Scougal Rubber Mfg. Co., Inc.

470 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD remedy and to remove the effects of the unfair labor practices and to effectuate the policies of the Act. Because of the nature and scope of Respondent's coercive practices, I shall recommend a broad cease and desist order. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAw 1. The Charging Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 2. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7, in the manner found under Concluding Findings, supra, Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8 (a) (1). 3. Said unfair labor practices having occurred in connection with the operation of Respondent's business as set forth in section I, above , have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce ;among the several States, and substantially affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] Scougal Rubber Mfg. Co., Inc.; Bruce J. Stewart, d/b/a Stewart Machine and Tool Co.; Mechanical Products Mfg. Co. ; Rottler Boring Bar Co., Petitioners and International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO, Local No. 79 Harbor Island Machine Works, Inc. and Lars R. Meyer, Peti- tioner and International Association of Machinists, AFL- CIO, Local No. 79. Cases Nos. 19-RM-265, 19-RM-261, 19-RM- 267, 19-RM-9370, and 19-RD-156. February 4, 1960 DECISION AND DIRECTION OF ELECTIONS Upon petitions duly filed under Section 9(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, hearings were held before Rachel Storer, hearing of- ficer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearings are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.' Upon the entire record in these cases, the Board finds : 1. The Employers are engaged in commerce within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act. 2. The labor organization involved claims to represent certain em- ployees of the Employers. 3. A question affecting commerce exists concerning the representa- tion of employees of the Employers within the meaning of Section 9(c) (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.' 4. These Employers have been part of a group of 50 or more em- ployers represented in collective bargaining in the Seattle area by the ' Attorneys for certain of the Employers filed a motion to consolidate the records after the hearings had been held. We hereby grant this motion to consolidate and also include in this consolidation for decision the case of Soougai Rubber inasmuch as it arises from the same factual background and involves the same problems. 2 We note that the Union claims to represent a unit broader in scope than that sought in the Employer petitions . See Triangle Publications, Inc., •115 NLRB 941. In the decertification proceeding we note that the Union did not disclaim interest In a single- employer unit. Compare Langenau Manufacturing Company, 115 NLRB 1505, 1506. ,126 NLRB No. 53. SCOUGAL RUBBER MFG. CO., INC., ETC. 471 Washington Metal Trades, Inc., an employer association. The As- sociation has contracted for some years with International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO, Local No. 79, for a unit of tool- and die- makers and machinists. Negotiations for a new contract were begun after April 1, 1959, the preceding contract having expired on March 31. On May 13, no agreement having been reached, the Union went on strike. Early in June Stewart filed its employer-petition herein and simul- taneously withdrew from bargaining through the Association, send- ing a copy of its letter to the Union. The testimony is conflicting as to whether the Union then offered to bargain separately with Stewart. We believe that it is a fair inference from the records in these cases as a whole that the Union is inaccurate in its recollection of discussing individually with this employer only a multiemployer agreement, and credit the latter's testimony that the Union then expressed willingness to discuss an independent contract at any time. Later in June the Union approached Scougal Rubber offering to bargain separately with it because it was not a machine shop. Al- though no separate agreement was reached, Scougal, on June 24, with- drew from the Association for bargaining. Its withdrawal was ac- knowledged in a letter stating that the Association would "be guided accordingly." On August 19, the Union addressed a letter to "Machine Shop Employers of Washington Metal Trades, Inc.," of which the other three employers here involved received copies. In it the Union im- plied that five large firms were prolonging the strike to the detriment of smaller firms such as the recipient, offered to bargain separately, and enclosed a blank form of contract. Rottler had already with- drawn authority to bargain from the Association and received ac- knowledgment. On September 2, it filed its employer-petition herein. Mechanical had also withdrawn authority to bargain before receipt of the Union's letter, and it filed the above employer-petition in late August. Harbor Island withdrew from Association bargaining on September 14. The decertification petition involving its employees was filed the same day. Another employer not here involved also received the Union's August 19 letter and withdrew from the As- sociation when a decertification petition was filed in September. That proceeding was terminated when the Union agreed to a consent elec- tion in a unit limited to the employer's employees.' On September 21, those employers who had remained in the Asso- ciation for bargaining purposes reached an agreement with the Union. The Union contends that the petitions should be dismissed because the withdrawals by the five employers here involved were untimely, 3 Cunningham Mfg Co , Case No 19-RD-155, unpublished. 472 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD inasmuch as the multiemployer bargaining unit was an established one and negotiations for a new contract had begun. The employers, on the contrary, contend that single-employer units are now appro- priate because of the special circumstances of these cases and mutual consent to abandonment of the multiemployer unit, hence that the petitions are timely. We find merit in the employers' contention and shall order elections in single-employer units. In reaching this con- clusion we note that in all of these cases not only do the employers seek to bargain singly, as witnessed by their formal withdrawals from the Association for bargaining purposes, but the Union-as to these employers at least-has expressed a willingness to abandon the multi- employer unit and bargain on a single-employer basis. We note also that in at least one other case involving an employer formerly rep- resented in the unit, the Union has consented to an election on a single- employer basis. In these circumstances we think it is clear that these parties should no longer be required to bargain on a multiemployer basis, whether we find mutual abandonment of multiemployer bar- gaining as to the employees covered by the petitions herein, or simply that the Union as to these parties is estopped to urge a position con- trary to its previous overtures for single employer bargaining.' We find that the following employees of the individual employers constitute units appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within Section 9 (b) of the Act : All production and maintenance employees employed by Employer Scougal Rubber Mfg. Co., Inc., at its Seattle, Washington, plant, excluding office clerical employees, professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. All production and maintenance employees employed by Employer Bruce J. Stewart d/b/a Stewart Machine and Tool Co., at its Seattle, Washington, plant, excluding office clerical employees, professional employees, and supervisors as defined in the Act. All production and maintenance employees employed by Employer Mechanical Products Mfg. Co., at its Seattle, Washington, plant, ex- cluding office clerical employees, professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. All production and maintenance employees employed by Employer Rottler Boring Bar Co., at its Seattle, Washington, plant, excluding office clerical employees, professional employees, guards, and super- visors as defined in the Act. All production and maintenance employees employed by Employer Harbor Island Machine Works, Inc., at its Seattle, Washington, plant, 4 See Neville Foundry Company, Inc., 122 NLRB 1187 ; see also Anderson Lithograph Company, Inc, et al., 124 NLRB 920, where the Board in effect held that the employers involved were estopped by their conduct to assail the m'ultiemployer unit. DALTON BRICK & TILE CORPORATION 473 excluding office clerical employees, professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. [Text of Direction of Elections omitted from publication.] MEMBERS RODGERS and JENKINS took no part in the consideration of the above Decision and Direction of Elections. Dalton Brick & Tile Corporation and United Stone & Allied Product Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Local 113. Cases Nos. 10-CA-3979 and 10-CA-3980. February 5, 1960 DECISION AND ORDER On July 31, 1959, Trial Examiner Arthur Leff issued his Inter- mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent Dalton Brick & Tile Corporation had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a brief in support thereof. The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter- mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the 'Trial Examiner's findings, conclusions, and recommendations.' ORDER Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that Respondent Dalton Brick & Tile Corpora- tion, Dalton, Georgia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall : I Respondent , on December 7, 1959, filed with the Board a motion to reopen the record to receive additional evidence which was not available at the time of the hearing. The General Counsel and Local 113 submitted briefs in response thereto. The additional evi- dence in question relates to further findings and a decision upon appeal of the Georgia Employment Security Agency with respect to applications for unemployment compensa- tion made by certain of Respondent 's employees subsequent to Respondent 's suspension of operations . In affirming the Trial Examiner 's conclusions that the Respondent, by its actions, violated Section 8 ( a) (1), (3), and (5) of the Act, we note that the Trial Examiner did not, in any manner , give weight to the findings or decision of the State agency, but rather, utilized the relevant circumstances to illustrate the inconsistent reasons for the suspension of operations given by the Respondent during the course of the proceedings before such State agency and before this Board . The Intermediate Report correctly finds that the reason given to the Georgia Employment Security Agency for such suspension constitutes a definite admission against interest so far as the instant proceeding is con- cerned . Inasmuch as the additional evidence which the Respondent seeks to introduce in no way refutes this patent inconsistency , Respondent's motion is hereby denied. 126 NLRB No. '61.