International Typographical Union, AFL-CIO

806 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD International Typographical Union , AFL-CIO and International Typographical Union Local 38, AFL-CIO and Haverhill Ga- zette Company International Typographical Union , AFL-CIO, its Executive Council, namely, Woodruff Randolph, Harold H . Clark, Joe Bailey, Don Hurd and Charles M. Lyon; International Typo- graphical Union Local 165, AFL-CIO, and its Scale Committee and Worcester Telegram Publishing Company, Inc. Cases Nos. 1-CB-4929 and 1-CB-430. April 17, 1959 DECISION AND ORDER On December 17, 1958, Trial Examiner Reeves R. Hilton issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondents had engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that they cease and desist there- from and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. He also found that the Respondents had not engaged in certain other alleged unfair labor practices and recommended dismissal of the complaint with respect to such allegations. Thereafter, the Respondents, the General Coun- sel, and Worcester filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and supporting briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Members Rodgers, Jenkins, and Fanning]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter- mediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case,' and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda- tions of the Trial Examiner.' 1 The Respondents' request for oral argument is hereby denied as the record, exceptions, and briefs adequately present the issues and positions of the parties. 2 In view of the fact, as found by the Trial Examiner, that the Companies had no sub- stantial objections to the Respondents' contract proposals or general laws covering the apprenticeship and priority systems, and therefore the Respondents' demands in this con- nection did not prevent the parties from reaching agreement on a new contract, we agree with the Trial Examiner's finding that in this respect the Respondents did not refuse to bargain in violation of Section 8(b) (3). We wish to make clear, however, that by de- manding the apprenticeship and priority systems established in the general laws, which systems delegate exclusive control to the Respondents in the establishment and mainte- nance of these systems, the Respondents did "attempt to cause" discrimination in violation. of Section 8(b) (2). See International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. (Pacific Inter- mountain Express Company), 107 NLRB 837. We agree with the Trial Examiner's finding that by striking to force the Companies to accede to the Respondents' demands for the illegal foreman and general laws clauses, the Respondents violated Section 8 ( b) (2) ; but we find it unnecessary to pass upon his finding that the Respondents violated Section 8(b) (2) by so striking also for the jurisdiction clause. 123 NLRB No. 97. INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION, AFL-CIO 807 ORDER Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that : I. The Respondents International Typographical Union, AFL- CIO, and International Typographical Union Local 38, AFL-CIO, and their officers, agents, and representatives shall : a. Cease and desist from : (1) Refusing to bargain collectively with Haverhill Gazette Com- pany for all the employees in the unit found appropriate herein, specifically by insistence upon acceptance of the Respondent Unions' jurisdiction, foreman, and general laws clauses, or by any other means, so long as the Respondent Unions are the representatives of the em- ployees in the above-described bargaining unit. (2) Engaging in strike action, or directing, instigating or encour- aging employees to engage in or threaten to engage in strike action, or approving or ratifying strike action taken by the employees, for the purpose of forcing Haverhill Gazette Company to execute an agree- ment requiring membership in the International Typographical Union as a condition of employment in violation of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act. (3) In any other manner causing or attempting to cause Haverhill Gazette Company to discriminate against employees in violation of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act. (4) In any manner restraining or coercing Haverhill Gazette Com- pany in the selection of its representatives for the purposes of collec- tive bargaining or the adjustment of grievances. b. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (1) Upon request, bargain collectively as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the unit found to be appropriate. (2) Post in conspicuous places at the business office of the Respond- ent International Typographical Union and the Respondent Local 38, and all other places where notices or communications to members of Respondent Local 38 are customarily posted, including the composing room of Haverhill Gazette Company, the Company being willing, a copy of the notice attached to the Intermediate Report marked "Ap- pendix A." 3 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the First Region, shall, after being signed by a duly authorized officer of the Respondent International Typographical Union and an officer of Respondent Local 38, be posted immediately 8 This notice shall be amended by substituting for the words "The Recommendations of a Trial Examiner" the words "A Decision and Order." In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order." 808 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD upon receipt thereof and remain so posted for a period of 60 consecu- tive days. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondents to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (3) Notify the Regional Director for the First Region in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respond- ents have taken to comply therewith. H. The Respondents International Typographical Union, AFL- CIO, its executive council, Woodruff Randolph , Harold H. Clark, Joe Bailey, Don Hurd, and Charles M . Lyon, and International Typo- graphical Union Local 165, AFL-CIO, and its scale committee, and their officers, agents, and representatives shall : a. Cease and desist from : (1) Refusing to bargain collectively with Worcester Telegram Publishing Company, Inc., for all the employees in the unit found appropriate herein, specifically by insistence upon acceptance of the Respondent Union's jurisdiction, foreman and general laws clauses, or by any other means, so long as the Respondent Unions are the repre- sentatives of the employees in the above -described bargaining unit. (2) Engaging in strike action, or directing, instigating, or en- couraging employees to engage in or threaten to engage in strike action, for the purpose of forcing Worcester Telegram Publishing Company, Inc., to execute an agreement requiring membership in the International Typographical Union as a condition of employment in violation of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act. (3) In any other manner causing or attempting to cause Worcester Telegram Publishing Company, Inc., to discriminate against employ- ees in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. (4) In any manner restraining or coercing Worcester Telegram Publishing Company, Inc., in the selection of its representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances. b. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (1) Upon request, bargain collectively as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the unit found to be appropriate. (2) Post at conspicuous places at the business office of the Respond- ent International Typographical Union and the Respondent Local 165, and all other places where notices or communications to members of Respondent Local 165 are customarily posted, including the com- posing room of Worcester Telegram Publishing Company, Inc., the Company being willing, a copy of the notice attached to the Inter- mediate Report marked "Appendix B." 4 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the First Region, shall, after being signed by a duly authorized officer of the Respondent *See footnote 3. INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION, AFL-CIO 809 International Typographical Union and an officer of Respondent Lo- cal 165, and the individual Respondents, be posted immediately upon receipt thereof and remain so posted for a period of 60 consecutive days. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondents to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (3) Notify the Regional Director for the First Region in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respond- ents have taken to comply therewith. INTERMEDIATE REPORT STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon separate charges duly filed by Haverhill Gazette Company and Worcester Telegram Publishing Company, Inc. (herein referred to as Haverhill and Worcester or collectively as the Companies) the General Counsel of the National Labor Rela- tions Board, by the Regional Director for the First Region (Boston, Massachusetts), issued separate complaints, dated February 6, 1958, against International Typo- graphical Union, its executive council, and International Typographical Union Local 38 and Local 165 and its scale committee (herein referred to as ITU, Local 38 and 165, or the Union, and collectively as the Respondents), alleging that the Respond- ents have engaged in and are engaging in certain acts and conduct in violation of the Act. The cases were consolidated for the purpose of hearing by order of the Regional Director. The Respondents filed separate answers to the complaints admitting certain allegations therein but denying the commission of any unfair labor practices. Pursuant to notice a hearing was held in the Worcester case at Worcester, Massa- chusetts, on April 2, 3, 4, and 29, 1958. All parties were represented by counsel and afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce relevant evidence, and to present oral argument. On April 29, 1958, certain stipulations were received in evidence with the understanding that the record remain open for 1 week so that counsel might have an opportunity to submit further evidence or exhibits. Having received no such request from counsel I entered an order closing the hearing as of May 8, 1958, and advised counsel of their right to file briefs in the matter. Thereafter, about August 1, 1958, counsel for the General Counsel, the Respondents, and Worcester submitted briefs which I have fully considered. Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANIES Haverhill is engaged in the business of publishing a daily newspaper and main- tains its principal office, publishing plant, warehouses, and other facilities at Haverhill, Massachusetts. In the year preceding the issuance of the complaint Haverhill held membership in, or subscribed to, various interstate news services, including United Press Association and Associated Press; advertised nationally sold products; and its gross revenue from its publishing operations was in excess of $500,000. Worcester is engaged in the business of publishing a daily newspaper and main- tains its principal office, publishing plant, warehouses, and other facilities at Worcester, Massachusetts. In the year preceding the issuance of the complaint Worcester held membership in, or subscribed to, various interstate news services, including United Press Association and Associated Press; advertised nationally sold products; and its gross revenue from its publishing operations was in excess of $500,000. I find that Haverhill and Worcester are engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED I find that ITU and Locals 38 and 165 are labor organizations as defined in Section 2(5) of the Act. .810 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD I also find that the -executive council, consisting of Woodruff Randolph, Charles M. Lyon, Harold H. Clark, Joe Bailey, and Don Hurd and their successors, is an agent of ITU within the meaning of the Act, and the scale committee is an agent of Local 165 within the meaning of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The pleadings The complaints allege that at all times material the Respondents were the representatives of the employees of Haverhill and Worcester, respectively, in a unit defined as employees engaged in composing-room work. The complaints further allege that since about May 29, 1957, in the Haverhill case and about June 2, 1957, in the Worcester case, the Respondents have caused and attempted to cause the 'Companies to discriminate against their employees, or applicants or prospective applicants for employment , by insisting upon the inclusion of the general laws of the ITU as a condition precedent to the execution of a collective-bargaining agree- ment as well as certain other contract provisions which would require the Com- panies to employ only ITU members, give preference to such members in respect -to hiring, increase or decrease in the work force and employment of substitutes, and -delegate to Local 38 and Local 165 control over the seniority of composing-room employees. It is further alleged that the Respondents failed and refused to bargain in good faith with the Companies by adamantly insisting upon inclusion of such terms as a condition precedent to the execution of an agreement and that the Companies designate only a union member as composing-room foreman for the purposes of collective bargaining and adjusting grievances. In addition the com- plaints allege that the Respondents insisted upon acceptance of their work jurisdic- tion clause, that is, the demand that the Companies bargain with respect to the hire, tenure, and terms of employment of persons and employees not included in the appropriate unit and/or job classifications not in existence and not included with the unit. When the Companies refused to agree to these conditions the Respondents directed, instigated, and encouraged their employees to engage in strikes, the Haver- hill strike commencing about October 25, 1957, and the Worcester strike about November 29, 1957, which were current at the time of the hearing. By reason of the above acts and conduct the complaints allege that the Respondents have engaged in and are engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (B)(2) and (3) of the Act. The Respondents in their answers deny the foregoing allegations and assert that any existing labor disputes are the result of unfair labor practices on the part of the Companies, including discrimination against ITU members in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act and refusals to bargain in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of. the Act. B. The records and stipulations of counsel; background of the cases As already stated, the hearing in the Worcester case was- held before me on various dates in April 1958. During the hearing counsel stipulated that the testimony of Woodruff Randolph, president of the ITU, adduced at the hearing in News Syndicate Company, Inc., et al., 122 NLRB 818, be incorporated in the record of this proceeding. Counsel further stipulated that the record in Worcester Telegram Publishing Com- pany, Inc., 121 NLRB 793, a hearing pursuant to Section 10(k) of the Act, be incorporated herein. The parties stipulated the record in Alpert v. ITU (161 F. Supp. 427), an injunc- tion proceeding under Section 10(j) of the Act, in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, before Judge Aldrich, as the record in the Haverhill case. While the facts in the cases differ the issues presented in each are the same, so for the purposes of discussion and resolution of the issues they will be considered together. At this point it seems appropriate to outline briefly two previous cases involving the ITU for they afford not only background of the issues herein but were the subject of discussion during the bargaining negotiations in the Worcester matter. Pursuant to proceedings based upon a charge filed by the American Newspaper Publishers Association (herein called ANPA) against the ITU and three of its officers, the Board on October 28, 1949, issued its decision (86 NLRB 951) adopting the Trial Examiner's findings that the intended and actual effect of the ITU's bar- gaining policy, following enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, was to compel em- ployers to exclude nonmembers from employment . The Board also adopted the INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION, AFL-CIO 811 Trial Examiner's finding that the ITU violated Section 8(b)(2) of the Act by .applying coercive pressures in the newspaper industry in order to compel employers to conduct their labor relations pursuant to a "bargaining" scheme designed pri- marily to effect the maintenance of "closed shop" conditions. The Board found .that the ITV's bargaining programs known as "Conditions of Employment" or "no- contract" strategy and the "P-6A," or "60-day contract" strategy, each of which .incorporated or included the ITU general laws, were violative of the Act. Under .the no-contract plan the ITU set forth the "only" conditions under which its mem- bers would work, one condition being they would not work with nonunion men, .and embodied the threat that failure of employers to provide the stated conditions would result in declarations by the Unions, pursuant to the general laws, of a "lockout." The only difference between the no-contract strategy and the 60-day ,contract, the Board held, was that under the latter reprisal action might be post- poned for 60 days. The Board specifically refused to pass upon the question of whether the ITU violated Section 8(b) (2) by demanding the inclusion in the 60-day contract of certain miscellaneous union-security clauses covering work jurisdiction of the Union, competency of composing-room employees, and the operation of the ITU general laws, for the reason that the bargaining strategy was designed to maintain closed-shop conditions under penalty of strike action. The Board further found that the ITU demand that employers continue to hire only union foremen whose powers were detailed in the general laws, under threat of strike action, which was an integral part of its bargaining policy, thereby attempted to compel to limit :the selection of this type of foreman to a class composed only of union members .in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act. The Board dismissed the Section .8(b)(1) (A) allegations of the complaint and did not find a violation of refusal .to bargain because the complaint did not allege a violation of Section 8(b)(3) of .the Act. On the basis of these findings the Board issued an order directing the ITU to cease and desist from engaging in the unfair labor practices thus found :and to post notices. On the same date the Board issued its Decision and Order in the Chicago Typo- graphical Union No. 16 and ITU case (86 NLRB 1041) wherein similar findings were made, except that the Board found the Respondents had refused to bargain in violation of Section 8(b)(3) of the Act. Thereafter the Board filed petitions for enforcement of its orders and the ANPA filed a petition for review in its case insofar as the Board failed to find a refusal to .bargain on the part of the ITU. (ANPA v. N.L.R.B., et al., 193 F. 2d 782 (C.A. 7).) The court granted enforcement of the Board's orders. The court further held in the ANPA case (pp. 799-800) that there was evidence to support a finding of re- fusal to bargain even though there was no 8 (b) (3) allegation in the complaint and remanded the matter to the Board for consideration and decision upon the merits of the charge. On May 6, 1953, the Board, pursuant to the remand, issued its Supplemental Decision and Order (104 NLRB 806) in which it found that the local negotiators represented the interests of the ITU and exercised bargaining powers granted by it and that the ITU and its officers had failed to bargain collectively in violation of the obligations imposed by Section 8(b)(3) of the Act. The order of the Board directed the ITU and its officers to cease and desist from refusing specifically, or by insistence upon the 60-day contract, or any other means, to bargain collectively in good faith with any employer in the newspaper industry, when the employees of such employer comprise an appropriate unit and a majority have designated or selected the ITU to represent them for the purposes of collective bargaining. On February 25, 1948, in an ancillary proceeding to the ANPA case, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana issued an injunction pur- suant to Section 10(j) of the Act (Evans v. ITU, 76 F. Supp. 881). The court found that there was probability that the Respondents herein violated Section 8(b) (1) (A) and (2) of the Act and ordered the Respondents to refrain from engaging in certain conduct. Upon the Board's petition to adjudge the Respondents in contempt, the court found "the Respondents have deliberately attempted since issuance of the injunc- tion to accomplish the objectives against which the injunction was directed, namely, the continuance of closed-shop conditons in the newspaper industry." (81 F. Supp. 674, 688.) 1. The Worcester Case There is little, if any, dispute of the substantive facts in this matter. The evidence concerning bargaining negotiations comes primarily from Richard G. Steele, general manager of Worcester, and Joseph R. Mahoney, president of Local 165, witnesses 812 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD for the General Counsel and Respondents , respectively. The General Counsel also called as witnesses William B. Weinrich , production manager of Worcester, and William B. Parry, assistant manager of New England Daily Newspaper Publishers Association. From the testimony of these witnesses I find as follows. Local 165 has represented the composing -room employees of Worcester for over 70 years and the last contract between the parties expired December 31, 1954. During 1954 , representatives of the Company and Local 165 met on three or four occasions and on seven occasions in 1955, but were unable to reach agreement on a complete contract . However, around June 1955, following these meetings, the Company granted a wage increase , retroactive to January 1, 1955, and informed the employees of this action by written notice placed in their pay envelopes . Mahoney, "in the jargon of the union," characterized this as a voluntary increase . The next meeting, according to Mahoney, was held in July 1956, at which time representatives of Worcester claimed the 1955 pay increase indicated a tacit agreement had been reached, which was denied by representatives of Local 165 , and the meeting con- cluded with the union representatives agreeing to submit a new contract proposal to the Company to serve as a basis for negotiations. On August 21, 1956, James J. Quinn , then president of Local 165, sent a letter to Steele requesting that negotiations be reopened and submitted contract proposals. Thereafter the parties held six meetings in 1956, commencing about October 14, and a similar number in 1957. At these meetings, generally speaking , Worcester was represented by Frank Phillips, manager of New England Daily Newspaper Associa- tion, Alfred S. Arnold , production manager, Howe C. Montheith , cost and methods engineer, and Steele, with Phillips acting as spokesman for the group . Local 165 was represented by Quinn while president and Mahoney , when he succeeded Quinn, and the local scale committee . In January 1957, Attorneys Elisha Hanson and Robert Bowditch entered negotiations on the part of the Company while William LaMothe , an international representative of ITU , joined the representatives of Local 165 in the negotiations. a. The 1954 contract; the proposals of Local 165 ; and the ITU general laws Since the negotiations centered principally on demands of Local 165 concerning jurisdiction , the incorporation of the ITU general laws, and the foreman's clause, it is appropriate to point out these provisions as they appear in the 1954 contract, the proposals of Local 165, and the specific general laws which the General Counsel alleges to be unlawful. The 1954 contract stated: The jurisdiction of the Union is defined as including all composing room work in shops covered by this contract and includes classifications such as hand com- positors , typesetting machine operators , make-up men , bank men, ad men, proofreaders, machinists for typesetting machines , operators, and machinists on all mechanical devices which cast or compose type or slugs. With respect to foremen the contract provided: The operation , authority, hiring for and control of each composing room shall be vested exclusively in the office through its representative , the foreman, who shall be a member of the Union . Provided that nothing in the section shall be construed to conflict with the right of the members holding situations to em- ploy competent substitutes without consultation or approval of foremen. The contract stated that it shall govern in regard to all subjects covered therein and incorporated the general laws of the ITU "not in conflict with state or federal law, shall govern relations between the parties on those subjects concerning which no provision is made in this contract." The proposals submitted by Local 165 contained the above clauses relating to fore- men and ITU general laws and a new jurisdiction provision , claiming: Jurisdiction of the Union and the appropriate unit for collective bargaining is defined as including all composing room work and includes classifications such as: Hand compositors ; typesetting machine operators ; make-up men; bank men; proofpress operators; proofreaders ; machinists for typesetting machines; operators and machinists on all mechanical devices which cast or compose type, slugs, or film; operators of tape perforating machines and recutter units for use in composing or producing type; operators of all phototypesetting machines ( such as Foto-setter, Photon , Linofilm, Monophoto , Coxhead Liner, Filmotype, Typo and Hadego ) ; employees engaged in proofing, waxing and paste-makeup with reproduction proofs, processing the product of phototype- INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION, AFL-CIO 813 setting machines, including development and waxing; paste-makeup of all type, hand-lettered, illustrative, border and decorative material constituting a part of the copy; ruling photoproofing; correction, alteration, and imposition of the paste-makeup serving as the completed copy for the camera used in the plate making process. Paste-makeup for the camera as used in this paragraph includes all photostats and prints used in offset or letterpress work and includes all photostats and positive proofs of illustrations (such as Velox) where positive proofs can be supplied without sacrifice of quality or duplication of efforts. The Employer shall make no other contract covering work as described above, especially no contract using the word "stripping" to cover only of the work above mentioned. Unless otherwise specified in this agreement all teletypesetter tape shall be perforated by journeymen or apprentices covered by this agreement. The General Counsel contends, as alleged in his complaint, that the following provisions of the ITU general laws create unlawful employment conditions and are violative of the Act: Article III, section 12: It is unalterable policy of ITU that all composing room work, or any machinery or process appertaining to printing and the preparations therefor, belong to ITU, and all local unions of ITU are directed and required to reclaim jurisdiction and control over all such work being performed by persons who are not members of ITU or any ITU local union. Article I, section 4: Any person before entering the trade as an apprentice must first be approved by the ITU local union. Article I, section 5: No apprentice may leave the employ of one employer and enter the employ of another employer without the written consent of the president of the ITU local union. Article 1, section 7: At the end of the first year, if an apprentice proves com- petent and the foreman and apprentice committee recommend him for member- ship he must be admitted to the union as an apprentice member. Article I, section 11: Beginning with the second year, apprentices must be in possession of an apprentice working card issued by the union. Article I, section 19: At least two members of the local union must be regu- larly employed as journeymen before the employer can engage an apprentice. Article V, section 11: All foremen and journeymen employees must be active members in good standing of the union. Article VII, section 1: Only members of ITU shall be permitted to operate the various composing room machines and devices used to process the products thereof. Article VII, section 5; article VIII: Only members in good standing of ITU may be employed in installing, operating, maintaining, servicing and repairing the various machines and other mechanical devices used in composing, imposing, processing and casting of typing, type matter, slugs and other material of any kind, whether operated mechanically or automatically and wherever located. Article VII, section 6: Only members in good standing of ITU or the con- stitutent local thereof may be employed upon all work necessary to processing the product of photo type setting machines. Article VII, section 7: Only members of ITU may be employed to perform duties in the paste makeup operation using reproduction proofs. Article V, section 9; article X: A member may select a substitute in his absence from work and such substitute shall be a member of the union and selected in accordance with the priority standing system of members established and maintained by the ITU local union and posted in its chapel. Article X: In filling vacancies created by the absence of an employee for more than 30 calendar days only a member of ITU or the constitutent local may be employed and such employee shall be selected in accordance with the priority system established by the local. Article V, section 1; article X: Any foreman filling a vacancy must give priority to the substitute listed on the priority list established by the local as oldest in continuous service, and the foreman shall be governed by provisions of the ITU General Laws. Article V: In decreasing or increasing the work force the foreman shall be governed by the ITU General Laws and increase or decrease the force in ac- cordance with the priority system established and maintained by the local union. Article V, section 8: Discharged members of the ITU shall have the right to appeal in accordance with the ITU laws and the right to challenge the fair- ness of any rule of the employer which caused his discharge. 814 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD b. The meetings in 1956 The first meeting on the above proposals was held about October 14 (Steele fixed: the date as about October 24), at which time only the jurisdiction and general laws clauses were discussed. In substance, Steele stated the union representatives took. the position the clauses must be taken as submitted while Mahoney said the company representaives termed the clauses as "key points" and it would be useless to discuss. other proposals until these clauses were settled. The meeting concluded with the Company agreeing to submit a counterproposal. The next meeting was held on November 1, when the Company presented its. counterproposal. In this document the Company, after pointing out that the key clauses should be settled before negotiating on other contract proposals, offered to grant the Union jurisdiction over all composing-room work including, "but is- not limited to," the classifications set forth in the last agreement. The Company also agreed to the proposal on general laws "to the extent that they are negotiated and become a part of the contract." The counterproposal concluded with an offer to negotiate for new language concerning certain provisions in the prior contract, in the event the parties reached agreement on the key clauses. The Company representatives, as related by Steele, inquired if there was any chance of reaching an agreement without the Union's language on jurisdiction and general laws and Quinn answer in the negative. Quinn further stated that the Union was tired of working without a written contract and in order to have a written agreement "it must contain language approved by Indianapolis, the ITU headquarters, and that was it." Mahoney testified that although the union representatives were ready to reject immediately the counterproposal there was some discussion particularly with respect to negotiation of individual general laws. The union representatives took the position they would negotiate anything into a contract that would give proper protection "even to substitute paragraph for anyone of the general laws." On cross- examination Mahoney stated they would not negotiate the general laws per se and that the general laws prohibit negotiation thereon. The meeting ended with the- Union agreeing to consider the counterproposal. Shortly after this session the union representatives presented the counterproposal' to the members who rejected the same and instructed the representatives to negotiate- on the original proposal. On November 7 or 8, the parties again met. At this time the union representa- tives stated the counterproposal had been rejected by the membership and they, the representatives, had been sent back for an approvable contract. Mahoney explained' that the term "approvable contract" meant approval by the ITU. According to Steele the Union insisted the jurisdiction and general laws provisions must be accepted while Mahoney said he did not understand that the ITU insisted upon the jurisdic- tion clause as written and that the general laws must be included, although he knew of instances where the provision was not required because the laws were incorporated into the contract. When the Union asked the Company to negotiate on other pro- visions of the contract, Phillips replied they would not refuse to discuss terms, but the Company would not grant the jurisdiction and general laws clauses as contained in the Union's proposal. Phillips said he could see a possible impasse and that the Union could take any action it desired but if they went on strike, "We will give you the God damnedest strike you ever saw." Apparently, the meeting ended on that note. At the meeting of November 29, the Company announced that it was considering the introduction of teletypesetter type as a means of reducing costs and was willing to give the Union jurisdiction over the insertion of tape into the machine and the handling of the product after it came through the machine. However, the Company would not agree to any curtailment of the amount of tape used or the manner in which it was used. The Company spoke at length on jurisdiction and pointed' out there was no need for the Union's proposal since the Company had no intention of introducing any new processes, except perhaps the teletypesetter. Although the Union suggested a clause-by-clause discussion of its proposal, the suggestion was not followed by the Company. The Union also accused the Company of using the key clauses as a wedge to prevent discussion of other contract terms, which Steele denied. The parties then met on December 6, and their positions were substantially the. same as stated at the previous meeting. Mahoney expressed the desire to maintain "vertical priority," or seniority, for the composing-room employees and hoped the parties could reach agreement, preferably a written contract, which would preserve that system. There was also a general discussion on the teletypesetter operation with the Company asserting it had the right to install and operate any processes in any manner it desired. INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION, AFL-CIO 815. c. The meetings in 1957 About January 8 or 10, the parties held their first meeting and LaMothe accom- panied the union representatives. Quinn explained that the Local felt an impasse. had been reached so they requested Randolph to assist them and he sent LaMothe for that purpose. LaMothe, according to Steele, asked the Company to state its. position and they replied it was basically the same as it had been for the past 2 years. The Company likewise inquired if there had been any change in the Union's. position and LaMothe said no. The Company then specifically asked about juris- diction and general laws and he stated "the Union language must be taken." Mahoney said that LaMothe brought up the subject of the Company's counter- proposal of October 31, and Phillips replied it had been rejected by the Union;, that the Company was standing on its counterproposal and the Union on its original proposal. While most of the time was devoted to a general discussion of preceding. events, the Company offered to submit a "non-introductory clause," that is, a pro- vision specifying new processes which would, or would not, be introduced during the term of the contract. LaMothe, as related by Steele, then asked about the general laws and the Company responded they would be willing to negotiate them individually. LaMothe rejected the offer and stated he would notify the Federal and State mediation services that the parties had reached a stalemate. About January 17, the Company presented its "non-introductory clause" to the Union, wherein it restated the jurisdiction provision in its counterproposal and added that (1) the Company was willing to give the Union full jurisdiction over all composing-room work and (2) it pledged, for the duration of the contract, not to, install Fotosetter, Photon, Linofilm, Monophoto, Coxhead Line, Filmotype, Typro,, or Hadego operation. In all other respects the counterproposal remained unchanged. On January 22 the mediators held separate meetings with the Company and the Union. The mediators, after meeting with the Union, informed the Company that the disputed clauses would have to be settled first and that the Union wanted a signed contract under which they could operate. The Company advised the mediators they were willing to make a liberal wage settlement, but they could not accept the Union's jurisdiction and general laws clauses because they were illegal. The mediators reported the Company's position to the Union who stated that they would ask for strike sanction at a membership meeting the next day, but agreed to meet with the Company on January 30. The mediators then informed the Company of this action and they agreed to a meeting on the above date. At the membership meeting it was agreed to ask the ITU for strike sanction. On January 30 the parties met after conferring separately with the mediators. At both the separate and joint meetings there was some discussion as to what would happen in the event of a strike and Hanson told the mediators and the Union that the paper would continue to publish and the matter would be presented to the National Labor Relations Board with the request that contempt proceedings be initiated in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. At the joint meeting Hanson acted as spokesman for the Company and LaMothe was present with the union representatives. Hanson said the Company would not be bludgeoned into a contract in conflict with the Taft-Hartley law and even if there was some way of working out the jurisdiction clause the Company would not take the general laws in toto. He further stated that the Company was willing to negotiate an agreement but many of the Union's contract clauses were illegal. During a discussion between Hanson and Mahoney on the Company's failure to go into the Union's entire proposal, Mahoney complained that the Company's counterproposal was very sketchy. Hanson stated he would give the Union a complete and legal counter- proposal and the meeting ended. Following the meeting LaMothe asked the media- tors to request the company president or publisher to participate in the negotiations.. The mediators reported back to the Union that they did not believe there was much chance of either of these individuals joining in the negotiations. On February 6 the Company submitted a complete counterproposal to the Union covering hours, wages, and conditions of employment. In this proposal the Com- pany offered to preserve the representation of the Union over such skilled work as had been normally performed in the composing room prior to Januay 1. The pro- posal also provided that all authority and control in the composing room shall be vested in the foreman as a representative of management, but eliminated the require- ment contained in the last agreement that the foreman be a member of the Local. The counterproposal contained no provision for inclusion of or operation under the general laws. On February 8 the parties met separately with the mediators and in joint session. At these meetings the Company and the Union maintained their former positions in 816 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD respect to the jurisdiction and general laws clauses and the Company made a firm offer of its "non-introductory clause." During the joint meeting Hanson declared that an impasse had been reached ( Mahoney could not remember anyone denying his statement) and proposed that the Company post a notice covering hours, wages, and working conditions , which notice was read to the Union . The Union objected to the notice, pointing out their experience with the 1955 wage increase , and Hanson stated he was not attempting to trap the Union into negotiating but simply desired to discuss the contents of the notice with them. The parties then discussed wages. In its original proposal the Union requested a $9-per-week increase on a 1-year con- tract. In the course of the meeting the Union told the mediators that on a 2-year contract they would take $6 and $6 each year and the Company informed the mediators it would consider $4 and $3 increases. During the discussion of the notice the Union asked if the Company would consider $4 and $4 and they said they would and announced the decision in the notice . At the suggestion of the Union, the Company agreed to eliminate the termination date and to include certain other terms relating to extra slide day, funeral leave, and jury duty. Mahoney pointed out there was nothing in the notice pertaining to priority and Hanson explained it was not practicable to include the lengthy priority system but guaranteed the system would be continued . This was satisfactory to the Union . LaMothe stated the notice was "no contract" and Hanson agreed it was not a contract but something under which the Union could operate. No further meetings were held until November. On February 9 the notice , as discussed, was posted and provided for a $4 weekly increase retroactive to January 1, and a similar increase effective January 1, 1958. By letter dated February 14, the Union informed the Company that at a special meeting of the Local on February 13, the membership voted that the Union would not object to acceptance of the wage increase or other improved working conditions by its members , with the understanding that the acceptance in no way binds the Union for any length of time to any contract of any kind . The letter concluded with the statement that the Union was willing at any time to continue negotiations for a complete contract covering wages and all other terms mutually satisfactory to the Union and the Company. At the meeting of February 13, Quinn advised the mem- bers that the Local had not obtained strike sanction from the ITU. Mahoney also told the members that absent the jurisdiction , general laws , and foreman clauses, the terms set forth in the notice appeared to be reasonable and fair. d. Events occurring between the February and November meetings Mahoney cited three instances which arose under the priority system. In April, as customary , the chapel chairman, the union representative in the shop, submitted to Foreman Madden the vacation schedule arranged according to priority. Madden complained that all makeup men would be off at the same time and insisted that one of the employees, Swenson, change his plans. The Union protested that many makeup men were available and this action constituted a violation of Swen- son's rights. However, the matter was straightened out and Swenson was given his vacation in accordance with his priority. The second incident involved a machinist "out of priority" which was resolved. The last incident involved O'Toole who worked as a substitute on the night shift from about June to October when he transferred to the day shift. Madden then put him to work as an adman, which he told Madden he was not competent to per- form. While this was Madden 's prerogative it had been the rule that a man could not be discharged for incompetency in performing a job for which he claimed no competence. In October O'Toole was discharged for incompetency as an adman. The Union considered this action a serious violation of the priority system affecting the jobs of all the men . The Union thereupon invoked the grievance procedure of the joint standing committee and meetings were held in October and November. Ap- parently the committee was unable to reach a conclusion and the matter seemingly was being prepared for arbitration when the strike occurred. On September 6 Mahoney, then president of the Local, addressed a letter to Howard M. Booth , publisher , requesting a meeting for the purpose of continuing negotiations and to discuss "serious alterations" in working conditions . On Septem- ber 25 Mahoney again wrote the Company for a meeting and if it failed to do so, the Union would report the matter to its membership for whatever action it might deem necessary and notify the conciliation services. Receiving no response to his letters , Mahoney telephoned Booth and asked if his silence indicated a refusal to bargain and Booth said no, that he would take up the matter with Steele . Shortly thereafter Steele called Mahoney and stated that Booth was sending him a letter , which he would like to explain or qualify . He then stated INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION, AFL-CIO 817 that the Company's position was the same and it would be fruitless to negotiate on the basis of the Union's proposal . Mahoney said under the circumstances the parties would never get any place but the Union was still ready to negotiate a complete, approvable contract. Following this conversation the Company sent a letter to the Union, dated Sep- tember 30, stating it did not consider this to be a reasonable time for negotiating. On November 5 the Union wrote the Company that it was not satisfied with its reply and requested an early meeting. The parties then made arrangements to meet. e. The meetings of November 26 and 27 At the November 26 meeting Hanson acted as spokesman for the Company and Charles M. Lyon, first vice president of the ITU , was spokesman for the Union. Hanson told the Union that the Company was willing to sign a legal contract but it could not accept the Union's provisions on jurisdiction , general laws, and foremen. Concerning the foreman's clause, Hanson said the Company had no objection to his being a member of the Union but could not agree to make union membership mandatory . Lyon replied that a contract containing these provisions would be legal if the Company agreed to it and mentioned the fact that other newspapers had agreements similar, if not identical , to the Union's proposal . Hanson denied that acceptance of these clauses would make them legal . The parties also discussed the jurisdiction clause and its application to employees-artists-engaged in a process known as "paste-up" or "paste make-up." The artists, as asserted by the Company, had performed this work for many years , did not work in the composing room, were neither members of nor represented by the ITU for the purposes of collective bargaining, and were not included under the jurisdiction provision of the last agree- ment. Weinrich stated that the Union did not claim or ask to represent the artists, or any other employees outside the composing room , but did request that makeup work be brought into the composing room. In this respect Mahoney informed the Company that the Local had trained men for this process since it had sent a man to Indianapolis to learn paste makeup, that he had trained a number of employees, and the Union wanted the work for its members . Mahoney added that the paste makeup was nothing but a substitute method of doing work which had always been performed in the composing room and while the Union made no claim over artists it considered the process as properly defined within the printing craft and within the meaning of its jurisdiction clause. ' Hanson said it was not a question of union jurisdiction but a question of representation. The parties also discussed the Union's proposal and Hanson said it did not coincide even closely with the Company 's wishes and it could not operate economically tinder such a contract . When Hanson de- clared that the parties could reach an agreement if the Union withdrew , or they could resolve, the three key clauses, Lyon explained why the Union wanted a workable contract and pointed out that these clauses had been accepted by other newspapers. Lyon informed the Company that the Union had taken a strike vote and Hanson responded that if the Union struck he would present the matter to the Board and seek to have the Union adjudged in contempt of the decree entered in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Lyon said if a strike occurred it would be by individual action of local members . Hanson requested the Union to give further consideration to the Company's counterproposal , which the Union agreed to do, and the parties arranged to meet the following day. On November 27 the parties went over the proposal and counterproposal and were in substantial disagreement on most provisions . Hanson again questioned the legality of the three key clauses and the Union replied it did not intend to withdraw or change the language of those clauses . When Hanson offered to arbitrate the provisions , Lyon rejected the offer, stating that the Union would not have sub- mitted the clauses if it thought the provisions were illegal . The parties concede an impasse was reached. The Union then caucused and when the meeting resumed Lyon announced that the matter had been placed in his hands and because of dif- ferences of opinion regarding the legality of certain questions, because the Union was dissatisfied with wages paid and hours worked, "We say good day and good bye." On November 29 all the employees in the composing room, 195 persons, went on strike. f. Events subsequent to the commencement of the strike On January 16, 1958, Mahoney wrote the Company that the foreman clause was not and is not an issue in the "lockout" and that the Union has been and is willing ' This controversy was the basis of the proceedings under Section 10 ( k) of the Act. 50888.9-60-vol . 123-53 818 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD to enter into an agreement without that provision if other issues are satisfactorily adjusted. By letters dated January 24 Randolph and Mahoney informed the Company they were withdrawing the demand for a clause providing the employment of a union foreman. On February 8 Mahoney and DeLorme , a local official, met with Steele and Bowditch. Mahoney inquired if the matter could be resolved locally and Steele re- plied it seemed impractical because they had had many negotiating meetings and the Union rejected its counterproposal . He further inquired if the Company was committed to go before the Board, and Steele stated that was the orderly procedure to follow and, in addition , the Company had taken steps to fill vacancies in the com- posing room . Steele also questioned Mahoney's authority in view of Lyon's state- ment at the last meeting and Mahoney said he had authority to discuss the matter from the ITU and that the ITU would have to approve any means of settling the dispute. No further meetings were held between the parties. 2. The Haverhill case For many years, and all times material herein , all employees in the composing room have been and are members of Local 38. At the commencement of the hear- ing in the district court the General Counsel stated, and his statement is accepted by counsel for the Union, that the last agreement between he Company and the Union expired in 1947. In December 1956 Local 38 submitted a proposed contract to the Company con- taining, inter alia, clauses on jurisdiction , general laws, and foremen identical to those set forth above. Thereafter the Company and the Union met on eight occa- sions, namely, December 1956, and January, May, October 28, and November 8, 20, 21, and 23, 1957. During the period December 1956 through November 8, 1957, negotiations were conducted by local personnel with John Russ, president, and William H. Heath, mechanical superintendent , representing the Company and An- thony Rigazio , president of Local 38 , and a committee representing the Local. At the meeting of November 8 Rigazio announced that future negotiations would be conducted by SITU officials and he assumed the Company would wish to call in representatives of the New England Daily Newspaper Association to meet with its representatives . At subsequent meetings Lyon and LaMothe represented the Union while Phillips and Parry represented the Company. In the first phase of the negotiations , December 1956 to November 8, 1957, the Company objected to the Union's jurisdiction clause, which covered new processes not in use, and this provision was the principal subject of discussion throughout the meetings. The Company also objected to the general laws clause for the reason that acceptance of that provision would be tantamount to agreeing to the Union 's juris- diction clause . While the Company objected in principle to the foreman clause, Heath informed the Union he would not make it a decisive issue because he was satisfied with the present foreman and had no intention of making any change. The Company opposed the jurisdiction clause on three grounds, which Heath ex- plained to the Union, as follows: ( 1) The assignment of personnel to machines and processes was the responsibility primarily of management , not the Union; (2) an agreement now to employ ITU members in the future to operate processes and machines not presently in use would expose the Company to conflict with other unions claiming jurisdiction over such processes ; and (3 ) since these processes were revolutionary in nature it would be foolhardy for the Company to agree in advance which union would supply operators for the processes. The Union, according to Heath, took the position that the new processes set forth in its jurisdiction clause were substitutes for traditional composing -room processes and Heath admitted the correctness of this statement insofar as it applied to some processes with which he was familiar. However, he expressed no opinion as to some new methods for lack of knowledge of the processes. The Union further claimed that the new processes could be better performed by printers and Heath responded he did not know which craft-printers , engravers, stereotypers or lithographers-was best qualified to per- form these new methods . In the past , he stated , when substitute processes were introduced the Company had shown its willingness to use local printers to do the work, but the Company was unwilling to grant jurisdiction in the future. Heath said there was never any mention of nonunion men performing any of the new processes. In general the parties did not discuss the economic provisions of the Union's proposal for the reason that, as explained by Russ, discussion on these subjects INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION, AFL-CIO 819 hinged on other contract provisions, jurisdiction, general laws , and foremen, and they were not discussed because of the time element. Russ admitted that the Union mentioned wages at the May and October meetings and while the Company stated it was willing to discuss this topic there was no discussion for the reason stated above. The union representatives also mentioned wages as they were leaving the Novem- ber 8 meeting . The Union's vacation proposal was discussed during the negotia- tions. Heath stated that under company policy employees with 10 or more years' service were granted 3 weeks' vacation but this policy did not apply to composing- room employees because only these employees had the "slide day." Russ explained that under the slide-day practice if an employee's regular day off falls on a holiday he is given an additional day off with pay, or if he works he is paid premium rates. The Union in its proposal asked an additional week's vacation in addition to the slide day. The Company told the Union it would not agree to 3 weeks' vacation and the slide day but would accept the vacation demand without the slide day. The parties did not reach agreement on this provision. In January and July 1957, the Company gave wage increases to all its employees including those in the composing room, without any notice to the Union. Follow- ing each increase the Union wrote the Company it did not object to its members accepting the voluntary increase and requested continuing negotiations for a com- plete contract. The parties maintained their respective positions on all issues throughout the meetings, except that at the November 8 meeting the Union changed its proposal in respect to the term of the agreement and wages. Heath said the Company offered to submit a written counterproposal to the Union but his offer was turned down. a. The November 1957 meetings On November 19 the Union held a meeting of its membership at which the em- ployees voted 24 to 0 in favor of striking. Early the next morning the composing-room employees engaged in a work stoppage for almost 2 hours because no negotiation meeting had been scheduled. Heath informed Parry of the stoppage, and Parry arranged to meet with Lyon at 2 o'clock that afternoon. Phillips and Parry conferred with Russ and Heath from about 11:30 to 2 o'clock for the purpose of ascertaining the Company's position in regard to the union proposals. The group discussed jurisdiction, general laws, fore- man, vacations, hours, and other provisions, some of which they went over quickly, Parry stated he had knowledge of the Company's position in respect to the general laws and foreman clauses through previous discussions with Heath and Russ, Sr., deceased, and meetings with Lyon and LaMothe, the last meeting being held some- time in 1955. As a consequence Parry knew that since 1948 the Company had re- fused to agree to incorporate the general laws in any contract because of the closed- shop provisions contained therein. At their meeting Heath expressed the opinion that the general laws were in violation of Taft-Hartley. Parry did not know the Company's position on the jurisdiction clause for that clause was first presented by the Union about December 1955. The group discussed the jurisdiction clause which "was one of the problems" and the general law clause. That afternoon Phillips and Parry met with Lyon and LaMothe. Lyon asked Phillips if he had read the Union's proposed contract and Phillips replied that he had. Phillips, as related by Parry, stated there were a number of illegal provisions in the proposed contract and he would like an opportunity to give the Union a counterproposal. Lyon told him, "What you might consider legal and what I might consider legal would be two different things." Phillips remarked, "for once . . we are in agreement." Lyon ended the meeting by saying he was "going to pull the boys out." Phillips testified he had known Lyon for about 30 years and that they had engaged in numerous bargaining negotiations in the newspaper industry during which they had disagreed regarding the legality of the jurisdiction, general laws, and foreman clauses. In view of their past experience Phillips understood that Lyon was standing on the contract as submitted, including the three provisions, and that Lyon understood the Company's offer would not contain these provisions. When Phillips remarked they were in agreement as to their respective positions, Lyon de- clared there was no use in wasting time, he was going to pull the men. The meeting, which lasted less than 10 minutes, then ended. Parry stated that following the meeting Lyon and LaMothe went to the composing room where Lyon spoke to the employees and about a minute later the employees left the plant. The parties stipulated the composing-room employees went on strike on November 20. On November 21 the same parties, plus the union scale committee, met at the request of Federal and State conciliators, who also attended the meeting. At this 820 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD session the parties discussed the Union 's proposed contract section by section but were unable to reach any accord on the economic or substantive demands therein. Most of the discussions at this meeting were directed to the jurisdiction and general laws provisions . Parry agreed to recognize the Union as the bargaining representa- tive of the composing-room employees exclusive of employees to operate new proc- esses with which the Company was unfamiliar and had no plans for introducing into its plant. There followed a lengthy discussion on new processes and the possibility of conflicting jurisdictional claims by other unions , during which the Union stated they were interested in not losing any work for its members . Parry assured them the Company did not plan to lay off any employee based on jurisdiction that might come up in the future . He also pointed out that the jurisdiction clause would pre- clude the Company's present use of tape perforated in Boston by United Press which it sent over leased wires and which was recut in the Company 's newsroom. He further pointed out the Company was using "typro," which is featured tape or tape reproducing features which was actually cut in St. Petersburg and the jurisdiction language would prohibit the use of this tape. LaMothe said something could be worked out on the United .Press service byway of limitation on the amount of tape or the use of all such tape not construed as features for which no extra charges were paid. The discussion on jurisdiction ended with the Company agreeing to propose definite language on this clause . The Company objected to the general laws clause because it was another way of obtaining jurisdiction over new processes and some of the provisions which provided for a closed shop were illegal . Parry offered to negotiate each law individually as part of the contract and Lyon answered that the general laws were not negotiable and he would not take them up individually. Lyon, according to Parry, inferentially agreed certain provisions of the general laws might be in conflict with other laws and mentioned there was a "savings clause" in the proposed contract 2 Parry stated the "savings clause" would be of little value since the Union's contract prohibited arbitration of the general laws and Lyon admitted they were not arbitratable. Lyon asserted that any . general laws in violation of Taft- Hartley were suspended but no mention was made of any specific provisions of the general laws to be included in or excluded from the contract . There was also some inclusive discussion on the struck work clause and the right of employees to obtain substitutes . Lyon stated the Union had to have an "approved contract ," that is one approved by the ITU. On November 23 the parties again met, with the conciliators present. In accord- ance with his agreement to submit a counterproposal on jurisdiction , Parry advised that: The Publisher recognizes the Union as exclusive bargaining agent for all em- ployees of the Publisher engaged in composing room work and any dispute that arises as to what constitutes composing room work shall be subject to arbitra- tion as provided in this contract. After some discussion as to the manner in which the impartial arbitrator should be selected, Lyon said the Union had to have the jurisdiction in the language set forth in its proposed contract. There was no discussion of the general laws clause, other than the Company objected ( and apparently did so at the November 21 meeting) to the provisions in the proposed contract and the general laws which provided the foreman "shall" be a member of the Union . Parry explained that if the Union ex- pelled the foreman ,' who'had no protection under the Act, the Company would be forced to discharge him and replace him with a union member. The Union re- sponded that the foreman had always been a union member and if he was forced to resign he might lose many benefits as a consequence of his membership . Parry sug- gested that the clause be changed so that the foreman "may" be a member, which was rejected by the Union . The vacation demand was discussed with each party maintaining his original position , the Union asking for 3 weeks plus slide day and the Company offering 3 weeks without slide day. At the previous meeting wages were mentioned , and Lyon characterized economic issues as secondary , so at the instant session Lyon asked Parry if he had any counterproposal on wages. At the time of the strike the rate was $96 .50 a week and the Union's proposed contract called for $109 .55 per week . Parry pointed out the Company had granted increases in January and July totaling $4.50 a wee]: and offered $3.50 per week, bring the 9 Article I, section 8 of the proposed contract provided , "nothing contained herein shall be construed to interfere in any way with the creation or operation of any rules not in conflict with law or this contract by any chapel or by the union for the conduct of its own affairs." INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION, AFL-CIO 821 scale up to $100, which was not acceptable to Lyon. At the suggestion of the conciliators the parties summarized the basic issues as follows: First was the limitation of, restriction of the use of teletype tape. The second was jurisdiction over new processes. And third was refusal of the employer to agree that the foreman shall be a member of the union, and the fourth was refusal of the employer to accept the general laws of the International Typo- graphical Union. Parry offered full arbitration on all these issues but Lyon refused his offer. The meeting then ended. Randolph testified that the general laws prohibit any arbitration thereof by local unions,3 but the prohibition "has no reference to the arbitration of the facts of the dispute. Its only whether or not they would arbitrate whether or not to exclude the general law from a contract, or to arbitrate whether it could be effective or not." Randolph further testified that, in accordance with the ITU bylaws,4 he designated Lyon as the ITU representative in the dispute and that the ITU sanctioned the strike. By letters dated January 17 and 24, 1958, the Local and the ITU, respectively, in- formed the Company that the demand for the foreman clause was being withdrawn. In brief, Randolph's testimony in the New York Mailers case (November 14, 15, 1957), discloses that for many years it was the custom of the ITV to include a provision in agreements that matters not covered by the contract shall be covered by the general law. Subsequent to the enactment of Taft-Hartley the clause was changed to include the general laws "not in conflict with this contract or with Federal or State law shall govern the relation between the parties on conditions not specifically enumerated herein." However, Randolph said it would not be possible to spell out what general laws might be validly applied under particular circumstances, but the employer or the local union could seek the advice of the ITU on these questions. He further testified "our general laws are the basis of union shop operations and have been so throughout the history of the ITU." In this connection he said that local unions must clear any proposed contract with the ITU before submission to the employer and, if agreement is reached, it must again be submitted for approval before final execution. Randolph concluded by stating the union shop allowed under the Act would permit the employer to determine not only the character, health, and competency of an employee but he would have a method of determining who would be members of the Union, which " is entirely repugnant to the history and tradition" of the ITU. C. Conclusions 1. The refusal to bargain Although it is conceded that the parties reached an impasse on the jurisdiction, general laws, and foreman clauses, it strikes me that the Respondents' demand for the jurisdictional clause covering many classifications for future work or processes was the primary cause of the disputes. Thus, in the Worcester case, the Company had collective bargaining agreements with the Union for many years and their last agreement included clauses incorporating the general laws therein and the employment of union foremen. In the Haverhill case Heath testified concerning the negotiations that the jurisdiction demand "was the basic issue from beginning to end." Heath explained the Company objected to the general laws clause for the reason that acceptance of that provision meant automatic acceptance of the jurisdic- tion clause, although he added that the general laws clause embraced more than the jurisdiction provision. To eliminate any doubt on this point the Court inquired of Heath: Your concern to the union, if I understand it, was that Section 8 [the contract demand for the general laws] and Section 5 [the jurisdiction provision] were two ways of expressing the same thing that you didn't want to take. 3 Article II, section 3. states : "It is imperatively ordered the executive officers of the International Typographical Union shall not submit any of its Laws to arbitration, nor shall any subordinate Unions arbitrate whether or not any General Law of the Inter- national Typographical Union is effective." 4 Article XIX, section 1, provides : "In the event of disagreement between a subordinate union and the employer which in the opinion of the local union may result in a strike, such union shall notify the President, who shall in person or by proxy investigate the cause of the disagreement and endeavor to adjust the difficulty. If his efforts should prove futile, he shall notify the Executive Council of all the circumstances, and if a majority of said Council shall decide that a strike is necessary, such union may be authorized to order a strike." 822 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Heath replied: Jurisdiction, that is right. Again, when asked by the court if he expressed "any objection to Section 8 that was independent of Section 5," he answered: I had no occasion to, your Honor, because discussions between management and the union almost exclusively hinged on the issue of jurisdiction. Therefore, the first question to be resolved is whether the units sought by the Respondent Unions under their jurisdiction clauses are appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining under the Act. Here, of course, there has been no Board determination of the appropriate unit but on the basis of the record herein and the bargaining history I have no difficulty in finding that a unit comprising all composing- room employees, subject to the statutory exclusion of foremen, in the work classifica- tions covered in the last agreement between the Union and Worcester (supra) is appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(c) of the Act. (ANPA, 104 NLRB 806, 814-815.) Of course, Haverhill and the Union have not had any collective-bargaining agreements since about 1947. However, the evidence plainly shows that negotiations were conducted on the basis of a unit consisting of composing-room employees and the Board has held such a unit, excepting foremen, to be appropriate in the newspaper industry. (ANPA, supra.) I therefore find that all composing-room employees, excluding foremen, of Haverhill is appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(c) of the Act. There is no question that the respective Respond- ent Unions represented a majority of the employees in these units . Accordingly, I find that Local 165 and the ITU and Local 38 and the ITU were, and are, the duly designated bargaining representatives within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act of the employees in the units herein found to be appropriate. (ANPA, 104 NLRB 806, 816.) In general the Board has refused to include in a unit nonexistent or future job operations. Thus, in Hamilton Watch Company (118 NLRB 591, 592, footnote 4) the Board declined to include factory clericals in a production and maintenance unit for the reason that the employer had no employees in that classification and did not contemplate hiring any such employees in the immediate future. ( See also, Combustion Engineering, Inc., 117 NLRB 1589, 1593; Koppers Company, Inc., 117 NLRB 422, 427, footnote 9.) Here the evidence is plain that the Companies had no intention of introducing the new methods or processes over which the Unions were asserting jurisdiction. Moreover, in the Worcester case the Company sub- mitted a counterproposal in which it agreed not to introduce certain methods during the term of the agreement, which proposal was rejected by the Union. It is undis- puted that the Respondent Unions insisted throughout the negotiations that the jurisdiction clause must be accepted in the language submitted. Counsel for the Respondents contend that the Unions only sought to bargain on behalf of those employees in the composing-room unit that they historically represented. Further, counsel contend, in the absence of a Board certification, the parties have the right to determine the scope of the unit and that a union may ask and strike for a contract provision relative to work not presently in existence . The plain answer to the latter contention is that the Companies refused to accept the Union's designa- tion of the bargaining unit, which I have found to be inappropriate, but nevertheless the Unions insist upon conducting negotiations on the basis of that unit. Nor do I agree with counsel that absent a prior Board determination of the unit a party may insist upon bargaining in a unit of his own choice, irrespective of its appropriate- ness. In Eastern Massachusetts Street Railway Company (110 NLRB 1963) the Board on the record before it, and without prior unit determination, found that a companywide unit of all operating and maintenance employees (regardless of the division where they worked) was an appropriate unit and that the Association was the representative of all the employees in the unit. The Board further found (pp. 1966-1967) that the Company in dealing with the Lowell Local as representative of a mere fraction of the unit, when the Association had the right and was insisting upon representing all the employees in the unit, thereby refused to bargain with the majority representative in an appropriate unit in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. In granting enforcement of the Board's order the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (235 F. 2d 700) held the bargaining unit determination was within the powers granted under Section 9(b) of the Act and the appropriateness thereof fully supported by the evidence. The court summarily rejected the company's contention that assuming the unit determination was proper, still there was no violation of Section 8(a)(5) because the Company believed in good faith that the smaller unit was appropriate. INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION, AFL-CIO 823 In Texlite, Inc. (International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, et al.), 119 NLRB 1792, the Board stated: A union which is the statutory representative of employees in an appropriate unit has the obligation, as does the employer, to bargain in good faith with respect to terms and conditions of employment for employees in that unit. A refusal "to enter into a collective bargaining agreement, unless the other party to the negotiations agrees to a provision or takes some action which is unlawful or inconsistent with the basic policy of the Act is a refusal to bargain in violation of the Act." Hence a union which insists upon bargaining only for an inappropriate unit does not fulfill its obligation to bargain as defined in the Act. [Citing American Radio Association, 82 NLRB 1344, Douds v. Interna- tional Longshoremen's Association, 241 F. 2d 278 (C. A. 2).I In view of the foregoing findings I cannot accept the Respondent 's contention that they were doing nothing more than bargaining on behalf of the composing- room employees for work traditionally performed by these employees. Moreover, the Board has resolved any question that might have arisen in that respect in its Decision and Determination of Dispute in proceedings under Section 10(k) of the Act involving Worcester and the instant Respondents. (121 NLRB 793.) Follow- ing the strike, Worcester filed a charge on December 2, 1957, alleging that the Respondents had been and were engaging in activities proscribed by Section 8(b)(4)(D) of the Act. In substance the charge alleged that the Respondents had induced and encouraged the employees of Worcester to engage in a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to handle or work on goods with an object of forcing or requiring Worcester to assign particular work to employees who were members of Respondent Unions rather than to employees in another trade, craft, or class. Briefly, the Board found that at least a portion of the Respondents' purpose in striking was to resolve the "disagreement" over the work jurisdiction clause by forcing or requiring Worcester to accept that clause. Continuing, the Board stated that if the Respondents' jurisdiction clause required assignment of work to its members rather than to employees in another labor organi- zation, or in another trade, craft, or class the strike was for an unlawful object within the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (D). The Board found that an object of the strike was to force or require Worcester to assign to Respondents' members working in the composing room the paste-makeup work which it had assigned to artists who were not members of the Respondents and who had been performing the paste-makeup operations for many years. The Board thereupon entered its determination of the dispute on that basis. I have no difficulty in concluding that by insisting upon acceptance of the Union foreman clause throughout the negotiations the Respondent Unions refused to bar- gain in good faith as required by the Act. In the ANPA case, both the court and the Board held that the Unions by engaging in coercive conduct designed to compel employers to continue to hire only union foremen violated Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act.5 In fact the court stated the Unions' "insistence on union foremen was a very important part of their scheme for the maintenance of the closed shop conditions." (193 F. 2d 782, 796, 805; 86 NLRB 951, 957-959.) Here the Respondents urge that the evidence negates the presumption that union foremen will discriminate in favor of union men, as held in Enterprise Industrial Piping Company (117 NLRB 995),6 for in the Worcester case the Union had diffi- culties with the foreman. In this connection Mahoney, as appears above, cited three instances which arose under the priority system, two of which were resolved quickly, and the remaining one, the O'Toole discharge, was being processed at the time of the strike. Mahoney testified that in his opinion the O'Toole discharge was one of the reasons why the members voted to strike but admitted Worcester was not informed that this matter was one of the causes of the strike. While these matters were important to the Local I do not see how they materially affect the issues herein. 5 The section provides : "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-(1) to restrain or coerce . . . (B) an employer in the selection of his repre- sentatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances." IIn this case the Board, in accordance with well established policy, held that where employers entrust their hiring to foremen who are members of the union and bound by its laws, they in effect agree with the union, through the foremen who are agents of em- ployers and the union, to operate under a closed-shop arrangement, which is prohibited by the Act. 824 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD As in the case of the jurisdiction and foreman provisions the Respondent Unions demanded the general laws be accepted in toto and summarily rejected all offers to negotiate the laws individually or to arbitrate any of the controversial provisions therein. The General Counsel contends that some 16 provisions of the general laws create illegal hiring conditions and by insisting upon acceptance of these laws as a condition precedent to a contract, and by striking to enforce these demands, the Respondent Unions violated, inter alia, Section 8 (b) (3) of the Act. On the other hand, counsel for the Respondents assert the general laws challenged are not illegal on their face, that under the "savings clause" only those laws which are not in conflict with the contract or civil law are included, and the laws thus excluded are protected as internal rules of membership by the proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. At the outset I wish to point out that the demand for observance of the general laws set forth in the complaints cannot be treated as an academic subject without any particular significance or meaning, but must be considered in the light of their adoption, purpose, enforcement, and evidence herein. Generally speaking Randolph's testimony discloses that undoubtedly the ITU has considered the general laws as the core of its organization for, as he stated, "our general laws are the basis of union shop operations and have been throughout the history of the ITU." It is equally clear from Randolph's testimony that his version of the union shop is not the union shop permitted under the Act. Nor is there any question that the experienced bargaining representatives in these cases entertained any doubt concern- ing the nature of the Unions' demands for inclusion of the general laws and the applicability, scope, and effectiveness of these laws. Accordingly, I consider the demand for acceptance of the general laws challenged in this background and the record herein. Although the contracts define "employees" as journeymen and apprentices and provide that only journeymen and apprentices shall be employed, there is no men- tion of membership or nonmembership of journeymen in the ITU. The general laws (article V, section 11) state that all foremen and journeymen must be active members in good standing in the Union and further declare (article VII, sections 1 and 5, and article VIII) that only members shall be allowed to install, operate, or service the various machines and devices used in the composing room. While the contracts do not provide that union membership is a condition of achieving journey- man status, and Randolph testified to this effect, they contain no provisions as to membership or nonmembership requirements once journeyman status has been established. As the general laws require all journeymen to be active union mem- bers, the term "journeymen" in the contracts must be held to refer only to journey- men who are union members. Accordingly, the demand by the Respondent Unions that the Companies agree to employ only journeymen in their composing rooms constitutes nothing less than a demand for a closed-shop provision. Further, the Board's decision in the Worcester case, supra, demonstrates that the Respondent Unions were not only seeking composing-room work for their members but also paste-makeup work which had been assigned to other employees, nonmembers of the Union, by the Company. I also conclude that the general laws requiring the foreman to be an active member of the Union is part of the Unions' strategy to maintain closed-shop conditions in the composing room. I therefore find that the general laws insofar as they supplement the jurisdiction and foreman clauses, spe- cifically, article III, section 12; article V, section 11; article VII, sections 1, 5, and 6, and article VIII are illegal. The remaining general laws alleged to be illegal cover apprentices and the priority system. Since the proposed contracts contain many clauses relating to apprentices, which would govern the relationship of the parties on those subjects, I believe it appro- priate to consider both the contract proposals and the general laws claimed to be illegal in this respect. In the Worcester case, Steele said the Company did not question the legality of the apprenticeship contract provisions but did oppose the demands on the grounds: (1) The Company wanted the right to pass on the com- petency of apprentice applicants rather than jointly with the Local, and (2) the Company should not be required to advise apprentices to subscribe to and complete the ITU course in printing. In the Haverhill case, Heath could not recall any discussion on the apprenticeship provision and stated -it has been traditional for the Union to accept a large measure of responsibility for the training of apprentices. When asked if he had any objection to the apprenticeship program at the plant, seemingly conducted under the general laws, Heath replied, "No, none at all. We had an excellent program." INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION, AFL -CIO 825 Unlike the journeyman clause, I see nothing unreasonable , much less illegal, in the contract proposals and general laws covering apprentices . Certainly, there is nothing in these demands requiring apprentices to be union members when hired or to acquire membership during the course of their employment. These provisions supersede any general laws to the contrary. In addition the testimonies of Steele and Heath refute the ;idea that the Companies had any substantial objections to the Unions' demands or the apprenticeship program itself . The General Counsel speci- fies five general laws as creating unlawful employment conditions concerning ap- prentices only two of which, in my opinion , require any comment. Thus, the requirement that "an apprentice must first be approved by the ITU local" (article I, section 4 ) is plainly inapplicable in view of the contract proposals and the record. The other provision attacked is that "Beginning with the second year, apprentices must be in possession of an apprentice card issued by the union" ( article 1, section 11). This law might appear to be illegal, except for the fact that the law is inac- curately stated in the complaint . As correctly quoted this section ( General Counsel's Exhibit No. 15, p. *82) states : "Starting with the second year apprentices are entitled to and must be in possession of an apprentice working card ." [ Empha- sis supplied.] Even assuming there might be some ramifications or farfetched arguments respecting the interpretation of this law, I am satisfied the evidence does not warrant the conclusion that the contract proposals or the general laws covering the apprenticeship program are illegal. The proposed contracts have provisions touching upon priority, for instance the employment of substitutes by the foreman , and reductions in force must be made on that basis, so the general laws (article X) detailing the priority system are incorporated into the contracts . The general laws (article X, section 2) state that: Subordinate unions shall establish a system for registering and recording priority of members in all chapels , which shall be conspicuously posted or kept in a place within the chapel accessible to members at all times. The priority standing of a member shall stand as recorded. I am convinced that the contract clauses and the general laws delegate exclusive control to the Respondent Unions in the establishment and maintenance of the priority system. The Board has held that such a delegation of power over a seniority system is unlawful . (International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., Local No. 41 (Pacific Intermountain Express Company ), 107 NLRB 837, 841; Chief Freight Lines Company, 111 NLRB 22, 32; Kenosha Auto Transport Corporation, 113 NLRB 643.) If the cases did not go beyond this point and involved only the bare legal question of the legality or illegality of the priority proposals as supple- mented by the general laws, I would have no difficulty in resolving the issue. How- ever, the evidence, as I view it, reveals that the Companies not only raised no objec- tions to the priority system but , apparently, acquiesced in the continuance of the plan at their plants. This is precisely the position of Worcester for Steele, on cross- examination , testified as follows: Q. During the negotiations , Mr. Steele, did the Company say that vertical priority would prevail? A. Mr. Hanson stated that priority practices would continue. Q. And did the Company make any statement about what priority they were putting into effect, if any? A. Mr. Hanson said that the Company would continue to observe priority practices as they had 'been. As appears above, Heath testified Haverhill opposed the general laws only insofar as they applied to the jurisdiction clause, and I fail to see any connection between the jurisdiction clause and the priority clause which would warrant the assumption that the Company thereby objected to the general laws on this ground . Under the particular circumstances , I do not find the general laws bearing upon the priority system to be illegal as alleged in the complaints. . I cannot adopt the Respondents' contentions that the "savings clause" includes only the general laws "not in conflict with state or federal law." As related by Randolph there never has been any attempt to state which, if any, of the general laws might be considered legal or illegal and plainly there is no evidence in the record remotely suggesting that the Respondents were not seeking to incorporate all the general laws, including those found unlawful herein , in the proposed con- tracts. Suffice it to say that a "savings clause" of this general character is ineffective to eliminate the illegal provisions of the general laws. (N.L.R.B. v. Gaynor News Company, Inc., 197 F. 2d 719, 723-724 (C.A. 2), affd. 347 U.S. 17; N.L.R.B. v: 826 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Red Star Express Lines, 196 F. 2d 78, 81 (C.A. 2); N.L.R.B. v. Gottfried Baking Co., Inc., et al., 210 F. 2d 772, 777, 780 (C.A. 2).) I have considered the arguments advanced by counsel for the Respondents that the evidence fails to establish a violation of Section 8(b) (3) of the Act. In essence counsel contend that the Respondents were earnestly attempting to negotiate lawful agreements with the Companies and that either party in bargaining negotiations may persist in his position, as they did, concerning any particular provision without violating his duty to bargain . Counsel rely upon Section 8(d) and the decision of the Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v American National Insurance Company, 343 U.S. 395. In the American National Insurance case the Supreme Court held that the statue does not encourage a party to engage in fruitless marathon discussions at the expense of a frank statement of his position and that the Board may not, directly or indirectly, compel concessions or otherwise sit in judgment upon the substantive terms of collective-bargaining agreements . The Court also rejected the Board's theory that, apart from the good-faith test prescribed in Section 10(d), the Company's bargaining for a management functions clause was, per se, violative of the Act. Of course, there was no contention that the management functions clause was illegal and on this point the Court expressly stated (p. 405, footnote 15) : Thus we put aside such cases as N.L.R.B. v. National Maritime Union, 175 F. 2d 686 (C.A. 2d Cir. 1949 ) (bargaining for discriminatory hiring hall .clause),-where a party bargained for a clause violative of an express provision of the Act. The foregoing language makes it clear that the good -faith test declared in Section 8(d) applies only in situations where a party proposes and bargains for contract terms lawful under the Act and not, as found here , for demands that would create illegal hiring and employment conditions . I agree with the Respondents' assertions that they were desirous of securing contracts with the Companies , but the evidence plainly shows they insisted upon acceptance of their jurisdiction , foreman, and gen- eral laws clauses , as written, as a condition precedent to the execution of any collec- tive-bargaining agreements. Having found these provisions to be illegal , I further find that by demanding the Companies agree to these clauses the Respondent Unions thereby engaged in conduct in violation of Section 8(b)(3) of the Act. 2. The violation of Section 8(b) (2) Section 8 (b)(2) provides : "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-. . . to cause or attempt to cause an employer to dis- criminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3). . The latter section makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate against an employee in order to encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization. The General Counsel contends that by striking , or threatening to strike, to secure contractual provisions which would require union membership as a condition of employment, the Respondents violated Section 8(b) (2) of the Act. The Respondents contend that the facts do not sustain a violation of either the "causing " or "attempt" provisions of Section 8(b)(2) for in order to establish a violation thereof it must be shown their activities were directed toward the actual , immediate discrimination against employees as contemplated by Section 8(a)(3). Further, they argue that insistence upon their lawful contract terms which , if accepted, might grant the power, or compel , the Companies to discriminate at some indefinite future time is insufficient to establish a violation of Section 8(a)(3). In support of the latter argument counsel point out that the terms demanded herein have been in effect in other agreements in the area as well as in the last contract with Worcester, with- out any charges of discriminatory application or enforcement of the contracts. I have already found the jurisdiction , foreman, and general laws clauses to be illegal, so I cannot accept the basic argument that the Respondents were simply insisting upon lawful contract terms, hence did not engage in any conduct proscribed by the Act. Nor does the fact that other publishers in New England , and Worcester in the past, have, or have had agreements embodying these clauses alter the situation for the Board has held that where an employer agrees to illegal hiring or employ- ment terms he violates Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. (Amalgamated Meat Cutters etc. (The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company ), 81 NLRB 1052 , 1054-1055; New York State Employers Association , Inc., 93 NLRB 127-128; Pacific American Shipowners Association , 98 NLRB 582, 584-585 .) I believe it only necessary to point out that the legal arguments here advanced by the Respondents were also raised in the ANPA case and rejected by the Court of Appeals. INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION, AFL-CIO 827 In the ANPA case and N.L.R.B. v. National Maritime Union of America (175 F. 2d 686, (C.A. 2)), the courts squarely held that a strike, or threat to strike, to obtain contractual provisions which would require union membership as a condition of employment constitutes a violation of Section 8(b)(2). On the basis of the record I have difficulty in finding that the primary object or purpose of the strikes against Worcester and Haverhill was to force the Companies to accede to the Respondents' demands for the illegal jurisdiction, foreman, and general laws clauses. By engaging in such conduct and activities the Respondents violated Section 8(b) (2) of the Act. 3. The violation of Section 8(b)(1)(B) 1 find that by engaging in the conduct described above in respect to the foreman clause, the Respondents restrained and coerced Worcester and Haverhill in the selec- tion of their representatives for the adjustment of grievances thereby violating Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act. 4. The alleged violation of Section 8(b) (1) (A) In the ANPA case the Board dismissed the Section 8(b) (1) (A) allegations of the complaint because the proscriptions of that provision are limited to situations in- volving actual or threatened economic reprisals and violence by unions or their agents in an effort to compel them to join a union or cooperate in a union's strike activities. (86 NLRB 951, 955-957, affd. 193 F. 2d 782, 800-801.) The facts in these cases are not so distinguishable from those in the ANPA case (and cases cited therein) that they would justify a conclusion contrary to the Board's decision. Ac- cordingly, I find the Respondents did not engage in any conduct in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A). 5. The ITU as a party to the proceedings In substance the ITU claims it is not chargeable with any unfair labor practices arising out of the negotiations because the Locals were negotiating independently and that it is not, and was not, the bargaining representative of the employees of Worcester and Haverhill, respectively. These arguments were advanced in the ANPA case (104 NLRB 806, 807-808) and the Chicago Typographical Union case (86 NLRB 1041, 1045-1048) and answered adversely to the ITU. Counsel for the ITU do not deny the similarity between those cases and the present cases. Here the evidence plainly shows that each of the Locals demanded an "approvable contract," that is, one which would be approved by the ITU. In this respect the record also establishes that the Locals were required to obtain ITU approval of their agreements prior to submission to the Companies and, again, approval before final execution of any tentative agreement. It is, of course, undisputed that Lyon and LaMothe actively participated in the negotiations as representatives of the ITU and that the ITU sanc- tioned and approved the strikes. On this evidence I find that the ITU and its executive council are proper parties to these proceedings and are chargeable with the unfair labor practices alleged and found herein. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent Unions, set forth above, occurring in connec- tion with the operations of Worcester and Haverhill, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondents have engaged in unfair labor practices I will recommend that they, and each of them, cease and desist therefrom. From the facts in these cases it is reasonable to infer that, unless effectively restrained, the Respond- ents will refuse to bargain collectively with the Companies as required by Section 8(b) (3) by persisting upon acceptance of their contract demands for unlawful hiring and employment conditions and will continue to strike, or threaten strike action, to obtain these illegal objectives. I shall therefore recommend that the Respondents cease and desist not only from engaging in the specific conduct found to be unlaw- ful but from engaging in any like or related acts for the same objective. 828 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and the entire record, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Worcester and Haverhill are each engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The ITU, Local 165, and Local 38 are each labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. 3. Respondents Woodruff Randolph, Harold H. Clark, Joe Bailey, Don Hurd, and Charles M. Lyon, and the scale committee of Local 165, are agents of the ITU and Local 165 within the meaning of Section 8(b) of the Act. 4. All composing-room employees, exclusive of foremen, of Worcester, including classifications such as hand compositors , typesetting machine operators , makeup men, bankmen , admen, proofreaders, machinists for typesetting machines , operators, and machinists on all mechanical devices which case or compose type or slugs , constitute, and all times constituted , a unit appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (c) of the Act. 5. All composing-room employees, exclusive of foremen, of Haverhill constitute, and all times constituted , a unit appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(c) of the Act. 6. Local 165 and Local 38 and the ITU were at all times material , and now are, the exclusive bargaining representatives of the employees of Worcester and Haver- hill, respectively, in the aforesaid unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 7. By refusing to bargain collectively with Worcester and Haverhill, Local 165 and Local 38 and the ITU have engaged in and are engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(3) of the Act. 8. By instigating, directing, and engaging in strikes to cause or attempt to cause Worcester and Haverhill to discriminate against their employees in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, the Respondents thereby violated Section 8(b)(2) of the Act. 9. By instigating, directing, and engaging in strikes to force Worcester and Haver- hill to hire only foremen who are members of the ITU, the Respondents restrained and coerced the Companies in the selection of their representatives for the adjust- ment of grievances, and thereby engaged in unfair labor practices within the mean- ing of Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act. 10. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and ( 7) of the Act. It. The Respondents have not engaged in unfair labor practices within the mean- ing of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] APPENDIX A NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION LOCAL 38, AFL-CIO, AND TO EMPLOYEES OF HAVERHILL GAZETTE COMPANY Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Re- lations Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that: WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively in good faith in our capacity as exclusive bargaining representative of all employees of Haverhill Gazette Com- pany in the bargaining unit described below with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment , and other conditions of employment including union- security as permitted in Section 8(a) (3) of the Act. The bargaining unit is: All composing-room employees, exclusive of foremen. WE WILL NOT engage in strike action , or direct, instigate , or encourage em- ployees to engage in or threaten to engage in strike action, or approve or ratify strike action taken by the employees, for the purpose of forcing Haverhill Gazette Company to execute an agreement requiring membership in the Inter- national Typographical Union as a condition of employment in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. WE WILL not in any other manner cause or attempt to cause Haverhill Gazette Company to discriminate against employees in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION, AFL -CIO 829 WE WILL not in any manner restrain or coerce Haverhill Gazette Company in the selection of its representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances. INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION, AFL-CIO, Union. Dated ------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Officer ) ( Title) INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION LOCAL 3 8, AFL-CIO, Union. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Officer ) ( Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof , and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. APPENDIX B NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION 165, AFL-CIO, AND TO EMPLOYEES OF WORCESTER TELEGRAM PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC. Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Re - lations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that: WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively in good faith in our capacity as exclusive bargaining representative of all employees of Worcester Telegram Publishing Company, Inc., in the bargaining unit described below with respect to rates of pay, wages , hours of employment, and other conditions of employ- ment including union-security as permitted by Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. The bargaining unit is: All composing-room employees, exclusive of foremen , including classifi- cations such as hand compositors , typesetting machine operators , makeup men, bankmen, admen, proofreaders, machinists for typesetting machines, operators , and machinists on all mechanical devices which cast or compose type or slugs. WE WILL NOT engage in strike action , or direct, instigate , or encourage em- ployees to engage in or threaten to engage in strike action , or approve or ratify strike action taken by the employees , for the purpose of forcing Worcester Telegram Publishing Company, Inc., to execute an agreement requiring mem- bership in the International Typographical Union as a condition of employment in violation of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act. WE WILL NOT in any other manner cause or attempt to cause Worcester Te!egram Publishing Company, Inc., to discriminate against employees in viola- tion of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act. WE WILL NOT in any manner restrain or coerce Worcester Telegram Publish- ing Company, Inc., in the selection of its representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances. INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION, AFL-CIO, Union. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Officer ) ( Title) ------------ -------------- --(WOODRUFF RANDOLPH) (IIAROLD H. CLARK) (TOE BAILEY ) (DON HUED) (CHARLES M. LYON) INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION LOCAL 165, AFL-CIO, AND ITS SCALE COMMITTEE, Union. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Officer ) ( Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.