Vinyl Craft Fence Co.

VINYL CRAFT FENCE CO. Andrew Craft, a sole proprietor d/b/a Vinyl Craft Fence Co. and United Steelworkers of America. Cases 25-CA-9588 and 25-CA-9588-2 March 29, 1979 NA An Age DECISION AND ORDER After a hea BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS nity to pres AND MURPHY ine witness, the Nation On November 21, 1978, Administrative Law Judge dered to po George F. McInerny issued the attached Decision in I Wl this proceeding. Thereafter. Respondent filed excep- or oth tions. becaus Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the tion 7 National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- give te tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- Board thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. I wI The Board has considered the record and the at- restrai tached Decision in light of the exceptions, and has of the decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclu- Natiot sions' of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt I wl his recommended Order, as modified herein. reinsta longer ORDER tion, otherr Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor make Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela- have s tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Or- terest. der of the Administrative Law Judge, as modified be- I w low, and hereby orders that the Respondent, Andrew crimin Craft, a sole proprietor d/b/a Vinyl Craft Fence Co., Kokomo, Indiana, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said rec- ommended Order as so modified: 1. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a) and reletter the subsequent paragraphs accordingly: "(a) Offer George Pyke immediate and full rein- statement to his former job or, if his job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without GEORGE prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or privi- tteeesult of leges previously enjoyed, and make him whole for alleging tha alleging tha any loss of earnings he may have suffered by reason discharged ( of Respondent's discrimination against him in the ruary 15. I manner and to the extent set forth in the section here charge alleg entitled "The Remedy." nated again: 2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the gion 25 of t Administrative Law Judge. complaint he etor d/b/a Respondent. (3), and (4 amended, he coercing his 'In his remedy the Administrative Law Judge inadvertently failed to cite by denying i F W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), for the forumla used in the computation of a backpay award. We therefore modify his remedy to in- dent, in his clude the citation. labor practii 607 APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE ,TIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ency of the United States Government tring in which all parties had the opportu- ent evidence and examine and cross-exam- es, it has been decided that I have violated al Labor Relations Act. I have been or- ost this notice and to comply with its terms. ILL NOT discharge, deny wage increases to, erwise discriminate against my employees se they engage in activity protected by Sec- of the National Labor Relations Act or estimony to the National Labor Relations LL NOT in any other manner interfere with, n, or coerce my employees in the exercise rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the ial Labor Relations Act. ILL offer George Pyke immediate and full itement to his former job or, if his job no exists, to a substantially equivalent posi- vithout prejudice to his seniority or any rights or privileges previously enjoyed, and him whole for any loss of earnings he may uffered by reason of his discharge, plus in- ILL make Ralph Ryan whole for any dis- ation suffered by him, plus interest. NDREW C. CRAFT, A SOLE PROPRIETOR /B/A VINYL CRAFT FENCE CO. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE F. MCINERNY, Administrative Law Judge: As a charge filed on January 24. 1978, by United s of America, herein referred to as the Union, t Vinyl Craft Fence Co. had discriminatorily 3eorge Pyke: an amended charge filed on Feb- 978, by the Union: and a second amended ling that Vinyl Craft Fence Co. had discrimi- st Ralph Ryan; the Regional Director for Re- he National Labor Relations Board issued the erein, alleging that Andrew Craft, a sole propri- Vinyl Craft Fence Co., herein referred to as or the Company, had violated Section 8(a)(1), ) of the National Labor Relations Act, as erein referred to as the Act, by threatening and employees; by discharging George Pyke; and Ralph Ryan increases in his wage rate. Respon- answer, denied the commission of any unfair ces. 241 NLRB No. 95 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held on this complaint in Kokomo, Indiana, on July 6, 7, and 31, 1978. All parties were represented. presented evidence, examined, and cross- examined witnesses. Following the hearing the General Counsel and Respondent submitted briefs which have been carefully examined. Upon the entire record in this proceeding, including my observation of the witnesses, I hereby make the following: FIND)IN(S OF FACT 1. ITHE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT The Respondent, Andrew Craft, is a sole proprietor doing business as Vinyl Craft Fence Co. At all times mate- rial herein he has maintained his principal office and place of business in Kokomo, Indiana, where he is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of vinyl coated chain link fencing. During the year prior to the issuance of the com- plaint herein Respondent sold manufactured products val- ued in excess of $50,000 to purchasers who themselves are engaged in interstate commerce. The complaint alleges, Re- spondent admits, and I find that he is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. II. HE LABOR ORGANIZATION The United Steelworkers of America is a labor organiza- tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. IHE UNFAIR LABOR PRA(cTICES A. Background In December 1976, George Pyke. who had been em- ployed by Respondent since March of that same year, en- gaged in discussions with his fellow employees Ryan, Loy. Zwickey, and Tate concerning a union. At a result. Pyke contacted one Breedon. a representative of the Steelwork- ers, and was referred, in turn, to the Union International Field Staff Representative Carl N. Morris. A meeting was set up on December 31, at which Pyke, Ryan, Tate, Loy, and an employee named Trotti signed union cards. On receiving the signed cards, the Union filed a petition, in Case 25-RC-6517. on January 10, 1977, for a unit of production and maintenance employees of Respondent. Following a stipulated election on June 9, 1977, at which Pyke served as the observer for the Union, challenges to a number of ballots were heard on September 6, 1977, and resolved by the Board in an unpublished decision dated April 19, 1978. The Union was certified as the exclusive representative of certain of Respondent's employees on May 16, 1978.' While the representation case was making its way through the processes of the Board, unfair labor practice charges were filed against Respondent2 which resulted in ' There are no questions as to the appropriateness of the unit, or of any refusal to bargain in good faith. The documents concerning the representa- tion case were received to assist the trier of fact in plotting the courses of two concurrent streams of events. 2 This case is identified in the General Counsel's brief as Case 25-CA- 8579 but in the record as Cases 25 CA 8578 and 25 CA-8578-2. the issuance of a complaint, and the scheduling of a hearing some time in May 1977, where a settlement was reached. Certain employees of Respondent, including Pyke and Ryan appeared at the hearing, but the record does not re- veal whether they in fact testified or whether the settlement was reached prior to their taking the witness stand. The record in this case is clear, however, that Ryan and Pyke did testify at the hearing on challenged ballots on Septem- ber 6, 1977. B. The Alleged 8(a)(1) Conduct The General Counsel introduced evidence of Respon- dent's activities in the period between the filing of the peti- tion in Case 25-RC-6517 on January 10, 1977, and the settlement agreement in May of that year. Respondent ob- jected to the admission of this evidence on the grounds that its receipt was foreclosed by Respondent's execution of, and compliance with, the settlement agreement: and, further, that all of the evidence proffered concerned events which had occurred more than six months before the filing of the charges in this case. At the hearing I indicated my views to Respondent's Counsel on this matter and urged him to furnish me with citations to authorities supportive of his position. This he has done, and, in fairness, I have carefully studied the au- thorities he has cited. However, I am of the opinion that the law on events occurring prior to the 6-month statute of limitations contained in Section 10(b) of the Act has been definitively settled by the Brian case,3 which itself is cited in Respondent's brief. In arguing that Section 10(b) prohibits consideration of Respondent's conduct occurring more than 6 months prior to the charge, Respondent cites Knickerbocker Manufactur- ing Company, Inc., 109 NLRB 1195 (1954); Indiana Metal Products Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 202 F.2d 613 (1953); and Olin Industries, Inc., 97 NLRB 130 (1951). Aside from the fact that all of these cases were decided before Bryan, it is clear that the proposition they stand for is that Section 10(b) bars use by the General Counsel or the Board of events which occurred prior to the 6-month period as the basisforfindings of unfair labor practices. In the instant case, the evidence was offered by the General Counsel and received by me not for the purpose of establishing violations of law, but to es- tablish an attitude or character in order to illuminate and to furnish a background for later events. The findings I make must be based on those later events. Thus my ruling is not inconsistent with the authorities cited by Respondent. With respect to the effect of the prior settlement agree- ment on the receipt of evidence as to events which were a part of prior charges, complaints, and settlements, Respon- dent has cited two categories of authorities. The first series of cases stands for the proposition that the Board cannot, or will not, make findings concerning independent allegations of violations occurring prior to the settlement agreement: Independent Life and Accident Co. d/bla Herald Life Insur- ance Comrpany, 227 NLRB 1546 (1977); Teamsters, Chauf- feurs, Helpers and Taxicab Drivers, Local 32 7, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware- Local Lodge No. 1424. International Association of Machinists, A FL-CIO, et al. v. V.LR B. 362 U. S. 411 (1960). reversing 264 F.2d 574 (1959). 608 VINYL CRAFT FENCE CO. housemen and Helpers of America (Greer Stop Nut Co., a Division of Kaynar Mfg. Co., Inc.), 160 NLRB 1919 (1966); and Eveready Garage, Inc., 126 NLRB 13 (1960). Here again, I must emphasize that the evidence in ques- tion was not received by me for purpose of making findings based thereon, nor do I make such findings. Respondent's reliance on these authorities is thus misplaced. The second group of cases dealing with settlements holds that a settlement agreement, in and of itself, is not evidence of hostility of antiunion animus and may not be used as the basis for such a finding. Poray, Inc., 143 NLRB 617 (1963), enfd. 337 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir., 1964); Southwest Chevrolet Corp., 194 NLRB 975 (1972); Local No. 92, International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO (R. W. Hughes Construction Co., Inc.) 138 NLRB 428 (1962); Raymond Buick, Inc., 173 NLRB 1292 (1967); Lincoln Bearing Co.,' 133 NLRB 1069 (1961), vacated 311 F.2d 48 (6th Cir. 1962); Bangor Plastics, 156 NLRB 1165 (1966), enforcement denied 392 F.2d 772 (6th Cir., 1967). In the instant case, of course, there has been no attempt by the General Counsel to use the fact of the settlement agreement as evidence of antiunion animus, and these cases are inapposite to the issue here.5 Accordingly, in reliance upon Bryan, supra, I find that evidence of animus and hostility occurring more than 6 months prior to the filing of the instant charges in January 1978 may be used to establish that such attitudes existed. Further, in reliance on Northern California District Coun- cil of Hodcarriers and Common Laborers of America, A FL- CIO, et al., 154 NLRB 1384 (1965), affd. 389 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1968), 1 find that the Board's policy with respect to presettlement activities is that such conduct may be consid- ered in assessing post-settlement actions of a Respondent. Accordingly, the credible and undenied testimony of Ste- ven E. Tate, James Loy, Jr., George Pyke, and Ralph Ryan concerning the activities of John Craft, Respondent's son and plant manager, is accepted as an accurate representa- tion of events which took place in January 1977, and shows that, at that time, by interrogating employees about their union activities; by threatening employees with reprisals for their union activity; by laying off Ralph Ryan: and by dis- charging George Pyke, Respondent demonstrated anti- union animus and hostility toward his employees' attempt to organize. In addition to these events, Ralph Ryan testified that sometime between July 10 and 20, 1977, John Craft told him that "the Union is not going to get in," and that Re- spondent was going to get rid of "every one of you that signed a union card" as soon as he had a chance.' This conversation is also outside the 6-month period prior to the instant charge, but it is an indication that, despite the settle- 'This case really concerned the issue of the Board's right to set aside a settlement agreement in the absence of post-settlement violations. 5 Fanr Milling Co., 360 U. S. 301 (1959), was cited by Respondent, but that case has nothing to do with the issues herein. 6 This conversation was not specifically denied by John Craft, although he did deny that he had spoken to any employees about "union activities of any sort." I do not credit Crafi's testimony on material issues. His memory was inaccurate, and his denials of threats or other coercive conduct were made in response to leading questions by Respondent's counsel in a conclusionary and unconvincing fashion. Ryan, on the other hand, impressed me as a credible, candid witness. ment of the prior charges, Respondent's hostility and ani- mus remained. Following the hearing on challenged ballots on Septem- ber 6, 1977, George Pyke was at work at the plant on Sun- day, September 11. At this time John Craft came up to him and with an obscenity, told Pyke he would like to bust his head open "with a steel pipe." Craft went on to say that Pyke was in the wrong crowd, that he should run around with a better crowd, and that he was just going along with the crowd to "get the union," adding that the reason Pyke had not received a raise was "because of the union."' C. The Discharge of George Pke Pyke was hired by Respondent in March 1976. He worked as a truck loader and as a fence-weaving machine operator. He started at the rate of $2.50 per hour. After 8 or 9 weeks he was raised to $3 and to $3.50, a month or two later. This last was his rate when he was discharged. As noted above, Pyke was active in bringing the employees into contact with the Union in December 1976, which fact was known by Respondent in January 1977, and testified credibly about interrogation by John Craft and his later discharge by Croft in a conversation marred with antiunion threats. Pyke was reinstated and awarded back pay as a result of the settlement agreement in May 1977, and he acted as the Union's observer at the representation election on June 9. The results of the election were not determined at that time, due to a number of challenges which were yet to be ruled upon, but on June 13 Respondent called the employ- ees together and announced that they were going to "stop playing games in this plant." He further stated that thence- forth a doctor's excuse would be required for all absences due to illness. Respondent did not stipulate what, if any, discipline would be imposed for transgressions of this rule. Pyke was admittedly not an exemplary employees. He had trouble keeping up production, although the Company kept no production records, and was absent frequently due to illness. However, from June, when Respondent instituted the new policy on illnesses, until October, nothing was said or done about these absences. There is no evidence that Pyke did not conform to this new policy. Some time in October Pyke was called in to the office where Respondent told him that if he did not keep up with the other employees he was going to be terminated. Re- spondent also mentioned Pyke's absentee record. but did not indicate that poor attendance was going to furnish grounds for discharge. Pyke was admonished to bring up his productivity and was given 2 weeks to do it. The 2 weeks passed and nothing further was said to him about either productivity or absenteeism. On December 15 Pyke became ill after lunch, and, not finding anyone in the office, asked several fellow employees to tell Respondent that he was not feeling well and was going to see a doctor. He visited a Dr. Bennett and was told I credit Pyke's version of this story. Pyke is a person of limited education. but I found him to be forthright and candid in his testimony despite ex- tended and vigorous cross-examination. This testimony was not specifically denied by John Craft. and, as noted above. I do not credit his general deni- als. 609 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD that he had high blood pressure. An appointment for x-rays was set up for December 20 at St. Joseph Memorial Hospi- tal in Kokomo. On the next day, December 16, Pyke called John Craft and told him about the high blood pressure. Craft was sympathetic and told Pyke to let him know as soon as he had a more definite prognosis. Pyke called in again on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday, on each occa- sion speaking to John Craft, who said it was "all right" that he could not come in. About 2 weeks later, Pyke testified that he came in to work, worked about 2 hours, but devel- oped a headache and became dizzy, so he left after notify- ing Ann Craft, Respondent's daughter and a secretary in his office. 8 The following Monday, January 16, Pyke came in to pick up his check and encountered John Craft. Ac- cording to Pyke, Craft told him not to come to work unless he had a doctor's excuse saying he could return to work.9 Later that week Pyke obtained a certificate from Dr. Bennett that he could return to work on January 20. On that date he presented himself ready for work at 8 a.m. John Craft took the doctor's certificate and instructed Pyke to return at 5 p.m. Pyke did as he was told, and, sometime after 5 o'clock that evening spoke to Andrew Craft, Re- spondent. Craft told Pyke "I thought you quit," and stated that Pyke had never showed up for work. Pyke told him about John Craft's request that he obtain a release from his doctor and Andrew Craft replied that Pyke should find a light job, that he might fall into one of the machines and get hurt or killed.'0 Pyke's story of his illness is credible, undenied, and, in- deed, corroborated at critical points by the testimony of Respondent, his son, and daughter. Moreover, Respondent gave no account of his action in discharging Pyke, other than to state the fact that he was discharged. Respondent's version of the events must then be constructed from the evidentiary materials at hand. Since I am urged by Respon- dent's brief to defer to the decision of the Indiana Employ- ment Security Division, which "says it all concerning Mr. Pyke." I have reviewed that decision. It is true that the determination of eligibility issued by the Division sustains the position of the employer. That determination was up- held by an appeals referee. But aside from the fact that I am not bound by a decision of the Indiana Employment Security Division," I find that these decisions support the General Counsel's contention that Respondent proffered shifting and conflicting reasons for its actions toward Pyke. Thus Respondent at one point said to Pyke that he thought he had quit. This position was carried over into the answer of Respondent to the complaint. Then Respondent stated that Pyke had been replaced, but no evidence was pre- sented as to who the replacement was, and Pyke's undenied testimony about his conversation with John Craft, on Janu- 0 Respondent's records show that this was on January 9, 1978. Ann Craft admitted that Pyke had told her he was dizzy, had high blood pressure, and went home on that day. I This conversation is corroborated by John Craft. 10This conversation was not denied by Andrew Craft. However, he did state at one point in the record that Pyke was fired for absenteeism, and at another point averred that he had been replaced. Respondent's answer to the complaint alleged as an affirmative defense that Pyke had quit. This was amended during the hearing when Andrew Craft testified that Pyke had been discharged for absenteeism. I mean no disrespect by this, but their standards and laws may be some- what different from those I must observe. ary 16, carries no hint of replacement. Quite the contrary, John Craft told Pyke to be sure to have a doctor's excuse that he was able to return to work. Finally, at this hearing Respondent himself stated that Pyke was fired for absentee- ism. In the light of all the evidence before me, based on the shifting reasons advanced by Respondent for his treatment of Pyke, and on the fact that at no time was Pyke warned that he would be discharged if the absenteeism continued, the open and evident animus and hostility shown by John Craft toward Pyke and the Union shortly after Pyke had testified in favor of the Union at the challenged ballots hearing in September 1977, 1 find that Pyke would not, despite his poor attendance record, have been discharged on January 20, 1978, if it were not for the fact that he had engaged in union activity and had given testimony before the National Labor Relations Board. Signal Delivery Ser- vice, Inc., 226 NLRB 843 (1976); Branthaven, Inc., d/b/a Hospitality Home, 192 NLRB 1062 (1971). D. The Failure To Increase Ryan's Wages Ralph Ryan began work at the Company on December 28, 1975. He also started out as a truck loader, but after only one day he was assigned to work on the weaving ma- chines where he remained until he resigned around May 12, 1978. When he started, Ryan was paid at the rate of $3.50 per hour. After a month, and after he had begun working on the weaving machines, his rate was increased to $4. In September 1976 he received another 50 cents, bringing the rate to $4.50. Ryan testified that he asked for another raise between January I and 10, 1977 and was granted a 25-cent increase. He remained at this same rate, $4.75, until he re- signed. Ryan was identified as participating, with Pyke and oth- ers, in signing a union card and participating in union meet- ings. Ryan was a good worker, was praised by John Craft, and was told by John after he had been on the weaving machine for less than a month that he would be "up with the other guys" within a year. The "other guys" are identified by Ryan as James Pearson and Michael Zwickey, who worked full-time on weaving machines at a rate of $6 per hour. Respondent's reasons for not granting any further raises, as in the case of Pyke's discharge, suffer from a lack of consistency as well as candor. Andrew Craft testified that Ryan was not doing a good enough job. However, he was never reprimanded for not doing good work, not offered training in the more technical intricacies of the weaving machine, and, indeed, John Craft testified that Ryan was progressing satisfactorily at the time of his resignation. As another reason why Ryan did not receive a raise, Re- spondent stated that no one received a raise. This defense is contradicted by evidence that a number of employees,' in- cluding Carl Justice, James Stine, Myron Roberts, and Don Ely, were granted raises unconnected, as claimed by Re- spondent, with a new job assignment. What is clear is that none of the employees who were employed at the time of " All of whom were hired after the date of the election, June 9, 1977, in Case 25-RC-6517. 610 VINYL CRAFT FENCE CO. the filing of the petition in Case 25-RC-6517 received a raise thereafter. No economic or other reasons were ad- vanced by Respondent for this." This explanation, like the I. Respon first, is unconvincing. within the rr Finally, Respondent advanced as a reason why Ryan was 2. United not awarded a raise was the asserted fact that Ryan, unlike tion within t more experienced employees, Pearson and Zwickey, and 3. By thr later Justice and Williamson," could not perform the tech- Pyke, Respo nical maintenance and adjustment functions required be- 4. By disc cause of the small size of Respondent's operation. behalf of the There was a great deal of testimony of Respondent and National La Union Representative Carl N. Morris concerning the rela- violated Secl tive requirements for reaching journeyman status as a 5. By reft weaving machine operator. In view of my findings and con- because of h clusions hereinafter stated, I do not find it necessary to at- has violated tempt to resolve the merits, or relative merits, of this con- 6. The aft troversy. practices affe In reviewing Ralph Ryan's record, I find that Respon- 2(6) and (7) dent's wage policy was, at least up to the advent of the Upon the Union, based on Respondent's subjective evaluation of the the entire re work of employees. This system rewarded those who per- sions of Sect formed to Respondent's satisfaction, and since Ryan's work recommend( admittedly satisfied Respondent, he received three increases in a relatively short time. With the coming of the Union, in January 1977, this pol- icy changed to a policy of granting no wage increases. The Resp, Based in part on the background evidence submitted by the Vinyl Craft General Counsel showing Respondent's hostility and ani- shall: mus toward the Union early in 1977, but more importantly 1. Cease on the statement by John Craft to Pyke in September 1977 (a) Threa to the effect that he was not granted an increase because of increases be, the Union, I infer and find that Respondent denied an in- (b) Threa crease to Ryan for the same reason, the union activity of testimony be Ryan and the other employees. (c) Disch; Respondent's defenses are, as noted above, inconsistent employees t and shifting, leading to the inference, which I draw in this cause they g instance, that the real reason for denying Ryan a wage in- tions Board. crease was his union activity. Shattuck-Denn Mining Corp. (d) In anl v. N.L.R.B., 362 F.2d 466 (C.A. 9, 1967). coercing em teed them b IV. THE REMEDY 2. Take ti to be necess Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain (a) Offer unfair labor practices I shall recommend that he be ordered former or st to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative whole in the action including the reinstatement of George Pyke together "The Remec with back pay and the payment to Ralph Ryan of a sum of (b) Make money equivalent to the sum of the raises he was not fered by hit granted in the period from January 1977 to May 1978, to- section entit gether with interest thereon computed in the manner pre- (c) Post a scribed in Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977) attached no (see also Isis Plumbing and Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716). tices, on for '1 In the light of Pyke's statement that John Craft told him he had not received a raise if it were not for the Union, this situation is certainly suspi- 1S In the evet cious. But there is no allegation in the complaint that other employees were Rules and Reg denied raises because of union activity, so there is no issue for me to con- conclusions, ani sider. of the Rules a: 14 Pearson and Zwickey had resigned at some time prior to the hearing. findings, conclu Williamson and Justice were recruited by Respondent from Florida in Octo- waived for all ber 1977 because of an unspecified "need" for expenenced weaving machime "In the ever operators. Williamson resigned in March 1978. Both he and Justice were States Court of hired at the rate of S6 per hour. After Williamson resigned Justice was given the National La raises of SI per hour in May1978 and another 50 cents in June, bringing his ment of the Un current rate to $7.50 per hour. tional Labor R, 611 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW dent is an employer engaged in commerce ieaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Steelworkers of America is a labor organiza- he meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. eatening and coercing its employee, George mndent has violated Section 8(aXl) of the Act. :harging George Pyke because of his activity on e Union, and because he gave testimony in a bor Relations Board hearing, Respondent has tion 8(a)( I), (3)., and (4) of the Act. ising to grant wage increases to Ralph Ryan is activities on behalf of the Union Respondent Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. oresaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor ecting commerce within the meaning of Section of the Act. foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, cord in this matter, and pursuant to the provi- ion 10(c) of the Act I hereby issue the following ed: ORDERs ondent, Andrew Craft, a sole proprietor d/b/a Fence Co., his agents, successors, and assigns, and desist from: tening or coercing employees with loss of pay cause they engage in union activity. tening or coercing employees because they give fore the National Labor Relations Board. arging or refusing to grant wage increases to because they engage in union activity, or be- give testimony before the National Labor Rela- y other manner interfering with, restraining or nployees in the exercise of their rights guaran- y Section 7 of the Act. he following affirmative action which is deemed ary to effectuate the policies of the Act: George Pyke immediate reinstatement to his ibstantially equivalent position, and make him manner described above in the section entitled dy." Ralph Ryan whole for the discrimination suf- n, also in the manner described above in the led "The Remedy." it his Kokomo, Indiana, facility, copies of the tice marked "Appendix." '6 Copies of said no- ms provided by the Regional Director for Re- nt no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the ulations of the National Labor Relations Board. the findings, d recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 nd Regulations. be adopted by the Board and become its sions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed purposes. at that this Order is enforced by a judgment of the United Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of abor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judg- nited States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Na- elations Board." DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD gion 25, after being duly signed by Respondent, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by him for 60 consecutive days there- after, in conspicuous places, including all places where no- tices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that such notices are not altered, defaced. or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 25, in writ- ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps have been taken by Respondent to comply herewith. 612