122 NLRB 125
Talladega Foundry & Machine Co.
TALLADEGA FOUNDRY & MACHINE COMPANY
125
weeks of November and the first 2 weeks of December, and that there
is likely to be a sharp decline in the size of the operations after Janu-
ary 1. In these circumstances, we hereby direct the Regional Direc-
tor to hold the election hereinafter directed, at or near the peak of
the season, occurring first after the issuance of this Decision and Direc-
tion of Election.
[Text of Direction of Election omitted from publication.]
Talladega Foundry & Machine Company and Local 421, In-
ternational Molders
& Foundry Workers Union of North
America, AFL-CIO.
Case No. 10-CA-2746.
November 19, 1958
DECISION AND ORDER
On November 12, 1957, Trial Examiner Thomas S. Wilson issued
his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had engaged in certain unfair labor practices and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report
attached hereto.
Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the
Intermediate Report and a supporting brief.
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The
rulings are hereby affirmed.
The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the
case and hereby adopts the Trial Examiner's findings and recom-
mendations insofar as they are consistent with our decision herein.'
The Trial Examiner recommends that all dischargees 2 should be
offered reinstatement and back pay, and that reinstatement be granted,
upon request, to the strikers.3
The Respondent excepts, contending
that all dischargees and strikers are disqualified from reinstatement
by reason of strike-connected misconduct.
We find, contrary to the
Trial Examiner, that the evidence concerning strike misconduct by
five of the six dischargees and by strikers Wright and Gilliland was
1 The Respondent excepts to the Trial Examiner 's conduct of the proceedings and urges
that the proceedings be set aside under the doctrine of Indianapolis Glove Company,
88 NLRB 986 , to avoid the appearance of a partisan tribunal.
Although, as discussed
below, we disagree with the Trial Examiner 's conclusion that the conduct of the dis-
chargees and certain strikers did not disqualify any of them from reinstatement, we have
concluded that the Trial Examiner 's conduct of the proceedings does not warrant setting
them aside.
2 James Sanders, Aughey
(Bud) Mitchell , James Mellon , Uell Dyson, Grover Sperling,
and James L. Watkins.
The strikers named by the Trial Examiner were : Gentry Mellon, William Waites,
Joseph Marler, John Watts, Leroy Wright, Charles Woods , Jesse Gilliland , Grady Mitchell,
Edward Johnson , J. L. Wilson, Phillip Jones, James Keith, J. H. Wilson , Sam Gooden,
Thornton Phillips , and Ollie Thornton.
122 NLRB No. 26.
126
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
substantial and of the kind to warrant the - denial to them of
reinstatement.
Ralph Mitchell, district representative of the Union, who called-the
strike, testified that he told the pickets "that they wasn't supposed to
let anybody into the plant." There is considerable evidence concern-
ing activity of the dischargees and strikers implementing the apparent
picketing objective of excluding people from the Employer's premises.
Thus, five dischargees (Sanders, Mitchell, Mellon, Dyson, and Wat-
kins) and strikers Wright and Gilliland engaged in individual wrong-
doing, as follows :
Mellon and Dyson physically restrained Supervisor Holt when he
attempted to enter the plant during the strike.
Under similar cir-
cumstances, the Board and the courts have held that deliberate
obstructions of this character to a supervisor's right to enter company
premises during a strike warrants a denial of reinstatement to those
engaged in the activity 4 In the Perfect Circle case, supra, the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied reinstatement under com-
parable circumstances, giving the same legal effect to the activity "as
if they (the obstructors) had used physical violence to prevent the
entry."
Similarly, the Board stated in the American Tool Works
Company case that it cannot regard this type of activity as divorced
from all implication of a threat of physical violence.
In addition, we
note that while on the picket line, Mellon threatened employee Thorn-
ton with harm, and Dyson threatened workers with forceful inter-
ference if they tried to enter the plant.
This activity independently
of the physical restraint of the supervisor would disqualify them from
reinstatement.
For, as the Board noted in the Brookville Glove case,5
where strikers engaged in conduct of this type, they exceeded the per-
missible bounds and were not entitled to reinstatement. It further
appears that Mellon joined with others in hanging a "scab" dummy
in effigy in front of the plant.
Under the circumstances, we find,
consistent with established law, that the foregoing conduct was so
serious as to forfeit the right to reinstatement of Mellon and Dyson.
Sanders, Mitchell, Watkins, and Gilliland engaged in deliberate
obstructions to the use of the Employer's premises by those having
a right to such use during the strike. Thus, they physically restrained
trucks and their occupants from loading and unloading merchandise,
and in other respects, by "ganging" around the trucks. Such obstruc-
tions are likewise of a serious nature and the Board and courts have
regarded the conduct as sufficiently reprehensible to disqualify those
engaging in it from reinstatement.'
Apart from the foregoing, we
note, as in the cases of Mellon and Dyson, that Sanders, Mitchell, and
4 Perfect Circle Company v. N.L.R.B., 162 F. 2d 566; W.
T. Rawleigh- Company v.
N.L.R.B., 190 F. 2d 832; and The American Tool Works Company, 116 NLRB 1681, 1682.
5 Brookville Glove Company, 114 NLRB 213.
See cases cited in footnote 4.
TALLADEGA FOUNDRY & MACHINE COMPANY
127
Watkins engaged in activity which we have heretofore pointed out
would disqualify employees from reinstatement.
Thus,, Sanders
shouted threats of harm to workers in the plant and threatened em-
ployee Bell; Mitchell threatened employees coming to work and
shouted threats into the plant; and Watkins warned truckdrivers not
to enter plant premises, and shouted threats to employee Hardigree.
In addition, it appears that Mitchell joined in hanging the "scab"
dummy in effigy in front of the plant.
We therefore find that Sanders,
Mitchell, Watkins, and Gilliland also forfeited their right to rein-
statement.
Since employee Wright shouted threats into the plant at employee
Hardigree and threatened employee Bell, we find also, as in the cases
of the others engaging in similar conduct, that he forfeited his right
to reinstatement.'
We also disagree with the Trial Examiner's finding that Sam Good-
en was an employee of Respondent. Contrary to the Trial Examiner,
we find that Gooden was hired and worked with the understanding
that he was employed by, and working for, Company Official Heacock
as his personal employee, that he spent most of his time at Heacock's
house digging a basement, and that he was paid with Heacock's per-
sonal checks.
In our opinion, therefore, Gooden was the employee
of Heacock and had no employee status with the Respondent. In these
circumstances, we shall not order his reinstatement.
ORDER
Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations
Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Talladega Foundry &
Machine Company, Talladega, Alabama, its officers, successors, and
assigns, shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Discouraging membership in Local 421, International Molders
& Foundry Workers Union of North America, AFL-CIO, or in any
other labor organization of their employees, by discharging any of
their employees because of their union membership or other concerted
activities, or in any other manner discriminating in regard to their
hire or any term or condition of employment.
(b) In any manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, or to en-
gage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining
7 Chairman Leedom and Member Rodgers would also find that Grover Spurling for-
feited his right to reinstatement by whittling with a knife on the picket line, and that
by reason of such activity itself Sanders, Mitchell, and Watkins also forfeited their right
to reinstatement.
In their view, the carrying of a knife , with the blade exposed, is,
irrespective of an alleged purpose of whittling , sufficiently menacing to those seeking to
enter the plant as to warrant a denial of reinstatement.
128
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
or other mutual aid or protection; or to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Offer to Grover Spurling immediate and full reinstatement
to his former or substantially equivalent position, without prejudice
to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and make him whole,
in the manner set forth in the section of the Intermediate Report en-
titled. "The Remedy," for any loss of pay he may have suffered by
reason of the Respondent's discrimination against him.
(b) Upon application, offer immediate and full reinstatement to
their former or substantially equivalent positions without prejudice
to their seniority or other rights and privileges to the following em-
ployees: Gentry Mellon, William Waites, Joseph Marler, John Watts,
Charles Woods, Grady Mitchell, Edward Johnson, J. L. Wilson,
Phillip Jones, James Keith, J. H. Wilson, Thornton Phillips, and
Ollie Thornton. If necessary, to effectuate reinstatement, any person
hired after the commencement of the strike shall be dismissed.
(c) Preserve and make available to the Board or its agents upon
request for examination and copying, all payroll records, social-
security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports,
and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of back pay
due and the rights of employment.
(d) Post in conspicuous places in the Respondent's plant in Talla-
dega, Alabama, including all places where notices are customarily
posted, copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix." 8
Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the
Tenth Region, shall, upon being duly signed by the Respondent's
representatives, be posted by it, as aforesaid, immediately upon receipt
thereof, and maintained for at least sixty (60) consecutive days there-
after.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure
that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for the Tenth Region in writing,
within ten (10) days from the date of this Decision and Order, what
steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
8 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of
Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the
words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that :
TALLADEGA FOUNDRY & MACHINE COMPANY
129
WE WILL offer to Grover Spurling immediate and full rein-
statement to his former or substantially equivalent position with-
out prejudice to any seniority or other rights and privileges previ-
ously enjoyed, and will make him whole for any loss of pay
suffered as a result of the discrimination against him.
WE WILL offer to each of the employees named below, upon
request, immediate and full reinstatement to his former or sub-
stantially equivalent position without prejudice to any seniority
or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, discharging
if necessary any employees hired on or after September 10, 1956:
Gentry Mellon
J. L. Wilson
William Waites
Phillip Jones
Joseph Marler
James Keith
John Watts
J. H. Wilson
Charles Woods
Thornton Phillips
Grady Mitchell
Ollie Thornton
Edward Johnson
WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce
our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization,
to form labor organizations, to join or assist Local 421, Inter-
national Molders & Foundry Workers Union of North America,
AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection, and to refrain from
any or all such activities except to the extent that such member-
ship may be affected by an agreement requiring membership
in a labor organization as a condition of employment as author-
ized in Section 8(a) (3) of the Act.
All our employees are free to become or remain or to refrain from
becoming or remaining members of the above-named Union or any
other labor organization.
We will not discriminate in regard to
hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employ-
ment against any employee because of membership in, or activities on
behalf of, any such organization.
TALLADEGA FOUNDRY & MACHINE COMPANY,
Employer.
Dated----------------
By-------------------------------------
(Representative )
(Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
505305-59-vol. 122-10
130
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon charges duly filed on October 10, 1956, and amended on February 28, 1957,
by Local 421, International Molders & Foundry Workers Union of North America,
AFL-CIO, hereinafter called the Union, the General Counsel of the National Labor
Relations Board, herein called the General Counsel' and the Board, respectively,
by the Board's Regional Director for the Tenth Region (Atlanta, Georgia), issued a
complaint, dated February 28, 1957, against Talladega Foundry & Machine Company,
hereinafter called the Respondent, alleging that the Respondent had engaged in and
was engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (1) and (3)
of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, herein
called the Act.
Copies of the complaint, the charge, amended charge, and the notice
of hearing thereon were duly served upon the Respondent and the Union.
With respect to the unfair labor practices the complaint alleged that the Respond-
ent:
(1) By various enumerated actions interfered with, restrained, and coerced its
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act;
(2) by discharging and refusing to reinstate employees Uell Dyson, James Sanders,
Aughey (Bud) Mitchell, James Mellon, Grover Spurling,2 and James L. Watkins on
September 10, 1956, because of their membership in and activities on behalf of the
Union; and (3) by discharging 16 named employees 3 on September 21, 1956, because
they went out on an unfair labor practice strike on September 10, 1956, in protest to
the discharge of the aforementioned 6 employees and because of their membership
in and activities on behalf of the Union, thereby engaged in unfair labor practices
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(I) and (3) of the Act.
The Respondent duly filed its answer wherein it denied the commission of any
unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before the Trial Examiner on August 20,
21, 22, and 23, 1957, at Talladega, Alabama.
The General Counsel, the Union, and
Respondent were represented at the hearing by counsel or representatives.
Full
opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce
evidence bearing upon the issues was afforded all parties.
The parties were advised
of their right to argue orally at the hearing, which was waived, and to file briefs with
the Trial Examiner thereafter.
A brief was received from the Respondent on Octo-
ber 10, 1957.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from his observation of the witnesses, the
Trial Examiner makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Talladega Foundry & Machine Company is an Alabama corporation having its
office and place of business in Talladega, Alabama, where it is primarily engaged in
the production of repair parts for the textile industry.
During the 12-month period
ending August 31, 1956, which is a representative period, Respondent sold and shipped
in excess of $50,000 worth of such products to customers located outside the State
of Alabama.
The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Local 421, International Molders & Foundry Workers Union of North America,
AFL-CIO,
is a labor organization admitting to membership employees of the
Respondent.
i This term specifically includes counsel appearing for the General Counsel at the
hearing.
2 Also spelled "Sperling" in the record.
3 Respondent moved to dismiss as to one Sam Gooden on the ground that the evidence
proved him to.be a temporary employee of James Heacock employed to dig abasement
for Heacock.
However, the Trial Examiner denied Respondent's motion for the reason
that the evidence proved that, in addition to digging Heacock's basement, Gooden also
worked at the foundry where his timecard was punched in and out apparently regardless
of where he worked and Gooden was also paid as were the remainder of Respondent's
employees by Respondent's bookkeeper.
The evidence to disprove Gooden's employment
status with Respondent was not produced at the hearing although within Respondent's
power to produce if it would have so proved. Consequently the Trial Examiner must
find that Gooden was an employee of Respondent.
TALLADEGA FOUNDRY & MACHINE COMPANY
III.
THE -UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
131
A. The facts
Respondent is a corporation presided over by its 2 principal shareholders, A. M.
Hocutt and James Heacock, and is engaged in the foundry and machine shop busi-
ness on a job-shop basis at its plant in Talladega, Alabama, where it employed at all
times material here approximately 32 production and maintenance employees under
Plant Superintendent Grady Williams and Foundry Foreman Clarence (Pat) Col-
quitt, Machine Shop Foreman James Hamlin, and Head Patternmaker Tom Holt.
Respondent acknowledged the supervisory capacity of Colquitt and Hamlin but
denied that Holt had supervisory authority.
The facts show that Holt, an elderly
man, back in the 1930's was foreman of the present foundry, had subsequently
operated his own foundry, and since 1948 had been head patternmaker for the
present owners and, as he described it, "I tell the boys [patternmakers] what to do,
more-or-less."
He expects the 2 patternmakers, 1 of whom is his son, to report to
him if and when they leave their work.
When Pat Colquitt is absent, Holt bosses the
foundry.
Although he executed affidavits stating that he had authority to hire and
fire employees prior to the hearing, he testified at the hearing that he then could not
recall ever being actually informed that he had such authority.
Due to his experi-
ence the employees recognized him as the "Boss-man" in the pattern shop.
His
admitted duties prove him to have supervisory authority.
The Trial Examiner
so finds.
About September 5 employee Sanders asked Holt to sign a union authorization
card.
Holt refused saying that Respondent would never recognize a union, that "it's
a bad thing to do" and that he had a brother who "joined a union, and had been put
out of a job more times than one, and got in bad shape,
. the same thing that
will happen to you."
Holt inquired as to who had joined the Union. Sanders gave
him a few names including employee Bill Bowman.
On the evening of Friday, September 7, 1956,4 following at least a week of
organizing and getting union authorization cards signed, some 27 of the Respondent's
employees were initiated into membership in the Union at the union hall in
Talladega by Ralph Mitchell, the district representative of the International Union.
On Sunday, September 9, Tom Holt stopped at employee Jesse Gilliland's house
when Gilliland asked Holt what he was doing.
Holt answered that he was just
seeing some of the employees who wanted to work and "don't want to have
nothing to do with what's coming up" and "That's my business out here, to see the
ones that wanted to work, without having anything to do with the Union."
Holt
also stated that he had seen employee Spurling who was for the union "a hundred
percent."
When next thereafter the employees reported back for work at 6 a.m. on Monday,
September 10, employees Bill Bowman and Bud Sexton 5 were notified that they
had been laid off or discharged because of a lack of work in the plant .6
Before 10 a.m. on September 10, Foreman Hamlin asked employee Sanders how
he "stood about the union" and was told that Sanders "stood on both feet."
Hamlin
made the same inquiry of employee James Watkins who stated that he was for the
Union.
Hamlin also asked employee Cull the same question. But Hamlin main-
tained that employee Bud Mitchell "volunteered" the information that they were
organizing a union.
From the testimony of Holt and Hamlin it is clear that knowledge of the Union
was widespread about Respondent's plant by September 10 at least.
* All dates are in the year 1956 unless otherwise noted.
6In its original and amended charges the Union claimed that Bowman, Sexton, and
one Enos Horn had also been discriminatorily discharged on September 10 in addition
to the six previously mentioned herein.
However, by letter dated February 28, 1957, the
Regional Director wrote that "it does not appear that there is sufficient evidence [in the
above three named instances] to warrant proceedings at this time" and, therefore, he
refused to include said individuals in the complaint filed that same day.
Hence the
discharges of Bowman, Sexton, and Horn are not at issue here and are, therefore, dis-
charges for cause. .
6 Hocutt testified that on the previous Saturday he and the foreman had discussed the
possibility of laying off Bowman and Sexton in the event that the Sunday mail did not
contain additional orders which would have kept them busy.
Hocutt further testified that
his first information that Bowman and Sexton had actually been laid off was given him
by some "third party" (Ralph Mitchell) about 10 o'clock Monday morning and before he
had opened the day's mail.
132
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Sometime that morning Bowman and Sexton met Ralph Mitchell on the streets
of Talladega and reported their discharge to him .
About 10 a.m. Mitchell, accom-
panied by Bowman and Sexton, repaired to the Respondent 's plant and to the
12-by-15-foot office then occupied by Hocutt and Heacock .
After introducing
himself by name and by occupation, Mitchell demanded that the Respondent rein-
state Bowman and Sexton .
Although this was Hocutt's first information as to
these discharges, according to his testimony, Hocutt stated that such discharges
were within the privilege of the foreman and that he would stand back of them.
Mitchell then argued that the rules of the Union required that layoffs be in accord-
ance with seniority and that Bowman and Sexton must be reinstated while two
employees with lesser seniority should be laid off.
Hocutt answered that there was
no union in the plant, that the Respondent would not recognize a union , and that
we "do business our way."
Whereupon Mitchell informed Hocutt that the men
had all joined the Union on Friday night and offered to show Hocutt the signed
authorization cards as proof .
When Hocutt replied that he could have signed the
cards himself, Bowman was dispatched to the plant to bring in some of the
employees to prove that they had all joined the Union.
When Bowman returned to the office accompanied by employees Uell Dyson,
"Red" Sanders , and Grover Spurling from the foundry and by "Bud " Mitchell,
James Watkins, and Jimmy Mellon from the machine shop, Mitchell requested the
men to tell Hocutt that the employees had all joined the Union which they proceeded
to do,
Hocutt reiterated that the Respondent had no union in the plant , would not
recognize any union , and would continue to do business "our way."
Hocutt then
requested the employees present to "clock out" because "this might take 5 minutes
or 2 hours."
The six named employees thereupon left the office and returned to the time
clocks in their respective departments where each group was met by its foreman
with the employees' timecards in hand who informed the employees that he had
already punched out their timecard , that they were discharged and were to get their
tools and get out.7
The two groups then left their respective departments , met again on the pathway
to the office , and reentered the office in a group .
Employee James Watkins in-
formed Hocutt that the foreman had already punched out their timecards and had
informed the employees that they were fired .
Again Hocutt stated that the foreman
had authority to hire and fire and that he would stand back of them.
Thereupon
the argument in the office centered around the reinstatement of eight men with
Mitchell demanding the reinstatement of these six plus Bowman and Sexton together
with the layoff of the two employees in the plant having the least seniority in
accordance with the union rules.
After some futile argument about the reinstate-
ment of these eight men during which Mitchell threatened at least twice that,
unless the men were reinstated , he would pull out all the men and close the plant,
Hocutt asked if he meant the men would "quit."
Mitchell, according to the testi-
mony of Hocutt, answered "yes."
Finally Hocutt said that he had work to do
and ordered the men to "get out." 8
In accordance with that order Mitchell and the eight employees then left the
office and the plant, went out onto the street, and called through the windows to
their fellow employees who were still at work telling them what had happened
and requesting them to come out also.
Almost all the employees left their work
and joined the pickets sometime during the day of September 10 or the following
day.
The employees formed a picket line and, when picket signs had been painted
that same day, carried picket signs.
About noon on September 10 after the picket line had been established, Gilliland
who did not join the strike that day was having lunch with Hamlin and Holt in the
plant.
Hamlin expressed surprise that the men had gone out and that Gilliland
was not with them.
When Gilliland noted that he was still inside , Hamlin said,
"Well, I'm glad you're not, because you can work here, but there won't be no
union , here.
I can tell you that, here and now."
Sometime that same day employee Harrison, Jr., who had not joined the strikers
at first, told Hamlin that he was going to leave the plant and join the strikers.
Ham-
lin promptly punched out Harrison 's timecard.
The Respondent's timecards for the week beginning September 10 are of signifi-
cance.
The timecards of Sanders , Dyson, Mitchell, Mellon, Watkins, Spurling,
T In this record this is the only instance, With one exception , where a foreman ever
clocked out an employee.
8 Hocutt and Heacock, alone of all the witnesses , testified that Hocutt twice ordered the
employees to go back to work.
TALLADEGA FOUNDRY & MACHINE COMPANY
133
Edward Johnson, and Charles Ingram indicate that these individuals checked into
the plant at or before 6 a.m. with the exception of James Watkins who checked in
at 7 a.m.
All of the above cards are clocked out as 10:08 or 10:09 a.m.
The timecard of Charles Woods contains the following notation on the line re-
served for Monday, September 10: "0. K. by Pat C. [Olquitt]." 9
The timecard of Edward Johnson indicates that he clocked in at 5: 30 a.m., out
at 11:59, in again at 12:26 p.m. and out again at 2:47 p.m.
This timecard also
contains the same annotation "o. k. by Pat C." 10
Hocutt testified that as soon as the employees had left the plant, he ordered the
foreman to secure men to pour off "the hot stuff," molten iron.
Hocutt was
obviously mistaken in this testimony as the record shows that the cupola in which
the iron was melted was never fired before 11:30 a.m. nor poured until 2:30 p.m.
so that it was not fired on September 10 so there was no "hot stuff" to be poured.
Hocutt also testified that iron was not poured on September 10 nor until December
31.
As there was no iron to pour on September 10, it is clear that Hocutt did not
order replacements that day. So far as this record shows the first replacement hired
by Respondent was on September 25.
On September 21 the Respondent gave all the strikers and the six discharged em-
ployees their paychecks for work performed prior to the strike.
Attached to
these paychecks was a typewritten slip reading:
Terminated 9/10/56
Reason: Quit voluntarily
A W-2 income tax form was also attached.
Jesse Gilliland, whose presence in the plant had surprised Hamlin on September
10, had gone to the hospital the next day for a period of 3 days and on doctor's
orders had remained at home the following week.
On Friday, September 21, he
returned to the plant to get his paycheck.
His check had the same "Terminated
9/10/56.
Reason:
Quit voluntarily" attached.
Gilliland asked Hocutt about
that explaining that his wife had told Colquitt that Gilliland would return to work
as soon as he was able.
Hocutt suggested that he, Hocutt, could remove the termi-
nation slip and then asked "By the way, you were with those fellows out there, or
are you with us?"
When Gilliland answered that he was "with the fellows outside,"
Hocutt said, "Well, that's all.
That [the termination notice] stays on there," pointed
to the door and told Gilliland to get out.
The strike was still current at the time of the hearing and the picket line still
in existence .
No request for reinstatement has been made.
Nor have there been
any reinstatements.
Ultimately the Respondent did secure replacements for the men on the picket
lines but there is no evidence in this record that any of the strikers were replaced
on or before September 21. In fact so far as this record indicates the first replace-
ment hired by the Respondent was "Red" Hardigree who was employed on Sep-
tember 25.
Other replacements who testified at the hearing had been hired as late
as January 1956.
B. The Respondent's evidence
The findings made above are a synthesis of the credible testimony of all the wit-
nesses produced at the hearing.
However, the tale told in the testimony of the Respondent's witnesses differs
greatly from that above. In fact the Respondent's testimony in many places can-
not be reconciled with that given by witnesses for the General Counsel.
According to Hocutt and Heacock, about 10 a.m. on September 10 a group of
11 or more employees "suddenly burst" into their 12-by-15-foot office with a
"stranger," whom they subsequently during the picketing learned was Ralph Mitchell,
demanding the reinstatement of Bowman and Sexton which Hocutt testified was
the first that he knew of the fact that Bowman and Sexton had been discharged.
They maintained that they had no idea that there was a union in the picture at
all and that Mitchell failed to introduce himself either by name or by occupation.
They claimed that at least twice Hocutt ordered the men to go back to work, that
Respondent never discharged any of the employees but that they just "voluntarily
quit" when the Respondent refused to reinstate Bowman and Sexton.
0 Hocutt testified that on the morning of the strike Charles Woods left the plant be-
cause of sickness and said he would like to stay home until "things kind of quieted down."
10 The record contains no further information as to employee Edward Johnson other
than that his timecard like that of Woods' indicates that at least he did not work the
remainder of the week beginning September 10.
134
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Neither Hocutt nor Heacock could recall being told by the employees upon their
return from clocking out that they had been discharged by their foreman .
Hocutt's
memory of events proved to be quite restricted.
Heacock's was even more so in
view of the fact that he contended that even the "sudden burst" of 11 or more
employees into that small office failed to disturb his concentration upon his affairs
until Hocutt ordered the men to clock out.
However, he had roused sufficiently
to note that Ralph Mitchell , Bowman, and Sexton led the group of employees into,
the office.
Heacock's alleged concentration verged on the unbelievable.
There are several things in the Respondent 's version of events which make it
extremely hard, if not impossible , to believe.
In the first place, according to Hocutt,
he held a 20- to 30-minute conference over employment and working conditions
with a total "stranger" whose name and occupation Hocutt claims not to have
learned until some little time after the picketing had been in progress .
Admittedly
this conference revolved around the reinstatement of employees , conditions of
employment, and seniority.
Both stockholders admitted that this "stranger" had
offered them the signed union authorization cards as proof of his authority to speak
on their behalf.
Furthermore, Hocutt acknowledged having heard rumors that
other Talladega foundries were being organized by the Union .
Thus, at this late
date in the year 1956 A.D ., it stretches credulity beyond the breaking point that
two present .-day employers in the United States of America in the light of these facts
could still remain in ignorance that they were involved with a union .
In addition,
the inquiries made by Foreman Hamlin and Holt as to the affiliation of the em-
ployees earlier that same morning proves beyond cavil that they , at least, knew
at that time that the Union was active in the plant .
It is impossible for this Trial
Examiner to believe that Hocutt and Heacock would have discussed employment
problems, working conditions, and seniority in the plant with a total "stranger"
for a period of 20 or 30 minutes without knowing that the statutes of the United
States gave that "stranger" some rights in regard thereto .
Thus the Trial Examiner
cannot credit the Respondent's first defense of ignorance.
Although the matter is of little consequence , the Respondent maintained that
all 11 or more employees "burst in" to the office at the same time while the General
Counsel's witnesses maintained that Ralph Mitchell, Bowman, and Sexton held a
preliminary discussion on the reinstatement of Bowman and Sexton prior to calling
the other 6 employees into the office to prove the authenticity of the cards offered
to Hocutt and also the fact of their union membership .
Although from his testimony
at least one of the six employees would seem to have been present throughout the
complete conference which, of course, militates against the finding made by the
Trial Examiner heretofore, logic appears to dictate that the grievance of Bowman
and Sexton would have been handled by the union representative and the grievants
alone and that, when Respondent questioned the representative capacity of Ralph
Mitchell and the authenticity of the signed authorization cards, the employees
themselves would have been called to prove or disprove the contention made by
Ralph Mitchell.
At one point in the hearing Heacock appeared to confirm the
testimony of the witnesses for the General Counsel that Ralph Mitchell , Bowman,
and Sexton were in the office first but immediately thereafter explained that he only
meant that those three had led the other employees in "bursting" into the office.
However, it makes no difference to the result in this case as to whether the conference
was in two parts or in only one.
Respondent's contention that the employees "voluntarily quit" their employment
is important but will not withstand analysis.
Hocutt's own testimony makes it clear,
even though Hocutt testified definitely that the word "strike" was not used during the
conference , that Ralph Mitchell threatened at least twice that the employees would
not return to work unless Bowman and Sexton were reinstated .
It was on the
second occasion , according to Hocutt 's testimony, when he, Hocutt, asked if that
meant that the men "quit" to which Ralph Mitchell allegedly answered "yes."
Even
with the use of the terminology testified to by Hocutt, the fact was clear that the
employees intended to withhold their services unless their demand that Bowman
and Sexton and, after the clocking out incident , the other six employees be reinstated
was granted and were not resigning their employment as contended by the Respond-
ent.
In addition, the immediate setting up of the picket line confirmed the fact that
the employees never intended to resign from their employment with the Respondent.
Respondent at least knew the employees were striking and not resigning .
Further-
more, it is clear from his testimony that Foreman Hamlin also recognized that the
men had been discharged even though he had not attended the conference.
Both foremen denied having discharged the six employees although both admitted
that they had clocked the men in their division out.
The timecards of the Re-
spondent proved that Foreman Hamlin checked out employees Mitchell, Jimmy
Mellon, and James Watkins at 10:08 a.m. and that Foreman Colquitt 1 minute later
TALLADEGA FOUNDRY & MACHINE COMPANY
135
checked out employees Charlie Woods , Uell Dyson, Jimmy Sanders, and Grover
Spurling.
The timecard of employee Woods also contains on the line reserved
for Monday, September 10, the notation "o. k. by Pat C."
Although his timecard
is not in evidence, Foreman Colquitt testified that, when employee Harrison, Jr.,
informed him that he was going out with the Union, Colquitt clocked him out. The
other timecards in evidence indicate that in seven other cases of employees at work
on September 10 their cards were not clocked out by the employee or by his fore-
man.
Thus it is quite evident that the foremen were clocking out only those em-
ployees whom they knew to be participating in the conference on reinstatement,
working conditions, and seniority with Hocutt and Heacock or those they knew
had joined the strike.
This unique and simultaneous action of the foremen together
with the testimony of the witnesses for the General Counsel convinced the Trial
Examiner, and he therefore finds, that Respondent discharged Uell Dyson, James
Sanders, Grover Spurling, Aughey Mitchell, Jimmy Mellon, and James Watkins on
September 10 because of their participation in a concerted or union effort regarding
conditions of employment, reinstatement, and seniority.
C. Conclusions
Under the facts of this case there can be no question but that the six employees
who were called to the conference in Hocutt 's office were engaged in a protected
concerted union activity in protesting the discharge of Bowman and Sexton and in
attempting to promote their own interests by securing Respondent 's approval of
the use of seniority in layoffs.
The facts also prove that these six employees were
discharged by the Respondent for having left their work in order to participate
in this protected concerted union activity.
It is too well settled for citation of
authority that an employer commits an unfair labor practice in violation of Section
8(a)(3) of the Act when he discharges an employee for having engaged in such
union and concerted activities .
The Trial Examiner finds that these six employees
were discharged in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and
( 3) of the Act.
Nor can there be any question but that the strike which resulted immediately
thereafter was caused by the Respondent 's unfair labor practices in discharging these
six employees for having engaged in such concerted activities .
This is so even
though said strikers may have also been protesting the discharges of Bowman and
Sexton as well as those of the six.
The law is well settled that when there are two
concurrent causes of a strike, only one of which happens to be an unfair labor
practice, the resulting strike is still an unfair labor practice strike.
Thus the strike
here caused by the discharges of Bowman and Sexton , which were legitimate, and
by the discharges of the six for engaging in the Union's concerted protest, which
constituted an unfair labor practice , is still an unfair labor practice strike.
So those
employees listed in Appendix A attached hereto who left their work to engage in
an unfair labor strike are unfair labor practice strikers entitled to reinstatement
upon request therefor .
The Trial Examiner so finds.
Furthermore, the facts prove that Respondent attempted to discharge all the
striking employees at least on September 21 by giving them their termination notices
along with their checks .
These termination slips made it clear that the employees
had been terminated , so far as Respondent was concerned , as of September 10, the
day they went on strike .
That it was Respondent's policy to terminate an employee
upon determining that the employee had joined the strike was clearly demonstrated
by Respondent's action in the Harrison, Jr., and the Jesse Gilliland episodes .
It is an
unfair labor practice for an employer to attempt to discharge an employee for
engaging in a legal strike.
By thus discharging the 16 employees listed in Ap-
pendix A because they engaged in a legal strike Respondent violated Section 8(a) (3)
of the Act.
Strangely enough, even if we accept the Respondent 's theory that the six employees
were not discharged and that the other employees merely went out on an economic
strike against the Respondent in protest against the legitimate discharges of Bowman
and Sexton and against the Respondent's refusal to recognize their own economic
demands, the ultimate result as to all these employees is not substantially changed.
Section 2(3) of the Act defines the term "employee " as " . . . any employee . . .
and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or
in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor prac-
tice.
"
Thus, even under the Respondent's theory, the six employees and
those strikers listed in Appendix A whose work ceased as a result of a current
labor dispute with the Respondent on or about September 10 continued to remain
employees of the Respondent until replaced permanently .
The Respondent had the
right to replace such economic strikers but it had no right to discharge them on
September 21 for concertedly engaging in an economic strike as it tried to do on
136
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that day when the strikers were notified that they had been discharged as of Sep-
tember 10 allegedly for "voluntarily quit[ting)." In view of the existence of the
picket line in front of Respondent's plant from September 10 on, even Respondent
must have recognized that the employees were engaged in a strike and had not
voluntarily "resigned" their positions with the Respondent.
This mass discharge
of September 21, prior to replacement, was in violation of the statutory right of
employees guaranteeing them the right to strike and thus constituted an unfair labor
practice in that it amounted to discharging employees for engaging in protected
concerted union activities in violation of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act.
As this mass
discharge had the normal and natural tendency to prolong the strike, it would
convert what, under the Respondent's theory, had been an economic strike into
an unfair labor practice strike.
Nor can the Respondent contend logically that
this mass discharge was a mere "tactical maneuver," as it sometimes has been called
in Board cases.
At least on September 21, even under Respondent's theory,
Respondent discharged all those employees involved here for participating in an
economic strike prior to replacement in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act."
In addition, the Trial Examiner finds that Respondent interfered with, restrained,
and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7
of the Act by the interrogation of the employees by Foreman Hamlin, by the
statements made to Jesse Gilliland by Foreman Tom Holt, and by the statement
made to Jesse Gilliland by Hocutt, and that thereby Respondent violated Section
8 (a)( 1 ) of the Act.
D. Alleged violence and misconduct
As its last line of defense to the reinstatement of the dischargees and the strikers
here, Respondent contends that various acts of alleged violence and misconduct
committed during the period of the strike disqualified all these individuals from
their right to reinstatement.
The Trial Examiner cannot agree.
Although a goodly portion of the hearing was devoted to this subject, almost
without exception the evidence contained nothing of substance.
The police, who
spent a considerable amount of time around the plant at the insistence of Hocutt,
agreed that the picketing was peaceful.
Even more important is the fact that even
those employees who continued working throughout the strike with one exception
concurred in this opinion.
During the whole period of the strike only two strikers
were arrested under circumstances which will be described hereinafter and those
two were never brought to trial.
Although this strike has lasted for over a period
of a year, yet there are only three minor matters which require any attention here.
This appears quite remarkable.
The first of these three incidents occurred the morning after the strike began when
Foreman Tom Holt, a crippled, elderly man who was the head patternmaker, arrived
for work.
He parked his automobile alongside the plant and walked a half block
or more to the front entrance of the plant while employee Joe Marler and a group of
pickets, in Holt's words, "told me he was going to ask me to stay out [of the plant]."
The strikers congregated around the old man as he was walking urging him to stay
out of the plant and told him that he would be a "scab" if he crossed their picket line.
While the group was arguing with Holt at the front door of the plant, Hocutt came
out, got Holt by the arms and began pulling him up the stairs to the front door.
Thereupon, employees Dyson and Mellon caught hold of Holt's person with the
result that a sort of tug-of-war commenced.
Two policemen arrived on the scene at
this point and, at Hocutt's suggestion, arrested Dyson and Mellon.
Holt continued
on into the plant and has continued to do so daily thereafter without further incident.
As noted, the cases against Dyson and Mellon have never been tried.
Of course,
neither Dyson nor Mellon had any right to touch Holt-but then neither did Hocutt.
It was an unfortunate fracas which will happen on any picket line.
There was noth-
ing vicious in the incident for even Holt, old and crippled as he was, was not injured
in any way.
Despite the fact that Dyson and Mellon had no right to touch Holt, the
Trial Examiner is convinced that there is nothing in this incident which would war-
rant disqualifying either man from reinstatement.
The next thing is that the strikers readily admitted that they customarily called
persons who crossed their picket line "scabs."
Respondent's brief relies heavily upon
the decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in the Caterpillar Tractor case,
230 F. 2d 357, which quoted extensively from Member Rodgers' dissenting opinion
in the Board decision in that same matter, 113 NLRB 553, as authority for the
proposition that by using such a term of opprobrium the strikers forfeited their rights
to reinstatement.
The Caterpillar case is inapposite here.
That case is authority for
u N.L.R.B. v. J. E. McCatron et al. d/b/a Price Valley Lumber Co., 216 F. 2d 212
(C.A. 9), cert. denied 348 U.S. 943.
TALLADEGA FOUNDRY & MACHINE COMPANY
137
the proposition that an employer may take reasonable precautions to maintain dis-
cipline and to prevent dissension among its employees within the plant .
In the instant
case, unlike the Caterpillar case, a picket line was in existence and employees were
on strike outside the plant.
In the common, ordinary day-to-day use of language
those on the picket line were either "strikers" or "pickets" while those who crossed
the picket line to continue working were either "loyal employees ," "strike-breakers,"
or, in labor parlance, "scabs."
No case has been cited, nor has the Trial Examiner
found one, where this Board has ever denied reinstatement to unfair labor practice
strikers for mere name-calling .
In fact, the Board has refused to find mere name-
calling to amount to a violation of Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act.12
Consequently,
the Trial Examiner finds that the mere name-calling here is insufficient to deny
reinstatement.
Respondent also complained that the pickets succeeded in practically shutting the
Respondent's plant off from the delivery and pickup service of the trucking com-
panies by speaking to the truckdrivers as they approached the Respondent's loading
platform and to the managers of the trucklines.
This was legitimate and proper so
long as no coercion or intimidation was used especially in the absence of the filing by
the Respondent of an 8(b)(1) (A) charge.13
The only possible evidence of any such coercion or intimidation of such truck-
drivers was on one occasion when the picket speaking to the driver happened to be
eating an apple by slicing off bits thereof with the assistance of a pocketknife.
As
this is, and has been for a long time , one well-recognized method of eating apples, the
Trial Examiner can find neither the presence of the pocketknife for that purpose to
amount to coercion nor that a man, just because he is on a picket line , must change
his method of eating apples in order to avoid the suspicion of attempting to coerce
someone.
Nor can the Trial Examiner find, as requested by Respondent, that pickets
on a picket line for the same reason must abandon their right to while away the time
by whittling.
On one occasion, however-and this is the third incident referred to above-
pickets Bud Mitchell and Watkins did continue picketing in front of the loading plat-
form as the company truck started to back into it.
The truck was stopped when the
pickets failed to get out of the way.
The truck was delayed a very few minutes
until a policeman took Mitchell by the sleeve and gently removed him from in front
of the loading platform.
This failure of the pickets to move amounted to physical
obstruction of the right of entry to the building and, as such, does amount to mis-
conduct.
But, as it was the only such episode in a strike of more than a year's
duration, thus qualifying it as only an "isolated incident," such isolated incident will
not disqualify the guilty parties from their right to reinstatement.
One other incident requires mention here.
Respondent hired "Red" Hardigree
on September 25.
He had no trouble entering the plant seeking employment.
When
Hardigree started to drive into the plant the next morning, September 26, there were
pickets on and about the driveway into the employees' parking lot.
Hardigree
stopped his car at the entrance to the driveway to the Respondent's parking lot.
He
then backed his car to the middle of the street, put it in gear, and started forward at
a speed he estimated as 10 or 12 miles per hour across the sidewalk and into the
entrance to the parking lot, scattering pickets as he went.
He stopped the car in the
parking lot, got out, reached into the back and brought forth a shotgun which he
admitted having placed in his automobile that morning.
At this point Foremen
Colquitt and Hamlin, who were in the parking lot, took both Hardigree and his shot-
gun in hand and into the plant.
According to Hardigree's testimony, he was fol-
lowed by an automobile with a few pickets in it as he left work that evening.
This
caused him to take a circuitous route on his way home and to drive his car up to an
admitted speed of 90 miles per hour.
Even if we assume the Hardigree story to be
true, which this Trial Examiner doubts in view of the fact that even Hardigree
admitted that the car with pickets was not behind him all the time during this circui-
tous drive, it must be admitted that Hardigree's actions of that morning were suf-
ficiently provocative to have provoked personal retaliation by those whose life and
limb had been endangered by Hardigree earlier.
Hardigree was arrested for reckless
driving but his case was never tried.
Thereafter, Hardigree entered and left the
plant without further incident.
After considering all of the evidence presented, the Trial Examiner finds that,
whether considered as to individuals alone or as to the men on the picket line as a
group, the evidence fails to establish any violence or strike misconduct sufficient to
warrant disqualifying said strikers and pickets from reinstatement.
12 Sunset Line and Twine Company, 79 NLRB 1487, 1505.
13 J. W. Banta Towing Company, Inc., at at., 116 NLRB 1787.
138
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
IV.
THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in con-
nection with the operations of the Respondent described in section I, above, have a
close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce
and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
It having been found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor
practices, it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and that it
take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
It having been found that the Respondent discriminated in regard to the hire and
tenure of employment of James Sanders, Aughey (Bud) Mitchell, James Mellon, Uell
Dyson, Grover Spurling, and James L. Watkins by discharging them on September
10, 1956, the Trial Examiner will recommend that Respondent offer said employees
immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent position
without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges and make each of
them whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered by !reason of said discrimination
against him by payment to him of a sum of money equal to that which he would
have earned as wages from the date of the discrimination against him to the
date of the offer of reinstatement less his net earnings during said period, in
accordance with the formula set forth in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289.
It having been found that the Respondent further discriminated in regard to the
hire and tenure of employment of those employees listed in Appendix A attached
hereto by attempting to discharge each of them on September 21, 1956, while they
were engaged in an unfair labor practice strike, the Trial Examiner will recommend
that, upon request, the Respondent grant each of them immediate and full rein-
statement to his former or substantially equivalent position without prejudice to his
seniority or other rights and privileges, discharging, if necessary, any and all
employees hired subsequent to September 10, 1956.
In the opinion of the Trial Examiner, the unfair labor practices committed by the
Respondent in the instant case are such as to indicate an attitude of opposition to the
purposes of the Act generally. In order, therefore, to make effective the inter-
dependent guarantees of Section 7 of the Act, thereby minimizing industrial strife
which burdens and obstructs commerce, and thus effectuate the policies of the
Act, it will be recommended that the Respondent cease and desist from infringing
in any manner upon the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the
case, the Trial Examiner makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Local 421, International
Molders & Foundry Workers Union of North
America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
2. By discharging James Sanders, Aughey (Bud) Mitchell, James Mellon, Uell
Dyson, Grover Spurling, and James L. Watkins on September 10, 1956, thus
discriminating in regard to their hire and tenure of employment, because each of
them had engaged in protected concerted activities for the purposes of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection of employees and because of his
membership and activities on behalf of the Union, the Respondent has engaged in
and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act.
3. By attempting to discharge those employees listed in Appendix A attached
hereto on September 21, 1956, because each of them had engaged in concerted
union activities by engaging in a strike for the purposes of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection of employees and because of his membership and
activities on behalf of the Union, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act.
4. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, Respondent has committed unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
,MONTEX DRILLING COMPANY
APPENDIX A
139
Gentry Mellon
Jesse Gilliland
J. H. Wilson
William Waites
Grady Mitchell
Sam Gooden
Joseph Marler
Edward Johnson
Thornton Phillips
John Watts
J. L. Wilson
Ollie Thornton
Leroy Wright
Phillip Jones
Charles Woods
James Keith
Montex Drilling Company and International Union of Operating
Engineers, Local No. 672, AFL-CIO.
Cases Nos. 33-CA-439
and 33-CA-440.
November 19, 1958
DECISION AND ORDER
On July 1, 1958, Trial Examiner Martin S. Bennett issued his Inter-
mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Inter-
mediate Report attached hereto.
Thereafter, the Respondent filed
exceptions to the Intermediate Report together with a supporting
brief.'
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the Board has delegated its powers in
connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman Leedom
,and Members Bean and Fanning].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed.
The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the
case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner.
1. We find, in agreement with the Trial Examiner, that the Re-
spondent is engaged in commerce, and that it will effectuate the poli-
cies of the Act to assert jurisdiction in this case.
The Respondent,
while not denying that it is presently engaged in commerce, contends,
in effect, that the Board should not assert jurisdiction because the
General Counsel failed to prove his allegation that Respondent was
engaged in commerce during the 12-month period immediately pre-
ceding the filing of the complaint.
We find no merit in this conten-
tion.
The unfair labor practices involved herein occurred between
October 10 and 27, 1957.
As the record shows that during its fiscal
year ending October 31, 1956, the fiscal period immediately proxi-
1 The Respondent also requested oral argument.
This request is hereby denied as the
record, including the exceptions and brief, adequately presents the issues and positions
of the parties.
122 NLRB No. 20.