Electrical Workers 323 (J. F. Hoff Electric Co.)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD) Local Union 323, International Brotherhood of Elec- trical Workers and J. F. Hoff Electric Co. Case 12 'C - 1006 April 3, 1979 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBHERS JENKINS, MURPHY, ANi) TRUIESDAI.E On July 24, 1978, Administrative Law Judge Mi- chael 0. Miller issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel and the Charging Party filed exceptions and supporting briefs, and Respondent filed an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.' ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela- In finding that the neutrality of the reserved neutral gate had been breached and hence that Respondent Union could lawfully picket that gate, the Administrative Law Judge relied on our decision in International Union of Operating Engineers. Local Union Vo. 450, .4 FL CIO (Linbeck Construc- tion Corporation). 219 NLRB 997 (1975). There, the Board held that a gen- eral contractor who acted as a supplier of a struck subcontractor was re- quired to use the same reserved gate as any other supplier of the struck employer even though the general contractor held title to the supplies so delivered. The general contractor's failure in Linbeck to do so and its bring- ing materials in through the supposedly neutral gate tainted that gate and allowed the picketing there. Our dissenting colleague's effort to distinguish Linbeck from the instant case, predicated on the contention that the supplies delivered in Linheck through the neutral gate (crushed stone) were "raw material," but the material moved through the neutral gate here (electrical fixtures) is a finished product and, according to our colleague, not "materials used" by Hoff in its work, is patently unsuccessful. As the court of appeals pointed out in enforcing the Board's order in Linbeck, "any gate used to deliver materials essential to the primary employer's normal operations is subject to lawful picketing." (Emphasis supplied.) 550 F.2d 311. 318 (5th Cir. 1977). The contention that delivery o electrical fixtures is not "essential" to the operations of an electrical contractor charged, as here. with installation of an electrical system for a general contractor is a contention that falls of its own weight, and the rationale of' the Board's decision in L.inhecA is fully applicable here in dismissing the instant complaint. As we agree with the Administrative Law Judge's finding that the neutral- ity of the reserved gate was breached, and as we agree with his further finding that Respondent's picketing along the southernmost portion of the construction project, closest to where the primary employer's employees were working, complied with Moore Dry Dock standards in a context free of unlawful secondary intent. we find it unnecessary to rely, as the Administra- tive Law Judge did, on the Board's decision in 'Construl-rion, Building Mate rial& Mi.tcellaneous Driers Local No. 83, affililted Kith Inernational Broth- erhood of Teamsters. Chauffeurs. W4arehousenn & Helpers oft .4 nlerira (Allied Concrete. In cj. 231 NLRB 1097 (1977), in determining that such picketing was lawful. Sailors' Union of the Pacific, .4 F. (Moore Dnr Dock ('ompan),i. 92 NLRB 547 (1950). tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Or- der of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby or- ders that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. MEMBER MURPHY, dissenting in part and concurring in part: Contrary to my colleagues and the Administrative Law Judge, I find that the neutrality of the reserved neutral gate was not breached and that Respondent Union therefore did violate Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of' the Act by its picketing at that gate. There is no dispute concerning the cogent facts. They are briefly as follows: Hoff, the Charging Party, was the electrical subcontractor on the construction project in question and became engaged in a primary labor dispute with Respondent. At or before the onset of' the dispute, the construction project general con- tractor established a reserved-gate system. The pri- mary (north) gate was reserved for Hofl; its employ- ees, and its suppliers (and for certain other subcontractors who are not involved in this proceed- ing). The neutral (south) gate was reserved for all oth- ers. Respondent's picketing in support of its dispute with Hoff was initially confined to the area of the primary (north) gate. Then, for a period of approxi- mately 4 or 5 consecutive days, Respondent picketed along the entire western boundary of the project, in- cluding both the primary and the neutral gates. Thereafter, Respondent withdrew its pickets from the neutral gate itself, but continued to picket for another month at the primary gate, as well as along the south- ern portion of the western boundary of the project, below the neutral gate, closest to where the Employ- er's employees were actually working. Finally, Re- spondent's picketing was limited to the primary gate only, in compliance with an injunction issued pursu- ant to Section 10(1) of the Act. Respondent picketed at the neutral gate because it had observed what it believed to be breaches of the neutrality of that gate resulting from the delivery of certain electrical light fixtures to the project site by an electrical supply company (not Hoff). These deliveries were made approximately once a week, through the neutral gate. The electrical light fixtures in question were ultimately installed by Hoff in the buildings un- der construction, pursuant to its subcontract with the general contractor. However, these fixtures were se- lected, ordered, purchased, delivered to, received, and owned not by Hoff, but by tl-e project owner itself. On one occasion, the project owner, having first ac- cepted delivery of a load of these fixtures, requested the supply company to take the fixtures directly to one of the buildings under construction. There, the delivery truck was unloaded by the supply company's 241 NLRB No. 98 694 I.O<CAL. NION 323. E.CIRICAI. WORKERS driver. and the fixtures were carried into the building by men who, in the eyes of a watching picketer, ap- peared to be electricians. On all other occasions rel- evant herein, the fixtures were stored on the project premises by the project owner prior to installation. From time to time, as required, Hoff's employees would remove these fixtures from the project owner's storage area and install them in the buildings. The installation of these fixtures was a very small part of Hoffs subcontract. Relying on the Board's decision in International Union of Operating Engineers. Local Union No. 450, A FL C10 (Linhe Co i Contruction Colporation), 219 NLRB 997 (1975), the Administrative Law Judge found, in effect, that the delivery of these electrical fixtures through the neutral gate constituted the deliv- ery of supplies for the use of the primary employer: that. as a result of these deliveries, the neutrality of the neutral gate had been breached: and that Respon- dent's picketing at the neutral gate was therefore law- ful primary activity. I believe that the Administrative Law Judge's and my colleagues' reliance on Linheck is misplaced. Linheck differs significantly from the instant case on the basis of sharp, relevant differences between the basic nature and use of the materials delivered through the neutral gates in the two cases. In .inheck, the primary employer was a subcontractor who was engaged. in part. to construct paved storm sewers and parking lots. Raw material in the form of crushed stone was supplied to the subcontractor and was de- livered to it through a reserved neutral gate. This raw material was used by the subcontractor in its con- struction and paving work. In other words, it was converted into the final product. Delivery of the crushed stone under those circumstances therefore constituted the delivery of supplies for use by the pri- mary employer. Delivery of those supplies through the neutral gate breached the neutrality of that gate. In the instant case. however. Hoff was engaged. in part, to install electrical light fixtures. Again, these fixtures were selected, ordered, purchased, delivered to, received, owned, and stored by the project owner itself, and not Hoff. They were no more "materials used" by Hoff in its work than Rembrandts and Pi- cassos would be "materials used" b a subcontractor engaged to hang paintings in an art gallery. Rather. the materials essential to Hoffs normal operations were, in the circumstances here, such items as cable. wire nuts, electrical tape, switches, and so forth -but clearly not the electrical lighting fixtures themselves which Hoff was engaged to install. Thus, the delivery of these fixtures to the project owner did not consti- tute the delivery of supplies to Hoff. the neutrality of the neutral gate was therefore not breached, aind Re- spondent was thus not privileged to picket at the neu- tral gate. In finding to the contrary, my colleagues contend that the delivery of electrical fixtures was "essential" to Hofl's operations in the performance of the sub- contract. Had I loff contracted to provide the electrical fixtures, I might agree. But, as seen above, such is not the case here. Rather, the project owner itself under- took the responsibility for providing the electrical fix- tures. Thus, the deliverv of the fixtures was not "es- sential" to Hoffs performance, because Hoff was not responsible for providing these fixtures. My colleagues' contention to the contrary appears to be premised on the tautologous proposition that. without electrical fixtures, one cannot install electrical fixtures and that, therelbre, electrical fixtures are es- sential to the installation of electrical fixtures. This is a nice abstraction, the truth of which cannot be de- nied in the vacuum in which my colleagues would have it preserved. Their theory of "essentiality" does not, however, survive removal from the vacuum and application to the particular circumstances of this case. That is, my colleagues would no doubt agree that without a building, one cannot install electrical fixtures and that, therefore, a building is essential to the installation of electrical fixtures. My colleagues would also undoubtedly agree that steel, wood. and plasterboard are essential to the construction of apartment buildings, such as were being constructed in this case. By logical extension, my colleagues would necessarily contend that inasmuch as steel, wood, and plasterboard are essential to buildings and inasmuch as buildings are essential to the installation of electrical fixtures therein, therefore steel, wood, and plaster are essential to the installation of electri- cal fixtures. But would my colleagues really adopt the absurd, yet inescapable, conclusion of their abstract reasoning as applied to the particulars off this case i.e., that the delivery of steel, wood, and plasterboard through the reserved neutral gate constituted the de- livery of materials "essential" to Hoff in performing its task of installing electrical fixtures? I think not. Thus, my colleagues' tautologous proposition (that the electrical fixtures were "essential" to Hoff because without them Hoff could not install them) is, when carried to its logical conclusion in the context of this case, reduced to an absurdity, which if applied to this case would legitimize the Union's picketing at the re- served neutral gate in response to the delivery through that gate of any material essential to the con- struction of the apartment building itself. 2 To legiti- ? [hus, it is eident that such words as "essential" and "normal opera- tions" must he applied in context est such words he extended to cover more than their intended use permits. For example, if those terms were literall applied without regard to factal realities, it would presumabhl? be lawful to picket a neutral gate through which paint passes when the primar, emplo)er (,ninudi) 695 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD mize such picketing would be quite simply to defeat the "dual congressional objectives of preserving the right of labor organizations to bring pressure to bear on offending employers in primary labor disputes and of shielding unoffending employers and others from pressures in controversies not their own." N.L.R.B. v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, et al. [Gould & Preisner]. 341 U.S. 675. 692 (1951). I do, however, agree with my colleagues and the Administrative Law Judge that Respondent's picket- ing away from the primary gate, along the southern- most portion of the project site, closest to where the Employer's employees were actually working, was lawful. Preliminarily, I agree that this picketing satisfied the guidelines set out in Moore D0r Dock, supra, and was conducted without any unlawful secondary in- tent on the part of Respondent. However, inasmuch as I have found that the neutrality of the neutral gate was not breached, I necessarily find that a system of legitimately maintained reserved gates was in force at the project during the time of Respondent's picketing. Consequently, in finding that Respondent's picketing away from the primary gate was nevertheless ulti- mately lawful. I rely-unlike my colleagues- on our decision in Allied Concrete, supra, where the Board found that ambulatory picketing away from a re- served primary gate but conforming to Moore Dr Dock standards was lawful, notwithstanding the fact that the reserved neutral gate had not been breached. is an interior decorator engaged, in this example. onily Ito pl the pint otherwise selected by. purchased by delivered to. anrd received h the huild- ing owner herself Despite the limited scope of the interior decorator', par- ticular contract in such an example. the paint would. under the njority's view, be "essential" to the inlterior decorator's operations Hut. of course. In the particular circumstances of the example, the limited extent it the con- tract would preclude a broad application of the terms "essential" and "nor- mal perations' Accordingly. I can perceive no good reason in the instlnt case to apply sweepingly such terms as "essential" and normal operations" Io, Hoff,. engaged as it is here to perlform onl a prtioln (i.e. instlhling fix- lures} of the services which it is potentially abhle to pertfrm i e . inst.tlhng and furnishing fixtures) Rather. the terms "essential" and "n,,rmal opera- tions" should here apply onlk to the services which Hof has in relevant part been engaged to) perfoirm the installation of the fixtures, but not the fur- nishing olflhenl lowever tinder the majoritys vie, , would seem that with respect Ito the neutral gate question presented here, it is immaterial that Hotiff has heen engaged ctuall) to do less than that which it potentialls could or might do. In an' eent I would find that the neutral gate has not been breached b the urnishing of electrical fixtures to the project ow ner through that gte and that Respondent therefoire violated Sec 8lh)(4H) and li)(B) by Its pickcting Ihereat I aifririn mr deci-isn in A41lied (ornrle DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MtCHAEL O. MILLER, Administrative Law Judge: This case was heard before me on March 27 and 28, 1978. in Coral Gables, Florida. upon a charge filed on January 9, 1978, by the J. F. Hoff Electric Co. (herein called Hoff Electric or the primary employer) and a complaint issued by the Regional Director for Region 12 of the National Labor Relations Board on January 25, 1978. The complaint alleges that Local Union 323. Interna- tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (herein called Re- spondent or the Union), violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, (herein called the Act) by its picketing of a construction project known as the Old Port Cove project with an object of forcing or requiring Wadsworth & Sabrice and other per- sons to cease doing business with Hloff Electric. Respon- dent's timely filed answer denied the substantive allegations of the complaint. Upon the entire record, including the briefs filed by Gen- eral Counsel and Respondent. and from my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following: FININ(;S () FA I 1. IIiF HB SINiESS ()F Iil IMPI.(OYIRS INVOI.VED Hoff Electric is a Florida corporation based in Tequesta, Florida. and engaged in he building and construction in- dustry as an electrical contractor. Wadsworth & Sabrice is a partnership engaged at West Palm Beach, Florida. as a general contractor in the building and construction indus- try. During the past 12 months, both Hoff Electric and Wadsworth & Sabrice have received at their Florida loca- tions goods. materials, and supplies valued in excess of $50.000 which were shipped to them directly from points located outside the State t' Florida. The complaint alleges. and Respondent admits, that Hoff Electric and Wadsxkorth & Sahbrice are employers and per- sons engaged in comnlerce or in an industry affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction herein. 11. 111: I.AB(R ORGANIZATION INVOI.VED The complaint alleges and Respondent admits that Local Union 323. International Brotherhood of Electrical Work- ers, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 111. tile ALI.L.GED UNFAIR I.ABOR PRACII(ES A. The Facts I. Introduction At the material times herein. Wadsworth & Sabrice has been the general contractor on the Old Port Cove project in North Palm Beach, Florida. constructing residences for Old Port Cove Harbor Village, Limited, the project's owner. Hoff Electric was the electrical subcontractor. The Old Port Cove project is bounded on the west by a highway, U.S. Route 1: on the north by a group of build- ings, including residences, stores, and offices, with adjacent parking areas; on the south by the Intracoastal Waterway; and on the east by a lagoon. Except at the driveways, the 696 LOCAL UNION 323, ELECTRICAL WORKERS western boundary of the project is bordered by curbs, grass. and hedges. The Union has been engaged in a primary labor dispute with Hoff Electric since approximately November 7, 1977. At no time material herein has the Union had any primary labor dispute with Wadsworth & Sabrice. At or before the onset of the labor dispute, Wadsworth & Sabrice established a reserved-gate system by placing signs restricting the use of the only two entrances to the project which entered from Route 1. At the northern extreme, at an entrance from the highway normally used to enter the shop- ping area and residences (referred to herein as the north or primary gate), a sign was posted reserving that entrance for Hoff Electric and certain other subcontractors and their employees and suppliers. Approximately 500 feet south of the north gate was a second entrance (referred to herein as the south or neutral gate) into a driveway which was imme- diately adjacent to the construction site. Use of this south gate was permitted to everyone except Hoff Electric and the other excluded subcontractors. The construction site con- tinued for approximately 800 feet south to the Intracoastal Waterway. 2. The picketing On November 7, 1977, the Union began picketing at the Old Port Cove project with signs protesting that Hoff Elec- tric lowered the Union's standards. Until December 28, 1977, the picketing was confined to the north gate. From December 28 for at least 3 to 4 days, the Union's pickets patrolled the entire western boundary, including walking up to the north and south edges of the south gate. There- after, the pickets patrolled from the primary gate south to a point about 150 feet north of the neutral gate and from a point approximately 150 feet south of the neutral gate to the waterway.' Since approximately the end of January, the Union's picketing has been limited to 25 feet on either side of the north gate, pursuant to a temporary injunction issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The Union began picketing at the neutral gate on and after December 28 because it had observed what it believed to be violations of the neutrality of that gate by the delivery of electrical fixtures by Consolidated Electric Supply Co. It is undisputed that at least once (and occasionally twice) a week, Consolidated made deliveries of electrical fixtures which were ordered by, and were the property of, the pro- ject owners. The deliveries were made through the neutral gate to the construction trailers of the project owner or the general contractor. On one occasion the Union's picket ob- served the Consolidated truck make a delivery directly to one of the townhouses under construction. The truck was unloaded by its driver, and men who appeared to be electri- cians carried the materials into the building. On all other occasions Hoff Electric employees secured the fixtures from The foregoing facts are not in dispute. General Counsel further con- tended that at vanous times throughout the month of January 1978, the Union's pickets were observed in close proximity to, or directly in front of, the neutral gate. The Union denied picketing at or near the neutral gate in January. Resolution of this issue is not required, as it would not affect the legality or illegality of the Union's conduct herein. the owner's trailer. The fiKtures were installed in the build- ings by Hoff Electric pursuant to its subcontract with Wadsworth & Sabrice. The installation of' the fixtures was only a small part of that contract. B. Conclusions The provisions of Section 8(b)(4) reflect "the dual con- gressional objective of preserving the right of labor organi- zations to bring pressure to bear on offending employers in primary labor disputes and of shielding unoffending em- ployers and others from pressures in controversies not their own." N. L. R. B. v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1964). Thus. a union is permit- ted to picket a primary employer with whom it has a labor dispute, but it runs afoul of Section 8(b)(4) if it pickets a neutral employer with the proscribed object of enmeshing that neutral employer in a controversy not its own. In as- sessing union picketing activities at a common situs, the Board is confronted by the difficult problem that unre- stricted union activity would be inconsistent with the neu- tral employer's intended immunity. Conversely, depriving a union of all opportunity to picket at a common situs might render nugatory its right to bring pressure upon a primary employer. In order to accommodate these conflicting interests, the Board in Sailors' Union of the Pacific, AFL (Moore Dry Dock Company), 92 NLRB 547 (1950), evolved criteria to help resolve the question of whether a union has the pro- scribed motive of enmeshing neutral employers. The rule as originally stated by the Board is as follows: When a secondary employer is harboring the situs of a dispute between a union and a primary employer, the right of neither the union to picket nor of the second- ary employer to be free from picketing can be absolute. The enmeshing of premises and situs qualifies both rights. In the kind of situation that exists in this case, we believe that picketing of the premises of a second- ary employer is primary if it meets the following condi- tions: (a) The picketing is strictly limited to times when the situs of dispute is located on t : secondary employ- er's premises; (b) at the time of tile picketing the pri- mary employer is engaged in its normal business at the situs; (c) the picketing is limited to place reasonable close to the location of the situs: and (d) the picketing discloses clearly that the dispute is with the primary employer. Compliance with the Moore Dry) Dock standards raises only the rebuttable presumption that the picketing .as not for a proscribed objectike. See General Teamsters Local 126 (Ready Mixed Concrete), 200 NLRB 254 (19721: L,,tal Freight Drilers 209 Sears Roebhuck). 224 NLRB 1116 (19763. The Board and courts he uniforml? held that picketing violates Section 8(b)(4')ia: and ('tubB) if any of the requirements of Moore Dr, Dock ."re disiegarded. However compliance with the standards does not immunize a union',, picketing, for a union may. by its other conduct. reveal a secondary objective. (See generall., General Teamsers l.o- cal 126, surra at 254 and 255.) Further, in order to insulate neutral employers ar d their 697 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD employees and suppliers from disputes not their own, em- ployers upon a common situs are permitted to establish and maintain separate gates for use by those primarily involved in a labor dispute and those not so involved. Local 761, International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO General Electric Company] v. N.L.R.B., 366 U.S. 667 (1961). Where such gates are properly established, a union may picket only at the gate of the employer with whom it has a dispute. General Counsel contended that such a reserve gate was established herein and that by its picketing of that gate, Respondent violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act. Respondent asserts that the integrity of that gate was violated by the delivery of electrical fixtures to Hoff Electric through the neutral gate, thus permitting it to picket at that gate. I find Respondent's argument persuasive. Resolution of the issue herein is controlled by the Board's decision in International Union of Operating Engineers, Lo- cal Union No. 450, AFL-CIO (Linbeck Construction Corpo- ration), 219 NLRB 997 (1975). Therein, materials intended fbor the use of the primary employer (Luckie) but owned by the general contractor (Linbeck) were brought on to the site through the supposedly neutral gate. Respondent, there as here, contended that as the materials entering through that gate were the property of a neutral employer, although in- tended for use by the primary, no breach of the neutral gate had occurred. The Board rejected this argument, holding: We agree with the Administrative Law Judge that Respondent's picketing near the Linbeck gate from June 24 through June 26, 1974, did not violate Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act inasmuch as there was evidence that Linbeck was bringing in materials through the Linbeck gate for Luckie's use during this period. In our view, it makes no difference that Lin- beck was the legal owner of these materials. What is important is that, in bringing in such materials, Lin- beck was acting as a supplier of Luckie and therefore was required to use the same reserve gate as any other supplier of Luckie-that which had been set aside and reserved for Luckie. By failing to do so and by deliver- ing the materials instead through the Linbeck gate, Linbeck subjected itself to the same pressures by the Union that the Union could use against any supplier of the primary. The court of appeals, in enforcing the Board's decision in Linbeck, stated: . . the controlling question is not who has title to the goods, but is for whose use they are intended. Thus, any gate used to deliver materials essential to the pri- mary employer's normal operations is subject to lawful picketing. Linbeck Construction Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 550 F.2d 311, 318 (5th Cir. 1977). General Couns l would distinguish Linbeck from the in- stant case on the basis that in Linbeck the parties changed their procedures in anticipation of the picketing. They placed title to the materials in the neutral, whereas those materials had previously been owned and signed for by the iprimarv: in the instant case, however, title to the fixtures had always been held by the project owner. This, I find, is a distinction without a meaningful difference. Indeed, while the court, but not the Board, pointed this change out in reaching its decision, it also stated that if it were to accept the respondent's reasoning in Linbeck, "general contractors throughout the construction industry could stop a 'tradi- tional goal of primary pressure'-halting the operations of the primary employer through the influence of a picket line on those suppliers who contribute thereto-,by the simple expedient of retaining legal title to all materials used by the subcontractors." (Emphasis supplied.) 350 F.2d at 318. This language clearly demonstrates that the court wass not con- cerned with whether the general contractor retained title to the materials at all times or merely acquired title in antici- pation of the labor dispute. General Counsel further contended that Consolidated's deliveries through the supposedly neutral gate were so few, and the installation of the fixtures such a small part of Hoff Electric's contract, that the violations of the gate were de minimis. Noting that these deliveries were a regular occur- rence throughout the period, that Consolidated's use of the gate was not according to any known schedule, and that the installation of these fixtures was a normal and essential part of Hoff's work on the site, I must reject this argument. Finally, General Counsel contended that the Union's picketing south of the neutral gate to the Intracoastal Wa- terway failed to comply with the third condition of Moore Dry Dock, i.e., that the picketing be limited to a place rea- sonably close to the location of the situs, inasmuch as there was a gate reserved for the use of the primary. Any picket- ing at points other than that gate, it argued, was not reason- ably close to the location of the situs. Noting, however, that the perimeter of the property south of the allegedly neutral gate was the area closest to where Hoff Electric's employees performed their duties (see Teamsters Local 83, (Allied Con- crete), 231 NLRB 181 (1977)), and noting particularly the regular breaches of the neutrality of the south gate by Hoffs Electric's supplier, I find that this picketing met the Moore Dry Dock standards. I further find that on the rec- ord before me there was insufficient evidence to establish that by this picketing the Union sought to enmesh neutral employers in its dispute with Hoff Electric. In view of the foregoing, I find that Respondent Union was engaged in lawful primary picketing and did not vio- late Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act. Accordingly, I shall recommend that the complaint be dismissed in its en- tirety. CON(CL!SIONS OF LAW I. Hoff Electric and Wadsworth & Sabrice are both em- ployers and persons engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Local Union 323, International Brotherhood of Elec- trical Workers, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. Local Union 323, International Brotherhood of Elec- trical Workers, did not commit unfair labor practices as alleged in the complaint. [Recommended Order for dismissal omitted from publi- cation.] 2 There was no contention that the picketing failed to meet any of the remaining criteria. 698