Highway Truckdrivers & Helpers, Local No. 107, Etc.

HIGHWAY TRUCKDRIVERS & HELPERS, LOCAL 107, ETC. 943 Highway Truckdrivers and Helpers, Local No. 107, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Independent and Riss & Company, Inc. Highway Truckdrivers and Helpers, Local No. 107, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Independent and Riss & Company,, Inc. Cases Nos.. -CC-123 and 4-CB-583. March 1, 1961 DECISION AND ORDER On August 9, 1960, Trial Examiner William F. Scharnikow issued his-Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, all parties filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report, together with supporting briefs. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rul- ings are hereby affirmed.' The Board has considered the Intermedi- ate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in these cases, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda- tions of the Trial Examiner insofar as they are consistent with the Decision herein. The relevant facts are substantially as described in the Intermedi- ate Report. The primary employer, Riss & Company, Inc., is an inter- state motor carrier maintaining terminal facilities in a number of cities. The terminal involved in this case, hereinafter referred to as the Terminal, is located in Philadelphia, and is owned by a separate corporation of Riss stockholders. Riss rents its space at the Ter- 'Respondent contends that the Trial Examiner erred in not striking the testimony of witness Nahrgang , on grounds - that a, pretrial statement executed by Nahrgang was not given Respondent until its cross-examination of Nahrgang was almost completed. We reject this contention. The record discloses that, ' upon Respondent's timely request, the General Counsel produced two affidavits executed by Nahrgang . Thereafter, during Re- spondent's cross-examination, the General Counsel discovered that he possessed an un- signed copy of a memorandum , the original of which was allegedly signed by. Nahrgang. After indicating that 'he had not theretofore known that the original of this memorandum had been signed , the General Counsel gave 'his copy to Respondent , and introduced it into the record as an exhibit. In its brief , Respondent contends at one point that Nahrgang's memorandum was a "statement" which should have been produced earlier under Rule 102.118 of the Board's Rules and Regulations ( Series 8 ) ; at another point Respondent urges that the memorandum was unsigned, therefore not a statement , and should not have been introduced into the record at all. We do not find it necessary to decide this ques- tion, whether the memorandum was or was not a statement , as in any event it was pro- duced by the General Counsel during Respondent's cross-examination of Nahrgang. The short delay involved appears to have been due to an oversight by the General Counsel, and in no way prejudiced Respondent. As for the introduction of the memorandum into the record, we have accorded the memorandum as such no probative value. 130 NLRB No. 91. 944 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD minal along with four other carriers, including Salem Express (herein called Salem) and Cartage and Terminal Corporation (herein called C&T). Prior to December 1959, Respondent Union represented Riss' local drivers and dockmen at the Terminal. On December 15, 1959, Riss contracted with C & T to perform the local delivery and dockwork previously handled by Riss' own employees , members of Respondent, and on December 31, 1959, Riss discharged these employees. On December 29, 1959, Respondent struck Riss over the pending loss of employment to its members. Pickets were installed at the Terminal gates with signs reading "Riss & Company, unfair to Teamsters Local 107"-later changed to "On strike at Riss & Company , Teamsters Local 107." The pickets permitted trucks carrying non-Riss freight, bound for other Terminal tenants, to enter and leave the Terminal, but engaged in certain activities in connection with Riss freight, both at and away from the Terminal . These activities, more fully de- scribed in the Intermediate Report, and, as necessary, below, con- stitute the alleged unfair labor practices. The Alleged Violations of Section 8(b) (1) (A) The Trial Examiner found that certain incidents involving force or threats of force committed in the presence of employees, were ;attributable to Respondent, and constituted violations of Section 8 (b) .(1) (A). Briefly, these incidents were: (a) obstruction of Riss' equipment at the Terminal on December 30, 1959; (b) threats to William Nahrgang, Riss' vice president, on December 30, 1959; (c) .obstruction of C & T equipment at the Terminal on January 4, 1960; (d) threats to C & T drivers on January 4, 7, and 11, 1960; (e) threats to C & T Terminal Manager Lonnee on January 4, 1960; and (f) the unhitching of a tractor-trailer driven by Salem employee Royce on December 29, 1959, at both the Terminal and the Pennsylvania Rail- road piggyback yards. We agree with the Trial Examiner's findings of 8(b) (1) (A) in connection with all the above incidents? With respect to the "Royce" incident, the record shows that on December 29, 1959, Royce, a Salem driver, picked up an empty Riss trailer at the Pennsylvania Rail- road's piggyback yard for delivery to Salem's New Jersey office. On the way, he had occasion to stop at Salem's Terminal office. Upon entering the Terminal gates, between 7 and 9 p.m., Royce was ap- 8 The record does not support Respondent 's assertion that C & T drivers were inde- pendent contractors and not "employees " within the meaning of Sections 8(b) (1) (A) and 2(3) of the Act. Cf. The Detroit Edison Co. et at., 123 NLRB 225, 230-231, enfd. 278 F. 2d 858 (C.A.D.C.). Member Fanning finds the evidence insufficient to establish that "employees ", were coerced in connection with the threat to C & T Terminal Manager Lonee on January 4, 1960, and hence he does not rely on that incident in finding that Respondent violated Section 8(b) (1) (A). I HIGHWAY TRUCKDRIVERS & HELPERS, LOCAL 107, ETC. 945 proached' by about five men whom he had seen before at Riss, and 'who he thought were Riss' employees.' These men :told Royce they were on strike and that Royce should drop the trailer. Royce then telephoned the Salem dispatcher in New Jersey, who. told him,to try to get another trailer. In the meantime, one of the men came in and told Royce they had already dropped the trailer. When Royce returned to his truck, some of the men asked him where he was going. Royce gave a fictitious destination, and then returned to the piggyback yard to pick up another Riss trailer. As he was hooking up the trailer -in the piggyback yard, "some of the fellows who were out in the yard" ,told Royce he had better get out of there "while the getting was good," and unhooked his trailer. In response to a question from Royce, they .:stated they did not care what he did "so long as it didn't have a Riss name on it, or anything to do with Riss." Royce then returned to the Terminal, picked up a Salem trailer, and left. For the reasons stated in the Intermediate Report, we agree with the Trial Examiner's con- elusion that it was Respondent's strikers who unhitched Royce' s trailer at both the Terminal and the piggyback yard. Moreover, in view of the credited evidence in the record that Respondent's officials on the .picket line themselves participated in acts of threats and violence against persons and equipment carrying Riss' freight, we hold Re- ..spondent responsible for both the above incidents .4 In making this finding, we are cognizant that the latter incident, occurred at the piggy- back yard, away from the primary picket line. However, this incident immediately followed an identical occurrence at the Terminal, and was in fact foreshadowed by the strikers' stated interest in Royce's next destination. We affirm the Trial Examiner's finding that Respondent committed a violation of Section 8(b) (1) (A) in connection with the Royce incident. The Charging Party agrees with the Trial Examiner's 8 (b) (1) (A) findings as outlined above. However, it excepts to the Trial Exam- iner's failure to find an additional 8(b) (1) (A) violation with respect to Respondent's physical obstruction at the Terminal gates of certain trucks carrying" Riss' freight on interline. The evidence fully sup- ports this contention of the Charging Party. The record reveals that on December 30,1959, from 10 to 20 of Respondent's pickets positioned themselves in front of the northeast gates at the'Terminal, and physi- cally prevented the entrance and exit of trucks belonging to Salem, North Penn Transfer Company, and Uhrik Transportation Company, .which were carrying Riss' freight on interline. Such activity, as the Board has held, has the unlawful effect of restraining and coercing s There is independent evidence in the record that picketing on December 29 at the Terminal continued into the evening. ' See, e.g., W. T. Smith Lumber Company, 116 NLRB 507, enfd . 243 F. 2d 745 (C.A. 5) ; Local No. 3887, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-C10 ( Stephenson Brick & Tile Co.), 129 NLRB 6. 597254-61-vol. 130-61 946 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the drivers of the trucks, as well as other employees, from crossing the picket line,' and we therefore find this additional violation of Section 8(b) (1) (A). The Alleged Violations of Section 8(b) (4) (i) and (ii) (B) Section 8(b) (4) (i) and (ii) (B) provides that SEC. 8 (b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organ- ization or its agents- (4) (i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any indi- vidual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is: (B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manu- facturer, or to cease doing business with any other person, ... . The Royce incident: This incident, described above in connection with Section 8(b) (1) (A), is alleged also to have constituted a viola- tion of Section 8(b) (4) (i) and (ii) (B), insofar as it occurred at a secondary location, the Pennsylvania Railroad piggyback yard. The Trial Examiner found the alleged violations of both sections; Re- spondent excepts. With respect to 8(b) (4) (i) (B), it is clear that by unhitching Royce's trailer, and warning him, to leave the premises, Respondent induced and encouraged Royce, an individual employed by Salem, not to transport goods, with an object of forcing and requiring Salem to cease doing business with Riss, the primary employer. Such activity falls squarely within the prohibition of Section 8(b) (4) (i) (B), and we affirm the Trial Examiner's finding of a .violation with respect to that section. We also adopt the Trial Examiner's finding of"8 (b) (4) (ii) (B). In so holding, we do not mean to imply that any inducement or encour- agement of a secondary employee, under Section 8(b) (4) (i) (B), is 6 See, e.g., Levitt Corp., 127 NLRB 900; W. T. Smith Lumber Co., supra. • In view of our finding herein, we do not adopt the Trial Examiner 's statement that, as to drivers of Salem, North Penn, and Uhrik , "it does not appear whether the drivers of these trucks were restrained or coerced or whether their action in not crossing the picket Hue was voluntary." HIGHWAY TRUCKDRIVERS & HELPERS, LOCAL 107, ETC. 947 necessarily restraint and coercion of his employer under 8(b) (4) (ii) (B). In the present case, Respondent physically prevented the secondary employee from carrying out his assigned task by uncou- pling his equipment and warning him to leave the premises. The necessary effect of Respondent's seizure of Salem's equipment was forcibly to obstruct Salem from performing the operation it intended at the piggyback yard. Such action made it impossible for Salem, the secondary employer, to carry on its business with the primary em- ployer, Riss, and was therefore directly coercive as to Salem. The fact that an employee was present, and was himself induced and encour- aged under Section 8(b) (4) (i) (B), does not, we think, preclude our finding of a violation of Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) in these circumstances.6 North, Penn: North Penn Transfer Company occupies a terminal across the street from Riss, and receives Riss' freight on interline. Its dockmen are represented by Respondent. On January 20, 1960, a load of Riss' freight was brought into the North Penn terminal, whereupon Respondent's steward, Baradi, told North Penn Manager Dare, "I'll have to find out whether we can handle it." Since Baradi was un- able to contact Business Agent Baker at that time, Dare loaded the freight himself. The next day, in Dare's presence, Steward Baradi had a telephone conversation with Baker, and then told Dare that "we are not handling Riss's freight . . . Riss has a case against 107." On January 25, a Riss truck backed into the North Penn terminal. Ba- radi told Dare again that his men would not handle Riss' freight. Dare relayed this information to the driver, who drove away. On the basis of the foregoing occurrences at North Penn, the Trial Examiner found that Respondent had violated Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B), but not (i) (B),oftheAct. We agree with the Trial Examiner's 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) finding. Re- spondent contends that Steward Baradi's statement to Dare, to the effect that the employees would not handle Riss' freight, was at most "a non-threatening statement of intention." However, the legislative history of the 1959 amendments clearly indicates that the purpose of Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) was to eliminate this very loophole in the existing law, whereby unions could coerce secondary employers di- rectly by threats to strike, picketing, and other forms of pressure and retaliation? We construe Steward Baradi's statement of January 21 as a threat to withhold employees' services should North Penn attempt to receive Riss' freight, and his remarks of January 25 as a reiteration and actual carrying out of this threat. In our view, these activities constitute restraint and coercion of North Penn for an unlawful ob- ject, as proscribed by Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) of the Act. 6'Cf. Perfection' Mattre88 & Spring Company, 129 NLRB 520. I E.g., Representative Griffin's analysis, NLRB Legislative History of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 , volume II, p. 1523(1). 948 - DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR - RELATIONS BOARD The Charging Party excepts to the Trial Examiner's failure to find that Respondent's activities at North Penn also constituted a violation of Section 8(b) (4) (i) (B). We find merit in this exception. As de- scribed above, Steward Baradi told North Penn Manager Dare, after a conversation with Business Agent Baker, that the North Penn em- ployees would not handle Riss' freight because of Respondent's dis- pute with Riss. When Riss' freight arrived on January 25, Baradi told Dare the employees would not handle it. The record discloses that thereafter, on other occasions, Respondent's members at North Penn did in fact refuse to handle Riss' freight. In our view, the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the above circum- stances is that Respondent's instructions to Steward Baradi were in- tended to be passed on to other employees.8 Contrary to the Trial Examiner, we find this evidence sufficient to establish that Respond- ent induced North Penn employees not to handle Riss' freight 9 More- over, in any event, under Section 8(b) (4) (i) (B), inducement or en- couragement of "any individual employed by any person" is suffi- cient to establish the requisite inducement. We find that Steward Baradi himself was such an "individual," employed by North Penn, and that he was induced by Respondent for an unlawful object. For the above reasons, we find that Respondent's activities at North Penn violated Section 8 (b) (4) (i) (B) of the Act. Respondent's activities at the Terminal: Respondent picketed at the Terminal gates with signs reading "`Riss & Company, unfair to Team- sters Local 107," later changed to "On strike at Riss & Company, Teamsters Local 107." As noted above, Riss rented its space at the Terminal along with four other carriers. At least two of these other carriers, Salem and C &. T, did business with Riss, and Respondent's pickets appealed directly to Salem and C & T employees not to cross the Terminal picket line when carrying Riss' freight. These appeals took the form of threats of physical harm to drivers, and bodily blockades and obstruction of vehicles. For example, on January 4, 1960, Respondent's steward, Hale, threatened C & T driver Daniels with a meathook if he attempted to cross the picket line; on January 7, Hale threatened to "get" C & T driver Gale as he attempted to leave the Terminal in his truck; and on January 11, as Gale was bleeding the brakes on his trailer immediately inside the Terminal gate, one of the pickets threatened him with a heated meathook. On December 30,1959, Salem drivers were physically blocked from entering or leav- i'ng the Terminal by 10 to 20 of Respondent's pickets. 8 Southwestern Motor Transport, Inc., 115 NLRB 981, 986. ° Since Baradi's statement was made concerning a matter within the scope of his authority as an agent of the Respondent, we find Dare's testimony concerning that state- ment admissible to show the truth of the subject matter asserted . Southwestern Motor Transport, Inc., Supra; Capital Paper Company, et al., 117 NLRB 635, footnote 1, IR pp. +644-645,. footnote 17, enfd. 267 F. 2d 870 (C.A. 7), cert. denied 361 U.B. 914. HIGHWAY TRUCKDRIVERS & HELPERS, LOCAL 107, ETC. 949 In his Intermediate Report, the Trial Examiner correctly noted that the Terminal was a common business situs for several carriers in addi- tion to Riss, including Salem and C & T. He therefore found that the tests laid down by the Board in the Moore Dry Dock case 10 were . applicable to Respondent's activities at the Terminal, and proceeded to consider whether these tests had been met. The Trial Examiner be- lieved and found that the Moore, Dry Dock tests had been complied with, and therefore concluded that Section 8(b) (4) (i) and (ii) (B) had not been violated by Respondent's picketing and other activities at the Terminal. The General Counsel and Charging Party except to this conclusion. In the Moore Dry Dock case, supra, and in other cases, the Board has recognized the conflicting interests inherent in common situs situations. On the one hand is the recognized right of a labor organi- zation to picket and carry on other activities at the primary situs of a labor dispute; on the other is the clearly expressed congressional purpose of shielding secondary employers and employees from pres- sure in controversies not their own. In Moore Dry Dock, the Board attempted to accommodate these dual purposes by laying down certain tests 11 to be followed by a union picketing at a common situs business location. Under Moore Dry Dock, the picketing union was required to disclose as clearly as possible, to secondary employees and others, that the union's dispute was with the primary employer only, and not with other secondary employers who happened also to have their regular business locations at the primary situs. Since Moore Dry Dock, the Board has been presented with a num- ber of cases in which labor organizations, although in seeming com- pliailce with Moore Dry Dock, for example as to the wording of their picket signs, have at the same time inconsistently made direct appeals to employees of, secondary common situs tenants. Such appeals have induced and encouraged these employees to cease work, with an object of causing their employers to cease doing business with primary em- ployers; These cases have involved, for example, common construc- tion sites 12 and ambulatory trucking sites.13 In such cases the Board 10 Moore Dry Dock Company, 92 NLRB 547. "These tests are : (1 ) The picketing must be strictly limited to times when the situs of the dispute is located on the secondary employer 's premises ; (2) at the time of the picketing the primary employer must be engaged in its normal business at the situs ; (3) the picketing must be limited to places reasonably close to the location of the situs; and (4 ) the picketing must clearly disclose that the dispute is with the primary employer. la See, e.g., Gonzales Chemical Industries, Inc., 128 NLRB 1352, where the Board majority, in applying Moore Dry Dock, found that the Respondent's oral appeals to secondary employees revealed an intent to extend the dispute beyond the primary employer. (Members Fanning and Bean dissented on the basis that, in their opinion , a "colnmon situs" was not there involved , and that therefore the Board majority improperly applied Moore Dry Dock to preclude lawful primary picketing in that case .) See also Gilmore Construction Company, 127 NLRB 541, enfd. as modified 285 F. 2d 397 (C.A. 8). 13 See , e.g., Delaware Valley Beer Distributors Association , 125 NLRB 12, footnote 3, enfd . as modified 281 F. 2d 319 (C.A. 3). 95O DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD .has held that the direct appeals to secondary employees of the other regular common situs tenants have in effect negated the conditions required in Moore Dry Dock to justify the picketing, and have there- fore exceeded the limits of permissible "primary" activity and con- stituted violations of the secondary boycott provisions of the Act.14 In our view, the present case presents essentially the same situation. Because Salem and C & T were regular tenants at a common situs with Riss, Respondent was obligated under Moore Dry Dock to take particular measures not to enmesh employees of these secondary ten- ants in Respondent's primary dispute with Riss. Such measures were not properly undertaken by Respondent, which instead threatened employees of these common situs tenants with meathooks, physically obstructed their trucks, and otherwise made it impossible for them to carry on their employers' business at their home station, insofar as this business pertained to Riss. Contrary to the Trial Examiner, we think such activities went beyond the bounds of permissible primary activities. As we find that employees of Salem and C & T were in this manner unlawfully induced at the Terminal, we find Respondent com- mitted a violation of Section 8(b) (4) (i) (B). And, in view of Re- spondent's aforementioned direct threats to C & T Manager Lonnee, and its physical obstruction of trucks belonging to the common situs tenants, we find that Respondent also violated Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) at the Terminal." THE REMEDY As we have found that Respondent has engaged in activities which violate Section 8(b) (1) (A) and (4) (i) and (ii) (B) of the Act, we shall order Respondent to cease and desist therefrom , and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies ' of the Act. With respect to the violations of Section 8(b) (4) (i ) and (ii) (B) which we have 'found, we shall order Respondent to cease and desist from engaging in unlawful secondary conduct against any secondary employers in Respondent's jurisdictional area, as concerns their doing business with Riss, and not merely against those secondary employ- 14 See the cases cited in footnotes 11 and 12, supra. See also Crystal Palace Market, 116 NLRB 856, 862, enfd. 249 F. 2d 591 (C.A. 9). And see the discussion in Milwaukee Plywood Company v. N.L.R.B., 285 F. 2d 325 (C.A. 7). 15 See the discussion above with respect to the Royce Incident. Contrary to the conten- tion of the General Counsel and the Charging Party, we view the principle enunciated by the Board majority in the McJunkin Corporation case, 128 NLRB 522, as inapplicable to the facts of this case. We also reject Respondent's contention that, in the circumstances of this case, C & T was an "ally" of Riss. As the dispute arose, Riss' contract with C & T preceded the strike, and appears to have been the cause of the dispute, and not its consequence. Thus, C & T was not performing work which, but for the strike, would have been performed by Respondent. See Catalina Island Sightseeing Lines, 124 NLRB 813-816, IR pp. 830-831. Nor is there any evidence that Riss and C & T are commonly owned or controlled, so as to constitute them allies. HIGHWAY TRUCKDRIVERS & HELPERS, LOCAL 107, ETC. 951 ers named in the complaint. In our opinion, a remedy of such breadth is necessary in this case to assure that Respondent will not put similar pressures upon other secondary employers in its dispute with Riss.16 We note particularly Respondent's proclivity to engage in unlawful secondary conduct, as evidenced in other recent cases be- fore the Board," and also the fact that Respondent's unlawful activ- ity in this case was aimed not at one but several secondary employers doing,business with Riss, both at and away from the common situs. ORDER Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Highway Truck- drivers and Helpers, Local No. 107, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Inde- pendent, its officers, representatives, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: . 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Blocking or obstructing employees from driving trucks in or out of the Riss Terminal, threatening employees, or, in employees' presence, their supervisors, with injury for doing so or attempting to do so, or in any other manner restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. (b) Engaging in, or inducing or encouraging any individual em- ployed by Salem Express, Cartage and Terminal Corporation, North Penn Transfer Company, or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, within Respondent's jurisdic- tional area, to engage in a strike or a refusal in the course of his em- ployment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise han- dle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any service, where an object thereof is to force or require said employers or other persons to cease doing business with Riss & Company, Inc. - (c) Threatening, coercing, or restraining Salem Express, Cartage and Terminal Corporation, North Penn Transfer Company, or any other person engaged.in commerce or in an industry affecting com- merce, within Respondent's jurisdictional area,'where an object there- of is to force or require said employers or other persons to cease doing business with Riss & Company, Inc. '- See, e.g., International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 501 et at. (Samuel Langer) v. N.L.R.B., 341 U.S. 694, at p. 706. U. Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, et al. v. N.L.R.B., 362 U.S. 479. 17 E.g., Virginia-Carolina Freight Lines, Inc., 123 NLRB 551, enfd. as modified 273 F. 2d 815 (C.A.D.C.) ; Coastal Tank Lines, Inc., et al., Cases Nos. 4-CC-81, 4-CC-82, and 4-CC-83, 40 LRRM 1270 (no exceptions) ; Horn & Hardart Baking Company, 115 NLRB 1184. 952 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Post at its offices and meeting halls copies of the notice at- tached hereto marked "Appendix." 18 Copies of said notice, to be- furnished by the Regional Director for the Fourth Region, shall,. after being duly signed by the Respondent's representatives, be posted. by it immediately upon the receipt thereof, and be maintained by it' for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members of the Respondent are custom- arily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by other material. (b) Additional copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Re- gional Director for the Fourth Region, shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent's representatives, be returned to the Regional Director for posting at the premises of Riss & Company, Inc., Salem Express, Cartage and Terminal Corporation, and North Penn Trans- fer Company, if these companies are willing, for 60 consecutive days, in places where notices to employees are customarily posted. (c) Notify the Regional Director for the Fourth Region, in writ- ing, within 10 days from the date of this 'Order, what steps the Re-_ spondent has taken to comply herewith. MEMBER KIMBALL took no part in the consideration of the above Decision and Order. "In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF HIGHWAY TRUCKDRIVERS AND -HELPERS, LOCAL No. 107, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS,. CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, INDE- PENDENT, AND ALL EMPLOYEES OF RISS & -COMPANY, INC., SALEM ExrREss, NORTH PENN TRANSFER COMPANY, AND CARTAGE AND TERMINAL CORPORATION Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify you that: WE WILL NOT block or obstruct employees from driving trucks in or out of the Riss Terminal, threaten employees, or, in employ- ees' presence, their supervisors, with injury for doing so or at- tempting to do so, or in any other manner restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. HIGHWAY TRUCKDRIVERS & HELPERS, LOCAL 107, ETC. 953 WE WILL NOT engage in, or induce or encourage any individual employed by Salem Express, Cartage and Terminal Corporation, North Penn Transfer Company, or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, within our juris- dictional area, to use, manufacture, process, transport, or other- wise handle or work on "any goods, articles, materials,, or com- modities or to perform any service, where an object thereof is to force or require said employers or other persons to cease doing business with Riss & Company, Inc. WE WILL NOT threaten, coerce, or restrain Salem Express, Cart- age and Terminal Corporation, North Penn Transfer Company, or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affect- ing commerce, within our jurisdictional area, where an object thereof is to force or require said employers or other persons to cease doing business with Riss & Company, Inc. HIGHWAY TRUCKDRIVERS AND HELPERS, LOCAL No. 107, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 'CHAUFFEURS, WAREIIOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, INDEPENDENT, Labor Organization. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative ) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE The complaint alleges, but the answer of the Respondent denies, that the Re- spondent labor organization has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor prac- tices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (i ) and (ii) (B), Section 8(b)(1) (A), and Section 2(6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act of 1947, as amended . The gravamen of the complaint is that , since on or about December 29, 1959, the Respondent has engaged in a strike , in picketing, in mass picketing, and in threatening violence at the Philadelphia terminal facilities of Riss & Company, Inc., an interstate motor carrier, and also at the Pennsylvania Railroad yards in Philadelphia, with the object of forcing and requiring three other motor carriers who are also engaged in commerce (i.e., Salem Express, Cartage and Termi- nal Corporation , and North Penn Transfer Company) to stop serving and doing business with Riss & Company, Inc. The complaint asserts that by the acts thus committed by the Respondent in furtherance of this object , the Respondent (1) in- duced and encouraged employees of the three motor carriers other than Riss & Company, Inc., to engage in a strike and to refuse to perform services in the course of their employment, thereby violating Section 8(b) (4) (i ) (B) of the Act; (2) threatened, restrained , and coerced these three motor carriers in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii )(B) of the Act ; and (3 ) restrained and coerced employees of Riss, Salem Express, and Cartage and Terminal Corporation , in the exercise of their organizational rights, thereby also violating Section 8 (b)(1)(A) of the Act. Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on May 10 and 11 , 1960, before the Trial Examiner duly designated by the Chief Trial Exami- ner. The General Counsel, the Respondent , and Riss & Company, Inc., appeared by counsel and were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross- examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing upon the issues. At the con- clusion of the hearing, counsel for the Respondent and counsel for Riss & Company, 954 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Inc., engaged in a brief oral argument upon the record. Since the close of the hearing, the General Counsel- and counsel for the Respondent have submitted briefs. Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF KISS & COMPANY, INC. Riss & Company, Inc., a Delaware corporation, maintains its principal office and place of business at Kansas City, Missouri. In the course and conduct of its motor freight transportation business, it operates freight terminals at locations throughout 26 of the States of the United States, including a terminal in Philadelphia, Pennsyl- vania. It operates under authority and licenses granted by the Interstate Commerce Commission and, as a common carrier, transports goods and materials to, from, between, and through the Middle-Atlantic and Midwestern States. Its annual re- ceipts from services rendered in connection with the movement of goods in inter- state commerce is more than $1,000,000. I find that Riss & Company, Inc., is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Respondent, Highway Truckdrivers and Helpers, Local No. 107, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Independent, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LAROR PRACTICES A. The general situation The pertinent events in the present case began with Riss' arrangement to have Cartage and Terminal Corporation (herein called C & T) handle Riss' pickups and deliveries in the Philadelphia area rather than to continue to do this work with a group of 13 or 14 of its own local employees who were members of the Re- spondent. On December 1, 1959, Riss resigned from membership in Motor Trans- port Labor Relations, Inc. (herein called MTLR), an employers' association whose master contract with the Respondent covered the local or city drivers and dockmen working for Riss, as well as those working for the other members of the MTLR in Philadelphia. On December 15, 1959, Riss entered into a contract with C & T for C & T's performance, after January 1, of the pickup and delivery work then being done by Riss' Philadelphia drivers: On December 23, 1959, Riss gave all of its Philadelphia drivers notice to this effect. On the morning of December 29, Riss' Philadelphia employees went on strike and, with Steward William Hale and Business Agent Walter Baker of the Respondent present on the picket line, began picketing Riss' terminal with signs which first bore the legend, "Riss & Co., unfair to Teamsters Local 107," and then, several days later, were changed to read, "On strike at Riss & Co., Teamsters Local 107." On December 31, 1959, Riss sent each of its Philadelphia employees a "Discharge Notice," stating that "Riss & Co. is no longer operating pickup, delivery and dock local operations at Phila. This work has been contracted to Cartage & Terminal Corp. Therefore your services are no longer required. You are hereby terminated effective Dec. 31, 1959." Aside from an incident at the Pennsylvania Railroad 'yards and a refusal by a steward of the Respondent to permit the employees of North Penn Transfer to handle Riss' freight at North Penn's terminal, the evidence of the Respondent's al- leged unfair labor practices was confined to the Respondent's acts in the course of its picketing Riss' Philadelphia Terminal-picketing which was still going on at the time of the hearing in May 1960. Riss' Terminal is located at Thompson and Luzerne Streets on a fence-enclosed 650- by 400-foot lot with three gates. The Terminal building, which is topped by a single 150-foot sign bearing Riss' name in neon lights, has storage and office space, loading platforms, and 58 truck bays, and is owned by Transport Manufacturing and Equipment Company whose stockholders are the same persons who hold Riss' stock. Riss is one of five motor freight com- panies who rent and use facilities at the Terminal. Three of these other tenants (i.e., Spector Motor Freight System, Buss-Linco, and Salem Express) were using the Terminal along with Riss in 1959. C & T became the fifth tenant in the begin- ning of January 1960, when it took over Riss' local deliveries and pickups. According to the General Counsel's and Riss' view of the evidence, the Re- spondent's unfair labor practices on the picket line at the Riss Terminal consisted of (,1) unlawfully conducted "common situs" picketing, since other motor freight HIGHWAY TRUCKDRIVERS & HELPERS, LOCAL 107, ETC. 955 companies, as well as Riss, conduct their business as tenants at the Terminal; (2) the blocking of the exit from the Terminal on December 30, 1959, of Riss' equip- ment driven by Riss' over-the-road drivers who had been pressed into service by Riss for local pickups and deliveries on that and the preceding day; (3) interference with the movement of C & T equipment in and out of the Terminal on the first appearance of C & T drivers on January 4, 1960; (4) the inducement of drivers for Salem Express, North Penn Transfer Company, and Uhrik Transportation Company not to enter the Terminal in connection with their respective employer's business with Riss; and (5) threats of violence on the picket line against Riss' vice president (William Nahrgang), Riss' over-the-road drivers, and the C & T drivers. In defending its picket line activity against the C & T drivers, the Respondent contends that C & T was an "ally" of Riss in the dispute between Riss and the Respondent arising out of Riss' discontinuance of the services of its own employees for its pickups and deliveries, and, therefore, that this aspect of the picketing was not violative of Section 8(b) (4) of the Act. Although the General Counsel and Riss deny this contention, the relevant facts are not in dispute. Neither Riss nor its stockholders own any C & T stock. The relationship between the two companies with respect to the Philadelphia operations appears to be simply that which arose out of their contract of December 15 1959, and the arrangements thereafter made by them for C & T's handling the pickups and deliveries under the contract. Under the contract, C & T, through its drivers, has performed exactly the same work which had been previously performed by Riss' city drivers and dockmen. Ninety percent of Riss' Philadelphia pickups and deliveries have thus been handled by C & T. These local operations, of course, are an integral part of the long- distance carriage covered by Riss' contracts with the shippers and are conducted with Riss' Terminal as their base. For its part in the operations, C & T has a terminal manager and a small office at the Riss Terminal. But its drivers are dis- patched by Riss' dispatcher and are paid by C & T checks drawn by one of Riss" clerks who computes the compensation on the basis of the weights and distances. shown by Riss' manifests. B. The Respondent's conduct 1. The picketing and its effect upon motor carriers other than Riss and C & T The strike of Riss' 13 employees started at 8:45 a.m. on December 29, 1959, and in an hour the picket line was set up at the Terminal's gates. The signs which the pickets carried have already been described. On the first day of the picketing, there were from 10 to 13 pickets, and pickets remained at the gates until at least 8:30 in the evening of that day. There were about 20 pickets on December 30, the second day, and the number reached a high of from 30 to 35 pickets on January 4, the first day the C & T drivers appeared at the Terminal. By the end of that week, the number had decreased to 15 or 16 and by the time of the hearing in May, the number varied from 2 to 6. The pickets stayed just outside the Terminal' s gates. Riss' vice president, William Nahrgang, testified that, although the trucks of Spector Motor Freight and Buss- Linco (two of the Terminal's tenants) entered and left the Terminal without inter- ference from the pickets, some trucks of Salem Express (the only other tenant aside from Riss and C & T) and also some trucks of North Penn Transfer Company, Uhrik Transportation Company, and K & K Transportation Company were "turned away" from the Terminal by the pickets. In only one instance , however, did Nahrgang overhear the preceding conversation between the picket and the driver. This was on the approach of one of the Uhrik trucks when, according to Nahrgang, Steward William Hale of the Respondent, told the driver, "We are on strike here. You can't come into the Riss yard. Come over here. I want to talk with you." But Nahrgang did testify that Salem Express' trucks were turned away only when it appeared, upon the pickets' questioning the drivers, that the particular trucks were carrying Riss' freight. Similarly, with respect to the other carriers whose trucks were turned away from the Terminal, Nahrgang referred to the fact that the North Penn Transfer trucks were "on interline" with Riss and that every one of these carriers whose trucks turned away from the picket line 'are "companies that do business with us every day." The final element of significance in Nahrgang's testimony on the present point was his testimony that he observed "many other trucks . . not doing business with Riss" enter the Terminal on January 4, one of the days when he saw the other trucks stopped by the pickets. Upon careful consideration of the substance of this testimony of Nahrgang (who was the only witness to give evidence on the pickets' alleged interference with the entrance or exit from the Terminal of trucks other than Riss' and C & T's trucks), I can find, and do find, only that, so far as the entry or exit of trucks other than 956 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOAIiD those of Riss and C & T was concerned , the Respondent, by its picket line, attempted to exclude and did exclude from the Terminal only those trucks which were carrying Riss' freight. 2. Obstructive picketing and threat of violence on December 30, 1959 On the morning of December 30, 1959 , three of Riss' over-the-road drivers ap- peared at the Riss Terminal and were instructed by Nahrgang to drive several of Riss' trailers out of the Terminal . Fentress, one of the drivers, started to drive out of the Luzerne Street gate but was blocked by 12 or 13 pickets who, on Fentress' approach, stood in front of his tractor and refused to move. There is no dispute about this in the evidence.' There is a conflict in the evidence as to whether , as Fentress drove up to the picket line that morning, Business Agent Walter Baker of the Respondent held a glass jar in his hand and threatened to break it over Nahrgang 's head if Nahrgang insisted on Fentress' driving the trailer out of the Terminal or if Nahrgang himself tried to do so. Despite Baker's denial of this and his testimony that Nahrgang was in fact the aggressor in directing Fentress to ride down the pickets , I credit Nahrgang's testimony that Baker did threaten to assault him with the bottle and that the threat was made in the presence of employees of Riss. 3. Obstructive picketing and threats on January 4, 1960 C & T employees were at the terminal with C & T equipment for the first time on the morning of January 4, 1960. There were 30 to 35 pickets there that morning. On this occasion, the C & T drivers attempted to drive the equipment out of each of the three gates, but the pickets blocked their exit by standing in front of the trucks with "their bodies placed before the bumpers so that the vehicles could not proceed." The police were again called but only after arrival of Lt. Francis X. Lynch of the special labor squad and his instructing the pickets to let the trucks go through, did the pickets, under Steward Hale, reluctantly permit the C & T equip- ment to move out of the Terminal. Later that day, the trucks returned and, although slowed by the pickets, did reenter the Terminal.2 Upon Nahrgang's uncontradicted testimony , I further find that, as the C & T drivers were attempting to drive out of the Terminal that morning , Steward Hale of the Respondent , holding a meathook in his hand , said to C & T driver Hyman Daniels, "I'll bring this down over your head if you try to move that truck out of this yard. I'll get you," and that Hale also said to C & T manager, Lonnee, at the same time, "You're the that started all of this. I'm going to get you, too." 4. Threats against C & T driver Gale C & T driver Israel W. Gale, Jr., testified that he was stopped by pickets as he attempted to drive out of the Terminal gates on January 7; that, upon his telling them that he would not respect the picket line, Steward William Hale threatened to follow Gale home and "get" him . Gale further testified that on January 11, while he was on the ground under his truck at the gate bleeding air from locked brakes, a picket waved a meathook which he had been holding in a fire, and said to Gale, "I'll kill you, you dirty black nigger." In his testimony, Gale at first identified this picket in the January 11 incident as being John Incolingo , but then , when shown a 1 Vice President Nahrgang of Riss testified that there were also cars and a rope stretched across the gateway. Business Agent Walter Baker of the Respondent in effect conceded that the pickets blocked the exit of the Riss trailer . He testified that he and the pickets-13 or 14 of ithem in all- had formed a circle at the gate as Fentress ap- proached, that they stayed there until Fentress stopped with the bumper of his tractor "actually touching me and -the other pickets," and that, as a result of all this , Fentress, "couldn't proceed any further. . . Nahrgang testified that Riss' trailer did not leave the Terminal that day ; Baker testified that the trailers were driven out of the Terminal after a police sergeant arrived and Baker told him that the pickets were not "stopping" the trailer but were merely asking the driver "to respect the picket line ." I believe this conflict in Nahrgang's and Baker's testimony to be inconsequential and do not resolve it. Whether the trailer was eventually driven out , it is clear that its exit had been effectively blocked before the police arrived. 2 These findings as to the obstruction of the C & T trucks are based upon the un- contradicted testimony of Nahrgang and Lieutenant Lynch. Business Agent Baker of the Respondent testified that he did not arrive at the Terminal that morning until the police were •there. HIGHWAY TRUCKDRIVERS & HELPERS, LOCAL 107, ETC. 957 pretrial statement he had signed for the General Counsel, said on cross-examination that this picket had been a man known as "Torpedo" as he said in his pretrial statement and was not Incolingo. According to Gale, his original error on the witness stand had occurred because he "had two different people mixed up." Neither Hale, nor Incolingo, nor anyone called "Torpedo," testified at the hearing and Gale's testimony is the only testimony as to these incidents on January 7 and 11. Counsel for the Respondent, however, attacks Gale's credibility not only because of the discrepancy between his original testimony and his pretrial statement, but also on the ground of Gale's asserted antagonism toward the Respondent since, as Gale testified, he had resigned from the Respondent several years before the hearing because he felt the Respondent was not getting him employment. But, in view of the Respondent's failure to produce Hale, Incolingo, or Torpedo, and in spite of the Respondent's attack upon Gale's credibility, I credit Gale's testimony. It appears to me from Gale's testimony that, aside from Hale, he did not himself know the names of the pickets but, relying upon what he was told were their names, became confused as to their identities except that they were among the pickets. Upon Gale's testimony, I find that Steward William Hale threatened to "get" Gale when he refused to honor the picket line on January 7, and that, as Gale was adjusting his brakes while passing through the Terminal's gates on January 11, one of the pickets threatened him with a heated meathook, saying he would kill Gale. 5. Incident involving a Salem-Cumberland driver on December 29, 1959 On December 29, 1959, George' M. Royce, Jr., a driver for Cumberland Transport of Deepwater, New Jersey, drove a Cumberland tractor to the Pennsylvania Rail- road's piggyback yard in Philadelphia and picked up a Riss trailer for the purpose of taking the trailer to Deepwater. Cumberland and Salem Express are associated in some way not clearly indicated by the record and, before returning to Deepwater, Royce drove to the Salem Express office at the Riss Terminal, arriving there between 7 and 9 p.m. As Royce drove the, trailer into the gateway, four or five men (whom Royce did not know) told him they were Riss' employees and that they were on strike. They asked Royce what he had in the trailer and he said it was an empty trailer which he was taking to "Dupont" at Deepwater. The men told Royce to drop the trailer and Royce thereupon telephoned Salem Express' dispatcher at Deepwater. On returning to his tractor, he was told by one of the men that, as was the fact, they had already dropped the trailer. Royce thereupon drove his tractor back to the Pennsylvania Railroad yards to pick up another Riss trailer in accordance with the instructions he had just received over the telephone from Salem's dispatcher. As he was hooking up the second Riss trailer, some of the men from the Riss Terminal came up, told him he had "better get the hell out of here while the getting out was good," and unhooked the second Riss trailer. Royce then left with his tractor and picked up a Salem trailer at the Riss Terminal. The findings I have' just made, are based upon the uncontradicted testimony of Royce. At the hearing, counsel for the Respondent objected to my taking this testi- mony on the ground that Royce could not identify the five men he encountered- first at the Riss Terminal and then again at the Railroad yards. I overruled the objec- tion and took the testimony. From the testimony of the other witnesses as to the picketing of the Terminal by the Respondent's pickets on and after December 29, I believe it to be a permissible inference that the five men at the Riss Terminal were Respondent's pickets. Upon my present consideration of the evidence, I now make that inference and find upon the evidence that on December 29, 1959, pickets of the Respondent stationed at the Riss Terminal protested to Royce, a driver for Cumberland Transport Company, against his hauling a Riss trailer, that they un- hitched the trailer from Royce's tractor, and that, upon Royce's hitching up another Riss trailer at the Pennsylvania Railroad yards, the Respondent's pickets, having followed him, unhitched the second Riss trailer and insisted that he leave without it. 6. Incident involving North Penn Transfer Company North Penn Transfer Company, which occupies a terminal across the street from the Riss Terminal, receives transfer freight from Riss at North Penn's terminal. Such a shipment arrived at the North Penn terminal on a Riss truck on January 20, 1960, and was received by, Percy Dare, North Penn's terminal manager. Thomas Baradi, the Respondent's steward on behalf of three dockmen and checkers em- ployed by North Penn, raised the question with Dare of "whether we can handle it," and Dare (after telling Baradi he would handle it himself) put the freight on a trailer after hours. Baradi said he would call the Respondent's officials to check 958 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the matter. On the following day, after making a telephone call, Baradi told Dare he would not handle Riss' freight. When the next Riss' freight came to the North Penn terminal on January 25, Baradi told Dare that the employees would not handle the freight; Dare repeated this to the driver; and the driver took the freight away. C. Conclusions 1. Violations of Section 8(b)(I)(A) of the Act From the evidence and my findings thereon, it appears that the Respondent re- strained and coerced employees of Riss and of C & T and also George M. Royce, Jr., an employee of Salem Express and Cumberland Transport, in the exercise of their employee rights under Section 7 of the Act to refrain from assisting the Re- spondent either by not crossing its picket line or by not otherwise handling Riss' equipment or freight, and that the Respondent thereby violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. My conclusion that the Respondent thus committed unfair labor prac- tices within the meaning of Section 8(b) (1) (A) is based upon my specific findings in section III, B, of this report that the Respondent's pickets with the participation at times of Steward William Hale and Business Agent Walter Baker: (1) Blocked and obstructed Riss' over-the-road drivers from driving Riss' equip- ment out of the Riss Terminal on December 30, 1959. (2) Threatened, in the presence of Riss' over-the-road drivers, to assault Riss' vice president, William Nahrgang, on December 30, 1929, if Nahrgang insisted upon Riss' drivers taking Riss' equipment out of the Terminal or attempted to do so himself. (3) Blocked and obstructed the attempts of C & T's drivers to drive C & T equip- ment out of the Riss Terminal on January 4, 1960, and also to drive the equipment back into the Terminal the same day. (4) Threatened to assault C & T's drivers Hyman Daniels, on January 4, 1960, and Israel Gale, on January 7 and 11, 1960, because they insisted upon driving C & T equipment through the Respondent's picket line at the Riss Terminal. (5) Threatened, in the presence of C & T's drivers to assault C & T's terminal manager, Lonnee, on January 4, 1960, because he was responsible for the C & T drivers' crossing the Respondent's picket line. (6) Unhitched Riss' trailers from the tractor driven by George M. Royce, Jr., as an employee of Salem Express and Cumberland Transport, first at the Riss Ter- minal on the evening of December 29, 1959, and also at the Pennsylvania Railroad yards later that evening. Although I also found that drivers of trucks containing Riss' freight and owned by Salem Express, North Penn Transfer, Uhrik Transportation Company, and K & K Transportation Company, turned away from the' picket line at the Riss Terminal after the pickets spoke to the drivers, it does not appear whether the drivers of these trucks were restrained or coerced or whether their action was voluntary. I there- fore do not find that there was any violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act in these instances and will recommend dismissal of the allegations of the complaint to the contrary. 2. Violations of Section 8(b)(4) of the Act Aside from the Respondent's picket line activities, the evidence supplies only two incidents in which the General Counsel and Riss contend that the Respondent vio- lated Section 8(b) (4) of the Act, i.e., Steward Baradi's refusal to permit the North Penn Transfer's employees to handle Riss' freight on January 25, 1960, and the Respondent's pickets following Salem Express driver Royce from the Riss Terminal to the Pennsylvania Railroad yard on December 29, 1959, and there unhitching Riss' trailer from Royce's tractor and warning him "to get the hell out of here while the getting is good." In the North Penn Transfer incident, although I find no evidence of the Respondent's inducement or encouragement of employees within the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (i) (B) of the Act, I do find that, by its steward's notifying North Penn's manager that the employees would not handle Riss' freight, the Respondent did coerce North Penn, a neutral employer, to refuse to handle Riss freight with the object of forcing and requiring North Penn to cease doing business with Riss, and that the Respondent, through the act of its steward, thereby committed an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) of the Act. In the Pennsylvania Railroad yard incident, I find and conclude that the Respondent, by its pickets' action in unhitching Riss' trailer and their ominous warning to driver Royce, induced and encouraged Royce, an employee of Salem Express, to refuse to perform services for his employer and thereby also threatened, restrained, and coerced Salem Express, his employer, with an object of forcing and requiring Salem HIGHWAY TRUCKDRIVERS & HELPERS, LOCAL 107, ETC. 959 to cease doing business with Riss, and that, by this action, the Respondent committed unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (i) and (ii) (B) of the Act. The Respondent's picket line activities at the Riss Terminal, affecting the entry or exit of drivers hauling Riss' freight or equipment, require more detailed con- sideration. For the manner in which the Respondent limited this picketing to the Riss Terminal and the passage of Riss' freight or equipment to and from the Ter- minal, raises the general question of whether, although conducted at the common business situs of the primary employer (Riss) and other neutral employers, the picketing was nevertheless such "primary picketing" as is now recognized as being permissible and not violative of Section 8(b) (4) of the Act 3 Under the tests established by the Board in the Moore Dry Dock 4 and Washington Coca-Cola 5 cases, the Respondent's picketing at the Riss Terminal was permissible primary picketing of Riss' operations in spite of the fact that other neutral employers also conducted their business at the same Terminal. The requirement of the Washington Coca-Cola decision was obviously satisfied since the only place the Re- spondent could have picketed Riss was at the Terminal. And it seems clear to me from the facts which I have found that the Moore Dry Dock requirements were also met: (a) The situs of the dispute was certainly at the picketed Terminal where the strikers had worked for Riss; (b) at the time of the Respondent's picketing of the Terminal, Riss was continuing its business operations there; (c) the picketing was at the Terminal's entrances which served Riss as well as the other tenants of the Terminal and' which were apparently as close as the picketing could get to Riss' operations in the Terminal; and (d) not only did the picket signs disclose that the Respondent's dispute was only with Riss, but the pickets consistently omitted any attempt to discourage-and certainly did not prevent-passage of the freight and equipment of neutral employers into and out of the Terminal. The pickets' inducement of the drivers for neutral employers (i.e., Salem Express, North Penn Transfer, Uhrik Transportation Co., and K & K Transportation Co.) to refrain from hauling Riss' freight or equipment through the picket line was itself only such primary pressure upon Riss at its business situs as has been- traditionally brought to bear by unions upon employers in the course of their labor disputes. It served simply to isolate Riss at its business sit-us and the situs of the dispute, from neutral employers without any more general effect upon the businesses or operations of these neutral employers. As the decisions of the Board have recognized, this has always been regarded as permissible primary action despite the limited effect upon the operations of the neutral employers at the sites of the dispute. That Salem Express, one of the neutral employers affected by the Respondent's picketing in the present case, was itself a cotenant of the picketed Terminal, is also immaterial. Indeed, in its Moore Dry Dock decision-the basic decision on common situs •picket- ing-the Board clearly recognized the propriety of this type of pressure directed against the business of the primary employer at a common situs, in spite of its limited, incidental effect upon the business operations of the Drydock Company some of whose employees had been induced by the union in that case to cease working upon the vessel of the primary employer at the shipyard. 8 By the 1959 amendments of the Act (P.L. '86-257), Congress added the following proviso to what has become Section 8(b) (4) (1) and (ii) (B) : "[N]othing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing." However, this merely stated a principle which had already been recognized by the courts and .the Board. N.L.R.B. v. International Rice Milling Co. Inc., 341 U.S. .665, 672-673 ; N.L.R.B. v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, et al. (Gould & Preisner), 341 U.S. 675, 687; N.L.R.B. v. Service Trade Chauffeurs, Salesmen & Helpers, Local 145, etc. (Howland Dry Goods), 191 F. 2d_65 (C.A. 2) ; Di Giorgio Fruit Corporation, et al. v. N.L.R.B., 191 F. 2d 642 (C.A.D.C.) ; Seafarers International Union etc. v. N.L.R.B., 265 F. 2d 585 (C.A.D.C.) ; International Union of United Brewery, Flour, Cereal, Soft Drink and Distillery Workers of America, AFL-CIO (Adolph Coors Brewery) v. N.L.R.B., 272 F. 2d 817 (C.A. 10) ; Oil Workers International Union, Local Union 346 (Pure Oil Company), 84 NLRB 315; Sailors' Union 'of the Pacific, AFL (Moore Dry Dock Company), 92 NLRB 547; Chauffeurs, Teamsters, and Helpers "General" Local No. 200 (Milwaukee Plywood Company), 126 NLRB 650. See also Interborough News Company, 90 NLRB 2135; U & Me Transfer, et at., 119 NLRB 852, 859. ' Cited in preceding footnote. See 92 NLRB at 549. "'Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc., 107 NLRB 299, enfd. 220 F. 2d 380 (C.A.D.C.). 960 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD What has. just been said about the propriety of the pickets' inducement of the drivers for Salem Express and other neutral employers to refrain from crossing the picket line with Riss' freight or equipment, would apply to the pickets' efforts in keeping the C & T drivers from crossing the picket line with Riss' freight even if, contrary to the Respondent's contention, C & T were regarded as a neutral employer rather than an "ally" of Riss. I therefore find it unnecessary to determine whether C & T was, or was not, an ally of Riss. My conclusion is that, in any event, the picketing of the Terminal in opposition to the carriage of Riss' freight was in itself legitimate, primary activity and not violative of Section 8(b) (4) (B) of the Act. The fact that the pickets resorted to illegal obstructive tactics and threats, which I have found were violations of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act, does not make the picketing itself a violation of Section 8(b) (4) (B). Upon the foregoing considerations, I conclude that the action of the pickets in opposition to the hauling of Riss' freight and equipment through the picket line at the Terminal by drivers for Salem Express, North Penn Transfer, Uhrik Transporta- tion Company, K & K Transportation Company, and C & T was not violative of Section 8(b)(4)(i) or (ii)(B) of the Act and that allegations of the complaint which in substance charge such violations should be dismissed. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in con- nection with the operations of Riss & Company, Inc., described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com- merce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in activities which violate Sec- tion 8(b) (1) (A) and 8(b) (4) (i) and (ii) (B) of the Act, it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. By physically blocking and obstructing employees of Riss and of C & T from' driving their respective employer's trucks in and out of the Riss Terminal through the picket line of the Respondent, by threatening these employees with injury when they did so, and by threatening their supervisors in the presence of the employees because the supervisors directed the employees to cross the picket line, the Respondent has restrained employees of Riss and C & T in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act to refrain from assisting the Respondent labor organization in its dispute with Riss, and has thereby engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act. 2. By the threats and acts of its agents inducing and encouraging George M. Royce, Jr., an employee of Salem Express, to refuse in the course of his employment to perform services for his employer, all with an object of forcing and requiring Salem Express to cease doing business with Riss, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of, Section 8(b) (4) (A) (i) (B) of the Act. 3. By the threats and acts of its agents and with the object described in the pre- ceding paragraph, the Respondent has also threatened, restrained, and coerced Salem Express, and has thereby engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. 4. By notice given by its steward as its agent to North Penn Transfer to the effect that North Penn Transfer's employees would not handle Riss' freight, the Respondent coerced and restrained North Penn Transfer with an object of forcing and requiring North Penn Transfer to cease doing business with Riss, and thereby engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) of the Act. 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices 'affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)- of the Act. ' 6. The evidence in the present case does not establish the Respondent's commis- sion of any unfair labor practices other than those described in the preceding paragraphs. [Recommendations omitted from publication.]