Elkwood Detective Agency

ELKWOOD DETECTIVE AGENCY William M. Bennett d/b/a Elkwood Detective Agency and William Witsman d/b/a Active Detective Agency General Service Employees Union Local No. 73, affi- liated with Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO and William Witsman d/b/a Active De- tective Agency. Cases 13-CA-16885 and 13 CB 7462 October 31, 1978 DECISION AND ORDER' By MEMBERS JENKINS. MURPHY. AND TRUESDAII. On July 5, 1978, Administrative Law Judge George Christensen issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent Union filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, as modified herein.2 ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modified below, and hereby orders that the Respondent, Wil- liam Bennett, d/b/a Elkwood Detective Agency, Summit, Illinois, his agents, successors, and assigns, and the Respondent, General Service Employees Union Local No. 73, affiliated with Service Employ- ees International Union, AFL-CIO, Chicago, Illi- nois, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order, as so modified: [Subsequent to issuance of this Decision and Order. Respondent Union on November 21, 1978. filed with the Board a motion for reconsideration of this panel decision by the full Board. Pursuant to Board policy, the same panel which decided this case considered Respondent Union's motion and declined to refer it to a full Board. After considering the motion, the three- member panel decided to clarify the orginal Order and in all other respects to deny the motion as raising no issues not previously considered. The Or- der and Appendix B herein appear as amended by the Board's "Order De- nying Motion for Reconsideration En Banc and Amending Decision, Order and Notice." dated May 15. 1979.1 1. Substitute the following for paragraph A, I(d): "In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act." 2. Delete paragraph B, I(a) and reletter the subse- quent paragraphs accordingly. 3. Substitute the following for the new paragraph B, I(c): "(c) In any other manner restraining or coercing the employees of Elkwood or the employees of any other employer of guards and/or detective personnel in these employees' exercise of their rights under Sec- tion 7 of the Act." 4. Delete the citation. "F. W. Woolworth Compa- nv, 90 NLRB 289," in paragraphs A. 2(b) and B, 2(a). 5. Substitute the attached notices for those of the Administrative Law Judge. Respondent :nion has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative L aw Judge It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibill- t, unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dr, Wall Producis, Inc.. 91 NLRB 544 (1950). enfd. 188, 362 (3d Cir 1951). We have carefully exam- ined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings. In affirming the Administrative L.aw Judge's conclusion that a broad order should issue. wse rely solely on Board Decisions and Administrative Law Judge Decisions adopted by the Board. Member Murphy agrees that a broad order is appropriate herein In so concluding, however, she does not rels ,n General Service Emplovees Union Local No. 73 (A I Securite Service (Co.), 224 NLRB 434 (1976), in which she dissented. Nor does she rely on the 8b$h7)(C) finding in General Senice Employees Union Local No. 73 {And! Frain. Inc ), 230 NLRB 351 (1977). for reasons stated in her dissent therein. Consistent with the Board's traditional language. "in any other manner," used in a broad order, we shall modify the Administrative Law Judge's recommended Order and notice accordingly In addition, we shall delete the Adrmnistrative Law Judge's citation of / 1$ Woolworth Conmpans, 90 NI RB 289 (1950), in pars A. 2(b) and B. 2(a). which refer to interest on monetar' awards. Woolworth has nothing whatsoever to do with interest; it Involves the reimbursement of backpay, which is inapplicable here We shall also delete the phrase "Interfenng with" in par. B. 1(c) Sec. 8(b I 1)A) onl, proscribes restraint and coercion of employees' Sec 7 nghts. APPENDIX A NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing at which all parties had an opportu- nity to present evidence, the National Labor Rela- tions Board has found that we committed certain un- fair labor practices and has ordered us to post this notice. We intend to abide by the following: WE WILL NOT recognize or bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative of our em- ployees for collective-bargaining purposes un- less and until a majority of our employees within an appropriate unit freely and without coercion 99 DEC ISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD has designated the Union as their representative for collective-bargaining purposes. Wi WILL Nor give any force or effect to any contract or contracts signed by us and the Union on and after July 7, 1977, covering our employees' rates of pay, wages, hours, and work- ing conditions. Wif V ii NOI assist the Union to become the representative of our employees for collective- bargaining purposes. WE WII.L NO1 in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, to self-organization, to bargain collectively through the Union or another representative of their choosing. to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities. WI wUi.l withdraw and withhold recognition of the Union as the exclusive representative of our employees for collective-bargaining pur- poses unless and until a majority of our employ- ees in an appropriate unit freely and without coercion have designated the Union as their rep- resentative for collective-bargaining purposes. WFe wii.L jointly and severally with the Union reimburse our employees for any initiation fees, dues, or other payments paid to the Union or made pursuant to the contract or contracts en- tered into between us and the Union on and af- ter July 7, 1977, with interest on the amounts due. WILIIAM BFNNEI-I. d/b/ a EI.KWO)I) DE.IE('IIVE AGENCY APPENDIX B Nof I(E To MEMBERS PoSTED BY ORDER OF IHE NATIONAI. LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The Board has issued a Decision finding we and Wil- liam Bennett, d/b/a Elkwood Detective Agency, vio- lated the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, by entering into a contract at a time we did not rep- resent a majority of Elkwood's employees within an appropriate unit. To rectify that violation and in view of its finding that we have commited similar violations in the past and will continue to commit them in the future unless barred from doing so, the Board has ordered us to refrain from certain acts and to perform others, and to notify you what we have been ordered not to do and what we have been or- dered to do. We therefore inform you: WE WIn. NOT demand or accept recognition and collective bargaining as the representative of employees of Elkwood or any other employer of guards and/or detectives unless and until a majority of employees within the appropriate unit employed by Elkwood or such other em- ployer freely and without coercion has designat- ed us as their representative for collective-bar- gaining purposes. WI WILL Not give any force or effect to the contract or contracts signed by Elkwood and us on and after July 7, 1977, covering the wages, rates of pay, hours, and working conditions of a unit of Elkwood's employees. WE WI.L NOI interfere with, restrain, or coerce the employees of Elkwood or the employees of any other guard or detective agency in the exer- cise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act to self-organization, to form, join, or assist the Union or any other labor organization, to bar- gain collectively through the Union or another representative of their choosing, to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of col- lective bargaining or other mutual aid and pro- tection (or to refrain from any and all such ac- tivities) and, WE- wi l. jointly and severally with Elkwood reimburse Elkwood's employees for any initia- tion fees, dues, or other payments received by us or otherwise paid as a result of the contract or contracts signed by Elkwood and us on and af- ter July 7, 1977, with interest on the amounts due. GIENEiRAL SERVICE EMPIOYE ES UNION LOCAL No 73 AFFII.IATED WITH SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION. AFL CIO DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE GEORGE CHRISTENSEN, Administrative Law Judge: On March 20-21, 1978, I conducted a hearing in Chicago, Illi- nois, to try issues raised by a consolidated complaint issued against William Bennett, d/b/a Elkwood Detective Agen- cy, herein called Elkwood, the Employer, or the Company, and General Service Employees Union Local No. 73. affili- ated with Service Employees International Union, AFL- C10, herein the Union, on November 14, 1977,' on the basis of charges filed against them by William Witsman d/b/a Active Detective Agency, herein the Chaiging Party, on September 26. All dates referred to hereinafter are in 1977. unless otherwise stated. 00 ELKWOOD DETECTIVE AGENCY The complaint alleges that the Company violated Sec- tion 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) and the Union violated Section 8(b)(I)(A) and (2) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (hereafter called the Act), by entering into a con- tract wherein the Company recognized the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of its guards, and required that they pay initiation fees and dues to the Union as a condition of continued employment without affording them any opportunity to decide whether or not they desired such representation. While the Company did not file a written answer to the complaint, the operational head of the Company, William Bennett, who appeared on its behalf without counsel at the heanng, was afforded an opportunity to respond orally to the allegations contained in the complaint. By Bennett, the Company admitted the commerce facts, execution of the contract without proof of the Union's majority repre- sentative status among its guards, and, that by such con- duct the Company violated the Act. While the Union also admitted it did not represent a majority of the Company's guards at the time it executed the contract, it denied the commerce facts and moved to dismiss the complaint for want of jurisdiction. The parties advised me that they were unable to reach a settlement because they disagreed on the scope of the remedial order, with the General Counsel contending the Union's conduct vis-a-vis the Employer was but a current example of an unlawful pattern or practice developed by the Union to coerce the unorganized segment of the guard industry in the area into signing the Union's standard area contract (which covered the organized segment of the in- dustry in the area) without regard to the desires of the affected guard employees, which pattern would continue unless a broad order issued barring such conduct and the Union contending the remedial order should be limited to bar such union conduct vis-a-vis this Employer only. The issues before me for resolution are: (I) Whether the Board has or should exercise jurisdiction in this case: (2) if so, whether the Company and the Union violated Section 8(a)(1), (2), (3) and Section 8(b)(l)(A) and (2) of the Act: and (3) if so, whether a broad remedial order should issue. The parties appeared at the hearing and were afforded full opportunity to adduce evidence, examine and cross- examine witnesses, argue, and file briefs. Briefs have been received from the General Counsel and the Union. Based on my review of the entire record, observation of the witnesses, perusal of the briefs, and research, I enter the following: FINIINGS 01 FA( I I JtRISI)I( ION As noted heretofore, the Company failed to file a written answer to the complaint, but orally responded to the cornm- 2 The complaint alleged. Ihe tJnlirn, wrilttn anser r .Idmitted Bennelt orally admitted. and I find at all times pertincit Bennel a. hlcensedrl hi tBhe State of Illinois to do business as a delecnle and iI:aird aicncs, BCenTIctl va' a partial owner and directed the operamnii, ouf Ihe ( np,.il. and lie ald h was a supervisor and agent of the (C lpan .iL a inge Iin Its behalf plaint allegations at the outset of the hearing with admis- sions it maintained an office and place of business at Sum- mit, Illinois. for the purpose of engaging in the business of providing guard and detective services in the Chicago and adjacent suburban areas, and that during the year 1977 it provided services valued in excess of $50,000 for users who met the Board's jurisdictional standards and therefore was an employer engaged in commerce in a business affecting commerce, within the meaning of the Act. Since the Union contended those admissions were not binding upon the Union in view of its denial thereof in its written answer, the General Counsel adduced testimony by Bennett and AnthonN R. Palumbo. a part owner of the Company who handled its financial affairs, including bill- ing of clients for services, accepting payments therefor, etc..3 that during the year 1977. the Company received in excess of $50,000 from McI)onald Corporation for guard services provided over the year, at approximatel. 18 res- taurants operated b\ McDonald in the area:4 between $10 15,000 from Burger King for similar services rendered over a 6-month period in 1977, at four restaurants: approxi- mately $6,000 from Paramount Threatres for similar ser- vices rendered over a 2 month period in 1977 at a theatre: between $4 6,000 from Fencl Chevrolet for similar services during 1977: and approximately $20,000 from Johny O's Supper Club for similar services during 1977. The parties stipulated that McDonald Corporation. Burger King, and Paramount Theatres at all times perti- nent, were employers engaged in commerce in business ef- fecting commerce within the meaning of the Act. I credit Bennett and Palumbo testimons recited hereto- fore: they displayed a detailed awareness and recollection of the scope of Elkwood's operations during 1977, and its receipts and disbursement. therefrom, during that year, particularly with respect to the companies cited ibove, and were convincing witnesses, impressing me with their truth and accuracs. It is further clear from McDonald's alone. over only 5 months of 1977, Ilkswood deriveJ $47.,(X) in revenues for guard ser' ices, at I8 locatilrnsf ;, ith 1at least an equivalent sum oser the remaining 7 months and certainly a sum in excess of $50,000. In view of the documentars support that in onls 5 of the on the h.,sis .f IhIl teSllllOnrls whih I (rehlil I find al all pelilnenl times P'llumbho %,, a supiierXls l Iand .entc of the (' .Implr a .ting Oie I( behalf IthICII IcItI' IntI V.aI, u iuppit i c x d phlicates of hills sent to Micl)Do ald ce rilriF Ihe perioid S\ sl l)citiihe r 1 I77n the griss .anllunin of $47.(XX) hBennCell lestlfled thic ihC (ht I prtn' 1977 re.enues fromn Mcl)nald for serm ices oter the full se.ar exceeded $ii).X)i .anrld Palumborh testified thl Ihe ( mlnp.aii\n 19- iYrelCn X frlm-i D1It [ iil Ifr suth cr5 .cs hitS een Jalcu ai't /tnd l!I ' IS7 hbilcid .; s h,, l ic f cic nnthl hillh nc at leais eqlldlic the $47h.1) .sh t o n I ri I t I, l st l)etetllh er 1977 bilnlln. aInl certillnlN exueeded $Si)ltot) f[Ir tot : ,f ipproxrnatel\ 5944K() :tndi $7.()O, respecti. vel I foind .lch Ilil liIt at the h}lic HILn .Hrd ton intlc to find 1ihiril cI/C I Iile 11l iis o hlCeCllon II. tihc ltlle l'blll; \ , f tCrlltin dupliplate hill, cnr hb i kvi,,od durinig I197 It , Lc It)nalId for etice-C, rendered onl the criclnd Ihc duplic.te hills in rtiesihn ncaitic the hecla in ".1 Ii l)elcci,.ie nenc., I credll P'lumnho'. lestinmonx Ih. he tdid rillrns for I tf prior io the forma- tion of I:lku(id and used the hblalk I IIn 'ti for IIkwotwd . hililncs. mere- 1s pahnlsit .aitker, re.dinlg e I lk,.I,.dl l)tetlse .igeuls s'er the I H he.iding on thei origirals o.f lhe hills senl t h) Iilk .i..l . thenis hbu nr t hlb h- ering to aJffix rtiuh stiker, t the drplic:ite. fi keptl a pait of JI kwood's recordsi .i it h1 ftrilhet tetliltiltl . t Iit tt , .ix fr.ll,.,,d 11 . 'is icr t. raitlns alid J i t 1n. tlIn ,lII 1'" .I I .II c I. to S \t \ i ) IItI.L1 I01 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 12 months in 1977 Elkwood performed guard services for McDonald valued at $47,000 and, thus, obviously received in excess of $3,000 more during the other 7 months within .that year Elkwood rendered such services to McDonald, I found it would not serve the purposes of the Act, it would unduly delay and prolong the hearing, and it might pro- duce results harmful and not intended by the statute 6 to hold open the record while the Union pursued an inquiry into the names and addresses of all of Elkwood's custom- ers. I also sustained objections to the Union's questions concerning the identity of customers turned over to Elk- wood by J.H. and what amounts, if any, Elkwood paid to J.H. for such referrals. I so ruled because of Palumbo's testimony, which I credit, that none of the accounts he and Bennett named, namely, McDonald, Burger King, Para- mount, Fencl, and Johny O's Supper Club, were turned over to Elkwood by J.H. and J.H., with whose operations he was familiar, at no time performed guard services for those companies just named. I therefore find my denial of the Union's request to per- mit the Union to pursue the names and addresses of Elkwood's customers and my sustaining of objections to questions concerning the identity of customers turned over to Elkwood by J.H. insufficient grounds for discrediting the testimony of Bennett and Palumbo concerning the commerce facts recited above. Based on the foregoing, I find and conclude during a representative period, 1977, Elkwood, in the normal course of its business, provided services valued in excess of $50,000 for users (McDonald, Burger King, and Para- mount) who met the Board's jurisdictional standards and therefore at times material hereto was an employer en- gaged in commerce in a business effecting commerce with- in the meaning of the Act. 11. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Facts 7 The Union commenced its campaign to organize Elk- wood by dispatch of a March 24 letter to Elkwood inform- ing Elkwood the Union believed the wages and fringe ben- efits Elkwood was providing its guards were below the Union's area standards for such wages and fringe benefits and requesting Elkwood inform the Union concerning the level of its wages and fringe benefits by a certain date. Elkwood did not respond to the letter. On June 23, Union Business Representatives Richard 6 In view of the Union's threat to contact Elkwood's customers and seek to disrupt their business relations if Elkwood failed to grant its demands for recognition and a union shop contract. The Union objected to the admission of any evidence concerning its conduct vis-a-vis Elkwood on the ground it and E.lkwood admitted execu- tion of a contract wherein Elkwood recognized the Union as the exclusive representative of its guards for collective-bargaining purposes arid requiring those guards to pay initiation fees and dues to the Union as a condition of employment without authorization from the guards and consequent ¥iola- tion of Sec. 8(bXI{XA) and (2) of the Act and that admission of such evi- dence might establish its further violation of Sec. 8(hb)(4 and or t8(b)7) of the Act. Since the General Counsel represented arid I ruled the evidence in question would relate solely to the issues in this proceeding. I overruled the objection. Wesley and Charles Bonesz 8 visited Elkwood's offices and interviewed Bennett. They informed Bennett that Elkwood did not meet the Union's area standards for wages and fringe benefits, as represented by the Union's standard guard contract; provided Bennett with a copy of the con- tract; advised Bennett the Union would picket Elkwood at its customer's locations if Elkwood did not satisfy the Union it was meeting the standards contained in the con- tract; suggested Bennett study the contract; and arranged a date for a second meeting at Bennett's office. Bennett telephoned Bonesz and canceled the proposed meeting at his office, but agreed to meet with the union representatives at the Union's office on July 7. On July 7, Bennett appeared at the Union's office and met with Wesley, Bonesz, and the Union's attorney, David Loewenberg.9 They discussed the wage and fringe benefits contained in the Union's standard guard contract and those of Elkwood's guards; Bennett conceded that Elk- wood did not match certain fringe benefit levels i' con- tained in the contract, though it matched or exceeded the wage rates. Loewenberg informed Bennett that the Union had a right to picket Elkwood's customers at locations where Elkwood provided guard services to its customers, that the Union would not do so if Elkwood signed one of its standard guard contracts, but would do so if Bennett left the union office without signing. Bennett stated he had to confer with Palumbo and secure Palumbo's agreement before he could sign. Loewenberg offered Bennett the use of an office and a telephone. Bennett accepted, was unable to reach Palumbo, but left word with Palumbo's answering service to return his call as soon as possible. Palumbo soon after returned Bennett's call. Bennett informed Palumbo what had transpired and then put Loewenberg on the tele- phone. Loewenberg informed Palumbo that the Union was too big for a small employer like Elkwood to fight, that bigger guard employers had fought the Union and lost, and suggested Elkwood sign the contract and avoid a struggle. Bennett took back the telephone and Palumbo advised him to sign the contract. Bennett and Loewenberg signed the Union's contract and Bennett left the union office." It has been admitted by both Elkwood and the Union that the Union did not represent Elkwood's guards at the time they signed the contract and that the contract con- tained an exclusive recognition clause, a union shop clause, and a dues-checkoff clause. Based on the foregoing, I find and conclude Elkwood violated Section 8(a)(l), (2), and (3) and the Union violated Section 8(b)1)(A) and (2) of the Act. 9 I find at all tinies material Wesle, and Bonesz were agents of the Union acting orl Its ibehall uithin thei meaning oif the Act. I' find ail 1 nilteria time. I.,rewenherg was an agent of the I nmon acting on its behalf sithil thre mieaning if the Act u0 For health and welfare, etc II 'Ihe findings under this heading are based primarily on the testimony of Bennett and Paiumh i Aith omnie corroboration from Wesley. Bonesz, and Loewenberg % here the irstrinirmns f the latter three witnesses differs front that of the two former witnesses, it is not credited. Bennett and Palum- Ix) impressed me as rehliablic iuthful witnesses In their testimony, and I find somewhat incredible the uliol witnesses' testimony that they never asked Bennett tot sign a contract and only acceded to Bennett's pleas to he fur- iished .i contract toi ,1 in 102 ELKWOOD DETECTIVE AGENCY B. The Scope of the Remedial Order The General Counsel contends since at least 1974 and continuing through 1978 the Union has been following a program designed to coerce the nonunion segment of the guard industry in the Chicago and suburban areas into exe- cuting the Union's standard guard contracts wherein the Union is granted exclusive recognition for collective-bar- gaining purposes, the guard employees covered by the con- tract are required to pay dues and initiation fees to the Union and the guards receive the rates of pay, wages, hours, and working conditions set out therein, all without regard to the sentiments of the guards concerning such rep- resentation. He contends the program is carried out by first establishing contact with a nonunion employer, asserting the wages, rates of pay, hours, and working conditions of the guard employees of that employer are below those con- tained in the Union's standard guard contract (an Associa- tion-Union agreement covering the unionized segment of the industry in the area); second, threatening to picket that employer at the premises of his customers if he fails or refuses to sign a contract containing the same terms, in- cluding, inter alia, provisions recognizing the Union as the exclusive representative of the employer's guard employees for collective-bargaining purposes, requiring those guard employees to pay initiation fees and dues to the Union as a condition of employment, etc.; third, in some cases, threat- ening to contact the employer's customers to threaten them with picketing unless they pressure the employer to sign the contract or the customers will switch to an employer under contract with the Union; fourth, in the event the nonunion employer resists, picketing locations where he provides guard services and contacting the persons for whom such services are rendered, pressuring those persons to inform the employer they will cease doing business with him un- less he enters into a contract with the Union covering his employees; and further pressuring those persons to switch their business to a guard service under such contract with the Union if he does not yield to such pressure. The General Counsel cites the following cases to support his argument: General Service Employees Union Local No. 73, affiliated with Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO (R.R.S., Inc.), JD-795-74 (unreported in the Board's bound volumes since the Union failed to file time- ly exceptions to Administrative Law Judge George J. Bott's Decision and that Decision, therefore, was adopted profor- ma by the Board); General Service Employees Union Local No. 73, etc. (A-I Security Service Co. & Jack Moran, d/b/a Moran Detective Agency), 224 NLRB 434 (1976) enfd. 97 LRRM 2906; (D.C. Cir. 1978); General Service Employees Union Local No. 73, etc. (Andy Frain, Inc. and Allied Securi- ty, Incorporated Chicago), 230 NLRB 351 (1977); Manage- ment Safeguards, Inc. & General Service Employees Union Local No. 73, etc., JD-166-78 (unreported in the Board's bound volumes since the Union failed to file timely excep- tions to Administrative Law Judge Robert C. Batson's De- cision, and that Decision was adopted pro forma by the Board); and the following pending cases (for informational purposes)-General Service Employees Union Local No. 73, etc. (Andy Frain, Inc.), JD-166-78 (Administrative Law Judge Robert A. Giannasi); Administrative Law Judge De- cision entered, before Board for review; General Service Employees Local No. 73, etc. (Wm Witsman, d/b/a Active Detective Agency), JD 368-78 (Administrative Law Judge Thomas D. Johnston), Administrative Law Judge Decision entered, before Board for review; General Service Employ- ees Union Local No. 73, etc. (Rainey's Detective Agency), Case 13-CP-359 (Administrative Law Judge Hutton Bran- don, hearing completed, awaiting Administrative Law Judge Decision); and General Service Employees Union Lo- cal No. 73, etc. (Safe Security, Inc.), 1978, Case 13-CB-7761 (complaint issued, hearing scheduled). In the first (R.R.S.) case to reach the Board (in 1975), the Board adopted Administrative Law Judge Bott's Decision that the Union violated Sections 8(bX7)(C) and 8(bX4)(i) and (iiXB) of the Act by Loewenberg's threatening R.R.S. with picketing of its customers if R.R.S. refused to sign its standard guard contract, by Loewenberg's threatening RtR.S.'s customers with picketing if they did not pressure R R.S. to sign the contract or switch their guard business to an employer covered by the contract, and by picketing at the premises of R.R.S.'s customers when R.R.S. refused to execute the contract and R.R.S.'s customes refused to pres- sure R.R.S. to sign and refused to switch their guard busi- ness to an employer of guards covered by the contract. In the next (A-I) case to reach the Board (in 1976), the Board ruled the Union violated Section 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act by Loewenberg's threatening A-I with picketing at its custom- ers' premises unless A-i signed the Union's standard con- tract. In that case, the Board overruled Administrative Law Judge Barker's recommendation that a broad order issue on the ground the R.R.S. decision was insufficient support for a finding the Union had a proclivity to violate the Act. In the third (Andy Frain and Allied Security) case to reach the Board (in 1977), the Board ruled the Union violated Sections 8(b)(7)(C) and 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act by threatening Frain and Allied with picketing of their cus- tomers if they did not sign the Union's standard guard contract, by threatening their customers with picketing if they did not sign the contract, and by picketing their cus- tomers when they refused to sign. In the fourth (Manage- ment Safeguards) case to reach the Board (also in 1977), the Board adopted the Administrative Law Judge's Decision that Management Safeguards violated Section 8(a)(l), (2), and (3) and the Union violated Section 8(b)(I)(A) and (2) of the Act by entering into the Union's standard guard contract without regard to the representation desires of the affected guard employees. While the Administrative Law Judge entered findings that the Union conduct relied upon to find violations of the Act in the R.R.S., A-l, Frain and Allied and in his (Management Safeguards) decision estab- lished the Union's proclivity for violating the Act and war- ranted the entry of a broad order, he failed to set forth a broad order in his recommended order adopted by the Board. In the next cases pending before the Board (Andy Frain and Active), the Administrative Law Judges entered find- ings the Union program described at the outset of this sec- tion of my Decision has continued, and additional cases so alleging await hearing (Rainey's and Safe Security). The reported cases amply support the General Counsel's contention the Union, since 1974, has been following an 103 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD unlawful program designed to coerce the nonunion seg- ment of the guard service industry in the Chicago and sur- rounding areas into signing the Union's standard guard agreement, without regard to the representational desires of the affected employees, by a campaign of threats ad- dressed to the nonunion guard employers and their cus- tomers followed by picketing of the latter in the event the nonunion guard employers fail or refuse to yield to the Union's demands and, in my judgment, support a finding the Union has demonstrated a proclivity to violate the Act which will continue unless barred by a broad order.'2 I, therefore, find the Union conduct set out heretofore demonstrates a proclivity to violate the Act by instituting and following an unlawful program designed to coerce the nonunion segment of the guard service industry in the C'hi- cago and surrounding areas into signing the Union's stan- dard guard agreement without regard to the representa- tional desires of the affected employees unless prevented from so doing by the entry of a broad order and, in view thereof, a broad order should issue in this case. CON( LUSIONS 01F LAW I. At all pertinent times, Elkwood was an employer en- gaged in commerce, in a business effecting commerce, and the Union was a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(2), (5), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. Elkwood violated Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the Act and the Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act by entering into a contract at a time the Union did not represent Elkwood's guard employees, wherein Elk- wood recognized the Union as the exclusive representative of its guard employees for collective-bargaining purposes. the guard employees covered by that contract were re- quired to pay initiation fees and dues to the Union as a condition of employment, and the wages, rates of pay, hours, and working conditions of the guard employees were governed by the contract. 3. In view of the Union's proclivity to violate the Act by coercing nonunion employers of guard employees in the Chicago and surrounding areas into signing the Union's standard guard contract without regard to the representa- tion desires of affected employees, a broad order should issue in this case barring the UInion from continuing such unlawful conduct. 4. The unfair labor practices recited above affect com- merce as defined in the Act. I I reject the union alguments thai the R R ;.5. 4 1, mIn, t-ain. rind 4/lltid Selurlrv, Aanarnrl'n l Sfc'l gluarut det iions ctilllri he relied upon t, support a finding of uniotn proclivity io vilarte the Act arid entr' iof a brolad ,order either heca.use the inion did nri, file exceplnirs to the Adirisitratii c I.aw Judge i)ecision adopted bv the Board i( R I and MWanag,'mnt~rri Saile guaLr) )or the D[)ecisio did nr( intle the salme ci rt]is lrf the sliatutc 4 1 or the lUnion did not file all answer it oppose entr? of an <rder gr;lnhing summary judgment against it (A4ndr traintl) It o.ulid he an ahbuse of Boiti precedent and policy it permit the tUrlioll t avoid consequelncec of its unlanwful conduct b y its strategy of falling [i file eceptions and because I1 several cases emploher refusal to sield to Its uilaifil L; acicIs ind sit.liCIg led to the filing of ch.rges under different secrions of the Act taihn thoce here. where its iniliil unlawful tactics .ere unlsuccessful THL REMEDY Having found that Elkwood and the Union engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Sections 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) and 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act, I shall recom- mend they cease and desist therefrom and take affirmative action designed to effectuate the purposes of the Act in- cluding, inter alia, the entry of a broad order designed to curb the Union's proclivity to continue in its program vio- lative of the Act. On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, conclu- sions of law, and the entire record in this case, and pur- suant to Section i0(c) of the Act, I recommend the is- suance of the following: ORDER 13 A. Respondent William M. Bennett d/b/a Elkwood De- tective Agency, Summit, Illinois, his agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Recognizing or bargaining with the Union as the col- lective-bargaining representative of its employees unless and until a free and uncoerced majority of Elkwood's em- ployees within an appropriate bargaining unit has designat- ed the Union as their representative for collective-bargain- ing purposes. (b) Giving any force or effect to the contract or con- tracts signed by Elkwood and the Union on and after July 7, 1977, covering the rates of pay, wages, hours, and work- ing conditions of Elkwood's employees. (c) Assisting the Union to become the exclusive repre- sentative of its employees for collective-bargaining pur- poses. (d) Interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employ- ees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action: (a) Withdraw and withhold recognition of the Union as the exclusive representative of Elkwood's employees unless and until a free and uncoerced majority of Elkwood's em- ployees within an appropriate unit has designated the Union as their exclusive representative for collective-bar- gaining purposes. (b) Jointly and severally with the Union reimburse its employees for any initiation fees, dues, or other payments paid to the Union or made pursuant to any contract or contracts entered into by Elkweod and the Union on or after July 7, 1977. together with interest thereon in the manner prescribed in F: W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977). and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). (c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents. for examination and copying, any and all records necessary to determine the amounts of money lt In the event no esxeptilns are filed as provided hb Sec 102 46 of the Rules anid Regulillons of the Natironal I.abor Relations Board. the findings, cornclusluons alnd recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102.48 of thc Rules anld Regulationlns be adopled h) the Board and becoine its findings cinclsions,. and Ordel anr! ;1ll obhJectiomns thereto shall be deemned vualxed for all purposes 104 ELKWOOD DETECTIVE AGENCY due and payable to its employees under this Order. (d) Post in conspicuous places at its principal place of business in Summit, Illinois, and at all other locations where notices to employees are posted, copies of the at- tached notice marked "Appendix A." 14 Copies of the no- tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re- gion 13, shall be signed and posted by an authorized representative of Elkwood immediately upon receipt thereof, and maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter. Steps shall be taken by Elkwood to ensure the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by other material. (e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 13, in writ- ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Elkwood has taken to comply with this Order. B. Respondent General Service Employees Union l ocal No. 73, affiliated with Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents, and representatives shall: I. Cease and desist from: (a) Threatening to picket and picketing Elkwood, Elkwood's customers or clients. any other employer of guards or detective personnel, and the customers or clients of such other employer where a purpose thereof is to secure recognition and collective bargaining unless and until a majority of the guard and/or detective personnel employed by Elkwood and such other employer within an appropri- ate unit has freely and without coercion designated the Union as their exclusive representative for collective-bar- gaining purposes. (b) Demanding or accepting recognition and collective bargaining as the representative of employees of Elkwood or any other employer of guards and/or detectives unless and until a majority of Elkwood's employees or of such other employer within an appropriate unit freely and with- 14 In the event that this Order is enforced by a judgment of a t nited States (Court of Appeals. the words in the notice reading "Posted hs Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant Ito a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of Ihe National Labor Relations Board" out coercion has designated the Union as their collective- bargaining representative. (C) Griving any force or effect to the contract or con- tracts signed by Elkwood and the Union on and after JulN 7, 1Q77. covering the rates of pay, wages. hours, and wwork- ing conditions of Elkwood's employees. (d) Interfering with. restraining, or coercing the emplos- ees of .lkwood and the employees of any other employer of guard and or detective personnel in those emploNees' exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action: (a) Jointl, and severally with Elkwood reimburse Elkw ood's employees for any initiation fees, dues, or other payments received by the Union or otherwise paid as a result of the contract or contracts signed by Elkwood and the Union on and after July 7, 1977, with interest thereon in the manner prescribed in F A'. Woolworth (Comrpae'l, stpru. Isis Plunbhing & Heating (o. supra, and Floridal Steel (Corporation. supra. (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, an) and all records necessary to determine the amounts of money due and payable to Elkwood's employees under this Order. (c) Post in conspicuous places at its business offices, meeting halls, and other places where notices to members are customarily posted, including bulletin boards at the premises of Elkwood and employers of guards and 'or de- tectives with whom the Union has collective-hbargaining re- lations (with Employer consent). copies of the attached no- tice marked "Appendix B." '' Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 13, shall be signed and posted by an authorized representative of the 1inion immediately upon receipt thereof and main- tained for 60 consecutive days thereafter. Steps shall be taken by the Ulnion to ensure the notices are not altered. defaced, or covered by other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 13. in writ- ing. within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Union has taken to comply with this Order. 'Se fn 14 105