129 NLRB 332
Miele Iron Works
332
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
We shall also order Respondent , in the event it does not reopen its manufac-
turing facilities, to make whole the employees discriminatorily denied reinstate-
ment
.
. . for any loss of pay suffered by reason of the discrimination against
them by paying to each of them a sum of money equal to the amount he or she
would .normally have earned as wages from [the date of discharge ] until such
time as each secures, or did secure , substantially equivalent employment with
other employers.
We also expressly reserve the right to modify the backpay and reinstatement
provisions of this Decision and Order if made necessary by a change of condi-
tions in the future, and to make such supplements thereto as may hereafter
become necessary in order to define or clarify their application to a specific set
of circumstances not now apparent.
I believe the situation presented in the Bonnie Lass Knitting Mills case is analogous
to the situation here except that here trucking operations, rather than manufacturing
operations, are involved .
I believe further that the remedy prescribed in that case,
with necessary adaptation of language , is appropriate in the instant case and will
effectuate the policies of the Act.
I will therefore frame the recommended order
in the instant case accordingly.°
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the
case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and
(7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By threatening his employees with economic reprisals in the event of unioniza-
tion, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in an unfair labor practice within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. By discriminatorily discharging Floyd David Catterson, Elfred Alson Elledge,.
Elwood M . Goble, Boyce Kirkpatrick, Roy Richardson, and Hobart Steele, Re-
spondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning
of Section 8 (a) (3) and ( 1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of
Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
9It should be noted that Respondent In the instant case disposed of his equipment to
Work Well, Incorp,^rated , the stock ownership of which was vested principally in Re-
spondent's wife and son.
Work Well, Incorporated , was not named as a respondent In
this proceeding and no order can be issued against it .
On the other hand, it may appear
In subsequent compliance negotiations or proceedings that for purposes of the Act and
without regard to the validity of the incorporation of Work Well , Incorporated, for tax
or related purposes, the latter entity Is an alter ego of Respondent, or a successor or
assign within the contemplation of the Board 's remedial order.
See Regal Knitwear
Oonvpany v. N.L.R.B., 324 U.S. 9; N.L.R.B. v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398.
Miele Iron Works and United Steelworkers of America, AFL-
CIO.
Case No. f2-CA-497. October 11, 1960
DECISION AND ORDER
On April 18, 1960, Trial Examiner John P. von Rohr issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had engaged in certain unfair labor practices and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report
attached hereto.
The Trial Examiner also found that the Respond-
ent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices and rec-
129 NLRB No. 34.
MIELE IRON WORKS
333
ommended that the complaint be dismissed with respect to them.
Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Re-
port and a supporting brief.'
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with
this case to a three-member panel [Chairman Leedom and Members
Rodgers and Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed .
The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and brief , and the entire record in this
case, and hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner, with the corrections noted herein.'
ORDER
Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations
Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Miele Iron Works, Union,
New Jersey, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns , shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Discouraging membership in United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO, or in any other labor organization, by laying off or
otherwise discriminating in regard to the hire or tenure of employ-
ment of its employees, or any term or condition of employment.
(b) Interrogating its employees concerning their union activities,
affiliation, or sympathies in a manner constituting interference, re-
straint, or coercion in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
(c) Threatening its employees with reprisals or promising them
benefits to discourage union membership and activity.
(d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization , to form
labor organizations , to join or assist United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization , to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing , and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection as guaranteed in Section 7 of the
Act, or to refrain from any and all such activities, except to the extent
' The Board hereby denies the Respondent's request for oral argument because the
record , exceptions, and brief adequately present the issues and positions of the parties
2 As no exception was taken to the Trial Examiner's finding that the Respondent did
not violate the Act by terminating the employment of Cleophus Burrough on Septem-
ber 30, 1959, we shall adopt such finding pro forma
'In his discussion of the layoff of Hardwick , the Trial Examiner states .
"As has
been seen , Miele stated to Hardwick , after having questioned him, 'I guess you're for
the union.' "
The Intermediate Report contains no prior reference to any such testi-
mony by Hardwick, but we note that the record reflects that Hardwick had so testified
and we correct accordingly the Intermediate Report.
The Intermediate Report is cor-
rected accordingly.
334
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOAIW
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring member-
ship in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as
authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Make whole Sammie Lee Hardwick, Chester Bell, Harvey
Daniels, and Cleophus Burrough for any loss of pay they may have
suffered, by reason of the discrimination against them, in the manner
set forth in the section of the Intermediate Report entitled "The
Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its
agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social se-
curity payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and
all other records necessary to analyze the amounts of backpay due
under the terms of this Order.
(c) Post at its plant at Union, New Jersey, copies of the notice
attached hereto marked "Appendix." 4
Copies of said notice, to be
furnished by the Regional Director for the Twenty-second Region,
shall, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of the
Respondent, be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in con-
spicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond-
ent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for the Twenty-second Region,
in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint herein be, and it
hereby is, dismissed, insofar as it alleges that the Respondent violated
Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act by terminating the employment of Cle-
ophus Burrough on September 30,1959.
4 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of
Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the
words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that :
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO, or in any other labor organization, by laying
MIELE IRON WORKS
335
off, or in any other manner discriminating against, employees in
regard to their hire or tenure of employment, or any term or con-
dition of employment.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with reprisals or make them
promises of benefit in order to discourage membership in United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organiza-
tion, or interrogate them as to their union membership or sym-
pathies in a manner constituting interference, restraint, or coer-
cion in violation of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or
coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from
any or all such activities, except to the extent that such right may
be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization, as authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of the Act, as
modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959.
WE WILL make whole Sammie Lee Hardwick, Chester Bell,
Harvey Daniels, and Cleophus Burrough for any loss of pay they
may have suffered as a result of the discrimination against them.
All our employees are free to become or remain, or to refrain from
becoming or remaining, members of the above-named Union, or any
other labor organization, except to the extent that this right may be
effected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organiza-
tion as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of
the Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act of 1959.
MIELE IRON WORKS,
Employer.
Dated--- -------------
By-------------------------------------
(Representative )
( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge, duly filed, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations
Board, for the Regional Director of the Twenty-second Region
(Newark, New
Jersey), issued a complaint, dated October 28, 1959, against Miele Iron Works,
herein called the Respondent or the Company, alleging that the Respondent had
engaged in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1)
and (3 ) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended
336
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondent filed an answer on November 2, 1959, in which it admitted the juns-
dictional allegations of the complaint, but denied the commission of any unfair
labor practices.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held at Newark, New Jersey, on February 1, 2,
and 3, 1960, before the duly designated Trial Examiner.
During the hearing the
General Counsel moved to amend the complaint to the extent that an allegation
charging the Respondent with a failure and refusal to reinstate one Cleophus
Burrough be amended to allege that Respondent discriminatorily failed and refused
to reinstate Burrough until on or about October 25, 1959.
The motion was granted
without objection.
Briefs submitted by the Respondent and the General Counsel
have been carefully considered.
Based upon the record as a whole, and upon
my observation of the witnesses, I hereby make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
I.
THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent is a New Jersey corporation with its principal office and place
of business located in Union, New Jersey , where it is engaged in the manufacture,
sale, and distribution of cellar doors, septic tanks, and related products.
The
Respondent annually purchases and receives raw materials valued in excess of
$50,000 from firms located outside the State of New Jersey.
The Respondent
admits, and I find, that at all times material herein the Respondent has been engaged
in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the
Union, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III.
THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background; interference, restraint, and coercion
The Respondent Company, which has always operated as a nonunion shop, is a
relatively small business and might be best described as a father -son operation.
It employed about 17 employees during the period here under consideration.
Raphael Miele, Sr., president, and Raphael Miele, Jr., vice president , were them-
selves engaged in physical work and at the same time were largely responsible for
the direct supervision of all employees.
The work of the employees, which con-
sisted principally of welding, fabricating, and paint spraying , was performed in the
open.
The Company's office is located in a converted trolley car and the only
other buildings consist of two small sheds which are used for storage purposes.
However, a new building was erected by the Company on its property at a cost of
$40,000 and was completed in August 1959.
Although the building was not yet put
to full use during the period in October when the alleged unfair labor practices
took place, some of the Respondent's machinery had been moved into the building
by this time.
The first indication which the Respondent had that its employees were interested
in the Union was on September 11, 1959 (a Friday), at which time it received a
communication from the Board notifying it that the Union had filed a petition for
certification as representative of its employees.
A copy of the petition was enclosed
with the communication.
On the same day Raphael Miele, Sr., called the employees
together and addressed them in two groups .
Miele, Jr., was also present at both
meetings.
Miele, Sr., conceded that the meetings were prompted by his receipt of
the Board's letter notifying him of the Union 's claim to represent his employees.
There is a conflict, however, between the Mieles and the employees who testified
as to what was said at the meetings, particularly insofar as any threats or promises
of benefits are concerned.
Five employees who were present at one or the other of the two meetings on
this Friday testified on behalf of the General Counsel with respect to the remarks
made by Miele, Sr., during the course of these meetings.
With the exception of
a few minor variations, the substance of the testimony of these witnesses with
respect to the statements which they attributed to Miele is corroborative and adds
up to substantially the same version.
Thus, according to these witnesses, Miele
first explained to them that in the year 1958 the Company made a profit of only
$7,500.
He proceeded to state that he could not afford to pay union wages, that
he would not have the Union in the plant, and that he would close the shop if the
Union came in.
According to witness Hardwick, Miele stated also "that [in the
MIELE IRON WORKS
337
event of a union] he would close the new building down and rent it out." Further,
according to Hardwick and witness Cleophus Burrough, that he and his son would go
into the business themselves of buying and selling cellar doors.
On the other hand,
according to all of these witnesses, Miele, Sr., stated that if they would go along
with him, he would give them a wage increase, a bonus, and hospitalization insurance.
We turn now to the senior Miele's version of the meetings.
Miele was frank to
concede that the meetings held on this day were occasioned by receipt of the Board's
letter.
He testified that he started the meeting by telling the employees that he had
received a letter that "some organization" was requesting to act as the bargaining
agent ". . . and that I would like to outline our position to them, so they would
understand, if possible, our economic status."
According to Miele, Sr., he proceeded
to tell them of the narrow profit margin ($8,500) that the Company had made in
the last year; that the increases in the cost of freight had gone up 100 percent; and
that the cost of material had gone up approximately 50 to 75 percent.
Miele testi-
fied also, "I told them that we had tried to make things so that the Company would
make more profit and be in a better position to improve conditions of work plus
some extra renumeration if we could get this building in shape for operations."
Further, "I told them that if we were compelled to increase our costs by any
organization, or other means, we would be compelled to rent out the new building,
that we could not stand the additional strain of approximately $500 a month and
we would then have to keep our products that we could compete on."
Miele denied
that he told the employees he would close the plant or rent out the building (in the
event of a union) and he denied promising the men any wage increases, bonus, or
hospitalization insurance during the course of these meetings.
The pertinent fact to be decided is whether in these meetings, Miele, Sr., made
any threats or promises of benefits to the employees based upon union considera-
tions.
From my observation of the witnesses, and in the light of the entire record
of this case, I credit the mutually corroborative testimony of the five employees
that during these meetings Miele, Sr., (1) told the employees that he would close
the plant and that he would rent out the new building if the Union came in,' and
(2) promised the employees a wage increase and other benefits if they went along
with him,2
The receipt of the Board letter advising of the Union's representation claim
also prompted Miele, Sr., to discuss the matter individually with each of the
employees.
According to the senior Miele's testimony, on the Monday following
the Friday meeting (discussed above) he prepared a list of names of all the em-
ployees so that he could check the names of each off the list after he spoke to them.
Miele did not detail the conversations he had with any of the employees, but
testified generally that when he spoke to the employees, individually, he told them
he had received complaints that some of the men did not understand "this Union"
and that "if they had any doubt an attorney could be appointed and they could
get out a petition and have their choice."
Concerning these conversations, Miele
testified that this was his way of trying to express to the employees that they had the
privilege of doing what they wanted.
Chester Bell, an employee, testified that on this Monday Miele, Sr., came to him
and started to talk, but that Miele, Jr., then approached and told Miele, Sr., to go
to some other men, that he would "take" him. According to Bell, Miele, Jr., asked
if he would go along with the Company. Bell replied that he did not know and
that he would not give an answer at present.
Miele, Jr., then told Bell that he would
guarantee him 25 cents more if he would sign for the Company, but Bell still refused
to give an answer.
Bell further testified that Miele, Jr., then took him to the base-
ment where his father was and told his father "this man won't give me no answers.
i Sammie Hardwick impressed me as an intelligent and honest witness
Moreover, his
testimony was not shaken under vigorous cross-examination
Counsel for the Respondent
thrice queried Hardwick as to whether Miele did not say that he (Miele) "might" have
to rent the shop "if forced" by a wage increase.
Hardwick repeatedly stated, "He
didn't phrase it like that . . . he just said that if the union would come in there that
he would close down and rent the new building out."
2 Miele, Jr, testified, in substance, that his father made no threats or promises of bene-
fits during these meetings.
However, I find that Miele, Jr., was a verbose and an un-
reliable witness.
I do not credit his denials in this respect.
Thus, although Miele, Sr,
conceded that he told the employees that he had received a request for representation
from some "organization," and also that this request prompted the meetings, Miele, Jr,
insisted that the meeting was called only for the purpose of explaining the Company's
financial position.
He refused to concede, as did his father, that anything pertaining to
a union matter prompted the meetings or was mentioned during the course of the meetings
586439-61-vol. 129-23
338
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
We might as well get rid of him .
He ain't no good to us." However , according to
Bell, Miele, Sr., said that he could not do that (get rid of him) and told him to go
back to work.
Harvey Daniels testified that Miele, Sr., approached him on the same Monday with
a paper in hand and asked him whether he was for the Company or for the Union.
Daniels testified that he replied he would rather have the Union, whereupon Miele
said, before walking away, "Well, it seems like you are for the Union and against
the Company."
Cleophus Burrough testified about a conversation he had with Miele, but identified
the time of this conversation as having occurred on the preceding Friday (September
11).3
Burrough testified that on this occasion Miele, Sr., took him to the basement
of the office building where they sat down at a table.
Miele had a folded piece of
paper in hand. Burrough testified that Miele said he was trying to find out how the
employees stood and that he was trying to get a petition for the employees to sign
which he could give to his lawyer to keep the Union from coming in the shop; and
also, that Miele promised him a 25-cent an hour raise, a bonus, and hospitalization
insurance.
According to Burrough, Miele then asked if he would sign the paper
against the Union, stating that he would make him a supervisor if he did. Burrough
testified that at this point he refused to sign the paper, whereupon Miele wrote his
name on the blank piece of paper and wrote the word "union" after it. This ended
the conversation and Burrough left.
Miele's version of the conversations, which he held with the individual employees,
has been stated above. In addition, Miele generally denied questioning employees
concerning their union sympathies or that he made any threats or promises of
benefits.
He also denied that he asked any employee to sign a paper or that he wrote
the word "union" after the name of any employee.
Having observed the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand, and under all the
circumstances of this case, including Miele's previously shown hostility to the Union
and his admission that he spoke to all the employees individually about the Union, I
accept and credit the employees' versions of the above conversations as being more
reliable.
Whether Miele merely put a cross mark after the employee's names, or
whether he wrote the word "union" after their names, I am satisfied and I find that
it was Miele's purpose to find out for himself who was for and who was against the
Union and that he coercively interrogated these employees about their union sym-
pathies and feelings.
There remains for consideration two additional incidents which are alleged to be
violative of Section 8(a)(1).
Eddie Mobly, a part-time employee and a welder,
credibly testified that shortly after the layoff of the four employees discussed below,
Miele came to him and asked how he felt about unions .
Mobly replied that he was
neutral in the matter and, further as a part-time employee his decision would have
no bearing, one way or the other.
Mobly's testimony concerning the rest of this
conversation, which is credited, is best told in his own words as follows:
Well, he mentioned that he had offered the rest of the fellows an increase in
wages, the amount he didn't say.
And that if they would go along with him,
and I asked him, "Go along with you on what ?"
So he says to keep the Union
out and I told him, "I think I mentioned before to you that I am neutral in this
thing, and however it turns out, well, I will probably be without the part-time job
anyway."
And so he wanted to know pointblank whether I was for him or for
the opposite side, and I told him I was still neutral and if I was forced to take a
side then I would let him know.
The last incident involving alleged infringement with the rights of the employees
occurred during a conversation which Miele, Jr., had with Sammie Hardwick.
Ac-
cording to the credited testimony of Hardwick, about October 8, Miele, Jr., took
him to the back of the new building and showed him some new machinery.
Hard-
wick testified that Miele at this point stated he was not going to set the machinery up
until he found out what was going to happen .
Miele then told Hardwick that he was
a good influence over the men, that he should take off and persuade the men to go
along with the Company, and that his father would still have more to offer than the
Union and that he would still give a 25 -cent wage increase?
'Miele conceded having an Individual conversation with
Burrough , as be did with
others, but did not specify the time when it took place.
4 In crediting Hardwick's testimony concerning this conversation , I have, among other
considerations, deemed it noteworthy that Miele, Sr., acknowledged that Hardwick was
influential among the men.
As he put it, "Mr. Hardwick seemed to have the men flocking
to him " Indeed , prior to a Board election, which was held on about October 1, 1959,
Miele, Sr., asked Hardwick to explain the election procedure to the men.
MIELE IRON WORKS
339
The law is well settled that threats and promises of benefit by an employer to his
employees, in the context of union considerations , is violative of Section 8 (a)( I) of
the Act.
Likewise, interrogations by employers of employees regarding their union
activities and union sympathies under such circumstances as are present in this case,
constitute coercive interference with rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. In
summary, I conclude and find that the Respondent , by interrogating its employees
concerning their attitude toward and their interest in behalf of the Union, and by
warning its employees against union activities and promising its employees benefits
for refraining from union activities, all of which is detailed above, interfered with, re-
strained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section
7 of the Act and thereby violated Section 8(a) (1).
B. The discriminatory layoffs of Hardwick, Bell, Burrough, and Daniels
On September 15, 1959, at the end of the day, Respondent laid off Sammie Lee
Hardwick, Chester Bell, Harvey Daniels, and Cleophus Burrough.
The stated reason
given the employees for the layoff by Miele, Sr., was lack of work due to a shortage
of steel.
The complaint alleges that this layoff, which lasted approximately 10 days,
was made in violation of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act.
From the evidence presented, it is clear that the General Counsel presented a very
strong prima facie case to show that the layoffs were discriminatorily motivated.
Witness the chain of events: On Friday, September 11, the Respondent received a
notification from the Board that the Union had filed a representation petition. It is
undisputed that this is the first notice or knowledge that Respondent received that
the employees were interested in a union .
On that same day, Respondent called a
meeting of employees and during that meeting sought to discourage them from any
further union activity by admonishing them with coercive statements and promises of
benefits
On the following Monday, Respondent continued its campaign against the
Union by coercively interrogating all of the individual employees.
The next day,
without prior notice and before the end of the workweek, it selected four employees
known to be sympathetic toward the Union for layoff
Before turning to the Respondent's defense, which is an economic one , considera-
tion must be given to Respondent's contention that the layoffs could not have been
discriminatorily motivated because the Respondent had no knowledge of the em-
ployees' union activities
Although it is true that knowledge by the Respondent of
any specific union activities by these four employees is lacking , it is equally true, and
it is found , that Respondent acquired knowledge of the union sympathies of these
employees through its systematic interrogation of them on the Monday and Friday
preceding the layoffs .
As has been seen, Miele stated to Hardwick , after having
questioned him, "I guess you're for the union."
Bell was threatened with discharge
by Miele, Jr., when he refused to state whether he was for or against the Union.
Burrough refused to sign a paper or a petition against the Union and Miele, Sr.,
made it clear to Burrough that he thought Burrough was with the Union.
Daniels,
upon being questioned, told Miele, Sr., that he was for the Union, whereupon Miele
told him , "Well, it seems like you are for the Union and against the Company."
Thus, it is clear, and I find, that Respondent regarded each of these employees as
being prounion in their sympathies .
It follows that if they were laid off by the
Respondent for this reason, the intended result would be to discourage union or
concerted activities among the employees and a violation of Section 8(a)(3) must
follow.
The decision that there would be a layoff on September 15 (a Tuesday ) was made
by Miele, Sr.
With respect to the Respondent's reason for laying the men off, the
sum and substance of Miele's testimony is that on this Tuesday he looked over the
situation and determined that the Company did not have enough fabricated steel on
hand to keep the men busy. Further , according to Miele, he did not have any assur-
ance as to when additional fabricated steel would be received.
The Respondent offered no documentary evidence to reflect the amount of steel
it had on hand at the time of the layoff .
While Respondent did introduce in evidence
a letter dated September 14, 1959, which it received from its principal fabricated
steel supplier, this letter stated only that the regular steel requirements could not be
met at the regular times during the steel strike.
Witnesses Hardwick, Bell, and Daniels credibly testified that at the time of the
layoff they observed that there was an adequate amount of work on the premises to
keep all the employees busy. Indeed, after generally testifying about the shortage
of steel, Respondent's economic defense was seriously impaired when Miele in effect
conceded that there was no such shortage of material as to warrant an immediate
layoff on September 15. Thus, when asked by his counsel how much work there
was for the welders on September 14, Miele replied , "We figured, after looking over
340
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the situation, that unless we got more steel in, we would be compelled, if we kept all
our men going to shut down in three or four days."
[Emphasis supplied.]
Further,
Miele testified, "At the time we laid off the men we had some prospects that we may
get steel, but we never knew when." In view of the foregoing, and contrary to Re-
spondent's contention, I find that on September 15, the date of the layoff, there re-
mained ample work for all the employees.5 This fact, coupled with the Respondent's
other simultaneous antiunion activity and the suddenness and the timing of the lay-
offs, is alone sufficient to compel the conclusion that the layoffs were discriminatorily
motivated.
But there are yet other factors which point to the same conclusion.
Thus, Miele testified that he did not use seniority as a basis in deciding which em-
ployees were to be laid off, but rather that he selected for layoff only the employees
he could spare the most-that is, Miele explained, he refrained from laying off those
employees whom he considered to be the "better workers."
This testimony can
hardly be reconciled with his testimony later in the hearing that Hardwick, who was
laid off, was "a very capable worker."
Miele, Jr., also described Hardwick as a
skillful worker, so skillful, in fact, that "when there was a special job particularly to
be done, we always called Sammie in on the job." Further, Chester Bell, another
of the laid-off employees, was characterized by Miele, Jr., as being a "good" em-
ployee.
Thus, assuming arguendo that there was a need to lay off employees at this
time, I cannot accept Miele's explanation that the layoff selections were predicated
upon the employees' job qualifications.
Further pointing toward the discriminatory motivation of the September 15 layoff
is the fact that Respondent hired a new employee on September 11 and that it
retained this employee during the entire layoff period. It is true that this employee,
Kenneth Williams, was the employee of another employer who was on strike at the
time and it is also true that he was hired by the Respondent with the knowledge that
he would remain only for the duration of the steel strike. I have no doubt, as claimed
by Miele, Sr., that Williams was a capable and experience employee.
However, it
will be recalled that Respondent also regarded Hardwick as a very capable and
skilled employee.
Yet, Williams and the others were laid off allegedly because of
the lack of work due to a shortage of materials. In this regard it is also significant to
note that Respondent continued to utilize the services of a part-time employee, Eddie
Mobly, during the layoff period.
In view of all the foregoing, I am persuaded, and I find, that the layoffs of the
employees on September 15 were not impelled by economic considerations, but,
contrary to the Respondent's contention, were precipitated by Respondent's discov-
ery and belief that these employees were in favor of the union.
Accordingly, it is
found that the Respondent laid off Sammie Lee Hardwick, Chester Bell, Harvey
Daniels, and Cleophus Burrough on September 15, 1959, in order to discourage mem-
bership in the Union in violation of Section 8(a) (3 and (1) of the Act.
C. The second alleged discriminatory layoff of Cleophus Burrough
Cleophus Burrough, whose discriminatory layoff on September 15, 1959, has been
discussed above, was recalled to work by the Respondent on September 25, 1959.
His employment was terminated again by the Respondent on September 30.
He
was recalled for the second time on or about October 25, 1959. Burrough's termina-
tion on September 30 is also alleged to be violative of Section 8(a)(3).6
The incident which prompted Burrough's second termination is for the most part
not in dispute. I find the facts concerning it to be as follows: On the day in ques-
tion, September 30, Burrough reported to work somewhat over 2 hours late and
after the end of the 10 a.m. smoking break.
On the day preceding he had told
Eugene Reid, the only foreman, that he would be late on the following day, but he
did not so notify either of the Mieles or the office, as was customary.
Upon arriving
at work, but before punching in, Burrough proceeded to the restroom to change his
clothes.
Eddie Mobly, a part-time employee, was using the toilet as he entered.
Burrough began to change his clothes and at the same time smoked a cigarette and
entered into a discussion with Mobly.
Here there is a minor variation between Bur-
rough and Miele as to what next occurred. Burrough testified that at this point
Miele entered the men's room and told him to get his money, that he was being dis-
charged.
Further, according to Burrough, he then asked Miele why he was being
5 There is also testimony by witnesses for the General Counsel and witnesses for the
Company that steel was received in September 1959, both before and after the layoffs
In view of the findings herein, it is immaterial whether Burrough's termination on
September 30 be regarded as a discharge, as urged by the General Counsel, or as a disci-
plinary layoff, as contended by the Respondent.
MIELE IRON WORKS
341
discharged and Miele answered only by saying he was a troublemaker.
Miele's ver-
sion is somewhat different.
According to Miele, he entered the restroom and ob-
served that Burrough was smoking and talking to Mobly.
He then waited outside
the door for about 20 minutes until Burrough came out, at which point, according to
Miele, "I told him that ,I could not countenance this constant infraction of the rules
and that he should go into the office and get his pay."
The General Counsel urges that "the September 30th discharge of Burrough, the
day before the N.L.R. B. election, was generated by Mr. Miele, Sr.'s antiunion animus
and was an attempt to eliminate a known vote for the union." I
Other than the
events heretofore described, which occurred prior to the first layoff, there is no
evidence of additional interrogation of or animus toward Burrough by the Respond-
ent between the time of his recall on September 25 and his termination on Sep-
tember 30.
Returning to the incident that led to the second termination of Burrough, it is my
conclusion that the General Counsel has not sustained the burden of proof to
support his contention that this incident was used by the Respondent as a pretext to
terminate Burrough.
Thus, the evidence establishes that Respondent gave the em-
ployees regular break periods for smoking.
Due to fire hazards on the property, the
Company had a rule against smoking at any other time. Burrough conceded that
the rule against smoking was generally enforced.
Thus, Burrough testified, "They
were always going around checking, you know, like Reid [the foreman] and so we
did not smoke in the men's room, not as I know of." Further, I credit Miele's
(testimony that he had warned Burrough on a number of occasions in the past for
various aspects of his personal behavior.8
Without burdening the report in this
regard, suffice it to say that Burrough conceded that on an occasion before his layoff
he admitted to Miele, Sr., that he was responsible for having written obscene remarks
on the restroom wall.9
Moreover, Burrough conceded that on past occasions he had
various "disagreements" with Miele, Sr.
It is obvious to the Trial Examiner that the termination of Burrough on September
30 was neither premeditated or planned.
On the contrary, Miele, Sr., took this
action on the spur of the moment.
Burrough himself testified that Miele was
"excited" over the incident in the toilet.
Further, from my observation of Miele on
the stand, I am satisfied that he is a high-strung and excitable individual.
On
several instances during the hearing Miele became so aroused that he arose from the
witness stand while testifying. In view of all the circumstances cited above, it is
not surprising that Miele became aggravated and upset when he observed Burrough's
conduct in the restroom and that he then and there decided to take some action
against Burrough i°
Accordingly, I find that Miele, Sr., terminated Burrough on
September 30 solely because of the incident in question and not because of Bur-
rough's union sympathies or union activities. It is therefore concluded and found
that Respondent did not, by terminating Burrough on September 30, for the reasons
stated, engage in discrimination within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section HI, above, occurring in con-
nection with the operations of the Respondent described in section I, above, have a
close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com-
merce and the free flow thereof.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices violative
of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist
therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of
the Act.
7 Official Board records, of which I have taken notice , show that an election was held
among Respondent's employees on October 1, 1959.
B Although I have previously discredited some of Miele, Sr .'s testimony, I have no
difficulty, upon a consideration of all the evidence, In crediting Miele's testimony con-
cerning Burrough's layoff on
September 30.
As stated
by Judge Learned Hand In
N,L R B v. Universal Camera Corporation , 179 F. 2d 749 (C.A. 2) : "It is no reason
for refusing to accept everything a witness says, because you do not believe all of it;
nothing is more common In all kinds of judicial decisions to believe some and not all."
9Burrough testified that he actually was not responsible for these writings, but that be
merely took the blame for the others
10 Specifically , I find that Burrough violated a company rule by smoking at a time
when smoking was not permitted
342
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Having found that the Respondent, on September 15, 1959, discriminated in
regard to the tenure of employment of Sammie Lee Hardwick , Chester Bell, Harvey
Daniels, and Cleophus Burrough, it will be recommended that these employees be
made whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result of the discrimination against
them.
Backpay shall be computed in accordance with the formula in F. W. Wool-
worth Company, 90 NLRB 289.
Inasmuch as the parties indicated some disagreement as to the exact date of recall
of these employees, a matter for compliance, it will be further recommended that
the Respondent, upon request, make available to the Board and its agents all payroll
and other records pertinent to the dates of recall and to the analysis of the amounts
of backpay due.
Since the violations of the Act which the Respondent has committed are related
to other unfair labor practices proscribed by the Act, and the danger of their com-
mission in the future is reasonably to be anticipated from its past conduct , the pre-
ventive purpose of the Act may be thwarted unless the recommendations are co-
extensive with the threat.
To effectuate the policies of the Act, therefore, it will be
recommended that the Respondent cease and desist from infringing in any manner
upon the rights guaranteed by the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in
this case I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7 ) of the Act.
2. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in and is
engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
4. By discriminatorily laying off Sammie Lee Hardwick, Chester Bell, Harvey
Daniels, and Cleophus Burrough on September 15, 1959 , the Respondent has en-
gaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(3) and^(1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
6. Respondent has not engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8 (a)(3) and ( 1) by terminating the employment of Cleophus Burrough on
September 30, 1959.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
Central Rigging and Contracting Corporation and David Edwin
Beard, Robert Thomas Quinnelly, Wesley B. Lasseter, Robert
Bruce Beard, and George Lawrence Eunice
Lodge 554, International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron
Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers , AFL-CIO,
and its Agent C. K. Curry and Robert Thomas Quinnelly,
Wesley B. Lasseter, Robert Bruce Beard, George Lawrence
Eunice, and David Edwin Beard .
Cases Nos. 10-CA-4082,
10-CA-4083, 10-CA-4084, 10-CA-4085, 10-CA-4087, 10-CB-1086,
10-CB-1087,10-CB-1088,10-CB-1089, a'nd 10-CB-1090.
October
11, 1960
DECISION AND ORDER
On April 21,1960, Trial Examiner Sidney Lindner issued his Inter-
mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondents had engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair
129 NLRB No. 37.