International Longshoremens's Association

INT'L LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION (INDEPENDENT), ETC. 35 International Longshoremen's Association (Independent) and its Agents James T. Moock and Clifford Carter and Motor Transport Labor Relations, Inc. Local No. 1332, International Longshoremen's Association (Inde- pendent) and its Agents Russell Williams and E . Carter Lyles and Motor Transport Labor Relations, Inc. Cases Nos. 4-CD-37 and 4-CD-38. April 6, 1960 DECISION AND DETERMINATION OF DISPUTE This proceeding arises under Section 10(k) of the Act, which pro- vides that "whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph (4) (D) of Section 8 ('b), the Board is empowered and directed to hear and deter- mine the dispute out of which such unfair labor practice shall have arisen . . . ." On March 17, 1959, Motor Transport Labor Relations, Inc., herein called MTLR, filed with the Regional Director for the Fourth Region charges against International Longshoremen's Association ,(Independent), its Local No. 1332, and certain of their agents, herein jointly called the ILA. The charges alleged, in substance, that since .on or about March 4,1959, the ILA induced ILA employees of various pier operators on the Philadelphia waterfront to strike in order to force trucking company members of the MTLR to assign particular work to the ILA employees rather than to the trucking companies' employees, who are members of various locals of International Broth- erhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (Independent), herein called the Teamsters, in violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (D) of the Act. Thereafter, pursuant to Section 10(k) of the Act and Sections 102.79 and 102.80 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the Regional Director investigated the charges, and, after consolidating the cases for purposes of hearing, provided for a hearing upon due notice to all -parties. The hearing was held before Daniel P. Dooley, hearing ,officer, on June 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 15, 16, 23, and 30, 1959, at Philadel- phia, Pennsylvania. All parties appeared at the hearing and were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and-to adduce evidence bearing on the issues. The rulings of the hearing officer made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed. Thereafter, the ILA and MTLR filed briefs with the Board. Upon the entire record in these cases, the Board finds: I. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYERS The parties stipulated, and we find, that MTLR is an association of motortruck carriers who are employers; that MTLR bargains with 127 NLRB No. 9. 36 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD labor organizations on behalf of its members; and that MTLR's 121 largest members annually receive $792,000,000 for services performed in interstate commerce. Accordingly, we find that the employers who comprise MTLR are engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. The parties also stipulated, and we find, that each employer on the Philadelphia waterfront who employs members of ILA, Local 1332, receives in excess of $100,000 annually for services performed in con- nection with the transportation of goods in interstate and foreign commerce, and that each of said employers is therefore engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED The parties stipulated, and we find, that International Longshore- men's Association (Independent), and its Local 1332, are labor or- ganizations as defined in the Act. III. THE DISPUTE A. The facts ILA "Carloaders," Local 1332, is the collective-bargaining repre- sentative for the "carloaders" employed by the pier operators on the Philadelphia waterfront, and various locals of the Teamsters, prin- cipally Local 107, represent the drivers employed by the various trucking companies which transport cargo to and from the Philadel- phia waterfront. MTLR represents the trucking companies in col- lective bargaining, and Philadelphia Marine Trade Association, herein called PMTA, represents the pier operators in collective bar- gaining. A current contract between the ILA and PMTA, effective from October 1, 1956, to September 30, 1959, states that it "is meant to cover the loading and unloading of railroad cars, trucks, teams, lights, barges, transferring freight in and out of storage places, sort- ing, piling and other miscellaneous work not performed by members of the Deepsea and Coastwise Locals." 1 The ILA and PMTA have had such a work coverage clause in their contracts since 1958. The current contract between MTLR and the Teamsters contains no work coverage clause with respect to waterfront work. However, the pier operators have issued "tariffs" during the term of their current con- tract with the ILA which state, in effect, that the loading and unload- ing of trucks may be done by the truckers, and will be done by the pier operators only "upon request" or "when requested." The general function of the ILA "carloaders" is the handling of cargo on the piers after it has been unloaded from ships and placed on the piers or in storage, and the handling of cargo for export on the I The latter locals have Jurisdiction over the actual loading and unloading of the oceangoing ships. INT'L LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION (INDEPENDENT), ETC. 37 piers before it is actually loaded on the ships. There are basically two areas and types of this work which are involved here. First, there is the loading and unloading of the trucks which is done in the immediate vicinity of the tailgate of the trucks, within an area of about 15 to 20 feet from the tailgate, and which is usually done by hand. Second, there is the transporting of cargo to and from the trucks which is done beyond that area on the pier, and sometimes for considerable distances from the trucks, and which is usually done mechanically with a so-called "forklift." The usual practice has been for the ILA "carloaders" to handle the latter work. The ILA has also handled about 75 percent of the tailgate loading and unloading with the truckers doing the rest themselves with their Teamster em- ployees. However, starting in 1956 there have been attempts, by three of the truckers who do waterfront work, to do certain of their own "forklift" work beyond the tailgate area with their Teamster employees. The last of these attempts, which occurred in March 1959, resulted in work stoppages by the ILA which lasted only until the truckers ceased their attempt to do "forklift" work beyond the tailgate area; and it is these work stoppages which form the basis for the 8(b) (4) (D) charges filed herein. Thus, the work in dispute is the "forklift" work beyond the 15 to 20 foot tailgate areas, which work the ILA claims is exclusively its, but .which the truckers con- tend they can assign to their employees if they so choose. It must be noted, in addition, that the ILA contract with PMTA contains the following union-security clause : "As to any and all work hereunder finally determined by duly constituted public authority not to be subject to any statute forbidding a preferential hiring pro- vision, the Employers agree to give a preference to carloaders who are members of the Union in good standing. As to all other work, the Employers agree to institute and maintain a union shop as shall comply with Section 8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 1947, or any amendment thereto." B. Contentions of the parties The ILA contends chiefly that it has a clearly defined contract right to the disputed work under its contract with PMTA, the representa- tive of the pier operators, and that the pier operators may not evade this contract obligation by authorizing and permitting the truckers to use their own employees for jobs covered by the ILA contract. It contends further that such interpretation of the contract is also sup- ported by the longstanding usual practice on the piers with respect to the disputed work. . MTLR contends chiefly that: (1) As a matter of past practice, and under the "tariffs" issued by PMTA, it is "trucker's choice" as to whether he wants to perform the disputed work with his own em- 38 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ployees or have the pier operator perform it with the ILA "carload- ers"; (2) the ILA contract with PMTA does not contain a clearly defined contract right to the work, because the PMTA attorney has placed a contrary interpretation upon the contract; and (3) even if the ILA has such a contract right vis-a-vis the pier operators, it is not "binding" on the truckers. MTLR also urges the Board to hold only that the ILA is not entitled to the disputed work, and not to make an "assignment" of the work even to the Teamsters but to leave the situation as "trucker's choice," particularly in view of the Federal Maritime Board's general regulatory power over waterfront pier operations. C. Applicability of the statute The charges, which were duly investigated by the Regional Di- rector, allege a violation of Section 8(b) (4) (D) of the Act, and the Regional Director was satisfied upon the basis of such investigation that there was reasonable cause to believe that such violation has been committed. Moreover, the record before us establishes that there is reasonable cause to believe that the ILA induced and encouraged employees of the pier operators to strike in order to force or require the pier operators to assign the disputed "forklift" work to members of the ILA although this work had been assigned to, and was being performed by, employees of the trucking companies who were mem- bers of the Teamsters. The Board has held that such factual circum- stances are sufficient to invoke the Board's jurisdiction to hear and determine a dispute within the meaning of Section 10(k) of the Act.2 Accordingly, we find that this is a dispute which is properly before us for determination under Section 10(k) of the Act. D. The merits of the dispute The Board has held that a union does not violate section 8 (b) (4) (D) by engaging in activity otherwise proscribed, if the assignment of the disputed work which is protested is in derogation of a current collective-bargaining contract which assigns the disputed work to the striking union in clear and unambiguous terms 3 It is well estab- lished, however, that a contractual claim to disputed work in favor of the striking union, for 10 (k) purposes, may not serve that purpose 2 The Board has held that the coverage of Section 8(b) (4) (D) Is not limited to employees of a particular employer, but also extends to an attempt, as here, to force the indirect assignment of work from employees of one employer (the truck operator) to employees of another employer (the pier operator). See, e.g , Local 562, United Associa- tion of Journeymen, etc (Northwest Heating Company ), 107 NLRB 542, 548, 549; United Association of Journeymen, etc. (Carrier Corporation ), 111 NLRB 940, 944. $Radio A Television Broadcast Engineers Union, Local 1212, et at. (Columbia Broad- casting System, Inc.), 114 NLRB 1354; International Longshoremen's Association, Ind., et at. (Abraham Kaplan, et al. ), 116 NLRB 1533; Local No. 48, Sheet Metal Workers International Association, AFL-CIO, et al. (Gadsden Heating and Sheet Metal Company), 119 NLRB 287. INT'L LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION (INDEPENDENT), ETC. 391 if the contract contains a union-security clause which is patently unlawful under Section 8 (a) (3).4 The union-security clause which appears in the ILA's contract with the PMTA, involved in the present case, is identical to one which the Board had before it in a previous case involving another ILA local.' In that case the Board found the provision of the clause for preferential hiring to be unlawful, because the evidence showed that, despite the provision purportedly deferring application of the preference system, the parties had been following- an unlawful hiring practice under and by virtue of the contract, The- Board thus concluded that the parties never intended to postpone- operation of the preference system and that the preference clause- was in fact designed to create present discriminatory conditions of employment. The Board-although it indeed intimated that the' clause was in fact unlawful 6-thus found no need to base its decision- upon a determination of the issue as to whether the union-security clause is unlawful upon its face. This latter is the question which, now confronts us squarely in the present case.' An examination of the ILA's union-security agreement with. PMTA as it appears in the present proceeding,' discloses that the- first sentence thereof provides for preferential hiring, but purports. to be limited in its application to such work under the contract as, may be "finally determined by duly constituted public authority" not to be subject to a statutory prohibition. The second sentence, which, applies to "all other work," provides for a union shop, but purports- to comply with Section 8(a) (3) of the Act or its amendments. We ° United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices, etc. (Philadelphia Association), 108 NLRB 186, 200; United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices, etc. (Carrier Corporation ), 111 NLRB 940, 945-946. 'Local 1566, International Longshoremen's Association (Philadelphia Marine Trade Association ), 122 NLRB 967. 6 See footnote 3 of Local 1566, International Longshoremen's Association (Philadelphia Marine Trade Association ), 122 NLRB 967, where the Board said: "Moreover, we ob- serve that the language of the quoted paragraph is so obscure that a workingman covered by its provisions could hardly be expected to know when union membership was required) and when it was not. The courts have said that a union-security clause should be written in language that an ordinary workingman can readily understand . N.L,R.B. v. Shuck Construction Co., 243 F. 2d 519 ( C.A. 9) ; Red Star Express Lines of Auburn, Inc. v. N L.R B., 196 F. 2d 78 (C.A. 2).11 7 The parties have not, it is true, raised the issue of the lawfulness of the union- security provisions, nor has any evidence been offered as to the parties ' practice under this section of their contract. However, as the ILA here asserts and relies upon its contract with PMTA as a principal basis for its claim to the disputed work, it is therefore incumbent upon the Board to determine, upon a full examination of the contract, whether- it meets the standards necessary to establish such a claim. See, for example, United' Association of Journeymen and Apprentices (Philadelphia Association ), '108 NLRB 186, 199, where, in determining the merits of a similar claim of contractual work assignment' in a 10 ( k) proceeding, the Board said, "For the contracts to insulate the [union's] actions, two conditions must be satisfied : (1) The [union's] contracts must embrace the disputed- rigging work, and (2 ) the contracts must otherwise be valid enforceable instruments."- In that case, as in this , it does not appear that an issue as to the validity of the union- security provision had been raised by the parties . Nevertheless, in the following the- doctrine thus indicated , the Board examined the union-security clause and found that it invalidated the contract as a basis for a 10(k) determination. 8 See text under statement of facts, section A, supra. 40 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD find that these provisions are patently unlawful and not validated by the deferral and savings clauses which they contain. We regard the terms of this clause, which in its entirety purports to cover all work subject to the contract,9 as vague and uninformative and aptly subject to the condemnation of such a clause as insufficiently explicit in the matter of the rights and obligations of employees affected by it, which the Board has expressed in other cases.10 Most recently, in the Perry Coal case,ll the Board unanimously held a union-security provision, less obviously involved and unclear than that contained in the agreement in the present case, nevertheless to be violative of the Act because it did not sufficiently inform the em- ployees nor enable them adequately to appraise the union-security requirements to which they must conform. The contract in that case provided that "as a condition of employment employees shall be, or become, members of the [union] to the extent and in the manner pro- vided by law." The Board in that case said: It is well settled that where, as here, a contract contains an un- lawful provision, a general "savings clause" that does not specify to what extent the provision is intended to be limited will not purge such a provision of its illegal character. Thus, the quali- fying language in this provision-"to the extent and in the man- ner provided by law"-fails to set forth in clear and unambigu- ous terms limitations on the requirement of union membership that conform the provision to the union security standards of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. We do not believe that the burden of statutory and judicial interpretation can reasonably be placed upon an employee to be acted upon at his peril. We are convinced that what the Board unanimously said in that case is no less applicable here. Accordingly, we find that the union- security clause in the present proceeding, which contains only gen- eral "savings" provisions, fails to meet the standards required of such an instrument, and is invalid. We conclude, therefore, that any contractual claim to the disputed "forklift" work which the ILA may have had under its contract with PMTA may not be utilized for the purpose of establishing a right to such work with respect to a 10 (k) proceeding. As the ILA may thus not rely on any contractual claim to the disputed work, and 9 We do not agree with our dissenting colleagues that the "preferential hiring" and "union-shop" provisions may be treated separately for purposes of determining the validity of the union-security agreement as a whole . The provisions are necessarily interrelated for, by the terms of the agreement , a determination of the applicability of either provision in any given instance must depend upon an initial determination as to which of the provisions covers the specific work , an interpretative requirement bringing into play in every instance the entire union-security agreement. io See cases cited in footnote 4, supra. n Perry Coal Company, et el., 125 NLRB 1256. 0 INT'L LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION (INDEPENDENT), ETC. 41 as the ILA has no asserted right to such work under a Board order or certification, we find that the ILA is not lawfully entitled to force or require the pier operator members of PMTA to assign the dis- puted work to ILA "carloaders" to the excludion of the Teamster em- ployees of the trucking company members of MTLR.12 DETERMINATION OF DISPUTE On the basis of the foregoing findings, and upon the entire record in this case, the Board makes the following determination of dispute pursuant to Section 10(k) of the Act: 1. International Longshoremen's Association (Independent), and its agents James T. Moock and Clifford Carter, and its Local No. 1332, and its agents Russell Williams and E. Carter Lyles, are not and have not been entitled, by means proscribed by Section 8(b) (4) (D) of the Act, to force or require the pier operator members of Philadelphia Marine Trade Association to assign to ILA "carloaders," to the ex- clusion of Teamster employees of the trucking company members of Motor Transport Labor Relations, Inc., the work of loading and un- loading of trucks on the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, waterfront by the use of "forklifts" beyond the 15- to 20-foot "tailgate" area of the trucks. 2. Within 10 days from this Decision and Determination of Dispute, all Respondents shall notify in writing the Regional Director for the Fourth Region of the National Labor Relations Board as to whether they accept this Determination of Dispute, and as to whether they will refrain from engaging in the conduct which the Board has found herein that they are not lawfully entitled to engage in. CHAIRMAN LEEDOM and MEMBER FANNING, dissenting : As stated by our colleagues, it is now well established that a union does not violate Section 8(b) (4) (D) by engaging in activity other- wise proscribed, if the assignment of the disputed work which is protested is in derogation of a current collective-bargaining agree- ment which assigns the disputed work to the striking union in clear and unambiguous terms.13 In the instant case, PMTA, whose pier operator members have complete authority over the usage of the piers, has a current contract with the ILA which assigns to the ILA the work of all "loading and unloading of . . . trucks. . . ." As the dis- puted "forklift" work is clearly one type of "loading and unloading of trucks," the contract on its face assigns such work to the ILA in clear ' See Local 173, Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers' International 'Union, AFL-CIO, at al. (Newark & Essex Plastering Co.), 121 NLRB 1094, 1107, 1108. However, this finding Is not to be construed as an "assignment" of the work in question to the Teamsters. International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, Local 181, at al, 121 NLRB '1072_ 13 See cases cited in footnote 3, supra. 42 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and unambiguous terms. Moreover, the practice under the contract, of the ILA doing all the disputed "forklift" work, except for the periodic attempted "encroachments" by a few truckers which the ILA always protested, lends further support to such an interpretation of the contract.14 Accordingly, we would find that the ILA had a clear and unambiguous contract right, supported by practice, to the dis- puted "forklift" work. Our colleagues do not dispute that the ILA had such a contract right to the disputed work, but they find that the .union-security, clause in the contract is unlawful, so as to nullify such right. We note first that none of the parties raised the latter issue, apparently feeling that there was no such issue, and it is only our colleagues who have injected this issue into the case.15 In any event, we disagree with our colleagues that the union-security clause involved should be found to be unlawful on its face. Thus, as we read the clause, and as the Board has already -interpreted the very same clause in the prior case alluded to by the majority involving another Local of the ILA,16 the first sentence in the clause, while providing for preference in hiring to union mem- bers, does purport to defer operation of such preferential hiring until it becomes legal. Moreover, consistent with such purported deferral, the second sentence of the clause purports to institute in the interim "a Union Shop as shall comply with Section 8 (a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act or any amendment thereto," which contains the -necessary specific limitation to be lawful.17 Such a union-security clause can hardly be construed as being unlawful on its face, and in the prior case involving such a clause the Board did not find that it was unlawful on its face. The worst that can be said for such a clause, -as the Board further recognized in the prior case, is that it is not 19 In view of the clear language of the contract, and the supporting practice thereunder, -we attach little weight to the unsupported contrary interpretation by the PMTA attorney, particularly in view of the contradictory interpretation by the PMTA's own executive secretary. 16 As indicated in the majority opinion, the only issue raised by the parties was whether the ILA actually had a contract right to the disputed work 16 Local 1566, International Longshoremen's Association (Philadelphia Marine Trade Association), 122 NLRB 967. 17 Cf. Perry Coal Company, supra, where, as described by the Board , there was only a "vague and general" savings clause. The majority states that this second sentence "provides for a union shop, but purports -to comply with Section 8(a) (3) of the Act or its amendments." While the exact meaning and significance of this interpretation is not entirely clear to us , we think it obvious that this sentence purports , as it states, to institute presently "a Union Shop as shall comply with section 8(a) (3)," and not a union shop which only purports to comply with Section 8(a)(3). Moreover, contrary to the majority's charge that we have treated the two sentences of the union-security clause separately in interpreting the clause, we believe that our interpretation above is the only way in which the two sentences of the clause may be read together as a whole, so as to have any meaning. It is rather the majority -which treats the two sentences separately, and arrives at the anomalous interpretation that the first sentence provides for "preferential hiring" which ordinarily connotes prehire -union membership , and the second sentence provides for an altogether different "union :shop" which ordinarily connotes posthire union membership. INT'L LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION ( INDEPENDENT ), ETC. 43 couched in language that an ordinary working man could readily understand so as to be ambiguous to such an individual; that such ambiguity gives rise to the suspicion that the parties may have never really intended to defer operation of preferential hiring; and that it is therefore necessary to examine extrinsic evidence of the actual prac- tice of the parties under the clause to determine the real intent of the parties. As this extrinsic evidence in the prior case showed that the parties had been following a present practice of preferential hiring, the Board drew the permissible inference that despite the deferral language the parties never really intended to postpone operation of the preference clause, and accordingly found that the preference clause was designed to create present discriminatory conditions of employment so as to be unlawful. Thus, we have here a purported "deferred" union-security clause which the Board previously did not find to be unlawful on its face, but only found to be unlawful on the ground that there was evidence of a discriminatory practice under the clause which warranted the inference that it was intended to be dis- criminatory. No basis exists for an entirely different finding here that the self-same clause is unlawful on its face.'8 Accordingly, as the union-security clause here may not properly be found to be "patently" unlawful, it may not serve to nullify the ILA's otherwise valid con- tract right to the disputed work.19 Moreover, as there is no evidence of actual practice under the clause or other extrinsic evidence to show that the parties did not really intend their purported deferral of pref- erential hiring,20 there is not even this lesser basis of the prior case for finding the clause unlawful.2i Accordingly, we would find that the ILA had a contract right to the disputed work, unaffected by the contract's union-security clause, which right it could lawfully attempt to enforce by strike action, and that the pier operators could not evade this work assignment by giving "tariff" authorizations to the truckers to do such work and thus in ' See also Sterling Faucet Company, 108 NLRB 778, 780-783, where the Board similarly did not find an ambiguous "deferral" clause unlawful on its face , but found it necessary to look at extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties , and found such clause not to be unlawful in the light of such extrinsic evidence. Cf. Perry Coal Company, supra, relied on by the majority, where it could not be said that the union-security clause involved even purported to comply with Section 8(a) (3), in view of only a "vague and general" savings clause. In the instant case, as pointed out above, the union- security clause at least purports to defer preferential hiring until it becomes legal and to comply with Section 8(a) (3) in the interim, and therefore cannot be found unlawful on its face. 39 As stated by the majority, the Board has held that an otherwise valid contract right to disputed work for Section 10(k) purposes may be nullified only if the contract contains a "patently" unlawful union-security clause. 'As indicated above, the parties did not even raise the issue of the union-security clause. = The fact that there was such evidence in the prior case with respect to another local of the ILA Is not, of course, controlling here. 44 . DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD effect transferring to another group of employees work to which the ILA had an exclusive contract right as za Cf. Local No. 4 8, Sheet Metal Workers International Association, AFL-CIO, et al., supra, where the Board held that a corporation could not evade a contract work assign- ment by transferring the work tda partnership which had the same ownership. While the ILA also may have had an exclusive contract right to the "tailgate" work under the contract, and may have waived such right by agreeing with the Teamsters to "concurrent jurisdiction" over such work and by actually permitting Teamster employees of the truckers to do 25 percent of such work , such a waiver could not affect its exclusive contract right to the disputed "forklift" work, any encroachment upon which it always resisted, and which therefore was not waived . See National Association of Broadcast Engineers, etc. (National Broadcasting Company, Inc.), '105 NLRB 355, 363-365, where the Board held that, although the striking union waived whatever contractual rights it may have had to part of a contract work assignment, it retained its unwaived contract right to the remainder of the contract work assignment which was in dispute. Allen-Bradley Company and Tool and Die Makers, Lodge No. 78,. International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO. Case No. 13-CA-3308. April 6, 1960 DECISION AND ORDER Upon charges duly filed by Tool and Die Makers, Lodge No. 78, International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO (herein called the Union), the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, by the Regional Director for the Thirteenth Region, issued a com- plaint dated August 27, 1959, against Allen-Bradley Company (herein called the Respondent), alleging that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (1) and (5) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. Copies of the charge, complaint, and notice of hearing before a Trial Examiner were duly served upon the Respondent and the Charging Party. With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint alleges, in substance, that the Union was and is the exclusive representative of all toolroom employees of the Employer in an appropriate unit, and that on May 21 and June 18, 1959, and at all times thereafter, Respondent unlawfully refused to bargain collectively with the Union. Respondent's answer, filed September 23, 1959, admits certain jurisdictional and factual allegations of the complaint, but denies the commission of unfair labor practices. On December 14, 1959, all parties to this proceeding entered into a stipulation of facts, and on the same date jointly moved to transfer this proceeding directly to the Board for findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decision and order. The motion states that the parties have waived their rights to a hearing before a Trial Examiner, and to the issuance of an Intermediate Report. The motion provides further 127 NLRB No. 8.