Pioneer Concrete Co.

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD W. Carter Maxwell, d/b/a Pioneer Concrete Co. and Leon Cantrell. Case 20-CA-13882 March 20, 1979 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS PENELLO AND TRUESDALE On December 19, 1978, Administrative Law Judge Russell L. Stevens issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed cross-exceptions and a letter in support thereof. Re- spondent thereafter filed a letter in response to the General Counsel's letter. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela- tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Or- der of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby or- ders that the Respondent, W. Carter Maxwell, d/b/a I The General Counsel has excepted to the Administrative Law Judge's finding that the misunderstanding concerning the amount and purpose of the "vacation" check given by Respondent to Cantrell at the time of his dis- charge was later corrected. We find merit in that exception, inasmuch as the record is unclear as to whether the check was intended to encompass vaca- tion pay and/or severance pay, and as to whether the matter was later cor- rected by the parties. Therefore, for the purposes of computing Cantrell's backpay, the issue concerning the amount and purpose of the "vacation" check shall be left to the compliance stage of this proceeding. The General Counsel has also excepted to the Administrative Law Judge's recommended remedy insofar as it recommends that interest on backpay should be computed at a rate other than the 9 percent requested by the General Counsel. We find no merit in that exception. See Florida Steel Cor- poration, 231 NLRB 651 (1977). In adopting the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Respondent vio- lated Sec. 8(aX3) and (1) of the Act by discharging Cantrell, we rely solely on the Administrative Law Judge's reasoning that said discharge was caused "in substantial part" by Cantrell's insistence on being paid overtime pursuant to the collective-bargaining agreement. In adopting the Administrative Law Judge's finding that the instant case should not be deferred to the grievance-arbitration procedure. Chairman Fanning relies on the Board's decision in General American Transportation Corporation, 228 NLRB 808 (1977). Member Penello, who dissented in Gen- eral American Transportation Corporation, would not defer because there is no assurance that the grievance, in its present posture, would be considered on the merits by an arbitrator. Member Truesdale finds it unnecessary to pass on the Board's decision in General American Transportation Corporation under the circumstances of the instant case. Pioneer Concrete Co., Santa Rosa, California, its offi- cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the ac- tion set forth in the said recommended Order. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE RUSSELL L. STEVENS, Administrative Law Judge: This matter was heard in Santa Rosa, California, on September 21 and 22, October 23 and 24, 1978.' The complaint,2 issued July 14, is based upon a charge filed June 8 by Leon Can- trell,3 an individual. The complaint alleges that W. Carter Maxwell, d/b/a Pioneer Concrete Co. (Respondent), vio- lated Section 8(a)(l) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, by asking an employee to obtain a copy of the employee's statement given to a representative of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board and violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discharging Cantrell because of his union or other activities protected by the Act. All parties were given full opportunity to participate, to introduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to argue orally. Briefs, which have been care- fully considered, were filed on behalf of the General Coun- sel and Respondent. Upon the entire record, and from my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION Respondent is, and at all times material herein has been, a sole proprietorship with a place of business in Santa Rosa, California, where it is engaged in the production and sale of ready-mixed concrete. During the past year Respondent, in the course and conduct of its business operations, derived gross revenues in excess of $500,000, nearly all sales being at retail.' The complaint alleges that during the past year Respon- dent, in the course and conduct of its business operations, purchased and received goods, materials, and supplies val- ued in excess of $3,000 which originated outside the State of California. Respondent denied that allegation. At the hear- ing, the General Counsel proved conclusively, and without any proof to the contrary submitted by Respondent, that during the period of time relevant herein Respondent pur- chased goods, materials, and supplies valued in excess of $6,000 which originated outside the State of California and which were shipped directly to Respondent, or which were sold to Respondent unchanged in any manner after being received by California suppliers from sources outside Cali- fornia. Respondent devotes little argument space in its brief to this issue and cites no law in support of its denial of jurisdiction. I All dates hereinafter are within 1978, unless stated otherwise. 2 As amended by the General Counsel at the hearing, with leave of the Administrative Law Judge. 3All individuals are referred to herein by their last names. 4 The facts stated in this paragraph were acknowledged by Maxwell at the hearing. 241 NLRB No. 31 264 PIONEER CONCRETE CO. Contrary to Respondent's apparent contention, it is not necessary when examining business transactions relative to the jurisdictional issue to limit applicable sales and pur- chases to those involved directly and immediately in inter- state shipments. Congress delegates to the Board the full limit of its own jurisdiction, which includes business "affect- ing commerce" as well as that "in commerce."' Thus, the total amount, in excess of $6,000, proved by the General Counsel is within the ambit of the Board's jurisdiction. As argued by General Counsel, the only question is whether or not the purchases proved at the hearing are de minimis, and thus beyond the concept that they affected commerce. 6 Clearly, the de minimis doctrine is not appli- cable herein. The Board has held that approximately $2,000 in value is not a de minimis amount' and also has held that a proved amounts of approximately $1,800 is not de mini- mis.9 The General Counsel proved at the hearing a purchase by Respondent from a Nevada supplier during the appro- priate period of cement invoiced at $1,890.20. That amount, alone, supports the Board's jurisdiction; certainly it is not a "trifle," i.e., de minimis. '° It is found that Respondent is, and at all times material herein has been, an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED General Truck Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Union Local 980, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America is, and at all times material herein has been, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. I111. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES Background" Pioneer Concrete Co., is a ready-mix concrete business owned, operated, and supervised by W. Carter Maxwell. The principal place of business is located in Santa Rosa, California, where Respondent maintains, among other as- sets, an office, a mixing plant, and a fleet of trucks operated by five drivers. Leon Cantrell, the Charging Party, was em- ployed as a part-time driver on May 1, 1967; worked regu- larly as a part-time driver until he was made a full-time driver on January 1, 1970; and thereafter worked full time until his discharge by Maxwell on May 5, 1978. That dis- charge is the principal issue involved in this controversy. Pioneer Concrete Co., was organized in 1950 and since that time has been run by Maxwell on an informal basis. Work hours have not been strictly followed, but the drivers generally come to work at 7:30 a.m. and leave work at 4 p.m., with a 30-minute lunchbreak that is taken midday, or Pohsh National Alliance of the United States of North America v. N.LR.B., 322 U.S. 643 (1944). 6N.L.R.B. v. Fainblar, 306 U.S. 601 (1939). ' Arlington Ridge Development Co., et al., 203 NLRB 787 (1973). 8 Some additional amounts were not established. 9 Somerset Manor, Inc., 170 NLRB 1647 (1968). IO N.LR.B v. Suburban Lumber Company, 121 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1941). "This background summary is based upon uncontradicted testimony and facts not in dispute. at some other time if work does not permit a break at the designated time. The drivers work 5 days each week, 52 weeks each year; they do not work on Saturdays, Sundays, or holidays. Occasionally it is necessary for drivers to report an hour or so early in the morning to deliver cement re- quired prior to normal work hours. It also is necessary, occasionally, for drivers to work an hour or so beyond 4 p.m. Respondent's busiest season is during the late spring, summer, and early fall, when construction activity is at its peak. At other times Respondent's business slackens, and cement deliveries are curtailed or discontinued during rainy weather. Since approximately the time of organization of the Company in 1950, Maxwell has had an arrangement with his drivers, whereby the drivers are permitted to leave early, without penalty, when work permits, in order to compen- sate for the occasions when they come in early or work overtime. However, such trade-offs occur only a few times each year. Maxwell never has paid his drivers overtime. Drivers do not punch timecards. The arrangement with the drivers goes beyond the matter of early and late hours; frequently during the rainy season they are permitted to do light work at the plant, or go home early in the day, or not come to work at all; they are not "docked" for any such loss of work. Further, drivers occasionally remain home be- cause of illness, or fail to work for personal reasons, but are not penalized therefor. Since his early days in the business Maxwell has paid his drivers full pay for each week of the year, regardless of any loss of work they may have encoun- tered. Respondent has had a contract with the Union continu- ously since approximately 1960. The current contract pro- vides, inter alia, for an 8-hour workday, with overtime at 1- 1/2 rate after 8 hours work during a single day, and after 40 hours work during a single week. The contract is an indus- try form agreement, and also has provisions relating to 4 hours showup time, vacations, grievances, and other work conditions. The agreement provides that working hours other than those stated in the agreement may be adjusted to conform with business requirements, provided any such ad- justment is agreed to by the Employer and the Union. Max- well and his drivers have known at all times relevant herein that the arrangement with the drivers concerning their hours is not in accord with the union agreement. The Union never was informed by Maxwell or any driver that the ar- rangement exists, nor has any grievance or complaint con- cerning the arrangement been filed with the Union prior to Cantrell's complaint which gave rise to the controversy herein. Union representatives heard rumors about and sus- pected that Respondent does not pay overtime, but no in- quiry was made, although union representatives frequently visit Respondent's premises and talk with Maxwell and the drivers. Cantrell is the only driver who has complained about the working hours arrangement. Since 1970, he has complained to Maxwell on many occasions about the fact that he was not being paid overtime for the instances in which he came in early or left work late. On each occasion Maxwell told Cantrell to take time off in lieu of receiving overtime pay. 12 Effective July 1, 1977 until July 1, 1980. G.C. Exh. 27. 265 I)6F('ISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD On no occasion were harsh words exchanged, nor did Max- well reprimand Cantrell for complaining. On May 4 Cantrell worked approximately I hour over- time, and after work that afternoon told Maxwell he wanted to be paid for the hour at the overtime rate. A brief argument ensued, after which Maxwell told Cantrell "I guess we can work out something perhaps under the table." On Friday, May 5, Maxwell called Cantrell into the office after work, told him the agreement of the preceding day was not going to work, and discharged him. Another brief argument ensued, after which Maxwell agreed to help Can- trell get another job, agreed to assist Cantrell obtain unem- ployment insurance, and gave Cantrell his vacation check.' After he was fired on May 5, Cantrell telephoned C('lair Cate, the Union's business representative, and they ar- ranged for Cantrell to come see Cate on the following Mon- day, May 8. When Cantrell met with Cate on May 8 they discussed the discharge and the vacation pay error, both of which Cate agreed to look into. Cantrell asked for a copy of the union contract with Respondent, and Cate gave him a copy. Cantrell and Cate met again on May 9.14 Article 15 of the current contract between Respondent and the Union provides, inter alia, "all discharge cases in dispute must be appealed within five (5) calendar days of the date of discharge." Cantrell submitted a grievance in writing on his own initiative after reviewing the contract given to him by Cate. A grievance committee was estab- lished in accordance with provisions of the union contract, and the committee met June 5, with Cantrell and Maxwell in attendance. Maxwell argued at the hearing that Cantrell did not submit his grievance in a timely manner. The com- mittee then withdrew to discuss that matter. The committee met immediately thereafter and announced that it would not hear the merits of the grievance because it was not timely filed. No further action was taken by the committee. In July, Maxwell and Cantrell agreed to place the dispute before an arbitrator, but Cantrell agreed to do so only if such action would not interfere with, or preclude, an NLRB hearing on his charge filed June 8. The matter has not gone to arbitration, and, as far as the record shows, neither Max- well nor Cantrell have withdrawn their agreement to arbi- trate. A. The Deferral Question Respondent argues in its brief "Essentially what we are doing here again is hearing the unfair labor practice matter once again before a different tribunal even though by the terms of the contract Mr. Cantrell would have been pre- vented from presenting his grievance because of untimeli- ness." That argument is not applicable herein. It may well be that Cantrell was precluded from a hearing on the merits because of an untimely grievance, but that is a contractual matter not controlling herein. Cantrell's charge was filed with the Board in a timely manner, and his grievance has not been heard except by the Board. The contractual griev- 11 Cantrell already had been paid for the week's work; Maxwell customar- ily paid the dnsrers I day in advance There was a misunderstanding about the amount of the vacation check, which later was corrected. 14 The)' testified differentl concerning the subjects discussed. ance committee did not hear anything concerning the al- leged unfair labor practices. Spielbergl5 is not applicable. Respondent does not argue that this case should be de- ferred to the arbitral process, as indeed it should not. First, Cantrell stated at the hearing and prior thereto that he is not amenable to arbitration as a substitute for an NLRB hearing. Second, the arbitral process under the union con- tract apparently is a continuation of the initial grievance procedure: it is entirely possible that an arbitral tribunal would do no more than the grievance committee did. Fi- nally, Cantrell followed proper procedures in placing the dispute before the Board, and his allegations involved rights accrued to him under Section 7 of the Act. Under such circumstances the Board does not defer cases arising under Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.l B. Cantrell's Discharge Cantrell worked full time for Respondent from 1970 until his discharge. As far as the record shows, his work was satisfactory; he was not disciplined or warned at any time during his employment. The work hours arrangement Maxwell had with his driv- ers was beneficial to the drivers; the arrangement was more to their benefit than would have been the case had they been paid in strict conformance with the contract and pur- suant to a timeclock procedure. Maxwell's testimony, that he paid the drivers for many days each year when they did not work because of inclement weather, is credited. Max- well's testimony is supported by drivers Bower, Bacigalupi, and Saraiba, who also testified that all drivers, except Can- trell, were pleased with the arrangement they had. The fact that Maxwell is generous with his employees, and has their respect and loyalty, is shown throughout the record. Can- trell acknowledged that Maxwell paid all the drivers, in- cluding him, fully and regularly, even for hours they did not work. Bower, Bacigalupi, and Saraiba readily acknowl- edged that they were in full support of Maxwell and wanted to see him win the case because they believed Cantrell was interfering with a generous and satisfactory arrangement. It also is clear that the few occasions when drivers worked overtime were not burdensome, involved approximately an hour or less, and did not approximate the free paid time they were given. There is little doubt that Cantrell wanted to have his cake and eat it too. He was willing to accept the free paid time Maxwell gave him, but he frequently complained about not being paid for the few overtime hours he worked. Maxwell testified that Cantrell also complained about working over- time, and Cantrell denied that allegation, but that matter is irrelevant. It is clear that Cantrell wanted overtime pay and frequently said so to other drivers and to Maxwell. Cate frequently visited Respondent's plant and talked with the drivers, and Cate had reason to suspect that drivers were not being paid overtime; clearly the Union was aware of some irregularity. However, that fact also is irrelevant since no driver, including Cantrell, complained to the Union un- til Cantrell was discharged. There was no reason for Cate to 15 Spielberg Manufacturing Compan), 112 NLRB 1080 (1955). i' General American Transportalion Company. 228 NLRB 808 (1977). 266 PIONEER CON(CRETE CO. upset an arrangement that was to the drivers' liking and advantage. lie was entitled to infer their satisfaction, in the absence of complaint, particularly in view of the long rec- ord some of the employees had with Respondent.' Finally, the fact that the contract provides for overtime pay is not in dispute, but that fact is not controlling since the question still remains as to whether Maxwell fired Cantrell because of the latter's complaint about failure to receive overtime pay. Even if the contract did not so provide, Cantrell's com- plaint about not being paid for overtime work would consti- tute protected activity. Cantrell was persistent for several years in his claim for overtime pay, but Maxwell apparently was not seriously annoyed by Cantrell's claim and took no retaliatory or dis- ciplinary action against Cantrell. Respondent argues there- from that Maxwell must have fired Cantrell for some reason other than the overtime pay claim. That argument appears at first blush to have some merit. However, events of May 4 and 5. as acknowledged by Maxwell, show Maxwell's initial decision to buy Cantrell's silence about the pay problem and his subsequent reversal of that decision, followed im- mediately b Cantrell's discharge. The issue thus comes down to Maxwell's basic defense, i.e.. that he fired Cantrell only because Cantrell screamed at him during the confron- tation of May 4 and 5. Cantrell testified that Maxwell handed him a check on May 5 that was made out prior to the conversation of that day. Maxwell testified that he made out the check after he fired C('antrell. It is not necessary to resolve this discrepancy. since it is clear from Maxwell's testimony that he had al- ready determined to fire Cantrell and called Cantrell into the office on May 5 for the sole purpose of firing him. Max- well testified: Q. Then on May 5, 1978 did you have a further discussion with Mr. Cantrell? A. Right. I called him in at that time and I said to him "There just is no point in trying to continue here. it is not going to work. Why don't you quietly go on and look for anotherjob. I will not do anything to hurt your unemployment pay." Cantrell's contention that he and Maxwell had quiet con- versations in normal tones of voice on May 4 and 5 is illogi- cal, is contrary to the testimony of Maxwell and Simmons, and is not credited. Further, Saraiba's and Bacigalupi's tes- timony that Cantrell was antagonistic toward Maxwell and intended to confront Maxwell to obtain a final solution to the problem, is credited. It is found that the meetings of Cantrell and Maxwell on May 4 and 5 were acrimonious and probably involved some shouting. However, regardless of the nature of those meetings, it is clear that Cantrell was fired, at least in substantial part, because of his insistence that he be paid overtime according to the union contract. It may well be, as argued by Respondent, that Cantrell was unreasonable and acting contrary to the best interest of other drivers. However, such considerations are irrelevant. The union contract was signed by Maxwell. and is enforce- able in case of breach. Cantrell's discharge, at least partially m FEighteen ?ears in Ihe case i Saribha. because he sought benefits due to him under the contract, swas a violation of the Act. C. 7The 8(t)(l) .4 l/tgtion, The complaint, as amended at the hearing, alleges that in late June or early July 1978 Maxwell asked an employee to obtain a copy of the statement the employee ga'xe to the Board. Bower credibly testified that Maxwell asked him to ob- tain a copy of his statement from the Board. Bower sup- plied the letter of request, addressed to the Board. Maxwell did not deny that testimony. When he asked for the affida- vit, Maxwell did not advise Bower that no reprisals would be taken because of the contents of the affidavit, or because of failure to obtain the affidavit. Nor did Respondent show that it had any particular need for the affidavit, such as a need for reasons of' litigation. Bower was not in a position to refuse to do as asked. Maxwell's actions were in violation of the Act, as alleged." It. ITl i EFFEI (F ilH UNFAIR 1ABOR PRA II t II'()ON ('O()MMIER( Respondent's activities set forth in section III. above, oc- curring in connection with the operations of Respondent described in section I. above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burden- ing and obstructing commerce and the ree flow of corn- merce. I. [Ii RIMIDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair la- bor practices in violation of Section 8(a)( I) and (3) of the Act. I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative actions de- signed to effectuate the policies of the Act. It has been found that Respondent unlawfully discharged Leon Cantrell. I will, therefore, recommend that Respon- dent offer Cantrell his former job or, if that job no longer exists, a substantially equivalent job, without prejudice to his seniority and other rights and privileges, and make him whole for any loss of earnings suffered by reason of the discrimination against him, by payment to him of a sum of money equal to that which he normally would have earned, absent the discrimination, less net earnings during such pe- riod, with interest thereon to be computed in the manner prescribed in F 1:'. Woolworth ('ompan '. 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and 'lorida Steel Corporation. 231 NLRB 651 (1977).2" It will be further recommended that Respondent preserve and make available to the Board, upon request. all payroll records. social security payment records, timecards, ' Biriel Ala.4ska. Inr, 197 NLRB 10i2 19721: (C & I Air (Condirning, Inc., :cKAeon (Construclion. 193 NL.RB 911 (1971); J. J. (Coo Consrucion Company. 203 NLRB 41 (1973) "9 King oui Bowling (orporaurin Missouri. 196 NLRB 390 1972): Dabhreak Lodge Nursing and ('onmaulesent Home, Inc. 230 NLRB 800 (1977). 20 See generall,, Iti Plumhng lcarn, ('o, 138 Nt.RB 716 1962). 267 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD personnel records and reports, and all other records neces- sary and useful to determine the amounts of backpay due and all the rights of reinstatement under the terms of these recommendations. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record, I hereby make the following: CONctLUSIONS OF LAW 1. W. Carter Maxwell, d/b/a Pioneer Concrete Co. is, and at all times material herein has been, an employer en- gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. General Truck Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Union Local 980, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America is, and at all times material herein has been, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By asking an employee to obtain a copy of the em- ployee's Board affidavit, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. By discharging Leon Cantrell on May 5, 1978, be- cause of Cantrell's protected activities, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER" The Respondent, W. Carter Maxwell, d/b/a Pioneer Concrete Co., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: I. Cease and desist from: (a) Interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employ- ees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, by asking an employee to obtain a copy of the employee's affi- davit given to the NLRB. (b) Discharging an employee because of his protected union activity, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (I) of the Act. (c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to self- organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the pur- pose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec- tion as guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, or to refrain from any or all such activities. 2. Take the following affirmative action, which is neces- sary to effectuate the purposes of the Act: (a) Offer Leon Cantrell immediate and full reinstatement 21 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings. conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. to his former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a sub- stantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his se- niority or other rights and privileges, and make him whole for his loss of earnings in the manner set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy." (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents all payroll and other records, as set forth in "The Remedy" section of this Decision. (c) Post at its Santa Rosa, California, operation, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of the attached notice, on forms provided by the Regional Direc- tor for Region 20, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of the Respondent, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicu- ous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that the notices are not altered, de- faced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 20, in writ- ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing at which all sides had the opportunity to present their evidence, an administrative law judge of the National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act, and has ordered us to post this notice. We intend to carry out the Order of the Board. WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act, in violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act, by asking our employees to obtain copies of their affidavits given to the NLRB. WE WILL NOT discharge our employees because of their protected union activity, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through represen- tatives of their own choosing, and to engage in con- certed activities for the purpose of collective bargain- ing or other mutual aid or protection as guaranteed by "22 In the event that this Order is enforced by ajudgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board," 268 PIONEER CONCRETE CO. Section 7 of the Act, or to refrain from any or all such activities. WE WILL offer Leon Cantrell immediate and full re- instatement to his former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position. without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and make him whole for his loss of earnings with inter- est thereon. W. CARTER MAXWELL, D/B/A PIONEER CONCRETE Co. 269