Inked Ribbon Corp.

INKED RIBBON CORP. Inked Ribbon Corp. and Gangadai Ramrich. Case 2 CA- 14760 FINDINGS OF FA(1I I. JURISDICTION March 15, 1979 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS PENELLO, MURPHY, AND TRUESDAI.E On November 3, 1978, Administrative Law Judge Arthur Leff issued the attached Decision in this pro- ceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed excep- tions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela- tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Or- der of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby or- ders that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE ARTHUR LEFF, Administrative Law Judge: Upon a charge filed by Gangadai Rambrich on March 10, 1977, and amended on April 18, 1977, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, by the Regional Director for Region 2, on April 20, 1977, issued a complaint against Inked Ribbon Corp., Respondent herein, alleging that Re- spondent had engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (4) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, by dis- charging Rambrich because she had announced an inten- tion to seek the assistance of the Board if Respondent failed to grant her certain benefits and a wage increase. Respon- dent filed an answer denying the commission of the alleged unfair labor practices. A hearing was held on January 12, 1978, and on February 27 and 28, 1978. Following the close of the hearing, briefs were filed by the General Counsel and by Respondent. Upon the entire record in the case and from my observa- tion of the witnesses, I make the following: Respondent, a New York corporation with its office and principal place of business in New York City, is engaged in the manufacture and wholesale distribution of inked rib- bons and related products that are used for data processing. During the past year, a representative period. Respondent shipped in interstate commerce from its place of business in New York City directly to points outside the State of New York products valued in excess of $50,000. Respondent ad- mits that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and it is so found. II. THE AI.I.EG(iD UNFAIR I.ABOR PRACTICFS A. The Issue as Framed by the Pleadings As noted above, this case is concerned solely with Re- spondent's discharge on March 8, 1977, of employee Gan- gadai Rambrich, alleged in the complaint to have been vio- lative of Section 8(a)(l) and (4) of the Act. The factual predicate for the alleged violation is set out in paragraphs 5 and 6(c) of the complaint as follows: 5. At various times between January and March 1977 Respondent was notified by Ms. Rambrich and others that if Respondent failed to grant her certain vacation benefits and a wage increase a complaint would be filed by and on her behalf with the National Labor Relations Board. 6(c). Respondent discharged and thereafter refused to reinstate Rambrich] because of the announced in- tention that she would seek the assistance of the [Board] in support of her claims as described above in paragraph 5. In its answer Respondent admitted the allegations of paragraph 5 of the complaint, but denied that Rambrich was discharged for the reason stated therein.' However, at the hearing, Respondent, although it did not formally amend its answer in this respect, in effect repudiated its prior admission of the allegations of paragraph 5, asserting that that admission had been made in error. As will appear below, Respondent contends that it was motivated to dis- charge Rambrich at the time it did because of her job atti- tude, inability to get along with her coworkers, and work history during the last 9 or 10 weeks of employment had made her an undesirable employee. B. Background Facts Rambrich began working for Respondent as a machine operator and general production worker September 23, 1976. Respondent was then a new Company, and Rambrich ' Respondent was not represented b) counsel and was appeanng pr se when its answer was filed. 241 NLRB No. 2 7 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD was among the first three production employees it hired. When hired she was already fully skilled and experienced in the work she was to do, having been employed for 5 previ- ous years in the same capacity by H. M. Storm, Inc. (Storm), a company that was engaged in the same line of business as Respondent. Louis Strict, Respondent's owner; Wendall Morrow, its general manager; and George Sharpe, its factory manager, had also been previously associated with Storm.' At Storm, Rambrich had been highly regarded as an employee. Rambrich was on maternity leave from Storm when hired by Respondent. She was referred to Respondent by a friend, Amin, who worked for Storm as a mechanic and who also performed similar services for Respondent on a part-time basis. Amin suggested to Rambrich that it would be advantageous for her to work for Respondent rather than for Storm because Respondent's place of business, lo- cated in Manhattan, was more accessible to her home in the Bronx than Storm's plant which was located in Brooklyn. Rambrich was desirous of changing her job for that reason but not if it meant giving up any of the benefits she enjoyed as an employee of Storm. Storm's employees were repre- sented by a union and their terms and conditions of em- ployment were defined by a collective-bargaining contract. Respondent's employees were not then, nor are they now, represented. Before agreeing to work for Storm, Rambrich, accompa- nied by her cousin Walter Isaac with whom she lived, met with Morrow to discuss the terms and conditions of her employment by Respondent. It is undisputed that Morrow at that meeting promised to provide Rambrich with the same employee benefits that she had at Storm, including vacations, holidays, paid sick days and health insurance. Morrow also agreed to compensate her at a wage rate that would give her $20 a week more take-home pay than her take-home pay as an employee of Storm.' Morrow reiter- ated these assurances to Rambrich on the day she started working for Respondent. According to Rambrich, Morrow at that time also told her that after she had worked for Respondent 3 months he "would think and give me a raise." This is disputed by Morrow who in his testimony denied that he ever "specifically" promised Rambrich a wage increase, either then or at any other time. C. The Evidence Pertaining to the Allegations of Paragraph 5 of the Complaint Prior to January 1977, Respondent had no defined per- sonnel policies applicable to its employees generally.' At 2 Strict had at one time been the owner of Storm, but had sold his owner- ship interest and had entirely severed his connection with that company several years before starting Respondent's business. Morrow, before joining Respondent, had managed Storm's operations for its new corporate owner as its "divisional president." Sharpe, who left Storm to work for Respondent in early October 1976, had theretofore managed Storm's factory operations. As appears from Morrow's testimony, the hourly rate which he agreed to pay Rambrich ($3.75) was the same as her hourly rate at Storm. The $20 difference in take-home pay was accounted for by the absence of any union dues deductions as well as the fact that Respondent's workweek was 4 hours more than Storm's. ' Rambrich, along with Respondent's other employees, was required to work on Columbus Day which was a paid holiday at Storm. When she complained about this, Morrow agreed to pay her double her regular rate for her work that day. Rambrich was also required to work on Election Day and the beginning of January 1977, Respondent formulated a fringe benefit program for all its employees. The program was announced to its employees by Plant Manager Sharpe at a meeting held during the first week of January.' Under that benefit program, all factory employees were to receive annually week's vacation, 7 paid holidays, and 6 paid sick days (but not more than I day in any I month). As an employee of Storm, Rambrich would have been entitled to 2-1/2 weeks' vacation, 11 paid holidays and 8 days of sick leave. When told by Sharpe that Respondent intended its fringe benefit program to apply to her as well as to the other employees, Rambrich became upset. She complained to Sharpe that the declared benefits were substantially less than those that Morrow had promised her when she agreed to leave Storm to work for Respondent. Sharpe told Ram- brich that he knew nothing of any such promise, but stated that he would check out her assertion with Morrow and Strict.6 Bessie Payne, a coworker of Rambrich who was called as a witness for Respondent, testified on cross-examination that Rambrich declared at this meeting that she would go to the "Labor Board" if she did not get the benefits that had been promised her. On redirect, however, Payne testified that the meeting had already broken up when Rambrich made that statement, and that she could not say that Sharpe heard it. The following day after reporting for work Rambrich went to Morrow's office and asked him whether Respon- dent intended its fringe benefit program to be applicable to her. Morrow said that it did, and he did not respond when Rambrich protested that these benefits were less than those he had promised her when she was hired. However, later that day Rambrich, as appears from her testimony, was summoned from her workplace to Strict's office. Her account of what occurred is substantially as fol- lows: Strict asked her what her problem was downstairs. She told him that the vacation and other benefits Sharpe had said she was to receive did not measure up to the Storm benefits she had been promised, and that she intended to on the day after Thanksgiving which were also holidays at Storm, but again she was paid double time for her work on those days. There is nothing in the record to indicate whether Storm's employees were required to work on holidays if paid at premium rates. s Sharpe, after joining Respondent in October 1976, was placed in charge of Respondent's factory operations. Thereafter Morrow, whose office was on another floor of the building had little if anything to do with the day-to-day direction of Respondent's factory operations. Strict, whose office was also on another floor of the building, devoted his time almost entirely to marketing functions and had only sporadic contact with Respondent's factory workers. 6 At this meeting, Rambrich also complained about a job instruction given machine operators that required them to move boxes containing ribbons from machine to machine as work progressed. Rambrich, who was again pregnant at the time, told Sharpe that she did not want to move or lift such boxes when they were heavy, and she declared that if compelled to do so she would hold Respondent legally accountable for any resultant ijury to her unborn child. In response Sharpe told Rambrich that if she did not want to move the boxes, she could leave and look for another job. Rambrich did not accept Sharpe's invitation to quit, but as appears from her testimony which is confirmed by Respondent's payroll and attendance records in evidence and is credited in this respect, remained at work the rest of the day and reported for work the next morning. No claim was made by any of Respon- dent's witnesses that she was discharged at that time. Rambrich denied that at any time after this meeting she failed to move or lift boxes when required to do so in the performance of her work, and Respondent presented no specific evidence to the contrary. 8 INKED RIBBON CORP. complain to the Department of Labor if she did not get all the benefits that she had been told she would get. Strict made it apparent to Rambrich that he resented being threatened by her. He told her, however, that he did not want her to go to the Department of Labor and that she need not bother doing so, as he would see to it that she got the vacation and other fringe benefits that Morrow had agreed to. Rambrich testified that this was the only meeting she ever had with Strict in his office. While testifying Strict did not specifically advert to or deny Rambrich's foregoing testimony. He did testify, how- ever, concerning a meeting which he says he had with Ram- brich in late January, several weeks after Respondent's benefit program was announced to its employees. Although not expressly stated, Strict's testimony concerning that meeting was evidently intended by Respondent to serve, at least in part, as a denial of Rambrich's testimony that at her January meeting with Strict she had threatened to go to the Department of Labor if she did not get the benefits she had been promised. According to Respondent, Rambrich, prior to her final discharge in March, had been discharged by Sharpe on an unspecified date in late January but had been reinstated by Strict about 2 days later. Strict testified that about I day or so after that asserted discharge he received a telephone call from a man who, after indentifying himself as Rambrich's husband, proceeded to harangue him at length about Rambrich having been let go, about "promises made to her that were not kept and so on," and who said he was going to "the Labor Board, I think." In order to get the caller off the phone, Strict agreed to meet with Rambrich to hear her complaint. He did meet with her on the following day and at that time agreed to reinstate her after receiving her assurance that Respondent would have no further trou- ble with her as an employee. At that time, Strict stated, he admonished Rambrich that if she had any problem she wanted to discuss with him in the future, she should see him herself and not have her husband call him. Strict's testimony that his January meeting with Ram- brich occurred in the context of a prior discharge impressed me as contrived. Rambrich emphatically denied that she had ever been discharged by Respondent prior to her dis- charge on March 8, 1977. For the reasons elaborated in the marginal note, I reject as not credible the testimony of Re- spondent's witnesses to the contrary and credit Rambrich's denial.' For like reasons, I also reject as not credible Strict's testimony about the meeting he says he had with Rambrich in late January. Respondent's admission in its answer to the allegations of paragraph 5 of the complaint adds credence to Rambrich's testimony that at her January meeting with Sharpe, who according to Respondent effected Rambnch's discharge in January, was vague and uncertain in his testimony as to the details of the discharge-time, place, and what specifically led him to take such action at the time. Morrow did offer a specific reason for the action assertedly taken at that time. He testified that Sharpe discharged Rambrich because of an inci- dent involving Rambrich and another employee. Bessie Payne. Morrow's testimony in that respect was directly contrary to Sharpe's testimony con- cerning the same incident. Respondent, when asked to do so, was unable to produce any personnel record, final paycheck, or any other documentary evidence to support its assertion of that discharge and admitted that it had none. In their prehearing statements, Morrow and Sharpe made no mention of Rambrich having been discharged at any time prior to March 8. Morrow's affidavit states only that Respondent was "considering" the discharge of Rambnch. Strict she announced an intention to seek the assistance of the Department of Labor if she did not get the benefits she had been promised. I credit Rambrich's testimony in that respect and find accordingly.' Rambrich's testimony reflects that after her meeting with Strict she continued to complain to Morrow about not being paid for all her sick days. There is nothing in the record to show, however, that Rambrich was not actually allowed the same sick benefits that she would have received as an employee of Storm. With respect to the specific alle- gations of the complaint, the General Counsel makes no claim that anything further of consequence occurred until March 1977. On Friday, March 4, 1977, Rambrich was absent from work. She had previously told Sharpe that she wanted to have the afternoon of that day off as she was moving to another apartment, and Sharpe had not objected. On the morning of March 4, Rambrich telephoned Morrow, told him that she was not feeling well, was going to a doctor, and would not come to work at all that day. Morrow indi- cated no objection to her absence. In the course of her tele- phone conversation with Morrow, Rambrich asked him when she could expect her pay raise. Morrow wanted to know what raise she was referring to, as he knew of none. Rambrich said it was the raise he had promised she would get after she had been on the job 3 months. Morrow told her that he had never promised her a raise.9 Rambrich was also absent from work on Monday, March 7. Rambrich admitted that she herself did not call Respon- dent that day to report her absence. Rambrich testified that she was not feeling well that morning, and that she asked her cousin, Walter Isaac, to telephone Morrow and tell him she would not be in for that reason. She had previously informed her cousin, Rambrich further testified, that Mor- row did not want to give her a raise. Isaac testified that on Monday about 9:30 a.m., he called Morrow and told him that Rambrich was not well and would not be in that day. Isaac further testified that in the course of his telephone conversation with Morrow the fol- lowing also occurred: Isaac asked Morrow when Rambrich would receive the raise she had been expecting. When Mor- row told Isaac that Rambrich had no raise coming to her, Isaac took issue with Morrow, declaring that he had been informed by Rambrich that Morrow had promised her a raise, a promise which Morrow told Isaac he had never made. Isaac also complained to Morrow that Rambrich was not being paid for all her sick days even though Mor- I As for Strict's testimony concerning the conversation he says he had with Rambrich's "husband," I believe that Strict may have had a conversation of that general nature with Rambrich's cousin, Walter Isaac, but not in the context of a complaint by Isaac of an earlier discharge and not at the time Strict says that conversation occurred. Rambrich testified that it was her understanding that before Strict called her into his office in early January to ask her what her problem was, her cousin had called Strict to communicate to him her grievance about her benefits. Isaac, who was called by General Counsel as a witnesses, was not questioned by either the General Counsel or Respondent concerning that call. 9 The findings in this par. are based on the credited testimony of Ram- brich. Morrow admitted that Rambrich called him that day to say she could not report for work; but, according to him, she stated that she wanted the time off to move. Rambrich's absence on that day. however, is recorded on Respondent's payroll record as an absence due to sickness. In his testimony Morrow did not deny that Rambrich spoke to him about a raise during their telephone conversation. 9 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD row had "promised" her, so he told Morrow that she would be paid for all sick days. When Morrow said he could not remember promising anything like that, Isaac declared that he had a witness (meaning himself) to prove it. Isaac testi- fied that when Morrow denied making the promises he at- tributed to Morrow, he became angry and told Morrow, "Look the only thing she [Rambrich] can do, she can go to the Labor Department and straighten everything out." Isaac's foregoing testimony is disputed by Respondent. According to Respondent, no one called on Rambrich's be- half on Monday to report her absence. Morrow testified more specifically that he had no conversation with any male that Monday regarding Rambrich. Morrow's testimony to that effect conflicts with a state- ment made by Sharpe in his prehearing affidavit, which is in evidence, that on the Monday preceding Rambrich's dis- charge, "Mr. Morrow or Mr. Strict told me Rambrich's husband had called and said that if that's the way you're going to run the place, I don't want Debby working there." '" Sharpe's statement does not, of course, serve affir- matively to support Isaac's testimony that he threatened to seek the assistance of the Department of Labor in further- ance of her claim for a wage increase. However, it does make suspect the reliability of Morrow's testimony that he had no conversation at all that day with anyone speaking on behalf of Rambrich and at least to that extent tends to render Isaac's testimony more believable than Morrow's denial on the factual conflict in question. In light of the unpersuasive explanation-to be considered below--given by Respondent for deciding on that particular day to dis- charge Rambrich, and also taking into account Respon- dent's admission in its filed answer (which was signed by Morrow) of the allegations of paragraph 5 of the complaint, I believe it far more likely than not that Isaac had a conver- sation with Morrow along the lines testified to by him, and I credit Isaac's testimony to that effect. D. The Discharge When Rambrich reported for work on Tuesday, March 8, Sharpe summoned her to his office and told her she was discharged. As appears from testimony of Respondent's witnesses, the decision to discharge Rambrich had been made the previous day by Strict and Morrow and commu- nicated by them to Sharpe for effectuation. Rambrich testified that when Sharpe gave her her final paycheck he told her that Morrow or Strict had received a call the previous day threatening to take them to the De- partment of Labor and that they had no "need" for anyone who threatened them with such action. This, she stated, was the only reason Sharpe gave her for her discharge. Ram- brich further testified that later that day she telephoned Morrow to inquire about her discharge. Morrow, she stated, also told her that Respondent did not "need" her in its employ because of her threat to go to the Department of Labor and suggested that she return to Storm. Neither Sharpe nor Morrow in his testimony adverted to or specifically denied making the statements attributed to him by Rambrich. Sharpe was vague as to the reason he 'o Isaac testified that when he called Respondent on Rambrich's behalf he did not identify himself other than to say he was calling for her. gave Rambrich for her discharge." Morrow testified that when Rambrich called he told her that he felt her discharge was best for all; for her, the Company, and everyone con- cerned. His testimony does not indicate the reason, if any. that he gave Rambrich for her discharge. E. Respondent's Asserted Justification for the Discharge Respondent now denies that it discharged Rambrich be- cause of any threat by her or by anyone on her behalf to go to the Department of Labor. It asserts in its brief that it was motivated to discharge Rambrich solely because of her be- havior and work history during the last 9 weeks of her em- ployment. Respondent concedes that Rambrich was a satis- factory employee during the first several months of her employment; but it contends that beginning in January 1977 there was a deterioration in her behavior, manifested by a belligerent and hostile attitude toward her coworkers, insubordination toward her leadlady, and a poor attend- ance record. To support its claim that Rambrich was belligerent and unable to get along with her co-employees, Respondent pre- sented evidence through Sharpe and employee witnesses concerning three incidents, referred to in the marginal note, involving quarrels between Rambrich and other employees, in only one which does it appear that Rambrich was the belligerent party.'2 All of these incidents occurred more than a month before Rambrich's discharge. Sharpe testified that "disturbances of this kind with female employees are not unusual." Rambrich's testimony is uncontradicted that during her employment by Respondent nothing was ever said to her by Sharpe, Morrow, or Strict about having fights with or being able to get along with other employees. Maria Serrano, the leadlady in Rambrich's department, when asked whether Rambrich got along with her coworkers, tes- tified that like all the other girls sometimes she did and sometimes she did not. To support its claim that Rambrich had been insubordi- nate, Respondent adduced evidence through Maria Ser- rano, the leadlady who assigned work to employees in Rambrich's department, that Rambrich had at times re- fused to follow her work assignment instructions.' Serrano, her testimony discloses, had the same problem with other girls but not to the same extent as with Rambrich. On one occasion, Serrano found it necessary to complain to Sharpe and Morrow about Rambrich, telling them she could not take it anymore from Rambrich. Serrano fixed the time of I According to Sharpe, he told Rambnch, "We have gone as far as we can with this whole entire situation." To which he claims Rambrich responded. "Well, I'm going to go to the Labor Board and create all kinds of problems." Sharpe's testimony did not impress me as truthful. 2 Item. As appears from the testimony of employee June Mass, an ex- change of "a few words back and forth" occurred between Mass and Ram- brich when Mass became annoyed at Rambrich because Rambrich had com- plained to Amin, the mechanic, about Mass playing her radio too loudly, and Amin had asked Mass to tone it down. Item: A quarrel erupted between Rambrich and employee Bessie Payne, according to Payne's disputed ver- sion, when Rambnch angrily complained to Payne about the latter's use of her chair. Item: Rambrich pushed a cart containing ribbons toward the next station that "almost" hit Judith Wesch's cousin, Margalie; whereupon Wesch became incensed and threatened to hit Rambnch over the head with a core if that happened again. '3 Rambrich admitted this was so but testified that this had occurred only when she had other work that had to be done first. 10 INKED RIBBON CORP. that complaint as about I month before Rambrich's dis- charge. She testified that this was the only time that she specifically complained about Rambrich. Respondent took no action against Rambrich at that time. Respondent's payroll for the 9-week period preceding Rambrich's discharge, which includes March 4.14 shows that Rambrich was absent from work on 5 days and had deductions, presumably for latenesses, of 1-1/2 hours on I day and 1 hour on another day. Four of the absences, in- cluding the one on March 4. are recorded as due to sick- ness; of these, three absences were sick days for which she received payment under Respondent's fringe benefit policy. Of the 10 rank-and-file employees listed on the payroll rec- ord in evidence, I employee had as many days of absence as Rambrich during that period and 2 had more.5' Ram- brich testified without denial that during the period of her employment no management representative had ever com- plained to her about her absences. As noted above, the decision made on March 7 to dis- charge Rambrich was made by Strict and Morrow. When Strict was asked at the hearing what precipitated the dis- charge decision on that particular date, he testified that Morrow came to him and told him that the girls were com- plaining about Rambrich and threatening to leave, Ram- brich's attendance record was very bad, and so she would have to be let go; to this statement he responded, okay. Strict's generalized statement that employees were com- plaining about Rambrich and were threatening to leave if she were retained is not, however, supported by any specific evidence. The record does show that Bessie Payne, at the time of her quarrel with Rambrich (see fn. 12. above), put on her coat and started to leave, but she was placated by Sharpe who induced her to remain." Except for that one incident which occurred more than I month before Ram- brich's discharge, the record is devoid of any specific evi- dence that any employee had ever threatened to leave be- cause of Rambrich. Further, apart from that incident and leadlady Serrano's one complaint about Rambrich, the rec- ord is devoid of specific evidence that any employee had ever addressed a complaint about Rambrich to Sharpe, Morrow, or Strict. Morrow's testimony does not support Strict's assertion that the discharge decision made on March 7 was precipi- tated by employee complaints about Rambrich and threats to leave because of her. His testimony makes no mention of any such complaints or threats during the period closely preceding the discharge decision. Morrow gave variable and self-contradictory testimony when questioned about whether Rambrich's absences on Friday and Monday were a factor influencing the discharge decision. Thus, when first asked if Rambrich's absences on those days had anything to do with her discharge, he re- sponded, "Not really," adding. "If she had come in on B4 Respondent produced its employee attendance records only for the pe- nod after January . 1977, claiming that it had no records covering Ram- brich's earlier period of employment. I' Although in the cases of two of these employees the bulk of their ab- sences was on successive days; the absences of the third employee. Heather Roman. were sporadic like Rambrich's. 16 Sharpe testified that he interceded in that quarrel and brought it to an end by telling both participants that they "should respect each other." Sharpe testified that he did not know who started the quarrel or who was at fault. Monday. that's when she would have been discharged." Morrow was then asked by the Administrative Law Judge "what made [him] take the action on that particular Mon- day, rather than, say. a week before, or two weeks before that?" His response: "I don't recall a specific incident, other than that's when the firm recommendation materialized." That answer was followed by a leading question by Re- spondent's counsel as to whether the decision "didn't have something to do with the fact that she didn't show up for work that day." To which he responded, inconsistently with his earlier answer, "That may have been a final straw, but that in itself was not a focal point of the decision." Later in his examination Morrow was asked to state spe- cifically why Respondent discharged Rambrich on March 8. In his answer Morrow made no mention of Rambrich's absences, but stated he did so because she was a "disruptive influence." When asked whether he could recall any specific disruptive incident that had occurred in the 4 weeks preced- ing Rambrich's discharge, Morrow stated that the "one spe- cific incident" that came to his attention during that period was Serrano's complaint to him about Rambrich's "contin- ued insubordination." Morrow fixed the time of that com- plaint as about 7 to 10 days before her discharge. Earlier in his testimony, however, Morrow had stated that that com- plaint was made to him about the beginning of February. Serrano. it will be recalled, fixed the date as about I month before the discharge. and stated it was the only time she had gone to a management representative to complain about Rambrich." E. Analvsis and Concluding Findinlgs The reasons advanced by Respondent for Rambrich's discharge strike me. at best, as an after-the-fact rationaliza- tion by Respondent as to why it now believes Rambrich could have been. or deserved to be, discharged. It does not persuasively explain why Respondent was prompted to dis- charge Rambrich at the particular time that it did. As found above, the specific incidents and events upon which Respondent relies to support its claim that Rambrich was unable to get along with her coworkers, was insubordinate toward the leadlady. and was a "disruptive influence" all occurred a month or more before her discharge; although the incidents I I were known to Respondent, they were not deemed reason enough to remove her from its employ dur- ing the intervening period. Rambrich's absences from work on March 4 and 7 were, to be sure, proximately related in point of time to the discharge decision. However, for rea- sons indicated above I do not believe that Respondent was actuated to discharge Rambrich because of her attendance record. Morrow's testimony as initially given, though later revised, confirms that Rambrich's absences on March 4 and 7 were "not really" the reason that sparked its discharge i' Following his initial examination Morrow was recalled as a witness by Respondent to authenticate and comment on Respondent's employee attend- ance records which Respondent had produced pursuant to an earlier request. He then revised his earlier testimony to state that Rambrich's absences were a "contributing factor" to the discharge decision. adding that when Ram- brich did not come In on Monday, "that was. I guess. the last straw to cause us to make the decision to terminate her." His testimony in that respect is in conflict with his initial testimony that Rambrich would have been discharged on Monday een if she had come n that day II DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD decision. Had that been the culminating factor influencing its discharge decision, it seems to me that Respondent would have so informed Rambrich; but at the hearing Re- spondent offered no evidence that it did, or, for that matter, that it gave her any other specific reason for her discharge. In light of the foregoing circumstances, I believe that the true explanation for the discharge determination made on March 7 is to be found in Isaac's call to Morrow that same day, wherein Isaac complained about Respondent's failure to grant Rambrich a pay raise and certain sick pay benefits that he insisted had been promised her and threatened, on Rambrich's behalf, to seek the assistance of the Department of Labor in support of her claims. As noted above, Sharpe and Morrow did not specifically deny Rambrich's testi- mony that that was the reason which they gave her for her discharge. I find her testimony to that effect both plausible and credible. I am convinced, after considering and evalu- ating all the relevant evidence, that even though Respon- dent may also have taken other considerations into ac- count, its decision on March 7 to discharge Rambrich was prompted by and primarily motivated by its resentment of Isaac's telephone call that same day to Morrow, wherein Isaac on behalf of Rambrich complained to Morrow about Respondent's failure to grant Rambrich a pay raise and certain benefits that he claimed had been promised her and threatened to seek the assistance of the Department of La- bor in support of her claims. I am also convinced that but for the aforesaid complaint and threat, Respondent would not have discharged Rambrich on March 8, 1977. so find. The finding made above does not, however, dispose of this case. The question remains whether Respondent's dis- charge of Rambrich for the reasons found above was viola- tive of Section 8(a)(1) and/or 8(a)(4) of the Act, as alleged in the complaint. The initial and determinative question posed by the 8(a)(1) allegation is whether Rambrich's complaint to Re- spondent that she was being denied a promised wage in- crease and sick pay benefits and the declaration of an intent on her part to seek the assistance of the Department of Labor in support of her claims constituted concerted ac- tivity for the purpose of mutual aid and protection within the meaing of Section 7 of the Act. On the facts in this case, I believe it clear that that question must be answered in the negative. Rambrich's complaint was an individual one; it was predicated, not on a collective-bargaining contract, but on a promise that she claimed had been made to her as an individual. She was not complaining about anyone else's benefits but her own, nor was she seeking a wage increase for anyone but herself. She was acting alone in the pursuit of her claims. Her grievance against Respondent did not acquire the status of a concerted activity because she was seeking to have it redressed through a governmental agency. It is true that the Board has held in certain situ- ations that an individual, though acting alone, engages in protected concerted activity when he enlists the aid of a governmental agency in support of a grievance or com- plaint against his employer."8 But that principle has been found applicable only in instances where the employee's complaint or grievance relates to a matter of common con- " See, e.g., Allelulia Cushion Co., Inc., 221 NLRB 999 (1975). cern to other employees or is directed toward the enforce- ment of a statutory obligation that has been legislated for the benefit or protection of employees generally, That is not the situation here. The 8(a)(4) aspect of this case is somewhat more trouble- some. That section makes it unfair labor practice for an employer "to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this Act." (Emphasis supplied.) It is well settled law that the purpose of this section is to insure the proper func- tioning of the Board in its administration of the Act by providing protection to employees who seek access to Board processes to remedy violations or supposed viola- tions of the Act or to employees who furnish information relating to such violations. The Supreme Court has ruled that Section 8(a)(4) is not to be read literally and confined in its reach to formal charges and formal testimony," but is to be construed liberally in the light of its purpose "to af- ford broad rather than narrow protection to the em- ployee."' 9 Consistently with that construction, the Board has held that it is a violation of Section 8(aX4) for an em- ployer to discharge an employee because he has expressed an intention to seek the assistance of the Board in support of a claim or grievance against his employer, even though he has not filed a charge or given testimony under the Act. The Board has applied that principle not only in situations where the claim or grievance would have provided the basis of a meritorious charge under the Act, but also in situations where the claim or grievance involved a matter that was not within the remedial jurisdiction of the Board.? Had the evidence in this record supported the com- plaint's allegation that the threat made by or on behalf of Rambrich prior to her discharge was to go to the "National Labor Relations Board" for assistance in support of her claims against Respondent, there can be little doubt that this, coupled with the other facts found above, would have required under established Board precedent a finding that her discharge was violative of Section 8(a)(4). The testi- mony of both Rambrich and Isaac, which I have credited, shows, however, that the threat made by and on behalf of Rambrich was to go to the "Labor Department" for assist- ance. I am aware of no reported case in which the protec- tive mantle of Section 8(a)(4) has been held to cover a charge or complaint addressed to any governmental agency other than the Board. Nor do I believe that Section 8(a)( 4) may fairly be construed, even under a broad reading of it, as extending its protection to employees who resort or threaten to resort to the processes of any agency other than the Board in support of claims against their employer-and this even though their claims may arise out of the employ- ment relationship and the non-Board agency is one that deals with labor matters. To so construe would be to ignore the limiting language, italicized above, contained in Section 1' N.L.R.B. v. Robert Scrivener, d/bl/a AA Electric Conpany, 405 U.S. 117, 122 (1972). 2 See Hoover Design Corporation, 167 NLRB 461, 462 (1976), enforcement denied 402 F.2d 987 (6th Cir. 1968) (employee discharged for making known an intention to seek Board assistance on his grievance relating to his employ- er's failure to pay a premium wage for holiday pay); First National Bank d Trust Co., 209 NLRB 95, 101 (1974) (employee discharged for expressing intent to file charges with the Board complaining about the insufficiency of a lunchbreak). See also General Nutrition Center, Inc., 221 NLRB 850, 855 (1975), and cases there cited. 12 INKED RIBBON CORP. 8(a)(4), as well as the specific purpose that this section was designed to serve. The record in this case does reflect clearly that neither Rambrich nor Isaac was aware, prior to Rambrich's dis- charge, of any distinction between the Department of La- bor and the Board; and that when they spoke of going to the "Labor Department" they did not have that govern- ment department specifically in mind, but were simply using "Labor Department" as a generalized discriptive ref- erence to some governmental branch or agency, Federal, State, or municipal, dealing with labor matters to which Rambrich might go for assistance in processing her griev- ance against Respondent.2' However, even assuming that Respondent understood the reference to the "Labor De- partment" to have that generalized meaning, I do not re- gard this as enough to bring Rambrich's announced inten- tion to go to the "Labor Department" within the protected ambit of Section 8(aX4). I might have viewed the matter differently and found such an intent to be implied had it appeared that the subject of Rambrich's grievance involved a matter over which the Board had remedial jurisdiction. That is not the case here. The General Counsel contends that a finding of a viola- tion of Section 8(a)(4) and of 8(a)(l) as well is justified in this case because, so he asserts, the threat made by Isaac on Rambrich's behalf to go to the "Labor Department" for assistance or her grievance was understood by Respondent as a threat to go to the Board. There is no evidence in the record, however, to support that assertion, except for Re- spondent's admission in its answer, repudiated by it at the hearing, of the allegations of paragraph 5 of the complaint. 21 Isaac, as appears from his testimony, first learned of the existence of the NLRB after Rambrich was discharged. I do not regard the repudiated admission as providing suffi- cient support for a finding that Respondent's understanding of the threat was what the General Counsel says it was- and particularly so since, as appears from the testimony of the General Counsel's witnesses that I have credited, the reference to the "National Labor Relations Board" in para- graph 5 of the complaint was itself inaccurate. For the reasons stated above, I conclude and find that the complaint's allegations that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (4) by its discharge of Rambrich have not been sustained, and accordingly I shall recommend dismissal of the complaint in its entirety. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent, Inked Ribbon Corporation, is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Respondent has not, as alleged in the complaint, en- gaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sec- tion 8(a)(1) and (4) of the Act. ORDER22 It is recommended that the complaint herein be dis- missed in its entirety. 22 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes 13