Neco Electrical Products Corp.

NECO ELECTRICAL PRODUCTS CORPORATION 481 gone to the office around 10 p.m. in response to "a case of trouble" and Shaver was not there. Shaver testified that he had not advised Boyd that he would be out that evening and that he did go out to attend a union meeting and returned around 10 p.m. The following morning Boyd inquired of Shaver where he had been the night before and Shaver replied that he had attended the union meeting. Shaver further testified that Boyd asked who else had attended the meeting. Shaver re- plied that he could not answer that. This ended the conversation according to Shaver. In view of Shaver's admitted and known absence from the Respondent's building on the evening before this conversation occurred, the inquiry by Boyd of Shaver as to Shaver's whereabouts was entirely normal and logical and I find that this entire conversation, standing alone as it does in this record, did not carry "with it more than the implication of curiosity." N.L.R.B. v. Syracuse Color Press, Inc., 209 F. 2d 596, 600 (C.A. 2). Under all the circumstances, it did not reason- ably tend to restrain or interfere with the employees in the exercise of rights guar- anteed by the Act. Blue Flash Express, Inc., 109 NLRB 591. Concluding Findings The General Counsel endeavored to establish that the remark made by Estes was not an unusual or uncommon remark among the Respondent's employees and that Estes did not intend the remark in a serious or threatening manner. General Counsel then sought to show that because the remark was intended in a light vein and because Estes was ,the most active union adherent among Respondent's em- ployees, that the reason advanced by Respondent for the discharge of Estes was a pretext. Such a theory is entirely plausible. However it is undisputed that Yancey-the supervisor to whom the words were spoken-thought that Estes was serious and regarded the words spoken by Estes as a threat to him. The Trial Examiner does not regard Yancey's failure to forthwith report the incident to his "boss" as such unreasonable conduct as would discredit his testimony. It is not unusual for a first line supervisor to seek to solve his own problems with the men under him. However, once Boyd questioned Yancey and the Respondent's manager learned of Estes' threat to Yancey, the Respondent took prompt action by discharg- ing Estes. The entire evidence here, while perhaps raising a suspicion of discrimina- tory motivation, fails to constitute the preponderance necessary to establish that the Respondent was illegally motivated in terminating the employment of Charles Vernon Estes or in its continued failure to reinstate Estes. Strachen Shipping Com- pany, 87 NLRB 431 and Western Lace and Line Co., d/bla Western Fishing Lines Company, 105 NLRB 749. Objectively viewed, any suspicion arises from the se- verity of the disciplinary action and not the motivation. Upon the above findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (1) The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. (2) The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. (3) The Respondent has not violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act as alleged in the complaint. (4) The Respondent has not engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act as alleged in the complaint. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] Neco Electrical Products Corporation and International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO. Case No. 15-CA-1093. August 13, 1959 DECISION AND ORDER On April 14, 1959, Trial Examiner Lloyd Buchanan issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that 124 NLRB No. 54. 525543-60-vol 124-32 482 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent and the Charging Party filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and supporting briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Members Rodgers, Bean, and Fanning]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Intermedi- ate Report,' the exceptions, the briefs, and the entire record in the case, and finds merit in one of the Respondent's exceptions. Ac- cordingly, the Board adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom- mendations of the Trial Examiner with the modification set forth below. We do not agree with the Trial Examiner's finding that Supervisor Lightsey's statements to employee W. R. Foley constituted threats in violation of the Act. In response to a question by Foley, Lightsey replied that the Respondent might lose two of its biggest customers if the Union came in, that these two customers wouldn't do business with a union company for fear of a shortage of products due to a strike, and that if the Respondent lost these two big orders there might possibly be a cutback in operations. We find that these state- ments are no more than predictions of possible future actions of third parties, should the Union win the election. As the statements con- tained no threats that the Respondent would take any steps to induce the happening of the future events, we find that they were privileged under Section 8(c) of the Act and therefore do not: constitute viola- tions of Section 8 (a) (1) ? The test of interference, restraint, and coercion under Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act turns on whether it may reasonably be said that the conduct in which the employer or its representative engaged tends to interfere with the free exercise of employee rights under the Act.' The illegal activities occurred here during an election cam- paign, and consisted of a threat to close the plant and a threat to deny reemployment opportunities to an employee unless she disavowed the Union. Because of the timing and nature of the threats, these activities go to the very heart of the Act and indicate a purpose to 1 At one point in the Intermediate Report, the Trial Examiner refers to Supervisor Rhodes' interrogation of Williamson about "Mr ." Foley. The record and the report both reveal that the conversation in question concerned Mrs. Foley, another employee. This inadvertent error in the report is corrected accordingly. z See Southwester Co., 111 NLRB 805; Safeway Stores, Inc., 122 NLRB 1369. 3N.L.R.B. v. Illinois Tool Works, 153 F. 2d 811 ( C.A. 7) ; American Freightways Co., Inc., 124 NLRB 146. NECO ELECTRICAL PRODUCTS CORPORATION 483 defeat the employees' self-organization' In these circumstances, unlike our dissenting colleague, we find that the violations cannot be dismissed as isolated, and that the purposes of the Act will be thwarted unless a remedy is provided. ORDER Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Neco Electrical Products Corporation, Bay Springs, Mississippi, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall : 1. Cease and desist from : (a) 'Threatening to shut down or remove the plant if the Union wins a representation election, or threatening to deny reemployment to employees who do not declare their withdrawal of support from the Union. . (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such rights might be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organiza- tion as a condition of employment, as authorized by Section 8(a) (3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Post in conspicuous places at its plant in Bay Springs, Missis- sippi, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted, copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix." 5 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Fifteenth Region, shall, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter. Rea- sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said no- tices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director for the Fifteenth Region in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, as to what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. MEMBER RODGERS, dissenting : I do not agree with my colleagues that a useful purpose can be served by issuing a cease and desist order based solely on the two minor 8 (a) (1) violations committed. 4 See Hancock Trucking, Incorporated, 109 NLRB 80, 85. 5In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals , there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words "Pursuant W a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order." 484 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD In reaching this conclusion, I particularly note that shortly before the two incidents, which involved Rhodes, a minor supervisor, and affected, at most, only two employees out of a total of over 400, the- Respondent distributed among the supervisors a memorandum specifi- cally instructing them that, both under the law and pursuant to Respondent's desire, they were not to threaten, bribe, or make promises to the employees. At the same time, the Respondent, by bulletin,. informed the employees that if anyone threatened them they were to let the Respondent know immediately. Although this action by the Respondent did not legally exculpate it for the later statements made by Supervisor Rhodes, it forcibly demonstrated, especially in the absence of any other violations of any kind, that the incidents were isolated in nature, did not represent official policy of the Respondent and, therefore, were not of such a nature as would warrant a cease and desist order.6 Accordingly, I would dismiss the complaint. O See Geilich Tanning Company, 122 NLRB 1119; American Gilsonite Company, 122 NLRB 1006; Sunset Lumber Products, 113 NLRB 1172, 1173. APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that : WE WILL NOT threaten to shut down or remove our plant if International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, wins a representa- tion election, or threaten to deny reemployment to employees who do not declare their withdrawal of support from the said Union or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representa- tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agree- ment requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of the Act. All of our employees are free to become, to remain, or to refrain from becoming or remaining, members of International Union of NECO ELECTRICAL PRODUCTS CORPORATION 485 Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization. NECO ELECTRICAL PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Employer. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative ) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER The complaint herein alleges that on various dates in August and September 1957 the Company violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, by threatening plant shutdown or removal , curtailment of work, or other economic reprisal if the Union won the representation election, which was held on September 6, and economic reprisal against employees unless they discontinued their union interest and activities or resigned from their employment before the election; interrogated employees concerning their own and other em- ployees' union membership , activities, and feelings; and advised an employee that he was making a mistake in acting as union observer in the election and that he should not do so. The answer denies the allegations of unfair labor practices. A hearing was held before the duly designated Trial Examiner at Bay Springs, Mississippi, on February 3, 1959. At the conclusion of the hearing counsel were heard in oral argument , and pursuant to leave granted to all parties , briefs have been filed by the Company and the Union, the time therefor having been extended. The Union's brief touches lightly on the issues before us. Apparently uninten- tionally since it does not appear to be characteristic of counsel as I observed him, that brief states that with respect to certain offers of proof by the Union and its motion to amend based thereon "the Trial Examiner has indicated that his views are already fixed." The fact is that counsel came fully prepared and did in detail argue the points at issue , and repeatedly, so that there is no question of either denial of opportunity for him to state his position fully or denial to the Trial Examiner of full basis for making his ruling thereon . With such complete, even repetitious dis- cussion , there is no need for a decisional rehash of the arguments and ruling how- ever much more weighty this report might thereby become and however much counsel, even if still unhappy over the ruling , might be satisfied that views, if mis- taken, were not "fixed." While contending that the matters embraced in his offer of proof are material "as background" to the issues framed by the pleadings as they exist without amend- ment, counsel renews his quarrel with the General Counsel because of the express omission of the allegations which he seeks to include, and urges, as he did at the hearing, that the complaint be amended . Notice, after full argument, that the matters would not be covered in the Intermediate Report and that the ruling "need not be repeated" should be regarded, as it was intended, as sparing all counsel the burden of further argument on the issue while enabling them to concentrate on the issues remaining before us; this without concern that views are fixed to any extent -beyond that inherent in any decision or ruling. The exceptions noted at the hear- ing can of course be taken to the Board. It is quite correct that the test is not the effect of interference but the tendency of acts or words to interfere. Despite a colloquy in which it was agreed that the pur- pose was to show what the effect "might have been," it was repeatedly pointed out that this was outside the issues . Aside from any question of right or authority to amend as urged by the Union, it may be noted here that almost 2 months after the hearing herein it was reported that a United States Senator was proposing amend- ment of the Act so that Board-conducted elections would be set aside when appeals are made to race prejudice ; the proposal cited "a gaping hole" which now exists. The Union is here seeking to plug that alleged hole by a shortcut method of quasi- judicial pronouncement instead of legislative enactment even while such enactment is being considered. The "social attitudes" which the Union decries, the "motives for the post-bellum industrialization of the South ," resistance to school integration in Mississippi, Arkansas, and Tennessee, and action taken under other laws are simply not an issue here , and we do not even get to the point of deciding whether certain 486. DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD letters, speeches, etc., are violative under the Act as it now reads and without any proposed or promised amendment. Upon the entire record in the case and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT (WITH REASONS THEREFOR) 1. THE COMPANY'S BUSINESS AND THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED It was admitted and I find that the Company, a Delaware corporation with prin- cipal office and place of business in Bay Springs, Mississippi, manufactures, sells, and ships electric blankets; and that during a representative year it manufactured products valued at more than $50,000, which were sold and shipped from the Bay Springs plant directly to customers outside the State of Mississippi. In find that the Company is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. I also find that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. II. THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF SECTION 8(a)(1) At the close of the General Counsel's case his motion to dismiss several allega- tions was granted. This served also to remove the issue of supervisory status, the Company having earlier stipulated that only some of the various persons named in the complaint were supervisors within the meaning of the Act. A. Grady Knotts The allegation here was only that Supervisor Knotts had on or about September 5 "advised an employee that he was making a mistake in acting as the union observer in the election and should not do so." Early questioned concerning this, the General Counsel declared that it was no mere advice by Knotts, but a threat. The testimony in support of this allegation is only that when employee Tubbs said on September 5 that he would not be in the next morning since he was going to be an observer for the Union at the representation election, Knotts replied, "That is where [you] made another mistake, being an observer for the union." Ques- tioned further by the General Counsel, Tubbs stated that Knotts did not tell him "to do it or not to do it or what to do." If this was a threat as distinguished from an expression of opinion (like saying that Tubbs was on the wrong side) without any suggestion of implementation, the evidence does not so indicate. Nor does Tubbs appear to have so regarded it. I do not find violation here. B. Jack M. Tubb, Jr. It is alleged that Supervisor Tubb questioned an employee concerning employees' union meetings and activities. In this connection the General Counsel had to rely on the testimony of James, a personnel secretary, whatever her reluctance or hostility. The latter testified that, contrary to Tubb's advice, she attended a union meeting in response to a general invitation on a handbill, and that she had a conversation with Tubb about it the next day; she did not recall whether Tubb asked who was at the meeting, but she did tell him approximately how many attended. Shown a copy of an affidavit which she had executed, she declared only that it stated her belief that Tubb might have asked her who was at the meeting. Aside from Tubb's testimony that James volunteered the information that she had attended the meeting, and the question whether James' statement of belief that Tubb "might" have asked her would support a finding of actual violative interrogation, the latter did not at the hearing adopt her affidavit: while she recalled what the affidavit said, as noted, she did not now recall her conversation with Tubb. This allegation of the complaint has not been adequately supported. C. The Company's letters On August 26 and 30 the Company sent to all but a few of its employees letters which allegedly contained threats of economic reprisal in the event the Union won the election. Having read these letters, 1 can appreciate the General Counsel's early deferment of argument or attempt to show in what respects they were violative, and his subsequent failure to perform. I find no "general tone" of threat in these letters. A single minatory note is found in the statement, "If the Union tries to force us to pay more than our business allows, we'll be forced to close down." But this is a statement of untoward result which might be brought on by NECO ELECTRICAL PRODUCTS CORPORATION 487 the Union, or the kind which has been found to be lawful,' rather than a threat of voluntary action by the Company. These letters were not violative. D. Paul L. Lightsey Former employee Lewis was clearly fearful, but he as clearly insisted that he did not recall what was said during a conversation between himself and Supervisor Lightsey in the men's room about August 20. Confronted with his statement to a Board field examiner, Lewis then testified that he did recall the conversation with Lightsey as described in that statement. He now had it first that Lightsey asked whether he had changed his mind about the Union; then that Lightsey did not say "about the union"; and finally that Lightsey, not mentioning the Union, said that Lewis knew what he was talking about. Lightsey would hardly have been coy in this respect in view of the Union's notice to the Company on August 5 that Lewis was a member of the organizing committee. Nor would Lewis have said that he knew nothing about the Union some 2 weeks after that letter was sent to the Company. But if Lewis, confronted with his written statement, made an attempt to support it, I cannot rely on such testimony as his to find a violation in any respect. This is not to say that I rely on Lightsey's denials. As we shall next see, in connection with Foley's testimony, I believe that Lightsey did unlawfully threaten. But however "consistent" it may appear to base similar findings on Lewis' testimony, the latter even if true in some respects is too unreliable. I find therefore that, whatever Lightsey may have said, the credible evidence does not show that he unlawfully questioned or threatened Lewis. W. R. Foley, who impressed me as truthful, testified that about August 29 he asked Lightsey what the latter thought about the rumor in the plant that, if the Union came in, "the plant would leave"; and that Lightsey replied that "he couldn't say whether the plant would move or not, but he would say that two of our biggest customers, Sears Roebuck and Rexall wouldn't do business with a union company because of the fear of shortage of products due to strike. He did say if we lost these two big orders that possibly we would be cut down to three or four days in operation a week. If we didn't sell the products we couldn't make it." I do not credit Light- sey's denials; nor was he merely answering the question put to him. Such a predic- tion of loss of work if employees vote for a union, based on unsupported anticipation of reaction by customers, is a threat in violation of the Act.2 E. Kathryn Helen Rhodes Foley testified further that on August 24, when he asked another supervisor about the rumor that the plant would move if a union came in, Supervisor Rhodes came up to them and said, "Mr. Ed Russell [president of the Company] doesn't own a thing in this plant that is bolted down where he can't move it." The complaint alleges that this occurred on or about August 24. The exact date is not of such moment here as to discredit Foley's testimony if Rhodes was not at work on August 24. Rhodes impressed me as partisan to the point where she would and did make unlawful threats. I do not credit her denial, and I find that she unlawfully threatened removal of the plant if it were unionized. Mrs. M. H. Foley testified that on September 3, some time after she had told Rhodes that she was going to quit, Rhodes urged her to quit at once and suggested that, to clear her skirts so that she might be able to return at a later date, she sign a statement in the office to the effect that she would not vote for the Union. Here was an unlawful threat of loss of reemployment opportunity unless Foley indicated that she would not support the Union. Rhodes -appears to have considered Foley to be a good worker despite her union sympathy. Her requests for leave may have provided convenient opportunity to terminate her employment. But the fact that the Company did not seize those earlier opportunities does not lessen the proof, which I credit, that Rhodes did threaten her. As we shall note infra, Foley returned from her leave some 10 days prior to this threat. I credit employee Williamson's testimony, which further indicates Rhodes' persistence, that the latter told her that she liked Mrs. Foley, suggested that William- son talk to her about her union activities, and offered to go into the office with Williamson if she too was "mixed up" with the Union. But whatever Rhodes had in mind when she thus spoke with Williamson, these remarks were not alleged to a Cf. Cary Lumber Company, 102 NLRB 406, 409. 2 New Madrid Manufacturing Company, 104 NLRB 117, 118. 488 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD be a threat or a violation. As for interrogation here, which is alleged, Rhodes' statement that if Williamson was "mixed up with the union it wasn't too late" was not a question; she neither called for nor elicited a reply. Rhodes did ask Williamson whether she knew that Mr. Foley was mixed up with the Union. This was not so much an inquiry as, judging from Williamson's reply that it did not matter to her, a statement of fact in question form. I find no unlawful interrogation. Considerable collateral testimony was received to impeach Mrs. Foley's credi- bility. Thus she testified on cross-examination that, when she left, the girls took up a collection and gave her two gifts, and that they were handed to her by Duckworth, a forelady under Rhodes. If one of the two gifts was actually from Duckworth, there was no more than an omission of detail by Foley, not neces- sarily a misstatement. Nor is she unreliable because she testified that Rhodes was her supervisor while Duckworth (a supervisor within the meaning of the Act) was her forelady. Clearly Foley testified that Duckworth's rank had been higher than her own. Duckworth had in fact been subordinate to Rhodes at one time, and even later Rhodes and Duckworth at times exchanged duties, so that Foley might rea- sonably have believed that Rhodes was still her supervisor. Nor is Mrs. Foley's statement when claiming unemployment compensation that she was unemployed contrary to her earlier remark to Duckworth that she wanted to care for her children and go into business. Neither does her intention, or hope, on quitting, to go into business contradict her testimony that she was not employed in a cafe when she filed her unemployment compensation claim. That the claim was denied is not strange since she had quit her employment on September 6; nor do we know the basis for that denial, nor what evidence was offered in that pro- ceeding. The evidence before us indicates that, intending to quit, Foley stayed on until the representation election, then quit. Such interest and partisanship do not themselves destroy her credibility as I find it. Counsel for the Company to the contrary notwithstanding, the fact that Foley was allowed to stay away from work in August, and her statement of intention to quit, followed by her quitting, do not indicate that the threat of September 3 was not made. Neither does the fact that Rhodes did not work on September 2, which was Labor Day, affect the finding herein. The complaint alleged this violation as on or about September 2; Foley testified that it occurred on September 3. F. Disavowal On or about August 5 the Company posted a three-paragraph notice on the bulletin board. The first two paragraphs refer to "the battle for . . dues and fees and assessments," and the Union's campaign promises. The third paragraph reads as follows: We will let you know about further developments. In the meantime, if any- one threatens you please let us know immediately. We will take steps to stop that kind of conduct. The acts described and the "further developments" were clearly those of the Union. This was a warning and a promise to take action against threats by the Union! It cannot reasonably be constructed as a disavowal of threats by company representa- tives approximately 3 weeks later. By contrast, the possibility of promises and threats by the Company is clearly described in a memorandum dated and distributed among supervisory personnel on the same day, August 5. Here the supervisors were informed that they were not allowed under the law, and the Company did not want them, to threaten, bribe, or make promises to employees. This and similar oral instructions by the Company to its supervisors do not exculpate it where, as here shown, its representatives did not heed them and where the contents of the instructions were not made known to the employees. The notice to employees and the memorandum to supervisory personnel are quite in order. But they do not constitute disavowals so as to affect the violations found or, as contrary evidence, the findings of fact. Further in connection with the question of disavowal, Rhodes testified that at one supervisors' meeting President Russell said that he had heard a rumor that the plant would close, and that it was not true. Russell was not the only company representative who heard that rumor. Yet neither the Company nor its supervisors appear ever to have told employees that the rumor was not true. Iu. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Company, set forth in section IT, above, occurring in connec- tion with the operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and PUERTO RICO GAS AND COKE COMPANY 489 substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. IV. THE REMEDY Having found that the Company has engaged in and is engaging in certain unfair labor practices affecting commerce, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action in order to effectuate the policies of the Act. It has been found that the Company, by threats of shutdown and removal if the Union won the representation election, and of loss of reemployment opportunity because of support of the Union, interfered with, restrained, and coerced its em- ployees in violation of Section 8(a)( I) of the Act. I shall therefore recommend that it cease and desist therefrom any like or related conduct. Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 2. By threats of shutdown and removal and of loss of reemployment opportuni- ties, thereby interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the Company has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. 3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce, within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] Puerto Rico Gas and Coke Company and Union de Trabajadores de la Industria de Gas Fluido de San Juan , FLT. Case No. 24-CA-929. August 13, 1959 DECISION AND ORDER On April 20, 1959, Trial Examiner John C. Fischer issued his Inter- mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had not engaged in any unfair labor practices and recom- mending that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief. Respondent filed a brief in support of the Inter- mediate Report. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman Leedom and Members Bean and Jenkins]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.' 1 Respondent alleged in its answer, as one of its affirmative defenses to the complaint, that the Charging Union was out of compliance with Section 9(f), (g), and (h) of the Act. Apparently in order to refute this contention, the Regional Director prepared an affidavit setting forth the compliance status of the Union, and counsel for the General 124 NLRB No. 67.