Simmons Co.

Q656 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD action, which the Board has held was not intended by Congress to be reached by the foregoing proscription in Section 8(b) (4) (A) The opinion, however, had just before, stated that the Board agreed with the Trial Examiner that the evidence did not establish that either the Teamsters or Operating Engineers was responsible for the decision of the members of those unions to re- spect the picket line It is thus apparent that there was no ruling in this respect on the issue involved in this case and it seems to me no inference can be drawn from its ,discussion of the primary nature of appeals to the employees of the primary employer The Respondent Union relies on language in the opinion answering a contention by the Company that the case was distinguishable from the Rice Milling case, supra, in that the Teamsters and the Operating Engineers had no dispute with Westhenner, the primary employer It is as follows Columbia-Southern contends, however, that the action of Teamsters and Operating Engineers in inducing employees of the primary employer [West hermer] in the instant case to leave their work is distinguishable from that of the union in the Rice Milling case, in that Teamsters and Operating Engineers ,did not, themselves, have any dispute with Westheimer , the only dispute being between Westheimer and Pipefitters However, as we read the legislative history of the provisions of- ection 8(b) (4) (A) here involved, Congress was not concerned to protect primary employers against pressures by disinterested unions, but rather to protect dis- interested employers against direct pressures by any union The Court thereby gives another reason why the case as, to the Teamsters and the Operating Engineers should be dismissed This language relates to the relationship of the Vinous to the primary employer as to inducement of his employees and does not touch the issue in this case There is evidence in the record as referred to earlier that the president of Local 200 participated in picketing on at least one occasion . I can see no unlawful action ,either by said officer or the Local in assisting, whether paid or not, in the picketing by Local 743 Any request, express or implied, by such picket to drivers of neutral ,carriers not to deliver or pick up is a traditional part and purpose of the picketing process and does not violate Section 8(b)(4)(A) It seems basic in principles of picketing that the union or group setting up a picket line may hire pickets or obtain pickets by requesting individuals to serve or by requesting other labor organizations to furnish persons to serve, whether or not the pickets or the assisting union are connected with the subject matter of the dispute I have been unable to find any such restrictions on the participation in or assistance to legal picketing at the premises of an employer In view of the considerations above discussed it is my opinion and I conclude that the inducement and encouragement by officers of Local 200 to its members to re- spect the primary picket line at Milwaukee Plywood and not to deliver or pick up for their carrier employers at the picket line was not a violation of Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the Act and I shall recommend that the complaint herein be dismissed CONCLUSIONS OF LAw 1 The Charging Party, Milwaukee Plywood Company, is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act 2 The Respondent Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act 3 The Respondent Union has not engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint as violating Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the Act [Recommendations omitted from publication ] `S1ntmans Company and United, Furniture Workers of America, Local 1010, AFL-CIO, Petitioner. Case No 21-]?--6012 Feb- ruary 15, 1960 DECISION AND ORDER Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before Louis S Eberhardt, hearing 126 NLRB No. 75 SIMMONS COMPANY 657 officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three- member panel [Chairman Leedom and Members Bean and Jenkins]. Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds : 1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. 2. The Petitioner and the Intervenor, Upholsters International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, and Local 15, are labor organiza- tions which claim to represent certain employees of the Employer. 3. No question affecting commerce exists concerning the representa- tion of employees of the Employer within the meaning of Section 9(c) (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, for the following reasons: Petitioner seeks a unit of employees in the mattress department of the Employer's Los Angeles, California, plant. The Intervenor claims its current contract is a bar and that the unit sought is inappro- priate. The Employer takes the position that the petition is prema- ture because the department sought is expanding and has not yet been established on a permanent basis.' The Employer is a major manufacturer of livingroom and bed- room furniture, operating some 14 plants in various parts of the country. The manufacture of livingroom furniture at the instant plant began in the spring of 1958, and the next year, in about Mao 1959, the Employer commenced the manufacture of mattresses. The mattress department is located on the same floor as the offices and showrooms. This floor also houses a warehouse area for packaged units, behind which is the space used for mattress manufacturing. Behind the latter, in the rear of the building, is the section where the livingroom furniture is made. A plywood board separates the two departments. In order to establish the mattress department, the Employer trans- ferred machinery, equipment, and supervisory personnel from its San Francisco factory to the instant plant. The supervisors were engaged primarily in training new employees for this department. At the time of the hearing in the fall of 1959, most of the mattress workers were still in the training process and on probationary status. The uncohtradicted record shows considerable similarity between the livingroom and bedroom operations. It is often difficult to dis- tinguish a livingroom piece from one used for sleeping purposes. Mat- tresses are used in upholstered furniture and vice versa. Both opera- , As we are dismissing the petition on other grounds, we find no necessity for con- sidering the Employer's expanding unit contention. 554461-60-vol. 126-43 658 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tions use closers, machine operators, component assemblers, sewers, packers, cutters, etc. Although the manufacture of mattresses lends itself somewhat more to machine work rather than hand operations, which is more characteristic of upholstery manufacturing, the required job classifications and skills are substantially the same. While there is at present little interchange of workers, certain skills will be readily interchangeable. In addition to using similar types of machines, both operations use the same materials, such as wood, coil springs, wire, metal bolts, cotton felt, and rubber. Each department has its own immediate supervision, but the same overall supervision. All the Employer's products are displayed in the same showrooms, both departments use the same trucks, the same maintenance employ- ees service both, the same plant rules apply, and the Employer's San Francisco office is responsible for payrolls. As indicated above, the manufacture of livingroom furniture began in April 1958, and on December 29, 1958, the Employer executed an agreement, here in issue, with the Intervenor, which has a termina- tion date of February 28, 1961. This contract by its express terms 2 covers all production and maintenance employees at this plant. There- fore, if as contended by the Intervenor, the mattress department is a normal accretion to the production and maintenance unit, the em- ployees therein are covered thereby. The Petitioner claims that be- cause the preamble of the contract refers to the Simmons Company, Living Boom Division, Los Angeles, California (emphasis supplied) as the Employer, and the mattress department is a new operation, it is not covered by the contract 3 We find this contention without merit. It is patently clear that the words "Living Room Division" were purely descriptive and intended for the purpose of identifying the Employer and not the scope of the contract's unit coverage. Nor do we find that the mattress department is a new operation so as to warrant direction of a separate election therein. Thus, the en- tire record in this case points to one crucial factor: the Employer is engaged in the same functional activity in its livingroom and bed- room operations-the manufacturing of home furniture. As hereto- fore indicated, both operations are closely integrated and there 2 Section 1 02. Employees covered • "The persons covered by this contract include all the employees who are production and maintenance employees of the Company employed in its Los Angeles, California , plant, excluding watchmen , truck drivers , inspectors, foremen, supervisory, office , administrative, engineering and clerical employees " ' Shortly before the establishment of the mattress department, in May 1959. Petitioner filed a representation petition ( Case No 21-RC-5820 ), seeking to represent all employees at this plant, with the usual exclusions The petition was dismissed by the Regional Director on the ground that the 1958 contract was a bar Petitioner appealed to the Board urging that the facts indicated an expanding unit and that therefore the contract was not a valid bar The Board affirmed the dismissal Thereafter, Petitioner filed the instant petition to represent employees in the mattress department The Intervenor urges that the Board determination in the appeal is dispositive of the issue in the instant case. As we are deciding that the contract is a bar , we find no necessity for ruling on this question. HARBUR TERMINAL COMPANY 659 clearly exists a community of interest between employees in the two departments. Nor does the fact that a little more machine work is required in mattress manufacturing than in upholstery making, persuade us that the overall fauction has been sufficiently changed to classify the bedroom operation as a new undertaking . It therefore follows that the Employer 's mattress department is a normal accre- tion to an existing unit, and that the contract of December 1958 bars the present petition.4 Accordingly, we shall dismiss the petition. [The Board dismissed the petition.] 4Ingersoll-Humphreys Division, Borg-Warner Corporation, 117 NLRB 1715; J. W Rex Company, 115 'NLRB 775, 777; Richfield Oil Corporation, 119 NLRB 1425; cf. W. P. Fuller & Companii, 122 NLRB 814. Harbur Terminal Company and Jesse J. Jamerson and Hod Carriers & Laborers Local Union 116, AFL-CIO, Party to the Contract. Case No. 23-CA-869 (formerly 39-CA-869). Febru- ary 16, 1960 DECISION AND ORDER On October 21, 1959, Trial Examiner James T. Rasbury issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman Leedom and Members Bean and Fanning]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter- mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the case and hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions, and recommenda- tions 2 of the Trial Examiner. 'The Trial Examiner found, inter alia, that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3 ) of the Act by maintaining an exclusive hiring -hall arrangement with the Union, without having posted notices relating to the functioning of the hiring arrangement, as required by Mountain Pacific Chapter of the Associated General Contractors, Inc., et al., 119 NLRB 883 Although it is not clear from the present record whether the Respond- ent's requirement, that applicants for employment be referred by the Union , resulted from the application of an exclusive hiring-hall agreement with the Union , as found by the Trial Examiner, or whether such requirement resulted only from a practice uni- laterally adopted by the Respondent, we find that in either event the Respondent violated Section 8(a) (3) and (1) of the Act. 2 As it is not clear from the instant record that there was an agreement between the Respondent and the Union for the establishment of an exclusive hiring hall, and as it 126 NLRB No. 85.