125 NLRB 593
Checical Construction Corp.
CHEMICAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION
593
Chemical Construction Corporation and Walter S. Lowry, Jr.
Case No. 15-CA-1362.
December 4, 1959
DECISION AND ORDER
On July 8,1959, Trial Examiner Thomas A. Ricci issued his Inter-
mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding finding that the
Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Inter-
mediate Report attached hereto.
Thereafter, the Respondent filed
exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a brief in support thereof.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel [Chairman Leedom and Members Rodgers and
Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in
the case, and hereby adopts the Trial Examiner's findings,' conclu-
sions, and recommendations 2
ORDER
Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations
Board hereby orders that Respondent, Chemical Construction Cor-
poration, a Delaware corporation, with its principal offices !in New
York City, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Discharging employees or otherwise discriminating against
them in their employment because of their concerted or union
activities.
(b) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to
1 We agree with the Trial Examiner that the Respondent , in violation of Section
8(a) (3) and
( 1) of the Act, discharged Lowry because it resented Lowry's activities in
processing grievances on behalf of employees as steward .
However, insofar as the Inter-
mediate Report indicates that Lowry's institution of a lawsuit against the Boilermakers
Onion constituted a grievance, Chairman Leedom and Member Jenkins do not agree.
Indeed, we note that the General Counsel did not rely on the lawsuit as a grievance.
On the other hand, if the Respondent relies on the lawsuit as justification for the dis-
charge, this would amount to penalizing Lowry for activities against the Boilermakers
Onion and would clearly constitute a discrimination in violation of Section 8(a) (3)
and (1 )
of the Act.
In this connection, Member Rodgers would not rely either upon
Lowry's filing of a suit against the Boilermakers , or upon Lowry's persistent complaint
with respect to the anchor bolt jurisdictional dispute , after such dispute had been satis-
factorily resolved by the Respondent and officials of the unions involved, as constituting
Such grievances.
9 Accordingly , Respondent's motion to dismiss the complaint is denied herewith.
125 NLRB No. 69.
594
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
form labor organizations, to join or assist any labor organization, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing
and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, as guaranteed in Sec-
tion 7 of the Act, and to refrain from any or all of such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Make whole Walter S. Lowry, Jr., for any loss of eanrings he
may have suffered as a result of the discrimination against him, as
provided in the section of the Intermediate Report entitled "The
Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its
agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social-
security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports,
and all records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under
the terms of this Order.
(c) Post copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix"
at any project of the Respondent that may now be in process of opera-
tion, or which may commence operation within 6 months from the date
on which compliance with this Order begins, within the territorial
jurisdiction of the South Mississippi District Council of Carpenters,
and mail a duly signed copy of such notice to each of the carpenters
who were employed at the completed Bayou Casotte, Mississippi,
project of the Respondent at his last-known address.
Copies of said
notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Fifteenth
Region, shall, after being duly signed by a representative of the
Respondent, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt
thereof and maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Re-
spondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or cov-
ered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for the Fifteenth Region in
writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps it
has taken to comply herewith.
a In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of
Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the
words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the Act, as amended,
we hereby notify our employees that :
CHEMICAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION
595
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate against our
employees in their employment because they have engaged in
union or concerted activities.
AVE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or
coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights to self-
organization , to form labor organizations, to join or assist any
labor organization, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, or to engage in concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities.
WE WILL make whole Walter S. Lowry, Jr., for any loss of pay
suffered as a result of the discrimination against him.
All our employees are free to become or remain members of any
labor organization.
CHEMICAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION,
Employer.
Dated----------------
By-------------------------------------
(Representative)
(Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding, with all parties represented, was heard before the duly designated
Trial Examiner in Pascagoula, Mississippi, on May 19, 1959, on complaint of the
General Counsel and answer by Chemical Construction Company, herein called the
Company or the Respondent.
The sole issue litigated was whether the Respondent
had violated Section 8(a) (1) and (3) of the Act.
The Respondent and the General
Counsel filed briefs with the Trial Examiner after the close of the hearing.
Upon the entire record, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the
.following:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Chemical Construction Corporation is a Delaware corporation, with its principal
office in New York City, engaged in the chemical engineer contracting business.
During 1958, a representative period, Respondent received in excess of $1,000,000
for services performed outside the State of New York.
During the same period it
performed services for Coastal Chemical Company at a construction project in
Bayou Casotte, Mississippi, the only project directly involved in this proceeding, for
which services the Respondent received in excess of $50,000. I find that the
Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act, and that it
will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction herein.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local No. 569, herein
called the Union, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
The charge in this case was filed individually by Walter S. Lowry, Jr., a journeyman
carpenter and member of Local 569 of the Brotherhood of Carpenters.
He was the
second of about 17 carpenters hired by the Respondent on a construction project it
carried on in a location called Bayou Casotte near Pascagoula, Mississippi, in the
596
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
summer of 1958. Lowry became job steward and in that capacity processed a
number of grievances.
When the need for carpenters began to decline, Lowry
found himself among the first four carpenters caught in a reduction-in-force.
The
complaint alleges that the Respondent selected Lowry because of his activities as
union steward in urging grievances .
Denying the allegation , the Respondent defends
on the affirmative ground that Lowry was singled out because he caused dissension
among the employees and was unable to get along harmoniously with the carpenter
foreman.
The discharge of an employee for advancing grievances being unques-
tionably unlawful, the issue becomes whether the evidence as a whole supports the
complaint allegation of unlawful motivation in the selection of Lowry.
There is no substantial conflict in the testimony with respect to the pertinent
facts.
What seeming conflict may appear in the testimony of the various witnesses
is more in the nature of conclusionary statements or descriptive characterizations of
the undisputed facts; essentially, the disagreement goes to what inferences should or
should not be drawn from the facts as they appear.
The Respondent was in the process of constructing an ammonia plant for the
Coastal Chemical Corporation.
Lowry was recommended to Bricker, the Re-
spondent's project superintendent, by Seable, the superintendent of the Fluor Cor-
poration, another company which was about to complete a separate plant also for
Coastal at the same location.
Lowry had been employed by the Fluor Company,
apparently to its satisfaction.
The first carpenter to be hired by Bricker was
Dickens, who became job foreman and, concededly, a supervisor representing the
Company in first-stage grievances.
Lowry was the second to be employed, on April
23, and, under the union conditions which were observed at the project, automatically
became steward.
A few weeks later additional carpenters were taken on until
gradually the complement reached a maximum of 17 during the last week of June.
Two oi:• three carpenters were released about the first week of July, the total went
to 11 by the end of the month, returned to 14 at the beginning of August, and
thereafter declined consistently until at the end of December there remained only 1.
As soon as there were five carpenters on the job, 2 or 3 weeks after Lowry started,
and again pursuant to union practice, an election was held among them and
Lowry was elected steward for the project.
The record as a whole shows that all
carpenters on the job were members of Local 569.
The first layoff, after the dis-
charge of two or three carpenters in the beginning of July, came on August 13, when
four carpenters were released, among them Foreman Dickens and Lowry.
Lowry had six occasions, during the 4 months of his employment, to approach
Foreman Dickens or Plant Superintendent Bricker with grievances concerning the
employees or the work of the carpenters. Sometime early in July he noted a saw
to be unsafe; he told Bricker about it and Bricker immediately discontinued the use
of that saw.
An apprentice who had been burned on the job was undergoing
medical treatments and doing so on his own time after working hours. Lowry
inquired of the front office whether company policy would permit the apprentice to
take time off from work for the medical treatments; he was told it was not company
policy to permit it.
On another occasion the pipefitters were welding sleeves on certain anchor bolts.
Lowry spoke to his superiors and claimed that that work fell within the Carpenters'
jurisdiction.
The work was discontinued.
Moss, the business agent of Local 569,
came to the project, supported Lowry's claim, and the work was then assigned to
the carpenters and transferred to the carpentry shop.
Thereupon the steward of
the ironworkers on the project claimed that the work fell within the jurisdiction of
his group.
The matter was then considered by the respective business agents of the
Ironworkers group and the Carpenters group; final agreement was that the work
belonged to the ironworkers. It was thereafter given to them.
Believing that such
jurisdictional assignment was incorrect, Lowry voiced his dissatisfaction with the
award to Superintendent Bricker several times.
He also wrote a letter to a district
board member of the Carpenters International in Atlanta, expressing his opinion
that under applicable earlier jurisdictional awards the work properly belonged to the
Carpenters.
His letter, received in evidence, shows clearly that he sought clarifica-
tion of the matter, still with the hope that the work might be assigned to the
carpenters.
The Company never varied from assignment of the work to the
ironworkers.
When Marino and Parker, journeymen carpenter and apprentice, respectively,
were laid off in the beginning of July, Lowry spoke to Foreman Dickens about it
because, as he testified, "Parker came to me and said he was laid off."
He also spoke
to Bricker about the layoff. It is quite apparent that Lowry, in his judgment, be-
lieved the foreman to have made a mistake in selecting these two instead of others.
On another occasion Lowry noticed the laborers removing certain pallet boards,
work which he believed properly belonged to the carpenters.
He raised the claim
CHEMICAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION
597
with his superiors, but when the matter was taken up above Lowry with Union
Business Agent Moss, the ultimate decision was to leave the work to the laborers.
The last grievance advanced by Lowry, and the one which, according to the
General Counsel, prompted the discharge, concerned overtime work allegedly per-
formed by certain carpenters during their lunch hour.
The established system set
the lunch hour from 12 to 12:30 p.m., and provided that for any work performed
,during that 30-minute period carpenters would be paid overtime rate at time-and-a-
half.
On August 8, the Friday immediately before his discharge, Lowry spoke to
Foreman Dickens, claiming that certain carpenters had performed lunchtime work
and had not been paid.
According to Lowry, whose testimony I credit, Dickens
accompanied him to the men, looked at their paychecks, and told them to bring their
check stubs to work the following Monday when the matter would be investigated
further.
Nothing was done about it the following Monday or Tuesday, and on
Wednesday morning, at 8 o'clock, Lowry again went to the foreman and asked what
was going to be done about the matter.
Dickens gave him no satisfaction.'
From Dickens, Lowry went directly to the superintendent.
He complained and
gave Bricker the names of the carpenters involved; Bricker called his timekeeper,
passed along the names, and had the matter investigated.
Lowry said the overtime
had been performed on July 30, and when Bricker asked why the grievance was
raised so late, Lowry explained that the previous Friday's checks were the first to
reflect payment for July 30, and that he recalled the day precisely because he had
that day gone to the doctor at noon.
At 10 o'clock Bricker went to Lowry and said
the record check showed no overtime pay was owed.
He also disputed Lowry's
assertion that the latter had gone to the doctor on July 30.
As they talked, Lowry
stressed the fact the foreman had told the men to bring in their paycheck stubs.
The conversation ended, still according to Lowry, with Bricker telling him he had
called Moss, the union business agent, to come out in the afternoon, and that the
matter would be straightened out then.
The foregoing are Lowry's recollections of his two conversations with Bricker
that Wednesday morning and I credit them. Bricker contradicted no part of this.
He said he did receive the grievance, inquired why so late, received some names, and
had the civil engineer and the foreman check with the men themselves.
He was
vague on the date; he believed it was on a Monday, but added "to the best of my
knowledge, it had to be either a Monday, Tuesday or Wednesday, August 11, 12 or
13, when Mr. Lowry brought this up to me."
As to having spoken to Moss that day,
he testified only that he had made a courtesy call to the union business agent that
morning to advise him that he had decided to discharge Lowry.
At 2 or 3 o'clock that day Bricker discharged Lowry, and told him the reason
was Lowry's inability to get along with the men and the foreman and because he
caused dissension among the men.2
Lowry accused Bricker of discharging him
because of his stewardship and of having violated union rules thereby.
Bricker
denied it and reiterated his assertion of dissension. In his testimony, Lowry did
not say that Bricker accused him of dissension, but he did not otherwise contradict
Bricker as to the discharge conversation.
As Bricker made the almost simultaneous
entry in the company records, and as Foreman Dickens corroborated Bricker on this
point, I find that Bricker did state that as his reason for the discharge on that day.
There is no direct evidence in the record of opposition to the Union by the
Respondent.
As a member of the National Constructors Association it operates
under direct written contract with United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America; it also is bound by an agreement between the Gulf Coast Chapter of the
Associated General Contractors of America and South Mississippi District Council
of Carpenters. In keeping with these various agreements it observes the working
conditions established by the Carpenters locally throughout the country.
The General Counsel stated clearly it is not his contention that the Respondent
violated the statute because early discharge of the steward contravened the union
conditions of employment which it observed at this project or because discharge of
1 Dickens, called by the Respondent, did not expressly contradict Lowry respecting their
conversation about this grievance.
He admitted Lowry brought the matter to his atten-
tion, first saying it had happened "within 2 weeks before I quit [August 13]," then
"pretty shortly before I left the job out there," then "it could have been August 13," and
"it could have been 2 or 3 days before."
2 Later that day, Bricker made the following entry in Lowry's employment record :
"Layoff from the standpoint of causing dissension among his fellow-craftsmen and in-
ability to work with the general foreman in an agreeable manner for the best interests
of men and job."
535828-60-vol. 125-39
598
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
a steward before completion of a project is per se an unfair labor practice.
His
essential theory of the case is that Lowry's protected
activities-processing of
grievances as a steward on behalf of fellow employees-of which the Respondent,
of course, always had knowledge, coupled with the timing of his discharge, coming,
as it did in the very teeth of the last grievance which was rejected by both the
foreman and the project superintendent, warrants an inference of illegal motivation.
And it would appear that if the record showed nothing more a prima facie case of
unlawful motivation is shown.
The Respondent starts its defense with the broad contention that all that was
involved here was a normal, economic reduction of staff; that because the need for
carpenters on the job was lessening, four had to be released and Lowry was one of
them.
It is conceded that an economic layoff was in order. Bricker admitted,
however, that he particularly selected Lowry for discharge for a special reason; he
said that to Lowry on the day of the discharge.
Thus, the fact that a reduction-in-
force was then necessary is not determinative of the true issue raised by the pleadings.
Rather, the question becomes whether or not Lowry was chosen for a reason
proscribed by the statute.
As the Board has stated: "the fortuitous coincidence of a
slackening season cannot serve as a license for the employer to engage in discrimina-
tory conduct clearly violative of the proscription of the act." 3
In view of Bricker's admission of his special selection of Lowry, the conflict
between his and Dickens' testimony concerning which four carpenters Dickens had
selected for layoff becomes almost academic.
A week before August 13, Dickens
was asked by Thompson, the civil engineer, to jot down on a piece of paper four
names.
Dickens testified he put his own first and added three others, not including
Lowry's.
Bricker testified Dickens had written Lowry 's name among the three, but
that he himself had not seen the list. I credit Dickens and find he did not recom-
mend Lowry's discharge.
As stated above, the Respondent's main contention is that Lowry was discharged
for causing dissension among the employees, including his relationship with Foreman
Dickens.
So stated, and as written into Lowry's personnel record, this is no more
than an assertion, a conclusion as distinguished from supporting evidentiary fact.
Asked to explain in what manner, or by what conduct Lowry had caused dissen-
sion among the carpenters, or had been unable to get along with the foreman,
Bricker testified as follows: (1) He said Lowry had brought a suit against the
Boilermakers; (2) Lowry had criticized the foreman for showing favoritism to-
wards certain men; he had claimed that some men had been given the dirty jobs
and others easy jobs; (3) Lowry had criticized Dickens' qualification to select
certain men for layoff; he had been outspoken in his opinion that others should have
been chosen.
Bricker explained that he was referring to the July layoff of Marino
and Parker; (4) finally, Lowry had spoken to Bricker several times after the anchor
bolt jurisdictional grievance had been finally determined adversely to the carpenters,
and had repeated his.. Lowry' s, opinion that the work involved should have been
awarded to the carpenters.
Precisely in what manner the foregoing activities of Lowry, activities which he
himself correctly described as grievance matters, caused
dissension among the
carpenters was not explicated on the record.
Lowry had once been a member of the
Boilermakers Union and had been expelled; the nature of his suit against that union
is not explained.
There is nothing to indicate that his prior boilermaker work or
union membership had anything to do with the employment of the carpenters on
the project in question.
He urged retention of Parker, a discharged carpenter who
had appealed to Lowry for help; but this is not an extraordinary representation for
a union steward to make on any project. Likewise, if-and I do not doubt it to be
true-Lowry protested that the foreman was assigning jobs in a discriminatory
manner, again all that appears from the bare assertion of the fact is a steward
concerning himself with equitable distribution of the more desirable and the less
desirable assignments .
And finally, as to the jurisdictional quarrel concerning the
welding of sleeves on anchor boats, certainly the initial claim of work for the car-
penters could hardly be called a disruptive activity calculated to divide the carpenters
into quarrelsome groups.
Nor does it appear that his continued belief that the
work should have gone to the carpenters instead of to the ironworkers, and his
letter to higher authorities within the carpenter brotherhood, tended to cause division
among the various carpenter employees.
The Respondent made no assertion that Lowry's activities in pressing the lunch-
time overtime grievance was a contributing act on his part leading to management's
conclusion that he had been a disruptive factor on the job.
Without explaining its
3 Akin Products Company, 99 NLRB 1270, enfd . 209 F. 2d 109 (C.A. 5).
CHEMICAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION
599
purpose, however, the Respondent attempted to prove that Lowry misstated some
subsidiary facts in connection with his activities in processing that grievance.
Lowry
testified -that the overtime work was performed on July 30, a day which he recalled
because of a visit he made to a doctor. Bricker attempted to show that Lowry had
gone to the doctor on July 29 instead of the 30th. In terms of evidence, however,
Lowry's testimony that he visited the doctor the day after he was hurt was not
effectively contradicted.
There was also some evidence by company witnesses
apparently intended to establish that in fact there had been no such overtime work
performed for which payment had not been made. If the purpose of this testimony
was to prove that Lowry deliberately attempted to process a grievance which he
knew to be groundless, it fell short.
Lowry could well have been mistaken in his
impression that overtime work had gone unpaid.
Not all grievances are won, or
have merit. I cannot say on this record that any deceit by Lowry has been estab-
lished.
In any event, the only disagreement or dissention that could have resulted
from Lowry's mistaken sense of righteousness was between him, on behalf of the
carpenters, and management, which believed him in error.
I think it is clear on this entire record that the Respondent was dissatisfied with
Lowry and considered him an undesirable employee because he processed grievances
on behalf of the carpenters, because he was persistent in urging his point of view
with respect to some of the grievances, and, perhaps, because Lowry was wrong
in some of the grievances he pushed. Indeed, the specifications advanced by the
Respondent in support of its conclusionary assertion virtually restate the very
grievance activities carried on by Lowry. I can appreciate a steward, or any em-
ployee, causing dissension among workmen-thereby interfering with proper per-
formance of work by the employee complement, as distinguished from a steward,
in the discharge of his representative duties, causing dissension between the employee
group on the one hand and management officials on the other. It is the latter form
of "dissension" that the Respondent has shown here.
Foreman Dickens said he
chose to quit on August 13 because he had been too much "dogged, worried and
aggravated" by Lowry.
All the record shows, however, is that Lowry went to him
first with the grievances.
This he was obligated to do, and it was part of Dickens'
job in his capacity as the appointed foreman of the carpenters, to deal with Lowry
as the Respondent's agent.
And so the inconvenience caused the project superin-
tendent; he, too, was management.
The worst that can be said of Lowry's steward-
ship on this record is that he was very persistent and determined.
But the legality
of -a steward's activities, or the degree of protection afforded it by the statute,
cannot be measured in terms of the number of grievances or of the steward's fervor.
Perhaps a clearer picture of the "dissension" which lay at the bottom of the Com-
pany's concern appears in the testimony of the Respondent's witness, Dickenson, the
carpenter who replaced Lowry as steward.
Dickenson blandly testified Lowry was
a bad employee, and he, Dickenson, a good one.
He went on to say that whereas
there had been dissension before Lowry left, there was none during his 5 months'
stewardship.
He also added he processed no grievances at all.
I deem it significant that none of the grievances urged by Lowry involved himself
personally.
Apart from the jurisdictional claims, which necessarily would have
benefited all the carpenters equally, all his disagreements with management arose
over claims benefiting others. I cannot find, as the Respondent inferentially seems
to argue, that Lowry used his steward position for personal gain or to foment
discord among the workmen.
Although some of his grievances may not have
prevailed, his conduct was not immoderate.4 I find on the entire record that
Bricker selected Lowry for discharge when he did because he resented Lowry's
activities in processing grievances as steward.
Bricker's description of Lowry's
activities as a cause of "dissension" appears almost as a "transparent euphemism." 5
"It is obvious that concerted activities which are protected by the act often create
a disturbance in the sense that they create dissatisfaction with the status quo. Such
a fact without more can hardly justify a discharge." 6
And it is immaterial whether
Lowry's activities be viewed as "union" activities or as concerted activities. In
either posture -they were protected by the statute.? I conclude that by the discharge
*Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company, 73 NLRB 1463, enfd. 167 F. 2d 983 (C.A. 7),
cert. denied 335 U.S. 845.
5 See the language of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in N.L.R.B. v. Smith
Victory Corporation, 190 F. 2d 56, enfg. 90 NLRB 2089.
Salt River Valley Water
Users' Association v. N.L.R.B., 206 F. 2d 325 (C.A. 9),
enfg. 99 NLRB 849.
° N.L.R.B.
v. Hymie Schwartz, Lion Brand Manufacturing Company, 146 F. 2d 773
(C.A. 5).
600
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of Lowry on August 13, 1958, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and
Section 8(a)(1) of the Acts
In reaching this conclusion, I have carefully considered some indications in the
record pointing to the existence of factions among the carpenters members of Local
569.
Lowry recommended Bricker hire his friends among the carpenters and
thereby assure a harmonious team on the project.
He even told Bricker at the
moment of discharge that things might have gone more smoothly had only Lowry's
friends been hired.
Whatever personal animosity may have been felt by some
carpenters against Lowry it does not appear to have affected the job performance
of any of them on this project.
With the Respondent itself pointing to Lowry's
grievance activities as the cause of the asserted "dissension," I could hardly search
elsewhere for any hidden and unproved proper cause for discharge.
Nor can I
give any weight, on this record, to the testimony of Peterman, secretary of the
District Council of Carpenters and member of another local, that in his opinion
the Respondent did not commit an unfair labor practice.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in con-
nection with the operations of the Respondent described in section I, above, have
a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among
the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing
commerce and the free flow thereof.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices,
I will recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that the Respondent discriminated against Walter Lowry with
respect to his hire and tenure of employment, I will recommend that it be ordered
to make him whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered because of the
discrimination against him, by payment of a sum of money equal to the amount
he normally would have earned as wages from the date of the discharge to the
date of the completion of the Bayou Casotte project in Mississippi, less his net
earnings during the said period, with backpay computed on a quarterly basis in
the manner established by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289.
Where, as in this case, the unlawful discrimination found consists of the selection
of a particular employee to be included in a broader economic reduction-in-force,
the Board normally requires that the employee involved be made whole only until
such time as, pursuant to the employer's established nondiscriminatory practice, his
employment would nevertheless have been terminated.
There is no occasion for
such uncertain provision here because the record shows when Lowry's job would
have ended in accordance with the Respondent's lawful practice.
As found above,
it observed the working conditions established by the Carpenter Brotherhood locally
throughout the country.
Among these is a provision that the steward "shall be
exempt from layoff unless all the carpenters are laid off a job or a job is entirely
completed."
Accordingly, I recommend that his make-whole period shall cease
on the date the last carpenter was discharged.
As the project has been completed,
there is no occasion to order reinstatement.
In view of the completion of the project, I shall also deviate from the standard
remedial provision for the posting of notices. I shall recommend instead that the
Respondent be ordered to post the notices at any project that may be in operation
now, or within 6 months of the start of compliance, within the territorial jurisdiction
of the South Mississippi District Council of Carpenters, and to mail copies of said
notice to all the individual carpenter employees who worked on the Bayou Casette
project.
I will also recommend that the Respondent make available to the Board, upon
request, payroll and other records to facilitate the determination of the amount due
under this recommended remedy.
As the discharge of an employee because of his union activity goes to the very
heart of the Act, the commission of similar and other unfair labor practices reason-
ably may be anticipated. I shall therefore recommend that the Respondent be
ordered to cease and desist from in any manner infringing upon the rights guaranteed
to its employees by Section 7 of the Act.
1J.
C. Boesptug Construction Co.,
113 NLRB 330; H.
Mauehlstein & Co., Inc., 118
NLRB 268.
AINSWORTH 'PRECISION CASTINGS CO, DIV HARSCO CORP
601
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in
the case, I make the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1
The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act
2 By discharging Walter Lowry the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act
3
By the foregoing conduct the Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and
coerced employees in the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act and thereby
has engaged and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a) (1) of the Act
4 The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act
[Recommendations omitted from publication ]
Ainsworth Precision Castings Company, Division of Harsco
Corp.
and
Teamsters,
Chauffeurs,
Helpers and Taxicab
Drivers, Local Union No. 327, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America
and The International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft
& Agricultural Implement Workers of America, AFL-CIO.
Cases Nos 10-CA-3630 and 10-CA-3969
December 4, 1959
DECISION AND ORDER
On June 29, 1959, Trial Examiner George A Downing issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair
labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the
Intermediate Report attached hereto
Thereafter, the General Coun-
sel, the Respondent, and the UAW filed exceptions to the Intermediate
Report and supporting briefs i
Pursuant to the provision of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with
these cases to a three-member panel [Chairman Leedom and Members
Bean and Jenkins]
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed
The
rulings are hereby affirmed
The Board has considered the entire
record in these cases, including the Intermediate Report and the
exceptions and briefs, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Trial Examiner 2
1 We hereby deny the UAW's request for oral argument, as the Intermediate Report,
exceptions, and briefs herein adequately set forth the positions of the parties
2 We have adopted the Trial Examinhr's credibility findings in these cases for we are
not convinced by a clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence that his credibility
resolutions are incorrect
Cadre Industries Corporation, 124 NLRB 278
125 NLRB No 65