Haberle Engineering and Manufacturing Co.

372 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD to check the eligibility list. Because Heaps' status was ascertainable by the Petitioner, through its members in the plant, we will apply the Board's usual rule that the burden of checking the accuracy of eligibility lists rests with the participating unions, and not with the Board. The Petitioner's belated objection to Heaps' ballot is in the nature of a postelection challenge and will not be entertained.2 As Steelworkers has obtained a majority of the valid votes cast, we shall certify it as the exclusive representative of the employees in the stipulated unit. [The Board certified United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, as the designated collective-bargaining representative of the em- ployees in the appropriate unit described in paragraph 4, above.] 2 Calcor Corporation, 100 NLRB 539 ; Earl Fruit Company, 107 NLRB 64. Haberle Engineering and Manufacturing Co. and International Association of Machinists, District 108, AFL-CIO. Case No. 13-CA-255. December 11, 1958 DECISION AND ORDER On August 19, 1958, Trial Examiner Eugene E. Dixon issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding, in effect, that the Respondent had not engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommending that the com- plaint be dismissed. in its entirety, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the General Coun- sel and the Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report, and briefs in support thereof. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-mem- ber panel [Chairman Leedom and Members Rodgers and Jenkins]. The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the In- termediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom- mendations of the Trial Examiner. Accordingly, we shall dismiss the complaint. [The Board dismissed the complaint.] INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon charges filed by the International Association of Machinists , District 108, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, the General Counsel of the National Labor 122 NLRB No. 64. HABERLE ENGINEERING AND MANUFACTURING CO. 373 Relations Board (herein called the General Counsel and the Board), by the Re- gional Director for the Thirteenth Region (Chicago, Ill.), issued a complaint dated February 25, 1958, against Haberle Engineering and Manufacturing Co., herein called the Respondent. With respect to the unfair labor practices the complaint alleges in substance that Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, herein called the Act, by threatening Dale Blockson on or about June 7, 1957, with reprisals because of his membership in and activity on behalf of the Union, and further that Respondent discriminated against Blockson by discharging him because of his union activity, and conduct in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. In its duly filed answer Respondent denies any violation of law. Pursuant to notice, a hearing herein was opened in Aurora, Ill., on April 1, 1958. At that time the General Counsel was granted leave to amend the com- plaint by adding a specific allegation of a Section 8(a)(1) violation over Respond- ent's objection. Respondent then moved for a continuance which motion was granted without objection by the General Counsel. Thereafter the hearing was resumed on April 14, and concluded on April 15. On May 14 a motion was filed to correct the record regarding certain testimony of Blockson or in the alternative to reopen the hearing for the purposes of taking further testimony from said Blockson. Respondent filed an objection thereto. On June 2 I issued an order reopening the hearing, and on June 19 additional testimony was taken in accord- ance with said order. All parties were represented at the hearing and afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce relevant evidence, to present oral argument, and to file briefs as well as proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Briefs were duly filed by the Respondent and the General Counsel. Upon the entire record and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT Respondent is an Illinois corporation' with its office and manufacturing plant located at Aurora, Ill., where it is engaged in the manufacture of machine prod- ucts. During the calendar year 1957, Respondent shipped from Aurora directly to points outside the State of Illinois finished products valued in excess of $500,000. Respondent admits and I find that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED International Association of Machinists, District 108, AFL-CIO, is a labor organi- zation within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES The main issue in this case is whether or not the employment of Dale Blockson was terminated by Respondent because of his activity on behalf of the Union, the Charging Party herein. At the time his employment ended on June 7, 1957,2 Blockson had been em- ployed by Respondent about 4 years. Whether or not Blockson had made several applications to Respondent before he was hired, as testified by Paul Haberle, Respondent's president and sole owner, or only one as maintained by Blockson in his testimony, it is not disputed that Haberle directed Assistant General Manager Szilage to hire Blockson. I am inclined to believe and credit Szilage's testimony that he was reluctant to hire Blockson for the reason that Blockson had an arti- ficial leg which Szilage believed, and pointed out to Haberle, might be dangerous for one working around machines and oily floors. Haberle's answer to that was "don't put him on a dangerous machine." Blockson's starting rate was $1.40 per hour. At the time he left he was earning $1.65 an hour. For the first 6 months or so Blockson worked under Foreman John Kurtz in the automotive department which was under the general direction of Louis F. Schmidt. Thereafter he was transferred to the special products depart. 'Until December 2, 1957, Respondent's business was conducted as an individual proprietorship. 2 All dates are in 1957 unless otherwise noted. 374 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ment and worked under the supervision of Foreman Howard Tiggeman. From time to time when the job he was on under Tiggeman ran out Blockson would be temporarily put on work in the automotive department. This was in accordance with the company policy of transferring idle employees to makeshift work even such as floor sweeping rather than send them home. The evidence shows that Blockson had a reputation in the plant as a drinker. Although no one claimed that he worked while intoxicated, the undenied testimony shows that he customarily smelled heavily of liquor.3 Although he first denied on cross-examination that he had ever had an argument or trouble with Tiggeman, when confronted with a statement he had given Respondent he admitted that he had said therein that Tiggeman "used to bawl [him] out for being drunk, laying off drunk and things that way...." He also admitted that the statement was true. While Blockson's drinking caused some concern to Respondent from a safety standpoint, the chief concern with it was its effect on his attendance record. The above admission by him confirms Tiggeman's testimony which I credit that he had discussed and warned Blockson about his absenteeism. During his last year of em- ployment Blockson's absenteeism increased almost 300 percent over the previous 3-year average? According to Haberle's testimony which was substantially corroborated by the testimony of Szilage, Superintendent William Jacobs, and Tiggeman, Haberle had numerous complaints from his supervisory staff about Blockson. In these com- plaints Haberle was informed that Blockson was "missing too much work" and always "had liquor on his breath." Szilage specifically complained about the fact that Haberle had requested that Blockson be put "on a careful machine so he don't get hurt" thus restricting the scope of his usefulness. He also complained about Blockson that the "minute you tell him something he gets mad and throws things around. He says if you don't like it, put somebody else on the job." Tiggeman testified to the same effect. Haberle on his own was aware of Block- son's drinking and testified that he talked to Blockson about it two or three times, on one occasion saying, "My God, man you must have had a drink before you came to work." 5 Six or seven suggestions had been made to Haberle that he let Blockson go, but he always said, "Give the fellow another chance," and told the supervisors to have patience with Blockson. The complaints continued so con- sistently about Blockson that Haberle finally got "mad" and told them, "If you guys don't quit coming around me with your complaints I am going to knock your block off." Although this kind of testimony is difficult to refute, being solely within the knowledge of the Respondent, I believe that the substance of the fore- going paragraph is true and so I find. I think that the record as reflected by Blockson's own testimony and admissions (already set forth and to be set forth below) tends to prove his deficiencies as an employee. While the extent of the complaints about Blockson and the number of recommendations for his dismissal may be exaggerated, I believe that some must have been made and that Haberle's reaction to them was substantially as he testified.6 Early in February Blockson became interested in the Union. He signed an authorization card and solicited similar authorizations from his fellow workers. On April 5 he acted as a union observer at the consent election conducted by the Board at the plant. In Haberle's presence he signed the tally certification.? As noted, on June 7 Blockson's employment terminated. What happened on the day before played a part in his termination. On that day Blockson was work- ing on a temporary assignment in the automotive department. According to Blockson's testimony, about 3:45 or 3:50 that day he went to the special products department to grind some tools although there were grinding facilities in the 3 Blockson testified that on occasion he may have had "a beer or two" on the way to work. 4 The company records show that during the last 4 quarters of his employment there were 23 weeks in which he did not complete a full week as compared to only 19 such weeks in the entire first 3 years of his employment. 5 My recollection of the testimony is that Haberle's remark was in the form of a question, "My God, man must you have a drink before you come to work?" This seems more in keeping with Respondent's testimony that Blockson always had liquor on his breath. s Haberle testified that he liked Blockson, and that while it was his practice to lend his employees money he probably treated Blockson somewhat more generously in this respect than some of the others. On one occasion he lent Blockson $400. According to the Board's unpublished decision in this matter, Case No. 13-RC-5420,, the union lost the election by a vote of 102 to 44. HABERLE ENGINEERING AND MANUFACTURING CO. 375 automotive department. After grinding the tools for 7 or 8 minutes, he went to the washroom in the special products department to wash the dust off his glasses. While there, Tiggeman came in and said, "Blockson, what the hell you doing in here? You ain't supposed to be in there. They are looking for you out there." Blockson asked who was looking for him and was told it was "Schmidt." 8 Block- son started to tell Tiggeman that he was going to quit working on the machine to which he had been assigned "until they got it fixed" but Tiggeman "kind of turned up his nose and walked out." Following Tiggeman out of the washroom Blockson got about halfway through the department when the quitting bell rang. There- upon he took his sharpened tools, laid them on his machine, filled out his card and went home. The next morning before the shift started, accompanied by a fellow employee, Clyde Baldridge, with whom he had ridden to work, Blockson met Schmidt and said to him, "Say, I heard you was looking for me last night." Schmidt stopped and thought, "Oh," he said, "I just wanted to know where you was." After talk- ing to Schmidt, Blockson and Baldridge proceeded to Tiggeman's department. There they saw Tiggeman working on a machine. As to what occurred at this point Blockson testified as follows: Well, I went over to him, and I was going to explain why I was in the toilet, see, the night before. And he kind of over lorded me, you know, and well, kind of made me a little sore. So he says, "Well, Blockson, you know you wasn't supposed to be in there." So, I says to him-the ways it was we got to arguing. He says to me, "I thought you was going to get another job." Well, I had been thinking of getting a job in a shoe factory in Chicago, see, and I guess I told him about it. And he said, "I thought you was going to get another job." And I says, "Well, so what?" He said, "Well, you couldn't get another job anyhow." I said, "Heck, I can get two or three of them if I want to." You know, times were pretty good then. So, he says, "Well, you been asking for it. You are liable to get it this morning," 9 So I walked away from him to keep from getting any more of an argument, because I figured I might get canned. Blockson began working at 7:30. Just before the rest period Tiggeman came over and got Blockson's card. About 5 minutes later Tiggeman returned and told Blockson that Swift, the then personnel manager, wanted to see him in the office. In the office Swift said, "Blockson, I hear you want to quit." Blockson denied it. Swift then said, "If you don't want to quit we are going to reverse the charges and let you go." Blockson said, "Well, that means I'm discharged, fired, canned." Swift said, "Yes." Although Swift gave no reason for the discharge, Blockson testified that he had his "ideas" about it. In his direct testimony, Baldridge corroborated Blockson as to seeing Schmidt on the morning of June 7 and what was said at that time. He also testified that Blockson went over to talk to Tiggeman but admitted that he did not "know exactly what was said" in the conversation until the end when Tiggeman said, loud and angry, "Well, Blockson you and your union has been asking for it. You are liable to get it today." In cross-examination Baldridge testified that he "didn't hear the conversation ... between" Blockson and Tiggeman and admitted in effect that all he knew about it was what Blockson had told him. Schmidt testified that Blockson was not at his machine at 3:40 the afternoon of the 6th. He went to look for the missing workman and asked Tiggeman where he was. Schmidt claimed to have been with Tiggeman when the latter found Blockson in the washroom at 3:55. Incongruously, Schmidt testified that he did not talk to Blockson nor did he know if Tiggeman went into the washroom. Schmidt also testified that the next morning Blockson hollered up the stairway to him, "For your information, I was sharpening my tools." Upon checking to see if this was true, Schmidt found that the tools had not been sharpened. Tiggeman's testimony was quite vague as to what happened on the evening of the 6th other than to confirm that he did discover Blockson in the washroom and to point out that he was not angry at the time, "just surprised." As for their 8 At this point in his testimony Blockson denied that Schmidt had ever given him any orders or instructions or that he knew what Schmidt's position was with the Company. Later, Blockson admitted knowing that Schmidt was in overall charge of the automotive department. O This is the way the original transcript reads. In the reopened hearing Blockson testified that Tiggeman said on this occasion , "Well, Blockson, you and your union asked for it. You are liable to get it this morning." 376 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD encounter the next morning Tiggeman testified that Blockson , about 30 feet from where Tiggeman was working on a machine, called, "Hey, come here." Tiggeman walked over to Blockson and saw that he was "kind of sore." "I don't have to work here," Blockson said, "I have got another job I can take. If you give me my check, I will leave." Tiggeman told Blockson he would have to wait until the office opened at 8 o'clock. When Swift came in, Tiggeman told him of "catching Mr. Blockson in the washroom, before quitting time (when) he was supposed to be in automotive"; of his hostility and hollering to Tiggeman that morning; of his statement that he did not have to work for Respondent and that he had another job he could take; that "he wanted to go," and had asked for his check. According to Haberle's testimony the first he heard of Blockson's situation was when he was asked to sign the checks. (Blockson was paid off with two checks.) Haberle had been away for a short time and asked, "What is the matter? What happened here?" He was told that Blockson had asked for his check. Since he was busy, he "didn't pay too much attention right then and there" and signed the checks, explaining on the stand, "After all, I got to back those fellows up a little bit." Later on, he "asked a few more questions" and was told again that Block- son had asked for his check. Before analyzing the foregoing evidence and drawing conclusions thereon, other pertinent facts should be noted. Haberle's first knowledge of the union campaign was when he saw handbills being given out at the plant. For some time he did nothing about the matter. He was on "friendly" terms with the two union organizers, Christofal and Popp, and on one cold day invited them inside where he permitted them to distribute their literature. In the meantime people in the plant asked him what he was "going to do about it." His comment was, "What should I do about it? I don't see anything what we can do. If there is fellows want to join the union there is nothing I can do." Furthermore, Haberle did not like to deal with lawyers. Nevertheless, Haberle finally sought legal advice about the matter. He was ad- vised to instruct his supervisors to keep strictly a "hands off policy" which he did. He was also advised that he could engage in noncoercive campaigning or "send letters to employees" but he chose not to do so. He also agreed to a consent election as already appears. In the spring of 1957 after the union election, Respondent 's business fell off seriously. The Company had lost contracts from Firestone, Chrysler, and Ford Machinery at one time. Moreover a $100,000 check it had received in payment from some unnamed company was returned unpaid.1° As a result Respondent had to cut hours and lay off several people. From January 1 to June 7 the total number of employees dropped from 175 to 148. By April 15, 1958, the number employed was down to 119. The complaint as amended alleges three items of violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act: threatening Blockson with reprisals for his union activity and his dis- charge on June 7; interrogation and threats of Baldridge in March and reprisals in June. The evidence as to the alleged threat to and discharge of Blockson has already been set forth. As for the statement about Blockson and his union ask- ing for it, I am inclined to and do credit Tiggeman here. Besides many incon- sistencies in Blockson 's testimony as reflected in his cross -examination, which may of course have resulted from a faulty memory or articulation, there is an indica- tion of deliberate misrepresentation in his testimony where he at first denied having any difficulties with Tiggeman. On the other hand, while Tiggeman's testimony is no shining example of lucidity or recollection, its deficiency so far as I can judge involves only memory. Furthermore, any effective corroboration of Block- son by Baldridge in this matter, while not completely effaced by his admission that all he knew about the conversation was what Blockson told him,ii is suffi- ciently nullified to render it relatively unimportant in this resolution. As for the other Section 8(a)(1) allegations, Baldridge testified that in a con- versation with Tiggeman in March, Tiggeman asked, "If the union would win the .election, how would you classify this man or how would you classify this job." Baldridge replied that they would "have to wait until the union got in to find out." In another conversation with Tiggeman also in March Baldridge, who was not then getting as much bonus work as he had been , according to his testimony, asked Tiggeman "about running a job on retainers." Tiggeman told him he was not 10 This check was still unpaid at the time of the hearing. 11 After so testifying on cross-examination , he reiterated on redirect examination that he heard Tiggeman say what Blockson testified he said. HABERLE ENGINEERING AND MANUFACTURING CO. 377 capable of running it. Baldridge complained that less than a year ago he had broken in the two men currently running it. Tiggeman's reply was "you just can't do the work." Baldridge asked, "Well, is it on account of my union activity?" Tiggeman said, "Yes, you are reported to be one of the leaders." • Tiggeman in his testimony denied the first conversation noted above. As for the second conversation, he admitted telling Baldridge he could not have the retainer job because he would not take off the man who was on it in order to give it to Baldridge, but he denied telling Baldridge it was because of his union activity. Even if the first conversation took place, I do not believe it reflects a violation of the Act and so find. As for the second conversation, the evidence further shows that Baldridge had been taken off retainers and put on another job which he had run for a year and a half. I credit Tiggeman here. Baldridge also testified about conversations with Haberle and with Szilage. In June, according to Baldridge's testimony, Haberle came up to his machine shortly after lunch one day and said, "What is this I hear about some more of this monkey business you are up to?" Baldridge asked what he meant. Haberle got very angry and shouted, "My patience is getting at an end with you Mr. Baldridge ... I have had a lot of patience with you . . . I thought we had an understanding." Bald- ridge said, "Well, I thought so too." Later that day Baldridge told Foreman Kurtz that Haberle had accused him "of being up to some monkey business and he did not know what Haberle was talking about." Kurtz said, "Why, he has probably heard about the unfair labor charge that Blockson has filed against the company. That is probably what he is talking about." I find nothing coercive in this evidence. Haberle's comments were certainly ambiguous. By his own admission Baldridge did not understand them. Nor can Kurtz' conjecture on what at best must have been hearsay to him be magnified into a coercive statement. Just prior to the election, Szilage called Baldridge into the office. After asking how many pieces Baldridge had left on a job he was doing, Szilage asked, "What is this I hear about you pushing the union?" Baldridge replied, "I don't know. What did you hear?" Szilage said, "I would like to know who else is in it. Is Frank?" He went on, "Well, it would be a good thing for us if the union gets in because we won't have to pay no more time and a half." Baldridge asked, "How's that?" Szilage said, "Well, we will work only 40 hours. A union shop only works 40 hours." In his testimony Szilage denied interrogating Baldridge. According to his version Baldridge told him the men were picking on him because of his support of the Union. Szilage told him that he had no control over the men in that connection and to "forget it." Baldridge asked, "What is this about the forty hours," stating that if the Union came in they would "have forty hours." Szilage "told him if the union came in, we would have forty hours . . . that is what we would give them." But he denied stating that Respondent would cut hours if the Union came in. Szilage's testimony here carries with it its own indictment, it seems to me. Accordingly, I credit Baldridge in the instance. Conclusions The General Counsel in substance contends that Respondent's evidence about Blockson's drinking, absenteeism, scrap production, and the events of June 6 and 7 are exaggerated pretexts for his discharge, the real motive of which was his union activity. He also contends that even if this evidence about Blockson be true, these things were accepted and condoned by Respondent for 4 years and only became important when Blockson became interested in the Union. While there is a strong suspicion that the General Counsel's contention is correct, I believe that the General Counsel's proof has not been of a sufficient preponderance to do more than raise a suspicion that Blockson was discriminated against by Respondent. The weight of the evidence and the logic of the record as a whole, it seems to me, requires a deci- sion in favor of Respondent in this connection. There is nothing in the record to indicate even a legal antiunion attitude on the part of Respondent, let alone a purpose to interfere with, restrain, or coerce the employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them in the Act. Moreover, as pointed out in Respondent's brief, Respondent had ample opportunity to get rid of Blockson prior to June 7 had it desired to do so. Certainly there is no evidence here of a scheme or plan to discriminate against Blockson. On the facts here, if there was discrimination it had to be a spontaneous act. The spontaneity is here but the evidence, I believe, points to cause rather than discrimination. I believe and find that Blockson was guilty to some extent of at least three of the charges leveled against him, namely, drinking, absenteeism, and an antagonis- tic attitude toward supervision. While it is true that Haberle apparently had been 378 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD willing to overlook these things in Blockson, I find that the contrary was true with regards to Blockson's immediate supervisors. Having been frustrated by Haberle in their efforts to have Blockson discharged or disciplined, it is conceivable that any animosity engendered in them by his derelictions might be aggravated by Haberle's protection of him. Considering this background, Blockson's gratuitous and angry searching out of Tiggeman on June 7 with the resulting argument cer- tainly provided a foundation for possible discharge, a possibility of which Blockson was admittedly aware.12 In this argument, Blockson admitted mentioning that he had two or three other jobs he could have if he wanted them. He also admitted having previously told Tiggeman of his intentions of taking a job in a shoe factory. On the night before in the washroom, according to Blockson's testimony, he started to tell Tiggeman that he "was going to quit" working on his machine until it was repaired. In this light it is clear that whether or not Blockson quit, his quitting was a subject of the heated argument that morning . In this light, too, it is un- necessary to decide whether Blockson told Tiggeman he was quitting, because I find that either Tiggeman was wishfully believing Blockson had said he was quit- ting or Tiggeman seized upon this as an explanation, with or without the con- vivance of Swift, to undercut any opposition from Haberle to the elimination of Blockson. Haberle's explanation of his part in the matter is logical and satisfactory enough except for his statement that "after all" he had "to back those fellows up a little bit." Whether or not Swift tried to sell Haberle on Blockson's having quit, it is apparent that Heberle knew more or soon learned more about the matter than he admits. Either he knew or suspected that Blockson's talk about quitting had been brought up in partial justification for his discharge. Having condoned Block- son's conduct for 4 years and having resisted previous suggestions for his discharge, his action here, as the General Counsel contends, permits an inference that Haberle was motivated by the fact that Blockson had now become a supporter of the Union. But even in the absence of a contrary inference which the facts also make possible here, the General Counsel's contention is not as compelling as it very often is on this type of situation. Here there is no evidence of any purpose or plan to "get" Blockson. Also, for practical purposes, instead of calling for a decision on Haberle's part, the matter was practically a fait accompli when it reached him. Furthermore, there was no element of timing here so often indica- tive of an impetuous and retributive action. And, as noted, the action here was spontaneous. At best, then, the inference the General Counsel would have me draw is somewhat tenuous. On the other hand there is another inference possible as to why Haberle may have become disenchanted with Blockson. During the last few months of Block- son's employment Respondent suffered substantial business reverses. Respondent had to reduce its workforce, retrench, and tighten its efficiency generally. Block- son's absenteeism alone in the light of this situation may very well have impelled Haberle (notwithstanding a sympathetic feeling toward him)13 to let Blockson go, particularly where it was as quick and relatively painless for Haberle as it was. This is the view I take and the inference I adopt. Accordingly, I find that Re- spondent has not discriminated against Blockson and I shall recommend that the 8(a)(3) allegation of the complaint be dismissed. I shall also recommend that the 8(a)(1) allegations of the complaint be dis- missed. Of those alleged and upon which evidence was offered, there is only one which I can find to have violated that section of the Act. That one is the conver- sation between Baldridge and Szilage a few days before the election. Considering the substance and circumstances of this conversation and the fact that this is the only aberration shown by Respondent in this record I feel that a remedial order is unnecessary here and that it would not effectuate the policies of the Act to issue such an order. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: 'a Besides the criticisms Blockson finally admitted receiving from Tiggeman for absenteeism, he further testified without denial that a few days before the union election Tiggeman told him, "Well, Blockson, from now on you are on my list." There is no indication that this was in connection with Blockson's union activity. 1s This feeling apparently explains the yearly 5-cent increase Blockson received with- out the benefit of consultation with his foreman as was usual in other cases as credibly testified to by Tiggeman. PARK TISSUE MILLS, INC. 379 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Haberle Engineering and Manufacturing Co., Aurora , Ill., is engaged in, and at all times material herein has been engaged in, commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. International Association of Machinists , District 108, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. The• Respondent has not engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] Park Tissue Mills, Inc. and Frost White Paper Mills, Inc. and Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO. Case No. 2-CA-5432. December 11, 1958 DECISION AND ORDER On August 29, 1958, Trial Examiner Arthur E. Reyman issued his Intermediate Report in this case, a copy of which is attached hereto, finding that the Respondents had not violated the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety. Thereafter, the Charging Party filed excep- tions to the Intermediate Report. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three- member panel [Members Rodgers, Bean, and Fanning]. The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the-In- termediate Report, the exceptions, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. [The Board dismissed the complaint.] INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE This is a proceeding under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136), herein called the Act. On May 29, 1957, a charge was filed by Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO (hereinafter sometimes called the Union ), against Park Tissue Mills, Inc., and Frost White Paper Mills, Inc., as employers . The charge asserted that on or about May 13, 1957, the employers had engaged in and were engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a)(1) and (3) of the Act. Thereafter, on January 31, 1958 , the General Counsel of the National Labor Rela- tions Board, on behalf of the Board, by the Regional Director for the Second Region, issued a complaint and notice of hearing against Park Tissue Mills, Inc., and Frost White Paper Mills, Inc., naming these corporations "Respondent herein." Each of the two corporations filed timely answers to the complaint , effectively 122 NLRB No. 60.