C. C. Griffin Manufacturing Co., Inc.

TRINITY VALLEY IRON AND STEEL COMPANY 417 also has shops and sales offices at both Orlando, and Jacksonville, Florida. All three companies have the same set of officers, are under the operational direction of a single general manager, have a single administrative office and payroll staff, and a common labor policy. These factors justify a finding that the three companies constitute a single employer within the meaning of the Act. In addition to the foregoing indicia of functional and organiza- tional integration, there is frequent interchange of employees between the three companies. During seasonal slack periods Reeves' employees are utilized in the production operations of Florida Wholesale and Southeastern. Florida Wholesale's employees frequently work at Reeves' warehouse. Reeves' employees are utilized in maintaining the grounds and equipment of Florida Wholesale and Southeastern. Florida Wholesale employees work in Southeastern's plant during slack periods and occasionally assist Reeves' employees in the erection of fences. Southeastern and Florida Wholesale use a common storage area, common watchmen, and a common foundryman. Florida Whole- sale's truckdrivers regularly spend some of their nondriving time working for Southeastern. In view of the common ownerships, the high degree of functional and organizational integration and the considerable amount of em- ployee interchange among the three companies, we find that the two- company unit sought by the Petitioner is inappropriate. Although employees of the three companies may constitute an appropriate unit, we are administratively advised that the Petitioner's showing of in- terest is insufficient to warrant the direction of an election in such a unit. Accordingly, we shall dismiss the petition. [The Board dismissed the petition.] Trinity Valley Iron and Steel Company, a Division of C. C. Griffin Manufacturing Company, Inc. and International Molders & Foundry Workers Union of North America, AFL-CIO, Local No. 9. Case No. 16-CA-1456. April 27, 1960 DECISION AND ORDER On January 11, 1960, Trial Examiner Thomas N. Kessel issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Inter- mediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief. 127 NLRB No. 61. 560940-61-vol. 127-28 418 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The Board 1 has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Interme- diate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in this case,2 and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda- tions of the Trial Examiner.' ORDER Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended , the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent , Trinity Valley Iron and Steel Company, a division of C. C. Griffin Manufacturing Company, Inc., Fort Worth, Texas , its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with the International Molders & Foundry Workers Union of North America, AFL-CIO, Local No. 9, and Lodge 1591, International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO, as the jointly certified exclusive bargaining representative of all its employees in the appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other terms and conditions of employment, by instituting changes in the terms and conditions of employment of employees in the appropriate unit without first con- sulting with and bargaining with the aforesaid joint bargaining repre- sentative concerning these matters. (b) Soliciting employees to abandon their strike, inducing employ- ees to abandon their strike by promising them benefits, and requesting employees to induce fellow employees to abandon their strike. (c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the right to self -organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist the above -named or any other labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in any other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in ' Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Members Rodgers, Bean, and Fanning]. O The Respondent ' s request for oral argument is hereby denied. In our opinion, the record, the exceptions , and the brief adequately present the issues and positions of the parties. 8In accordance with Board policy, the Trial Examiner recommended reinstatement of the unfair labor practice strikers with backpay to begin 5 days after the date of applica- tion for reinstatement until the date of Respondent 's offer of reinstatement. See Tiny Town Togs, Inc., 7 NLRB 54. As Respondent's exceptions contain insufficient reasons for departing from this customary remedy, we shall adopt it. TRINITY VALLEY IRON AND STEEL COMPANY 419 a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with International Molders & Foundry Workers Union of North America, AFL-CIO, Local No. 9, and Lodge 1591, International Association of Machinists, AFL- CIO, as the jointly certified exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the appropriate unit consisting of all production and maintenance employees at the Respondent's Fort Worth, Texas, plant, exclusive of office clerical employees, over-the-road truckdrivers, guards, professional employees, the shipping clerk, the patternmaker, and supervisors as defined in the Act, and embody any understanding reached in a 'signed contract. (b) Upon application, offer immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, to all those employees who were on strike on and after June 30, 1959, and who have not already been reinstated to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, dismissing if necessary any persons hired by the Respondent on or after June 30, 1959, who were not in the Respondent's employ on that date. (c) Make whole the employees specified in paragraph numbered 2(b), above, for any loss of pay they may suffer by reason of the Respondent's refusal, if any, to reinstate them in the manner provided in paragraph numbered 2(b), above, by payment to each of them a sum of money equal to that which he normally would have earned as wages during the period from 5 days after the date on which he applies for reinstatement to the date of the Respondent's offer of reinstate- ment, less his net earnings if any during said period. (d) Post at its plant in Fort Worth, Texas, the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix." 4 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Sixteenth Region, shall, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of the Respondent, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Re- spondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 4 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order." 420 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (e) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social se- curity payment records, timecards, personnel cards and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amounts of backpay which may be or become due and the rights of employment under 'the terms of this Order. (f) Notify the Regional Director for the Sixteenth Region, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the complaint herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed, insofar as it alleges that a remark by Respondent's Office Manager Sligh to employee Milton Hill, Sr., to the effect that the employees should have come to the Respondent before seeking the help of the Unions, was in violation of the Act. APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the Labor Manage- ment Relations Ac. We hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL bargain collectively upon request with the Interna- tional Molders & Foundry Workers Union of North America, AFL-CIO, Local No. 9, and Lodge 1591, International Asso- ciation of Machinists, AFL-CIO, as the jointly certified exclusive bargaining representative of all our employees in the appropriate unit described below with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment, and, if an agreement is reached, embody such understanding in a signed contract. The appropriate unit is: All production and maintenance employees at our Fort Worth, Texas, plant, exclusive of office clerical employees, over-the-road truckdrivers, guards, professional employees, the shipping clerk, the patternmaker, and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT unilaterally institute changes affecting the terms and conditions of employment of employees in the appropriate unit described above without first consulting and bargaining with International Molders & Foundry Workers Union of North America, AFL-CIO, Local No. 9, and Lodge 1591, International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO, as the jointly certified bargaining representative of our employees. TRINITY VALLEY IRON AND STEEL COMPANY 421 WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Act by directly inducing them to abandon their strike, by promising them benefits to induce them to abandon their strike, or by requesting them to solicit their fellow employees to abandon their strike. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the right to self-organiza- tion, to form labor organizations, or to join or assist the above- named or any other labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purposes of collective bar- gaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from engaging in any or all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring member- ship in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis- closure Act of 1959. WE WILL, upon application, offer immediate and full reinstate- ment to their former or substantially equivalent positions, with- out prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, to all our employees who were on strike on and after June 30, 1959, and who have not already been reinstated to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, dismissing if necessary all persons hired on or after June 30,1959. WE WILL make each such employee whole for any loss of pay suffered by him as a result of our failure to reinstate him within 5 days after his application. TRINITY VALLEY IRON AND STEEL COMPANY, A DIVISION OF C. C. GRIFFIN MANUFAC- TURING COMPANY, INC., Employer. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative ) ( Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon a charge and amended charges filed by International Molders & Foundry Workers Union of North America , AFL-CIO, Local No. 9, against Trinity Valley Iron and Steel Company, a Division of C. C. Griffin Manufacturing Company, Inc., herein called the Respondent , the General Counsel for the National Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board, by the Regional Director for the Sixteenth Region, 422 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD issued his complaint dated August 6, 1959, and his amended complaint dated September 24, 1959, against the Respondent alleging that it had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136, herein called the Act. Copies of the complaint and its amendment, the charge and its amendments, and notice of hearing were duly served upon the parties. The Respondent's answer to the complaint duly filed denies the allegations of unlawful conduct therein. A hearing was held at Fort Worth, Texas, on October 5 and on November 16, 1959, before the Trial Examiner duly designated to conduct the hearing. All parties were represented by counsel or other representative. Full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce evidence, and to submit argu- ment was afforded all parties. Upon the entire record in the case, and from observation of the witnesses, the Trial Examiner makes the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. PERTINENT COMMERCE FACTS The following commerce facts are alleged by the complaint and admitted by the answer. C. C. Griffin Manufacturing Company, Inc., is a Texas corporation which through its division, Trinity Valley Iron and Steel Company, operates an iron foundry at Fort Worth, Texas. In the operation of this foundry the Respondent, during the 12-month period preceding issuance of the complaint, sold products vijlued in excess of $50,000 which were shipped in interstate commerce from Fort Worth to points outside the State of Texas. From these facts I find that the Respondent is engaged in interstate commerce and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction in this case over its business. II. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED International Molders & Foundry Workers Union of North America, AFL-CIO, Local No. 9, and Lodge 1591 , International Association of Machinists , AFL-CIO, are labor organizations which admit to membership employees of the Respondent. They are herein jointly called the Unions. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES The Unions are and during all relevant times were the jointly certified exclusive bargaining representative of the Respondent's production and maintenance employees. Pursuant to the Unions' February 5, 1959, request the Respondent entered bargain- ing negotiations and before June 8, 1959, both sides met several times without reaching agreement. On this latter date the Unions struck in support of their demands. After the start of the strike the parties met once again on August 10, 1959, without coming to an agreement. There have been no other meetings and the strike still continues. The General Counsel maintains that the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by unilaterally granting wage increases to its nonstriking employees during the strike; that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)( I) of the Act by offering material benefits to certain employees to induce them to abandon the strike, and further that the Respondent in violation of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act requested an employee to solicit the abandonment of the strike by his fellow employees. The complaint further alleges that the strike was prolonged on or about June 13, 1959, by the commission of these unfair labor practices. The Respondent's answer simply denies the commission of unfair conduct ascribed to it by the complaint. The Respondent offered no testimony in its defense. From-the uncontroverted and unimpeached testimony of the General Counsel's witnesses, which I credit, I find that the Respondent, through its acknowledged agents, committed the following conduct: (1) According to striking employee Nelson Cary, Ferrell A. Butcher, identified by Cary as his foreman but conceded by the Respondent to be its assistant foundry superintendent, spoke to him on the street about three blocks from the plant on a Saturday, 1 or 2 weeks after the start of the strike, and asked him to come back to work the following Monday stating that if he did he "might get a raise." (2) According to striking employee Johnny Allen, he and several other employees had returned to the plant 1 week after the start of the strike to receive their last paychecks. As Allen was handed his check by L. G. Robinson, the Respondent's general superintendent, the latter said to him in the presence of other employees, "Johnny, I'm going to let you come on back to work. We need you awfully bad in TRINITY VALLEY IRON AND STEEL COMPANY 423 here." Allen replied, "I might be back Monday," whereupon Robinson remarked, "Well come on back we are going to make time better, things will be better." (3) According to striking employee Milton Hill, Sr., the aforementioned Ferrell A. Butcher, whom he identiled as his foreman, spoke to him on the picket line in front of the plant during the second or third week of the strike and said, "Why don't you throw that old sign down and come back to work? The company gave everybody a five percent raise starting this morning." Employee Clifford Lee Harrington, who was also present on this occasion, corroborated Hill's testimony. Further, according to Hill, when he received his paycheck on June 12, 1959, in the Respondent's office, Office Manager John R. Sligh said to him that before the employees "went on strike and got a union-they should have gotten together and come to the company with what they wanted instead of hiring Mr. Heickman [the Molders' International representative]." (4) According to striking employee Ernest D. Manning, D. F. Brown, identified by Manning as his foreman and who appears to be the H. F. Brown acknowledged by the Respondent to be the foreman of the core department, spoke to him on the picket line on July 1 and told him "to throw the picket sign down and come on back to work, that they was making a right smart of changes that evening." -(5) According to striking employee Eugene Spears, the aforementioned Butcher under whom he worked spoke to him on the street about 3 or 4 weeks after the start of the strike and requested him to talk to the other strikers and to get them to come back to work. (6) According to striking employee Alphonso Johnson, foundry Superintendent Wallace B. Erb under whom he worked called him by telephone during the second week of the strike and discussed with him his reasons for striking. When Johnson revealed that one of his complaints related to the work conditions imposed by Butcher, Erb told him to come back to work and he would "work out something." He further stated that Mr. Griffin, identified by Johnson as the owner of the plant, would give him "better satisfaction inside than outside because he is kind of hard- boiled." Johnson further related that while picketing in front of the plant during the third week of the strike John E. Hardin, foreman of the maintenance department, asked him to return to work and informed him the Respondent was granting a 5- percent raise the following Monday. When Johnson advised he would not return, Hardin again told him "to be sure to come back Monday to go to work," and added "if I hear anymore about this it's a damn lie." Johnson testified this last comment was meaningless to him. (7) The Respondent's payroll data in evidence reveals that in the June 27, 1959, pay period a wage increase of approximately 5 percent was given by the Respondent to numerous employees who had remained at work during the strike. According to the credited testimony of International Representative Heickman, who had been the spokesman for the Unions during the contract negotiations, there had been no agree- ment between the Respondent and the Unions concerning wages during the meetings preceding the strike or at the one meeting on August 10, 1959, during the strike. The Respondent's initial position on wages as shown by a handwritten statement from Attorney John Price, the Respondent's spokesman during the negotiations, was to continue the rates existing at the start of negotiations. The Respondent later pro- posed a 5-cent hourly increase provided the Unions accepted a 5-year contract with- out a wage reopening clause, and in the alternative offered a 1-year contract without any wage increase. Neither alternative was accepted by the Unions. At one point the Unions suggested a 1-year contract with a 5-cent hourly increase but this proposal was rejected. At another point the Unions requested a 10- or 15-cent across-the- board increase in hourly rates which apparently was also rejected. At the June 4 meeting, the last before the strike, Heickman brought up for discussion the foregoing alternatives previously proposed by the Respondent. At that time Attorney Price presented him a document entitled "Apprentice Program" which included a starting and top wage for five classifications with provisions for a 21/2 -cent advancement in the hourly rate every 3 months until top is reached with advancement "contingent on worker's ability " Heickman observed that the maximum rates for these classi- fications were lower than those already in effect. At this meeting the Respondent unexpectedly added a set of working rules to the negotiations and this prompted Heickman to comment that the negotiations were deteriorating. At this point the Respondent's negotiators left the meeting. At the August 10 meeting Heickman asked the Respondent to offer the same wage increase which according to his in- formation had been granted to nonstrikers, and was told by Price the Respondent would give nothing which cost it money. Heickman testified also that Price responded that he would not discuss wages because "it was now in the hands of the Courts and it was for them to decide as to what the wage rate was going to be." At this same 424 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD meeting Heickman asked Price for additional wage data to reflect the wage rates then being paid. Heickman received certain data by mail about September 1, 1959, which listed the rates then in effect for the Respondent's employees without identifying them by name. The only information provided by this data to show the rates paid specific employees was a listing of clock numbers opposite the rates and classifications. Notwithstanding the obscurity of this data comparison with the job classifications shown on wage data furnished by the Respondent before the strike permitted Heick- man reasonably to determine from it that the Respondent had during the strike granted wage increases. This determination was consistent with the reports of such unilateral conduct which Heickman had received before then from striking employees. The appeals by the Respondent through its admitted agents to employees to abandon the strike being waged by their Unions and to return to work, especially when coupled with direct or clearly implied promises of benefit, constituted unlawful interference with, restraint, and coercion of employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.' The Respondent by the following conduct of its agents violated Section 8(a)( I) of the Act: 1. Assistant Foundry Superintendent Butcher's request to employee Nelson Cary to return to work coupled with the implied promise of a raise; 2. General Superintendent Robinson's request to employee Johnny Allen in the presence of other employees to return to work coupled with an implied promise of benefits; 3. Butcher's request to employee Milton Hill, Sr., in the presence of another strik- ing employee, to stop picketing and return to work coupled with the implication that he would receive the 5-percent raise which the Respondent had just granted its employees; 4. Foreman H. F. Brown's request to employee Ernest D. Manning to stop picket- ing and return to work coupled with an implied promise of benefits; 5. Butcher's request to employee Eugene Spears to solicit the return to work of fellow strikers; 6. Foundry Superintendent Wallace B. Erb's request to employee Alphonso John- son to return to work coupled with a promise of benefits; and 7. Foreman John E. Hardin's request to employee Alphonse, Johnson to return to work coupled with his assertion that the Respondent was about to grant a 5-percent raise. I do not consider the remark by Office Manager Sligh to employee Milton Hill, Sr., to the effect that the employees should have come to the Respondent before seeking the help of the Unions as unlawful. I regard this as a noncoercive privileged ex- pression and recommend the dismissal of the complaint allegation that it was viola- tive of the Act. The grant of the wage increase to nonstriking employees during the June 27, 1959, pay period was in derogation of the Respondent's statutory obligation to refrain from altering the terms and conditions of employment of its employees without notice to and opportunity for consultation with their certified bargaining representative. The record shows that at no time during their negotiations had the Respondent and the Unions proposed or discussed an increase in wage rates such as that shown to have been instituted by the Respondent, and no explanation was offered by the Respondent in this proceeding to justify this unilateral action taken without any notice to the Unions. By this conduct the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. All the foregoing actions by the Respondent constitute a pattern of conduct de- signed to undermine the representative status of the Unions and to break the strike. The Respondent must reasonably have expected that the news of its illegal actions conducted by direct and open solicitation of strikers accompanied by promises of pay increases would inevitably reach the Unions, as indeed it did. The Respondent must also reasonably have understood that the Unions confronted by these circum- stances to save face with the employees on strike and to preserve their representative status would have to insist that they receive in any settlement with the Respondent no less than those benefits freely conferred by the Respondent on other employees who had not joined the strike. It is unrealistic to expect that a labor organization in these circumstances would take less for employees supporting its strike. While it is uncertain when or on what terms the parties might have resolved their differences, essentially over wages, and have reached on agreement terminating the strike had the Respondent not engaged in its misconduct, it is clear that after commission of the aforesaid unlawful conduct the Respondent created a situation in which the strike could not be ended short of an agreement granting strikers the same wage increases 1 Clinton Foods, Inc, 112 NLRB 239. TRINITY VALLEY IRON AND STEEL COMPANY 425 unilaterally conferred by the Respondent on nonstrikers. This, obviously, the Re- spondent had not intended doing. No such offer had ever been made to the Unions during the negotiations, and when on August 10, 1959, the Unions asked that the increases be extended to strikers they were flatly turned down. Even more, the Respondent sought to obscure its actions by withholding the meaningful pay data requested by the Unions thus emphasizing the futility of the Unions' effort to secure the increase for strikers. Necessarily, the Respondent by its deliberate unlawful conduct aggravated its differences with the Unions and created a new and serious impediment to settlement of the strike with the net result that the strike, economic in origin, was, as alleged in the complaint, prolonged and consequently converted into an unfair labor practice strike. The record shows that the Respondent's misconduct was committed substantially within 3 weeks after the strike started on June 8, 1959. I therefore find that the strike was converted into an unfair labor practice strike on or before June 30, 1959. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in con- nection with the operations of the Respondent described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow thereof. V. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, it shall be recommended that the Respondent cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. As the Respondent on June 27, 1959, and at all times thereafter has refused to bargain collectively with the Unions as the certified representative of its employees in an appropriate unit with the good faith required by the Act, it will be recommended that the Respondent, upon request, bargain collectively with the Unions, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. It has also been found that the strike by the Respondent's employees which was in progress at the time of the hearing was prolonged by the Respondent's unfair labor practices and thereby on June 30, 1959, was converted to an unfair labor practice strike. Employees who were on strike on that date and thereafter thus became unfair labor practice strikers who were entitled to reinstatement upon application irrespective of whether their positions have been filled by the Respond- ent's hire of other employees as replacements for them. Accordingly, in order to restore the status quo as it existed prior to conversion of the strike on June 30, 1959, and thereby to effectuate the policies of the Act, it will be recommended that the Respondent shall, upon application, offer reinstatement to their former or substan- tially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, to all their employees who were on strike on and after June 30, 1959, dismissing, if necessary, any persons hired after that date. It is also recommended that the Respondent be ordered to make whole those employees who were on strike on and after June 30, 1959, for any loss of pay they may have suffered or may suffer by reason of the Respondent's refusal, if any, to reinstate them, by payment to each of them a sum of money equal to that which he normally would have earned as wages during the period from 5 days after the date on which he applied for reinstatement, to the date of Respondent's offer of reinstatement. Loss of pay shall be computed on a quarterly basis in the manner established by the Board in F. W. Woolivorth Company, 90 NLRB 289; N.L.R.B. v. Seven-Up Bottling Com- pany of Miami, Inc., 344 U.S. 344. In view of the nature of the unfair labor practices committed, the commission of similar and other unfair labor practices may reasonably be anticipated. I shall therefore recommend that the Respondent be ordered to cease and desist from in any manner infringing upon the rights guaranteed its employees by Section 7 of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Trinity Valley Iron and Steel Company, a Division of C. C Griffin Manu- facturing Company, Inc., is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 426 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2. International Molders & Foundry Workers Union of North America, AFL-CIO, Local No. 9, and Lodge 1591, International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO, are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The aforesaid labor organizations were during the Respondent's payroll period ending June 27, 1959, and have at all times thereafter been the jointly certified exclusive bargaining representative of the Respondent's employees for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act in the following appropriate unit: All production and maintenance employees at the Respondent's Fort Worth, Texas, plant, exclusive of office clerical employees, over-the-road truckdrivers, guards, professional employees, the shipping clerk, the patternmaker, and supervisory employees as defined in the Act. 4. By failing and refusing at all times since the unilateral grant of a pay increase to nonstriking employees during its June 27, 1959, payroll period to bargain col- lectively with the aforesaid labor organization as the exclusive representative of the employees in the foregoing appropriate unit the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 5. By directly soliciting the abandonment of their strike by its employees, by inducing them to abandon their strike by promises of benefit, and by requesting an employee to solicit the abandonment of the strike by his fellow employees the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. 6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] Kit Manufacturing Company and United Steelworkers of Amer- ica, AFL-CIO and Blue Mountain District Council, Lumber & Sawmill Workers, AFL-CIO. Cases Nos. 19-CA-1742,19-CA- 1766, and 19-CA-1816. April 27, 1960 DECISION AND ORDER On January 6, 1960, Trial Examiner Martin S. Bennett issued his Intermediate Report in the above -entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. The Trial Examiner also found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with these cases to a three -member panel [Chairman Leedom and Members Bean and Fanning]. The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter- mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in this 127 NLRB No. 62.