I. Taitel and Son

910 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The unfair labor practices of Local 242 set forth in section III, above , occurring in connection with the operations of the AGC Chapters described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the, several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com- merce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Local 242 has violated Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act, I shall recommend below that the said Local 242 cease and desist from its unfair labor practices and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and on the entire record in this. proceeding, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The AGC Chapters are, and each of them is, an employer within the meaning of Section 2 (2) of the Act. 2. The District Council and Local 242 are, respectively, labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. 3. By restraining and coercing, employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act, as found above, Local 242 has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] Irving Taitel, Ruth Taitel and Jerome Taitel, d/b/a I. TaiteI and Son, a partnership and General Teamsters, Chauffeurs and. Helpers Union, Local No. 298, I. B. T. & H. of A.' Case No. 13-CA-0196. December 14, 195' DECISION AND ORDER On March 13, 1957, Trial Examiner W. Gerard Ryan issued his. Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom- and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Inter- mediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent and the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report, and the Respondent filed a supporting brief? Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Members Murdock, Rodgers, and Bean]. The Board having been notified by the AFL-CIO that it deems the Teamsters' cer- tificate of application revoked by convention action, the identification of this union is. hereby amended. 2 The Respondent requested oral argument. The request is denied, as the record with the exceptions and brief adequately presents the issues and the positions of the parties- 119 NLRB No. 124. I. TAITEL AND SON 911 The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the In- termediate Report, the exceptions and the brief, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom- mendations of the Trial Examiner with the modifications and addi- tions noted below. 1. We find in agreement With the Trial Examiner that the Re- spondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act in violation of Section (a) (1) of the Act by engaging in the following conduct, as detailed in the Intermediate Report : (a) Respondent I. Taitel's threats to employees Ross, Brooks, Bar- nett, Johnson, and Beem that the Respondent would close the plant if the Union succeeded in organizing its employees. (b) Respondent I. Taitel's offer of a supervisory job to employee Ross if he abandoned his activities in behalf of the Union. (c) The unlawful interrogation of employees Ross, Beem, and Beauchamp concerning their union activities by Respondent I. Taitel and his solicitation of their assistance to combat the Union's efforts to organize the plant. (d) Factory Manager Kepler"s conduct in informing employees Ols, Stacey, Cole, Brooks, Beauchamp, and Hamilton of Taitel's threats to close the plant if the Union succeeded in organizing the employees. (e) Kepler's unlawful solicitation of employees Stacey, Ols, Cole, and Brooks to abandon the strike and return to work. 2. We find, as did the Trial Examiner, that on March 17, 1956, and at all times material hereto, the Union represented a majority of the Respondent's employees in the unit found to be appropriate. The parties agree that on March 17 there were 96 employees in the appropriate unit. In support of its claim to majority representation, the Union produced 65 authorization cards of which 49 were identi- fied at the hearing by the employees, whose names appeared thereon, as the cards which they executed before March 17, 1956. We find them to be valid cards.' 3 While the authorization cards of Madeline Allen, Adeline Beauchamp, Bonnie Cole, . Mildred Clemons, Ruth Howard, and Anna Walker are either not dated or were dated by someone other than the employee himself, or misdated, the fact that these cards were signed by the employees concerned before March 17, 1956, was established in each case by their own testimony or other evidence in the record. Accordingly, they are, as found by the Trial Examiner, valid designations. Flora Salyer 's card is dated March 10, 1956 . Salyer testified that she filled out the card , including her name at the top of the card , at her home following -a union meeting held early in March , but forgot to sign it on the signature line, and that later during the strike, when the omission was called to her attention, she did so. Salyer testified that when she filled out the card, it was her intention to join the Union, that subsequently she served on the picket line during the strike, and that she is currently a member of the 912 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD In addition to the 49 cards identified by the employees, who ex- ecuted the same, the General Counsel adduced in evidence 16 other cards, which remained unidentified by the employees who signed them. Except for the card of Russell Beauchamp, on which the date is illegible, all cards bear a date prior to March 17. The Respondent moved to strike these cards from the record on the ground that the signers thereof were not called to testify. This motion, except as to the card of Beauchamp, was denied by the Trial Examiner. We agree. Union representatives testified that these authorization cards were obtained in the course of the Union's organizational campaign in the same manner as the other 49 cards. They testified that early in March they began passing out blank authorization cards at union meetings for the execution by employees present at the meeting. Some extra cards were also given to key employees for distribution to the employees at the plant. After the cards were filled out and signed, some of them in the presence of the witnesses, they were returned to them at a union meeting either by the employees who executed the cards or by the key employees who secured them. The cards so received remained in their possession or under their control until they were admitted in evidence. With the cards in evidence, the Respondent had ample opportunity to check the authenticity of the signatures on the cards by comparing them with the payroll. The Respondent made no contention that the cards were not genuine. Under these circumstances, we are satisfied that the 15 cards' ad- mitted by the Trial Examiner in evidence are valid designations and should be counted together with the other 49 cards in ascertaining the Union's majority status as of March 17 and April 26 when demands for recognition were made by the Union. As the Union produced 64 valid designations in the unit consisting of 96 employees, we find that the Union was the majority representative of the Re- spondent's employees on the above dates. 3. We agree with the Trial Examiner that in denying on March 17, 1956, the Union's request for recognition and insisting upon a Board- directed election, the Respondent was not motivated by any good- faith doubt as to the Union's majority status, but was motivated by a desire to gain time in which to undermine the Union and dissipate its strength, thereby violating Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act. Union. We find, in agreement with the Trial Examiner, that her card is a valid designa- tion as of March 10, 1956. Lura Sands' card is not signed . Sands testified that she filled out the card on March 13, including her name on the top of the card, but forgot to sign her name at the bottom of it. As in the case of Flora Salyer we find, as did the Trial Examiner, that under the circum- stances the absence of her signature on the card does not invalidate her designation of the Union as her bargaining representative. Cf. Bird Machine Company, 65 NLRB 311. 4 The cards of Ella Dixon and Pauline Sitek were further identified by their fellow workers Kenneth Ross and Delona Fugate who testified that they personally secured their cards and then turned them over to Union business Agent Baker. 5 H2inter Engineering Company, 104 NLRB 1016. I. TAITEL AND SON THE REMEDY 913 Although the Trial Examiner found that the Respondent engaged in extensive violations of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act and refused to bargain with the Union in violation of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act, he nevertheless limited his proposed remedy to an order directing the Respondent to cease and desist from the specific unfair labor practices committed by the Respondent. We do not agree. Since the violations of the Act, which the Respondent committed, are persuasively related to other unfair labor practices proscribed by the Act, and the danger of their commission in the future is to be anticipated from the Respondent's conduct in the past, the pre- ventive purposes of the Act will be thwarted unless the order is coextensive with the threat. Therefore, in order to make more effec- tive the interdependent guarantees of Section 7 of the Act, to prevent a recurrence of unfair labor practices, and thereby minimize industrial strife which burdens and obstructs commerce, and thus effectuate the policies of the Act, we will order that the Respondent cease and desist from infringing in any manner upon the rights guaranteed in Sec- tion 7 of the Act. ORDER Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Irving Taitel, Ruth Taitel and Jerome Taitel, d/b/a I. Taitel and Son, a partnership, its agents, successors, and assigns, shall : 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith concerning wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, with General Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Union, Local No. 298, I. B. T. & H. of A., as the exclusive representative of all its employees in the following appropriate unit: All production and maintenance employees employed at the Respondent's plant at Knox, Indiana, excluding janitor-guards, office clerical employees, and all supervisors as defined in the Act. (b) Interrogating employees concerning their membership in or activities on behalf of the above-named Union, or any other labor organization, in a manner constituting interference, restraint, or coercion in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act; threatening to close the plant if the organizational attempt of the Union succeeds; offering inducement or promotion and soliciting employees to return to work, in violation of Section 8 (a) (1). (c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to 476321--58-vol . 119-59 914 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD form labor organizations, to join or assist General Teamsters, Chauf- feurs and Helpers Union, Local No. 298, I. B. T. & H. of A., or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through repre- sentatives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro- tection, or to refrain from any or all of such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the above-named Union as the exclusive representative of all the employees in the appropriate unit, and embody in a signed agreement any understanding reached. (b) Post at its office in Knox, Indiana, copies of the notice attached hereto and marked "Appendix A." 6 Copies of said notice, to be fur- nished by the Regional Director for the Thirteenth Region, shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent or its representative, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and main- tained by it for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for the Thirteenth Region in writing, within ten (10) days from the receipt of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 6In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States ,'.Co'nrt of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order." APPENDIX A NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor. Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that : WE WILL NOT interrogate any of our employees concerning their membership in or activities on behalf of General Teamsters,. Chauffeurs and Helpers Union, Local No. 298, I. B. T. & H. of A., or any other labor organization, in a manner constituting inter- ference, restraint, or coercion in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. I. TAITEL AND SON 915 WE WILL NOT make threats to close the plant or that we will make changes in pay rates, if the employees designate the above Union, or any other labor organization, as their collective-bar- gaining representative. WE WILL NOT offer any inducement or promotion, or solicit employees to abandon a strike and to return to work in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self -organ- ization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist General. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Union, Local No. 298, I. B. T. & H. of A., or any other labor organization, to bargain collec- tively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar- gaining or other aid or protection, and to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organ- ization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. All our employees are free to become or remain members of this Union or any other labor organization. WE WILL bargain collectively upon request with the above- named Union as the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit described herein, with respect to rates of pay, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment, and if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. The bargaining unit is : All production and maintenance employees at our Knox, Indiana, plant, excluding janitor-guards, office clerical em- ployees, and all supervisors as defined in the Act. IRViNG TAITEL, RUTH TAITEL AND JEROME TAITEL, D/B/A I. TAITEL AND SON, A PARTNERSHIP, Employer. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material: INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE Charges having been filed by General Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Union, Local No. 298, herein called the Union, a complaint and notice of hearing having been issued and served by the General Counsel, and an answer having been filed by Irving Taitel,' Ruth Taitel and Jerome Taitel, d/b/a I. Taitel & Son, a partner- 1 The name of the Respondent is hereby corrected pursuant to stipulation. 916 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ship, herein called the Respondent, the hearing involving allegations of unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, herein called the Act,-by the Respondent was held before W. Gerard Ryan, the duly designated Trial Examiner. Before the hearing the Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint because it is based on charges alleging facts not being within the knowledge of the person who signed the charges and therefore hearsay. Trial Examiner John H. Eadie denied the motion in all respects. The Board denied Respondent's request for special permission to appeal. At the hearing the Respondent renewed that motion to dismiss on the grounds that the charges are based on hearsay and therefore not a proper basis for the complaint as they are in violation of Section 10 (b) of the Act and the rules of the district courts apply. I now deny such motion. The Respondent also moved to dismiss paragraph 7-D of the complaint as not based on any charge. I now deny the motion. The Respondent moved further to dismiss the complaint because it has no jurat attached to it. The Respondent argued that because the answer is required to have a jurat it seems to be irregular and dis- criminatory against the Respondent and that the General Counsel's office should not have to attach a jurat to the complaint. The motion is hereby denied. At the end of the General Counsel's case-in-chief, the Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the General Counsel had failed to establish a prima facie case, and also at the end of the case moved for dismissal on the entire record. Both motions are hereby denied. At the hearing full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine wit- nesses, to introduce evidence pertinent to the issues, to argue orally upon the record, and to file briefs, proposed findings and conclusions was afforded all parties. An unopposed motion by the General Counsel to conform the pleadings to the proof with respect to formal matters such as names and dates was granted. Oral argu- ment was waived and briefs have been received from the General Counsel and the Respondent. Upon the entire record in the case and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT The Respondent is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of trousers and jackets. In the course, conduct, and operation of its business, it causes and at all times material herein had caused large quantities of its finished products to be shipped and transported in interstate commerce from its plant at Knox, Indiana, into and through States of the United States other than the State of Indiana. During the calendar year 1955, the value of finished products sold and transported by the Respondent outside the State of Indiana was in excess of $100,000. The complaint alleged, the answer admitted, and I find that the Respondent is and at all times material herein has been engaged in commerce and has affected commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED General Teamsters , Chauffeurs and Helpers Union , Local No. 298, I. B. T. & H. of A., A. F. L.-C. I. 0., is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Violations of Section 8 (a) (1) During the conversation at the Respondent's plant between William C. Jenkins, the union representative, and Jerome Taitel in Knox, Indiana, on March 13, 1956,2 and again later that day in a telephonic conversation between Jenkins and Irving Taitel 3 who was in Louisville, Kentucky, the Respondent learned from Jenkins that the Union was requesting recognition as the bargaining agent for the pro- duction and maintenance workers in the Respondent's plant, and a meeting was arranged to be held by the parties on March 15 in Knox. ' 2 All dates hereinafter mentioned refer to the year 1956 unless otherwise specified. $ Irving Taitel will be hereinafter referred to as Taitel . Whenever his son and partner, Jerome Taitel, is referred to he will be referred to as Jerome Taitel. I. TAITEL AND SON 917 Taitel returned to Knox and on March 14 walked through the plant, greeting and talking to the individual employees. He admitted that the line of conversation he discussed with the employees on that day was, as he expressed it, that with conditions as they are there was not much the Company could do for the employees at that time. On March 14, Taitel shook hands at 11 o'clock in the forenoon with Kenneth Ross who was employed in the cutting room, and said, "Kenny, what's this idea you got in getting this union into the plant?" When Ross replied-that he was not making enough money, Taitel told him he had a big opportunity in the plant and that he was going to let Ross take over Storey's job as head of the cutting department. When Ross replied that he could not live on opportunity alone, Taitel said, "Well, how would you like me to close this plant down and put all these poor old women out of work?" Ross answered that it was not only Ross' idea but that the other people wanted it too, just as well as Ross did. At 2:30 p. m. that same day, Taitel returned to Ross and said, "I am going to leave it up to you, Kenny, whether you close this factory down and put all these poor old women out of work. . . . I am going to leave it all up to you. I'll be back after a while and I want your answer." When Taitel came back later, Ross said, "I am going to stay with the Union." Taitel then said, "Well, this conversation is over with." The above findings are based on the credited testimony of Ross. Taitel admitted that he had a conversation with Ross, but denied that he referred to the Union or closing the plant. Taitel testified that he told Ross he was a good man and was next in line to become head cutter as soon as the present head cutter retired. Taitel further testified that he told Ross the business situation was not good and the Company needed the cooperation of the younger people in the factory to put the business on a sounder foundation. Taitel admitted that Ross was wearing a visible union button like a number of other employees were wearing, but that he did not say anything to Ross about the button. Taitel testified that Ross was being trained for the head cutter's job; that he had not personally told Ross that he was being trained and admitted he does not know definitely what Ross had been told about his future job; but he believes he had been told by Superintendent Kepler and was being trained for it by Jerome Taitel. Kepler testified that he himself had never told Ross that he was being trained for the head cutter's job. Jerome Taitel did not testify. On March 14, Taitel approached Cletus Brooks and asked if Brooks was the mechanic. When Brooks replied that he was, Taitel said, "What's your trouble?" Brooks, who was wearing a union button, replied, "Not enough wages, no paid vacation, nor paid holidays like other places were getting." Taitel asked if that was all and when Brooks replied in the affirmative, Taitel said, "Of course, you realize if the Union gets in here we will have to close this plant down and have to throw these poor old women out of work." To that Brooks replied, "That's the risk we'll have to take." The foregoing findings are based on the credited testimony of Brooks. Taitel testified that in walking through the plant he met the mechanic, Cletus Brooks, for the first time; and that after the usual greetings, he asked Brooks, "How are things?"; that Brooks replied that everything was all right except that he and others were not satisfied with the working conditions and vacations and then asked Taitel if he saw a number of them wearing union buttons. Taitel replied that he had but said it did not make any difference to him because he could not afford any increased costs; that any extra burden on the plant at that time would throw a lot of people out of work. Taitel testified further that he denied asking Brooks if he were with the Union even at the risk of closing the plant and throwing the old people out of work. Taitel admitted referring to the subject of people being out of work but contended it was because of economic conditions and not because of the Union. On March 14, Taitel passed by where Janie Barnett was working at her machine. Barnett was wearing a union button. Taitel said, "I see you have joined the Union." Barnett replied that she had joined, whereupon Taitel asked if she had been forced to do it, and she answered that she had not been forced to join. Taitel then inquired, "What would turn you back to our side?" Barnett did not answer him and then Taitel stated, "Well, I will have to close down" and walked away. The foregoing findings are based on Barnett's credited testimony.. Taitel testified that he had a conversation on March 14 with Barnett, who was one of the girls who complained to him that the rate had been the same for 3 years without an increase, and she asked what he could do for her. Taitel testified that he told her there was nothing he could do right at that time but he would consider it. He testified that he believed she was wearing a union button at the time but denied asking her if she were forced to join the Union. On March 14, Taitel asked employee Edith Johnson, "Are you one of them that is going to help put Taitel out of business?" Johnson asked him what he meant and 918 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD he replied, "You know, the Union is trying to get in." Taitel then asked her if she did not feel sorry for the girls that were working there who had to work, to which Johnson replied that she did not, that they had minds of their own. Taitel said then that he could shut the place down and take it south where people wanted to work. On March 16, Taitel approached the machine where Johnson was working and she asked him if he had met with the Union yesterday. Taitel said that he had but he could not do anything because his lawyer was not there; and then said that the Union "wasn't coming in over his dead body, and that he would do like we did before, work a few days and they will get out." The foregoing findings are based on the credited testimony of Johnson. Taitel testified that he talked with Johnson on March 14; that he said, "How are you?" and she asked how things were going and he replied, "Rough." He testified that he thinks she then said, "Well, don't worry about it." Taitel denied making any statement or any reference to moving the plant south when he spoke to her. He testified that later when he returned from meeting with the Union on March 15 she asked what the outcome was and he said something to her about not having a lawyer-"I have to get a lawyer, and meet Saturday again." Johnson was questioned closely as to whether Taitel had referred to the possibility of closing the plant because the Company was losing money; but she definitely insisted that Taitel had said he could not work the factory under the Union and did not mention the possibility of closing the plant for financial reasons; that neither Superintendent Kepler nor Taitel had said the plant had to close down either. She insisted that Taitel had said he could not work the factory under the Union. Careful analysis of her testimony indicates that she drew a clear line of distinction between having to close the plant at Knox and shutting the plant down and moving it south. On March 14, Taitel stopped employee Arthur Beem, who was wearing a union button, in the hallway, returning from the restroom. Taitel inquired, "Are we still friends?" Taitel then added, "Well, it don't look like it" and then continued, "Well, I am trying to get some of you boys together to help fight this thing." Beem asked what thing Taitel was talking about and he replied, "This union thing." Taitel continued, "If I can't get you boys together and lick this thing, we are going to have to shut the plant down-you know, there is some of these women here that need their jobs." Taitel then asked Beem if he thought the town would be better off if the plant closed down, and Beem replied that he believed it would be. The conversation ended by Taitel saying, "Well, Art, there isn't anything that I can do to make you change your mind about this?" and Beem replied, "No, there isn't." The foregoing findings are based on the credited testimony of Beem. Taitel testified that he spoke with Beem as he passed him and admitted that Beem was wearing a union button. Taitel denied that he said he would close the plant if he could not get any of the boys to fight the Union. The only conversation, according to Taitel's testimony. that he recalls is that he asked Beem, "Are we still friends?" On March 14, Taitel went to the shipping room where employee Donald Hamilton was working, shook hands, and asked how he was getting along. Hamilton replied, "All right." As Taitel started to walk away he noticed a union button that Hamilton was wearing, and Taitel asked, "What is this?" Taitel looked at the button and as he walked away said, "Do you think you can eat that -button?" Hamilton replied that he could try. The foregoing findings are based on the credited testimony of Hamilton. Taitel testified that as he walked through the shipping room he greeted Hamilton, but Hamilton did not reply. Taitel testified that he did not discuss the Union with Hamilton. On March 14, Taitel shook hands with employee Wilson Beauchamp in the ship- ping room and asked Beauchamp if he remembered him. Then Taitel saw the union button that Beauchamp was wearing and asked Beauchamp if he could eat that button. Beauchamp replied that he could if Taitel thought he could make Beau- champ eat it, and that Beauchamp would like it fine. Taitel then left and went to the pressing room with Superintendent Kepler. About 20 minutes later, Taitel returned and called Beauchamp to the stockroom, stating that he wanted to talk with Beauchamp where nobody could hear. Taitel then asked Beauchamp if he was with him. Beauchamp replied that he did not know what Taitel meant. Taitel then said, "Will you help me throw the Union out?" Beauchamp said he would not because he was helping to get the Union in. Taitel then said that if the Union comes in, he was going to close the plant and all those poor old women will be out of work. The foregoing findings are based on the credited testimony of Beauchamp. Taitel testified that when he greeted Beauchamp in the shipping room, Beauchamp said something that Taitel did not hear because his hearing aid was not effective all the time; and as he was going toward Beauchamp to get closer to hear him. he was called to the pressing room by Kepler. so that he (Taitel) did not have a chance to hear what Beauchamp had to say. Taitel denied that he discussed the Union with Beau- I. TAITEL AND SON 919 champ. When Taitel was asked if he commented on the union button that Beau- champ was wearing, Taitel testified, "I don't recall commenting on that, but if I did- if I did, it could have been that with conditions as they are, there isn't much we could do for them at that time; because that was the line of conversation that I discussed that day." Taitel denied that he threatened to close the plant if the Union were successful in its organizing campaign. The Respondent introduced testimony from Lloyd Kepler, office manager (and also referred to as superintendent), that Wilson Beauchamp was in charge of the shipping room and that Kepler considered Beauchamp's position supervisory and that he had told Beauchamp that several times. Kepler testified that Beauchamp did not have authority to hire or fire; but if Beauchamp had a man in the stockroom who did not do the work right, Kepler would listen to him; and if Beauchamp wanted a man to work in that department, the Company would be glad to hire that man. Kepler also referred to an unnamed employee who had been working in the shipping room in the 6 months preceding the hearing who Beauchamp had told him was not doing such a good job; but Kepler could not remember whether he was discharged or had quit. Kepler also testified that another unnamed employee did not get a 5-cent increase at one time because of what Beauchamp had told him. Wilson Beauchamp testified that only he and Donald Hamilton work in the ship- ping room; his title is shipping clerk and Donald Hamilton is a packer. Beauchamp takes the goods that have been ordered and sets them out on shelves. Hamilton's duties are to take the goods set out on the shelves, check with the order, and pack them in boxes. Beauchamp receives $1.30 per hour and Hamilton receives $1 per hour. Although both Hamilton and Beauchamp work in the same room they are separated from each other by approximately the length of the room. Beauchamp testified that he has never been told by management that he had authority to hire, fire, or recommend hiring, firing, or disciplining; that he has never recommended that an employee be disciplined or fired; that his title is shipping clerk and he has never been referred to as superintendent of the shipping room or head of the ship- ping room. I credit Beauchamp's testimony and find that the proof is insufficient to hold that Beauchamp is a supervisor within the meaning of the Act. Lloyd Kepler, the factory manager, and referred to above as the superintendent, admitted that on April 6, while the strike was still on, he called at the home of employee Bonnie Cole and asked her to return to work. While he was talking to Cole, employees Ols and Stacey came in, and Kepler admitted that he asked the three employees to return to work. (As appears, infra, the strike between March 19 and April 10 was an unfair labor strike.) While he was there, Kepler told Cole, Ols, and Stacey that if Taitel could not get the plant on a paying basis he would have to close the plant if they did not get back to work; and that if the Union got into the plant the girls getting higher wages would be cut down to the girls getting lower wages. After he had stated that Taitel could close the plant, Kepler said that he did not care because he had a job in South Bend that he could go to tomorrow if he wanted to. They thereupon asked Kepler if he had that job in South Bend why did he not take it and keep out of their hair. The foregoing findings are based on the credited testimony of Ols, Stacey, and Cole. Kepler testified that he may have made the statement at Cole's home that Taitel might be forced to close the plant, but he insisted that he did not say that if the Union comes in Taitel would have to close because he could not pay union wages. Kepler testified that the girls asked him what he would do if the factory shut down, and he said he probably would go to work in South Bend. He admitted that he may have made the statement that he could go to work at South Bend the next morning but does not remember making it. Kepler also admitted that he asked Ols and Stacey to return to work. Kepler also admitted that during the strike he visited the home of employee Cletus Brooks and asked him to return to work. Kepler testified that he also told him he wished that Brooks would bring back some of the boys in the cutting room as the Company needed them "real bad." Kepler also told Brooks that if an election were held and Brooks wanted to vote for the Union that would be well and good. During the conversation, Kepler and Brooks discussed the Union, union shops, and the strike. Kepler stated to Brooks that he did not know Taitel like Kepler did; that if this went on much longer, he was afraid that both he and Brooks would be looking for jobs. The foregoing findings are based on the credited testimony of Brooks and the admissions of Kepler. On April 13, after the strike had ended, Donald Hamilton was present at a con- versation between Wilson Beauchamp and Kepler in front of the plant. Hamilton and Beauchamp were at work fixing the awnings in front of the plant. Kepler looked up at the wornout sign "I. Taitel & Son" and remarked that he wished he knew what the outcome would be, and he would put up a new sign. Beauchamp asked Kepler 920 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD what he meant and Kepler replied, "Well , if the union comes in the plant is going to close down." The foregoing findings are based on the credited testimony of Hamilton and Beauchamp . Kepler testified that with reference to the conversation about the sign he told Hamilton and Beauchamp that if everything straightened out and business was good, and we stayed in business , we would probably put another sign up. Kepler testified that the words "if everything straightens out" had no ref- erence to the union problems and that he did not use the words "If I only knew the outcome." Kepler denied that he made any reference at all to the Union during that conversation. Conclusions Based upon the above findings and the entire record, I conclude that the Re- spondent violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act by Taitel threatening employees Ross, Brooks, Barnett, Johnson, and Beem that the plant would close; by Taitel illegally interrogating employees Johnson and Ross about their union activity with the intention of discouraging union activity ; by Taitel offering Ross a supervisory job after first asking Ross why he got the Union in the plant; by Kepler informing employees Ols, Stacey, Cole, Brooks, Beauchamp , and Hamilton that Taitel threat- ened he would close the plant if the Union were successful ; by Kepler threatening employees Stacey, Ols , and Cole with changes in their pay if the Union succeeded; and by Kepler illegally soliciting employees Stacey, Ols, Cole, and Brooks to abandon their strike and return to work. B. The refusal to bargain 1. The appropriate unit At no time during the organizational campaign or during the hearing did the Re- spondent question the propriety of the production and maintenance employees, with the usual exclusions , constituting an appropriate unit. Furthermore, the Respondent admitted that it had never had a collective -bargaining agreement with any of its plants except at the present location in Knox, Indiana, and that unit then was for production and maintenance employees . The Board traditionally finds a produc- tion and maintenance unit to be an appropriate unit, absent unusual situations which are not present here. Accordingly, I find that all production and maintenance employees at the Knox, Indiana, plant of the Respondent , excluding office clerical employees, guards, professional employees , and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute and at - all times material herein did constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act. 2. The majority It was stipulated that the unit found to be appropriate had 99 employees during the week ending Saturday, March 17. Three employees-Janton, Robinson, and Wade-must be excluded because they were janitor-guards . Thus out of the re- maining 96 employees 49 would constitute a majority. It was further stipulated that March 16 was the last day worked before the strike on Monday, March 19. The majority of the employees in the unit includes, but is not limited to, the following 49 employees who selected the Union to be their statutory bargaining agent before the meeting between the Union and the Respondent at 11 o'clock in the forenoon of March 17: Madeline Allen,4 Stella Allen, Agnes Anderson, Mabel Anderson (committeeman ), Janie Barnett, Adeline Beauchamp,5 Wilson Beau- champ, Arthur Beem (committeeman ), Delbert Beem, Florence Bradley, Harles Bradley (committeeman ), Lorraine Bradley,6 Cletus Brooks (committeeman ), Sophie Brown, Jean Burnett , Bonnie Cole ,7 Irene Cole, Vechie Clark, Mildred Clemons,& Thomas Dever, Bertha Dietz, Barbara Earl, Delma Jean Fugate (committeeman), 4 Madeline Allen's card bears no date but she signed it in early March after filling it out at home, and she wore a union button at work in the plant. 6 Adeline Beauchamp 's card bears no date but she signed it at least 3 weeks before the strike at the second union meeting at the Home Hotel and she wore a union button at work in the plant. 8 Lorraine Bradley's card admitted into evidence by stipulation. 7 Bonnie Cole signed her card which is dated March 6. She testified she was not sure about the date but that she signed it on the day the plant worked one -half day before the strike. It was stipulated that March 16 was that day. 8 Mildred Clemons testified she signed the card on her second day of work. It was stipulated that she was hired on March 9. She therefore signed the card on March 10. I. TAITEL AND SON 921 Lois Haddix, Lorena Hale, Donald Hamilton, Ruth Howard,9 Margie Lee Jackson, Edith Johnson, Marie Kalva,10 Annabelle Lambert," Jean Ols, Patty Ols, Geneva Osborne, Purlie Peters, Ila Puckett, Catherine Ritchie, Kenneth Ross (committee- man), Violet Rudd, Flora Salyer,12 Lura Sands,13 Grace Savage, Beth Ann Scutch- field, Samuel Scutchfield, Frances Sohne, Freda Stacey, Ethel Tolson, Anna Walker,14 and Bertha Williams. In addition to the foregoing 49 cards, there are other cards including 16 cards, 9 of which are dated on or before March 12, 3 dated March 13, and 3 dated March 14, all of which the Respondent has moved to strike because the signers thereof were not called to testify' 15 The motion is granted as to the card of Russell John Beauchamp because the date thereon is illegible but the motion is denied as to the remaining 15 cards. (Hunter Engineering Company, 104 NLRB 1016 at 1020.) Several other witnesses testified they signed cards but never notified the Union they had withdrawn their authorizations. The Respondent contends that the authorization cards are invalid because: The employees were coerced into signing them in view of the fact that they had heard or had been told that if they did not sign then it would cost them $25 later; dues or initiation fees were not paid and membership cards were not sent to employees; some cards are not dated or if dated were signed on dates other than what is shown on the cards; and some cards did not contain the name of the Local when they were signed. The first contention is without merit. The union policy with respect to the $25 initiation fee is that such fee is waived until the Union is successful in obtaining a collective-bargaining agreement. Employees joining after that is accomplished pay the initiation fees. The Board has stated: "The practice of offering special reduced initiation fees during a union's organizational campaign has been traditionally used by unions to attract new members. The Board has held that such a practice during a preelection campaign does not in and of itself interfere with the conduct of an election." The Gruen Watch Company, 108 NLRB 610 at 612. Nor does the fact that dues or initiation fees were not paid and membership cards not sent to em- ployees invalidate the designations of the Union. The Board in Geigy Company, 99 NLRB 822, 823, stated: "Cards, whether or not binding upon the employees as application for membership in the union, constituted valid designations of the union as the bargaining representative of the employees. That is all the Act requires." The Respondent's contention that some cards are invalid because they did not con- tain the number of the Local is without merit. In Dolores, Inc., 98 NLRB 550, the Board held: "Nor does the fact that some of the cards bore only the name of the CIO, with the space allocated for designation of the international union left blank, derogate from the authority of the United Paperworkers of America, CIO, to rep- resent the employees." The fact that some cards are not dated or are misdated is not fatal if, as here, by credible testimonial evidence the date is established by ref- erence to other known events, e. g., that the cards were executed prior to the strike or during the time the plant was operating prior to the strike which in this case included March 16. Thus credible testimony that employees executed their cards while working and/or wore union buttons at work established that such cards were executed prior to March 17. Accordingly, I find that on or about March 13, 1956, and at all times material there- after, a majority of the employees in the unit found to be appropriate in fact had designated and selected the Union to be their representative for the purposes of col- lective bargaining. 9 Ruth Howard's card is dated March 13. She testified that she signed it on the last day the plant worked before the strike. She therefore signed it on March 16. 10 Marie Kalva's card is signed Marion D. Kalva. 11 Annabelle Lambert's card admitted into evidence by stipulation. 12 Flora Salyer's card is dated March 10. She made it all out, because she wanted to Join the Union, at her home on a Saturday, the day following a union meeting which she had been unable to attend. Later when it was called to her attention that she had neglected to sign the card she signed it. The card is valid. 13 Lura Sands' card is not Signed but she filled it out in her own handwriting on March 13 and wanted to join the Union. The absence of her signature under these circum- stances does not invalidate her choice of the Union. 14 Anna Walker's card is dated March 12. She did not put the date on the card but she signed the card at a union meeting, held on March 12. 19 Ellen Dixon, Pauline Sitek, Addle (Adele) Scutchfield, Leola Cole, Dora Barnett, Ellis Wagers, Irene Boyko, Evelyn Ann Bailey, Phyllis Mary Burkett, Ray Morris Clark, Carrie C. Collins, Helen J. Hoover, Shelby Jean Rowe, Albert Meiser, Betty L. White, and Russell John Beauchamp. 922 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Stella Ruzas and Goldie Holbrook are the only 2 employees out of 67 who testified for the General Counsel and the Respondent that they were told by coemployees that if they did not sign authorization cards they would lose their jobs. Holbrook did not sign an authorization card. Ruzas testified that she was told by Wilson Beauchamp when he asked her to sign a card. Ruzas is Lithuanian who does not read or write English. When her testimony is analyzed it is questionable whether she testified that Beauchamp actually told her she would lose her job or, whether that was her own conclusion misinterpreting what he said. When she quoted 'him directly, she made no mention of his stating in words that she would lose her job. Only when she used indirect discourse is it difficult to determine if he said it or if she concluded that she would lose her job. She testified that Beauchamp made her sign the card, as follows: Q. He made you sign?-A. Yes, he told me-scared me-I have to pay $25; if I don't I'd be out of the place. On cross-examination, she testified: Q. You testified that Wilson Beauchamp made you sign the card; is that correct?-A. That is correct. Q. Did he take your hand, physically, place it on the card, and have you sign it?-A. No, he did not. You see- Q. Just answer my questions, if you please. Did Mr. Beauchamp physi- cally threaten you with harm if you did not sign the card?-A. He said, if I don't sign, that was the last time-if I don't sign, it would be $25. I told him, "Give me a chance." I didn't talk to nobody. Nobody would talk at the factory. When we were going home-I was riding with him and his wife. He said, "would you sign for union?" I said, "How come? What is about it?" He said, "Today is the last day." I said, "Give me time-until tomorrow." He said, "Tomorrow too late." It would be $25. He wanted me to go in his house, but I wouldn't go. So we went to my daughter's. He went home, got the card, he filled it at my daughter's house and told me to sit down and write, and I wrote it. Q. You signed the card?-A. I signed the card. Q. Wilson Beauchamp did not threaten you physically with any harm? He didn't say, "If you do not sign the card, I am going to beat you up?"-A. No, he didn't. He told me if I didn't sign, it would be $25. Q. The only statement he made was with reference to the $25 initiation fee?-A. Or else, I wouldn't work. He said, "Today is the last day. Every- body signed." Ruzas continued to testify that the card was signed in the presence of her daughter and son-in-law. I do not believe Ruzas' testimony is sufficiently reliable to support a finding that Beauchamp told her if she did not sign, she would lose her job. Certainly her exaggerated testimony that he "made" her sign and "scared" her is not supported by anything she says he did. In any event I have not counted her card in finding a majority had designated the Union. The facts in this case are so different from the situation in Puerto Rico Food Products Corporation, 111 NLRB 293, that the decision therein has no application here. There is no evidence in this record that any union official made any threats of any nature. 3. The Union's request for recognition and the Respondent's refusal On March 13, William C. Jenkins, the president and business representative of the Union, testified that he and Thomas Baker, a business representative and organizer of Teamsters Union Local 298, with a committee of four employees, went to the Respondent's plant and told Jerome Taitel that the Union had a majority of the production and maintenance employees signed as members of the Union, and that the Union would like to have recognition and negotiate a contract.ls Jerome Taitel replied that he had no authority to make any commitments, decisions, or even discuss anything relative to the personnel in the plant, or labor relations; that all labor relations business was handled by his father, Irving Taitel. Jerome Taitel gave Jenkins the telephone number where his father could be reached in Louisville. Jenkins telephoned there and left word for Taitel to telephone. Jerome Taitel also M Jerome Taitel did not testify. I. TAITEL AND SON 923 telephoned to his father and informed him that Jenkins of the Teamsters Union wanted to meet with him. Taitel telephoned to Jenkins that same day at Michigan City, Indiana, and was told that Jenkins would be at Knox, Indiana, at the Home Hotel that afternoon about 4 o'clock. Taitel telephoned there at 4 o'clock and conversed with Jenkins. Jenkins testified that he told Taitel the Union had a majority of the production and maintenance employees signed as members of the Union. Jenkins testified that he does not believe Taitel made any reply to that; that this discussion was in reference to setting up a meeting between them. Jenkins testified that Taitel offered to meet him alone in the office of Taitel's attorney which Jenkins refused but countered with the suggestion that Taitel bring his attorney to a meeting in Knox with the union committee. A meeting was arranged for March 15 in Knox. At the meeting held on March 15, Irving Taitel and Lloyd Kepler, the plant man- ager, met with Jenkins, Baker, and a committee of about 10 employees. Jenkins testified that he spoke to Taitel and reiterated, more or less, the conversation he had had with Taitel on the telephone the day previous, that the Union had a majority of the production and maintenance employees signed as members of the Union, and that they wished to have recognition by the Company and negotiate a con- tract; but the only answer Taitel made was that he could not answer without advice of counsel. Jenkins testified that he then reminded Taitel of their telephonic con- versation on March 13, wherein he had told him to bring his counsel to the meet- ing but the only answer from Taitel was that he could not answer without advice of counsel. A meeting was thereupon scheduled for Saturday, March 17, at 11 a. m. On March 17, the meeting was held in the forenoon. Those present included Irving Taitel, George Rose, attorney for the Respondent, and Kepler on behalf of the Respondent; and Jenkins, Baker, and the employee-committee of approximately 10 employees for the Union. The Union requested recognition on the basis of a majority of the employees in the unit. Rose questioned whether or not the Union represented a majority whereupon Jenkins offered the signed cards to Rose to check the authenticity of the signatures with the payroll. Rose refused to check the cards and then stated that he wanted an election by the National Labor Relations Board. Jenkins then suggested an election under State auspices or conducted by a neutral person. When the suggestion was rejected, the Union proposed and ex- pressed its willingness to enter into an agreement for a consent election to be con- ducted by the Board. That was also refused by the Respondent. No reason was given by the Respondent for insisting on a Board-ordered election. While the Respondent claimed in its paid newspaper advertisement on March 20, which was distributed to nearly all the employees, that it could not recognize the authorization cards as proof of the Union's majority because threats had been made that em- ployees who had not joined the Union would have to pay $25 later, such reason was not asserted by the Respondent at the meeting of March 17. At the meeting on March 17, Taitel, although refusing recogntion, inquired of the Union what its bargaining demands were. The Union refused to divulge its demands unless the Respondent recognized it as the bargaining representative. Notwithstanding that proper refusal, Taitel offered to show the Company's books and records to the Union as proof of the Company's weak financial position because, as Taitel testified, he feared that the Union would demand salary increases. When the Respondent refused to reconsider its position that the Union prove its majority through a Board- ordered election, the meeting ended. The strike for recognition began on March 19 and continued until April 10 when the employees returned to work. In a letter dated April 26, the Union again demanded recognition and requested the Respondent to bargain with it. The Respondent failed to reply. Conclusion The question presented is whether the Respondent was motivated by a good- faith doubt as to the Union's majority at the time it refused recognition and insisted on a Board-ordered election. If the Respondent acted in good faith, then the complaint in that respect should be dismissed; but if, instead of a good-faith doubt, it was motivated by a desire to gain time in which to undermine the Union's majority by unlawful means, then it has failed to bargain in good faith as required by the Act. The Board has stated in KTRH Broadcasting Company, 113 NIRB 125, that there is no simple yardstick by which a good- or bad-faith determination can be made; and that all the evidence must be weighed in the particular case, including the character and extent of the unfair labor practices and the sequence of events, before a finding of good or bad faith refusal to bargain is made. At the meeting on March 17, after the Union had requested and the Respondent had denied recogni- 924 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tion, Taitel requested the Union to make known its bargaining demands. The Union refused to make any bargaining demands until the Respondet recognized it as bargaining representative. Taitel testified that he offered to open the books and records of the Respondent to the Union to show the Company's alleged weak financial condition because he feared the Union would make a demand for salary increases . That indicates that Taitel was more concerned with what the Union would demand as bargaining agent if the Company recognized it than he was with whether the Union had its claimed majority. There was no question of jurisdiction raised nor was the appropriateness of the unit discussed. When the Union demanded recognition, the Respondent first questioned the Union's claim that it represented a majority and then rejected the Union's proffer of the authorization cards for verification; rejected the Union's suggestion that an election be conducted by some outside neutral agency, such as a public official or clergyman; rejected the Union's proposal for a consent election to be conducted by the Board; and, adamantly, insisted upon a Board-ordered election. Taitel did not mention to the Union at the meeting of March 17 that the reason the Respondent was not accepting the authorization cards as proof of majority was that the employees had been coerced into signing them because threats had been made that employees who did not join would have to pay $25 later. Although Taitel testified on direct examination that "there were reasons for preferring the hearing by the NLRB and a secret vote" and that their reasons were discussed for "most of an hour" at the March 17 meeting, the record does not disclose what reasons, if any, were discussed. Taitel testified that his position during the March 17 meeting was best evidenced by a paid commercial advertisement which was published on March 20 and which stated that the "Company could not accept the cards . as various pressure . it means threats have been made that em- ployees who do not join now, will have to pay $25 later when the Union comes in." That this was an afterthought is shown by Taitel's testimony: Q. At the time you met on March 17, with Mr. Jenkins, and the Union negotiating committee, was anything said about $25. Did you ask Mr. Jenkins, "I have heard rumors about $25 being paid." Is that true, Mr. Jenkins?- A. No, nothing was said. The Respondent had further evidence of a visual nature that a majority of the employees in the unit supported the Union when the strike began on March 19. This majority support continued while the strike lasted until April 10 when all employees were returned to work. The Board has held that majority support of a strike is evidence that the Union represented a majority. Seven Up Bottling Com- pany of Miami, 92 NLRB 1622, enfd. 196 F. 2d 424 (C. A. 5). Notwithstanding such evidence, the Respondent did not reply to the Union's further demand for recognition contained in its letter dated April 26. While the Board found no Section 8 (a) (5) violation in Sunset Lumber Products, 113 NLRB 1172 at 1176, where it relied in part on the fact that the Respondent did not commit any unfair labor practice subsequent to the Union's request for recognition , the converse situation is presented in the case at bar in that almost immediately following the Union' s request for recognition on March 13, the unfair labor practices violative of Section 8 (a) (1), as found above, began on March 14 and continued throughout and after the strike. In view of all the foregoing, and particularly in view of the Respondent's conduct of interference, restraint, and coercion, violative of Section 8 (a) (1) as found, the conclusiori is inescapable to me, and I find, that the Respondent did not in good faith insist that the Union prove its majority in a Board-ordered election, but was motivated by a desire to gain time in which to undermine the Union and dissipate its strength. I accordingly find that at all times on and after March 17, 1956, the Respondent has refused to bargain in good faith with the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in the appropriate unit, thereby violating Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act. While the Union demanded recognition on March 13 and 15, the Union on March 13 agreed to a meeting with Taitel on March 15; and on March 15 the meeting was adjourned to March 17 so that the Respondent could have legal counsel present. I have therefore fixed the date as March 17 when the Respondent refused to bargain instead of March 13 or 15. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in con- nection with the operations of the Respondent described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the ANDOR COMPANY, INC. 925 several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com- merce and the free flow thereof. V. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. General Teamsters , Chauffeurs and Helpers Union, Local No. 298, I. B'. T. & H. of A., A. F. L.-C. I. 0., is a labor organization within the meaning of Section. 2 (5) of the Act. 2. All production and maintenance employees of the Respondent at its Knox, Indiana, plant excluding watchmen -janitors or janitor-guards, office clerical em- ployees, and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act. 3. The above-named Union was on March 13, 1956 , and since that date has been at all times the exclusive representative of all employees in the aforesaid ap- propriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Sec- tion 9 (a) of the Act. 4. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. 5. By refusing on March 17, 1956, and at all times thereafter , to bargain collec- tively with the above-named Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in the aforesaid appropriate units, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act. 6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce, within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] Andor Company, Inc. and Jose P. Feliciano, Petitioner and Local 229, United Textile Workers of America, AFL-CIO. Case No. 2-UD-33. December 14, 1957 DECISION AND DIRECTION OF ELECTION Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (e) of the National Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before Julian J. Hoffman, hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.' Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds : 1. The. Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.2 ' At the hearing , the Union objected to the hearing officer's granting the Petitioner permission to amend its petition by adding the term "Inc ." to the name of the Employer listed thereon, and by adding the term "AFL-CIO" after the name of the Union. As the amendments seek to correct merely technical defects in the names of the Employer and the Union , and as there is no showing that these parties have been prejudiced thereby, the Union 's objection is overruled. See United States Plywood Corporation, 112 NLRB 1471, 1472-73. The names of the Employer and the Union are accordingly amended. 2 The Union asserts that the Employer is not engaged in commerce and that the Board should decline to exercise jurisdiction over it. The record discloses that during the annual period material to this proceeding , the Employer furnished belts valued in excess 119 NLRB No. 120.