Boston Quilting Corp.

BOSTON QUILTING CORP. AND NAT'L WADDING CO., INC. 491. eludes the idea of service which is private in its nature "d is not to be obtained by the public." 16 [Emphasis supplied.] It is thus clear that the nature of the Employer's service is private rather than public and that accordingly, the Jonesboro standards rather than the Greenwich Gas standard are- applicable. If the Jones- boro standards are reasonable as the majority asserts, how can it be a reasonable action to refuse to apply them? The Supreme Court has already exploded the basic premise on which the majority decision rests-that the business of furnishing space, water, light, and power to manufacturers engaged in producing goods for interstate commerce does not have the pronounced effect on commerce which would justify the assertion of jurisdiction. We have also shown that the sale of water, steam, and electricity alone warrants the assertion of jurisdiction under the Jonesboro standard and the majority's effort to rebut that fact by the claim that the Employer must meet the public utility standard has no legal foundation. We have also noted the absence of any rationale or reasoning to support the majority's fiat that the office building standard is appropriate for industrial properties and that the latter do not have sufficient impact on interstate commerce to warrant the Board in continuing to exer- cise its discretion to assert jurisdiction over them. Inasmuch as this decision goes beyond the 1954 standards in restricting even further the Board's jurisdiction, it is pertinent to point out that there is no administrative necessity for the Board to go further and to curtail or deny the use of its facilities in this important area. Our experience under the more restrictive 1954 standards and with the caseload which those standards yield demonstrates that the Board's existing personnel and machinery could easily handle more cases than the 1954 standards produce. Employers, employees, and unions who have urged the Board to make its processes available to them are being needlessly denied the benefits of the Act, as are the parties to this case. We thus find it paradoxical for the Board at this time to announce a new juris- dictional standard in this area which further restricts the coverage of the Act. What is clearly indicated at this time is not new restric- tions on jurisdiction, but further liberalization. se Springfield Gas ea Electric Co. v. City of Springfield, 126 N. E. 739, 745 , 292 111. 236. Boston Quilting Corporation and National Wadding Co., Inc. and Industrial Trades Union of America, Petitioner. Case No. 1-RC-4122. February 17, 1956 DECISION AND ORDER Upon a petition filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before Herbert N. Watterson, hear- 115 NLRB No. 78. 492 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD mg officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.' Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds : 1. Each Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act. 2. The labor organizations involved claim to represent certain em- ployees of the Employers. 3. No question affecting commerce exists concerning the representa- tion of employees of the Employers within the meaning of Section 9 (c) (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act, for the following reasons : Until May 1955, when they moved to a single building in Woon- socket, Rhode Island, the Employers occupied separate premises in Norfolk, Massachusetts. Textile Workers Union of America, AFL- CIO, represented the employees of both companies in separate units. On June 22,1955, the Petitioner wrote a letter to the National Wadding Company, which was received by the latter on the following day, claiming bargaining rights for employees. The Employers acknowl- edged that they understood that this claim of representation, although addressed to only one of the Employers, was intended to cover the em- ployees of both companies. On June 29 and 30,1955, respectively, each of the Employers signed a separate collective-bargaining agreement with the UTWA, after a cross check of authorization cards by the Rhode Island Labor Relations Board had shown that the UTWA had cards signed by a majority of the employees of each Employer. The wage provisions of these contracts will terminate on February 1, 1957, all other provisions a year later. On July 5, 1955, the Petitioner filed a representation petition with the Board claiming that the em- ployees of both Employers constitute a single appropriate unit. How- ever, the Petitioner did not submit a showing that it had been desig- nated by at least 30 percent of the employees in the unit claimed to be appropriate until after July 15, 1955, or more than 10 days after the Petitioner had made its initial claim of representation.' The Employers and the UTWA contend that the collective-bargaining agreements which they signed on June 29 and 30 are bars to the present proceeding. In the General Electric X-Ray 2 case, the Board found that the previous practice of permitting a "mere naked claim of representa- tion . . . to defeat, without limitation as to time, a subsequent but 'The healing officer referred to the Board the motions of the Employers and United Textile Workers of America, AFL-CIO, herein called the UTWA, to dismiss the petition. Foi the reasons stated hereinafte , the motions to dismiss are hereby granted 2 Section 101 16 of the I;eni d'v Statements of Procedure requires that "the petitioner must supply, within 48 hours after filing but in no event later than the last day on which the petition might timely be filed , evidence of representation ." The petitioner must ordi- naiily submit evidence that it "has been designated by at least 30 percent of the em- ployees " Section 101 17, id J General E lectric X-Ray Oorpoi ation, 07 NLRB 997 PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS, INC. 493 otherwise valid collective agreement" impaired the collective-bar- gaining process. By taking advantage of the old rule, claimants without representation strength were able to "play the role of dog-in- the-manger, and indefinitely to frustrate collective bargaining." To obviate these undesirable effects, the Board adopted what is now known as the General Electric X-Ray rule, namely, that "where a petition is filed more than 10 days after the assertion of a bare claim of representation, and no extenuating circumstances appear, an agree- ment, otherwise valid, which is executed in the interval should be held to constitute a bar." However, unless it is accompanied by the requisite showing of interest, or this showing is furnished within the limited time prescribed by the Board's Statements of Procedure,4 the petition is nothing more than another "naked claim of representa- tion." To give effect to such a petition merely because it was filed within 10 days of the first unsupported claim would defeat the salu- tary purpose of the General Electric X-Ray rule. In the present case, the Petitioner did not furnish the requisite 30 percent showing-of-interest in the unit claimed to be-appropriate until more than 10 days after the filing of the petition, and more than 20 days after it had made the claim of representation. We find that, in these circumstances, the petition filed on July 5 cannot operate so as to prevent the contracts of June 29 and June 30 from being bars. Accordingly, we shall dismiss the petition. [The Board dismissed the petition.] 4 Section 101.16, supra. Pan American World Airways, Inc. Guided Missiles Range Divi• sion and International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO, Petitioner Pan American World Airways, Inc. Guided Missiles Range Divi- sion and International Union, United Plant Guard Workers of America, Petitioner. Cases Nos. 10-RC-3208 and 10-RC-3975. February 17,1956 DECISION AND ORDER Upon petitions duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, hearings were held before John C. Carey, hearing of- ficer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearings are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed. Upon the entire record in these cases, consolidated for purposes of decision, the Board finds : 1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. 115 NLRB No. 76.