 dues should be made before October 1. A copy of this purported form of notice was offered subject to connecting up by adequate proof, and at the hearing the Trial Examiner reserved decision on the acceptance of that document in evidence. Upon a review of the whole record, the copy seems properly to be proved under the rules of the evidence and accordingly the notice is now accepted as a part of the record. The notice, on the letterhead of Allied Independent Unions, was dated September 21, 1953, and reads as follows: Krambo Employees In accordance with our contract now in effect, all employees in the grocery and produce departments are required to become members of the AIU-CUA after 30 days of employment . This applies to all those employees working 15 hours or more per week. We expect you to pay your initiation fees and dues before October 1, 1953, in order to continue your employment at Krambo . Your dues will be credited for the month of October, 1953. Kindly pay your initiation fee and dues to the union representative in your store. Executive Board, Allied Independent Unions, CUA. ------------------------------- The notice bears the penciled signature of Floyd Vossekuel , identified as a shop steward. Maxine Lightner, prior to her discharge , had paid her initiation fee to the Inde- pendent, so that when the Independent again began representing the employees after August 25 , 1953, no initiation fee was required of her . On October 1, 1953, she paid dues to a steward, who gave her a temporary receipt for the dues received on that day which she says were dues for the month of October. During the month of November 1953, she paid her November dues to the same steward who at that time punched her dues card-for the months of October and November. On either the last day of November or the first day of December, she paid her December dues to Sorenson . According to her, on the day she was discharged she and Mrs . Grant- ham went to Sorenson 's home and at that time Sorenson admitted to her, in the pres- E There is a conflict of testimony on whether the dues previously paid by these two employees were for December or for November . This factual situation is disposed of below. 252 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ence of Grantham, that he had collected her December dues. On this particular point, Sorenson's memory was rather vague , although he did testify that he told Lightner and Grantham on that day that their dues were paid and they were in good standing until the last day of December. Grantham testified that sometimes during the first week in October 1953, she paid her dues to the same union steward to whom Lightner had paid her dues, after Arnold Leaman, employment supervisor for the Company, had told her that starting on October 1 "everyone in Krambo 's stores would have to join the Union." Ap- parently, after the acceptance of her October dues she was excused from the pay- ment of an initiation fee. Either on November 30 or December 1, 1953 , Shirley Retzlaff, who had just assumed the duties of steward for the Independent at the store where the three girls were employed, requested Lightner to pay her dues. According to Lightner, Retz- laff told her that: ( 1) She was collecting January dues in advance and that Lightner told her that she had just paid her December dues and when next month's dues were due she would pay them ; and (2 ) she intended to collect dues early and she wished Lightner to pay her next month's dues , and Lightner refused. Grantham was approached by Retzlaff on December 2 or 3, 1953 , and at that time she paid 1 month's dues. Retzlaff did not have a ticket punch, but initialed Mrs. Grantham's dues card in the square showing the payment of December dues. According to Grantham , the following day Retzlaff asked for her dues and she re- minded her that she had already paid dues the day before, whereupon Retzlaff said yes, but she meant she was asking for January dues because "we are behind and we would like to get going so that we pay a month ahead of time." The contention of the Independent, supported by the testimony of Sorenson and Mrs. Retzlaff, that neither Lightner nor Grantham had paid dues for the month of December 1953 is, as pointed out above, inconsistent with the constitution , resolu- tion, and records of the Union . There is a sharp conflict of testimony between Retzlaff on one side and Lightner and Grantham on the other in connection with Retzlaff's attempt to collect dues from each of them early in December . Retzlaff claims that she was attempting to collect December dues; the other two assert that they had paid their December dues and that Retzlaff clearly told them that she wanted to collect January dues in advance. The Trial Examiner has had no difficulty in resolving this conflict against Retzlaff . Retzlaff, on cross-examination, denied giving a statement to a representative of the General Counsel 's office during the course of the investigation of these cases prior to the issuance of the complaint. .This statement, received in evidence at the hearing for the sole purpose of showing the conflict between Retzlaff's testimony at the hearing and her prior statement, was emphatically repudiated by her at the hearing. The document, consisting of two sheets in the handwriting of the attorney , witnessed by him and signed by Retzlaff, contains statements bearing on her collection of dues from Lightner and Grantham directly in conflict with her testimony at the hearing. It does appear from her testi- mony that she was following the instructions of Sorenson in attempting to collect monthly dues early in December 1953 , but the records made available at the hear- ing and the testimony of other credible witnesses impel the Trial Examiner to find that she was actually attempting to collect dues for the month of January and not the month of December . The Trial Examiner regards as incredible her testimony that she did not make the statement set forth in the document above referred to. An examination of the document in its entirety , together with the testimony of the person who wrote and witnessed it, combined with other credible testimony con- tradictory to that of Retzlaff, shows that her testimony in this respect should be dis- regarded. The explanation given by Sorenson concerning the application of the 30 -day grace period is, to say the least, confusing . He would have it believed that at the time of the passage of the October 6 resolution , dues paid at that time were for the month of September and that upon payment of those dues for September the 30-day grace period for October was checked on records . However, no records were produced showing payment of any dues for the month of September by any member of the Union-on the contrary, the first record of dues payments , according to the record produced at the hearing, is for the month of October 1953. On this point it should be noted that the resolution was not passed until after the collection of dues in Sep- tember: and , contrary to Sorenson's testimony , that the resolution on its face says: . . . this Union had an absolute right to insist on the payment of dues for the months of August and September 1953. However, we felt that . . . it would be advisable to insist upon the payment of dues on or before the last day of September and that membership dues cards be punched for October 1953." In connection with KRAMBO FOOD STORES, INC. 253 the question of whether or not Grantham had paid September dues, her membership and dues card show that dues for the month of October were paid . Sorenson ad- mitted that when the two girls called on him on January 4, the day they were dis- charged, he told them that their dues were paid and they were considered in good standing up to the last day of December 1953. The union notice, dated Septem- ber 21 , 1953, posted on the bulletin board, is in direct conflict with his testimony in that it advised the employees that "your dues will be credited for the month of October 1953,"-a plain implication that the Union, after the decision of the Board in August 1953, did not contemplate the collection of dues for the month of Sep- tember. In view of the fact that Sorenson had difficulty on the witness stand in interpreting the true meaning of the resolution adopted at the union meeting of October 6 and in reading the records produced by him, the Trial Examiner is in- clined to believe that his testimony with respect to the 30-day grace period was pure fiction, adopted to defend his unseemly haste in demanding on December 31 that the Company discharge Lightner and Grantham. His demand for discharge was premature. Under the plain provisions of the Union's constitution and bylaws (assuming arguendo that neither of the two Charging Parties had paid their Decem- ber dues), they would not in any event have been in arrears until after December 31, 1953. Their almost immediate tender of dues on January 5, 1954, the day following their discharge, was a legal tender, and Sorensen as president of the Union was in error in rejecting that tender. January 1 was a holiday, the next day was a Saturday, Grantham's day off, and the discharges were effected the very next working day, just after the two employees had reported for work. As noted above, Arnold Leaman, the employment supervisor for the Company, had informed Grantham that everyone would have to join the Union beginning Octo- ber 1; and Grantham immediately paid a month's dues. On or about the same day that Sorenson wrote to the Company demanding the discharge of Lightner and Grantham, he had talked to the store supervisor and Leaman and requested that the girls be discharged because they were in bad standing. Nowhere in the record does it appear that any demand was made for the payment of dues at any time after Retzlaff approached Grantham and Lightner early in the month of December, so that the first notice either one had of the Union's claim that they were in arrears was at the very time of their respective discharges on January 4. They took immediate steps to accede to the Union's demand, by sending their money orders to Sorenson for the payment of January dues. It would seem, if Sorenson was completely honest in asserting that December dues were due rather than January dues, he would have said so in his letter of January 7 to each of these employees when he returned their money orders to them. No representative of the Company made any effort to determine the correctness of Sorenson's statement, orally and in writing, that these members of the Union were delinquent in the payment of dues. The Company apparently accepted these statements of Sorenson in blind faith without making any effort to determine from either of these employees whether they claimed to have paid their dues or not. It clearly appears that the services of Lightner and Grantham had been completely satisfactory to their Employer, and that the only reason they were discharged was Sorenson's request. It clearly is apparent that there was warm rivalry between the Independent and the Retail Clerks and that employees of the Company had paid dues to the Retail Clerks during the interim when the Retail Clerks acted as the bargaining representa- tive of these employees in the unit designated by the Board. As a result of a conversation or conversations between Grantham and certain unnamed persons, on the day of her discharge and apparently on the following day she and Lightner called at the office of the Retail Clerks and there discussed their discharge with one Stedleman , an official of that union. While there, Grantham executed an affidavit, in which was set forth her version of the circumstances of her discharge the day before. That affidavit was attached to a propaganda flyer dis- tributed by the Retail Clerks in its campaign before the election conducted by the Board in Case No. 13-RC-3564. Subsequently, on or about January 14, the first charges filed in these consolidated cases by Lightner and Grantham were prepared, at their requests and probably at the suggestion of Stedleman, by one of the at- torneys for the Retail Clerks, and filed the following day with the Regional Director for the Thirteenth Region. Grantham was closely cross-examined concerning, the circumstances surroundine the execution and distribution of her affidavit of January 5 as related by her on direct examination . After observing her demeanor on the witness stand , listening to her testimony, and examining the stenographic transcript of her testimony, the Trial Examiner is satisfied that she proved a credible witness. 254 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Concluding Findings In this case, the Independent appears in a very poor light. It, through Sorenson, by its own construction and distortion of its constitution and bylaws and its own resolution respecting the resumption of the requirement of dues payments by em- ployees of Krambo, sets forth a defense which to the Trial Examiner seems to be completely specious . Even if the Trial Examiner were to accept Sorenson's explana- tion concerning the application of the "grace period" theory (which he does not) the fact remains that his demand for the discharge of these two employees on December 31, 1953, was premature. Neither of these employees was in bad standing or could have been in bad standing for the month of December until at least the first day of January 1954.7 Lightner and Grantham were members in good standing on Decem- ber 31, 1953, and under the practice of the Union as demonstrated by the records and credible testimony at the hearing, had until the last day of January 1954 to pay their January dues. Each of them was justified in refusing to tender their periodic dues prematurely and in a manner not uniformly required by the Independent as a condi- tion of retaining membership in that Union, and the Trial Examiner so finds. By causing the Company to discriminate against Grantham and Lightner, the Independ-, ent engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (2) and 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act, and the Trial Examiner so finds. On January 4, Lightner and Grantham each advised the store supervisor or store manager that they were not in arrears in payment of dues, and Grantham was advised by the employment super- visor to see Sorenson and pay her dues so that she could return to work. She did see Sorenson, as advised, and took Lightner with her. Apparently no representative of the Company questioned Sorenson's oral advice to them on or before December 31. In such circumstances, there was a duty upon the Company to inquire further into the matter, since, under the standards prescribed by the Act, the Company had reasonable grounds for believing the statements of the employees at least until such time that the Union, voluntarily or upon the Employer's inquiry, specifically denied the truth of these statements The Company in the instant case did not exercise due diligence in an effort to determine whether the Independent had demanded the dis- charge of these employees for some reason other than their failure to pay or tender periodic dues in a manner uniformly required by that Union. The words of the Board in Bloomingdale's, 107 NLRB 191, illustrate the sort of due diligence which the Company here did not exercise: The record shows that the Company undertook in a meticulous manner to carry out the terms of its contract with the Union, and no more While the Union had made no statements to Ward disavowing the necessity to pay fines, company officials were told on numerous occasions by union agents that the Union was interested only in Ward's dues and that fines were not involved. In connection with its final request for Ward's discharge the Union specifically informed Bren- nan [the Company's personnel director] that it would accept Ward's dues, if tendered. Thus . the Company was in the position of having been re- peatedly assured that the Union's sole reason in requesting Ward's discharge was his failure to pay dues, as required under the contract. Nor did the Company stop at these assurances. Before the discharge occurred Brennan interviewed Ward and attempted to determine, with all due diligence, whether some reason other than his failure to pay dues, motivated the Union's request at this time. Ward was completely uncooperative. In view of these facts, we find, in agree- ment with the Trial Examiner, that the Company did not have reasonable grounds for believing that Ward's discharge was requested in June 1952, for a reason other than his failure to pay dues. By discharging Grantham and Lightner and by refusing to reinstate either of them for the reason that each of them refrained from assisting the Independent, in that each of them refused to tender periodic dues prematurely and in a matter not uni- formly required by that Union as a•condition of retaining membership, the Respond- 7 The union-security clause reads as follows (2) any person to be covered by this agreement shall be hired only on a 30-day trial basis, during which time she may be discharged by the Employer without recourse. Employees whose regular work week is over (15) fifteen hours per week must apply for membership in the Union and shall work under the provisions of this agreement, and shall thereafter maintain membership in good standing in the Union in order to maintain his or her employment. Employees shall, after (30) thirty days of employment, become members of the Union, and shall maintain membership in good standing as a condition of employment. KiAMBO FOOD STORES, INC. 255 ent Company thereby discriminated in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of its employees and thereby encouraged membership in the Respondent Union, and thereby engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act and by so doing interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act in contravention of the provisions of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act; and the Trial Examiner so finds .8 IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The respective activities of the Respondents set forth in section III, above, occur- ring in connection with the operations of the Respondent Company, described in sec- tion I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and :ommerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and 3bstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY It has been found that the Respondent Company has engaged in unfair labor prac- tices violative of Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of the Act, and that the Respondent Union has engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) and 8 (b) (2) of the said statute. In view of the findings, the Trial Examiner shall recommend that the Respondents cease and desist from their respective unfair labor practices and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. The Trial Examiner shall also recommend that the Respondent Union furnish copies of its notice, hereinafter referred to, to the Regional Director, said notices to be posted on company bulletin boards, the Respondent Company willing. It-having been found that the Respondent Union caused the Respondent Company to discharge Maxine Lightner and Dorothy L. Grantham on January 5, 1954, and that such discharge violated Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act, the Trial Examiner shall recom- mend that the said Respondent Company offer Maxine Lightner and Dorothy L. Grantham immediate and full reinstatement to their respective former or substan- tially equivalent positions without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges, and that the Respondent Company and the Respondent Union jointly and severally make said Maxine Lightner and said Dorothy L. Grantham whole for any loss of pay either one of them may have suffered as a result of a discrimination against her by payment to her of a sum of money equal to that which she would have earned as wages from the date of her discharge to the date of the offer of re- instatement less her net earnings, the loss of pay to be computed on a quarterly calendar, basis in accordance with the formula adopted by the Board in F. W. Wool- worth Co., 90 NLRB 289. It having been found that the Respondent Company, in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act, has interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exer- cise by them of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, and that the Respondent Union, in violation of Section 8 (b) (1) (A), has restrained and coerced employees in the exercise of such rights, the Trial Examiner shall recommend that the Re- spondent Company and the Respondent Union be directed to cease and desist in the future from committing the said respective violations of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in this proceeding, the Trial Examiner makes the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Allied Independent Union, CUA, is and at all times material herein has been a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. 2. Krambo Food Stores, Inc., is and at all times material hereto has been an em- ployer within the meaning of Section 2 (2) of the Act. 3. By discriminating in regard to the tenure of employment of Maxine Lightner and Dorothy L. Grantham the Respondent Company has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. 4. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent Company has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. 5. By causing the Respondent Company to discriminate in regard to the tenure of employment of Maxine Lightner and Dorothy L. Grantham in violation of Sec- 8 See The Baltimore Transfer Company of Baltimore City, Inc, 94 NLRB 1680. 256 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tion 8 (a) (3), the Respondent Union has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (2) of the Act. 6. By restraining and coercing persons employed by the Respondent Company in the exercise of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent Union has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act. 7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] Santa Clara County Pharmaceutical Association and Owners' Section, Santa Clara County Pharmaceutical Association and Retail Clerks Union, Local No. 428, AFL and Pharmaceutical Clerks Association of Santa Clara County . Case No. 20-CA- 992. October 7,1955 DECISION AND ORDER On May 18, 1955, Trial Examiner James R. Hemingway issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Santa Clara County Pharmaceutical Association and Owners' Section, Santa Clara County Pharmaceutical Association, herein indi- vidually referred to as Respondent Association and Respondent Owners' Section, and collectively referred to as Respondents, had en gaged in and were engaging in certain unfair labor practices, and recommending that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in- the copy of the Intermediate Report attached. hereto. He also found that the Respondents had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint, and recommended dismissal of those allegations. Thereafter, Respondent Owners' Section and the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Inter- mediate Report and briefs. The request for oral argument by the Re- spondent, Owners' Section is hereby denied, as the record and'briefs, in our opinion, adequately present the issues and positions of the parties. To the extent here material, the Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing, and finds that no preju- dicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has `considered the Intermediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and is of the opinion that the assertion of jurisdiction over the Respondents is not warranted. - The Respondent Association is a nonprofit California corporation existing for the purpose, among other things, of furthering the "stand- ards of Pharmacy" and of securing "the preservation and advance- ment of Pharmacy." Its membership is composed mainly of registered pharmacists, drug salesmen, and owners and operators of retail drug- stores and pharmacies. During 1954, the 6$ dues-paying owner-mem- 114 NLRB No. 60.