Williamson-Dickie Manufacturing Co.

356 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Williamson-Dickie Manufacturing Company and American Fed- eration of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations. Case No.16-CA-460. February 9,1956 DECISION AND ORDER Upon a charge filed by Congress of Industrial Organizations, now merged with the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Indus- trial Organizations, herein called the Union, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board issued a complaint dated October 1, 1952, and an amended complaint dated January 21, 1953, against Williamson-Dickie Manufacturing Company, herein called the Re- spondent, alleging that the Respondent had engaged in and was en- gaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act. With respect to the unfair labor practices, the amended complaint herein alleges, in substance, that the Respondent discriminatorily dis- charged eight employees on specified dates in 1951 and 1952, in viola- tion of Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act and, since June 3, 1951, has interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of their rights by interrogation, threats of reprisals, surveillance of union meetings and employee concerted activities, discriminatory ap- plication of certain company rules, preventing union solicitation and circulation of union literature, refusing to grant equal time to the Union to address the employees on company time and premises, and the discriminatory discharge of a supervisory official to discourage union activity, all in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. The Respondent's answer, as amended, denied the commission of any un- fair labor practices and, at the same time, admitted the termination of the employment of the persons named in the complaint with the affirmative explanation that the said persons either resigned volun- tarily, were discharged for cause, or were laid off for economic reasons. Pursuant to proper notice, a hearing was held on the issues framed by the pleadings before Eugene F. Frey, the duly designated Trial Examiner. The General Counsel and the Respondent were repre- sented at the hearing and both parties were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence pertinent to the issues. The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudi- cial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. On July 20, 1954, the Trial Examiner issued his Intermediate Re- port, copies of which were duly served upon the parties, in which he found that the Respondent had violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act as hereinafter set forth and discussed. He also found, with regard to the alleged discriminatory discharges, that the Respondent had vio- 115 NLRB No. 62. WILLIAMSON-DICKIE MANUFACTURING COMPANY 357 lated Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act in the cases of 5 of the discharges, but found no violation as to the remaining 3 and, accordingly, dis- missed the complaint as to them.' Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions directed to the Trial Examiner's findings of fact and conclusions of law, and a supporting brief in which the Respondent generally contends that the findings of fact are against the weight of the evidence and that the conclusions of law are erroneous. The Board has considered the Intermediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the case. To the extent noted be- low, we find merit in the Respondent's exceptions and adopt only so much of the Trial Examiner's findings, conclusions of law, and recom- mendations as are consistent with the Decision and Order herein.' I. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES 3 A. The credibility of Florine Thompson Florine Thompson was a former supervisor on the staff of the Respondent, whose employment was terminated on October 29, 1951. We find, in agreement with the Trial Examiner, that her separation was due to her dissatisfaction with a change in her work assignment and not, as alleged in the complaint, because of antiunion considera- tions. At the hearing, Thompson was the General Counsel's most im- portant single witness, and gave damaging testimony against the Respondent. Although the Trial Examiner refused to credit Thomp- son as to her denials of the execution of certain documents and found that her partisanship and bias against the Respondent were evident, he, nevertheless, credited Thompson's uncorroborated testimony over the conflicting testimony of the Respondent's witnesses. The Trial Examiner accordingly based certain unfair labor practice findings on such testimony by Thompson. The Respondent excepts to the Trial Examiner's credibility findings regarding Thompson, contending that she was unworthy of belief in any respect because of her impeachment on the record. In support of its contention, the Respondent cites the following incidents. Thompson testified that she had never told any one that she had resigned from the Respondent's employ. However, the Respondent ' Bernice Young, Virginia Maxwell, Ethel Newsome. In the absence of exceptions to the Trial Examiner's dismissal of the complaint as to these three, we adopt his findings without comment. 2 Because the Board believes that the Decision and Order herein makes adequate dis- position of all of the issues presented, the Intermediate Report is not annexed hereto. 3 Because the record shows that the Respondent, during the year preceding the issuance of the complaint herein, shipped more than $50,000 in manufactured products directly outside the State of Texas , we agree with the Trial Examiner that the Respondent is en. gaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. We also agree„khat the American Fed- eration of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations and Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, are labor organizations within the meaning of the Act. 358 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD introduced into evidence a letter to the Respondent from Thompson, stating that she had "elected to resign from Williamson-Dickie Manu- facturing Company...." The General Counsel admitted the genu- ineness of Thompson's signature upon this document. Thompson gave testimony that she had discharged Janice Williams upon'the instructions of Mason, the Respondent's plant superintendent, and that she had never submitted a written statement in her own handwriting to the effect that Williams had resigned. Her veracity on this point is completely destroyed by a personnel report, entirely in Thompson's handwriting and bearing her signature, stating that Williams desired to resign because of dissatisfaction with the work and working conditions. The Trial Examiner found, as do we, that this document was genuine. Thompson testified that she had never reprimanded any employee for holding back production tickets 4 This testimony was completely refuted by the Respondent's introduction of a written reprimand of one Georgia Kramer, in the handwriting of Thompson, stating that she had reprimanded Kramer for holding back production tickets. Although Thompson denied the genuineness of this document, we find,, as did the Trial Examiner, that the signature and the hand- writing of the report are Thompson's. . Finally, Thompson testified that, upon Burdine's discharge,' she prepared a payroll change notice, at the request of Mason, to the effect that Burdine was laid off for lack of work. However, the payroll change notice which Thompson had prepared stated Burdine was dis- charged for violation of company rules. As in the cases of the written reports hereinabove described, we find, in agreement with the Trial Examiner, that the report submitted in evidence was a genuine docu- ment bearing the true signature of Florine Thompson. The Board is always reluctant to disturb the credibility findings of a Trial Examiner who has had the opportunity, which the Board does not have, to- observe the deportment and demeanor of the witnesses who appear -before him.6 However, although we do not agree with the Respondent that the General Counsel's entire case rests upon Thompson's testimony, we do. find, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that the foregoing incidents show Thompson to be an unreliable wit- ness. Accordingly, we are unwilling to give any probative value to those portions of Thompson's testimony which are denied and which are not corroborated by objective circumstances or the testimony of other credible witnesses. 4 A discussion Hof the use and value of these production tickets is found under the dis- cussion of the discharges of Northcutt and Matthews 5 Burdine is one of the alleged discriminatees whose discharge is hereinafter discussed. 6 Standard Dry Well P,edncts, Inc., 91 NLRB 544, 545 WILLIAMSON-DICKIE MANUFACTURING COMPANY 359 B. The violations of Section 8 (a) (1) We agree with the Trial Examiner that the Respondent ,violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act during the Union's campaign which be- gan in June 1951 and ended on November 13, 1952, the day of the Board-conducted election. The incidents which we find violative are as follows : (1) October 1951: The interrogation of Daisy Northcutt, an alleged discriminatee, by Bertie Turner, her supervisor , wherein during a routine personnel progress interview Turner asked Northcutt whether she was a member of the Union; whether she had attended meetings'of the Union; and inquired what benefits Northcutt hoped to obtain through union membership. (2) October 1951: The interrogation of employee Perlaney Fulcher by Supervisor Florine Thompson and C. D. Williamson, the Respond- ent's president, wherein both Thompson and 'Williamson questioned Fulcher with regard to Burdine's solicitation on behalf of the Union. (3) October 05,1951: Although we agree with the Trial Examiner that Foreladies Miller and Campbell engaged in unlawful surveillance of a union meeting on October 25, 1951, we do so without reference to the testimony of Florine Thompson to the effect that Miller and Campbell planned the surveillance in Thompson's office in the pres- ence of Thompson and Mason, the plant superintendent, on the after- noon of'the event, and that on the day following the event, Superin- tendent Mason displayed to Thompson-a list of the employees whom Miller and Campbell had observed at the union hall the evening of the event. Rather, we rely on the undisputed fact that Miller and Campbell were stationed in close proximity to the union hall while a scheduled meeting was being held and that the explanation offered by both Miller and Campbell does not controvert the reasonable inference from their presence alone, when viewed in light of the record as a whole, that they were there in order to seek information with regard to the union activities of the Respondent's employees. Miller's and Campbell's tes- timony, although varying slightly on minor points, in the main sought to establish that their presence in an automobile outside the union meet- ing hall on October 25, 1951, at the time that the Respondent's em- ployees were gathering for a meeting with union officials, was a mere coincidence and that they were there for the sole purpose of calling for Miller's teen-age son who was momentarily expected to emerge from a nearby movie theater in order to take him home. However, the record also credibly establishes, through the testimony of both Miller and Campbell, that although the 2 claimed to be close personal friends and had worked together for about 20 years, Campbell had never picked up Miller's son before ; Miller had never before that evening been in Campbell's automobile ; Miller and Campbell resided 360 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD in opposite ends of Fort Worth and Campbell resided a great distance from the point at which the car was parked; Campbell had had to leave guests visiting at her home in order to make her appointment with Miller; and Miller and Campbell had visited each other only about once or twice during the entire term of their friendship. In these cir- cumstances we cannot credit the testimony of Miller and Campbell as to the reason for their presence at the meeting hall and find, as did the Trial Examiner, that their presence at the meeting hall, as aforesaid, constituted unlawful surveillance. (4) June 1952: The interrogation of and threat to employee Grace Hudson by Supervisor Essie Pryor who asked Hudson if she had been disloyal to the Respondent and stated in effect, that if she, Pryor, dis- covered that Hudson had joined the Union, Hudson would be dis- charged at the first opportunity. (5) November 1952: The interrogation of and threat to Grace Hudson by Odie Mills, supervisor of the cleaning department, wherein Mills stated "... for God's sake protect the Company," and then asked Hudson how she would like to be out of a job by Christmas. (6) November 10, 1952: The threat to employee Etta Hall,' by Odie Mills, in which the latter stated to Hall, who was wearing a CIO button, that Mr. Williamson owned the plant and could do with it what he liked. (7) November 12, 1952: The promise of benefit to employee La Vada MacNeill by Lillie Butts, a floorlady, in which Butts told MacNeill, in substance, that if she would get on the "right side" the Respondent would always take care of her; that the Respondent would take special care of those who would change their loyalty and vote against the Union. (8) November 12, 1952: The interrogation of and threat to em- ployee Maudine Wood by Ruth McKibbin; a floorlady, wherein after asking Wood why she thought a union was needed at the Respondent's plant, McKibbin stated that she did not think the Union would help the employees any because Mr. Williamson had plants located in other cities and did not have to maintain the Fort Worth plant. (9) October 21 and November 6,1952: The refusals by the Respond- ent to grant to the Union equal opportunity to address employees on company time and premises. Although we agree with the Trial Ex- aminer that these refusals constituted violations of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act, we do so only because, as hereinafter found, the Respondent, by its interpretation and enforcement of its no-solicitation rule, un- lawfully prohibited union solicitation on company premises on non- working time.8 'Etta Hall should not be confused with Hermia Hall, an alleged discriminatee, whose dischargers hereinafter discussed. 8 See Livingston Shirt Corporat ion, et al., 107 NLRB 400. WILLIAMSON-DICKIE MANUFACTURING COMPANY 361 However, for the following reasons we do not agree with the Trial Examiner that Bess Gist, the Respondent's employment relations su- pervisor, unlawfully interrogated Mildred Browning in Gist's office -on the afternoon of November 13, 1952. As hereinafter fully dis- cussed in relation to her alleged unlawful discharge, Browning was discharged for pasting CIO stickers on the wall of a booth in the ladies' washroom on the third floor of building No. 1 on the morning .of the election. At her exit interview, and upon the witness stand, Browning emphatically denied that she had pasted the stickers. The Trial Examiner found, as a fact, that Browning did paste the stickers on the washroom booth's wall as alleged by the Respondent and that, therefore, Browning's testimony in this respect was not credible. Nevertheless, the Trial Examiner credited Browning's testimony to the effect that Gist requested of Browning a list of union adherents while Browning was in Gist's office on the afternoon of the incident. At the same time, the Trial Examiner refused to credit Gist's denial of this conversation on the basis of Gist's demeanor as a witness. The Respondent excepts to the foregoing resolution of credibility, contending that the Trial Examiner's determination that Browning was not truthful when she twice denied that she had pasted stickers on the wall, should have prevented the Trial Examiner from crediting Browning over Gist. We agree. Although, as stated in our decision with regard to Thompson's testimony, we are reluctant to disturb the credibility findings of a Trial Examiner who has the opportunity of observing the witnesses whose credibility is at issue, it is apparent that Browning's credibility has been substantially impaired by the Trial Examiner's finding, contrary to her testimony, that she had pasted stickers on the wall. In these circumstances, and as Gist was not impeached on the record, we are unwilling to base an unlawful interrogation finding on Browning's uncorroborated and denied testimony.' C. The discriminatory discharges The Trial Examiner found that the Respondent discriminatorily discharged Nina Mae Burdine, Hermia Hall, Daisy Northcutt, Mildred Browning, and Christine Matthews. For the reason hereinafter set forth we affirm the findings of the Trial Examiner with regard to the discharge of Burdine, but shall dismiss the complaint with regard to the other four. 1. Nina Mae Burdine On October 17, 1951, Burdine, an operator in the department then supervised by Florine Thompson, was summoned to the office of C. D. 9 Member Peterson would affirm the Trial Examiner and find that Gist unlawfully inter- rogated Browning. In his opinion , Browning's denial of an act which could cost her her livelihood or reinstatement to her former position does not necessarily render her testi- mony unreliable in all other respects. 362 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Williamson, the Respondent's president, who interviewed her concern- ing her union activity in the plant in relation to the company rules. This interview, which was recorded and a transcript thereof intro- duced into evidence, may be briefly summarized as follows : Williamson asked Burdine whether she had solicited employees on the premises.1° When Burdine replied in the affirmative, Williamson asked if she had obtained permission to do so. Burdine replied, in effect, that she thought it was proper for her to solicit during nonwork- ing hours, and that she had not solicited except during her nonwork- ing time. To this reply Williamson rejoined, "We have a rule that you are not to solicit for any purpose while you are here on company prem- ises." Burdine then again stated that she thought that her soliciting on lunch and rest periods was permissible and Williamson answered that the rest periods belonged to the Company. He then asked whether Burdine had also solicited fellow employees while they were working and Burdine replied in the affirmative. Williamson then recited rules 14 and 16 from the company rule book, which Burdine admitted she had received. When Williamson stated that lunch time was not com- pany time, Burdine said that she had solicited on lunch time; William- son then replied, "We do not permit circulation of handbills or circu- lars and petitions; or solicitation of funds during lunch period on the premises without permission." Burdine indicated that her understanding of her rights were to the contrary,- that she had been informed as to her rights by the Union which told her that she could solicit on the premises on nonworking time. Williamson then mentioned a long-standing company rule against unauthorized solicitation and that violation thereof was grounds for discharge. He added that for her violation of this rule, the Company had sufficient grounds to discharge Burdine since she had received her interpretation of the rules from outside the Com- pany. Burdine answered-that she was talking about union rules, not company rules, and repeated her understanding that she could solicit on free time. Williamson finally rejoined that he was talking about company rules and that if it was a case of company rules versus union rules, that was a different thing, that the Union had no control over the 10 In the rule book listed as causes for discharge were rules 14 and 16 as follows 14 The use of Company time for other than Company business without prior approval. 16. Unauthorized circulation of handbills , circulars and petitions or solicitation of funds. Elsewhere in the same handbook is found the following Solicitations , contributions-funds may be solicited from our employees only with prior permission from the personnel department. No handbills, circulars, or peti- tions of any kind may be circulated on Company property WILLIAMSON-DICKIE MANUFACTURING COMPANY 363 Company, and that under the circumstances Burdine should be dis- charged. We think that it is clear from the above-mentioned interview that the Respondent was interpreting and applying its rules so as to pro- hibit union solicitation both during working and nonworking time. It is well settled that, absent special circumstances not here present, an employer may not promulgate or enforce a broad rule prohibiting union solicitation on company property during nonworking periods.it We accordingly find, as did the Trial Examiner, that the Respondent, by interpreting and enforcing its rules so as to preclude union solicita- tion on company property during lunch and recess periods, interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. At the hearing, and in its brief, the Respondent contended that Burdine was discharged because she solicited fellow employees on behalf of the Union while they were at work. However, in our opinion the record fails to support this contention. While it is true that dur- ing the terminal interview Burdine admitted that on her nonworking time she had solicited other employees while they were working-a practice which the Respondent could have lawfully prohibited-it is clear to us that this was but a minor phase of the interview and was not the operative reason for the discharge. Indeed, it is significant that Williamson at no time made any ap- preciable distinction in applying the rules between solicitation during working and nonworking time but, instead, centered the discussion with Burdine upon the more fundamental matter of her right to use company property at all for that purpose, irrespective of time. We are satisfied from a reading of the terminal interview in its entirety that the evil of Burdine's conduct in the eyes of the Respondent at the time of her discharge was the fact that, according to Williamson's interpretation, she had violated company rules by soliciting on com- pany property. That Burdine was discharged under the Respondent's rules merely for solicitation on company premises is further substantiated by the fact-that the discharge of employee Campbell, who was also charged with violating the no-solicitation rule, was cancelled only upon Camp- bell's acceptance, in writing, of the Respondent's unlawful condition that she not solicit on company premises.12 Indeed, Williamson in effect admitted at the hearing that Burdine's discharge-was due to her refusal to agree to and accept Williamson's interpretation of the Re-' 11 Republic Avuatlon Corporatwn v N. L R. B , 324 U. S 793 ; Air!an Radio Corpora- tion, Ltd., d/b/a KFSD-TV, 111 NLRB 566 'a The Respondent also required her to agree not to use company time but that was mere surplusage as it was included in the broad prohibition against the use of company property 364 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD spondent's rules which, as found above, unlawfully prohibited union solicitation on company property without qualification. Under all the circumstances, we find that Burdine was discharged pursuant to a no-solicitation rule which was being unlawfully ap- plied and interpreted by Williamson and that the Respondent thereby discriminated against her in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. 2. Hermia Hall The Trial Examiner found that Hall was discharged on November 13, 1951, because of her union activity. We do not agree. It is established that Hall was a long-time employee who, prior to the events hereinafter related, performed satisfactorily. During the organizational campaign Hall was active on behalf of the Union. On November 13, 1951, she was summoned to the office of C. D. Wil- liamson and, after a rather lengthy interview, was discharged for the following assigned reasons: (a) She had created disturbances and unrest by means of threats of violence in the belt loop cutting depart- ment where she was employed; (b) contrary to instructions, she had cut more than two belt loops at a time; and (c) she had refused to perform work that was assigned to her. The record shows that bad blood existed between Hall and some of her fellow employees, especially La Verne Gidley, a newer employee, who, Hall thought, was being given special treatment. Upon several occasions Hall addressed other employees regarding Gidley, expressing her dislike and wishing that she could trip her and cause her to break her neck. These remarks were repeated to Gidley and, as a result, Gidley became nervous and was unable to perform her work effectively. The threats of violence also upset other workers whose morale and production potentials were thereby affected. Hall's violent language was even directed to Pryor, her supervisor, for whom Hall admitted dislike. Thus, it can be concluded, from the record, that Hall's con- duct did have a deleterious effect upon her fellow employees and upon production in the belt loop department. With regard to the assigned reason for discharge that Hall had cut more than two belt loops at a time, this, too, is established by the record. Indeed, Hall admitted to the same, although she at- tempted to justify this conduct on the basis of an implied permission to do so by Pryor. This Pryor denied. Nor was there any other testi- mony in the record that would support Hall's assertion of implied permission beyond the admission by others that they had earlier cut more than two belt loops at a time but had ceased when cautioned by Pryor, whereas Hall had continued the practice. During the exit interview Hall, in effect, admitted that she had not performed certain work assigned to her by Pryor, her department WILLIAMSON-DICKIE MANUFACTURING COMPANY 365 supervisor. She admitted that when Pryor had requested her to straighten out belt loops in trays which had somehow become upset, she had neglected to do so. She sought to excuse her conduct on the ground that the trays were old and unfit for the purpose for which they were used; that they were a source of annoyance not only to Hall but to other employees as well; and that she was singled out by Pryor to perform the task of straightening out the trays although she was not at fault and had not upset them. However, there is nothing in the record to show that Hall was the only one singled out for this pur- pose or that others had refused or neglected to perform tasks assigned or that the Respondent had condoned such practice. In finding that the misconduct assigned by Williamson as the reason for Hall's discharge was mere pretext, and that the true reason was Hall's union activity, the Trial Examiner relied in substantial part upon the testimony of Florine Thompson to the effect that sometime before the date of -Hall's discharge, during a supervisor's meeting held in Plant Superintendent Mason's office, Mason, through a window, had observed Hall passing out union pamphlets at the plant gate and had announced that Hall would not be with the Respondent very long. This testimony was denied by all others who attended that meeting. Inasmuch as we have decided to disregard Thompson's testimony except where substantiated, we cannot credit it in this instance. In view of the foregoing, the record in our opinion fails to establish that Hall's discharge was discriminatory. 3. Daisy Northcutt The Respondent contends that Northcutt was discharged on August 26, 1952, because : (a) She was a leading participant in a disturbance- in her department on the Friday prior to her discharge; (b) she had held back and given away production tickets for use by others; and (c) she had refused to perform work which came to her in the normal course of her employment. The record shows that on Friday, August 22, 1952, Northcutt and a fellow employee in the trouser inspection department, Jimmie Meador, created a disturbance in the department by continuously badgering fellow employees McGehee and Nuckols, who consistently refused to. sign union authorization cards despite Northcutt's urgings. The man- ner in which Meador and Northcutt operated was to send messages to- McGehee and Nuckols via service boys, whose job it -was to distribute work and to pick up finished work. The messages were all in the same vein and consisted of repeated requests to sign union cards. When McGehee and Nuckols refused, Northcutt and Meador laughed, jeered, and made derisive sounds and remarks, thereby upsetting not only- McGehee and Nuckols, but also the other workers in the department. who observed this behavior. 366 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD As the result of an investigation into the causes of the disturbance, Northcutt was conducted to C. D. Williamson's office on August 26 where an interview ensued between Williamson and Northcutt. While Williamson questioned Northcutt as to her part in the Friday after- noon disturbance, two other grounds for discharge were revealed. The first of these was confessed to by Northcutt when she revealed that she had given production tickets to Viola Lewis, a fellow in- spector, who had received an increase in salary as a result. The other ground was Northcutt's admission that she had refused to perform the inspection operation on certain lots of wool pants, the inspection of which allegedly had already been refused by McGehee. Upon the conclusion of the interview, Northcutt was discharged. In finding that the assigned reasons were merely pretext for an unlawful discharge, the Trial Examiner relied primarily upon his find- ing that there was disparate treatment of Northcutt on the one hand and Meador and Lewis on the other, inasmuch as the latter were only reprimanded and Northcutt was discharged. However, it is signifi- cant that all 3 were union members and, as the Respondent points out, Lewis and Meador were found guilty of a single offense, whereas Northcutt was found wanting on at least 3 matters. Upon the entire record, and after due consideration of all of the factors relied on by the Trial Examiner, we are unable to find that Northcutt's discharge was motivated by antiunion considerations. 4. Mildred Browning The Trial Examiner found that Mildred Browning was discrimina- torily discharged on November 13, 1952, the day of the Board-con- ducted election. We do not agree. The Respondent contends that Browning was discharged because she had pasted union stickers to the wall of a booth in the ladies' washroom contrary to the Respondent's long-standing antidefacement rule.13 Browning denied that she had pasted the stickers both at the time of her discharge and at the hearing on the witness stand. As mentioned above, the Trial Examiner found, contrary to Browning's testimony, that she had in fact pasted the stickers on the wall. How- ever, he found this not to be the real reason for the discharge because : (a) No one had ever before been discharged for defacing walls in the Respondent's plant and the Respondent had, therefore, never before enforced its rules relating to defacements; (b) Browning had a long record of faithful service; and (c) Browning had been unlawfully interrogated and her discharge took place in a context of other unfair labor practices. " The Respondent also contends that Browning was discharged for having violated the agreement between the Union and the Respondent not to campaign on election day. How- ever, inasmuch as we make our decision on other grounds , we do not find it necessary to dispose of this contention. WILLIAMSON-DICKIE MANUFACTURING COMPANY 367 The record shows that the Union's campaign had resulted in con- siderable damage to plant walls in the period immediately preceding Browning's discharge. Therefore, the Respondent's decision at that time to enforce its rules, and the fact that Browning was the first vio- lator apprehended thereafter, is not entitled to controlling adverse significance. Moreover, we have heretofore refused to find that Gist unlawfully interrogated Browning, and we do not believe that the other unfair labor practices found establish an unlawful motive in Browning's discharge. In these circumstances, and after full consideration of the record and the factors relied upon by the Trial Examiner, we find that Browning was not discriminatorily discharged. 5. Christine Matthews The Trial Examiner found that Matthews, who had been an em- ployee of the Respondent for about 10 years, and who had been an ob- server for the Union at the polls on the day of the Board-conducted election, was discriminatorily discharged for union activity on De- cember 2, 1952. The Respondent contends that Matthews was dis- charged for cause in that she had used production tickets borrowed -from other employees for the purpose of fraudulently increasing the amount of bonus pay to which she was entitled. It is apparent that the Trial Examiner did not attach serious sig- nificance to Matthew's ticket offenses. The record shows that Mat- thews' incentive or bonus pay was based upon the volume of her work which was evidenced by production tickets taken from bundles of gar- ments which she handled. The record clearly establishes that in at least two instances Matthews sought to and did increase her incentive pay by utilizing production tickets which she had wrongfully ob- tained from other employees. To that extent she obtained unearned money from the Respondent. Contrary to the implications of the Trial Examiner, the record fails to show any similar type of record falsification by other employees. While it is true, as found by the Trial Examiner, that other employees had violated rules by holding back tickets, which they had earned, for later use, and for which they were merely reprimanded, we agree with the Respondent that such an offense can reasonably be regarded as less serious than Matthews'. Accordingly there is no basis for finding disparity in the discharge of Matthews. On the contrary, Louise Souder, who had cooperated with Matthews by giving her at least one production ticket, and who was not shown to have been a union member, was also discharged for that reason. The other employee who gave Matthews tickets was a learner who quit her employment before Matthews' discharge. 368 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD In these circumstances, we find, after full consideration of the evidence presented by the record, that Matthews was discharged for reasons unrelated to her union activity. H. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section I, above, occur- ring in connection with the operations of the Respondent described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. III. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, we shall order that the Respondent cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action which the Board finds necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that the Respondent discriminated against Nina Mae Burdine, by discharging her on October 17, 1951, and having refused to reinstate her, we shall order that the Respondent offer to her im- mediate and full reinstatement to her former or substantially equiv- alent position without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges, and make her whole for any loss of pay which she may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against her, by pay- ment to her a sum of money equal to that which she would have earned as wages from the date of her discriminatory discharge to the date of a proper offer of reinstatement, less her net earnings, such sums to- be computed in accordance with the formula set forth in F. W. Wool- worth Company.14 We shall also order that the Respondent, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll and other records necessary to enable the Board to analyze and compute the amounts of back pay due and the right of reinstatement under the terms of the Board's Order. Because of the number and variety of the unfair labor practices committed by various supervisors in the Respondent's employ, the repetition of which in the future may reasonably be anticipated, and. because we believe that a discriminatory discharge goes to the very heart of the Act, we shall order the Respondent to cease and desist not only from the specific conduct found above, but also from in any other manner infringing upon the rights of employees as guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act 15 Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire- record in the case, the Board makes the following : i' 90 NLRB 289 15 N. L. R. B. v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120 F. 2d 532, 536 (C. A. 4). WILLIAMSON- DICKIE MANUFACTURING COMPANY CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 369 1. American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organiza- tions and Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. 2. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employ- ment of Nina Mae Burdine, thereby discouraging membership in the above labor organizations, the Respondent has engaged in and is en- gaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. 3. By such discrimination and by interrogation, threats of reprisals, promises of benefits, surveillance, fostering the impression of surveil- lance, intrepreting or enforcing its rule in such manner as to prohibit union solicitation of any kind on company premises on nonworking time, and other conduct found above, thereby interfering with, re- straining, and coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting-commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. 5. Respondent has not violated the Act by the layoffs of Bernice Young and Virginia Maxwell, the discharges of Florine Thompson, Hermia Hall, Daisy Northcutt, Mildred Browning, and Christine Matthews. ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record in'the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Board hereby orders that Williamson-Dickie Manufacturing Company, Fort Worth, Texas, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall : 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Discouraging membership in American Federation of Labor- Congress of Industrial Organizations, Amalgamated Clothing Work- ers orAmerica, AFL-CIO, or in any other labor organization of its em- ployees, by discharging or refusing to reinstate any of its employees, or in other manner discriminating in regard to their hire or tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment. (b) Interrogating employees concerning their union afilia'•ion, sentiments, or activities; threatening employees with reprisals, in- cluding loss of employment, because of their union affiliation and ac- tivities; offering employees benefits to induce them to refrain from 390609-56-vol 115- 25 - 370 DECISIONS dF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD union affiliation and activities ; engaging in surveillance, or fostering the impression of surveillance , of employees' union and concerted ac- tivities ; and interpreting or enforcing plant rules regulating the cir- culation of handbills , circulars , and petitions, and solicitation of funds in such manner as to prohibit union solicitation of any kind or any other concerted activities by employees on company premises on non- working time. (c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining , or coercing its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form labor organizations , to join or assist American Federation of Labor- Congress of Industrial Organizations, Amalgamated Clothing Work- ers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization , to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection , or to refrain from any or all of such activities , except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Offer to Nina Mae Burdine immediate and full reinstatement to her former or substantially equivalent position , without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges , and make her whole in the manner set forth in the section of this Decision and Order entitled "The Remedy," for any loss of pay she may have suffered by reason of Respondent's discrimination against her. (b) Preserve and make available to the Board, or its agents, for examination and copying , all payroll records, social -security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary for an analysis and computation of the amount of back pay due and the right of reinstatement under the terms of the Board's Order. (c) Post in all buildings of its Fort Worth, Texas, plant, copies of the notice attached hereto and marked "Appendix ." 16 Copies of such notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Sixteenth Region, shall , after being duly signed by the Respondent 's representa- tive, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it for sixty ( 60) consecutive days thereafter in con- spicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond- ent to insure that such notices are not altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. 16 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Couit of Appeals, Enfoicing an Oider WILLIAMSON-DICKIE MANUFACTURING COMPANY 371 (d) Notify the Regional Director for the Sikteenth Region in writing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the amended complaint be, and it hereby is, dismissed Insofar as it alleges the. unlawful discharge of Florine Thompson, Bernice Young, Virginia Maxwell, Ethel Newsome, Daisy Northcutt, Hermia Hall, Mildred Browning, and Christine Matthews. MEMBERS MURDOCK 'and BEAN took no part in the consideration of the above Decision and Order. APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT discourage membership in American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or in any other labor organization of our employees, by discharging or refusing to re- instate any of our employees, or in.any other manner discriminat- ing in regard to their hire or tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment. WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees concerning their union affiliation, sentiments, or activities; threaten our employees with reprisals, including loss of employment, because of their union affiliations and activities; offer them benefits to induce them to refrain from union affiliation and activities; engage in surveil- lance, or foster the impression that we are engaging in surveil- lance, of our employees' union and concerted, activities; or inter- pret or enforce any plant rules regulating the circulation of handbills, circulars, and petitions, and solicitation of funds, in such manner as to prohibit union solicitation of any kind or any other concerted activities by our employees on company premises on nonworking time. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the right to self-organiza- tion, to form labor organizations, to join or assist American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations, Amal- gamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representa- tives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro- tection, or to refrain from any or all of such activities except to 372 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement re- quiring membership in a labor organizationias a condition'of em- ployment as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. WE WILL offer to Nina Mae Burdine immediate and full re- instatement to her former or substantially equivalent position, - without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges, and will make her; whole for any loss of pay she may have suffered by reason of our discrimination against her. All our employees are free to become, remain, or to refrain from becoming or remaining, members of American Federation of Labor- Congress of Industrial Organizations, Amalgamated Clothing Work- ers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, except to the extent that this right may be affected by an agreement in conformity with Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. WILLIAMs0N-DICKIE MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Ji inployer. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative ) ( Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Sharon Wire Company, Inc. and International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, (UAW, AFL-CIO),' Petitioner. Case No. 2-RC- 7709. February 9,1956 DECISION AND DIRECTION OF ELECTION Upon a petition duly filed wilder Section 9 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before Abraham J. Lehman, hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed. Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds: 1. The Employer is a New Jersey corporation having its principal office and only plant it Cedar Grove, New Jersey. There it is engaged in two operations. The first is the purchase, ,redrawing to a smaller diameter, and sale of aluminum wire. Of the $44,000 the Employer received in its last fiscal year from the sale of redrawn wire, $22,000 was received from Plastoid Company, a New Jersey enterprise which annually ships directly in interstate commerce goods valued in excess of $50,000. The Employer's other operation consists of the cleaning i As the AFL and CIO merged after the hearing in this case, we aie taking notice of the merger and amending the designation of the Petitioner accordingly 115 NLRB No. 65.