Shopmen's Local Union No. 501

856 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD constitute a unit appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act. 5. On and since February 6, 1957, the Union has been and is the majority rep- resentative of the employees in the appropriate unit for purposes of collective bar- gaining in respect to rates of pay, wages , hours of employment, or other conditions of employment. 6. By refusing on February 6, 1957, and thereafter to recognize and thus to bar- gain with the Union, the Respondents have engaged in and are engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act. 7. By the discharge of Harrington , by the discharge of the 23 strikers on February 26, by unlawfully refusing to bargain with the Union, and by threatening to close the plant, the Respondents have interfered with, restrained, and coerced their employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and have thereby engaged in and are engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. 8. The operations of the Respondents are in and affect commerce within the mean- ing of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. 9. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] Shopmen's Local Union No. 501 of the International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL- CIO and Oliver Whyte Company, Inc. Case No. 1-CC-186. May 8, 1958 DECISION AND ORDER On December 27, 1957, Trial Examiner Louis Libbin issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had not engaged in any unfair labor practices, and recom- mending that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the General Counsel and the Charging Party filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report, and the General Counsel filed a supporting brief. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby af- firmed. The Board has considered the Intermediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. [The Board dismissed the complaint.] INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon charges filed by Oliver Whyte Company, Inc., herein sometimes called the Charging Party, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, by the Regional Director for the First Region (Boston, Massachusetts), issued a 120 NLRB No.112. SHOPMEN'S LOCAL UNION NO. 501 857 complaint dated October 10, 1957, alleging that Shopmen's Local Union No. 501 of the International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union or the Respondent, had engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136, herein called the Act. More specifically, the complaint alleges in substance that the Respondent represented the employees of the Charging Party for collective bargaining purposes; that Respond- ent has been on strike against the Charging Party since on or about July 16, 1957; that on or about July 19, 1957, the Charging Party contracted with Wilford Perry, d/b/a Atlantic Wire and Iron Works, herein called Atlantic, to fabricate certain products; that on August 9, 1957, Atlantic employed two members of Respondent; that thereafter in furtherance of Respondent's demand upon Atlantic that it cease doing work for the Charging Party, Respondent on or about August 23, 1957, induced or encouraged its members employed by Atlantic to cease work con- certedly, which they did; that Respondent engaged in the above-described conduct with an object of forcing or requiring Atlantic to cease doing business for the Charging Party; and that by such conduct Respondent violated Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act. In its duly filed answer, Respondent admits that it represented the employees of the Charging Party for collective-bargaining purposes and that Respondent has been on strike against the Charging Party since on or about July 16, 1957; denies the commission of any unfair labor practices; and affirmatively avers that on or about July 16, 1957, members of Respondent went out on strike against numerous employers, including the Charging Party, engaged in the fabrication of metal products, that 2 member-employees participated in said strike and accepted tem- porary employment with Atlantic pending settlement of the strike, that upon learning that Atlantic was performing struck work for the Charging Party the 2 employees voluntarily terminated their employment with Atlantic, and that Atlantic knowingly contracted to perform work which would normally have been performed by the employees of the Charging Party in the absence of a strike and that Atlantic thereby became a primary party to the dispute between Respondent and the Charging Party. Pursuant to due notice, a hearing was held on October 24, 1957, at Boston, Massachusetts. All parties were represented by counsel at the hearing, afforded full opportunity to be heard , to examine and cross-examine witnesses , to introduce relevant evidence, to present oral argument, and thereafter to file briefs as well as proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. All parties waived the filing of briefs. The Respondent's motion to dismiss the complaint , made at the conclusion of the hearing and upon which I reserved ruling, is hereby granted in accordance with the findings and conclusions made below. Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. COMMERCE ; THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANIES INVOLVED At all times material herein, Oliver Whyte Company, Inc., the Charging Party, has been a Massachusetts corporation with its principal office and place of business in Medford, Massachusetts, where it is engaged in the fabrication of ferrous and nonferrous metals into tanks, material handling equipment , and related products. The Charging Party annually produces and ships to points outside the Common- wealth of Massachusetts products valued in excess of $50,000. Wilford Perry, d/b/a Atlantic Wire and Iron Works, herein called Atlantic, maintains his principal office and place of business in Brighton , Massachusetts, where he is engaged in the manufacture and fabrication of wire products, doors, partitions, window guards, and other products. Upon the above admitted facts, I find that the Charging Party is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act and that assertion of jurisdiction over this proceeding is in accord with the Board's well-established practice. II. THE RESPONDENT The complaint alleges, the Respondent's answer admits, and I find, that Shop- men's Local Union No. 501 of the International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. 858 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Sequence of events i Respondent Union was the collective-bargaining representative of the employees of the Metal Fabricators Association, composed of 19 employers engaged in metal fabrication. Respondent Union was also the collective-bargaining representative of the production employees of Oliver Whyte Company, Inc., the Charging Party, who was not a member of the Association. During the 1957 contract negotiations, Re- spondent, in accordance with its past bargaining practice, was seeking the same terms and conditions of employment from the Association and non-Association members. Due to failure to agree on contract terms, the Respondent voted to strike. The employees of the Association members struck on July 16, 1957; the employees of the Charging Party went out on strike 2 days later, on July 18. About a week after the strike was in progress, the Charging Party made arrange- ments with Atlantic, another non-Association member, for the latter to work on orders of the Charging Party involving the fabrication of wire products, work which ad- mittedly would normally have been done by the employees of the Charging Party in its own plant. Prior to that time, the Charging Party had had no business relations with Atlantic. Curtis Brown, president of the Charging Party, admitted that the work was farmed out because "our customers needed it." Wilford Perry, owner of Atlantic, admitted that as soon as the strike began he knew that the employees of the Charging Party were out on strike.2 Thereafter, Atlantic continued to process a series of orders for the Charging Party with fair regularity up to the date of the hearing in this proceeding, as of which time the strike was still in progress. Al- though Atlantic was also performing work for other companies, the Charging Party was its only customer whose employees were on strike. When Atlantic first began to work on orders of the Charging Party in July 1957, Atlantic's work force consisted of its owner, Wilford Perry, his father, and another employee, none of whom were members of the Respondent. On August 9, 1957, Atlantic hired 2 additional employees, Albert Cranshaw and Arthur Frappier, to fabricate wire products. Perry knew that Cranshaw and Frappier were members of Respondent and were striking employees of Conway and Cannon Company, a mem- ber of the Metal Fabricators Association. He assumed that they intended to work until the strike was settled. When Cranshaw and Frappier were first hired, they did not know that Atlantic was doing work for the Charging Party, and Perry ad- mitted that he did not apprise them of that fact. During the first week in August, Charles Kelley, Respondent's business agent, visited Atlantic and spoke to Perry. After introducing himself, Kelley asked Perry if he was doing any work for companies which were on strike. Perry replied in the negative, stating that "we had enough work of our own " Kelley then asked Perry not to do any work for companies which were being struck by Respondent. Perry replied that "we wouldn't." - - On August 22, Brown, president of the Charging Party, delivered some materials to Atlantic in a green Ford ranch wagon At that time Cranshaw and Frappier were apprised of Brown's identity and his connection with the Charging Party. Cranshaw asked Perry if the work that he and Frappier were doing at that time was Oliver Whyte's. Perry replied that it was not and that it was his own [Perry's] job. About noon of the next day, August 23, Kelley again visited Atlantic's premises. Kelley called Cranshaw and Frappier out to the gate and spoke to them for about 5 or 10 minutes. About that time Perry went out for lunch. When Perry returned about 10 minutes later, Kelley approached him and asked if Perry was doing work for Oliver Whyte Company, the Charging Party. When Perry replied in the nega- tive, Kelley stated that Atlantic was doing work for the Charging Party because the men who were picketing the Charging Party had trailed Mr. Brown with materials in his beach wagon to Atlantic's place of business. Perry then admitted that he had made some guards for the Charging Party. Kelley then said, "I asked you not to make any work for them." At that time there was in Atlantic's shop a completed order of guards with tags bearing the name of the Charging Party. Kelley then left and again called Cranshaw and Frappier over to the gate where they engaged in a conversation. Kelley asked Cranshaw if he knew that Atlantic was doing work for the Charging Party. Cranshaw replied that he had found that out the previous day when Brown had visited the plant in a station wagon. Kelley then stated, "you're kind of working against yourself if you continue that way," that "it wouldn't be to our benefit" because "we would be strike-breaking against our- I Unless specifically mentioned, the facts set forth in this section are not disputed. 2 Respondent was not the collective-bargaining representative of Atlantic's employees. SHOPMEN'S LOCAL UNION NO. 501 859 selves." Cranshaw replied that they were going "to get through" that evening. When Kelley asked why they had not quit before, Cranshaw stated that the job they were doing at the present time was Perry's own work. Upon the conclusion of this conversation, Cranshaw went back and told Perry, "this is it. We can finish the day but we can't come back." He explained that "by continuing to do any more work that we would be strike-breaking against ourselves," that they had to work with the Union and that they did not want any trouble. At the end of the day, Cranshaw and Frappier were paid off and were no longer considered to be employees of Atlantic by Perry. Perry admitted that his employees had no way of knowing the names of the customers whose work they were doing unless the work was tagged with an order number received from the customer and containing the name of the customer. He also admitted that only one order from the Charging Party had tags with the Charging Party's name on it, that Perry himself had worked on that order, and that that was the order which was already completed when Kelley spoke to him on August 23. Perry further admitted that Cranshaw and Frappier had worked on a number of jobs for the Charging Party, that these jobs did not have any tags so that they had no way of knowing that they were orders for the Charging Party unless Perry were to tell them, and that Perry had not apprised them of that fact. B. Respondent's defenses and concluding findings 1. The contention that there was no inducement or encouragement of employees to engage in a concerted refusal to perform services The Respondent contends that Kelley did not induce or encourage Cranshaw and Frappier to quit or terminate their employment because the decision to terminate their employment was made by them before speaking to Kelley on August 23. In support of this contention, Respondent relies on the testimony of Cranshaw to the effect that he and Frappier, his father, had discussed the matter on Thursday evening, August 22, and at that time had reached a definite decision to quit the next evening, Friday, August 23. He admitted, however, that at no time prior to their conversation with Kelley had they communicated this decision to Perry, although they saw him when they reported for work Friday morning. I cannot believe that Cranshaw and Frappier would have made no effort to communicate to Perry, as soon as possible, a decision of such finality and importance if that were truly the fact. And when Cranshaw finally did speak to Perry immediately after Kelley's conversa- tion at the gate, Cranshaw gave no indication that the decision to quit was made the previous evening. Moreover, Respondent made no effort to corroborate this alleged state of mind through the testimony of Frappier, nor was there any showing or claim that the latter was unavailable. Under all the circumstances, including the demeanor of Cranshaw while testifying, I do not credit Cranshaw's testimony in this respect Moreover, even assuming contrary to my finding, that such a decision had been made by Cranshaw and Frappier on the evening of August 22, Kelley's statements to them on August 23 constituted, as I find, inducement and encourage- ment to adhere to that decision. Respondent's further contention that there was no concerted refusal to do any- thing because Cranshaw and Frappier terminated their employment permanently, need be given short shrift By terminating their employment, they were induced or encouraged to engage in a concerted refusal to perform any services for Atlantic. Upon the basis of the entire record considered as a whole, I find that on August 23, 1957, Respondent, acting through its business agent, who admitted that one of his duties was to see that the strike was effective, induced or encouraged Cranshaw and Frappier, employees of Atlantic, to engage in a concerted refusal to perform any services for Atlantic with the object of forcing or requiring Atlantic to cease doing business with the Charging Party. 2. The contention that Atlantic was an "ally" of the Charging Party and therefore not within the protection of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) Atlantic knowingly contracted with the Charging Party, upon the latter's solicita- tion, to perform the work which the employees of the Charging Party would have performed had they not been on strike. Thereafter, Atlantic actually worked on such orders for the Charging Party and that was the sole work which Atlantic was performing for the Charging Party. Because Atlantic had failed to comply with Respondent's request not to handle the struck-bound work of the Charging Party, the Respondent, acting through its business agent, induced or encouraged two of its members employed by Atlantic concertedly to quit working for Atlantic. 860 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Respondent's object in engaging in this conduct was to force or require Atlantic to cease doing business with the Charging Party. The Respondent contends that by knowingly engaging to, and performing the struck-bound work of the Charging Party, Atlantic had so allied itself with the Charging Party that the Respondent's conduct was not prohibited by Section 8 (b) (4) (A) under the "ally" doctrine approved by the Board and the courts? The General Counsel concedes that Atlantic was an "ally" of the Charging Party within the meaning of the decisions cited in the margin ; he contends, however, that under the "ally" doctrine Respondent may lawfully induce or encourage the employees of Atlantic only to engage in a concerted refusal to handle the Charging Party's struck- bound work. Since the employees of Atlantic were also working on orders for employers whose employees were not on strike, the General Counsel contends that the Respondent's conduct in inducing or encouraging the two employees of Atlantic to cease working entirely for Atlantic, was not permissible under the "ally" doctrine and hence was violative of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act. The General Counsel is thus contending for a doctrine which would in effect brand struck work as "unfair" or "hot" and for that reason require a union to confine its conduct to the struck work by permitting it to induce or encourage the employees only to engage in a partial strike, conduct which has been held to constitute a valid ground for discharge.4 I find no warrant in the legislative history or in the court and Board decisions for the limitation urged by the General Counsel upon the "ally" rule. During the course of the debate on Section 8 (b) (4), Senator Taft stated that: This provision makes it unlawful to resort to a secondary boycott to injure the business of a third person who is wholly unconcerned in the disagreement between an employer and his employees.5 The meaning of this statement was explained by Senator Taft during the course of debate on proposed amendments to the Act in the Eighty-first Congress when Senator Taft said that: The secondary boycott ban is merely intended to prevent a union from injuring a third person who is not involved in any way in the dispute or strike, and therefore should not suffer economic damage simply because of the action of a labor organization . It [the secondary boycott ban ] is not intended to apply to a case where the third person is, in effect, in cahoots with or acting as a part of the primary employer. The spirit of the Act is not intended to protect a man who in the last case I mentioned is cooperating with a primary employer and taking his work and doing the work which he is unable to do because of the strike .6 And President Eisenhower, in his recommendations to Congress for revision of the Act, included a suggestion that Congress make it explicit "that concerted action against ( 1) an employer who is performing `farmed-out' work for the account of another employer whose employees are on strike . . . will not be treated as a secondary boycott." '1 Nowhere is there any indication that Section 8 (b) (4) was intended to protect a union's conduct only to the extent that it was directed against the struck-bound work performed by the secondary employer. On the contrary, the legislative history makes it clear that this section of the Act was intended to have no application at all to such an employer because he has lost his status as a neutral by cooperating with the primary employer in handling his struck 'bound work, and that the conduct of a union directed to the employees of such an employer , which would be violative of Section 8 (b) (4) if he were a neutral employer, does not constitute a secondary boycott within the meaning of that section. The decisions of the Board and the courts are to the same effect . Thus, in Business Machine & Office Appliance Mechanics etc., 111 NLRB 323, the union 3N. L R B v. Business Machine & Office Appliance Mechanics Conference Board, Local 459 , etc, 228 F. 2d 553 (C. A 2) ; 111 NLRB 317, 329, Douds v. Metropolitan Fed- eration of Architects, etc (Project Engineering Company ), 75 F. Supp. 672 (D. C., N Y ). * N. L R B v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F 2d 486, 496 (C. A . 8) ; Auto Parts Co , 107 NLRB 242 5 93 Cong Ree 4198. 0 95 Cong Rec. 8709. 7 Text of President's message to Congress on Taft -Hartley amendments , January 11, 1954. SHOPMEN'S LOCAL UNION NO. 501 861 was picketing the premises of several independent typewriter repair companies whose employees were engaged in repairing typewriters for numerous employers, including the struck-bound work of Royal Typewriter Co., with whom the union had a primary dispute. The pickets carried signs with the legend set forth in the margin.8 The Board pointed out that the picketing "occurred at entrances used by employees of those companies and other employers" (111 NLRB at p. 330), Although the Board has consistently held that "a picket line induces action un-, related to the literal appeal of the signs carried by the pickets" and that "the traditional union picket line before employee entrances has the effect of inducing employees to refuse to work for the picketed employer" and to refuse to cross the picket line,9 the Board nevertheless adopted the Trial Examiner's holding that one of the independent typewriter repair companies, Manhattan, "became an ally of Royal and picketable like Royal" (111 NLRB at p. 329). The Board found a violation with respect to the picketing at the premises of two of the independent typewriter repair companies because it found, "on the basis of the factual record," that no "`alliance" existed between them and Royal, the primary employer with whom the union had its primary dispute, "such as would operate to exempt the picketing of these independents from the application of § 8 (b) (4) (A)" (111 NLRB at p. 318). As to these independents, the Board specifically found that the picketing had constituted unlawful inducement and encouragement, not only of the employees of the independents, but also of employees of persons doing business with the independents at the latter's premises, and directed its order to the employees of all these employers. (111 NLRB at pp. 319-320.) The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit unanimously reversed the Board's factual finding that the independents were not "allies" of the primary employer, Royal, and held that "the picketing of the independent typewriter companies was not the kind of secondary activity which Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Taft-Hartley Act was designed to outlaw" (228 F. 2d 553, 558). The court stated that (at pp. 558-559): When an employer is attempting to avoid the economic impact of a strike by securing the services of others to do his work, the striking union obviously has a great interest, and we think a proper interest, in preventing those services from being rendered. This interest is more fundamental than the interest in bringing pressure on customers of the primary employer. Nor are those who render such services completely uninvolved in the primary strike. By doing the work of the primary employer they secure benefits themselves at the same time that they aid the primary employer. The ally employer may easily extricate himself from the dispute and insulate himself from picketing by re- fusing to do that work. . We therefore hold that an employer is not within the protection of § 8 (b) (4) (A) when he knowingly does work which would otherwise be done by the striking employees of the primary employer and where this work is paid for by the primary employer pursuant to an arrangement devised and originated by'him to enable him to meet his contractual obligations. [Emphasis supplied.] A similar issue was involved in the Project case.io There Ebasco, a corporation engaged in the business of providing engineering services, regularly subcontracted some of its work to Project, a firm providing similar services. When Ebasco's employees went on strike, Ebasco transferred a greater percentage of its work to Project, including some jobs which had already been started by Ebasco's employees. Thereupon, the union picketed Project with signs denominating Project as a scab shop for Ebasco, and induced some of Project's employees to resign their employment Notice to the Public Only Employees of Royal Typewriter Co. on Strike [Name of the appropriate repair company] employees are being used as strikebreakers Business Machine & Office Appliance Mechanics Union, Local 459, IUE-CIO See, e g, Local 50, Bakery and Confectionery Workers International Union, AFL-CIO (Arnold Bakers, Inc ), 115 NLRB 1333, 1339 ; Local 618 et at. (Incorporated Oil Com- pany ), 116 NLRB 1844, 1846 io Douds v Metropolitan Federation of Architects, etc. (Protect Engineering Company), 75 F. Supp 672 (D. C., N. Y.). 862 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD with Project. Although Project's employees were not working solely on Ebasco's struck-bound work, the court held that Project was not a person "wholly unconcerned in the disagreement between an employer and his employees" such as Section 8 (b) (4) (A) was designed to protect." Thus, Judge Rifkind stated at p. 677: The conduct of the Union in inducing Project's employees to strike is not different in kind from its conduct in inducing Ebasco's employees to strike. If the latter is not amenable to judicial restraint, neither is the former. In encouraging a strike at Project the Union was not extending its activity to a front remote from the immediate dispute but to one intimately and inextricably united to it. . The case at bar is not an instance of a secondary boycott. For these reasons it is clear that there has been no violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (A). . . . [Emphasis supplied.] The result reached in this decision has been described as a proper interpretation of the Act by its principal sponsor, Senator Taft (95 Cong. Rec. 8709), and by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the Business Machine case, hereinafter discussed. I also note the statement of Board Member Rodgers in a recent dissenting opinion,12 with which the majority opinion does not quarrel, that "the Courts have held, and properly so in my opinion, that if a secondary employer cooperates with the primary employer by handling his struck work, the secondary employer loses his status as a neutral and picketing against him does not violate the statute (citing the Metropolitan Federation of Architects and the Business Machines & Office Appliance Mechanics cases)." Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has recently held 13 that: As we understand this statute there are two necessary requirements to find a violation of it [Section 8 (b) (4) (A)]. These are: (1) Independent neutral employers (see N. L. R. B v. Business Machine and Office Appliance Mechanics Conference Board, Local 459, et al., 2 Cir 1955, 228 F. 2d 553, 557, for a situation where the secondary employers were found to be "allied" with the primary employer), and (2) the union must have as an object of its picketing (or other activity) the inducement or encouragement of the neutral employees to engage in a concerted refusal to work for their neutral employer. . . . The first question for consideration is whether or not the lessees operating retail stands in the Market were independent neutral (or secondary) employers and thus within the protection of §8 (b) (4) (A). And even the United States Supreme Court has held that "the applicable proscrip- tions of § 8 (b) (4) are expressly limited to the inducement or encouragement of concerted conduct by the employees of the neutral employer." 14 From all the foregoing, I conclude that once an employer "allies" himself with the primary employer whose employees are on strike, he stands in the shoes of the primary employer so that the union may lawfully exert the same type of pressures against the former employer as it may against the latter. I therefore find that Atlantic was an "ally" of the Charging Party, that Atlantic thereby lost its status as a neutral employer and that Atlantic therefore was not within the protection of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act. Moreover, to hold in this case that Respondent could lawfully only induce or encourage the employees to cease work solely on the struck-bound work of the Charging Party, would permit the Respondent to perform only a useless and meaningless act because, as the record shows, the employees had no way of knowing whether the orders on which they were working came from the Charging Party or from an employer whose employees were not on strike. "Although there was a close business relationship between Project and Ebasco, the issue decided was whether the Act was violated in view of the transfer of the struck work from Ebasco to Project Alpert v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, etc. (J. G. Roy and Sons Co.), 143 F Supp 371, 375 (D C, Mass ). Thus Judge Rifkind specifically stated that he did not "indicate any opinion as to the application of the Act if the normal volume of subcontracting work in this case had not been increased by reason of the primary contractor's strike " 75 F Supp at p 677 'a United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, etc. (J G Roy and Sons Company), 118 NLRB 286 (footnote 5). 13 Retail Fruit & Vegetable Clerks Union, Local 1017, et al. (Retail Grocers Assn. of San Francisco v N L R B, 249 F 2d 591 (C A 9). 14 N L li B v Inteination,al Rice Milling Co, 341 U S 665, 670-671 U. S. OIL AND REFINING COMPANY 863 Under all the circumstances, I find that Respondent's conduct in inducing or encouraging two employees of Atlantic to cease work concertedly with the object of forcing or requiring Atlantic to cease doing business with the Charging Party, was not violative of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act. I will accordingly recommend dismissal of the complaint. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] U. S. Oil and Refining Company and Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union , AFL-CIO, Petitioner U. S. Oil and Refining Company and Plumbers and Steamfitters Union, Local No. 82, AFL-CIO, Petitioner Douglas Guardian Warehouse Corporation and International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 606, AFL-CIO, Peti- tioner. Cases Nos. 19-RC-f056, 19-RC-2107, and 19-RC-2080. May 8, 1958 DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION OF ELECTIONS Upon separate petitions duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the Na- tional Labor Relations Act, a consolidated hearing was held in the above-entitled cases before E. Kenneth McClaskey, hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from prej- udicial error and are hereby affirmed. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman Leedom and Members Bean and Jenkins]. Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds: 1. U. S. Oil and Refining Company, hereinafter referred to as U. S. Oil, is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.' 2. The labor organizations involved claim to represent certain em- ployees of the Employers.' 3. A question affecting commerce exists concerning the representa- tion of employees of U. S. Oil within the meaning of Section 9 (c) (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. In Case No. 19-RC-2080, the International Union of Operating Engineers (IUOE) Local No. 606 seeks to represent a unit limited to the employees of Douglas Guardian Warehouse Corporation, here- inafter referred to as Douglas. U. S. Oil operates an oil refinery at Tacoma, Washington, and Douglas is a public warehousing business operating throughout the i In view of our finding , infra, that the bonded representatives sought in a separate unit, Case No. 19-RC-2080, are employees of U S 0i1, it is not necessary to determine whether Douglas Guardian Warehouse is likewise engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act 2 The 011 , Chemical and Atomic Workers, hereinafter referred to as the Oil Workers, and the International Union of Operating Engineers , Local No. 606, hereinafter referred to as IUOE, intervened in the proceedings brought by the other unions. 120 NLRB No. 116.