United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, Etc.

UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS, ETC. 853 United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO; Twin City District Council, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America , AFL-CIO; Local Union No. 889, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO; Local Union No. 7, United Brother- hood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO; Nassau County Carpenters District Council , United Brother- hood of Carpenters and Joiners of America , AFL-CIO; and Local Union No. 1397, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO and Endicott Church Furni- ture, Inc.' United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, Its Agents, Representatives, Affiliated Local Unions and District Councils and Endicott Church Furniture, Inc. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO; Carpenters' District Council of Wayne, Oakland, Macomb, Sanilac, St. Clair and Monroe Counties and Vicinity and Local Union No. 998, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO and Endicott Church Furniture, Inc. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, Its Agents, Representatives, and Affiliated Local Unions and District Councils and Endicott Church Furni- ture, Inc. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO ; and Local Union No. 181, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO and Endicott Church Furniture, Inc. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO; and Local Union No . 181, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO and Endicott Church Furniture, Inc. Carpenters' District Council of Wayne, Oakland, Macomb, Sani- lac, St. Clair and Monroe Counties and Vicinity and Local 'On May 13, 1959, Don Endicott, president of Endicott Church Furniture , Inc., served notice upon the Board , and upon the parties to this proceeding, that on April 1, 1959, the original corporation here involved sold all its assets and operating business to Endicott Church Furniture, Inc., which is carrying on the identical business with the same work force as the former owner, and he moved the Board to have the new corporate entity, bear- ing the same name as the original charging party , made a party to this proceeding. In the absence of any objection , this motion is hereby granted. 125 NLRB No. 81. 535828-60-vol. 125-55 854 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Union No. 998, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO and Endicott Church Furniture, Inc. Carpenters District Council of Chicago, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO and Endicott Church Furniture, Inc. Carpenters District Council of Chicago, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America , AFL-CIO and Endicott Church Furniture, Inc. Cases Nos. 7-CC-65 (formerly 18-CC- 38), 7-CB-401 (formerly 18-CB-95), 7-CC-61, 7-CB-393, 7-CC- 68 (formerly 13-CC-159), 7-CB-409 (formerly 13-CB-539), 7-CB-1p15, 7-CC-69 (formerly 13-CC-161), and 7-CB-417 (for- merly 13-CB-5116). December 18, 1959 DECISION AND ORDER On May 21, 1958, Trial Examiner C. W. Whittemore issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondents Nassau County District Council of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, and its constituent Local Union No. 1397, had engaged in and were en- gaging in certain unfair labor practices, and recommending that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. The Trial Examiner also found that the above-named Respondents had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint, and that other named Respondents had not engaged in any of the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint, and recom- mended that the allegations of the complaint to such extent be dis- missed. Thereafter, the General Counsel, the Charging Company, and the Respondents Nassau County District Council and Local Union No. 1397, filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and sup- porting briefs, and the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, and its constitutent Local Union No. 181 filed a brief in support of the Intermediate Report. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter- mediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case,' and finds merit in many of the exceptions filed by the 2 While this case was pending before the Board, the Charging Company filed a motion that a new charge (Case No . 8-CC-8'2) which it had filed be consolidated with the cases in this proceeding, and the record reopened to take evidence in this matter. On March 18, 1959, the Board (Members Rodgers and Jenkins dissenting ) denied this motion. On May 22, 1959 , the Charging Company filed a motion that the Board take judicial notice of the file in Case No. 8-CC-82, including a settlement .agreement entered into by the parties there involved . A settlement agreement, however, does not establish that the conduct in question occurred or that it constituted a violation of the Act . See Puerto Rico Rayon UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS, ETC. 855 General Counsel and the Charging Company. Accordingly, the Board adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner only to the extent that they are consistent with this Decision and Order.3 A. The alleged nationwide campaign Endicott, the Charging Company, is engaged in the manufacture of church furniture at its plant in Warsaw, Indiana. Its contracts, for the sale and installation of its products are in many instances not, subcontracted through the church construction contractor, but arel made directly with the church. Endicott crews working out of Warsaw perform installations throughout the United States, and sometimes work in the Warsaw plant when not engaged in installation of Endicott products. In March 1956, a consent election was held at the Warsaw plant. Local Union No. 3044 of the Respondent United Brotherhood, the only union on the ballot, was rejected by the employees.' The com- plaint, as amended, alleges that the Respondents engaged in a nation- wide campaign to compel Endicott employees to become members of the Respondent Unions and to compel Endicott to recognize the United Brotherhood, Local 3044, or another affiliate. There is background of statements 5 by United Brotherhood repre- sentatives indicating an intent to interfere with Endicott installations unless Endicott granted recognition. These statements, however, were made prior to the election, with reference to a work stoppage at Bunker Hill, Indiana, whereas the incidents found below to con- stitute violations of the Act occurred at projects in Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, and New York, and took place from about 8 months to more than a year after the election. Nor did such incidents occur at all projects where Endicott crews were working, not even at all the union projects, and Endicott crews also made installations in churches being built by nonunion labor. Moreover, Endicott crews worked Mills, Inc., 117 NLRB 1355, 1364. The motion is granted , therefore, to the extent that we have taken judicial notice of what occurred in Case No. 8-CC-82, but we shall give no weight to the settlement agreement in resolving ,the issues involved in this proceeding. 8 Members Rodgers and Jenkins join in this Decision and Order to the extent that it finds violations of the Act and orders appropriate remedial action ; as set forth in their separate opinion, they would find violations of the Act in addition to those found herein. Member Fanning joins in this Decision and Order to the extent that it dismisses certain allegations of the complaint, as supplemented by the bill of particulars , and to the extent that it finds that the involved locals and district councils have violated Section 8 (b) (1) (A) and (2) at Edison Park, Illinois , and Royal Oak, Michigan, and Section 8(b) (4) (A) at Hopkins, Min- nesota, and Nassau County, New York ; as set forth in his separate opinion, he would dis- miss the remaining allegations of the complaint. * The tally of ballots showed 12 votes cast for the Union, 25 against it, and 6 challenged ballots . At the time of the hearing herein, Endicott had 65-70 employees. 5 These statements were made more than 6 months before the filing of charges herein, and the Board is therefore precluded by Section 10(b) of the Act from considering these statements for purposes other than as background for the conduct alleged to constitute unfair labor practices. 856 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD without interference for about 1 to 3 days at each of the projects here involved, until union members working under the general con- struction contracts in effect on these projects observed that the Endi- cott trucks were from Indiana, or that the Endicott crews were work- ing longer than union hours. The evidence indicates that the union representatives in question were seeking to maintain the union-shop conditions of their respective construction contracts, and that the incidents in question would have occurred if the employees doing the installation work were nonunion, whether they came from Endicott or some other company. The evidence does not establish that the various union representatives involved had been alerted to interfere with Endicott installations on projects throughout the country, were aware of the election at Warsaw, or were seeking recognition, as alleged in the amended complaint, of the United Brotherhood, of Local 3044, or of any other affiliate. While the totality of the Re- spondents' conduct gives rise to a strong suspicion that there might have been a nationwide campaign rather than a number of inde- pendent acts, the evidence, in our opinion, is not sufficient to establish such a campaign.° Accordingly, we shall dismiss the complaint inso- far as it alleges violations of Section 8(b) (4) (B) and 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act based upon a nationwide campaign to compel Endicott to recognize a union not selected by its employees. The complaint also alleges that the Respondents engaged in various unfair labor practices at several church construction projects where Endicott crews were working. The Trial Examiner found a viola- tion of Section 8(b) (4) (A) at the Nassau project, for which he held the Respondents Local and Council there involved jointly responsible, "Members Rodgers and Jenkins , in their dissenting opinion, would find such a nation- wide campaign , and have gleaned from the record several remarks by union representatives on which they rely for this finding. We cannot perceive in these remarks the probative effect Members Rodgers and Jenkins attribute to them. They point first to remarks by two representatives of the United Brotherhood , both of which were made more than 6 months before the charges were filed as well as prior to the Endicott election, and which, more- over, are the only incidents involving representatives of the United Brotherhood. They rely also on a remark by union agents at the Minneapolis project about "incidents similar to ours." As stated in sec. E, 1, below, however, the same union agents had an earlier en- counter with the same Endicott men at another Minneapolis project, which is not the sub- ject of charges. It is far more likely that the remark in question referred to this earlier meeting than to a nationwide campaign. Moreover , there is a denial that the remark in question was made, and this conflict is not resolved by the Trial Examiner. Similarly, the remark at the Edison Park project relied upon in this dissent referred to projects in the State of Illinois, not throughout the country . The Nassau project remarks , made on the telephone to the minister of the church, refer to the Endicott men being from Indiana, but this fact was apparent from the trucks Endicott crews parked at projects where they were working. The remarks pertaining to the Royal Oak project , made by Pinner , a union busi- ness agent, in his office to Morgan , an Endicott attorney, indicate , when quoted out of context , that Pinner knew about the election which the Union lost at Endicott . The com- plete context, however, shows that Morgan told Pinner about the election during their con- versation . Nor can any of the other remarks be said specifically to refer to a nationwide conspiracy. They appear rather to refer to the respective local disputes , and to be made by union agents concerned with maintaining the union contracts under their jurisdiction, not with a national situation. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS, ETC. 857 but recommended dismissal of this allegation as against the United Brotherhood and dismissal of all the other allegations of the com- plaint. The conduct in question at the several projects is discussed below in the sequence followed in the attached report. B. The Edison Parlc project in Chicago, Illinois The complaint alleges violations at this project in October 1957 of Section 8(b) (4) (A) and (B) and Section 8(b) (1) (A) and (2) by the Respondents Local 181, Chicago District Council, and United Brotherhood. The Trial Examiner found no violations at this proj- ect, to which the General Counsel and the Charging Company have excepted. We find merit in some of these exceptions. 1. Section 8(b) (4) (A) and (B) On the third day of the Endicott installation work at Edison Park, the carpenter steward at the project, a member of a local not named as a respondent, asked the Endicott men, Foreman Glenn Thomas and employee Ronald Shepler, about their union status, learned that they were not members, and called his local. As a result of this call, Christensen, a business agent of Respondent Local 181, came to the project about noon, and told the Endicott men, when they returned from lunch : ... You can't do any more work in here. . . . If you are not union you will have to pack up your tools and leave. . . . If you want to work in this state go down and get yourself a union card . . . and that's all the way you or any crew of Endicott's will install church furniture in the State of Illinois. The evidence does not establish that these remarks, addressed to the primary Endicott employees, were overheard by any secondary em- ployees, nor that any other remarks which were made and which might constitute unlawful inducement were made by union agents to sec- ondary employees. The dissenting opinion of Members Rodgers and Jenkins would find violations of Section 8(b) (4) (A) and (B) here on the basis of the testimony of Van Aken, an Endicott attorney, that Christensen ad- mitted such violations to him in a telephone conversation. The Respondents objected to the admission of this testimony and later filed a motion to strike it on the ground, among others, that Van Aken had recorded the conversation on an electronic device in violation of an Illinois statute prohibiting "electronic eavesdropping." The Gen- eral Counsel and the Charging Company filed briefs in opposition to this motion. The Trial Examiner, by telegram, denied the motion to strike, and he comments on this matter in his report, but makes no 858 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD other reference to Van Aken's testimony. Moreover, although Van Aken's testimony on this matter is discussed at length in the General Counsel's brief to the Trial Examiner, the latter states in his report that he "finds no credible evidence in the record, and in his brief General Counsel points to none, from any employee of any secondary employer to the effect that Christensen in any way even attempted to get him to engage in a work stoppage." It appears that, even if Christensen's statement established all the elements which constitute a secondary boycott, Van Aken's testimony about the statement was not credited by the Trial Examiner. Moreover, although the dissent- ing opinion maintains that Christensen's "admission" was corrob- orated by the testimony of Palacious, an electrician, this witness, who evidently knew Christensen as he testified that he saw him at the church on the day in question, testified further that he was unable to identify the individual who "did imply or said" the statements upon which the dissent relies in finding unlawful conduct here. In our opinion, the General Counsel has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the violations in question at this project occurred as charged. We therefore adopt the Trial Examiner's conclusion that there was no violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) or (B) at Edison Park. 2. Section 8(b) (1) (A) and (2) We do not agree with the Trial Examiner's finding that there was no violation here of Section 8(b) (1) (A) or (2) of the Act. The two Endicott men at Edison Park when Christensen came to the project were Thomas, who was supervising the work, and Shepler. There is no exception to the Trial Examiner's finding that Thomas was "Endi- cott's representative on this job." In view of his supervisory authority and the absence of any other Endicott representative, we find that Thomas, while thus engaged at Edison Park, was in the position of Shepler's employer? The Trial Examiner also found, without exception, that "the deci- sion to stop work and withdraw from this job was made by Foreman Thomas, and made pursuant to the above-quoted remark by Business Agent Christensen." He nevertheless concluded that there was no cause or attempt to cause Thomas to discriminate against Shepler on the ground that there was no evidence that Christensen sought any change in Shepler's employee status. But when Christensen demanded that the Endicott men cease work-and Thomas felt compelled to comply with this demand before the work was completed-Shepler perforce had to cease work and return to Indiana for a new assign- ment. It is difficult to perceive how Christensen could demand that Thomas terminate this work without necessarily seeking to cause a T Section 2(2) of the Act provides that "employer" includes "any person acting as an 11 agent of an employer, directly or indirectly . . . . UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS, ETC. 859 change in the terms of Shepler's employment. We are convinced that Christensen's demand, based upon Shepler's lack of union member- ship, was "tantamount to a request to discriminate . . ." with respect to the terms of Shepler's employment, and was "reasonably calculated to bring about that result." 8 Such conduct necessarily encourages union membership. We find, accordingly, that Christensen caused Thomas to discriminate with regard to the terms and conditions of Shepler's employment within the meaning of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act, and thereby violated Section 8(b) (2) of the Act. We further find that, by such conduct, Christensen restrained and coerced em- ployees in the exercise of their rights, in violation of Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act.' As stated above, Christensen was a business agent of Respondent Local 181. In consequence, the Local is responsible for his unlawful conduct. 3. Responsibility of the Chicago District Council The complaint alleges that the Respondent Chicago District Coun- cil is also responsible for this conduct. The authority of a Carpenters district council over its constituent locals stems from the United Brotherhood's constitution, which requires that where there are two or more locals in a city, they must be represented in a district council composed of delegates from the local unions, and governed by the laws and rules adopted by the district council and approved by the local unions and the first general vice president of the United Brotherhood. Moreover, the bylaws of the Chicago District Council provide in part that : "All Business Agents of this district shall be under the super- vision of the President of the District Council"; the president is re- quired to hold meetings of all business agents regularly at least twice each month; and the agents receive their credentials from the Council, and are tried and punished by the Council for permitting a violation of the working rules. The working rules provide that "No member shall work on a job with non-affiliated carpenters . . ." and that "Any member refusing to stop work when ordered to do so by the Business Agent . . . shall be subject to a fine . . . ." It is clear from these provisions that the Council exercised close supervision over the work of the business agents, that the agents were required to enforce the rule prohibiting members from working with nonmembers, and that Chris- tensen was enforcing this rule at the Edison Park project. We find, 8 See Northern California Chapter, et al., 119 NLRB 1026; Melvin Rupp, d/b/a Rupp Equipment Company, 112 NLRB 1315; United Association of Journeymen, etc. (Carrier Corporation), 112 NLRB 1385; Austin Company, 101 NLRB 1257; Wand Corporation, 122 NLRB 499. 9 See Local Union No. 450, International Union of Operating Engineers, et al. (Tellepsen Construction Company ), 122 NLRB 564 ; Local No. 1400, United Brotherhood of Car- penters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, et at., (Pardee Construction Company), 115 NLRB 126. 860 DECISIONS Or NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD therefore, that the Council is jointly responsible with the Local for Christensen's violations of the Act.'° 4. Responsibility of the United Brotherhood The General Counsel maintains that the United Brotherhood must share with Local 181 and the Chicago District Council the respon- sibility for the unfair labor practice found above. We agree. The United Brotherhood's constitution, which sets forth the "fun- damental principles, policies and objects of the organization," makes it abundantly clear that members of the United Brotherhood and its constituent bodies are expected and required to conduct themselves in accordance with certain basic principles. Thus, the constitution pro- claims that local unions and members of the United Brotherhood are "subject to its laws and usages . . ." (section 1, paragraph A), and that, while local unions and district councils shall have the power to make bylaws and trade rules, they shall "in no way conflict with the Constitution and Laws of the United Brotherhood, and must be approved by the First General Vice President before becoming law . . . ." (Section 25, paragraph A; see also section 6, paragraph C.) The constitution further vests the United Brotherhood with the power to establish and charter local unions and district councils, and declares that its "mandates must be observed and obeyed at all times" (isection 6, paragraph A). To compel obedience to the United Brotherhood's mandates and compliance on the part of local unions and district councils with these basic principles, the constitution reserves to the United Brotherhood the right to take over the govern- ment of any local union or district council whose affairs are "con- ducted in such a manner as to be a menace to the welfare of the Inter- national body" (section 6, paragraph D), and reserves to the general president the power, subject to an appeal to the general executive board, to suspend any local union or district council that "wilfully or directly violates the Constitution, Laws, or principles" of the United Brotherhood (section 10, paragraph F). Among the basic principles or policies set forth in the constitution, there is a provision which requires that "Members who . . . become foremen, must comply with Union rules and hire none but members of the United Brotherhood" (section 42, paragraph U). And rule 12 of the Chicago District Council's working rules provides, under penalty of a fine, that "No member shall work on a job with non- affiliated carpenters and where other workmen . . . do carpenter work of any kind." As pointed out above, business agents are subject to a fine for "allowing violations of the working rules . . . ." It is clear, therefore, that the Council's bylaws and working rules, in accord 10 See Local 169 , United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America , AFL-CIO, et at . (111. H. Condo), 119 NLRB 726, and 121 NLRB 308. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS, ETC. 861 with which Christensen demanded that the nonunion Endicott em- ployees cease work, were required to conform with United Brother- hood policies and to be approved by one of its officers. Under these circumstances, and in view of the United Brotherhood's general control and supervision over its constituent bodies, we find that Christensen was complying with a mandate imposed by the United -Brotherhood and, therefore, that the United Brotherhood shares the responsibility for his unlawful conduct," together with Local 181 and the Chicago District Council.12 C. The Glen Ellyn, Illinois, project As the attached report points out, the complaint, as amended, did not contain allegations of unlawful conduct at the Glen Ellyn project. Prior to the hearing, pursuant to a request by the Respondent United Brotherhood, the General Counsel filed 'a bill of particulars specifying dates, places, and names of persons and organizations involved. In- serted in longhand at the end of the typewritten bill of particulars is an item which reads merely "Mission Covenant Church, Glen Ellyn, Ill,, 11-22-57." Some issues involving the Glen Ellyn project were litigated at the hearing. It appears that the Endicott men assigned to this project were Thomas and Shepler, who were involved in the Edison Park episode, with Thomas again supervising the work. The Trial Examiner found as follows : Thomas and Shepler worked for a time with no inter- ference except for an inquiry whether they were union members made by fn unidentified carpenter, and not, as the General Counsel had claimed, by Lein, foreman of the project; when Thomas replied in the negative, the carpenter asked when they were coming back to complete the work; when Thomas answered that they would return the following week, the carpenter said something would have to be done at that time. The Endicott men worked without incident on the day they returned although Lein heard the same day that they were not union members. On the following morning, Lein telephoned Krishack, a business representative for three locals, none of which is a named respondent but all of which are affiliated with the Respond- ent Chicago District Council, and Krishack talked to Thomas on the telephone, asked why they came in and caused trouble and why they did not stay out until the other work was completed, and requested the Endicott telephone number, whereupon Thomas handed the tele- ' Member Bean would not find the United Brotherhood responsible for this conduct, or for any of the violations found below , and, therefore, as to this issue , joins Member Fanning in his dissent. 12 Galveston Maritime Association, Inc., et al., 122 NLRB 692 ; Millwrights' Local 22$0, etc. (Farnsworth & Chambers, Inc.), 122 NLRB 300; Alexander-Stafford Corporation, 118 NLRB 79 ; Local 1016, United Brotherhood of Carpenters i Joiners of America, AFL- G10; et al. ( Booher Lumber Co., Inc.), 117 NLRB 1739, 1748. 862 . DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD phone to Van Aken,- counsel for Endicott, who was present. The report does not set forth the conversation between Krishack and Van Aken 13 on the ground that it was "immaterial to the question of con- duct, but only relevant to that. of `purpose"' and "the point of. purpose is not reached, in disposing of this incident." The Trial Examiner concluded that, as there was no work stoppage nor any evidence of an attempt to cause a work stoppage or to prevent the Endicott men from completing their work, there was no violation of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) or (2) at Glen Ellyn, and, further, that there was no violation in the Chicago area of these subsections nor of Section 8(b) (4) (A) or (B), without, however, specifying whether. this applied to Glen Ellyn. It is not clear, therefore, whether he considered that viola- tions of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) and (B) had been alleged or litigated as to Glen Ellyn. The General Counsel took no exception to any of the Trial Exami- ner's findings, but did except to his conclusions. He excepted also to the failure to find that the United'Brotherhood and the Chicago Dis- trict Council, by the conduct of Krishack and Lein, violated Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act. In his brief to the Trial Examiner; however, the General Counsel maintained that the conduct at Glen Ellyn vio- lated Section 8(b) (1) (A) and (2) of the Act. The brief in support of the Intermediate Report filed by the Respondents Chicago District Council and Local 181 maintained that there was no violation of Sec- tion 8(b) (4) at Glen Ellyn as there was no secondary work stoppage and the Endicott men completed their work ; that there was no allega- tion of a violation of Section 8(b) (1) (A) at Glen Ellyn; and that there was no violation of Section 8 (b) (2) at Glen Ellyn as no one told the Endicott men to leave and they did not leave before their work was completed. It is thus not clear, with'respect to the Glen Ellyn incident, which subsections of the Act were alleged in the complaint to be violated, which were litigated, which were passed upon by the Trial Examiner, and which the General Counsel preserved by his exceptions. The General Counsel's brief in support of his exceptions sheds no light on this question as it does not discuss the Glen Ellyn project. In view of this procedural confusion, as well as the facts that there was no demand for recognition, there was no work stoppage, the Endi- ' As summarized by the General Counsel in his brief to the Trial Examiner filed prior to issuance of the report, this telephone conversation was as follows : Mr. Van Aken asked Mr. Krishack if the dispute could be settled by hiring union carpenters to work on the pew installation and Krishack replied that that could be done. Van Aken inquired if the Endicott crew would be permitted to work on the installation and Krishack replied that that could not be done, and they ( the union workers) could not work with nonaffiliated men. Van Aken inquired if this was a rule of 1527 or a rule of the United Brotherhood. Krishack replied, "It was a rule of the United Brotherhood," and he said , furthermore, "We are all one." He stated it was required by the constitution and bylaws of the United Brotherhood. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS, ETC . 863 cott men completed their work, Krishack's telephone conversation with Thomas contained no coercive remarks, and his replies on the telephone to the questions of the Endicott attorney were not made in the hearing of any employees, we shall adopt the Trial Examiner's recommended dismissal of all the allegations as to Glen Ellyn.l" D. The Hopkins, Minnesota, project The complaint alleges violations at this project in November 1956 of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) and (B) by the Respondents Local 889, Twin City District Council, and United Brotherhood and of Section 8(b) (1) (A) and (2) by the United Brotherhood only." 1. Section 8(b) (4) (A) The conduct in question at this project was initiated by Hovland, whose supervisory status is discussed below. Hovland, accompanied by Wickman, a carpenter, asked the Endicott men, Foreman Ray Smith and employee Floyd Yant, who were working at this project, whether they were union members. When he learned they were not, Hovland remarked : "We will have to do something about this. This is a union contract." Wickman thereupon called Linde, business agent of Respondent Local 889, who came to the project. In the mean- time, Hovland and Wickman stopped working, and Hovland told Morin, a carpenter, and other workers on the project that the Endicott men were nonunion, that he was not going to work, and that he did not think they should. There was a work stoppage until, following a telephone conversation between Bakken, secretary of the Council, and Child, chairman of the church building committee, the committee agreed to Bakken's demands that the Endicott men be replaced by union members, and the committee have the architect write to Endicott that he would not use or recommend its pews until it made peace with the Union. Linde arrived, in response to Wickman's call, after the work stop- page began. He questioned the Endicott men about their nonunion status, during which, he testified, the carpenters were "all around there." The Trial Examiner found, although denied by Linde, that Linde threatened the chairman of the building committee that he would "banner" or picket the job if necessary. He did not refer to testimony by Lindstrom, a painter, which was also denied by Linde, that " . . . I heard Linde say, that the matter wouldn't be settled in a few minutes, and that if things didn't straighten out that they would have a banner there. And he said it would not be settled in a few 14 Local 1922, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO ( Mid-Island Electrical Sales Corp ., et al. ), 122 NLRB 850. 15 Such allegations at some of the projects here involved were barred by Section '10(b) as to the Respondents other than the United Brotherhood. 864 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD minutes, so the best thing was to go home and they would call us." Lindstrom testified that he did leave. The Trial Examiner found that "responsible union agents did threaten to -`banner' the job,".but rejected the contention that this caused a prolongation of the work stoppage. on the ground that the threat was made only to church officials. The Trial Examiner did not credit Linde's denial that he threatened the church officials with a picket line, while he credited other testimony of Lindstrom, On the basis of the Trial Examiner's credibility reso- lution and our examination of the record, we likewise credit Lind- strom's testimony and discredit Linde's denial.16 Accordingly, we find that Linde's threats to picket were made in the hearing of Lind- strom. It appears that other employees were also present at the time, in view of Linde's remark about the carpenters being "all around there," and of Lindstrom's reference to Linde's advice to go home "and they would call us." The Trial Examiner found the work stoppage attributable to Hovland. On the basis, however, of testimony by the church archi- tect that Hovland was "acting as our superintendent," the Trial Ex- aminer found that Hovland was acting superintendent for the general contractor, and, therefore, a management representative whose con- duct was not attributable to the Respondents. Hovland himself testified, however, that he was not a superintendent but "a carpenter foreman," and it is clear that he was in charge of the carpentry work. He testified also that he was a member of Local 87, which is not a respondent, and of Twin City Council, which is. In fact, the agree- ment between the Council and an association of general contractors in effect on this project requires that "all foremen giving orders to any employee covered by this agreement shall be affiliated with the Council." It also provides that "It shall not be a violation of this agreement for any employee to refuse to work on a job where non- union men are doing work of a type coming under the jurisdiction of unions affiliated with a Building Trades Council." The constitution and laws of the Twin City Council provide that, when there are two or more journeymen on a job, one sha.11 be desig- nated leadman or foreman, and a foreman must assist the stewards, hire and discharge men under his supervision, and, if he assigns any work coming under United Brotherhood jurisdiction to any other craft or violates any of the working rules or requests any member under his supervision to do so, is subject to a fine; and no union man will work on a job where nonunion carpenters are employed. Hovland, whether designated a foreman or "acting as" superin- tendent, was in charge of the carpentry work and, therefore, was the ie See Local 1205 and Local 707, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. (Atlantic- PaoifioManufacturing 'Corporation ), 122 NLRB 1215. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS, ETC. 865 individual to whom these constitutional provisions were applicable.'? It is clear that he served in a dual capacity, and that, as a supervisor, he was a management representative whose principal concern was to expedite the work of which he was in charge, while, as a unlion-member foreman, he was obligated to refuse to work, or to permit men under his supervision to do so, when nonunion men on the project were performing work over which his union claimed jurisdiction.18 In view of all the circumstances, we find that, in his conduct at this project, Hovland subordinated his management duties and gave para- mount importance to the obligations placed upon him by the Council contract' and constitution. Moreover, Bakken, the Council secretary, confirmed and implemented Hovland's efforts to apply the terms of the union contract to all carpentry work on the project, even that covered by the separate Endicott contract, and prolonged the work stoppage caused by Hovland. Accordingly, we find that : (1) Hov- land, in accord with Council requirements, induced and encouraged employees of secondary employers to stop work in order to force such secondary employers to cease doing business with Endicott; (2) Bakken, the Council secretary, endorsed and participated in this conduct; and (3) the Council thereby violated Section 8('b) (4) (A) of the Act.19 We find further that Linde not only ratified Hovland's violation of Section 8(b) (4) (A), but he also threatened to picket and advised employees to go home, which at least one of them did. Local 889 is therefore jointly responsible with the Council for this violation of the Act. Moreover, for the reasons set forth in section B, 4, above, we find the United Brotherhood likewise responsible for this unlawful conduct. 2. Section 8(b) (4) (B) We find no violation here of Section 8(b) (4) (B) of the Act as the evidence does not establish that Hovland, Linde,.or Bakken was seek- ing recognition by Endicott of the United Brotherhood or any affili- ated organization. 3. Section 8(b) (1) (A) and (2) The Trial Examiner found no violation of Section 8(b) (2) on the ground that the Respondents' pressure seeking replacement of the nonunion Endicott men was applied only to the pastor and the church 17 See Local Union No. 450, International Union of Operating Engineers , et at. (Tellepsen Construction Company ), supra; Carpenters' District Council of Rochester and Vicinity, et at. [Rochester Davis-Fetch Corporation], 122 NLRB 269. 1s See Booth and Flinn Company, 120 NLRB 545, 548. 10 Local 657, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. (Southwestern Motor Trans- port, Inc.), 115 NLRB 981, 987. S66 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD building committee. While it is true that the secondary employees here were employees of the construction contractor, the pastor and those on the church building committee were at least equally con- cerned with completion of the- construction work on schedule. Pres- sure on them, therefore, to cause replacement of the nonunion men was as effective as pressure on the contractor. The Board has found such pressure exerted upon those who award contracts to constitute coercion against the contractor and its employees, and held that Sec- tion 8(b) (2) proscribes indirect pressure of this character as well as direct pressure to induce employee discrimination 20 The effective- ness of such indirect pressure is clearly evident here, where it achieved its purpose of replacing the Endicott foreman and employee with union men. We find, therefore, that the conduct of Hovland, Linde, and Bakken was intended to, and did, cause the pastor, the building committee, and the Endicott foreman to discriminate with regard to the terms and conditions of employment of Yant, the Endicott em- ployee, within the meaning of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act, in violation of Section 8(b) (1) (A) and (2) of the Act .21 As stated above, violations of these subsections at the Hopkins project are alleged in the complaint as to the United Brotherhood alone. We have found above that the United Brotherhood shares the responsibility of Local 889 and the Twin City District Council for the Section 8(b) (4) (A) violation because such conduct was con- sonant with principles laid down by the United Brotherhood and mandatory upon the Local and Council. As the violation of Section 8(b) (1) (A) and (2) - described above also stemmed from Council laws, prescribed and approved by the United Brotherhood, we find the United Brotherhood responsible for these violations by its subordinates. E. The Minneapolis, Minnesota, project The complaint alleges violations at this project in January 1957 of Section 8(b) (4) (A) and (B) by the Respondents Local 7, Twin. City District Council, and United Brotherhood, and of Section 8(b) (1) (A) and (2) by the United Brotherhood. 1. Section 8 (b) (4) (A) The Trial Examiner described Jaeger, who was in charge of this- project, as the "representative of general contractor," but Jaeger him- self testified that, at the time in question, he was the foreman also .as there was only one carpenter on the project. He also testified that he 20 Wand Corporation, supra; Northern California Chapter, et at., supra, 21 Local 610, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO (Cameron Store Fixtures), 122 NLRB 476. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS, ETC . 867 was a member of Respondent Local 7. According to Jaeger, he asked the Endicott men, Foreman Smith and employee Yant, if they- ca rried union cards. When they replied in the negative , he com- mented : "That is bad. It has been union job so far ." He also told the carpenter and other craftsmen that nonunion carpenters were installing the pews. Later, according to Jaeger 's testimony, Erickson; business agent of Local 7, happened to stop at the project, "said that there is a couple of nonunion carpenters setting seats upstairs there," and, when Jaeger asked what to do, Erickson told him to continue with his work, which Jaeger did. Erickson called Carlgren, business agent of Respondent Twin City Council, who came to the project. The Trial Examiner found, al-. though they denied it, that the two union agents told the Endicott men, whom they had met at another Minneapolis project: "Are you back here again ? Ain't you ever going to learn your lesson . . . ?" However, when one of the Endicott men told the other to pick up the tools, the business agents stated that they were not ordering the Endicott men to stop working. Carlgren called Newstrum, of the church building committee, who came to the project. Although Carlgren denied it , the Trial Exam-: finer found that he told Newstrum that the work could not be comIF pleted with two nonunion men on the job, and, if they remained, "future work at the church might be jeopardized." The pastor of the church and the two Endicott men joined in this discussion . ' Newstrum explained that the pews had been purchased under a separate coil- tract, but the matter was finally settled on the basis that union meii would assist the Endicott men in completing the installation. On the ground that there was no work stoppage , and on the basis of his finding that there was no "credible evidence that any agent of the Respondents even attempted to cause any employee of any em- ployer to stop working," the Trial Examiner found no evidence :of any unfair labor practices at this project. Jaeger, however, like Hovland at the Hopkins project, occupied a dual management-union position. In this capacity, his union obliga- tions required him not to work on a job where nonunion carpenters were employed,. or to request the men he supervised not ,to work on such a job. His comment to the men about the nonunion status of the Endicott carpenters was, under these circumstances , a reminder of their duty not to work with nonunion men, and constituted unlawful inducement whether or not an actual work stoppage ensued. We find, accordingly, that Jaeger . and the Respondent Local '7, to which he belonged; violated Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the Act. 22 2'Local 1016, United Brotherhood of Carpenters J.Joiners of America, AFL-CIO; at al: (Booker Lumber Co., Inc.), 117 NLRB 1739; Local 11, United Broth.erh'ood of'Carpenters J Joiners of America, AFL, at al. (General Millwork Corporation), 113 NLRB 1084. 868 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Moreover, it is clear that the Twin City Council business agents not only approved Jaeger's conduct, but implemented it by prevailing upon those in authority at the project to reassign part of the work to union men. We find that the Council, in view of its bylaws requiring Jaeger to act as he did, and in view of the conduct of its business agents, is jointly responsible with Local 7 for the Section 8(b) (4) (A) violation. We find the United Brotherhood also re- sponsible for the reasons set forth in section B, 4, above. 2. Section 8(b) (4) (B) As the evidence fails to establish that the union agents at this project were seeking union recognition, we find there was no viola- tion of Section 8(b) (4) (B) of the Act. 3. Section 8(b) (1) (A) and (2) Although, as described above, the union business agents did not order the Endicott men to cease work, they asked if they were ever going to learn their "lesson." They then proceeded to threaten the representative of the church building committee that the remaining work would be jeopardized if the nonunion men continued, and suc- ceeded in impressing their lesson upon the nonunion Endicott men by causing part of their work to be transferred to union men. We find that the business agents, by pressure upon Foreman Smith and the building committee, forced them to curtail the Endicott work, and thereby caused them to discriminate with. regard to the terms and conditions of employment of Yant, the Endicott employee, within the meaning of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act, in violation of Section 8(b) (1) (A) and (2) of the Act, and, further, that the United Brotherhood, the only Respondent charged with such violations at this project, is responsible therefor. F. The Nassau County, New York, project The complaint alleges violations at this project in January 1957 of Section 8(b) (4) (A) and (B) by the Respondents Local 1397, Nassau County District Council, and United Brotherhood, and of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) and (2) by the United Brotherhood. 1. Section 8 (b) (4) (A) As the Trial Examiner found, Unneberg, a business agent of Local 1397, which is a member of the Nassau County District Council, .ap- proached Foreman Robert Ring and employee Glenn Thomas, the two Endicott men who were installing pews at this project, and asked UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS, ETC. 869 Ring if they were union members. When they replied that they were not, Unneberg announced that "this work could not go on." He then talked to the carpenters about the matter and warned them that they were subject to a fine if they worked with nonunion men. They stopped working. He told Heidtmann, the general contractor, as the latter testified, to "retire from the picture with my men" until the non- union situation was "straightened out." Heidtmann complied. Unne- berg also talked about the nonunion situation to employees of sub- contractors, who complied with his request to stop working. Later that day, the pastor of the church, who had ordered the pews from Endicott, discussed the situation with Unneberg, and acknowledged his mistake in ordering the pews as this was a union job, but Unne- berg would not permit the carpenters to return while the nonunion men continued to work. The matter was finally "straightened out" by an agreement that parishioners would install the pews, and the Endicott men returned to Indiana. The Trial Examiner found Unne- berg's conduct violative of Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the Act. We agree. (a) Local 1397 and the Nassau County District Council except to this finding on the ground, among others, that it does not comport with the wording of the complaint, which alleges that these Respopd- ents committed the acts in question in furtherance of a campaign by all the Respondents to compel Endicott to recognize one of them. The Respondents here involved argue, therefore, that no violation can be found except as part of such a campaign. The complaint, how- ever, clearly sets forth the acts alleged to be unlawful, and the specific subsections of the Act alleged to be violated, and . these allegations have been litigated. We are satisfied, therefore, that our finding that the evidence failed to establish the alleged campaign does not pre- clude a finding that specific unlawful conduct occurred as charged. (b) The hearing in this proceeding was conducted in Warsaw, Indiana, where the Endicott plant is located, on January 7, 8, and 9, 1956, and at various times thereafter in the several localities involved, including New York City on February 11, 1956. The New York Respondents except to the fact that the Trial Examiner relied,, in find- ing a violation at the Nassau project, upon undisputed testimony of Endicott employees Ring and Thomas, who testified at the hearing in Warsaw but were not at the New York hearing. These Respondents were not represented at the Warsaw hearing, and maintain that only testimony taken in New York should be considered in determining whether there was a violation in New York. We find no merit in these contentions. The Board is empowered by the Act (Section 5) to prosecute any inquiry necessary to its func- tions in any part of the United States, and its Rules (Section 102.33) 535828-60-vol. 125-56 '870 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD provide for the transfer and consolidation of cases involving more than one Region. In addition, the Warsaw hearing was attended by representatives of several of the Respondents, including the United Brotherhood, whose counsel cross-examined one witness at the War= :saw hearing on his 'testimony about incidents in New York. More- over, the New York Respondents had ample notice that the original hearing would be held outside New York, and they had more than a month in which to examine the transcript and determine whether to request that Ring and Thomas be available at the New York hearing. Finally, when the general contractor testified in New York about Unneberg directing employees of neutral employers to stop work- ing, Unneberg was present at the hearing but did not testify. (c) The Respondents also except to the finding that the Nassau County District Council, as well as Local 1397, is responsible for the violation of Section 8(b) (4) (A). Unneberg was a business agent of Local 1397, but it was stipulated at the hearing that Local 1397 is a constituent member of the Nassau County District Council, and the Council's constitution and bylaws provide that : The Council has :executive powers on matters of general interest to the locals; business agents are under the supervision and direction of the Council; they must attend Council meetings and make verbal reports; they may be charged and tried for insubordination if they disobey a general order ,of the Council; charges against a business agent will be tried by the 'Council; any member who refuses to stop work when ordered to do .so by the business agent is subject to a fine; and no foreman will hire or permit nonmembers "to do any work requiring the skill, knowledge or ability of a carpenter to perform." In view of the evident control which the Council exercises over member locals and the business agents, we agree with the Trial. Examiner that the Council and Local 1397 are jointly responsible for Unneberg's unlawful conduct.23 (d) The Trial Examiner found no responsibility by the United Brotherhood for this conduct. We find, however, in accord with the General Counsel's contentions, that the United Brotherhood shares the responsibility for this violation. The Council's constitution de= clares that the Council is organized in conformity with the constitu- tion of the United Brotherhood and'exercises the powers and privileges provided under the laws of the United Brotherhood. The Council policy against members working on a project where nonmembers were ,doing • carpentry work was in conformity with the laws of the United Brotherhood. When Unneberg induced a work stoppage in order to force the nonunion Endicott employees to leave the project, he was, :therefore, effectuating a Council policy which had been required and approved by the United Brotherhood. za See Local 169, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America. AFL-CIO, et at. (W. H. Condo), supra. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS, ETC. 871 2. Section 8(b) (4) (B) The Trial Examiner found , and we agree, that the conduct here in question did not violate Section 8 (b) (4) (B) as Unneberg's object was to remove nonunion carpenters from the union project, not to force recognition by Endicott of the United Brotherhood or one of its affiliates. 3. Section 8(b) (1) (A) and (2) . The complaint charges only the United Brotherhood with viola tions of these subsections at the Nassau project. The Trial Examiner found no such violations on the ground that Unneberg , although an, agent of the Council, was not an agent of the United Brotherhood. As described above, Unneberg, as a business agent of Local 1397, was required to work under the direction and supervision of the Nassau County District Council, and to carry out Council policies. The Council 's constitution and bylaws show that one of its policies' was to prevent members from working on a project with nonmembers doing carpentry work. All policies of the Respondent Councils were required to conform with laws of, and to be approved by, the United Brotherhood. It is thus clear, and we find, that Unneberg , in carrying out Council policies, was at the same time required to, and did, effec- tuate the policies of the United Brotherhood. We have already described how Unneberg threatened the union carpenters with a fine if they continued to work while the nonunion Endicott men were doing carpentry work on the same project, induced employees of subcontractors and of the general contractor, to stop, work because of the nonunion Endicott men, and persisted in his demands for the removal of the nonunion men until they were com- pelled to stop their work , return to Indiana, and permit others to complete the installation. Accordingly, we find that Unneberg, by pressure upon the pastor, who had'ordered the pews from Endicott, and upon Ring, the Endicott foreman, forced them to transfer the Endicott work to others, and thereby caused them to discriminate with regard to the terms and conditions of employment of Thomas, the Endicott employee, within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act, in violation of Section 8(b) (1) (A) and' (2) of the Act, and, further, that the United Brotherhood is responsible for this unlawful conduct. G. The Royal Oak, Michigan, project The complaint alleges violations at this project in July 1957 of Section 8(b) (4) (A) and (B) and 8(b) (1) (A) and. (2) by the Respondents Local 998, Wayne District ;Council, and United Brotherhood. 872 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1. Section 8(b) (4) (A) Sievertsen, superintendent for Anderson, the general contractor on this project, was in charge of several-craft groups. He testified that there was no carpenter foreman as there were only two carpenters, but that he directed their work. O'Rear, a truckdriver on the project who was also employed by Anderson, identified Sievertsen as the carpenter foreman. Sievertsen was a member of Local 1433, which is not a respondent, but which is affiliated with the Respondent Wayne Dis- trict Council. There were three Endicott men at this project, Fuller and Arndt working under the supervision of McClung, the foreman. After they had been working a couple of days, Sievertsen raised the question of their union status with Campbell, the carpenter steward, Bubar, a carpenter, and some laborers, and asked Campbell to check on the matter. Campbell did so, and reported back to Sievertsen and the others that the Endicott men did not have union cards. After some discussion, they decided to call the Respondent Local 998. Sievertsen made the call and told a business agent that "we had some out-of-town people working here, and they should come and cheek the job." O'Rear testified that Sievertsen told him "there might be a picket line around the church Friday, and if there was he would call me that night and let me know not to report for work." Business Agents Jacobs, Fair, and Pinner, the last also referred to as the business manager of Local 998, arrived shortly after Sievert- sen's call. Jacobs asked Sievertsen whether the Endicott men were nonunion, to which Sievertsen replied : "That's your department. That's why I called you." Campbell and Bubar were a few feet away at this time. The business agents told the Endicott employees that they could not work as they were not union members, but the Endicott men continued to work for awhile. When the Endicott men returned from lunch, Pinner again told them, in the presence of Anderson, the general contractor, and the pastor of the church, that they could not work until the matter was settled. Later that afternoon, they returned to work, but stopped when Anderson, told them if they did not leave they probably would be put out bodily by the union men. One of the witnesses who testified about the conduct of the business agents was 15-year-old Perkins, a helper for Anderson, his grand- father. The Trial Examiner disregarded his testimony on the ground, among others, that he testified about "unidentified" union men. How- ever, when Pinner, who was in the hearing room, was pointed out, Perkins identified him as one of the union men who told the employees they had to close the job down because of the nonunion men. At a meeting the next morning in Pinner's office, attended by Fore- man McClung, an attorney representing Endicott, and the attorney UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS, ETC. 873 for the church, after Pinner stated that the union bylaws prohibited .union men from working with nonunion men, and that picketing was possible if the matter was not settled, it was agreed that union car- penters would complete the installation work under McClung's super- vision. This was done. (a) The Trial Examiner found no violation at this project on the ground, among others, that Sievertsen was a management represent- ative. Sievertsen was, as the Trial Examiner found, the superintend- ent of the project, but he was also, with respect to the carpenters, their direct supervisor. Moreover, although the local to which Sievertsen belonged is not a respondent, it is affiliated with the Re- spondent Wayne District Council. The Council bylaws provide, in part, that the Council shall: Set wage scales, including those for foremen ; have legislative and executive powers on all matters of common interest to the locals; frame and enforce all trade rules; issue and control quarterly working cards; order all strikes; and decide all disputes between locals. In addition, the Council's working rules require that: No member will work on a job with nonunion men or where any violation of the working rules exists; any member knowing of a violation must report it to the Council ; all foremen must be mem- bers of the United Brotherhood thoroughly familiar with the laws and rules of this Council; those who direct work shall be designated as foremen; where three or more carpenters are employed, one must act as foreman; the foreman must work with the steward to uphold trade rules, and they will be equally liable for any violation; a fore- man running a job without a steward may be fined $100 and otherwise severely punished; the first man on a job is to act as steward, and the steward must see that all rules are adhered to; business represent- atives must enforce the working rules, and are responsible to the Council secretary-treasurer; and every member will insist at all times that any work defined under carpentry jurisdiction will be done only by members. We are convinced, from the entire record, that the provisions re- garding foremen were applicable to Sievertsen as one who directed carpentry work. We are equally convinced that he felt himself bound by these provisions, and that it was for this reason that he set in motion the events here in issue by raising the question of the Endicott men's union status with the carpenter steward and the employees; by participating in the decision of the employees to call in Local 998; by making the telephone call requesting that a business agent come to the project; and by turning the matter over to the business agents who came to the project. He also told one employee that there might be a picket line around the church, and that he would call him and let him know. This is hardly the conduct of a management representa- tive concerned primarily with the timely completion of contract com- 874 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD mitments, but rather is that of a union member whose first loyalty was to. the union mandate that carpentry work be done only by members, and who, because of his supervisory status, was in a strategic position to carry out this mandate .24 Upon the entire record, we find that Sievertsen was a Council agent, exercising the authority vested in him. by the Council rules.25 We also find that he induced and encouraged an unlawful work stoppage by secondary employees,26 and that this conduct, as well as his instigation of and acquiescence in the conduct of the Local 998 representatives, discussed further below, constituted a violation by the Council of Section 8(b) (4) (A) . of the Act. We find further that the Council would in any .event :be ;jointly responsible for the Local's violations in view of the control vested in the Council over the conduct of its -constituent locals. (b) As described above, Campbell, the carpenter steward, at Sievertsen's behest, checked on the Endicott men's union membership, and then. reported their nonunion status to Sievertsen and to the employees on the project. The Board finds that the transmission of such information by a steward is sufficient to invoke employee obliga- tions under the union rules, and, therefore, that it constitutes pro- hibited inducement.27 We find, accordingly, that Campbell's conduct constituted unlawful inducement, and that Local 998 thereby violated Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act. Moreover, Sievertsen's instigation of Campbell's conduct constituted a further violation by the Council of Section 8(b) (4) (A). (c) Among. the grounds for the Trial Examiner's conclusion that there was no attempt by union agents to cause neutral employees at this project to stop working were his findings that (1) "the single bit of testimony" on this point came from young Perkins, Anderson's grandson, (2) this testimony was elicited "only after considerable prompting with leading questions" by the General Counsel, and (3) this testimony referred to some unidentified union men.. As to (1), we have found above that Sievertsen and Campbell were union agents who attempted to cause neutral employees to stop working. Regard- ing (2), a careful examination of the record does not establish any impropriety in the General Counsel's questioning of Perkins. And 24 Local 1016, United Brotherhood of Carpenters 4t Joiners of America , AFL-CIO; et al. (Boo her Lumber Co., Inc. ), supra. 25 See Carpenters' District Council of Rochester and Vicinity, et al. [Rochester Davis Fetch Corporation], supra. 20 There is a conflict of evidence as to whether or not a work stoppage occurred on this project. The Trial Examiner did not resolve the conflict, and we find it unnecessary to do so as it is not requisite to a finding of unlawful inducement to show that it resulted in an actual work stoppage . Local 11, United Brotherhood of Carpenters cf Joiners of America, AFL, et al, ( General Millwork Corporation ), 113 NLRB 1084, 1086. 27 See Local 657, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. (Southwestern Motor Transport, Inc.), 115 NLRB 981, 986; N.L.R.B. v. Local 135, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. (Capital Paper Company, Consolidated Sales, Inc. ), 267 F. 2d 870 (C.A. 7). UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS, ETC. 875 as.to .(3), Perkins identified Pinner, who was in the hearing room, as one of the union men about whom he. was testifying, and this testi- mony was unrefuted as Perkins was not cross-examined and Pinner did not testify. Accordingly, we find that Pinner told the employees, on this project that they had to close the job down because of the nonunion Endicott men, and that, by this conduct, and by Pinner.'s. participation in the unlawful sequence of events initiated by Sievert- sen, Local 998 further violated Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the Act. (d) The agents of both Local 998 and the Wayne District Council were acting pursuant to the Council rule that members will not work on a job with nonunion men. As Council rules were required to accord with United Brotherhood laws, and to be approved by an officer of the United Brotherhood, we find that organization likewise responsi- ble for the Section 8(b) (4) (A) violations of its subsidiaries. 2. Section 8(b) (4) (B) For the reasons relied upon with regard to the other projects herein discussed, we find no violation at this project of Section 8(b) (4) (B) of the Act. 3. Section 8(b) (1) (A) and (2) As described above, Sievertsen directed Campbell, the steward, to check on the union status of the Endicott men, and told at least one employee there might be a strike. Thereafter the business agents, called to the project by Sievertsen, told the Endicott men they could not continue their .work as they were not union members. Pinner's remarks to this effect were made in the presence of Anderson, the general contractor, who later aided Pinner's purpose by warning the Endicott men, when they attempted to resume their work, that they should get out or risk being ejected forcibly by the union men. Fi- nally, at the conference in Pinner's office the next day, attended by Foreman McClung and an Endicott attorney, following Pinner's remarks about the union bylaws prohibiting union men from working with nonunion men, and about the possibility of picketing if the mat- ter were not settled, McClung and the others agreed that the Endicott work would be completed by union men working under McClung's supervision. We find, accordingly, that agents of both Local 998 and the Wayne District Council engaged in a course of conduct-which included in- sisting that the Endicott employees could not continue to work be- cause of their nonunion status, convincing the general contractor that the work could not go on if the Endicott employees remained, causing him to order the Endicott employees off the project under threat of the use of force,28 holding out the threat of a possible picket line at 21 See Northern California Chapter, et al., 119 NLRB 1026. 876 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the project if the Endicott employees persisted in completing their work, and finally prevailing upon the Endicott representatives to replace the Endicott employees with union men-that caused the Endicott representatives to discriminate with regard to the terms and conditions of employment of the Endicott employees within the mean- ing of Section 8(a) (3), thereby violating Section 8(b) (1) (A) and (2) of the Act. For the reasons adverted to with regard to the Section 8 (b) (4) (A) violations at this project, we find the United Brotherhood, as well as Local 998 and the Wayne District Council, jointly responsible for the violation of Section 8(b) (1) (A) and (2) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that certain of the Respondents have engaged in unlawful practices, we shall order that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. In addition to the Trial Examiner's finding that the Respondents Nassau District Council and its Local No. 1397 have violated Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the Act, we have found that the Respondents Twin City District Council and its Locals No. 889 and No. 7, Wayne District Council and its Local No. 998, and the United Brotherhood have en- gaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the Act. We have found further that the Respondents Chicago District Council and its Local No. 181, Wayne District Council and its Local No. 998, and the United Brotherhood have caused and attempted to cause Endicott Church Furniture, Inc., by pressures brought upon its representatives, its contractors, or other persons, to discriminate with regard to the terms and conditions of employment of certain employees, within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act, in viola- tion of Section 8(b) (1) (A) and (2) of the Act. It does not appear whether any of these employees suffered a loss of earnings as a result of the Respondents' unlawful conduct. Accordingly, we shall require that they receive,backpay to the extent of their losses, if any. Be- cause these Respondents have infringed upon the fundamental rights of employees guaranteed by the Act, the commission of other unfair labor practices may reasonably be anticipated. We will, therefore, order these Respondents to cease and desist from the conduct found herein to be violative of the Act, and from in any other manner in- fringing upon the rights guaranteed employees by Section 7 of the Act.29 -The General Counsel's brief urges that "the Respondents should be required to take such affirmative action in amending their Constitution, Laws, Bylaws , and Working Rules, and in enforcing and effectuating the same, so as to avoid the type of violations which have UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS, ETC. S77 Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in these cases, the Board makes the following : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. District Council of Carpenters and its Local Union No. 181, Twin City Carpenters District Council and its Local Unions No. 889 and No. 7, Nassau County District Council and its Local Union No. 1397, Carpenters' District Council of Wayne, Oakland, Macomb, Sanilac, St. Clair, and Monroe Counties and Vicinity, and its Local Union No. 998, all affiliated with United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, and United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, are labor organiza- tions within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 2. Twin City Carpenters District Council and its Local Unions No. 889 and No. 7, Nassau County District Council and its Local Union No. 1397, Carpenters' District Council of Wayne, Oakland, Macomb, Sanilac, St. Clair, and Monroe Counties and Vicinity, and its Local Union No. 998, all affiliated with United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, and United Brother- hood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, and their agents, have engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the Act by inducing or encouraging em- ployees of secondary employers to engage in a strike or concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, mate- rials, or commodities, or to perform any services for their employer, an object thereof being to force or require such secondary employers to cease doing business with Endicott Church Furniture, Inc. 3. Carpenters District Council of Chicago and its Local Union No. 181, Carpenters' District Council of Wayne, Oakland, Macomb, Sanilac, St. Clair, and Monroe Counties and Vicinity, and its Local Union No. 998, all affiliated with United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, United Brotherhood of Car- penters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, and their agents, have engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b) (1) (A) and (2) by causing or attempting to cause Endicott Church Furniture, Inc., and other employers to discriminate with regard to the terms and conditions of employment of Endicott"s em- ployees, within the meaning of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. occurred in this case." We shall not specifically order such amendments , but leave it to the Respondents to determine how to avoid violations of the type prohibited herein. 878 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ORDER Upon the entire record in these cases, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that : A. The Respondents Chicago District Council of Carpenters and its Local Union No. 181, of United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, and United Brotherhood of Car- penters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, their officers, representa- tives, agents, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Causing or attempting to cause Endicott Church Furniture, Inc., or any other employer as to whom the Board would assert jurisdiction, to discriminate with regard to the terms and conditions of employment of its employees, within the meaning of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act. (b) In any other manner restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. 2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will effectuate the purposes of the Act : (a) Make whole Ronald Shepler for any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of the discrimination with regard to the terms and conditions of his employment caused by the Respondents. (b) Post at their respective offices copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix A." 30 Copies of said notice, to be 'fur= nished by the Regional Director for the Seventh Region, shall, after being duly signed by representatives of these Respondents, be posted immediately upon receipt thereof, and maintained for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to their respective members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the said Respondents to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. B. The Respondents Twin City Carpenters District Council, its Local Unions No. 889 and No. 7, of United Brotherhood of Car- penters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, and United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, their officers, representatives, agents, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from : an In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Ap- peals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order." UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS, ETC. 879 (a) Inducing or encouraging the employees of any secondary employer to engage in a strike or concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or other- wise handle or work on any goods , articles, materials, or commodi- ties, or to perform any services for their employer, where an object thereof is to force or require any employer or other person to cease doing business with Endicott Church Furniture, Inc. 2. Take the following affirmative action , which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Post at their respective offices copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix B." 31 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Seventh Region, shall , after being duly signed by representatives of these Respondents, be posted im- mediately upon receipt thereof , and maintained for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to their respective members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the said Respondents to insure that said notices are not altered , defaced, or covered by. any other material. C. The Respondents Nassau County District Council and its Local Union No. 1397, of United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, and United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, their officers, representatives, agents, and assigns, shall : 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Inducing or encouraging the employees of any secondary em- ployer to engage in a strike or concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport , or otherwise han- dle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities, or to perform any services for their employer, where an object thereof is to force or require any employer or other person to cease doing business with Endicott Church Furniture, Inc. 2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Post at their respective offices copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix C." 32 Copies of said notice , to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Seventh Region, shall, after being duly signed by representatives of these Respondents , be posted im- mediately upon receipt thereof, and maintained for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to their respective members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the said Respondents to insure that said notices are not altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. 11 See footnote 30. 31 See footnote 30. 880 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD D. The Respondents Carpenters' District Council of Wayne, Oak- land, Macomb, Sanilac, St. Clair, and Monroe Counties and Vicinity, and its Local Union No. 998, of United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, and United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, their officers, repre- sentatives, agents, and assigns, shall : 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Inducing or encouraging the employees of any secondary em- ployer to engage in a strike or concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise han- dle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities, or to perform any services for their employer, where an object thereof is to force or require any employer or other person to cease doing busi- ness with Endicott Church Furniture, Inc. (b) Causing or attempting to cause Endicott Church Furniture, Inc., or any other employer as to whom the Board would assert juris- diction, to discriminate with regard to the terms or conditions of em- ployment of its employees within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. (c) In any other manner restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor- Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. 2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will effectuate the purposes of the Act : (a) Make whole Marvin Fuller and Walter Arndt for any loss of pay each of them may have suffered by reason of the discrimination with regard to the terms and conditions of their employment caused by the Respondents. (b) Post at their respective offices copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix D." 33 Copies of said notice, to be fur- nished by the Regional Director for the Seventh Region, shall, after being duly signed by representatives of these Respondents, be posted immediately upon receipt thereof, and maintained for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to their respective members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondents to insure that said notice is not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. E. The Respondent United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, its officers, representatives, agents, and as- signs, shall : 1. Cease and desist from : 33 See footnote 30. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS, ETC. 881 (a) Causing or attempting to cause Endicott Church Furniture, Inc., or any other employer as to whom the Board would assert juris- diction, to discriminate with regard to the terms or conditions of employment of its employees within the meaning of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act. (b) In any other manner restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor- Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. 2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will effectuate the purposes of the Act: (a) Make whole Floyd Yant for any loss of pay he may have suf- fered by reason of the discrimination with regard to the terms and .conditions of his employment caused by union representatives at the First Methodist Church project in Hopkins, Minnesota, and at the Bethlehem Baptist Church project in Minneapolis, Minnesota. (b) Make whole Glenn Thomas for any loss of pay he may have :suffered by reason of the discrimination with regard to the terms and conditions of his employment caused by union representatives at the Nassau Baptist Church project in East Williston, New York. (c) Post at its offices, and at the offices of its District Councils and Locals which were involved in the discrimination against Yant and Thomas, copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix E." 94 ,Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the .Seventh Region, shall, after being duly signed by representatives of this Respondent, be posted immediately upon receipt thereof, and maintained for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in con- spicuous places, including all places where notices to its members and to members of the District Councils and Locals referred to above are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the said Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. F. Additional copies of all said notices, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Seventh Region, shall be signed by repre- sentatives of the respective Respondents and forthwith returned to the Regional Director for posting by Endicott Church Furniture, Inc., if willing, at places where notices to its employees are customarily posted. G. Each of the Respondents found herein to have engaged in, or to be responsible for, violations of the Act shall notify the Regional Director for the Seventh Region, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps it has taken to comply herewith. 86 See footnote 30. k 882 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dis- missed insofar as its alleges that the Respondents violated the Act by conduct other than that found herein to be violative thereof. MEMBERS RODGERS and JENKINS, dissenting in part and concurring in part: We agree that the Respondents engaged in the widespread viola- tions found above by our colleagues. We disagree, however, with. their findings that the Respondents did not engage in certain other unfair labor practices with which they were charged. (1) In particular, we disagree with the majority's disposition of the principal issue in this case, namely, the allegation that the Re- spondents engaged in a nationwide campaign to compel Endicott: employees to become members of the Respondent Unions and to com- pel Endicott to recognize the United Brotherhood, Local 3044, or another affiliate. We are convinced that the record as a whole estab- lishes that the Respondents threatened to, and did, engage in such a campaign. In the first place, the majority opinion minimizes the effect of the statements made by the United Brotherhood representatives prior to the election at Endicott, but these statements, which can be considered as background evidence, point clearly to the intent of these repre- sentatives to compel recognition, if necessary, by interfering with Endicott installations. McElroy, one of these representatives, came to the Endicott office and claimed that he had two Endicott jobs tied up, one at Bunker Hill, Indiana, and one at Moline, Illinois. When told there was no Endicott project at Moline, McElroy asked what Endicott intended to do about the work stoppage at Bunker Hill. He was told that Endicott had no plans to do anything about it. There- upon, McElroy stated: "Why don't you let us take over some of your labor troubles? . . . If you would recognize the union these troubles. would no longer be yours. Your boys could go out and install these jobs without all of the difficulties you are having, without all of the delays." The contractor on the project at Bunker Hill testified that the construction work was being performed under a contract with the Wabash Valley District Council of Carpenters, that he called a representative of the United Brotherhood to try to persuade him to allow the work to proceed, and that this representative replied that "he was sorry that he caused us this inconvenience, that they were trying to organize Endicott, and they were following them all over the country, wherever they could-wherever they thought they could apply pressure, in order to organize them . . . ." The entire series of acts and statements by the various Respondents, engaged in at projects in several different States, should be viewed. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS, ETC. 883 against this background of threats to "apply pressure" throughout the country, wherever Endicott crews were engaged in installation work. When thus viewed, a clear pattern emerges of a nationwide campaign to compel recognition by Endicott. Without detailing all the conduct of the Respondents which composes this pattern, much of which is adverted to in the discussions of the violations at the various projects, we shall merely point to a few of the statements which illustrate the Respondents' resolve to carry on such a campaign until their goal of recognition was achieved. Thus, a union agent at the Edison Park, Illinois, project told the Endicott crew that "If you are not union you will have to pack up your tools and leave. . . . If you want to work in this state go down and get yourself a union card, which will cost you a hundred and eighty dollars, and that's all the way you or any crew of Endicott's will install church furniture in the State of Illinois. . . . Endicott would never install any more church furniture in the state unless they was union . . ."; a union agent at the Hopkins, Minnesota, project would not permit the installation of the furniture by his own' union men until the architect on the project wrote a letter to Endicott stating that he could not recommend its pews unless it made its "peace with the Union"; a union agent at the Minneapolis, Minnesota, proj- ect, told a member of the church building committee that "they had tried to form a union in the plant at the Endicott Company, that it. was a company that paid their employees a low wage, and that there had been incidents similar to ours"; 35 a union agent at the Nassau County, New York, project told the minister that "You have some men; there from the Endicott Church Furniture Company, I believe, in Indiana, who are nonunion. My men can't come back on the job while they are there"; and a union agent at the Royal Oak, Michigan, project told an Endicott attorney that "he couldn't imagine what kind. of man Mr. Endicott was, not to have recognized the carpenters' union, and he didn't know. what was the matter with the employees. of Endicott in not joining the union." Endicott's attorney then, stated that the Union had rejected the Carpenters' Union in an elec- tion. Pinner then stated that "it appeared to him as though Mr,. Endicott and his fifty employees were trying to stand against the carpenters' union and their eight hundred thousand employees,. and . . . that Mr. Endicott would probably continue to have this. 85 The majority is unwilling to accept this statement (footnote 6), as having probative, value because the phrase "incidents similar to ours" probably referred to previous incidents, in Minneapolis rather than a nationwide campaign. This may well be true as to this par. ticular phrase. The portion here relied on, however, is the prior references to the effort to, organize Endicott which clearly shows the union agent had knowledge of the refusal to recognize at Endif ott and that the pressure brought was intended to obtain such recognition. 884 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD type of trouble throughout the country unless he did recognize the Carpenters' Union...." 36 These statements by Respondents' own representatives completely refute the contention of the majority that the Union's activities can be attributed solely to a desire to preserve local union-shop conditions. The statement by the union business agent at the Minneapolis project with respect to the effort to form a union at Endicott and the state- ment by the union agent at the Royal Oak project with respect to Endi- cott's failure to recognize the Union and that he would continue to have such trouble until he had done so had no bearing on local union- shop conditions. Even more revealing , however, was the refusal by the business agent at the Hopkins, Minnesota, project to permit the installation of the furniture with his own union carpenters until the architect had written Endicott to make its "peace with the Union" if it desired further business from the architect . Had he been interested solely in local union-shop conditions the agreement to utilize union carpenters would have been sufficient and the further condition he imposed was wholly unnecessary unless he had a further purpose, i.e., to force recognition from Endicott. At times, in fact, the desire to force Endicott to recognize the Union transcended any concern over local union-shop conditions as at the Nassau, New York , project where the union agent permitted the work to be done by the parishioners after the Endicott personnel had been ousted from their jobs. We are convinced, on this evidence, that Respondents' intentions were not confined to protecting local union-shop conditions but encom- passed the further-and perhaps more important-objective of forcing Endicott to recognize the Carpenters Union contrary to the expressed desires of its employees. Moreover, as we have found , in agreement with our colleagues, the Respondents, including locals, district councils , and the United Brotherhood, have engaged, at projects in different parts of the coun- try, in unlawful conduct constituting violations of Sections 8(b) (4) (A), 8(b) (1) (A ), and 8 (b) (2). We are convinced, from the foregoing and the entire record, that the Respondents, before the election, clearly indicated their intention to interfere with Endicott installations unless they obtained repre- sentative status, and, after the election, carried out such intention at practically all the projects involved in this proceeding.37 We would wThe above is the complete context of the testimony of Morgan , Endicott's attorney. As will be observed , business agent Pinner's remarks about Endicott 's failure to recognize the Carpenters 'Union preceded the remark about the election by Morgan . It is therefore clear that Pinner knew of the failure of Endicott to recognize the union from a source of information other than the remark by Morgan, as is suggested by the majority in foot- note 6. 31 As noted in footnote 2, above, we dissented from the Board's action in denying the Charging Company's motion to consolidate , for consideration with these cases, the addi- tional charges in Case No. 8-CC-82 , involving allegations of subsequent violations similar UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS, ETC. 885 find, therefore, that the Respondents engaged in a nationwide cam- paign to compel Endicott to grant recognition to a union which its employees had rejected, in violation of Section 8(b) (4) (B) and 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act 38 We would, accordingly, further find that all the separate acts by which the Respondents sought to carry out their campaign to compel recognition, which have been found violative of other subsections of the Act, also constituted additional violations of 'Section 8(b) (4) (B) and 8(b) (1) (A). (2) In addition, we do not agree with the conclusion in the majority opinion that there was no violation of Section 8(b) (4) (A) and (B) at the Edison Park project. Van Aken, one of the Charging Com- to those here in issue . It seems anomalous indeed on the one hand to dismiss the allega- tion of a nationwide campaign on the ground of insufficient evidence while, on the other, refusing to admit additional evidence pertaining to this matter. In any event, however, we are convinced that the evidence which is before the Board establishes that there was such a campaign. -In N.L.R.B. v. United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, AFL- CIO and its Local 511 (O'Sullivan Rubber Corporation ), 269 F. 2d 694 (C.A. 4), the court, in agreement with the Board, found that a union violated the Act by the exertion of eco- nomic pressure upon an employer in order to secure recognition although it had lost an election, and stated in part as follows : Again, it is contended that the use of the consumer boycott by the Union in this case, whether coercive or not, cannot be regarded as a violation of § 8(b)'(1) (A) be- cause § 8 (c) of the Act authorizes "the expressing of any views , arguments or opinion, or the dissemination thereof whether in written, printed, graphic or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under the provision of this Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal , force or promise of benefit." 3 Freedom of speech , however, does not furnish a conclusive answer to the problem, for the right of free speech in general does not justify the encouragement or incitement of a breach of law. Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277. Thus it has been held specifically that peaceful picketing is not protected as an exercise of the constitutional right of free speech if its object is to violate a state law. In International Brother= hood of Teamsters, Local 695, AFL, et at. v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 40 LRRM 2208, where the Court upheld the validity of a state law forbidding peaceful picketing to coerce an employer to put pressure on his employees , contrary to the public policy of the state, to join a union, the Court said (page 289 ) that picketing by an organized group is more than a communication of ideas or freedom of speech since the very presence of the picket line may induce action irrespective of the ideas that are being disseminated. Similarly, in International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, et at. v. N.L.R.B., 341 U.S. 694 , it was held, notwithstanding the rights of free expression accorded by § 8(c) of the statute, that it was an unfair labor practice under § 8(b) (4) (A), for a union to engage in peaceful picketing to induce union employees to strike in order . to force a general contractor to terminate his contract with a nonunion subcontractor . The Court said, page 700 : e. The remedial function of § 8(c ) is to protect noncoercive speech by employer and labor organization alike in furtherance of a lawful object. It serves that purpose adequately without extending Its protection to speech or picketing in furtherance of unfair labor practices such as are defined in § 8(b) (4). The general terms of § 8(c ) appropriately give way to the specific provisions of §8(b) ('4). In' like manner , § 8(c) should be so interpreted as not to nullify the protection accorded to employees by § 8(b ) (1) (A) of the statute. 3In.N.L.R.B. v. International Association of Machinists , 263 F. 2d 796 (C.A. 9), it "was held that the actions of a union in listing an employer on its "We Do 'dot Patronize List" and in urging others not to do business with him were protected by the First Amendment and did not constitute unfair labor practice. 5 35828-60-vol. 125-57 886 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD pany's attorneys, testified that, in a telephone conversation with Christensen, the business agent of Respondent Local 181, Christensen "stated that he had talked with the other tradesmen on the job and had told them that if the Endicott employees did not quit work that they should quit work." Although Christensen was present at the hearing, he was not called as a witness, and Van Aken's testimony therefore stands uncontradicted.39 Thus we have here a clear admission by Christensen that he induced and encouraged secondary employees to cease work until the Endicott employees left. Moreover, Palacious, an electrician, testified that "Somebody did imply or said" that if "the Endicott employees return to work we shouldn't work." Palacious must have been referring to Christensen, who had admitted that he made such remarks, and there is no indication of such conduct by anyone else. Furthermore, as the Trial Examiner indicates, there is evidence of a brief work stoppage at this project. Therefore, we find that Christensen, by inducing and encouraging a work stoppage by the secondary employees, violated Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the Act, and that, as such conduct was part of the nationwide campaign to compel recognition by Endicott, it also violated Section 8(b) (4) (B) and 8(b) (1) (A). We find further that the Respondents Local 181, Chicago District Council, and United Brotherhood are jointly responsible for such violations. (3) We agree with the majority's dismissal of the Section 8(b) (4) (A) and (B) allegations as to the Glen Ellyn project, as we are not convinced that the General Counsel has established such violations by a preponderance of the evidence. We are convinced, however, contrary to our colleagues, that the evidence does establish a violation of Section 8(b) (2) and 8(b) (1) (A) at Glen Ellyn.4° Endicott counsel Van Aken testified to a tele- phone conversation with Krishack , a business representative for three 39 The majority refuse to accept this evidence on the grounds that the Trial Examiner's finding that there was "no credible evidence in the record, and in his brief General Counsel points to none, from any employee of any secondary employer to the effect that Christensen in any way ever attempted to get him to engage in a work stoppage " (emphasis supplied) constitutes a discrediting of the testimony of Van Aken. It should be noted that Van Aken was the Company's attorney and not "an employee of any secondary employer" and the finding of the Trial Examiner therefore had no reference to his testimony . It is quite obvious from the Intermediate Report that the Trial Examiner completely ignored the probative value of this evidence and since it constitutes direct, uncontradicted evidence of a violation of the Act the Board is not justified in compounding the Trial Examiner's error by refusing to consider it. As for the contention that Van Aken's conversation was inadmissible because of "electronic eavesdropping " it is our opinion that the Trial Examiner was clearly right in denying the motion to strike. so we are satisfied , from our examination of the record, that the question of a violation-' of Section 8(b) (2) and 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act was adequately litigated, and that this, Issue was preserved, if not by the General Counsel 's exceptions to the Intermediate Report,' then clearly by the exceptions of the Charging Company. In our opinion, therefore, our colleagues are in error in relying upon procedural defects as a reason for dismissing these allegations. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS, ETC. 887 locals affiliated with the Respondent Chicago District Council, in part as follows : I asked him if the dispute could be settled by hiring union carpenters to work on the installation of the pews and he said that that could be done. I asked him if the Endicott crew would be permitted to continue to work on the installation and he said that that could not be done, they could not-that they could not work with non-affiliated men. I asked him if this was a rule of Local 1527 or a rule of the United Brotherhood because as I understood it, he was a repre- sentative only of the local. And he said that it was a rule of the. United Brotherhood and he said, "We are all one." I think I also asked him whether this was required by the constitution and bylaws of the United Brotherhood and he re- plied, that it was. Krishack did not testify. On the basis of Van Aken's uncontra- dicted testimony, we would find that Krishack's statement to an Endi- cott representative that the union men would not work with non- affiliated men was an attempt to cause Endicott to discriminate against its employees on this project by replacing them with union men. Whether successful or not, such an attempt constitutes a violation of Section 8(b) (2) and 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act.41 MEMBER FANNING, concurring in part and dissenting in part : Unlike Chairman Leedom and Members Rodgers and Jenkins, I would not find the United Brotherhood responsible for any unlawful conduct at Edison Park, or at any of the other projects involved here. In making their finding of such responsibility at Edison Park and elsewhere, my colleagues point principally to the fact that, while the United Brotherhood's constitution grants authority to local unions and district councils to make their own bylaws and trade rules, they shall "in no way conflict with the Constitution and Laws of the United Brotherhood, and must be approved by the First General Vice President before becoming law" ; and the further fact that the district councils have a "working rule" which prohibits union members from working on a job with nonunion men. From this, and the United Brotherhood's "general control and supervision" over its constituent bodies, they conclude that when the locals involved engaged in un- lawful conduct pursuant to this "working rule" they were complying with a "mandate" imposed by the United Brotherhood, and therefore that the United Brotherhood shares the responsibility for such un- lawful conduct, together with the locals and the district councils. It should be emphasized at the outset that the actual participants in a Local 61 '0, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO ( Cameron Stores Fixtures ), 122 NLRB 476. 888 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the unlawful conduct were the local unions, and that neither the dis- trict councils nor the International actively participated in such conduct. Accordingly, an extension of responsibility to these non- participants in the unlawful conduct should not be undertaken lightly. In view of the fact that the above-mentioned "working rule" which was invoked by the local unions to commit the unlawful conduct was a rule of the district councils, and in view of the further facts stated by my colleagues that the local unions are "governed" by the laws and rules of the district councils and are under the "close super- vision" of the district councils, I agree with my colleagues that there is firm ground on which to base an extension of responsibility to the district councils. I am unable to agree, however, that there is firm ground on which to base a still further extension of responsibility to the International. As already indicated, the "working rule" in- voked-that union men shall not work with nonunion men-was a rule of the district council and not of the International, for in fact the International did not even have such a "working rule." 42 Moreover, as conceded by my colleagues, the International exercised only "gen- eral control and supervision" over the locals, having delegated direct control and "governing" authority to the district councils with spe- cific authority to make "work rules" such as the one involved here for the locals. This delegation of authority to make "work rules" carries the qualification that such rules shall not "conflict" with the consti- tution and laws of the International, but this does not mean that they have to conform in all respects to International rules so as to be merely carbon copy of International rules, as demonstrated by the very rule involved which was a rule of the district council and not of the international. There is also the qualification that the "work rules" adopted by the district council must be "approved" by the interna- tional, but the record shows that this is only a pro forma approval which does not carry any "mandate" of strict observance of such rules, for at two of the six projects involved here the "work rule" that union men shall not work with the nonunion men was "honored in the breach" and apparently with impunity.43 In these circum- stances, I do not believe there is sufficient basis for finding that the locals were complying with a "mandate" of the International when they invoked the "working rule" involved. Accordingly, and also in the absence of evidence of any actual participation by the Interna- tional in the local conduct involved or even that the International had 43 My colleagues also cite a provision of the international constitution dealing with union obligations of foremen with respect to hiring, but that provision is not involved here. 43 Thus, at Glen Ellyn, although it became known that the nonunion Endicott men were working on the project, there was no work stoppage or attempt to cause one or to prevent the Endicott men from completing their . work. At Minneapolis , the dispute was settled by an agreement that the union men and the nonunion Endicott men would jointly complete the installation. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS, ETC. 889 knowledge thereof, I would not hold the United Brotherhood re- sponsible for any unlawful conduct engaged in by the local unions 44 And a fortiori, I would certainly not hold, as my colleagues do in an even more extreme interpretation of legal responsibility, that the International should be held responsible for alleged unlawful conduct at some of the projects involved where the locals and district councils have not even been charged with such unfair labor practices. In this connection, I would only add the obvious query as to whether it is appropriate to find that a nonparticipant in alleged unlawful con- duct has committed such unlawful conduct where the actual partici- pant is not even charged with committing such unlawful conduct 45 In all other respects I concur in the opinion of Chairman Leedom and Member Bean, except as follows : 1. I do not concur in the finding that there was a violation of Sec- tion 8 (b) (4) (A) at the Minneapolis project. The essential facts there were that : When Foreman-union member Jaeger discovered that the Endicott men were nonunion he simply reported this fact to secondary employees; when Jaeger thereafter reported this fact to Business Agent Erickson and asked for advice, Erickson told him to continue with his work, which Jaeger did; thereafter Erickson and Business Agent Carlgren even told the Endicott primary employees that they were not being ordered to stop work; and thereafter the matter was settled on the basis that union men would assist the Endicott men in completing the installation. Even assuming the premise of my col- leagues that Jaeger occupied a dual management-union position in which capacity his union obligations required him not to work with the nonunion Endicott men and to request his men to do the same, I cannot agree with their conclusion that his simple comment to the secondary employees about the nonunion status of the Endicott men was, in these circumstances, a reminder of their duty not to work with nonunion men, so as to constitute Section 8(b) (4) (A) inducement. Such a simple comment might possibly in other circumstances be con- strued as a "wink or nod" type of reminder of such duty so as to constitute unlawful inducement. But here there followed a specific instruction by a union representative to the secondary employees to continue with their work, a specific statement by union representa- tives to the primary employees that the union was not even attempting u See United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO; et al. (Del- Mar Cabinet Company, Inc.), 121 NLRB 1'117, 1119, where the Board in similar circum- stances found that the same International was not responsible for unlawful conduct of a constituent body. .e The fact that Section 10 (b) of the Act barred such charges against the locals and the district councils can hardly serve to justify such a finding . Indeed, there arises a serious question as to whether Section 10 (b) did not also bar even any charges against the Inter- national in such circumstances. 890 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD to stop them from working, and an agreement that union men and the nonunion men would jointly complete the work. In such circum- stances, I think the most reasonable interpretation of Jaeger's simple comment is not that it was a reminder of any kind of union "duty," but that it was a simple statement of fact of the presence of the non- union men, with the subsequent conduct of the union belying any intent to even attempt to cause any kind of work stoppage, either secondary or primary. Accordingly, I would find that this allegation of the complaint is not sustained by the evidence. 2. I also do not concur in the finding that there was a violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) at the Royal Oak project. My colleagues rely first on a finding that Sievertsen, the general contractor's superintendent on the project, engaged in unlawful in- ducement of secondary employees as an agent of the Union. It is true that Sievertsen directed the work of the two union carpenters on the project because there was no carpenter foreman, and that Sievert- sen still retained his union membership in a local which is not a respondent herein. It is also true that Sievertsen raised the question of the union status of the Endicott men, called union representatives in on the question, and told one employee that there might be a picket line around the church and if there were he would let the employee know. But I cannot agree with my colleagues that this is sufficient basis for finding that in so doing Sievertsen was acting as a union member whose first loyalty was to the union mandate that carpentry work be done only by members, and that he was thus acting as an agent of the Union. I consider it extremely unrealistic to apply this "first loyalty" doctrine to such a high echelon of management as the general superintendent of a building project, just because the individ- ual involved happened to retain his union membership for reasons not disclosed herein. It is surely not unreasonable to separate man- agement from the Union at this level, and to assume that one is not acting for the other. Moreover, Sievertsen's actual conduct appears to me as the perfectly reasonable anticipation by a management offi- cial of a possible work stoppage by the Union over the employment of nonunion men on a union project, and an equally reasonable attempt to prevent such a work stoppage so as not to interfere with management's timely completion of contract commitments. Surely this is still a management prerogative which Section 8 (b) (4) (A) was not designed to curtail. In any event, the only possible specific and direct inducement of secondary employees by Sievertsen was his statement to 'O'Rear that there might be a picket line around the UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS, ETC. 891 church, and if there were he would let O'Rear know. I fail to see how a conditional statement like this, with the condition never ma- terializing, can possibly be construed as "inducement or encourage- ment" of an employee to cease work, within the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (A). My colleagues rely next on the conduct of Campbell, the carpenter steward, who at Sievertsen's behest checked on the union status of the Endicott. men and then simply reported their nonunion status to Sievertsen and to the employees on the project. They find that the mere transmission of such information by a steward is sufficient to invoke employee obligations under the union rules, and therefore that it constitutes prohibited inducement. Assuming arguendo, but with- out conceding, the validity of this doctrine, it has no application here, for it rests upon the inference that Campbell engaged in this conduct as an agent of the Union, whereas the facts affirmatively show that Campbell was acting as an agent of Management Repre- sentative Sievertsen in both gathering and transmitting the informa- tion as to the union status of the Endicott men. Finally, my colleagues rely on the testimony of Perkins, the 15-year- old grandson of the general contractor who was a "helper," to establish that there was unlawful inducement by the Union. Perkins testified at first that some unidentified union men told him, a secondary em- ployee, that the job would have to be closed down because of the non- union Endicott men, and then when Union Representative Pinner was pointed out in the hearing room, testified that "I think he was one of them." [Emphasis supplied.] Moreover, this testimony was elic- ited only after considerable prompting with leading questions by the General Counsel. I do not deem it appropriate to base a violation of the Act on the uncorroborated testimony of a 15-year-old boy, particu- larly where he is "led" to give such testimony, and even then does not make a positive identification of the individual who allegedly com- mitted the unlawful conduct. APPENDIX A NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF CHICAGO DISTRICT COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS, LOCAL UNION No. 181, AND UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby give notice that : 892 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD - WE WILL NOT cause or attempt to cause Endicott Church Furni- ture, Inc., or any other employer as to whom the Board would assert jurisdiction, to discriminate with regard to the terms and conditions of employment of its employees, within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. WE WILL NOT in any other manner restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agree- ment requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. WE WILL make whole Ronald Shepler for any loss of pay he may have suffered as a result of the discrimination against him. CHICAGO DISTRICT COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS, Labor Organization. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative ) (Title) LOCAL UNION No. 181, Labor Organization. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, Labor Organization. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative ) ( Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. APPENDIX B NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF TWIN CITY DISTRICT COUNCIL, LOCAL UNION No. 889, LOCAL UNION No. 7, AND UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby give notice that : UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS, ETC. 893 WE WILL NOT induce or encourage the employees of any second- ary employer to engage in a strike or concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, trans- port, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materi- als, or commodities, or to perform any services for their employer, where an object thereof is to force or require any employer or other person to cease doing business with Endicott Church Furni- ture, Inc. TWIN CITY DISTRICT COUNCIL, Labor Organization. Dated-- -------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative ) ( Title) LOCAL UNION No. 889, Labor Organization. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative ) (Title) LOCAL UNION No. 7, Labor Organization. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative ) (Title) UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, Labor Organization. Dated-- -------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative ) ( Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. APPENDIX C NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF NASSAU COUNTY CARPENTERS DISTRICT COUNCIL, LOCAL UNION No. 1397, AND UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby give notice that.: WE WILL NOT induce or encourage the employees of any second- ary employer to engage in a strike or concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, trans- port, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materi- als, or commodities, or to perform any services for their employer, 894 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD where an object thereof is to force or require any employer or other person to cease doing business with Endicott Church Furni- ture, Inc. NASSAU COUNTY CARPENTERS DISTRICT COUNCIL, Labor Organization. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative ) ( Title) LOCAL UNION No. 1397, Labor Organization. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative ) ( Title) UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, Labor Organization. Dated-- -------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative ) ( Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. APPENDIX D NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF CARPENTERS' DISTRICT COUNCIL OF WAYNE, OAKLAND, MACOMB, SANILAC, ST. CLAIR, AND MONROE 'COUNTIES AND VICINITY, LOCAL UNION No. 998, AND UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA , AFL-CIO Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby give notice that : WE WILL NOT induce or encourage the employees of any sec- ondary employer to engage in a strike or concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, trans- port, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, ma- terials, or commodities, or to perform any services for their em- ployer, where an object thereof is to force or require any employer or other person to cease doing business with Endicott Church Furniture, Inc. WE WILL NOT cause or attempt to cause Endicott Church Fur- niture, Inc., or any other employer as to whom the Board would assert jurisdiction, to discriminate with regard to the terms and conditions of employment of its employees, within the meaning of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act. WE WILL NOT in any other manner restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS, ETC. 895 except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agree- ment requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. WE WILL make whole Marvin Fuller and Walter Arndt for any loss of pay each of them may have suffered by reason of the dis- crimination with regard to the terms and conditions of their employment. CARPENTERS' DISTRICT COUNCIL OF WAYNE, OAKLAND, MACOMB, SANILAC, ST. CLAIR, AND MONROE COUNTIES AND VICINITY, Labor Organization. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) LOCAL UNION No. 998, Labor Organization. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, Labor Organization. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. APPENDIX E NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby give notice that : WE WILL NOT cause or attempt to cause Endicott Church Fur- niture, Inc., or any other employer as to whom the Board would assert jurisdiction, to discriminate with regard to the terms and conditions of employment of its employees, within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. WE WILL NOT in any other manner restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agree- ment requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition 896 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. WE WILL make whole Floyd Yant and Glenn Thomas for any loss of pay each of them may have suffered by reason of the discrimination with regard to the terms and conditions of the employment of Yant at the First Methodist Church project in Hopkins, Minnesota, and at the Bethlehem Baptist Church proj- ect in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and of Thomas at the Nassau Baptist Church project in East Williston, New York. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, Labor Organization. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. INTERMEDIATE REPORT STATEMENT OF THE CASE Charges having been filed and served in each of the above-entitled cases; orders consolidating said cases, a complaint, an amended complaint, and a supplement to amended complaint, and notices of hearing thereon having been served by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, and answers having been filed by the above-named Respondent Unions, a hearing involving allegations of unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(A) and (B), and Section 8(b)(l)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act,' as amended (61 Stat. 136), herein called the Act, was held in Warsaw, Indiana, on January 7, 8, and 9; in Chicago, Illinois, on January 27; in Minneapolis, Minnesota, on January 30 and 31; in New York, New York, on February 11; in Detroit, Michigan, on February 18 and 21; and in Indianapolis, Indiana, on March 18, 1958, before the duly designated Trial Examiner. The relevant excerpts from the Act : Section 8(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents- (1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 : Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein; . . . (2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) . . . t n t • M n W (4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is : (A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or employer organization or any employer or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person; (B) forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section 9; . . . UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS, ETC. 897 At the hearing all parties were represented,2 were afforded opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce evidence pertinent to the issues, to argue orally upon the record, and to file briefs. Oral argument was waived. Briefs have been received from General Counsel, the Charging Party, and Respondents Chicago District Council and Local 181, and Nassau County Council and Local 1397. After hearing sessions at Chicago, but before the hearing closed in Indianapolis, a motion was received from counsel for the Chicago Respondents to strike certain testimony given by counsel for the Charging Company-John T. Van Aken-at the Chicago session. The point was thereafter briefed by General Counsel, counsel for the Chicago Respondents and counsel for the Charging Company. By wire dated April 3, 1958, the Trial Examiner denied the motion to strike. (The typographical error in said wire-"Aiken" instead of "Van Aken"-is hereby ordered corrected.) Motions to dismiss made by the Respondents Twin City Council and United, upon which ruling was reserved during the hearing, are disposed of by the findings, con- clusions, and recommendations appearing below. Upon the entire record, and from his observation of the demeanor of the wit- nesses, the Trial Examiner makes the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE CHARGING COMPANY Endicott Church Furniture, Inc., is an Indiana corporation, with its principal office and place of business in Warsaw, Indiana, where it is engaged in the manufacture and sale of church furniture which it installs in churches throughout the several States of the United States. During the 12-month period ending December 31, 1956, representative of all times herein material, the Charging Company sold and shipped to points outside the State of Indiana furniture products valued at more than $100,000, and during the same period received at its Warsaw plant raw ma- terials and products from points outside the State of Indiana valued at more than $100,000. The Charging Company is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO; Twin City District Council, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL- CIO; Local Union No. 889, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO; Local Union No. 7, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO; Nassau County Carpenters District Council, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO; Local Union No. 1397, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO; Car- penters' District Council of Wayne, Oakland, Macomb, Sanilac, St. Clair, and Monroe Counties and Vicinity and Local Union No. 998, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO; Local Union No. 181, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO; and Carpenters District Council of Chicago, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background In substance, it is the claim of the complaints that the various District Councils and Locals named herein, together with the parent organization, United Brother- hood, since February 1956, have engaged in a campaign to force the Charging Company, Endicott, to bargain with United Brotherhood and its affiliated Local 3044 as the exclusive bargaining representative of Endicott's employees although neither United Brotherhood, Local 3044, nor any other local of United Brotherhood has been certified as such representative under provisions of Section 9 of the Act. The conduct and acts in this alleged campaign constitute the specific issues of claimed unfair labor practices. Since they vary both in nature and identity of participants, summary of them will be reserved for and set out at the beginning of each subsection hereinafter, and each such subsection will be devoted to a par- ticular geographical area involved. 2 Not all counsel were present at all sessions. The official transcript indicates which counsel were present at each hearing date. 898 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD First, however, comes the question of fact concerning certification. Testimony is not in dispute and it is found that in February 1956, the Respondent United Brotherhood, through its Regional Director Cletus R. Wheeler and International Representative Daniel R. McElroy, demanded recognition from the Charging Com- pany Endicott as the collective-bargaining representative of Endicott's production, maintenance, and installation employees at its Warsaw, Indiana, plant. Endicott refused. Thereafter Local 3044 of the Respondent United and Endicott entered into a consent-election agreement. The Board conducted an election on March 12, 1956. Local 3044 of the United, the only labor organization on the ballot, lost the election. On March 20 the Regional Director for the Board's Thirteenth Region issued his notice certifying that this labor organization was not the exclusive representative of Endicott's employees, in Case No. 13-RC-4883. Thus the historical fact is established that as of March 12, 1956, neither the Respondent United nor its Local 3044 nor any other affiliate represented a majority of Endicott's employees.3 There is also undisputed testimony in the record that at the time McElroy of the United, in February, visited Endicott to demand recognition, he referred to pressure the United had recently (in the latter part of January) been exercising at an air base chapel construction job in Bunker Hill, Indiana, to prevent installation of Endicott's nonunion-made pews by Endicott's nonunion employees. It is clear that McElroy's reference to this matter was made in an effort to get Endicott to recognize the United at once. United made no effort to rebut certain testimony regarding actual events at the Bunker Hill project, and General Counsel himself conceded that he was not urging that such events constituted unfair labor practices within the meaning of the Act. Whether or not these events at Bunker Hill should be considered as having back- ground bearing upon later events, specifically alleged as unfair labor practices, will be determined in a later section in this Intermediate Report. B. The Chicago area Involved in the Chicago area were Endicott pew-installation jobs at two churches: Edison Park Lutheran Church in Chicago, in October 1957; and Mission Covenant Church at Glen Ellyn, Illinois, in November 1957.4 Respondents alleged to have engaged in unfair labor practices here are United Brotherhood, Chicago District Council, and Local 181. As finally amended, the complaint alleges that these three Respondents engaged in conduct violative of. Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) and 8(b)(4)(A) and (B) of the Act. The specific subsections invoked are quoted in footnote 1 above. At Edison Park: General construction of this church was performed under contract between the church and Solberg & Sullivan, general contractors. Purchase and installation of church pews was under a separate contract between the church and Endicott. Construction was nearly completed when Endicott's crew delivered and began assembly of the pews on October 19. It is established that Endicott's crew worked without interruption or incident on this day and the following Monday, October 21. Nor is there any evidence that members of other crafts stopped working on those 2 days. Early Tuesday morning, October 22, according to his own testimony Dave Scott, an employee of the general contractor and serving as the carpenter steward on the job, approached the two Endicott men-Foreman Glenn Thomas and employee Ronald Shepler-and asked them if they carried union cards. They said they did not. Scott reported this fact to his foreman, Herman Thode, the general con- tractor's representative on the job, and then called the business agent of Local 80, 9 The amended complaint alleges that the Board certified this fact "in February 1956." Proof submitted by General Counsel, however, shows that such certification was not issued until March 20, and the election was not held until March 12. There is no proof in the record to sustain General Counsel's additional claim in the same paragraph that "Since February 1, 1956, . . ." these organizations have not "represented a majority of Endicott's employees." Lack of such representation was proven only since March 12. 4 Although neither the amended complaint nor the supplement to amended complaint specifically alleges any illegal conduct on the part of any of the Respondents at Glen Ellyn, on January 7, 1958, in response to a previously made motion for bill of particulars by the Respondent United, General Counsel placed In evidence his bill of particulars in which he claims that "work stoppages took place," among other locations, at "Mission Covenant Church , Glen Ellyn , Illinois, 11-22-57." UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS, ETC. 899 a member of the Chicago District Council and the local to which he, Scott, be- longed. The business agent said he would send another business agent over. Just before noon Charles Christensen, business representative of the Respondent Local 181, came to the job and went directly to Foreman Herman Thode. When the two Endicott men returned from lunch a few minutes later Christensen approached them and, according to the testimony of Foreman Thomas, said to them: Hold it right there. Stop it. . You can't do any more work in here. If you are not union you will have to pack up your tools and leave. . . . If you want to work in this state go down and get yourself a union card, which will cost you a hundred and eighty dollars, and that's all the way you or any crew of Endicott's will install church furniture in the State of Illinois. Upon this remark by Christensen, and also according to Thomas' testimony, "we gathered up our tools and left." Thomas, as his own testimony fully establishes, was Endicott's representative on this job, with complete supervisory authority as defined by the Act: to direct the work and employees under him, and to quit or start work according to his own independent judgment. (As Thomas admitted, employee Shepler was required to work "the hours that I wanted.") Thomas' testimony makes it clear, and the Trial Examiner concludes and finds, that the decision to stop work and withdraw from this job was made by Foreman Thomas, and made pursuant to the above-quoted remark by Business Agent Christensen. The foregoing are the relevant facts bearing upon the incident at this location directly involving any of the Respondents and employees of Endicott, the Charging Party and the primary employer. It appears to be General Counsel's claim, made without specific citation, that Christensen's conduct constituted, insofar as Endicott's employees are concerned, a violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act. In the absence of zany precedent of which the Trial Examiner is aware, he is unable to so read the subsections cited as to conclude that the foregoing conduct was in direct violation of either. Even had the decision to stop work not been made by Endicott's own representative on the job, upon Christensen's demand that they stop work because not members of the Respondents, the Trial Examiner does not believe that Christensen's demand that they stop work can realistically be considered "re- straint or coercion." Christensen had no authority over Endicott's men, either as an employer or as an officer of any labor organization to which they belonged. He engaged in no violence, and his words, as quoted by Thomas and in the opinion of the Trial Examiner, are not reasonably to be interpreted as a threat of violence. And in order that Section 8(b) (2) apply, it would be necessary to find that Christen- sen "caused or attempted to cause" Thomas, as a representative of the employer Endicott, to "discriminate" against employee Shepler "in violation of subsection 8(a)(3)." This necessary finding, in the opinion of the Trial Examiner, is un- warranted by the evidence. There is no evidence that Christensen sought, by any means or method, any change in the employer-employee relationship between Endi- cott and Shepler. As to the possible indirect violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A), under the Board's theory in Curtis Brothers, Inc. (119 NLRB 232) and Alloy Manufacturing Com- pany (119 NLRB 307) urged by General Counsel to support his case in general, the Trial Examiner does not believe that the foregoing findings of fact will support the conclusion that either or both of these cases govern. Even if Christensen's remarks to Thomas be construed as a type of "picketing," there is not the slightest evidence that the purpose of his remarks was to require Endicott, as the employer, to recognize any of the Respondents here involved as the exclusive representative of Endicott's employees. And such a finding would be essential to come within the Curtis or Alloy policy. Christensen's purpose was clearly expressed to Thomas, so far as this incident is concerned: he wanted them to obtain a union card. In view of this direct evidence, and considering other evidence at other locations also intro- duced by General Counsel to the effect that where Endicott employees did obtain working permits from local Carpenter unions they were permitted to work, the Trial Examiner does not believe the inference warrantable that recognition by Endi- cott of some other local, in another locality, was the purpose of Christensen's remarks to Thomas and Shepler.5 In short, the Trial Examiner concludes and finds that the evidence is insufficient to find that the Respondents, or any of them, through any conduct by Christensen 5In his brief, ,counsel for the Chicago Respondents raises another point upon which the Trial Examiner, in view of his ultimate conclusions , finds it unnecessary to pass: the question of the "scope " of the Curtis and Alloy theories . This Edison Park incident occurred more than a year and a half after the election at Warsaw. 900 . DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD with respect to Foreman Thomas and employee Shepler , violated any of the cited sections of the Act. Turning now to other conduct by Christensen on the same job, alleged by General Counsel to have induced employees of other employers to cease work, within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4) (A ) and (B ). Competent and credible testimony of General Counsel's witnesses is the basis for the findings.s Rev. A. G. Nasby, minister of the Edison Park church involved , went to the construction job during the noon hour of Tuesday, October 22 . He spoke to Herman Thode, superintendent of the construction job for the general contractor , and asked him, in effect, what the trouble was. Thode told him that "these [Endicott] men were not union and they had no right to work." At about this point Christensen came in and the ,two stepped into another room . Christensen told the pastor, accord- ing to the latter's testimony, in effect that the Endicott men would have to stop installing the pews. At this juncture Christensen left the minister to approach Foreman Thomas and Shepler , as previously described. The Trial Examiner finds no credible evidence in the record , and in his brief General Counsel points to none, from any employee of any secondary employer to the effect that Christensen in any way even attempted to get him to engage in a work stoppage. There is some vague and uncertain testimony by an electrician, Louis Palacious, who said he saw Christensen at the church that day when he returned from lunch, in conversation with "two electricians and one . . . or two of the carpenters , I think," and toward the "end" of some "trivial conversation . somebody . . . made some reference to the Endicott people, that they were going to leave that afternoon." Palacious also said that "somebody did imply or said" that if "the Endicott employees return to work we shouldn 't work." He was unable, however, to identify who made such statements. Donald Deithloff, foreman of the electricians, employed by one of the subcon- tractors, said only that he heard Christensen say that "the Endicott people were non- union." Clearly this remark may not reasonably be found to be inducive of a work stoppage . Whatever may be in the Carpenters ' rules concerning not working with nonunion men, there is no showing that electricians , members of another craft, are in anyway bound to observe such rules. While it does appear that for a few minutes after lunch, and until Endicott's men left the premises, some craftsmen may not have promptly returned to their tasks, there is insufficient evidence to establish, in the opinion of the Trial Examiner, (1) that there was any "strike or a concerted refusal . . . to perform any services" or (2) that Christensen or any other responsible agent of any of the Respondents engaged in any conduct to "induce or encourage " any such concerted action.7 It follows and the Trial Examiner concludes and finds that so far as the Edison Park incident is concerned, the allegations as to violations of Section 8(b) (4) (A) and (B ) are not sustained. At Glen Ellyn: Here Foreman Thomas and employee Shepler were also assigned to deliver and install church furniture, under direct contract with the Mission Covenant Church. About a week before November 22, these two arrived and began assembly. Their work was interrupted or halted by no one, although some unidenti- fied carpenter approached Foreman Thomas and asked if they "belonged to the union." Thomas replied in the negative , and was then asked when they planned to return to finish the job. He said "next week." Upon this reply the carpenter told him , "We have got to do something about this . If you are coming back here next week we will let it go until then." 8 Thomas and Shepler returned the following Thursday , November 21, and worked all day without incident, although according to the testimony of Foreman Martin 9 The Trial Examiner can place no reliance upon such obviously hearsay testimony as urged by General Counsel in his brief , in the following quotation : "Additionally , Carpenter Foreman Herman Thode told Mr . Van Aken ( counsel for the Charging Party ), in a tele- phone conversation, that the business agent ( Christensen) said when he came out to the job 'that either the Endicott employees had to leave or they would have to leave.' " Van Alien was the only witness on this point. Thode was not called by General Counsel. 4 As counsel for the Chicago Respondents notes in his brief, "It is . . . significant that none of the three tradesmen called to testify by the General Counsel were ever asked if they had participated in, or knew of, any work stoppage on the job." s In his able brief, General Counsel refers to this unidentified carpenter as being Foreman Lein . The Trial Examiner does not believe the evidence warrants such identifi- cation. Thomas could not make identification and Lein , later also a witness for General Counsel, said that he first learned that the Endicott men were "not union men " the fol- lowing week , when "one of the carpenters" so informed him. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS, ETC. 901 'Lein, a witness for General Counsel and carpenter foreman for contractor Boror Johnson, he was told by one of the carpenters that day that they were "not union men." The next morning, however , Foreman Lein called Joseph Krishack , a business representative for Locals 558, 1527, and 2004, all such locals being members of the Respondent Chicago District Council . Krishack asked to talk to Endicott Foreman Thomas. According to this foreman, Krishack- asked me what we were trying to do, coming in there and causing trouble, and I told him we weren't causing trouble, and he wanted to know why we didn't stay out until they were done working . . . and he wanted to know the com- pany, Endicott Church Furniture 's 'phone number. Thomas did not give Krishack the number , but handed the telephone over to Counsel Van Aken, attorney for Endicott. That is all there was to the Glen Ellyn occurrence , as far as any conduct or communication is concerned between any responsible agent of any of the Chicago Respondents and employees of any employer.9 According to the testimony of General Counsel's witness Lein , there was no work stoppage by anyone . Nor is there the slightest evidence that anyone attempted to cause a work stoppage , or to prevent Endicott's men from completing their job. The Trial Examiner concludes and finds that there is insufficient evidence to sus- tain the allegation of the complaint or its amendments to the effect that conduct of any of the Respondents at the Glen Ellyn project was violative of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) or (2). And in summary as to the Chicago area, the Trial Examiner concludes and finds that the preponderance of credible evidence fails to support allegations that the Respondents United, Chicago District Council , and Local 181, or any of them, have violated Section 8(b)(1)(A ) and (2 ) and 8 ( b)(4)(A) and (B) of the Act. C. The Minneapolis area In contradistinction to the events described above in the Chicago area, the two incidents placed in issue by the complaint, in the Minneapolis region, occurred within a period of 1 year from the date the Board certified that the Respondent United did not represent Endicott's employees . That at the First Methodist Church in Hopkins, Minnesota, took place in November 1956, and that at the Bethlehem Baptist Church of Minneapolis early in January 1957. The complaints as variously amended claim that the Respondents in this area-United, Locals 889 and 7, and Twin City Council-all violated Section 8(b) (4) (A ) and (B ) of the Act, and that. the Respondent United also violated Section 8(b) (1) (A) and (2 ) at each of the two locations. The Hopkins project: A summary of essential facts relating to this location. follows: On or about November 6, 1956 , Endicott's Installation Foreman Ray Smith and employee Floyd Yant arrived at this site with a load of church furniture. They completed unloading and during the same evening set up a number of the pews without incident. The next morning , before the starting hour of 8 o'clock, Acting Superintendent Cornelius Hovland of the general contracting firm of Krauss Anderson ,ia approached Smith and Yant and asked them if they belonged to the Union . When Smith replied that they did not Hovland said , "We will have to do something about this. This is a union contract ." The Endicott men continued working." 6 Whatever Krishack may have said to Counsel Van Aken is , in the opinion of the Trial Examiner, immaterial to the question of conduct , but only relevant to that of "purpose." As noted above , the point of purpose is not reached , in disposing of this incident. 10 That Hovland was "acting superintendent" was established by G. C . Armstrong, a witness for General Counsel and retained by the church to "supervise the relationship between the church and the general contractor." It The finding as to this first incident at Hopkins rests upon the credible portions of the testimony of Foreman Smith and Acting Superintendent Hovland . The Trial Examiner does not credit Smith's claim that Hovland introduced himself as the "steward." (In his brief, General Counsel also urges that employee Wickman was "acting steward" on the job for the carpenters , a contention unsupported by any convincing evidence .) The de- meanor of both Smith and Yant , as witnesses, impressed the Trial Examiner as more indicative of their desire to color their testimony to suit Endicott , their employer , than to relate their accurate recollections . For example, they insisted that other craftsmen sat 535828-60-vol. 12 5-5 8 '902 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Other craftsmen on this project did not start working that morning.ia The sub- stance of General Counsel's witnesses is to the effect that they declined to go to work after Acting Superintendent Hovland told them that the Endicott men, who were continuing work, were nonunion . (For example, painter Lindstrum said he agreed when, upon his arrival, he was told by Hovland of the nonunion status of the pew-setters, and that he, the acting superintendent, did not think they should work. And tilesetter Zuern said that Hovland said he was not going to work, and that he then left the job upon instructions from his own tile foreman.) At this point the Trial Examiner concludes and finds that the failure to start work by the craftsmen is attributable to none of the Respondents, but only to Hovland, who plainly was acting as the representative of the general contractor and not as an agent of the Respondent Unions, despite the fact that he was a union member.13 One of the carpenter employees, Anton Wickman, called Carl Linde, business representative of the Respondent Local 889. Linde arrived about 9 o'clock, and checked with Endicott's men their own nonunion status, whereupon he then began a discussion with R. B. Child, chairman of the church building committee, Rev. R. B. Bailey, and Armstrong, the architect. Linde told the three officials that the pews were being installed by nonunion men and had been made by nonunion labor. Child turned to Foreman Smith and asked what had been done elsewhere in similar situations. Smith said that sometimes they had been able to obtain working permits from locals. Child asked Linde if this arrangement would be possible. Linde said "no," and added that they would "banner" (picket) the job if necessary. After further discussion Linde succeeded in reaching, by telephone, John J. Bakken, secre- tary of the Respondent Twin City District Council, and turned the instrument over to Child. Child pressed Bakken for some way of continuing and completing the construction work. Bakken told Child that to do so the following conditions must be met by the church officials: (1) The church committee must arrange with the general contractor to have his union carpenters complete installation of the pews. around playing poker in the church, a charge flatly denied by other witnesses for General Counsel, the church officials. On the other hand, the Trial Examiner does not believe Hovland's denial that lie referred to a union contract. Such a contract in fact existed; it is realistic to believe that he not only was aware of it, as a representative of the general contractor, but that he also mentioned it to two nonunion men. "General Counsel, in his brief, apparently prefers to believe Smith's testimony instead of that of other witnesses called by himself, notably R. B. Child, chairman of the church committee, G. C. Armstrong, architect, Painter L. Lindstrum, and Tilesetter A. J. Zuern. 'a In his brief General Counsel urges that Hovland was an agent of the Respondents, on the ground that he was a union member and as a member was bound by certain working rules of the District Council, including that of not working with nonunion men, and not requesting any member under his supervision to violate the previously stated rule. General Counsel cites Booker Lumber Co., Inc. (117 NLRB 1739), in support of his position. There, however, in concluding that a carpenter foreman, Trueworthy, was a union agent, the Board said this : Accordingly , we conclude that Trueworthy , in dealing with the issue of the installa- tion of the nonunion staircase , was carrying out union rules, in accord with his union obligations , at the behest of the union business agent, and that he was, there- fore, a union agent. [Emphasis supplied.] The italicized portions, above, clearly distinguish the cited case from the facts here established. There is not the slightest evidence that Acting Superintendent Hovland engaged in any conduct "at the behest of" any "union business agent." And there is affirmative and credible evidence in the record in the testimony of the only union carpenter of the job, A. Wickman, that upon his discovery that the Endicott men were nonunion, of his own volition he both informed Hovland of the fact and called the business agent. Wickman declined to work under this condition-there is no credible evidence that he came to this decision through any remark of Hovland. And Wickman was the only employee on the job over whom Hovland had "supervision," in terms of the working rules. Under the circumstances, the Trial Examiner believes that the inference sought by General Counsel must be rejected in the light of the following testimony of his wit- ness, Architect Armstrong : Q. Cornelius Hovland was the superintendent on the job for Krauss Anderson? A. He was acting as our superintendent, yes. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS, ETC. 903 (2) The church committee must have the architect write to Endicott and decline to use or recommend its pews unless and until they "had made their peace with the Union." (3) Send a check to a cancer fund as a penalty for permitting nonunion men on a union job. The church committee finally agreed to Bakken's demands, and Endicott's crew returned to the factory, while union carpenters completed the installation. Conclusions as to Hopkins: The foregoing findings establish beyond question that responsible agents of Respondents Twin City District Council and Local 889 threat- ened to "banner" or picket the church premises unless Endicott's nonunion employees were sent back and union carpenters substituted. There is likewise no question but that a work stoppage, or refusal to work, on the part of employees of secondary employers, occurred, at least for a brief period. These are, of course, facts requiring establishment in order to reach the ultimate legal conclusions sought by General Counsel. More is needed, however, in the opinion of the Trial Examiner, to complete a reasonable structure of violation of the Act. First, and with reference to the work stoppage: Who, in fact, caused it? Not Linde or Bakken, since neither appeared on the scene until an hour or more after the craftsmeh had declined to go to work. And the finding has previously been made, on the basis of credible testimony by General Counsel's own witnesses, that Acting Superintendent Hovland, in charge of the job for the general contractor, was wholly responsible for initiating the failure of at least some of these craftsmen from starting work, and there is no evidence as to why others did not work. The Trial Examiner considers it tortured reasoning to infer, as General Counsel appar- ently would have inferred, that Linde and Bakken, upon their appearance at the scene long after certain action precipitated by a representative of the general con- tractor had taken place, promptly incurred responsibility for such action. In short, the Trial Examiner concludes and finds that the preponderance of credible evidence is insufficient to support General Counsel's position that the failure to go to work, on the part of one carpenter and other craftsmen, was caused or attempted to be caused by any agent of the Respondents. As to the possible contention of the prolongation of a work stoppage already begun, it has been found that responsible union agents did threaten to "banner" the job. But this threat, as the evidence clearly shows, was made, not to employees, but to the church officials, or the actual employers. And on this point, so far as the Trial Examiner is aware, the Board has not departed from the following doctrine enunciated by the Court in Henry V. Rabouin, d/b/a Conway's Express v. N.L.R.B., 195 F. 2d 906 (C.A. 2) : [Rabouin] sees in the union's pressure on neutral employers to stop accepting his shipments a violation of the secondary boycott provisions. § 8(b)(4)(A). Even if the demands carried with them an implicit threat to strike, we cannot agree that they tended to induce or encourage the employees to engage in a strike or concerted refusal forcing the employer to cease doing business with another. The embargo on Rabouin's goods was the product solely of requests addressed to management or supervisory personnel. The former are clearly employers, and the latter have lately been so defined by the new § 2(2,11) ... . The union thus did not "encourage the employees." Upon the basis of the foregoing authority, then, the Trial Examiner concludes and finds that none of the Respondents, at the Hopkins project, violated Section 8(b)(4)(A) or (B) of the Act. Turning now to the question as to whether or not the Respondent United Brotherhood violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act. In support of his contention that such violation occurred, General Counsel cites RuiJalo's Trucking Service, Inc. (119 NLRB 1268); Acousti Engineering of Alabama, Inc. (120 NLRB 212); Alloy Manufacturing Company (119 NLRB 307); and Curtis Brothers, Inc., (119 NLRB 232). The essential distinguishing feature in each of the cited cases, in the opinion of the Trial Examiner, is that actual picketing occurred. Here there was no picketing, and no threat of picketing made except to the employers. The Trial Examiner concludes and finds that no agent of the Respondents "restrained or coerced" employees of Endicott, within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A). As to the 8(b) (2) phase: It appears from his brief that General Counsel has come up with a theory, novel at least to this Trial Examiner, that by putting pres- sure upon the pastor and the building committee, a House of God was used by the Respondents as an instrument to force Employer Endicott to discriminate in the employment of Smith and Yant in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. It also appears from the same brief, however, that General Counsel rests this claim upon 904 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the contention that "secondary activity" was involved, a claim which has been previously found to be without merit. It is therefore concluded and found that the Respondent United did not violate Section 8(b)(2) of the Act, even if there were sufficient foundation for a finding that Linde and Bakken were serving as agents of the Respondent United. The Minneapolis incident: The event here at issue occurred on or about January 9, 1957, and involves allegations against the Respondents United, Twin City District Council, and Local No. 7. On January 8 Foreman Smith and employee Yant delivered a vanload of church furniture for installation at the Bethlehem Baptist Church. They worked at their job all that afternoon and evening without being interrupted. They returned to the church early the next morning and were approached by Superintendent George C. Jaeger, representative of General Contractor Orville Madsen and Son.14 Having noticed two strangers on the project of which he had full charge, Jaeger asked them where they were from and if they carried union cards. They answered the latter question in the negative. Jaeger walked away, remarking, "That is bad. It has been a union job, so far." 15 According to Jaeger's own testimony he mentioned the fact that nonunion carpenters were setting pews, to some painters and an electrician as well as to the one carpenter working that day. No craftsman halted work, however, and the Endicott men proceeded with their work without molestation. Two hours or more later, Business Agent Joseph Erickson, of Local 7, chanced to stop at the project. (There is no credible evidence in the record that Erickson was. called to the site by anyone on the job.) 16 Erickson recognized the two Endicott men, having seen them, according to Fore- man Smith, on another Minneapolis project. Erickson called John Carlgren, busi- ness representative of the Respondent Twin City Council. When Carlgren joined Erickson, the two union agents approached Smith and Yant and demanded, "Are you back here again? Ain't you ever going to learn your lesson?" 17 One of the Endicott men then said to the other, "Well, it appears that this is all, pick up the tools." At this remark, however, the business agents promptly assured them that. they were not ordering them to quit work.16 Carlgren then called E. F. Newstrum, of the church building committee, and Newstrum came to the site, whereupon Carlgren told him that work could not be completed with two nonunion men on the job. If it continued, he said, "future work la Foreman Smith made no claim that Jaeger identified himself as the holder of any position , with the contractor or with the Union. General Counsel thereupon stated, in open session, that he would later identify the individual who approached them as Jaeger, "carpenter foreman and steward." Whereupon, and apparently pursuant to General Counsel's statement of intention, the next witness, Yant, declared that Jaeger introduced himself as the "union steward." When General Counsel called Jaeger as his own witness, some weeks later, he established Jaeger's position as superintendent. The Trial Ex- aminer can place no reliance upon Yant's testimony. Jaeger has been construction. superintendent for 20 years. It is hardly reasonable to believe that lie would suddenly demote himself to journeyman before a stranger. 15 The quotations are from Jaeger' s testimony. -10 For reasons previously stated, the Trial Examiner does not credit Foreman Smith's testimony that Superintendent Jaeger said , "I will have to call the business agent." Equally untrustworthy is Yant's testimony to the effect that Jaeger "went to the tele- phone and called someone." Immediately after making this claim , which lacks Smith's support, he admitted that he did not see Jaeger call anyone. The circumstances fully support Jaeger's flat denial that he called the business agent. As noted above, when. Erickson chanced to stop by, some hours later, he discovered the presence of Smith and Yant, already known to him (as Smith admitted), and he called another business agent.. 17 The quotations are from the credible portion of Smith's testimony. The Trial Ex- aminer specifically discredits the testimony of both Smith and Yant to the effect that the. business agents told them they could not place the pews because they did not bear the union label. The credible testimony of church officials, to whom the business agents spoke immediately thereafter, is in agreement that what the latter insisted upon was that union carpenters perform the installation. On the other hand, the Trial Examiner does not believe the testimony of Erickson and Carlgren to the effect that they did not approach the Endicott men and did not make the statement quoted above. is The testimony of both Carigren and Erickson, undisputed, establishes that they made- this statement. Furthermore, Smith's own testimony makes it plain that they continued work, without interruption, until 'temporarily stopped by E. F. Newstrum, of the church. building committee. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS, ETC. 905 at the church might be jeopardized." Newstrum explained that the pews had been purchased under another contract than that with the general contractor. At about this point, Endicott's two men joined the group, as did the pastor, Rev. E. N. Lindholm. After some discussion, according to the testimony of Endicott's own foreman, it was agreed by all present that Endicott's employees would complete the job, but with union men assisting them. The agreement was carried out; there was no work stoppage. And the record is without credible evidence that any agent of the Respondents even attempted to cause any employee of any employer to stop working. In summary, the Trial Examiner concludes and finds that the preponderance of evidence fails to support any of General Counsel's allegations of unfair labor prac- tices at this project. D. Nassau County area Three Respondents: United Brotherhood, Nassau Council, and Local 1397 are alleged by the complaint and its various amendments to be involved, at a single incident, in violations of Section 8(b)(4)(A) and (B) and 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act. The incident occurred at the new Nassau Baptist Church in East Williston, New York,19 in January 1957. The general contractor for the construction of the church was H. G. Heidtmann, his own employees doing some of the carpentry work, and subcontracting various other craft work, including plastering, painting, masonry, plumbing, electrical, and tiling. Two Endicott workers, Foreman Robert Ring and Glenn Thomas, the latter previ- ously identified, delivered and started to set up church pews in the basement of the church on January 10. There was no interruption of their work that day. On January 11, about noon, Business Agent Unneberg of Local 1397, which is a member of the Respondent Nassau Council, came to the building project. He approached the Endicott workers, and asked Ring if they were union members. Ring said "no." The business agent then approached a number of carpenters installing kitchen cabinets in the same room, told them of the situation, and warned them that they could be fined for working with nonunion men 20 The carpenters thus warned by Unneberg, employees of Whitehall Company, stopped work. Unneberg then went to the general contractor, H. G. Heidtmann, who was there, and told him of the nonunion conditions and advised him to "retire from the picture with his men" until is was "straightened out." Heidtmann then called his one carpenter off the job. At about the same time Unneberg approached two employees of another subcon- tractor, A. Broido, who were delivering tile for flooring, gave them his business agent card, and told them not to unload. Broido's sales representative was there at the time, and the card was turned over to him. This individual, Morgenroth, instructed the tilemen to stop work while he communicated with his office. After making telephone calls, Morgenroth returned and told the employees under his supervision to continue unloading. Later that same afternoon Rev. Albert R. Siebert, who had purchased the pews from Endicott, discussed the situation with Unneberg. The pastor, according to his own testimony, acknowledged his mistake in ordering the pews from Endicott, because the rest of the job, as intended, was to be performed by only union workers. Unneberg, however, was adamant, and insisted that the carpenters under his juris- diction would not return so long as the nonunion Endicott men remained there. Finally it was decided that parishioners would install the pews, and Endicott's men returned to Indiana. Concsions as to Nassau: Here undisputed and credible testimony established beyond question that Unneberg, a responsible agent of Local 1397 and the Nassau District Council, both attempted to and succeeded in causing, by direct approach to them, employees of neutral employers, Whitehall Company and A. Broido, to engage in a concerted refusal to perform services, an object thereof clearly being to force Endicott's men off the job, and to that extent forcing the Nassau Baptist Church to cease doing business with Endicott. This conduct of Unneberg was plainly in violation of Section 8(b) (4) (A). '- Most of the documents refer to the location as "Williston Park." Reverend Siebert, a witness for General Counsel, gave the above address as the correct one. ° These findings are based upon the undisputed testimony of Ring and Thomas. Al- though Unneberg was at the hearing, he was not called as a witness. The general con- tractor, Heidtmann, also testified that Whitehall's employees informed him they were stopping work because they were union men. 906 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The Trial Examiner finds no merit, however , in General Counsel's claim that the same conduct also violated Section 8 ( b) (4) (B). There is no evidence that Unneberg had as an object, in bringing pressure upon union carpenters or other craftsmen, the forcing of Endicott to recognize and bargain with either the United or any local . The testimony of all witnesses is in substantial agreement that his sole object was to remove nonunion carpenters from a union project. Nor is there sufficient evidence , in the opinion of the Trial Examiner, to support the conclusion sought by General Counsel to the effect that the same conduct of the business agent resulted in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A ) or 8(b)(2). That allegation runs only against the Respondent United, and there is no direct or con- vincing evidence that Unneberg was acting in the capacity of an agent for the United. Only by way of piling inference upon inference may the conclusion sought by General Counsel be reached : that Unneberg, as agent for the United , engaged in his conduct for the purpose of forcing Endicott to recognize the United or some local as the exclusive bargaining agent. It would first have to be inferred that because he was an agent for the District Council he must also be an agent for United. It would then have to be inferred that he was aware of happenings in Warsaw, Indiana, nearly a year before . And finally it would have to be inferred that, despite his clearly enunciated object, he really had another one. In the opinion of the Trial Examiner such -inferential steps of reasoning will not sufficiently bear the weight of truth. In summary , the Trial Examiner concludes and finds that evidence is insufficient to sustain the allegations of violation, at this project, of Section 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(b) (1) (A ) and (2); but is sufficient to sustain the allegation of violation of Section 8(b)(4)(A). E. Detroit area As to the one project in this area , it is alleged by General Counsel that by certain conduct of union agents the Respondents United, Wayne Council, and Local 998 violated Section 8(b)(4)(A ) and (B ) and 8(b)(1 )(A) and (2) of the Act. The location was at the Woodlawn Church of God, in Royal Oak, Michigan. It is alleged to have occurred in July 1957, more than a year after the election, previously described , at Warsaw, Indiana. Endicott's installation crew of three men worked here undisturbed on July 25 and 26. The crew consisted of Foreman McClung and employees Fuller and Arndt. On the morning of July 27 Arthur Sievertsen , superintendent for Harry Anderson, general contractor , with full supervision over employees in several crafts, asked the carpenter's union steward, Allen Campbell, to check the union status of Endicott's men. Campbell did so, and reported back to the superintendent , who then called the office of Local 998, and informed a business agent that "we had some out-of- town people working there , and they should come and check the job." 21 There- after, during the morning, three union agents came to the jobsite: Business Repre- sentatives Jacobs, Fair, and Grady Pinner, the last being business manager of Local 998. The Endicott employees were approached by them and told that since they did not belong to the Union they could not work. There is no credible evidence, however, that these union agents made any threats of violence which might be construed as restraint or coercion , and Endicott's men continued work for a time, until Foreman McClung told them to stop work until he had talked with the minister, Reverend Streeter, with whom Endicott was under contract for the pews and their installation. When Endicott's crew returned from lunch they voluntarily approached Reverend Streeter, General Contractor Anderson , and Pinner, where the three were in conver- sation. Pinner told them they could not work until the issue was settled, and McClung made no effort to have the men under his supervision return to work. (In his brief General Counsel claims, in effect , that Endicott's men followed Pinner's "order." The Trial Examiner is at a loss to understand the basis for such termi- nology. Pinner had no authority over McClung, and no threats had been made against Endicott's men. If it be considered that McClung yielded because Reverend Streeter and the general contractor did not countermand Pinner's demand , thereby endorsing it, then the responsibility was of course upon these two employers, not the Union.) McClung then reported to his Warsaw office , and about 2:30 that afternoon received instructions from Counsel Eschbach , attorney of record for the Charging Party, to have his men go back to work . McClung did so. Shortly after this General Contractor Anderson came to Endicott's men and said, "You can't work. =The quotations are from the superintendent's testimony. UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS, ETC. 907 You will have to get out." According to McClung, the general contractor told them that if they did not leave, they probably would be put out bodily by the "union men." Upon instructions from the general contractor, McClung had his men pack up the tools, and they left the premises. Endicott's men met with the Charging Party's counsel, one Morgan, that night. The next morning Morgan and McClung returned to the jobsite. When superin- tendent Sievertsen arrived, Morgan asked him to communicate with the union busi- ness agent and see if in conference the matter would be disposed of. An appoint- ment was made, and Foreman McClung and Attorney Morgan went to Pinner's office at the union hall. Here they were joined by Attorney Leenhouts, retained by the church. According to the credible testimony of Leenhouts, Pinner made it quite plain to all concerned that there would be no violence on this or any other job, of which he would approve, but that unless the matter were straightened out there was a possibility of picketing. Pinner also pointed out that under their bylaws, carpenters under his jurisdiction "were not allowed to work with nonunion laborers." According to other credible testimony of Leenhouts, "all of his (Pinner's] statements taken as a whole would certainly indicate to me that he was doing all he could to encourage them [Endicott's men] to become members of the union, and stating that if they did not they could not work on the job." After discussion between Foreman McClung, Pinner, and the two attorneys, it was finally decided that union carpenters would complete the job of installation with Foreman McClung supervising their work. It is established that this arrangement was put into effect. The foregoing account narrates the essential facts. In his brief General Counsel points to certain testimony which he claims supports his claim of coercion on the part of union agents against employees of Endicott, and of an attempt by such agents to cause employees of neutral employers to stop work. As to the first point Fuller, one of Endicott's three employees to testify, said that Pinner told them, when they quit work on the first occasion, that he "hoped we would not risk trying to come back in that night, as we usually do." Although Pinner was not a witness, and so Fuller's testimony stands undisputed in the light of the fact that it is without the support of either of the other two Endicott men, and that he quickly admitted that Pinner did not say what would be done if they did come back, and in view of the credible testimony, previously quoted, of the church counsel regarding Pinner's open disavowal of violence, the Trial Examiner does not believe Fuller. As to the second point, the single bit of testimony comes from a 15-year old schoolboy, one Donald Perkins, who was helper for his grandfather, the general contractor, Anderson. And only after considerable prompting with leading questions was General Counsel able to elicit from him the testimony that some unidentified "union men came, and they asked us to leave the job." In the onipion of the Trial Examiner this is most flimsy evidence upon which to base a conclusion of a secondary boycott. Conclusions as to Royal Oak: Upon the basis of the above findings of fact the Trial Examiner concludes that no agent of any of the named Respondents (1) re- strained or coerced employees of any employer; (2) induced or encouraged em- ployees of any employer, except those of Endicott, to cease work; or (3) caused or attempted to cause Endicott to violate Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. As found, the first move resulting in the call of the business agents to the scene was made by Superintendent Sievertsen, not the union steward. It may not reasonably be held that Sievertsen was acting as an "agent" for the Unions, particularly in view of the fact that the one possible threat was uttered by the general contractor himself. And whatever was said at the union office by Pinner, besides himself there were present only representatives of employers, and by no reasonable construction may be con- sidered as conduct against employees. The Trial Examiner therefore concludes and finds that the preponderance of credible evidence is insufficient to sustain General Counsel's allegations of unfair labor practices by any of the Respondents at the Royal Oak, Michigan, incident 22 23 In reviewing the transcript, the Trial Examiner notes that during the hearing at Detroit he reserved ruling upon a motion by Counsel O'Hare to strike certain testimony given by Foreman McClung in Warsaw. There McClung referred to an incident involv- ing a "short fellow, a bald-headed fellow, red face." General Counsel was asked if he intended to supply more accurate identification and if he would show who this bald- headed man was. "That's what I'm not sure of," replied General Counsel, "I kind of have a hunch his name is Joseph, but I am not sure." The only individual at the hearing in 908 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD F. Conclusions in summary As found above, credible evidence sustains the allegations of the complaint and its various amendments only to the extent of a violation of Section 8(b) (4) (A) by the Respondents Nassau District Council and Local 1397. In view of the above findings and conclusions, the Trial Examiner believes it un- necessary to relate happenings at the Bunker Hill project, which took place before the election at Warsaw. General Counsel disclaims that such events were unfair labor practices within the meaning of the Act, and no evidence adduced thereafter reasonably connected them with events which are in issue. As noted earlier, it appears that General Counsel specifically alleged that certain working rules, and provisions in bylaws of the Respondents are themselves violative of the Act. On this point, the Trial Examiner repeats his conclusion in Del-Mar Cabinet Company, Inc. [121 NLRB 1117], on which the board has not yet passed: Since the Board has never, so far as the Trial Examiner is aware, held any constitution, bylaws or trade rules in the construction field to be, per se, illegal, and General Counsel cites no case to the contrary, the Trial Examiner per- ceives no good purpose in appraising and analyzing the several provisions quoted in section C, above. In General Millwork Corporation, 113 NLRB 1084, 1086, the Board found it "unnecessary to decide whether the union rules constituted inducement and encouragement." In an earlier case, Joliet Con- tractors Association, 99 NLRB 1391, at 1394, the Board said: Like the Trial Examiner, we do not find the bylaws are per se violations of the statute; nor, unlike the Trial Examiner, do we find that their use in an illegal manner-as set forth below-made them illegal. Moreover, here the Trial Examiner also draws attention to the specific proviso of Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organiza- tion to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein. It follows, and the Trial Examiner concludes and finds, that allegations of the complaint relating to such rules and bylaws are not sustained. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondents Nassau District Council and Local 1397, set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of the Charg- ing Party, described in section 1, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial rela- tion to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. By inducing and encouraging employees of neutral employers, Whitehall Com- pany and A. Broido, doing construction work at the Nassau Baptist Church in East Williston, New York, to engage in a concerted refusal in the course of their employ- ment to perform services for their employers, an object thereof being to force the Nassau Baptist Church to cease doing business with Endicott Church Furniture, Inc., the Respondents Nassau District Council and Local 1397 have engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the Act. 2. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices within the mean- ing of Secton 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 3. The Respondents United Brotherhood, Twin City Council, District Council of Wayne, Chicago District Council, and Locals 889, 7, 998, and 181, have not engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of the Act, as alleged in the complaint, and the Respondents Nassau District Council and Local 1397 have not engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) and 8(b)(4)(13) of theAct. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] Detroit reasonably fitting the description was the Trial Examiner, and his name Is not Joseph. Identification never became clearer than General Counsel's remark. While the testimony of McClung on the point was of small moment, the motion to strike the testi- mony in question is granted.