125 NLRB 984
Retail Clerks International Association, Etc.
984
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
I find it unnecessary to require that each employee's losses should be computed on
a quarterly basis, in the manner customarily prescribed by this Agency
See F W
Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, 291-294, N.L R B v Seven-Up Bottling Com-
pany of Miami, Inc, 344 U S 344 In order to assure expeditious compliance with
this recommendation, it will be recommended, finally, that the various Respondents,
upon request, make available to the Board and its agents, for examination and
copying, all payroll and other records necessary to enable this agency to analyze
and compute the amounts of backpay due
Since the available evidence, however, will not warrant an inference that the
various Respondents, in the commission of the unfair labor practices found, were
motivated by some affirmative antipathy to Plumbers and Steamfitters Local Union
No 347, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and
Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO, as a labor organi-
zation, or to its employee members-although their course of conduct, herein found
to be subject to statutory proscription, may deserve characterization as a course of
conduct improperly motivated in a legal sense-no inference may be drawn that the
Respondents, when apprised of the national labor policy, will nevertheless continue
to engage in these unfair labor practices, or any others forbidden under the statute
No recommendation will be made, therefore that the Respondents be required to
cease and desist from such other unfair labor practices, or that they be required
to post notices to that effect
In the light of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the
case, I have reached the following
CoNcLusioNs OF LAW
I
The Willamette Association of Plumbing and Heating Contractors, Inc, and its
various employer members and associated contractors , Hoffman Engineering Co,
Buchanan Co, Inc, W T Lord and George A Lord, d/bi a Lord Bros, Contractors,
and Widmer Plumbing & Heating Co, are employers engaged in commerce and
business activities which affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act, as amended
2 Plumbers
and Steamfitters Local Union No 347, United Association of
Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the
United States and Canada, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act, as amended, which admits employees of the various
employers designated to membership
3
By discrimination in regard to the hire or employment tenure of their employ-
ees, reasonably calculated to discourage membership in the above-designated labor
organization, the employers named have engaged in and are engaged in unfair
labor pracitces within the meaning of Section 8(a)(l) and (3) of the Act, as
amended
4 The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce, within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, as amended
[Recommendations omitted from publicationI
Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, and Retail
Clerks Union Local
770,
AFL-CIO and Food Employers
Council, Inc.
Case No 21-CD-488
December 18, 1959
DECISION AND DETERMINATION OF DISPUTE
Food Employers Council, Inc (herein called the Council), filed
charges with the Regional Director for the Twenty-first Region, and
amended charges thereafter, alleging that Retail Clerks International
Association, AFL-CIO, and Retail Clerks Union Local 770 (herein
called the International and Local 770, respectively, or the Clerks,
collectively), had engaged in certain unfair labor practices within the
125 NLRB No 86
RETAIL CLERKS INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, ETC.
985
meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) (D) of the Act. The charges in substance
alleged that the Clerks had induced and encouraged employees of
certain retail food markets who are members of the Council to engage
in strikes or concerted refusals to perform services, or to handle goods
or materials in the course of their employment, with the object of
forcing their employers to assign the displaying, arranging, replenish-
ing, and servicing of such merchandise as hardware, health and beauty
aids, paper products, soft drinks, and dairy and bakery products to
employees who are members of the Clerks rather than to members of
the Teamsters.
Pursuant to Section 10 (k) of the Act and Sections 102.79 and 102.80
of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the Acting Regional Director
investigated the charges and provided for an appropriate hearing
upon due notice.
A hearing was held at Los Angeles, California, be-
fore Karl W. Filter and Kenneth M. Schwartz, hearing officers.
Copies of the charges and the notice of hearing were also served on
Joint Council of Teamsters No. 42; United States Hardware and
Paper Co.; and Wesco Merchandise Co., all of whom intervened at the
hearing.
All parties appeared at the hearing and were afforded full
opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and
to adduce evidence bearing on the issues.
The rulings of the hearing
officers made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are
hereby affirmed.
The Clerks, the Teamsters, and the Council filed
briefs with the Board.
Local 770 moved the Board to reopen the proceedings for submis-
sion of a judgment of the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of California ordering arbitration of the recognition and
work assignment clauses of the agreement between Local 770 and the
Council, and to stay such proceedings pending final determination of
the dispute by arbitration, or in the alternative, to dismiss these pro-
ceedings.
Thereafter, the Council, the Teamsters, United States
Hardware, and We'sco filed statements in opposition.
The Board heard oral argument at which all parties to the proceed-
ing participated. In addition, a representative of the General Counsel
appeared for the limited purpose of arguing that there was reasonable
cause to believe that the charge alleging violations of Section 8(b) (4)
(D) had merit.
At the oral argument and subsequently, further
motions and memoranda were filed by various parties.
The Board
hereby accepts the motions, the oppositions thereto, and the memo-
randa as part of these proceedings, and so far as they are relevant to
the issues has considered them in its determination.
Upon the entire record in the case, and upon consideration of the
briefs and memoranda filed by the parties, the Board makes the
following :
986
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The Council is a nonprofit corporation composed of employers
who are engaged in food processing and distribution at wholesale and
retail levels in southern California.
Employer members of the Coun-
cil annually purchase and receive goods valued in excess of $2,000,000
from points outside the State of California. We find that the Council
is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
2. Retail
Clerks International
Association,
AFL-CIO, Retail
Clerks Union Local 770, AFL-CIO; Joint Council of Teamsters No.
42, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers; and the local unions affiliated with
the Joint Council are all labor organizations within the meaning of
the Act.
3. The dispute :
A. The facts
The Council is an employer association which negotiates and ad-
ministers collective-bargaining agreements on behalf of about 180
employers in southern California who are engaged in food processing
or in the wholesale and retail distribution of food.
The bulk of its
membership consists of retail food markets which range in size from
individuals who own and operate a single outlet, to the largest chain
operator in the area which controls over 200 outlets.
The greatest
concentration of Council members is in Los Angeles, where Local 770
has jurisdiction for the representation of food market clerks.
The
Council has bargained with Local 770 and other Clerks locals in south-
ern California for many years, negotiating identical contracts on be-
half of its members with each local having jurisdiction in a particular
geographical area.
The contract in effect during the dispute under
consideration here was effective from January 1, 1956, through De-
cember 31, 1958. There are no Board certifications for the units repre-
sented by the Clerks.
In recent years, the development of the self-service food market
has been marked by an expansion in the number and type of items
which are displayed and sold there.
A centralized source of supply
of nonfood items has been provided in the Los Angeles area, by dis-
tributors referred to as rack-jobbers or suppliers who specialize in
handling kitchenware, hardward, toys, health and beauty aids, and
paper products for distribution to the markets.
These items are often
prepackaged and premarked by the rack-jobbers, and are displayed on
racks and gondolas which they furnish to their customer outlets. Be-
cause of the great variety of items supplied, the rack-jobbers believe
that they can be best displayed by their own employees who are
trained in their merchandising techniques.
This requires the rack-
jobbers' employees, commonly known as driver-salesmen, to deliver
RETAIL CLERKS INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, ETC.
987
the items to the individual market, and to shelve them in a particular
area set aside by the market. Thereafter, they replenish, rotate, and
clean their stock, remove damaged articles and items which are not
selling well, and otherwise improve the appearance of their displays.'
Many of the rack-jobbers, including United States Hardware and
Wesco, have bargaining agreements with the Teamsters covering the
driver-salesmen.
Some rack-jobbers bargain with the Clerks for the
individuals who do the shelving work in the stores' selling area, al-
though apparently in these cases, the items are first delivered by truck
from the rack-jobbers' warehouse to the store's backroom. It also
appears that the employees of some of the specialty food and soft-
drink distributors are not represented by any labor organization.
As the food markets took on new lines of nonfood items, the busi-
ness of the rack-jobbers also expanded.
Since the driver-salesmen's
duties in the selling areas of the markets are no different from those
of food market clerks in shelving, displaying, and rotating food items,
there has been a running controversy between the Clerks and the
markets over the driver-salesmen's impingement on the claimed juris-
diction of the Clerks.
Because of alleged interference by the Clerks
with their systems of distribution, United States Hardware, in 1949
and 1954, and Wesco in 1954, obtained injunctions against the Clerks.
These were not dissolved until April 1958 during the pendency of
this proceeding.
Nor were Clerks' claims for all shelving work
directed solely against the employment of Teamsters members; also
involved were those distributors who employed nonunion driver sales-
men, and "book salesmen" who take orders and set up displays of their
products.
In June 1956, shortly after the execution of the new agreement, the
Clerks and the Council disagreed over the meaning of the work as-
signment clauses.
The dispute was set off by the decision of the
largest retail food chain in the Los Angeles area, Safeway Stores, to
use rack-jobbers' employees who were Teamster members for shelving
work.
After oral representations by the Clerks against the expansion
of the rack-jobbers' activities in the selling areas of the stores, all the
Clerks locals in the area formally protested against "the unilateral
innovations and practices of [Safeway] in subcontracting, assigning
or permitting employees of other employers outside of the bargaining
unit to stock and otherwise handle and care for merchandise within the
store premises."
The letter of protest referred to article XIV of the
agreement, and asked for a meeting of representatives of the Council
1 Even before the development of self-service markets, food stores were often supplied
with perishable products such as milk and bread by driver -salesmen who placed their
products directly on the store's shelves .
For many years also, distribution of such
specialty food items as soft drinks , potato chips , cookies, spices , etc., has frequently been
done through driver-salesmen who have performed the same tasks in the stores ' selling
area as the rack-jobbers' employees.
988
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and the Clerks in an effort to reach a settlement. This constituted a
preliminary step in the procedure for adjustment and arbitration of
disputes under the agreement.
The Council and Safeway claimed that the agreement was industry-,
wide and areawide in scope so that any employer who was a signatory
to it was entitled to use the services of rack-jobbers and driver-sales-
men for all products which were being distributed to other food.,
markets in the area. In their view, the only limitation on their right
to use driver-salesmen was as to new lines not already being handled.
by a rack-jobber.
In October 1956, representatives of the Council and the Clerks met
to settle the Safeway dispute, but failed to agree.
The Council took
the position that this was not a matter covered by article XIV because
the dispute involved the jurisdiction of the Clerks, an area excepted
from the issues which might be arbitrated under the agreement. In
succeeding months there were further disagreements over shelving
work.
At least two additional meetings were held, in April and
October 1957, in an effort to reach a mutually acceptable understand-
ing as to the meaning of the work assignment and subcontracting
clauses of the agreement.
At all these meetings, the parties reargued
their opposing interpretations as to the intent behind, and the meaning
of the provisions, and the steps which might be taken to work out
a satisfactory solution.
Representatives of the Teamsters also at-
tended the April meeting and, in accord with the Council's position,.
refused to accept the Clerks claim that their driver-salesmen members
could work in store selling areas only with the permission of the
Clerks.
Also in April 1957, Local 770 advised its members in its publication,
"The Voice of 770" that clerks' work in the stores could not be per-
formed by persons outside the bargaining unit, and that anyone who
worked for outside companies was permitted to do shelving work
in the stores only if they were members of the Clerks and worked for
a company which was under contract with one of the southern Cali-
fornia locals.
It listed the names of the firms with such contracts,
and advised its members to question any person doing stocking, pric-
ing, or displaying work who was not employed by the store as to
whether he had an authorization letter from the Clerks.
The last meeting, held in October 1957, was attended by the presi-
dent of the Council and a committee of employers, and by representa-
tives of all the Clerks locals, as well as officials of the International.
The General Counsel of the International accused the Council of
violating the agreement. He stated that all work in the food markets
from wall to wall and from floor to ceiling belonged to the Clerks,
and that other persons worked in the stores only at its sufferance.
The president of the Council again disputed this interpretation of
RETAIL CLERKS INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, ETC.
989
the agreement, and when asked if the employers would arbitrate the
issue, restated their position that the dispute was not arbitrable.
Sometime in the autumn of 1957, Hughes Markets, a Council mem-
ber operating five markets, transferred its purchases of hardware
items from a rack-jobber which had a contract with the Clerks, to
United States Hardware which had a contract with the Teamsters for
the driver-salesmen.
On October 30, 1957, a business agent of the
Clerks entered one of the markets and demanded of the manager that
all items displayed by United States Hardware be removed from the
shelves and be replaced by the store employees who were within the
Clerks' bargaining unit.
The manager refused to do so. A few hours
later, two business agents of the Clerks returned to the market, spoke
to the employees, and as a result of their conversation, the employees
stopped working and congregated at the front of the store.
About
this time, the president of Hughes Markets arrived at the store and
then phoned the recording secretary of Local 770 who told him that
the merchandise would have to be removed or covered up so that it
could not be sold until store employees could take it off the shelves
and restock it. When the president agreed to do so, the clerks resumed
working, and thereafter, the merchandise was first removed and then
replaced by store employees.
The next morning, a business agent of the Clerks arrived at the
Pasadena store of Boys Market, a Council member, and informed
the assistant manager that all the merchandise of Serveteria, a sub-
sidiary of United States Hardware, supplying drugs and cosmetics,
would have to be removed from the shelves and restocked by store
employees.
This was rejected, and the business agent then spoke to
the employees who immediately stopped working. The assistant man-
ager then called Serveteria which sent its employees to remove its
items from the shelves.
When they arrived and began their work, the
store employees resumed working, later replacing those items which
had been removed by Serveteria employees.
A similar incident also occurred on the same date at Hollywood
Ranch Market except that the Clerks' business agent did not order
the store employees to cease working, since the store manager agreed
to cover merchandise supplied by Wesco so that it would be unavail-
able for sale until Clerks' member had had an opportunity to remove,
and return it to the shelves.
In the next 2 months a number of other incidents involving Clerks'
business agents took place at other markets operated by Council mem-
bers, in which the business agents told the driver-salesmen who were
engaged in delivering goods to the store to be shelved, that they were
not permitted to do the shelving work unless they had authorization
letters from Local 770.
990
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Within a week after the actual stoppages of work by clerks at the
stores operated by Hughes Markets and Boys Markets, the Council
filed charges alleging violations of Section 8(b) (4) (D), and Hughes
Markets obtained a preliminary injunction against Local 770. In the
State court proceedings relating to the preliminary injunction, the
Clerks filed a cross-petition for arbitration of the work assignment
clauses which was denied on the ground that the necessary prelim-
inary steps for adjustment of the grievance had not been complied
with.
On May 9, 1958, the General Counsel of the Board obtained a Sec-
tion 10 (1) injunction against further violations of Section 8 (b) (4) (D)
from a United States district court. In October 1958, Local 770
filed an action under Section 301 of the Act in district court against
the Council, seeking arbitration of its dispute over the interpretation
of the agreement.
The court ordered arbitration if the arbitrator
first determined that the dispute was arbitrable under the contract.
After the expiration of the contract on December 31, 1958, the Council
requested that this order be suspended, and on February 5, 1959, the
court suspended its order for arbitration but reserved jurisdiction
over the proceedings.
B. Contentions of the parties
The Council, the Teamsters, United States Hardware, and Wesco
argue that there is reasonable cause to believe that the clerks have
violated Section 8(b) (4) (D).
They contend that the Clerks' de-
mands and the stoppages were to compel the assignment of the shelving
work to its own members, despite the arrangements between the food
markets and the suppliers which provided that the work be performed
by the latter's employees.
They also urge that the Clerks-Council
contract permits the markets to subcontract the disputed shelving
work but, if it is ambiguous on that point, then the Clerks are thereby
deprived of any basis under the contract for their alleged right to the
disputed work.
Further, even if the dispute is arbitrable, the arbitra-
tion provisions of the contract are not a method for the voluntary ad-
justment of the dispute, as contemplated in Section 10(k), because the
Teamsters and the suppliers, whose interests would be directly af-
fected by an arbitration award are neither parties to the contract nor
have any standing in an arbitration proceeding arising thereunder.
They also point out that the district court's order to arbitrate has now
been suspended.
Finally, they contend that the expiration of the
contract has not rendered the dispute moot since the Clerks has not
abandoned its continuing claim for shelving work performed by em-
ployees of suppliers who are not under contract with the Clerks.
The Clerks contend that the proceeding should be dismissed because
(1) its dispute with Council is solely one of contract interpretation,
RETAIL CLERKS INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION , ETC.
991
not constituting a jurisdictional dispute within the meaning of Section
8(b) (4) (D ) ; (2) even if a jurisdictional dispute exists , the contract
has unambiguously assigned all shelving work to its members; (3) the
Board should as a matter of policy abide by the parties ' agreement to
arbitrate their contractual differencies , because such an award would
be definitive as to the Clerks ' rights under the contract, and it there-
fore constitutes a method of voluntary adjustment under Section 10 (k)
since it would be binding on all the essential parties to the dispute;
(4) as the contract has now expired , a Board determination would
constitute only an advisory opinion based on facts which are no longer
applicable, the termination of the agreement having deprived the
Clerks of any basis for insisting upon the Council 's compliance; and
(5) the Board has found certain Teamsters' agreements with United
States Hardware and Wesco illegal and such agreements cannot be
"specific contracts" within the meaning of the clause permitting sub-
contracting by the food markets under the basic 1956 agreement be-
tween the Clerks and the Council.
C. Applicability of the statute
Before the Board may proceed with a determination of a dispute
pursuant to Section 10 (k) of the Act, it must be satisfied that there
is reasonable cause to believe that Section 8(b) (4) (D) has been
violated by the Respondents.
We must first consider whether there has been inducement or en-
couragement by the Respondents, or by either of them, of employees
of an employer to engage in a concerted refusal in the course of their
employment to handle any goods or to perform any services for the
food markets. This question must be answered in the affirmative.
The
evidence shows that on October 30 and 31, 1957 , business agents of
Local 770 induced employees at a Hughes Markets store and a Boys
Markets store (both of which are Council members ) to engage in
work stoppages in protest against the store managers ' refusal to re-
move items from the shelves which had been placed there by em-
ployees of United States Hardware or its subsidiary .
We find that
on these two occasions employees of Council members were induced to
cease working in furtherance of the disagreement between Local 770
and the Council over shelving work which was being performed by
employees of the suppliers and other distributors who were employ-
ing non-Clerks members.
We do not consider it necessary to set out
or to decide whether other inducements, as to which testimony was
taken at the hearing, are violative of the Act.
The Clerks contend, however, that its disagreement with the Coun-
cil does not amount to a jurisdictional dispute within the meaning of
Section 8 (b) (4) (D).
The argument is supported by two related as-
sertions : (1) that its demands of the food markets and of the Council
,992
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
are part of its claim that the Clerks-Council agreement prohibits sub-
contracting of shelving work to anyone not within its bargaining
unit; and (2) that the dispute is not for an object proscribed by Sec-
tion 8 (b) (4) (D) since there are no conflicting demands by competing
groups of employees upon a single employer with the authority to
assign work as between the two groups.
The Clerks' demands of the Council were that the latter abide by
the Clerks' interpretation of the agreement, under which no shelving
work could be performed by anyone not a Clerks member.
Where
such work was presently being done by others, such as Teamsters
members employed by the rack-jobbers, satisfaction of the Clerks' de-
mands could be obtained only by reassigning work from one group
of employees to another group.
The insistence of the Clerks that its
view as to the meaning of the agreement be accepted was therefore no
more and no less than a demand that Clerks members be reassigned
work which had already been assigned to other groups of employees.
This is an objective proscribed by Section 8(b) (4) (D).
The Clerks,
however, have cited to us as a controlling precedent the Austin Com-
pany case.'
The facts in that case were that Austin, the Charging
Party, was doing construction work at a plant owned by Dow Chemi-
cal Company.
Austin used compressed air obtained from Dow's
plant lines which were, at Dow's insistence, controlled by a Dow em-
ployee.
Austin had a contract with the Respondent Union under
which Austin was obligated to employ a union member whenever
plant steam or air was used on a job. The Union caused a strike when
Austin refused to employ a union operator to handle the air lines.
The Board found that the stoppage was not violation of Section
8(b) (4) (D). It reasoned that since Austin was powerless to assign
the work to its own employees, its refusal to employ a union operator
was not a refusal to reassign work which had already been assigned
to employees of Dow.
'The Clerks urge that here also there were no conflicting demands
which have been made of a single employer with the authority or
power to settle such demands.
But even if we concede, for the pur-
poses of this proceeding, that the Clerks did not insist that the rack-
jobbers employ Clerks members, or that the Teamsters made no work
assignment claims upon the food-markets, we would still find that the
Clerks' pressure on the markets to use its members for shelving work
were either demands that they directly assign store clerks to do such
work, or that they indirectly assign it such work by transferring their
business to rack-jobbers who employed Clerks members.
Demands for
an indirect as well as for a direct assignment of work is, in these cir-:
2 Local 450,
International
Union of Operating
Engineers, AFL-CIO ( The Austin
Company ), 119 NLRB 135.
RETAIL CLERKS INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, ETC.
993
cumstances, an object proscribed by Section 8(b) (4) (D).3 In both
situations the markets could, unlike the Charging Party in Austin,
reassign the work to the Respondent Union.
They could certainly
have banned the driver-salesmen from their selling areas, and by this
act alone would have reassigned the shelving work to employees in
the Clerks bargaining unit.
They could also, if they wanted to, have
discontinued purchasing from suppliers who employed Teamster
members in order to buy from those suppliers who had contracts with
the Clerks.
The Clerks also contend that, even if the Board finds that the dis-
pute is cognizable under Section 8 (b) (4) (D), it should, as a matter of
policy, accept the parties' agreement to arbitrate their differing views
as to the meaning of the recognition and work assignment clauses of
the contract.
Answering the assertion of the Council that the dispute
is not arbitrable because of a reservation in the arbitration provision
relating to questions of the Clerks jurisdiction, the Clerks point out
that the agreement specifically provided that questions as to arbitra-
bility should also be arbitrated.
An award in the arbitration pro-
ceedings would, according to the Clerks, be definitive as to its rights
under the contract, and the dispute would thus be settled as between
the essential parties.
It therefore argues that the arbitration clauses
of the contract constitute agreement for a method of voluntary adjust-
ment, which under Section 10(k), is a ground for quashing the instant
notice of hearing.
A jurisdictional dispute necessarily involves a conflict arising from
the competing demands of two groups of employees. Such a dispute
cannot be finally resolved unless all the parties caught up in the work
assignment controversy have bound themselves to abide by in arbitra-
tion award.
The argument of the Clerks that the agreement to arbi-
trate need include only itself and the Council is based upon the
contention, which we have discussed previously, that the dispute is
exclusively concerned with the meaning to be given to the recognition
and work assignment clauses of the 1956 agreement.
But this is only
the manner in which the controversy happens to be phrased; the sub-
stance of the controversy is whether the food markets have a statu-
torily protected right to make work
assignments without being
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America , Local 581, et at. (Ora
Collard ), 98 NLRB 346 ; Local 562, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices
of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry, etc., et at.
( Northwest Heating Company),.
107 NLRB 542 ; Local 553, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the
Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry, etc., et at. (Alton Water Company), 106 NLRB 186;
International
Longshoremen's
Association,
Local 1294
(Independent )
( Cargill, Inc.),
108 NLRB 313; United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and
Pipe Fitting Industry,
etc., et at., Local 177
( Carrier Corporation),
111 NLRB 940;
Bay Counties District Council of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, et at.
(Associated Home Builders of San Francisco, Inc.), 115 NLRB 1757; Local 173, Wood,
Wire and Metal Lathers' International Union, AFL-CIO, et at. (Newark & Essex Plaster-
ing Co.), 121 NLRB 1094.
994
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
subjected to strike pressures.
If the Council has contracted away
certain work assignment rights of the markets in favor of a "wall to
wall, floor to ceiling" jurisdiction of the Clerks, it is the Clerks pre-
rogative to test the alleged failure of the Council to live up to its
agreement by methods provided for in the agreement.
But whether
the Clerks are willing or are now able to proceed with a determination
of their rights through arbitration, the Board must still determine if
it had a right to induce a work stoppage in order to obtain work reas-
signments.
This is a statutory problem which only the Board is
qualified to pass upon.
The Council and the Clerks may be the essen-
tial parties in determining whether there has been a violation of the
agreement, but the Teamsters and the suppliers are equally essential
parties to the voluntary method of adjustment contemplated in Section
10(k).
Without their consent to participate in an arbitration pro-:
ceeding, there can be no effectual voluntary settlement of the dispute.'
We also find no merit in the Clerks contention that the dispute is
now moot because the 1956 contract under which its claims allegedly
were made has now expired.
This again merely restates its basic
contention that the contract assigned the shelving work to it, so that
the expiration of the contract has deprived it of any further right to
demand the disputed work. The Clerks demand for the shelving work
was not, however, based solely on the 1956 contract.
Similar demands
were asserted under previous contracts which did not contain the same
recognition or work assignment provisions.
The claims of the Clerks
are in fact based on its status as the recognized bargaining representa-
tive of employees doing "clerks work" in the food markets, and it is
in support of this basic jurisdictional claim that the Clerks are
demanding the right to all shelving work which the markets permit
others to perform.
We find, therefore, that expiration of the 1956
4 Local 173, Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers' International
Union, AFL-CIO; et at.
(Newark & Essex Plastering Co.), supra; Millwrights Local 1102 , United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO; et at. (Don Cartage Co.), 121 NLRB 101 ;
Local 46, Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers' International Union, AFL-CIO; et at. (Acousti-
cal
Contractors Association
of
New York),
120 NLRB 837;
Wood,
Wire and Metal
Lathers International Union and its Local Union No. 2 , AFL-CIO, et at. (Acoustical
Contractors Association of Cleveland ), 119 NLRB 1345;
Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers'
International
Union, Local
46, AFL-CIO
(Jacobson &
Co.,
Inc. ),
119 NLRB 1658;
Local Union No. 1, Sheet Metal Workers International Association, AFL, at at. (Meyer
Furnace Company ), 114 NLRB 924; Local Union No. 9, Wood, Wire, and Metal Lathers
International Union, AFL (A. W. Lee, Inc.), 113 NLRB 947; Truck Drivers Local Union
No, 375,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters ,
etc.
(Service Transport Co.),
113
NLRB 452; National Association of Broadcast Engineers and Technicians , etc. (National
Broadcasting Company, Inc.), 105 NLRB 355, footnote 22.
General Warehousemen and
Employees Union, Local 636, et al.
(Roy Stone Transfer Corporation), 99 NLRB 662 ;
International Brotherhood of Teamsters , etc., Local #236, etc.
(Wm. F. Traylor), 97
NLRB 1003;
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners
of America, Local 943,
A.F. of L.
(Manhattan Construction Company, Inc.), 96 NLRB 1045; Local 26, Inter-
national
Fur and Leather Workers Union, etc. (Winslow
Bros.
&
Smith Co.),
90
.NLRB 1379.
RETAIL CLERKS INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, ETC .
995
contract has not extinguished the Clerks continuing claim to the work
in dispute.
Responsibility of the International: Respondent International was
not a party to the agreement between the Council and the southern
California locals, including Respondent Local 770, nor is there any
evidence that it participated in the negotiations leading thereto. Its
participation in the events preceding the stoppages in October 1957
consisted in having its representatives appear at the three meetings
which were held in 1956 and 1957 between the Council and the nine
signatory locals.
In October 1956, a year before the work stoppage,
Philpot, West Coast regional director for the International, attended
such a meeting.
Philpot was not the spokesman for the locals, having
apparently been called in to act as a mediating influence. Philpot was
also present at the next meeting in April 1957, attended by officials of
the Council, Local 770, and Teamsters Joint Council No. 42. DeSilva,
executive secretary of Local 770, acted as spokesman for the Clerks,
a role he had also filled in the previous meeting.
However, at the third
of these meetings, held shortly before the work (stoppages, the presi-
dent and the general counsel of the International appeared, with the
latter assuming the most active role among the Clerks' representatives.
When the Council president refused to give an unequivocal answer as
to whether it would arbitrate the dispute, the general counsel of the
International stated that the Clerks would be free to take other steps.
There is no evidence that Local 770 required, or obtained, the ap-
proval of the International before engaging in the work lstoppages
which constitute the inducement of employees in this case, nor does it
appear that the International could have forced Local 770 to desist
from the actions it took.
The only evidence of joint responsibility of
the International for the stoppages is the fact that its general counsel
warned the employers that the Clerks would not be satisfied until their
disagreement was arbitrated.
We find that this is not sufficient to
establish either participation in, or ratification of the steps subse-
quently taken by Local 770 in its efforts to enforce its demands.
Accordingly, the notice of hearing in this proceeding as to the
Respondent International will be quashed.
Upon the entire record, we find that there is reasonable cause to
believe that Respondent Local 770 has induced or encouraged em-
ployees of Council members to refrain from performing services for
the purpose of forcing food markets who are Council members to as-
sign the work of shelving, displaying, and rotating items supplied
by United States Hardware, Wesco, and other suppliers to Clerks
members, and that the said Respondent thereby violated Section
8 (b) (4) (D) of the Act.
We further find that the dispute in this
proceeding is properly before us for determination under Section
10 (k) of the Act.
996
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
D. Merits of the dispute
It is well established that an employer is free to make work assign-
ments without being subject to strike pressure of a labor organization
seeking work for its members, unless the Employer is failing to con-
form to an order or certification of the Board determining the bar-
gaining representative for employees performing the disputed work,
or unless the Employer is bound by an agreement to assign the dis-
puted work to the claiming union.
No order or certification of the
Board is invoked in this case.
There remains for consideration, there-
fore, in determining this dispute, the Clerks' contention that it has a
contractual right to the work.
Before proceeding to an analysis of
the 1956 contract, we believe it would be helpful to set out the recog-
nition clause of previous contracts, and the proposals made in nego-
tiating the 1956 contract, in order to determine what changes, if any,
the parties intended to make.
From 1948 to 1956, the recognition clause of the Clerks-Council
agreement was "The Employer recognizes the Union as the sole col-
lective bargaining agency for all employees working for the Employer
and within the jurisdiction of the Union. . . ." [Emphasis supplied.]
During the negotiations for the 1956 agreement, the Clerks proposed
a recognition clause which would cover all persons working within the
employers' establishments.
The proposal also contained a clause
whereby the employer would agree not to subcontract any work in the
stores unless the work was to be performed by journeymen clerks em-
ployed by companies signatory to the agreement between the Clerks
and the Council.
Finally, the Clerks proposed that where the work
performed in the employers' stores was being performed by persons
not covered by the agreement, the practice could continue only at the
discretion and sole consent of the Clerks.
On the other hand, the Council's proposal was that work performed
in the employers' stores would be in accordance with the practices and
policies in effect in January 1955, and that a status quo of the condi-
tions as of that date would be maintained for the duration of the
contract to be negotiated.
Article I of the 1956 agreement is quite detailed but does not incor-
porate the specific wording proposed by either party. It reads as
follows :
Article I-Recognition of the Union.
A. Bargaining unit.
1. The Union is hereby recognized as the sole collective bar-
gaining agent for all employees within the bargaining unit com-
prised of those classifications of employees which constituted the
Union's bargaining unit on January 1, 1955, or on such other
RETAIL CLERKS INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, ETC.
997'
basis as may result from the Agreement [between Retail Clerks
and Meat Cutters Union].
B. Work Performed :
All work performed on the premises in the nature of work gen-
erally performed by retail clerks shall only be performed by
employees in the bargaining unit as herein defined.
C. Subcontracting or Assignment of Work.
1. The Employers shall not subcontract any work ordinarily
performed by retail clerks in the stores or markets of the Em-
ployers, and, further, any future work created by the Employer
within the Employer's stores or markets which would ordinarily
be performed by retail clerks shall be performed only by members
of the bargaining unit as herein set forth, except that such work
may be subcontracted to an employer who is signatory to an
Agreement with the Union.
2. The Employer agrees not to assign or contract with any-
other union or person for work which is presently being per-
formed by members of the bargaining unit represented by the-
Union.
3. Any other work which is presently under specific contracts.
with the Teamsters, Culinary Workers, and Building Service
Employees Unions shall not be affected by the Agreement, except
as to any change which may result from an agreement of the-
unions involved and the signatory Union and upon presentation
to the Employer of bona fide proof thereof.
D. Exceptions of Paragraphs B and C Above.
[Not set out here, but discussed below.]
E. Union Jurisdiction.
The recognition understanding, and the practices hereunder-
shall govern with further agreement that, during the life of this
Agreement, the Union will not engage in jurisdictional disputes
on the premises of the Employer's place of business. Should the
jurisdiction as hereinabove set forth be violated, the Union re-
serves the right to take any defensive action of a lawful nature.-
It will be noted that article I does not specifically refer to the prob-
lem of what services could be performed by driver-salesmen on the-
premises of the food markets, even though the Clerks and Council
were fully aware of their dispute with respect to that problem. If'
the agreement assigned this work to the Clerks, it did so inferentially,.
through the general broad coverage granted that union, and not sub-
sequently qualified by other provisions which permit the food market-
operators to subcontract, and to assign, work to members of other-
unions.
535828-60-vol. 125-64
'998
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The first major issue then, in ascertaining the coverage of article
I is to determine the meaning of the phrases "performed on the prem-
ises in the nature of work generally performed by retail clerks" and
"work" which is "presently" and "ordinarily" performed by retail
clerks, which the employers may not subcontract or assign to others
than Clerks members.
We are urged by the Clerks to find that work
generally performed by retail clerks covers the work of the driver-
salesmen in the markets because it is of the same general type as that
admittedly assigned to clerks in the stores.
Succinctly stated, since
clerks ordinarily do shelving work, all shelving work has been as-
signed to the Clerks.
The Council and Teamsters, however, point out that driver-salesmen
have been performing shelving work for many years in the ordinary
and regular course of food market operations, so that the tasks
assigned to the driver-salesmen have not generally or ordinarily been
performed by food market clerks.
The second major area of difference in the interpretation of the
agreement is as to the rights of the food markets to subcontract work
to be performed on their premises. Some markets have individual
contracts with the Culinary Workers Union covering the employees
at snack bars in the stores, and with the Building Service Employees
Union for their janitorial help.
Other markets have leased out the
snack bars, or subcontracted the maintenance work, to independent
firms who have contracts with these unions.
Only one market op-
erator, Ralph's Markets, has a specific contract with the Teamsters for
work to be performed on the store premises, and this applies only to
backroom employees who act as receiving clerks away from the selling
area.
The Clerks regard the privilege of subcontracting, or the
assigning of work to members of other unions, as being limited to
those types of work which are not ordinarily performed by Clerks,
and then only if it is covered by a specific contract with one of the
three named unions. Thus it is argued, that work which is ordinarily
performed by store clerks is within the Clerks' jurisdiction, even
though it is the subject of a specific contract between a market and one
of the above-named unions. This argument is further developed by
asserting that the phrase "specific contracts" does not refer to con-
tracts between one of the three named unions and an independent
contractor who may be performing services on the market premises
with his own employees. The Clerks would therefore recognize as the
only specific Teamsters contract which it is bound to respect as that
which the Teamsters have with Ralph's Markets for the backroom
employees.
The counterargument of the Council and Teamsters is
that the "specific contracts" which the Clerks must honor refers to
the contracts between the markets and the rack-jobbers, leading to
RETAIL CLERKS INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, ETC .
999
the conclusion that the work of the driver-salesmen, in the words of
paragraph C-3 "shall not be affected by the Agreement. . . ."
The Clerks also argue that those specific contracts with the Team-
sters which it must honor can mean only contracts entered into with
market operators, and not with rack-jobbers, since otherwise para-
graph D "Exceptions to Paragraphs B and C" would be unnecessary.
Paragraph D consists of minor exceptions permitting non-Clerks
members to do clerks' work such as inventory taking, offering of sam-
ples, and certain activities in connection with opening new stores.
However, these exceptions would be necessary whether or not para-
graph C was intended to exempt the services of the driver- salesmen
from the Clerks' jurisdiction.
There are other closely reasoned arguments based on a word by
word analysis of the various paragraphs of article I.
Enough, how-
,ever, has been set out above to indicate the conflicting interpretations
to which this article has given rise.
Each side can point to phrases
and sentences which support its position, and each side has built up
.a logical argument based on article I, on the past practice of the
parties, and on the course of the negotiations which led to the 1956
agreement.
An arbitrator who might have to decide the ultimate
meaning of article I could do so by balancing the relative reason-
ableness of the opposed interpretations.
For our part, however, we
can only find that the agreement is susceptible to varying interpreta-
tions, none of which can be summarily rejected as wholly irrational
or unreasonable.
Thus, it is clear that the shelving work performed
by driver-salesmen is certainly work of the same nature as that gen-
.erally performed by retail clerks, but it is also work which was not
recognized as being within the Clerks unit on January 1, 1956.
We
also believe that the agreement contemplated the performance of
services for the food markets by Teamster members under certain
circumstances which are not fully explicated.
As we stated above,
article I offers some support for the inconsistent interpretations of
the contracting parties.
We can only conclude that article I does
not display the degree of clarity which we require when a respondent
union relies on a contract provision as exoneration for its inducement
of employees to engage in a work stoppage with the object of forcing
an employer to reassign work to it .5
National Association of Broadcast Engineers and Technicians,
C.I.O.,
Hollywood
Chapter
(National Broadcasting Company, Inc.), 105 NLRB 3,55;
Radio & Television
Broadcast Engineers Union, Local 1212, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
.AFL-CIO ( Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.),
114 NLRB 1354;
General Drivers,
Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 968, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc.
(Farnsworth & Chambers Co., Inc. ), 115 NLRB 617; and Local 675, Union of Operating
Engineers, etc. (Port Everglades Terminal Company, Inc .), 116 NLRB 27.
Our dissenting colleagues would find that the Clerks- Council agreement is a defense to
the charges because its ambiguous work assignment provisions are susceptible of eventual
-determination through arbitration and are, therefore, potentially unambiguous.
They
1000
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Finally, the Clerks urge us to find that agreements between United
States Hardware and Wesco with the Teamsters during the 1956-58
period were illegal and cannot therefore be "specific contracts" within
the meaning of article I C-(3) of the agreement. On August 4, 1959,.
the Board issued a Decision and Order in Cases Nos. 21-CA-2852 and
2853 pursuant to a settlement stipulation of the parties, under which
United States Hardware and Wesco were ordered to withdraw and
withhold recognition from the Teamsters until it was certified, and
not to renew, apply, or enforce any agreement with the Teamsters,
unless it conformed to Section 8(a) (3).
The illegality of a contract
between the Teamsters and the two suppliers, who are Charging
Parties here, is wholly extraneous to the issues presented for deter-
mination in this proceeding.
Whether the food-markets were justi-
fied in subcontracting work to rack-jobbers who had an illegal
contract with the Union whose members were then assigned the
disputed work is irrelevant to a determination of the food markets'
rights to assign disputed work tasks.
The food markets who made
the assignments had no contracts with the Teamsters, and no taint
of illegality pertains to that relationship e
DETERMINATION OF DISPUTE
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings, and the entire record in
this case, the Board makes the following determination of dispute
pursuant to Section 10(k) of the Act :
1. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, AFL-CIO, and its agents are
not, and have not been entitled, by means proscribed by Section
8(b) (4) (D) of the Act, to force or require members of Food Em-
would treat an admittedly ambiguous work assignment clause with the same effect as a
Board order or certification for purposes of exoneration , if the meaning of the clause can
be arbitrated.
The members of the majority, on the other hand, believe that a con-
tractual provision for arbitration constitutes an agreed upon method for the voluntary
adjustment of a work assignment dispute under Section 10 ( k), and may be a defense to
Section 8(b) (4) (D) charges only when all parties to the dispute have agreed to be bound
by such method. See cases cited in footnote 4.
We believe that our view of the effect to
be given an agreement to arbitrate in a work assignment dispute, i .e., the necessity that
all the parties be bound, is preferable to that of our dissenting colleagues because we are
of the opinion that in this respect arbitration to settle the meaning of an ambiguous
work-assignment clause should be treated like arbitration to settle the conflicting claims
arising thereunder.
In both cases, the arbitration procedure is ineffective unless all
parties having an interest in the outcome of the dispute agree to be bound .
Secondly,
even when the Board has refused to remedy an unfair labor practice because the same
facts also constitute a dispute subject to arbitration, it has done so only when all the
affected interests have had an opportunity to participate in the arbitration.
See, for
example, Spielberg Manufacuring Company, 112 NLRB 1080 .
Finally, we see no reason
to favor the Clerks on the ground that the Council refused to accept arbitration, since
the Clerks did not seek judicial enforcement of their right to arbitration until after it had
resorted to self-help.
Cf. W. L. Mead, Inc., 113 NLRB 1040.
0National Association of Broadcast Engineers and Technicians , C.I.O., and its Chicago
Chapter
( American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc.),
110 NLRB 1233, 1243 ;
Local 595, International Association of Bridge , Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers,
A.F.L., et al.
(Bechtel Corporation ), 108 NLRB 823 , 835 ; and International Longshore-
men's Association, Ind., et al.
(Abraham Kaplan, et al.), 116 NLRB 1533, 1537.
RETAIL CLERKS INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, ETC.
1001
ployers Council, Inc., to assign the work of displaying, arranging,
inventorying, checking, replenishing, and servicing merchandise
owned and/or supplied by United States Hardware and Paper Co.,
Wesco Merchandise Co., and other rack-jobbers, suppliers, and dis-
tributors, to its members rather than to the employees of said suppliers
who are not members of the Respondent.
2. Within 10 days from the date of this Decision and Determination
of Dispute, Respondent Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, AFL-CIO,
shall notify, in writing, the Regional Director for the Twenty-first
Region of the National Labor Relations Board whether or not it
will refrain from forcing or requiring members of Food Employers
Council, Inc., by means proscribed by Section 8(b) (4) (D) of the
Act, to assign the work in dispute to its members rather than to the
employees of said suppliers who are not its members.
3. Notice of hearing as to Retail Clerks International Association,
AFL-CIO, heretofore issued herein, be, and it hereby is quashed.
MEMBERS ROiGERS and FANNING, dissenting :
We would quash the notice of hearing herein because, in our opinion,
the 1956 agreement between the Clerks and the Council provides a
defense for the Clerks action in striking to protest the food markets
alleged violation of that agreement.
The Board has long recognized
the value, in its disposition of jurisdictional disputes, of requiring
parties to adhere to their agreements by denying relief under Section
10(k) to an employer who has assigned work to one group of employ-
ees in derogation of the unambiguous assignment of that work to
another group of employees by contract? In acknowledging the
validity of a clear assignment by contract as a defense in a Section
10(k) proceeding, the Board has gone beyond a literal construction
of Section 8(b) (4) (D) under which only failure by an employer to
conform to an order or certification of the Board determining the
bargaining representative for employees performing the work con-
stitutes a defense for a labor organization charged with violating that
section."
But now the Board refuses to take the next step, which is
essential to the logic of its position-that a contract which provides
' National Association of Broadcast Engineers and Technicians ,
C.I.O.,
Hollywood
Chapter
(National Broadcasting Company, Inc.), 105 NLRB 355 ; Radio & Television
Broadcast Engineers Union, Local 1212, etc .
( Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.), 114
NLRB 1354 ; Local No. 48, Sheet Metal Workers, etc.
( Gadsden Heating, et al.), 119
NLRB 287.
8 In the National Broadcasting Company case, 105 NLRB 355 at 364, the Board said :
.
.
[Al literal construction of Section 8(b) (4) (D ), in the circumstances of this case,
would require that the Board acquiesce in the invasion of an incumbent union's con-
tractual rights by sanctioning
,the device of reallocating work assignments under color of
an agreement with a rival union at a time when the applicable contract is in full force
and effect.
The incumbent union compelled thereby to strike to protect its contract would
be denied a determination in its favor in a 10 ( k) proceeding because it lacked a certifica-
tion or Board order, a result wholly incongruous with the purpose of the Act to promote
stability of bargaining relations and minimize industrial disputes."
1002
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
for final and binding arbitration of its meaning is not an ambiguous
contract.
In providing a method for resolving its meaning, such
a contract will perforce, when its own terms are properly complied
with, be clear and unambiguous.
We agree with the majority that the Board should not decide
whether the intention of the Clerks and the Council can now be accu-
rately determined, or how the apparent inconsistencies of article I of
the agreement can be reconciled.
This is not to say, however, that its
meaning must forever remain uncertain and be a continuing source
of perplexity and discord.
The parties have provided a method of
self-governance in their contract through the grievance and arbitra-
tion procedures of article XIV, even to the extent of agreeing on means
for determining whether a particular dispute is arbitrable.
But
despite its commitment to the settlement of contract disputes through
the machinery of arbitration, the Council has unilaterally selected
the Board as its favored forum in its longstanding controversy with
the Clerks.
We see no reason why that choice requires the Board to
intrude into a situation which could have been finally and effectively
disposed of through arbitration.
Precedents in other areas of the Board's jurisdiction, moreover,
satisfy us that here is an overlap between statutory and contractual
rights which should be settled wholly by resort to the contract itself.
Alleged violations of Section 8(a) (3) and (5) which arise from con-
duct that may also be considered a contract violation have been dis-
posed of by our refusal to remedy the statutory violation if the griev-
ance and arbitration procedures of the contract have not been
invoked.'
The Board has also refused to issue a determination of dis-
pute in a Section 10(k) proceeding when a party which first agreed
to arbitrate a work assignment dispute later refused to do so. In
effect, we uphold the validity of an agreement to arbitrate, even when
the Charging Party is thereby denied the immediate protection of a
Section 10(k) determination.lo
Encouraging compliance with stipulated grievance and arbitration
procedures in a collective-bargaining agreement would better effectu-
ate the statutory policy underlying Section 8(b) (4) (D) than does
the action of the majority here.ll
This case well illustrates the truth
e Consolidated
Aircraft
Corporation, 47
NLRB 694,
enfd. as mod .
141 F. 2d 785
(C.A. 9) ; Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. N.L.R.B.,
161 F. 2d 949
(C.A. 6) ;
Crown
Zellerbaeh Corporation, 95 NLRB 753; McDonnell Aircraft Corporation, 109 NLRB 930;
United Telephone Company of the West, et al., 112 NLRB 779; Spielberg Manufacturing
Company, 112 NLRB 1080.
- Don Cartage Co., Inc., 121 NLRB 101; Meyer Furnace Company, 114 NLRB 924,
930; A. W. Lee, Inc., 113 NLRB 947, 951; Wm. F. Traylor, 97 NLRB 1003.
u The expiration of the agreement in effect during the period of the disputes and
stoppages does not relieve the Council of its contractual duty to arbitrate a dispute aris-
ing thereunder.
Textile
Workers
Union of America, AFL-CIO v. Lincoln
Mills of
Alabama, 353 U.S. 448; N.L.R.B. v. Knight Morley Corporation, 251 F. 2d 753, 759-760
(C.A. 6) ; Purex Corporation, Limited, 123 NLRB 1507.
DIT-MCO, INC.
1003
of that observation.
The Clerks first requested arbitration in June
1956, 6 months after the effective date of the agreement.
Fifteen
months later, in October 1957, the work stoppages took place as a
direct consequence of the Council's refusal to abide by the contract-a
refusal even to arbitrate the arbitrability of the dispute.
Two years
thereafter, the Board is determining that there is reasonable cause
to believe that Section 8(b) (4) (D) has been violated. It should be
obvious that we compound "the law's delay" by allowing our processes
to be utilized whenever the arbitration provisions of a contract are
not respected.
Accordingly, we would quash the notice of hearing.
DIT-MCO, Inc. and District Lodge No. 71, International Asso-
ciation of Machinists, AFL-CIO, Petitioner.
Case No. 17-RC-
2991.
December 18, 1959
DECISION AND DIRECTION OF ELECTION
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, a hearing on this case was held before William M.
Guerin, hearing officer.
The hearing officer's rulings made at the
hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel [Chairman Leedom and Members Bean and Fanning].
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds :
1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the
Act.
2. The labor organization involved claims to represent certain
employees of the Employer.
3. A question affecting commerce exists concerning the representa-
tion of employees of the Employer within the meaning of Section
9(c) (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
4. The Employer, at its plant and office in Kansas City, Missouri, is
engaged in the manufacture and sale of electronic equipment.
The
Petitioner seeks to represent the production and maintenance em-
ployees.
While the parties are in agreement generally as to the ap-
propriateness of such a unit of employees' the Employer would
exclude assembler leadladies and the final assembler leadman as
supervisors, and test-out technicians as technical employees.
The
Petitioner would include all these employees.
i The parties agree that the employees in the following classifications should be in-
cluded in the unit : assemblers , final assemblers, stock handler, storeroom clerk, receiving
clerk, shipping clerk, shopman, and assistant shopman.
Likewise, they agree to the
exclusion of the draftsmen and guard.
125 NLRB No. 103.