Local 660, Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers

LOCAL 660, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS 537 Local 660, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, and its agent, George Sabo and Traffic Safety, Inc. Case No. 1-CC-226. December 2, 1959 DECISION AND ORDER On June 12,1959, Trial Examiner W. Gerard Ryan issued his Inter- mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondents had engaged in and are engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Inter- mediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondents filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter- mediate Report, and the entire record in the case, including the ex- ceptions and brief, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, with the following additions and modifications. The Trial Examiner found that the Respondents violated Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act by reason of the picketing of the project of the general contractor, Oneglia and Gervasini, Inc. (herein called 0 & G), because of a dispute with Traffic Safety,.Inc., a subcontractor on that project. We agree, but in so doing we rely solely on the following considerations : The facts in this case are largely undisputed. 0 & G was the general contractor engaged in the construction of a bridge and relocation of State Highway Routes 8 and 68 in the vicinity of Naugatuck, Con- necticut, pursuant to a contract with the State of Connecticut. Traffic Safety, Inc., was a subcontractor engaged by 0 & G to perform certain electrical work. The employees of Traffic were not members of any labor organization. The record shows that sometime prior to the picketing activity of November 24, 1958, Traffic had sought to estab- lish contractual relations with the Respondent Union. The latter demanded that Traffic post $5,000 as an assurance of financial respon- sibility before discussions could be continued. Traffic refused. On November 24, at a time when no employees of Traffic were at work on the project, the Respondent Union placed a picket on a sidewalk ad- jacent to a concrete pier being constructed by 0 & G. The picket paraded with a sign stating that the electrical work being done on the project was "UNFAIR" to Local Union 660, IBEW. The picket was instructed by George Sabo, an agent of the Respondent Union, not to speak to any employees and to refer all inquiries to Sabo. Prior to the picketing Sabo had informed the business representative of the Iron 125 NLRB No. 52. 538 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Workers' Union that the picket line was not intended to induce a work stoppage, and similar advice was given on the day of the picketing to a business agent for the Hoisting Engineers. Subsequent to the estab- lishment of the picket line Sabo, when asked by business agents of other unions, offered the same explanation. The picketing occurred during working hours, but after the employees reported for work and before they left in the evening. The picket was clearly visible to all employees employed on the project. No employees ceased work as a result of the picketing. The Respondent contends that the picketing was a valid exercise of its rights under Section 8 (c) of the Act. The object of the picketing, according to the Respondents, was to encourage the use of union elec- tricians on area projects. Obviously, this objective could only be ac- complished by forcing a cessation of business between general con- tractors, such as 0 & G, and Traffic, a nonunion subcontractor. The latter object is proscribed by Section 8(b) (4) (A) if accomplished by the means of inducing employees of neutral employers concertedly to refuse to perform services for their respective employers. It is by now well settled, as the Trial Examiner found, that the general pro- visions of Section 8(c) do not immunize conduct forbidden under the .specific provisions of Section 8 (b) (4). The issue in this case is whether the picketing can reasonably be said to have induced employees of 0 & G working on the project to cease working. At the outset it should be noted that the picket sign in this case was not addressed to employers, customers, or the public generally.' It was the traditional picket sign used by unions to advertise a labor dispute at a specific work location. Its appeal his- torically has been to employees.2 The wording of the sign is, more- over, strikingly similar to that used by the respondent union in Inter- national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 501, et al. v. N.L.R.B. (Sanvuel Langer), 341 U.S. 694, 697: "This job is unfair to organized labor : I.B.E.W. 501 A.F.L." There, as here, a nonunion electrical subcontractor was performing work on a construction project. There, as here, the union insisted that the electrical work must be performed by union electricians. The Supreme Court affirmed the Board's finding that Section 8(b) (4) (A) had been violated by such picketing. As set forth above, there is evidence in the instant case in support of i Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Local 50, Bakery and Confectionery Workers International Union, AFL-CIO ( Arnold Bakers , Inc.), 245 F . 2d 542 ( C.A. 2), setting aside 115 NLRB 1333; N.L.R.B. v. Business Machine and Office Appliance Mechanics Conference Board, Local 459, etc. (Royal Typewriter Co.), 228 F. 2d 553 (C.A. 2), setting aside 111 NLRB 317, cert. denied 351 U. S. 962. 9 The fact that the picketing did not result in a work stoppage does not in and of itself resolve the question of unlawful inducement . N.L.R.B. v. Associated Musicians, Local 802, AFL (Gotham Broadcasting Corp .), 226 F. 2d 900 , 905 (C.A. 2), cert. denied 351 U . S. 962. LOCAL 660, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS 539 the Respondents' argument that they did not intend a work stoppage. Thus, one business agent was notified and others, upon inquiry, were told that union members were not required to respect the picket line. There is, however , countervailing evidence which must be considered in assessing Respondents' bona fides with respect to Sabo's statements to other union officials who sought information . So far as the record shows no employee was ever informed by the Respondents or, indeed, by their own officials that the picket line was not intended to have its normal and traditional appeal to unionized and other employees. The picketing occurred at a time when no Traffic employees were em- ployed at the construction site and could only have been directed to those employees of 0 & G at work during the picketing . The picket sign, as indicated above, did not establish that the picketing was confined to Traffic alone and was not intended to embrace the entire jobsite. The Board and the courts have held that Section 8(b) (4) (A) was intended by Congress to forbid secondary , but not primary picketing. Where two or more employers occupy a joint business situs the Board has attempted to strike a balance between the right of the union to publicize its dispute with the primary employer and the right of neutral employers to be free from controversies not their own. In its search for an adequate formula to effectuate these purposes the Board, with judicial approval, has developed certain objective criteria to assist in determining the impact of picketing on employees of neutral employers and the intent of the picketing union. In Sailors' Union of the Pacific, AFL (Moore Dry Dock Company), 92 NLRB 547, the Board said that "picketing of the premises of a secondary employer is primary if it meets the following conditions : ( a) The picketing is strictly limited to times when the situs of the dispute is located on the secondary employer's premises; (b) at the time of the picketing the primary employer is engaged in its normal business at the situs ; (c) the picketing is limited to places reasonably close to the location of the situs ; and (d ) the picketing discloses clearly that the dispute is with the primary employer." The Board's decision has been specifically affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in N.L.R.B. v. Service Trade Chauffeurs, etc. (Howland Dry Goods), 191 F. 2d 65, 68. The criteria set forth above have been in effect since December 1950. Notwithstanding that the highway project could have been picketed lawfully in the manner set forth above , the Respondents in the instant case failed to observe at least three of the four requirements for lawful picketing at a common situs. Such evidence of the Re- spondents' flagrant disregard for judicially approved picketing can- not in our opinion, be overcome by self-protective statements made, 540 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD for the most part, after the picketing began and only at the request of interested union officials. Contrary to our dissenting colleague, we do not believe that the Respondents took "all reasonable precautions" to insulate the impact of Respondent Union's picketing from the employees of secondary employers. If that were so there would be little need for objective criteria to assure a fair balance in the area of common-situs picketing. The Respondents could have established the reasonableness of their conduct by adhering to the long-established and widely accepted Moore Dry Dock standards. Accordingly, we find that the Respondent Union's picketing induced or encouraged employees of 0 & G to engage in a concerted work stoppage with an object of forcing 0 & G to cease doing business with Traffic Safety, Inc. ORDER Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent Local 660, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, and its officers, rep- resentatives, successors, assigns, and agents (including the Respondent George Sabo), shall : 1. Cease and desist from engaging in, or in inducing and encour- aging the employees of Oneglia and Gervasini, Inc., or of any other employer other than Traffic Safety, Inc., to engage in a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment, to perform any services, where an object thereof is to force or require Oneglia and Gervasini, Inc., or any other employer, to cease doing business with Traffic Safety, Inc. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Post at its business office copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix." 3 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the First Region, shall be duly signed and posted immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that such notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Mail to the Regional Director for the First Region, signed copies of the notice, for posting by Oneglia and Gervasini, Inc., if willing, at places where it customarily posts notices to its employees. a In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order." LOCAL 660, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS 541 (c) Notify the Regional Director for the First Region, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps have been taken to comply herewith. MEMBER BEAN, dissenting : I disagree with the majority's holding in this case. It seems to me that this is another instance of the raising of what were intended to be evidential rules to the status of statutory prohibitions.' The Moore Dry Dock criteria are rules of evidence and not of law. The failure to conform to these criteria is evidence, but not conclusive evi- dence, of inducement to engage in a work stoppage for a prohibited objective. The question still remains in every case whether under all the facts of that particular case the intent or probable consequence of the picketing was to induce action by employees of secondary employers.5 In every case, the issue is whether the picketing is likely to induce a work stoppage in the particular context in which the picketing takes place and there must be some independent evi- dence supporting the inference of inducement, in addition to the fact of picketing.' In the present case, the Respondent Union took all reasonable pre- cautions to prevent its picketing from having any effect on employees of secondary employers. Thus, the picketing was so timed and located as to make unnecessary the crossing of the picket line to reach the project. Moreover, the Respondent Union's business agent notified the business agents of unions having members working on the project that there was to be no work stoppage. The construction industry is noted for the respect shown picket lines. The fact that no work stoppage resulted from the picketing in this case is strongly indicative of the fact that the Respondent Union's requests to other unions were indeed communicated to employees at the project'' Under the cir- cumstances, I would not find that the Respondents induced or encour- 4 See N.L.R.B. v. General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Local 968, etc. (Otis Massey ), 225 F. 2d 205 (C.A. 5), setting aside 109 NLRB 61, cert. denied 350 U.S. 914; Sales Drivers, Helpers & Building Construction Drivers, etc. v . N.L.R.B. ( Campbell Coal Co.), 229 F. 2d 514, setting aside and remanding 110 NLRB 2192. See also the dissent- ing opinions in United Wholesale and Warehouse Employees, Local 261, etc. (Perfection Mattress & Spring Company), 125 NLRB 520 ( Members Bean and Fanning) ; and Gardeners, Exterminators and Florists, etc. (Roberts 0 Associates ), 119 NLRB 962, 965 ( Members Bean and Jenkins). 6 N.L.R.B. v. Local 50, Bakery and Confectionery Workers, etc. (Arnold Bakers, Inc.), 245 F. 2d 542 (C.A. 2), setting aside 115 NLRB 1333; N.L.R.B. v. Business Machine and Office Appliance Mechanics Conference Board, Local 459, etc. (Royal Typewriter Co.), 228 F. 2d 553 (C.A. 2), setting aside 111 NLRB 317, cert. denied 351 U.S. 962. 6 N.L.R.B. v. Local 50, Bakery and Confectionery Workers, etc ., supra at p. 548. 7 "While the success or failure of the picket line is not determinative of its legality, . . . it is some evidence of the tendency of a picket line to cause a work stoppage , along with other circumstances." N.L.R.B. v. Local 50, Bakery and Confectionery Workers, etc., supra, at p. 549, footnote 6. 542 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD aged employees of secondary employers to engage in a work stoppage for a proscribed objective. As such inducement is a prerequisite to a finding of a Section 8(b) (4) (A) violation, I would dismiss the complaint. APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF LOCAL 660, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, AFL-CIO Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify you that : WE WILL NOT engage in or induce or encourage the employees of ^Oneglia and Gervasini, Inc., or of any other employer, other than Traffic Safety, Inc., to engage in a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to perform any serv- ices, where an object thereof is to force or require Oneglia and Gervasini, Inc., or any other employer, to cease doing business with Traffic Safety, Inc. LOCAL 660, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, AFL-CIO, Labor Organization. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative ) ( Title) Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- GEORGE SABO , Business Representative This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or. covered by any other material. INTERMEDIATE REPORT STATEMENT OF THE CASE This proceeding was heard before W. Gerard Ryan, the duly designated Trial Examiner, in which the issue presented was whether Local 660, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, and its agent, George Sabo, herein referred to as the Respondents, violated Section 8(b)(4)(A) of the Act. At the hearing held in New Haven, Connecticut, there was no testimony. The General Counsel and the Respondents stipulated that the record made in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut in Civil Case No. 7583 be the record herein together with additional exhibits which were received in evidence. Oral argument was waived, and briefs have been received from the General Coun- sel and the Respondents. Upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS I. THE BUSINESSES OF ONEGLIA AND GERVASINI, INC. (HEREIN REFERRED TO AS 0 & G), AND OF TRAFFIC SAFETY, INC. ( HEREIN REFERRED TO AS TRAFFIC) 0 & G, a Connecticut corporation with offices and a place of business in Connecti- cut, is in business as a general contractor currently engaged in the construction of a bridge and relocation of State Highway Routes 6 and 68 in the vicinity of Nauga- tuck, Connecticut, pursuant to a contract with the State of Connecticut amounting to more than $1 ,000,000. Routes 8 and 68 connect with other Connecticut State LOCAL 660, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS 543 highways and with the Federal highway systems. In addition, Route 8 connects directly with Massachusetts Route 8, with U.S. Highway 1, and with the Connecticut Turnpike. The two State highways aforesaid are an essential link in the interstate highway system affecting interstate commerce. 0 & G has purchased in the 12 months preceding the issuance of the complaint materials for the said project from outside Connecticut in amounts totaling $65,000. The funds for the contract origi- nate partly with the State of Connecticut and partly with the Federal Government, the construction project 'being a Federal Aid project with an identifying Federal Aid project number. Traffic at all times material herein has been and is a Connecticut corporation with an office and place of business in Naugatuck, Connecticut, where it is engaged in the work of an electrical contractor. Traffic sells, installs, and services traffic signals and street lighting equipment which, in the normal course of its business, it sells to municipal and State agencies for street and highway projects and to shop- ping centers and parking lots. Traffic currently holds a subcontract from 0 & G for the installation of traffic signals on the aforesaid project in the total amount of $11,500, approximately $7,400 of which is for equipment purchased outside the State of Connecticut. Within the 12 months prior to the issuance of the complaint, Traffic has received for work performed outside the State of Connecticut approximately $20,312.78 and has purchased products from outside the State of Connecticut totaling approximately $16,000. On the basis of the foregoing I find that 0 & G and Traffic are engaged in com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Local 660, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. The complaint alleged, the answer admitted, and I find that at all times material herein, Respondent George Sabo has been and is an agent for Local 660 within the meaning of Sections 2(13), 8(b), and 10(1) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES In the performance of its contract on the aforesaid project, O & G employs em- ployees of several crafts and trades, including laborers, masons, drivers, and hoisting engineers. The work being performed is adjacent to the main artery between Naugatuck and Waterbury, Connecticut, and is visible to all motorists coming or going between the two cities. In the installation of the traffic signals required by its subcontract from 0 & G, Traffic requires the employment of electricians for work which is regarded by mem- bers of the electricians union as work within their trade jurisdiction. The employees of Traffic are not members of an IBEW union or any other union and the Company is not a signator to any collective-bargaining agreement between itself and an IBEW local or other union. In January 1958 or earlier 1 Traffic, through its treasurer and general manager, instigated meetings with Respondents seeking a collective-bargaining agreement. In July 1958, representatives of the Respondents informed Traffic that it would have to post a cash sum of $5,000 as an assurance of financial responsibility before further discussions could be had. Traffic refused and the discussions ceased. Local 660 has never requested recognition as bargaining representative of Traffic's employees and has never requested Traffic to enter into a collective-bargaining agreement. On November 13 and 14, 1958, employees of Traffic worked on the 0 & G job doing such electrical work as was required at that time. Having concluded its preliminary work (laying conduits) it ceased any further installation pending addi- tional construction by the general contractor, 0 & G. 0 & G planned to recall Traffic to complete its installations in March 1959. Since November 14, Traffic, at least to the time of the court hearing on December 18, had done no work on the project and had no employees working there. Sometime prior to November 17, an unemployed member of Respondent Local inquired from Sabo who was doing the electrical work on the project. Sabo replied that he did not know but would find out. On November 17, Sabo visited the project and asked Celadon, the superintendent for 0 & G, if Traffic was doing the electrical work. The superintendent replied in the affirmative. Sabo replied that Traffic was. 1 George Sabo testified that it was sometime in 1957. 544 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD nonunion and left.2 One of the State engineers told Sabo that no Traffic employees were then at work. Prior to November 24, Sabo telephoned to James D. Kavanaugh, the business representative of the Iron Workers' Union, and stated to him that a picket line was to be established but there was not to be any work stoppages and all were permitted to go through the picket line. On November 24, 1958, after the employees of 0 & G and other contractors on the job were already at work, Sabo placed a nonmember picket at the job site, shortly after 8 a.m. The picket was placed on the sidewalk on the west side of Route 8 immediately adjacent to one of the concrete piers being built by 0 & G in connection with the bridge. There were two cement finishers working on that pier directly at the point where Sabo told Smith, the picket, that he wanted the picket line established. There were also laborers and carpenters working at the bridge and its approaches. Sabo told the picket to picket the pier and the sidewalk on the west side of Route 8. The picket wore a sign in front of him on which there was the following: The Electrical Installation Being Done On This Project Is UNFAIR Local Union 660 IBEW The picket was instructed by Sabo not to interfere with any work on the job or to speak to any employee coming to work or going from work or to anyone making deliveries, and to refer all inquiries to Sabo at Sabo's office. No one did speak to the picket during the entire picketing except Richard S. Kostka, the general manager for Traffic, who had been informed by 0 & G's Super- intendent Celadon of Sabo's visit. When Kostka inquired from the picket on November 24 as to why he was there, the picket made no answer except to refer him to Sabo. At the time Sabo was through giving his instructions to the picket on the morning of November 24, John Lewis, the business agent for the hoisting engineers whose members were working on the job, approached Sabo to inquire about the picketing. Sabo informed him that the picket had been placed there to publicize the fact that work was being done "nonunion" and there was to be no work stoppage by anyone on the job. After placing the picket on November 24, Sabo stayed there about 5 minutes and then left. He never returned to the jobsite thereafter. When the business agents for the Carpenters' Union and the Plumbers' Union inquired from Sabo after the picket line was established if he had put the picket there, he replied to the same effect as he had stated to Lewis. The record does not disclose the date when Sabo so informed the carpenters' representative and the plumbers' representative. It was not until a few days later that Sabo also similarly informed the business agent for the cement finishers. The picket walked in a position where employees working on the job could see him and from where he could see the employees. The picket picketed during the entire day on November 24 and one or two entire days thereafter; and during parts of the day in the morning and afternoon daily thereafter until December 8 when picketing ceased. All the picketing was done during working hours but always after the employees had reported for work in the morning and before they left work in the evening. No employee was therefore required to cross the picket line going to or leaving work and no deliveries made by truck or car were caused to cross the picket line. Although Sabo testified he instructed the picket to picket in front of the pier and not to cross the roadways, the picket did cross the roadways and walked about 75 feet south on Route 8 from the bridge pier under construction to within 25 feet of the 0 & G field office .3 Superintendent Celadon testified that Sabo also said something about going to New Haven to see about shutting down the job . Sabo denied that he made any such statement. On this square conflict of testimony, I make no credibility finding as I did not see or hear the witnesses and therefore was unable to observe their demeanor. 3 On each side of the pier which was 30-35 feet in width there were two roadways used by employees and trucks and cars making deliveries to the jobsite . The 0 & G field office was the place where employees reported in when coming to work and at night when leaving to report their time worked. LOCAL 660, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OP ELECTRICAL WORKERS 545 Apart from whatever effect the picketing may have had, no request was made by Sabo upon 0 & G, or any other employer engaged on the job site to cease doing business with Traffic; nor was any request made upon any other contractor to force , or require it to cease doing business with Traffic. Throughout the picketing it is undisputed that there were no employees of Traffic on the project, and there have been no work stoppages or interference with the work being done. Sabo also testified that his decision to publicize the matter at the foregoing times and place by the picket line was based on the fact there were three or four projects in the area which required electrical work and he wanted to notify all people involved that they should use union electricians on the job. Sabo further testified that the crux of the problem is that Traffic was not using union labor and the electrical instal- lation being done was unfair because it was being done by men not members of Local 660 or any other union. The General Counsel contends that on the basis of the foregoing facts Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the Act has been violated by the Respondents in that employees of employers other than those of Traffic, the primary employer, have been induced and encouraged to engage in a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to perform any services where an object thereof is forcing or requiring any employer or other person to cease doing business with any other person. The General Counsel contends that an object of the picketing herein has been to force or require 0 & G to cease doing business with Traffic. The Respondents deny the commission of any unfair labor practice and contend that the record as a whole does not contain substantial evidence to establish that the Respondents have induced or encouraged employees of 0 & G or any other employer to engage in a strike or other concerted refusal in the course of their employment ; that the picketing was not for an object proscribed by Section 8(b) (4) (A) but was a valid exercise of the Respondents ' rights under Sections 7 and 13 of the Act and the free speech provisions of Section 8(c) of the Act and the First Amendment. Counsel for the Respondents in his brief has urged the legality of the Respondents' conduct in a comprehensive discussion of cases several of which are decisions by courts of appeals including the Second Circuit which are at variance with the Board's construction of the Act. The Board has held in such instances of variances that it is not for the Trial Examiner to speculate as to what course the Board should follow when a circuit court has expressed disagreement with its views, but that it is the Trial Examiner's duty to apply established Board precedents which the Board or the Supreme Court has not reversed . Insurance Agents' International Union, AFL-CIO ( The Prudential Insurance Company of America), 119 NLRB 768, 773. Upon the basis of the foregoing facts, and upon the entire record , I find that the Respondents have violated Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act. The total absence of any of Traffic 's "primary" employees from the vicinity leaves this case without any of the issues arising when the picketing in question induces employees of both primary and secondary employers . Local 618, Automo- tive, Petroleum and Allied Industries , etc. (Incorporated Oil Company), 116 NLRB 1844, 1848. I find no merit to the Respondents ' contentions that it was evident no intent was present to induce or encourage the secondary employees of 0 & G or other employers because Sabo had informed several business representatives of unions whose members were employed on the project that they were not to strike but were to continue working during the picketing. In this connection it should be noted that the cement workers worked several days behind the picket line before their business representative was informed by Sabo that the Respondents sought no work stoppage. In a recent case the Board in holding there was a violation of the Act pointed out that respondent there had not made it concomitantly clear to all neutral employees that they were not being induced or encouraged by the picketing to participate in concerted action and where, as here, there was no evidence that any of those unions who were so notified relayed that message to their members. The Board held that the fact that the respondent's unfair labor practices were unsuccessful in that no employees of neutral employers responded to the strike appeal is no defense to such unfair labor practices . Drivers, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local 639, etc. (District Distributors, Inc.), 122 NLRB 1259, and cases cited? As the Board an 'd the courts have held, the effectiveness of secondary picketing in attaining its objective is not material in determining its legality under the Act. Southwestern Motor Transport, Inc., 115 NLRB 981 , 983, 985. 4 Reaffirmed by the Board in Bangor Building Trades Council , AFI CIO ( Davison Construction Company, Inc.), 123 NLRB 484. 546 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD It is clear from the above that by reason of the picketing herein the employees of O & G were induced or encouraged to participate in concerted action and that an object of the Respondents' picketing was to force or require 0 & G to cease doing business with Traffic. The Respondents' reliance upon Section 8(c) of the Act and the First Amendment with respect to free speech provisions affording them the right to publicize their dispute by peaceful picketing is without support. The Supreme Court stated in International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 501, et al. (Samuel Langer) v. N.L.R.B., 341 U.S. 694, 704-705: e. The remedial function of § 8(c) is to protect noncoercive speech by employer and labor organization alike in furtherance of a lawful object. It serves that purpose adequately without extending its protection to speech or picketing in furtherance of unfair labor practices such as are defined in § 8(b)(4). The general terms of § 8(c) appropriately give way to the specific provisions of § 8(b)(4). 5. The prohibition of inducement or encouragement of secondary pressure by § 8(b) (4) (A) carries no unconstitutional abridgement of free speech. . . . IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondents Local 660 and George Sabo set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operation of the Employers set forth in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondents Local 660 and George Sabo have engaged in conduct in violation of Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the Act, I shall recommend that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Local 660, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 2. George Sabo is an agent of Respondent Local 660 within the meaning of Sections 2(13), 8(b), and 10(1) of the Act. 3. On and. since November 24, 1958, the above-named labor organization and its agent, George Sabo, have engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(A) of the Act by inducing and encouraging employees of Oneglia and Gervasini, Inc., and of other employers, to engage in a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on goods, materials, or commodities, or to perform services with an object of forcing or requiring Oneglia and Gervasini, Inc., to cease doing business with Traffic Safety, .Inc. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] Carpenters District Council of Detroit , Wayne, Oakland, Macomb, Sanilac, St. Clair and Monroe Counties and Vicinity of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (AFL-CIO) [W. J. C. Kaufmann Company] and Kenneth F. Bissonnette. Case No. 7-CB-479. December 2, 7959 DECISION AND ORDER On May 28, 1959 , Trial Examiner Herbert Silberman issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that 125 NLRB No. 60.