124 NLRB 604
United Hatters, Cap and Millinery Workers Union
604
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tives to that labor organization, which the Board in such circum-
stances finds to be an appropriate unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining. In the event that a majority of the employees in voting
group (a) select the Operating Engineers and if a majority of the
employees in voting group (b) select either the Teamsters or the
Joint Petitioners, the Regional Director is instructed to issue a certifi-
cation of representatives to that labor organization for a unit of pro-
duction employees, which the Board, in these circumstances, finds to
be appropriate for collective bargaining.
However, if a majority of
the employees in voting group (a) do not vote for the Operating
Engineers, the votes of both groups will be pooled,13 and the Regional
Director conducting the election is instructed to issue a certification
of representatives to the Joint Petitioners, if this organization is
selected by a majority of the employees in the pooled production and
maintenance group, which the Board, in such circumstances, finds to
be appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining.14
[Text of Direction of Elections omitted from publication.]
18 If the votes are pooled, they are to be tallied in the following manner : The votes
for the labor organizations seeking separate units shall be counted as valid votes but
neither for nor against the labor organization seeking to represent the more compre-
hensive production and maintenance unit; all other votes are to be accorded their face
value, whether for representation by the union seeking the more comprehensive group or
for no union.
14 See Dierks Paper Company, 120 NLRB 290, 294.
United Hatters, Cap and Millinery Workers Union, AFL-CIO
and Korber Hats, Inc.
Case No. 5-0C-107.
August 20, 1959
DECISION AND ORDER
On May 20, 1959, Trial Examiner Vincent M. Rotolo issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair
labor practices, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the
Intermediate Report attached hereto.
Thereafter, the Respondent
filed exceptions to the Intermediate report and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel [Chairman Leedom and Members Bean and Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The
rulings are affirmed.
The Board has considered the Intermediate Re-
port, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the case and
124 NLRB No. 79.
UNITED HATTERS, CAP & MILLINERY WORKERS UNION
605
hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions,2 and recommendations I of
the Trial Examiner, except as indicated herein.
ORDER
Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, United Hatters,
Cap and Millinery Workers Union, AFL-CIO, its officers, representa-
tives, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from engaging in, or inducing or encouraging
employees of Theo. Epstein and Sons, or of any employer other than
Korber Hats, Inc., by picketing or by any other conduct, to engage in
a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to
use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on
any goods, articles, materials, or commodities, or to perform any
services, where an object thereof is to force or require Theo. Epstein
and Sons or any other employer to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of, or to otherwise
cease doing business with, Korber Hats, Inc., or any other producer,
processor, or manufacturer.
2. Take the following affirmative action which it is found will
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its business office and meeting halls in the city of
Baltimore, Maryland, copies of the notice attached hereto marked
"Appendix."' Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the regional
Director for the Fifth Region, shall, after being duly signed by an
1 We do not adopt or rely on the Trial Examiner's findings, In that portion of the
Intermediate Report entitled "Analysis and Conclusions; Object of the Picketing," with
respect to the events at the Korber Hats plant, beyond the admitted facts that such a
strike occurred and that Korber Hats made shipments to Theo. Epstein and Sons despite
the strike.
Nor do we adopt or rely on the Trial Examiner's characterization of the
efforts of Scheinan, Respondent Union's business manager and agent, to secure the Epstein
Company's cooperation as "frantic" or his findings concerning Scheinan's subjective think-
ing and reasons for engaging in the conduct herein found violative of the Act.
2 We agree with the Trial Examiner that an object of the Respondent Union's picketing
was to induce and encourage the employees of Theo. Epstein and Sons and of the trucking
companies which made deliveries to and pickups from that company to engage in a strike
or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to perform services for their
employers in order to force Theo. Epstein and Sons to cease doing business with and
accepting deliveries of shipments from Kerber Hats, Inc.
However, the Trial Examiner's
conclusion of law to the effect that Respondent Union also sought to induce and en-
courage the employees of the other tenants of the building in which the Epstein Company
Is located is not supported by his factual findings or by the evidence in the record.
Accordingly, we do not adopt this latter finding.
3 No specific exceptions have been filed to the Trial Examiner's recommended order.
However, the Trial Examiner recommended, among other things, that the Respondent
Union be required to send signed copies of the notice to the Regional Director for posting
by other tenants of the building in which Theo. Epstein and Sons is located, if such other
tenants be willing.
We have found that the Respondent Union's unlawful conduct was not
shown to have been directed to -the employees of the other tenants. Accordingly, we shall
not include that requirement in our order.
4In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of
Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the
words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an order."
606
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
officer or other representative of the Respondent, be posted by it im-
mediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it for a period of
60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to its members are customarily posted.
Reason-
able steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices
are no altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Mail a signed copy of said notice to each of its Locals in the
city of Baltimore with instructions to post same at the business office
and meeting hall of said Local for a period of 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places. It shall also send instructions to said Locals that
they should take reasonable steps to insure that the notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Mail signed copies of said notice to the Regional Director for
the Fifth Region, for posting by Theo. Epstein and Sons and by all
trucking companies in the Baltimore city area doing business with
Theo. Epstein and Sons, the companies willing, at a place or places
where notices to their employees are customarily posted.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for the Fifth Region in writing,
within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps it has taken
to comply herewith.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF UNITED HATTERS, CAP AND MILLINERY
WORKERS UNION, AFL-CIO, IN THE BALTIMORE, MARYLAND,
AREA, AND TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that :
AVE WILL NOT engage in , or induce or encourage the employees
of Theo. Epstein and Sons, or of any other employer, by picket-
ing or by any other conduct, to engage in a strike or a concerted
refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture,
process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods,
articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services,
where an object thereof is to force or require Theo. Epstein and
Sons or any other employer to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of, or to other-
wise cease doing business with, Korber Hats, Inc., or any other
producer, processor, or manufacturer.
UNITED MATTERS, CAP AND MILLINERY
WORKERS UNION, AFL-CIO,
Labor Organization.
Dated----------------
By-------------------------------------
(Representative )
( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
UNITED HATTERS, CAP & MILLINERY WORKERS UNION
607
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding, brought under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended (hereinafter referred to as the Act), was duly heard at Baltimore,
Maryland, on April 7, 1959, pursuant to notice of hearing served on all parties. The
complaint, issued on February 5, 1959, is based on a charge filed by Korber Hats,
Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the Korber Company), on December 17, 1958,
against United Hatters, Cap and Millinery Workers Union, AFL-CIO (hereinafter
referred to as the Respondent).
The complaint alleges, in substance, that the Respondent, being engaged in a labor
dispute with the Korber Company at its plant in Fall River, Massachusetts, where
it was conducting picketing activities, established a picket line at the entrance to the
building where the Epstein Company is a tenant at 38 Hopkins Place, Baltimore,
Maryland. It further alleges that by engaging in picketing activities at the Epstein
Company's place of business the Respondent engaged in, and induced and encouraged
the employees of the Epstein Company and the employees of other employers to
engage in, a strike or concerted refusals in the course of their employment to per-
form work for their respective employers and that objects of said picketing activities
were (1) to force or require the Epstein Company and the other employers to cease
doing business with the Korber Company, and (2) to force or require customers
and suppliers of the Epstein Company and any other employer or person to cease
doing business with the Epstein Company. It concludes that said conduct on the
part of the Respondent constitutes unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the Act.
The Respondent, by its answer to the complaint, admits that it was engaged in
strike and picketing activities against the Korber Company at its plant in Fall
River, Massachusetts, and that it also picketed the premises of the Epstein Company
in Baltimore between December 5, 1958, and January 22, 1959. It denies, however,
that by its picketing activities at the Epstein Company it engaged in a strike against
the Epstein Company or that it induced or encouraged the employees of the Epstein
Company or the employees of any other employers to engage in a strike or a con-
certed refusal in the course of their employment to perform work for their respective
employers or that it engaged in said picketing activities for the objects set forth
in the complaint.
At the hearing, all parties, except the Korber Company, entered their appearance,
were represented by counsel, and were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to
examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce evidence bearing on the issues,
to argue the issues orally on the record and to file briefs and proposed findings.
At the opening of the hearing counsel for the General Counsel, without objection
from counsel for the Respondent, submitted the transcript of testimony of witnesses
of a 10(1) injunction proceeding brought before the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland, by the General Counsel against the Respondent.
The
General Counsel rested his case upon the submission of such record.
Counsel for
the Respondent then indicated that the Respondent would not submit any evidence
to contradict the evidence contained in the transcript of testimony submitted by the
General Counsel and that it adopted said evidence as part of the Respondent's case,
making an agreement with the General Counsel, on the record, that said testimony
be considered as a stipulation of facts from which the Trial Examiner could make
his findings and conclusions.
Before the close of the hearing counsel for the Re-
spondent made a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the General
Counsel had not proved that the Respondent had committed a violation of Section
8(b) (4) (A) of the Act. The Trial Examiner reserved ruling on said motion, which
is hereby denied for the reasons set forth hereinafter in this report.
Counsel for the
General Counsel and counsel for the Respondent submitted briefs to the Trial
Examiner which have been considered in the making of this report.
Upon the entire record in this case I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. BUSINESS OF THE KORBER AND EPSTEIN COMPANIES
Korber Hats, Inc., the Charging Party in these proceedings, manufactures and sells
hats at its plant and place of business located in Fall River, Massachusetts. In con-
nection with its business operations it sells and ships substantial quantities of hat
materials from its plant in Massachusetts to various wholesale distributors of hats
that are located in States other than the State of Massachusetts.
608
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Theo. Epstein and Sons is a copartnership which conducts a business of purchas-
ing and selling men's hats and caps at wholesale to various men's retail hat shops
and other retail establishments from its place of business located at 38 Hopkins Place,
Baltimore, Maryland.
During the 12-month period prior to the issuance of the com-
plaint, it purchased and received hat materials, valued at in excess of $50,000, from
various hat manufacturers that are located in various States other than the State
of Maryland.
During the same period it sold and shipped finished men's hats and
caps, which were valued at in excess of $50,000, to various men's retail hat shops
and other retail establishments located in States other than the State of Maryland.
I conclude from the above facts that both the Korber and Epstein Companies
are, and have been at all times material herein, engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
If. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
United Hatters, Cap and Millinery Workers Union, AFL-CIO, the Respondent
herein, is, and at all times material herein has been, a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
No Conflicting Testimony
There is no conflict of testimony in this case, the parties having stipulated, on the
record, that the testimony of the witnesses submitted by the General Counsel in
Section 10(1) proceedings brought in the U.S. District Court be considered the
testimony of both parties in this proceeding. I have therefore credited the testimony
of those witnesses.
The only conflict between the parties results from the divergent
inferences and conclusions which each would have the Trial Examiner draw from
the established facts.
The following is a summary of those facts.
Events Which Occurred Prior to December 5, 1958
As indicated above, Korber Company is a manufacturer of hats, with its plant
and place of business located in Fall River, Massachusetts. Sometime in September
1958, the Respondent began a labor dispute with the Korber Company and there-
after, beginning with on or about October 14, 1958, it engaged in strike and picketing
activities against that company at its plant in Massachusetts.
Throughout the period
in which the events related below occurred, the Respondent's strike and picketing
activities against the Korber Company, mentioned above, were in progress.
The Epstein Company business is conducted by Irvin Epstein and his father,
Theodore Epstein, and brother, Gilbert Epstein.
The father and brother spend most
of their time on the road soliciting hat and cap orders from the approximately 900
men's retail hat shops and other retail establishments located in various States along
the southeastern coast of the United States.
Only 25 of these customers of the
Epstein Company are located in the State of Maryland and of these only 13 are in
the city of Baltimore. Irvin Epstein takes care of the office and plant which are
located in the top three floors of a five-story commercial building located at
38 Hopkins Place, Baltimore, Maryand.
The Epstein Company does not manufac-
ture hats.
It orders the hats to be made by various hat manufacturers located in
other States, according to its specifications as to size, color, dimensions, materials,
and styles.
However, it receives the hats in unfinished form without linings or bands.
After it receives the unfinished hats it assembles, finishes, and prepares them for ship-
ment to its customers by placing them in hatboxes.
The hatboxes are then placed
in large cartons for transportation by motortruck to the retail shops.
All but a few
of its shipments are made by independent motortrucking companies.
The Epstein
Company uses some of the large and well-known truck transportation companies
which operate over a wide area along the eastern seaboard, such as McLean Trucking
Corp., Bayline Transport Co., Wooleyhan Trucking Co., and Associated Transport,
Inc.1
Deliveries of unfinished hats and caps are also made by independent motor-
trucking companies that operate in several States.
These companies are engaged by
the hat manufacturers for that purpose.
None of the hats or caps prepared for the
retail trade by the Epstein Company have any markings or other lettering which
would indicate to its customers what particular manufacturer had made the hats or
11 take judicial notice of the well-known fact that the motortrucking industry in the
eastern section of the United States has been generally organized and that the drivers
and helpers of the motoetrucking companies mentioned above are, In all probability,
represented by locals of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Union.
UNITED HATTERS, CAP & MILLINERY WORKERS UNION
609
caps.
The Epstein Company places its own linings in the hats and caps which have
its trademarks of "Holbert" or "Tepson" or "Headmaster."
The hatboxes and
cartons in which they are packed for shipment have the markings of the Epstein
Company.
As indicated above the Epstein Company's place of business is located in the
top three floors of a five-story commercial loft building located at 38 Hopkins Place,
Baltimore, Maryland.
On the street level or first floor of this building is located a
check-cashing firm known as The Citywide Check Cashing Company which shares
the first floor space with another concern known as The Linen Art Novelty Company.
These two firms have a separate entrance of their own on the north end of the
building line.
The main entrance to the building is located on the opposite or south
end of the building about 8 feet from the other entrance.
Access to the upper floors
of the building is had through the main entrance located on the south end of the
building.
Immediately beyond the doorway of the main entrance there is a small
vestibule which leads to a freight and passenger elevator facing the main entrance.
The elevator is operated by an employee of the landloard of the building.
On the
second floor of the building there is located the plant of a linen manufacturing con-
cern known as Duchess Linen Manufacturing Company.
This company manu-
factures linen products which it ships out of the building to its customers.
The
record, however, does not show how many workers it employs at its plant or how it
ships its products.
The elevator operator and the employees of both the Duchess
Linen Manufacturing Company and the employees of the trucking companies which
make deliveries of goods and materials to the Epstein and Duchess companies as
well as the employees of the trucking companies which make pickups of products
from the tenants in the building must pass through the doorway of the main en-
trance in order to perform their work inside the building.
At the time the events related below occurred, the Epstein Company employed
only one employee, named Willard Wagner, who is its shipping clerk and errand
boy.
Wagner also assists Irvin Epstein in finishing, preparing, and packing the hats
and caps in boxes for shipment to the Epstein Company customers.
Wagner also, at
times, assists the truckmen of the common carriers who bring materials to the
Epstein Company premises as well as the truckmen of the common carriers who
make the pickups of orders from the Epstein Company premises for shipment to its
customers.
On occasions Wagner carries small orders to the post office for ship-
ment by parcel post.
During the times that Wagner assists the truckmen he helps
them to unload or load the trucks.
When the cartons of hat materials are being
brought to the Epstein Company premises he helps the truckmen remove the cartons
from the trucks and carries them into the building, and into the freight elevator
for transportation to the Epstein Company premises.
When he helps the truckmen
who make shipments to the Epstein customers, he carries the cartons into the ele-
vator.
At street level he helps carry the cartons to the trucks stationed in the street
in front of the building.
Deliveries of hat materials and goods to the Epstein
Company premises occur daily and at all hours of the day. The shipments from the
Epstein Company are usually made in the afternoon. From two to six separate
shipments are made each day throughout the year depending upon the season.
Irvin Epstein testified that almost all of the orders it receives from its customers
are obtained by his father and brother who spend most of their time traveling to the
retail establishments to obtain the orders.
On rare and infrequent occasions a local
hat shop from the city area of Baltimore may telephone in an order and later send
its representative to pick up the order.
During the period in question only 10 such
local merchants called in their orders and picked up their shipment.
Sometime during the latter part of September 1958 Jesse Scheinan, the business
manager and agent of the Respondent who has charge of the Respondent's affairs
in the Baltimore area, telephoned the Epstein Company to inform Irvin Epstein that
the Respondent was then engaged in a labor dispute with the Korber Company.
At that time Scheinan informed Epstein that soon there would be "trouble" at the
Korber plant in Fall River, Massachusetts, and that he was calling to give the
Epstein Company warning to place its orders for straw hats, which the Epstein
Company usually purchased each year from the Korber Company, with some other
hat manufacturer. Scheinan further explained to Epstein that within a short time no
hats would be coming out of the Korber plant and advised him that he should pre-
pare himself for such an eventuality.
Epstein told Scheinan at that time that he
was not concerned because he had already obtained and sold most of his supply
of straw hats for that year and that it was too early to place orders for straw hats
for the next spring and summer seasons.
On or about October 14, 1958, the Re-
spondent commenced strike and picketing activities at the Korber plant in Fall River,
525543-60--vol. 124--40
610
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Massachusetts.
While the Respondent's strike and picketing activities at the Korber
plant were going on and specifically on or about December 3, 1958, Scheinan again
called Epstein to inform him that the Korber Company was making a shipment of
44 cartons of straw hats to the Epstein Company and asked Epstein whether he
would accept or refuse the shipment.
When Epstein replied that he would accept
the shipment, Scheinan warned him that if he did so the Respondent would place a
picket line in front of the building.
Epstein facetiously remarked to him that the
pickets would look peculiar patrolling in front of the fourth story of the building
but Scheinan again demanded of Epstein whether he would accept or refuse the
shipment.
When Epstein again told Scheinan that he would accept the shipment
Scheinan hung up the receiver of the telephone and abruptly ended the conversation.
On the following day, December 4, 1958, the shipment of 44 cartons of straw hats
from the Korber Company arrived at the Epstein Company premises and Epstein
accepted the shipment.
Events Which Occurred On and After December 5, 1958
On December 5, 1958, the Respondent established a picket line at the main en-
trance of the building where the Epstein Company is a tenant. The pickets patrolled
the whole width of the building covering the main entrance and up to the entrance
of the Citywide Check Cashing Company. The pickets carried picket signs which
contained the following legend:
T. Epstein and Sons sells nonunion hats made by Korber Hat Company.
Do not buy Korber Hats.
The Respondent's name was on the lower portion of the picket sign.
In the beginning the Respondent's pickets patrolled every day and continuously
during the work hours of the day. Since deliveries of hat materials from the hat
manufacturers were made daily and at all times of the day, the truckdrivers of the
independent trucking companies who made deliveries of hats to the Epstein Company
premises were required to pass through the picket line in order to carry the cartons
of materials to the elevator and up to the Epstein Company premises.
Likewise it
was necessary for the truckdrivers of the independent trucking companies who made
pickups of cartons of hats from the Epstein premises to pass through the picket line
to enter the building in order to pick up the cartons of hats being shipped by the
Epstein Company to its customers.
All other employees, such as the elevator
operator and the Epstein Company shipping clerk and the employees of the Duchess
Linen Manufacturing Company, were also required to cross the picket line to go to
their places of work inside the building.
None of these employees, however, re-
fused to cross the picket line.
There was no actual interruption with the business
operations of the tenants in the building and, except for one incident related below,
the pickets made no attempt to prevent the employees from entering or leaving the
building.
The picketing activities became irregular and sporadic toward the latter
part of December 1958. It ceased altogether on January 22, 1959.
At one time in
December 1958 the weather was so cold that the pickets huddled in the doorway of
the main entrance to the building to protect themselves from the cold wind.
On such
occasions they held the picket signs before them facing the street.
Willard Wagner, the Epstein Company's shipping clerk, testified that on one occa-
sion during the month of December he went down to the street to help a trucker
carry cartons of hat materials up to the Epstein Company premises.
While he was
carrying a large carton of materials on his way into the building toward the freight
elevator one of the pickets blocked his passage and would not let him pass.
Wagner
politely requested him to step aside, but the picket still refused to let him go through.
Wagner then pushed the picket aside with the box and proceeded on his way to the
freight elevator.
When he returned to the street to pick up another carton of hat
materials from the truck the same picket shoved him and ridiculed him.
With the exception of this incident there is no other evidence in the record to
indicate that any of the Respondent's agents or pickets ever talked to the employees
that passed through the picket line each day as they entered or left the building.
The Issues and Contentions of the Parties
The only real issue presented in this case is whether the Respondent's act of estab-
lishing and maintaining its picket line at the main entrance to the building where
the Epstein Company is a tenant induced and encouraged the employees of neutral
employers, who were required to pass through the picket line, not to perform work
inside the building.
The Respondent does not contest the General Counsel's con-
UNITED HATTERS, CAP & MILLINERY WORKERS UNION
611
tention that an object of the picketing was to bring pressure on the Epstein Company
to cease buying hats from the Korber Company. In fact it impliedly concedes this
to be the fact in its brief. It insists, however, that the only means it used to bring
pressure upon the Epstein Company to yield to its request was to make a public
announcement through signs carried by pickets patrolling in front of the building
telling the whole world that the Epstein Company was selling nonunion hats made
by the Korber Company and appealing to all the customers of the Epstein Company
not to buy Korber-made hats. It also insists that its picket line cannot and should
not be considered as evidence of inducement and encouragement of neutral employees
in this case because, it contends, the legend on its picket signs clearly indicated to
everyone that it was directed to customers only. It argues that because of this the
employees could not have construed the picketing as a signal or invitation to them
to stay away from their work or to refuse to cross the picket line. It contends
further that the only purpose it had in mind in establishing its picket line was to
persuade the Epstein Company customers not to buy Korber hats. It insists that its
intention was to use the picket line only as a means of persuading the Epstein
Company and not to persuade neutral employees. It finally argues that the neutral
employees understood this to be so because they disregarded the picket line and
crossed it during the entire period of the picketing activities.
The General Counsel contends, on the other hand, that the Respondent had more
than mere "customer picketing" in mind when it established and maintained its
picket line in front of the building where the Epstein Company is a tenant.
He
contends that the Respondent knew or was in a position to know that very few of
the Epstein Company customers ever came to the building to pick up their orders
and that it also knew that the entrance to the building was used constantly and all
hours of the day by neutral employees who had to enter the building in the course of
their work.
It particularly knew, he asserts, that the truckdrivers of independent
trucking companies frequently had to enter and leave the building when they
carried cartons to or from the Epstein Company premises.
Also, he argues, the
Respondent knew there were other neutral employers in the building whose em-
ployees had to cross the picket line to go to their places of work in the building.
The General Counsel contends that because it knew all these things and what
effect a picket line generally has upon employees who have to cross it in order to
go to their places of work, it should be held to have intended that its picket line
would induce and encourage the employees to stay away from their places of work
or to engage in a concerted refusal to perform work in the course of their employ-
ment.
The Respondent answers this by saying that such was not its intent and
that the employees understood that the picket line was not directed to them because
all of them crossed the picket line during entire course of the picketing activities
and that there was no disruption of the business of the tenants in the building because
of the picket line.
The General Counsel counters this with the argument that the
Respondent cannot claim any credit from the fact that the neutral employees crossed
the picket line. In the first place, he says, there is no evidence that they did so be-
cause of anything the Respondent said to them during the picketing or that it took
any other action to indicate that they could cross the picket line freely.
On the
contrary, he points out, the Wagner incident indicates that the pickets understood
it was being directed to the employees.
Finally he points out that in this type of
case where the Respondent was clearly bringing economic pressure upon an inno-
cent secondary employer to force it to cease doing business with another employer,
the fact that the neutral employees crossed the picket line only shows that the in-
ducement, although intended, proved unsuccessful and that such proof cannot be
considered as a defense to the unfair labor practice committed.
This is essentially
the Board's position as stated in the Associated Wholesale Grocery of Dallas case,
118 NLRB 1251. The General Counsel further points out in his brief that the
Board has repeatedly held that where a labor organization establishes a picket line
at employee entrances of a neutral secondary employer to bring pressure upon him
to cease doing business with another employer the act of picketing, without more,
is sufficient evidence of inducement and encouragement of employees and satisfies
the requirement of such proof under Section 8(b) (4) of the Act.
He concludes
finally that since the object of the Respondent here was clearly to force the Epstein
Company to cease doing business with the Korber Company, the Respondent cannot
avoid the legal consequence of its picketing activities by the simple device of putting
some words on its picket signs indicating an appeal to a few customers of the neutral
employer not to buy the products of the struck employer.
For the reasons indicated below I find merit to the contentions and arguments
made by the General Counsel and reject those made by the Respondent's counsel.
612
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Analysis and Conclusions
Object of the picketing
I have found that prior to the picketing the Respondent's agent, Jesse Scheinan,
requested Irvin Epstein that the Epstein Company cease receiving deliveries of hat.
materials from the Korber Company. I have also found that 2 days before the
picketing activities commenced, Scheinan, in a conversation with Irvin Epstein,
threatened to picket the building where the Epstein Company is a tenant if he-
accepted the 44 cartons of straw hats which the Korber Company was sending to
the Epstein Company. I have also found that on or about December 4, 1958, the
day before the picketing commenced, the Epstein Company accepted the shipment
of the 44 cartons of straw hats which Scheinan had told Irvin Epstein was being.
made by the Korber Company. I have also found that on the following day,
December 5, 1958, the Respondent made good its threat and established its picket:
line at the main entrance to the building where the Epstein Company is a tenant.
Although a request by a striking union, made directly to a neutral employer who
does business with the struck employer, that it cease its business relations with the
struck employer and even a threat to picket him if he does not do so, are not, in
themselves, violations of the Act, the Board and the courts have frequently held that.
such statements may be considered in determining whether picketing activities sub-
sequently engaged in by the union were designed to bring unlawful boycott pressure
upon the neutral employer by inducing his and other neutral employees to engage in.
strike action to accomplish the union's objective.
See N.L.R.B. v. Associated
Musicians, Local 802, AFL, 226 F. 2d 900 (C.A. 2); N.L.R.B. v. Denver Building-
and Construction Trades Council, 193 F. 2d 421, 423-424 (C.A. 10).
Viewing, therefore, the Respondent's act of establishing its picket line at the
Epstein Company's premises in the light of the Respondent's request and its threat.
made to Epstein immediately before the act of picketing took place, I have no
difficulty in concluding that one of the purposes of the Respondent's picket line was.
to cause the Epstein Company to suffer economic loss by disrupting its business.
operations and to involve its employees and the employees of other neutral employers
who did business with or performed services which were beneficial to the Epstein
Company's business, in the labor dispute which it had with the Korber Company.-
That it sought to inflict economic loss on the Epstein Company but cutting off its-
flow of materials from other hat manufacturers is patently clear to me from a con-
sideration of the setting and background against which the picketing activities were
initiated and all of the circumstances which accompanied the picketing activities.
Because of this setting and background and the surrounding circumstances, I cannot
accept the Respondent's explanation that the only purpose it had in mind when it
placed a picket line in front of the Epstein premises was to publicize its dispute with-
the Korber Company and to appeal to the Epstein Company's customers not to buy
Korber-made hats.
On the contrary I find and conclude that one of the purposes, if
not the only purpose, with which the Respondent established its picket line at the
main entrance to the building was to bring economic pressure upon the Epstein
Company to stop purchasing hats from the Korber Company and that it sought to
accomplish this by attempting to prevent other hat manufacturers from making.
deliveries of their products to the Epstein Company.
As part of this plan it used
the picket line to induce the drivers of trucking companies, engaged by such other
manufacturers, not to cross its picket line on their way to make their deliveries to
the Epstein Company premises.
In order to fully understand how I have reached the above conclusion, a detailed
analysis of the circumstances which surrounded the establishment and the mainte-
riance of the picket line by the Respondent is appropriate at this time.
It should be recalled that when the first request was made by the Respondent
Union's agent, Scheinan, to Irvin Epstein in September of 1958, Epstein did not then
reject Scheinan's request.
He only told Scheinan that he was not placing any orders .
with the Korber Company at that time because it was too early in the season to
do so. Scheinan apparently was satisfied then that Epstein might be induced to
cooperate with the Respondent in the event its dispute with the Korber Company
was not settled by the time the Epstein Company was ready to place its orders for
straw hats for the next season.
About the middle of October 1958 the Respondent
was forced to declare a strike against the Korber Company and to establish a picket
line at its plant to enforce its demands.
However, the Korber Company resisted'
the strike and kept its plant in production hiring strike replacements to make its
products.
The strike and picketing activities at the Korber plant proving un-
successful, the Respondent looked around for other means to bring economic pres-
sure against the Korber Company.
By the early part of December 1958 it was .
UNITED HATTERS, CAP & MILLINERY WORKERS UNION
613
clear to Scheinan that unless he took other action the Respondent's strike was lost.
Pressure on the Korber Company customers to stop buying its product was the
answer. It is with this background and setting that Scheinan made his telephone
call to Epstein on December 3, 1958. It explains the frantic efforts by Scheinan
to get Epstein to agree not to accept the shipment of 44 cartons of straw hats which
were on their way from the Korber plant .
Scheinan knew that the drivers of the
trucking companies being used by Korber could not be relied upon to stop making
deliveries to its customers because they were disregarding the Respondent 's picket
line at the Korber plant.
He also knew, after December 3, 1958, that Epstein
could not be persuaded directly to stop buying the Korber products .
He decided
then to bring pressure against the Epstein Company by placing a picket line in
front of the building where it is a tenant.
It is clear to me that when Scheinan decided to do this he was not thinking of
the pressure he could put on the Epstein Company through its customers because
only a few orders were ever picked up by customers from the Epstein Company
premises.
I cannot believe that Scheinan thought that he could convince the Epstein
Company by depriving it of these few local orders .
I find rather that he was think-
ing of the more effective method of bringing pressure on it by depriving it of its
flow of hat materials from the other hat manufacturers .
To make this plan succeed,
however, it was necessary to secure the cooperation of the drivers of the trucking
companies that brought these materials to the Epstein Company premises.
The
"formidable weapon" of the picket line was the answer to his problem and he used
it.
That the plan was not successful does not prove that he did not want it to succeed.
Perhaps the employees did not feel like cooperating with him for reasons of their
own wholly unconnected with the picket sign legend .
Perhaps also the Teamsters
Union, having been expelled from the AFL-CIO, of which the Respondent is a
member, had told its locals not to have their members respect picket lines set up
by AFL-CIO labor organizations .
We can only speculate about this.
On the
record as it stands we cannot determine why they did not respect the Respondent's
picket line.
One thing appears clear , however, and it is that there is no proof to
indicate that the reason the employees crossed the picket line was because the
Respondent's agents or pickets told them they could do so.
Since the Respondent claims, in effect , that it told them they could do so by the
language on its picket sign, a look at the picket sign legend is now in order to deter-
mine whether its message was so plain that the employees could not fail to under-
stand that the picket line was not being directed to them and that they could cross
it freely.
A close examination of the language on the picket signs used by the
Respondent reveals a curious fact. It did not address the picket signs to any per-
son or group of persons in particular .
It did not state "Notice to Public Only" or
"Notice to Epstein Company Customers" or "Notice to Patrons."
Experienced
labor representatives know that these are the usual headings on picket sign legends
when "customer picketing" is intended.
Scheinan , however, chose to omit such a
heading from his picket signs.
Then he made a general announcement: "Theo
Epstein & Sons sells non-union hats made by the Korber Company."
It is clear
that this was a statement intended for the whole world, including the neutral em-
ployees, informing that the Epstein Company was selling articles made by "non-
union" labor .
Fearing, perhaps, that left alone this statement might involve him too
much with the law, Scheinan added the words "Don't buy hats made by Korber Hats,
Inc."
He thus cleverly created the issue in this case as to whether the picket sign
was an appeal directed only to Epstein Company customers .
When he did this, it
must have been with tongue in cheek since he surely was aware of the fact that only
a handful of Epstein Company customers ever came there and that cutting their
business off would not really hurt the Epstein Company. It is clear from this that
the picket signs were intended as more than "customer picketing ."
The language is
far from clear as an appeal directed solely at the Epstein Company customers.
Surely there is nothing on the picket signs which told the employees that the picket-
ing was not being directed to them and that they could cross the picket line freely.
It is therefore reasonable to infer and I find that Scheinan placed the picket line
where he did and used the general language on the picket signs that he did because
be hoped that some truckdrivers of the trucking companies engaged by the other hat
manufacturers that supplied the Epstein Company would be induced not to cross the
picket line when they arrived in front of the building with their trucks on their way
to delivering cartons of hats to the Epstein Company premises , and he had good
hope and expectation that this result might come about .
Truckdrivers of large and
well-known trucking companies that operate in more than one State have generally
been organized and usually do not cross picket lines.
The message that Epstein
Company was selling articles made by nonunion employees could be expected to have
614
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
a definite effect upon them.
He would try it, and even if it succeeded only par-
tially, it would disrupt Epstein's business and force it to surrender.
That the first
drivers who saw the signs did not heed the message did not discourage him.
He
kept his pickets on the job, even during the freezing weather, in the hope and expecta-
tion that some drivers who had not come there before would refuse to cross the
picket line.
Certainly he did not go through the trouble of doing all this to stop only
a handful of Epstein Company customers from buying a few orders of hats from
the Epstein Company.
In view of the above I conclude that the inclusion of the words "Don't buy Korber
Company hats" on the picket signs was a sham and a subterfuge to avoid the con-
sequences of what the Respondent knew to be an unlawful act and to provide itself
with an argument or contention in the event a secondary boycott charge was filed
against it by either the Korber or Epstein Company.
In any event, irrespective of whether Scheinan deliberately chose to use general
language on his picket sign legend or that he did not thereby intend his picket line
to induce the neutral employees, I find that under the conditions and in the setting
in which the picketing activities took place, the picket line had a good likelihood of
bringing influence and persuasion to bear upon the neutral employees not to perform
work behind it.
For these reasons I find and conclude that the Respondent's picket line constituted
a direct appeal to the neutral employees not to perform work beneficial to the
Epstein Company.
The fact that it may have been intended also as an appeal to
the Epstein Company customers is no defense.
I also find and conclude that the picket signs did not "make it plain" to the
neutral employees that it was directed solely to the customers of the Epstein Com-
pany.
In this connection also I am impressed by the fact that during the entire
course of the picketing, which extended over a period of some 6 or 7 weeks during
the months of December 1958 and January 1959, none of the Respondent's agents
or pickets made any efforts, either by words spoken to the employees or by any
action taken in connection with its picketing, to make it clear to them that the picket
line was not being directed to them and that they could cross the line freely.
On the
contrary I am compelled to conclude that the Respondent did not wish to give such
an impression to the employees. It certainly did not give instructions to its pickets
to inform the employees that they could cross the picket line freely. I infer this
from the incident which occurred during the picketing when one of the pickets
attempted to prevent Wagner, the Epstein Company shipping clerk, from helping
the trucking company employee make deliveries of hat materials to the Epstein
Company premises.
The evidence concerning this incident was submitted to the
United States District Court by the representative of the General Counsel in connec-
tion with the Section 10(1) proceeding.
The Respondent did not call the picket in
question or any other picket to explain or contradict the testimony of Wagner either
at that time or subsequently at the hearing in the instant proceedings.
Neither did it
call any of its agents to testify that the picket in question had acted contrary to the
Respondent's instructions.
There is no explanation on the part of the Respondent as
to its failure to call these persons to testify concerning these matters. I infer and
find from this not only that the Respondent did not give its pickets instructions to
inform the employees that they could cross the picket line freely but also that the
pickets themselves believed that the purpose of the picket line was to prevent the
neutral employees from making deliveries of materials to the Epstein Company
premises.
I have examined all of the above circumstances accompanying the picketing
activities of Respondent in order to determine whether there could be some support
in the record for the Respondent's contention that it established its picket line at the
entrance to the building where the Epstein Company is a tenant only to influence
customers and not employees. I am compelled to conclude that this explanation of
the Respondent does not jibe with the surrounding circumstances and the setting in
which the picketing activities were established and maintained. I cannot escape the
conviction that the Respondent established its picket line where it did, at least in
part, to influence and persuade the employees of neutral employers not to enter the
building to make deliveries of materials to the Epstein Company premises.
Even if
one of the Respondent's purposes was to appeal to the few customers who might have
had occasion to come to the Epstein premises to pick up an order, I am convinced
that the Respondent also desired, by its picketing, to exert influence and persuasion
on neutral employees not to make deliveries of materials to or pickups of products
from the Epstein Company premises. I therefore conclude that at least one of the
purposes of the picket line was to induce and encourage the employees of neutral
employers and that the Respondent engaged in such conduct to accomplish its
UNITED HATTERS, CAP & MILLINERY WORKERS UNION
615
object of compelling the Epstein Company to cease accepting further deliveries of hat
materials from the Korber Company.
The Law Applicable to the Case
The Supreme Court of the United States has clearly enunciated some proposi-
tions of law concerning the nature and purpose of an industrial picket line. It has
clearly adopted the legal proposition that industrial picketing is more than a mere
communication of ideas to all who come in contact with the picket line. It recog-
nizes clearly that the very presence of a picket line may induce persons who come
in contact with it to take action of one kind or another quite irrespective of the nature
of the message or the appeal contained on the picket signs .
It holds that the very
purpose of a picket line is "to exert influences" and that it produces consequences
different from other modes of communication. It recognizes that it "evokes re-
sponses and exacts loyalties" which are unlike those which flow from appeals by the
printed word only. See International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 501,
et at. v. N.L.R.B.,
341 U.S. 694, 700; and Hughes et al. v. Superior Court of
California, 339 U.S. 460, 464-465.
The Supreme Court has also held that the
words "inducement and encouragement of employees" as used in Section 8(b) (4) of
the Act comprehends all forms of exerting influence or persuasion upon employees
to engage in strike action.
See International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
Local 501, et al. v. N.L.R.B., supra.
But the Supreme Court did not specifically
hold that the response or action which a picket line produces upon employees is
that they refuse to perform work behind it. It did not spell out the particular form
of loyal action which is expected of employees when they were faced with a picket
line in the course of their daily labors.
This answer was later provided by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Printing Specialties and Paper Converters
Union, Local 388 v. LeBaron, 171 F. 2d 331, 334. In that case the court clearly
stated that a picket line is an invitation to all employees to cooperate with the
picketing union by not performing work behind the picket line.
From the language used by the courts in the above cases the Board has evolved
the labor law doctrine or legal proposition that a picket line induces action wholly
unrelated to the literal appeal of the signs carried by the pickets and that the use by
a union of the traditional industrial picket line before employee entrances has the
tendency and effect of exerting influence and persuasion upon employees not to cross
the line to perform work behind it.
The Board has recently stated its position as
follows: (1) The maintenance of the traditional picket line before employee en-
trances-wholly apart from the literal appeal of the signs carried by the pickets-
constitutes an act of inducement or encouragement of employees who must perform
services behind the picket line, to engage in a concerted refusal to perform services for
their employer; and (2) such picketing-whether or not it succeeds in bringing about
a strike or concerted refusal by employees to perform work-is within the reach of
Section 8(b) (4) of the Act, if it is directed to one of the objectives therein pro-
hibited.
See Industrial Chrome Plating Co., 121 NLRB 1298 and cases cited in
footnote 9.
The courts in several recent cases, which have a factual situation sub-
stantially similar to the instant case, have sustained the Board's general position that
labor organizations use a picket line to exert influence upon and persuade employees
who come in contact with it not to cross the line to perform work behind it.2
Although the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has on two occasions criticized the
Board's application of this legal proposition in special situations which, it believed,
required particular findings as to the actual intent with which the picketing union
established its picket line 3 in another case in which there were no special circum-
stances which required a specific finding of actual intent, it adopted and applied the
general proposition, enunciated by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, that the
normal purpose of a picket line is to influence and persuade employees not to cross
the line to perform work behind it.
2Dallas General Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local No. 745, AFL-CIO
(Asso-
cia-ted Wholesale Grocery of Dallas), 118 NLRB 1251, enfd. 264 F. 2d 642 (C.A. 5) ;
Laundry, Linen Supply & Dry Cleaning Drivers, Local 928
(Southern Service Co.), 118
NLRB 1435, enfd. 262 F. 2d 617
(C.A. 9) ; Associated Musicians, Local 802, AFL
(Gotham Broadcasting Corp.), 110 NLRB 2166, enfd. 226 F. 2d 900 (C.A. 2), cert. denied
351 U.S. 962.
a N.L.R.B. v. Business Machine and Office Appliance Mechanics Conference Board, etc.
(Royal Typewriter Co.), 228 F. 2d 553; N.L.R.B. v. Local 50, Bakery & Confectionery
Workers International Union (Arnold Bakers, Inc.), 245 F. 2d 542.
4 N.L.R.B. v.
Associated Musicians, Local 802, AFL (Gotham Broadcasting Corp ),
supra.
616
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
As a Trial Examiner of the Board I am bound to follow the Board's precedents
and to apply its general theory that a picket line, without more, is an inducement and
encouragement of employees not to cross the line to perform work behind it.
How-
ever, I have carefully examined all of the circumstances which accompanied the
picketing to determine whether there are any special considerations which would
make the application of the Board's rule inconsistent with the facts or legally doubt-
ful.
I have found no such special circumstances present in this case.
On the con-
trary, I have found that the case is one which makes the application of the Board's
rule particularly appropriate.
The Respondent in its brief has urged that there is a special circumstance present
in this case which prevents the application of the Board's rule. It points out that the
fact that none of the neutral employees refused to cross the picket line makes the
application of the Board's rule inapplicable, both factually and legally.
To support
its argument it cites the Royal Typewriter and Arnold Bakers cases cited above in
which the Second Circuit Court said the Board was not warranted in applying its
rule.
But a close examination of those cases reveals that in addition to the fact
that the employees crossed the picket line and performed their work, there was
another special circumstance which, considered in the light of that fact, impelled the
court to refuse to apply the Board's rule. In the Royal Typewriter case, the court
noted that the picketing union took steps to "make it plain" to the neutral employees
that they should cross the picket line and continue to perform their work behind it.
This special circumstance coupled with the fact that the employees did cross the
line and performed their work behind it, impelled the court not to apply the Board's
rule and to require a specific finding as to the intent with which the union estab-
lished its picket line.
Since the Trial Examiner and the Board had not made such
a finding it felt it was not in a position to enforce the Board's order.
In the Arnold Bakers case the court again found a special circumstance in addi-
tion to the fact that the employees crossed the picket line and performed their usual
work behind it. In that case the court found evidence in the record which indicated
that the picketing union had made it clear to the employer being picketed and his
employees that all it was seeking to do was to convince the employees to join its
ranks as members. It noted particularly that the union had given clear instructions
to its pickets to tell the employees, if they asked, that they were not being solicited
to engage in strike action and that they should cross the picket line and go to work.
It also found that the pickets followed these instructions and so informed the em-
ployees who were curious to know what the purpose of the picket line was.
It is clear, therefore, that in each case there were special circumstances which
made the fact of the employees having crossed the picket line and performed their
work particularly significant. In the Association Musicians case, supra, decided by
the same court, there were no special circumstances in addition to the fact that the
employees crossed the picket line and performed their work.
There the court
attached no significance to that fact and did not hesitate to apply the Board's rule.
Since I have found that there are no special circumstances in this case which make
the Board's rule inappropriate, I cannot give the fact that the employees crossed the
picket line and performed their work any significance.
My examination of the set-
ting and the circumstances in which the picketing activities took place not only makes
it particularly. appropriate to apply the Board's rule but confirms the general in-
ference which the Board draws from the fact that the act of picketing takes place
where neutral employees must pass in order to perform their daily work.
Thus,
the fact that the Respondent failed to clearly limit its picket sign legend to the
Epstein Company customers; that it failed to inform the employees, by either words
or actions taken concomitant with its picketing activities, that they could and should
cross the picket line freely to perform their work behind it; and finally that it failed
to instruct its pickets that the picket line was not being directed at neutral employees
and to so inform them if asked, all make the application of the Board's rule appro-
priate and lead to the conclusion that the Respondent intended and desired the neutral
employees to engage in strike action.
In a recent case 5 the Board made it clear that where the picketing union does not
take steps to "make it plain" to the neutral employees that they could, and should
cross the picket line to perform their work behind it, the fact that the employees
crossed the line and performed their work has no significance and is not a defense
to the charge.
6 District Distributors, Incorporated, 122 NLRB 1259.
UNITED HATTERS, CAP & MILLINERY WORKERS UNION
617
Respondent advances the further argument that the Board and the courts have
recognized the right of a striking union to engage in secondary picketing at the
place or places of business of all those who buy the products of the struck employer-
whether they be wholesalers or retailers-in order to appeal to the customers of those
establishments not to buy the products made by struck employers. I readily con-
cede that a striking union has that right but I hold that it must exercise that right in
such a manner and under such conditions that neutral employees who must cross
the picket line to perform work at the premises being picketed are clearly informed
by the striking union that the picket line is not meant for them and that they can
and should cross it to perform their work behind it. I find and conclude from a care-
ful examination of the record as a whole that the Respondent did not make it clear
to the neutral employees who had to cross its picket line to perform work in the
building where the Epstein Company premises are located that its picket line was not
meant for them and that it took no steps to inform them that they could cross the
picket line freely and perform their usual work behind it.
On the contrary, I have
found that the Respondent conducted its picketing activities in such a manner and
under such conditions as to lead employees to believe that the picket line was
addressed to them, and that they were expected not to cross it.
Ultimate Fact Conclusions
1. Between on or about December 5, 1958, and January 22, 1959, the Respond-
ent maintained a picket line at the main entrance to the building located at
38 Hopkins Place, Baltimore, where the Epstein Company and other neutral em-
ployers are tenants and conduct their business.
2. The Respondent placed its picket line in front of the building mentioned above
and conducted its picketing activities at that place in such a manner and under such
conditions as to induce and encourage the employees of neutral employers who had
to cross its picket line to perform work in said building, to engage in a strike or a
concerted refusal to perform work for their respective employers.
3. An object of the picketing activities of the Respondent mentioned above was
to compel the Epstein Company to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or
otherwise dealing in products manufactured by the Korber Company and to cease
doing business with it.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent, described above, occurring in connection with
the operations of the Epstein and Korber companies, described above in section I,
have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among
the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing
commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has violated Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the Act,
it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirma-
tive action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Epstein Company and the Korber Company are employers engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. United Hatters, Cap and Millinery Workers Union, AFL-CIO, is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By inducing and encouraging employees of the Epstein Company and of other
neutral employers who are tenants of the building located at 38 Hopkins Place,
Baltimore, and the employees of independent trucking companies making deliveries
of materials to and pickups of products from the premises of said tenants, to engage
in a strike or concerted refusal in the course of their employment to perform services
for their respective employers with an object of forcing or requiring the Epstein
Company to cease doing business with the Korber Company, the Respondent engaged
in conduct which violated the provisions of Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the Act.
4. The activities of the Respondent described above constitute unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(A) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]