Pan-O-Ramic Package Co., Inc.

1174 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Pan-O-Ramic Package Co., Inc. and United Textile Workers of America, AFL-CIO. Case No..13-CA-3685. March 3, 1961 DECISION AND ORDER On August 23, 1960, Trial Examiner Thomas A. Ricci issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action,. as set forth in the copy of the Inter mediate Report attached hereto. The Trial 'Examiner also found' that the Respondent has not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices as alleged in the complaint, and recommended that these particular allegations be dismissed. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection` with this case to a three-member panel [Members Rodgers, Fanning, and Kimball]. The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter= mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda- tions of the Trial Examiner.' ORDER Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Pan-O=Ramie Package Co., Inc., Janesville, Wisconsin, its officers, agents, successors; and assigns, shall : 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Threatening to deprive employees of existing economic benefits in their conditions of employment, or to make it "harder" upon them if they choose to engage in collective bargaining through a union. In the absence of exceptions thereto we adopt the Trial Examiner's findings of viola- tions of Section 8(a) (1) pro forma. We find no merit in the General Counsel's excep-. tions to the Trial Examiner's failure to find a violation of Section 8(a) (3) and (1). in the discharge of employee Bouton. Although we do not adopt the Trial Examiner's characterization of Bouton's conduct during his meeting with the Respondent's officers on May 6, 1960, as persistent provocation amounting to insolence , daring, threatening, and taunts, we believe that his anxious and insistent interrogation of the Respondent's officers concerning his job security sufficiently tried the latter 's patience to-cause his discharge. As the Trial Examiner , we are persuaded that Bouton's discharge was' not related to his union or other protected concerted activities . We also find , contrary to the General Counsel's allegation that the Respondent by urging its employees to attend a' scheduled union meeting did not convey the impression of having 'surveyed the union activities of its employees. We shall therefore dismiss the complaint insofar as' it alleges a violation of Section 8 (a) (1) on this ground. 130 NLRB No. 111. ' PAN-O-RAMIC PACKAGE CO., INC. 1175 (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to join or assist United Textile Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or to form, join, or assist any other labor organization, to bargain col- lectively through representatives of Their own choosing, to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all of such activi- ties, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agree- ment requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of the Act, as modi- fied by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : . (a) Post at its plant in Janesville, Wisconsin, copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix." 2 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Thirteenth Region, shall after being signed by Respondent's representative, be posted by Re- spondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in. conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director for the Thirteenth Region, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps it has taken to comply therewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dis- missed insofar as it alleges that the Respondent violated Section 8(a) (3) and (1) of the Act by discharging employee Warren Bouton, and Section 8(a) (1) by creating the impression of surveillance of its employees' union activities. 2 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words "Pursuant to a Decree of.the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to a Decision 'and Order of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that : WE WILL NOT threaten to deprive our employees of existing economic benefits in their conditions of employment, or to make it "harder" upon them if they choose to engage in collective bargaining through a union. 1176 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re- strain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist United Textile Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through represent- atives of their own choosing, or to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of mutual aid or protection as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, or to refrain from any and all such activi- ties, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. All our employees are free to become or remain, or to refrain from becoming or remaining members of any labor organization. PAN-O-RAMIC PACKAGE CO., INC., Employer. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE This proceeding, with all parties represented, was heard before the duly desig- nated Trial Examiner in Janesville, Wisconsin, on July 20, 1960, on complaint of the General Counsel and answer by Pan-O-Ramic Package Co., Inc., herein called the Company or the Respondent. The issues litigated are whether the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act in certain statements of its supervisors, and whether it violated Section 8(a)(3) in the discharge of an employee. All parties were afforded full opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce evidence, to present oral argument, and thereafter to file briefs. A brief was received from the General Counsel. Upon the entire record, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT Pan-O-Ramic Package Co., Inc., is a corporation existing under the laws of the State of Wisconsin, and maintains its principal office and place of business at Janes- ville, Wisconsin, where it is and has at all times material been engaged in the manu- facture of plastic boxes and packages. During the calendar year 1959 the Re- spondent purchased goods and materials for its Janesville plant valued in excess of $50,000, which goods and materials were transported to that plant from, outside the State of Wisconsin. During the same calendar year, in the regular course of its operations, the Respondent manufactured and shipped from its plant products valued in excess of $50,000 to enterprises which annually produce and ship goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly out of the State of Wisconsin. I find that the Re- spondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction in this proceeding. H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED United Textile Workers of America, AFL-CIO, is, and at all times material herein has been , a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. PAN-O-RAMIC PACKAGE CO., INC. 1177 III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES The Charging Union started an organizational campaign among the Respondent's employees during April 1960. On May 5 it filed a petition for an election with the National Labor Relations Board. Two major actions by the Respondent, occur- ring about the time of these events, are said in the complaint to have been unlawful interference with the employees' right to self-organization, and to constitute viola- tions of the statute. On May 4, 1960, officers of the Company read a prepared statement to assembled employees, and made comments thereon, and on May 6 the Respondent discharged Warren Bouton, an employee. The statement read to the employees is, assertedly, a threat of economic retaliation if they persisted in select- ing a union, and the discharge of Bouton is alleged to have been because of his union activities. The Respondent denies the commission of any unfair labor prac- tices, and affirmatively contends that Bouton was released for cause. A. 'Unlawful coercion of the employees By May 4, 1960, the Respondent's officers concededly were aware that self- organizational activities were going on among the employees. On that morning, about 10 a.m., two officers gathered groups of employees for the purpose of ad- dressing them concerning their union activities. The plant is divided into two major sections-the box department, with 10 or 12 employees, and the plastic department, with 12 to 14 employees. Alvin Gehri, the company president, gathered the em- ployees of plant No. 1 at the end of their break and spoke to them for 15 or 20 minutes. He testified his purpose was to advise them of the "facts" about union activities, to remind them of the benefits they had been receiving from the Re- spondent, and to tell them what he thought the situation would be by comparison in the event a majority representative was selected. He read to them the following prepared statement: VACATION PAY 1/52 First year wages 1 yr to 5 yrs i Week Over 5 yrs 2 Weeks BIRTHDAY OFF WITH PAY CHRISTMAS BONUS CHRISTMAS PARTY BREAK PERIODS A.M. & P.M. 10 minutes each CLEAN UP PERIODS A.M. & P.M. 5 minutes each SMOKING REGULATIONS GROUP INSURANCE - '/2 paid by company LIFE INSURANCE 1/2 paid by company EMPLOYEE LOAN SYSTEM WITHOUT INTEREST Employee will no longer be able to contact his foreman direct for any bene- fits on his behalf. All this must be done through a middle man (the union representative). Employee cannot come to officers of company on any matter-this must be done through union representative. Employee will lose his identity and will become part of large group-all dealing will be done on a group basis. IF A UNION IS VOTED INTO THIS SHOP ALL BENEFITS LISTED ABOVE WILL BE REMOVED AT ONCE AND WILL HAVE TO BE RE- INSTATED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS OVER A PERIOD OF YEARS. We urge you to attend this meeting tonight and judge the facts for yourself don't allow yourself to buy something you don't understand or want completely. [S] ALVIN F. GEmu. At the same time, Vice President Jack Pregont spoke to the 10 or 12 employees of plant No. 2 when they were taking their work break. Pregont testified in the same vein as did Gehri, explaining that he too wished to advise the employees of the "facts." And he too read to the second group of employees the very same state- ment which Gehri was at the time reading to his group. In addition to reading the above statement, Gehri conceded that he explained to the employees what he had in mind. At the hearing he admitted without equivoca- tion that he intended them to understand that if a union were voted into the shop, all the benefits listed on the prepared statement would be discontinued. He added this was his opinion as to how things would develop. The Board has consistently held that a threat by an employer to terminate existing benefits in the event the 1178 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD employees choose a bargaining agent, is a direct threat of retaliation for their union activities and a potent form of restraint and coercion upon them in the free exercise of the right to select a bargaining agent.' As I read the statement in evidence, I can only hold that it contains an unequivocal and direct threat to remove benefits the moment the employees should choose a union. It says "all benefits" will be re- moved at once. Nor can the immediately following assurance that the Respondent would negotiate with a bargaining representative serve to qualify the direct an- nouncement; instead the closing phrase telling the employees that the existing bene- fits would "be reinstated . . . over a period of years" is the clearest possible lan- guage of finality as to the promised loss. • There is a suggestion, not clearly articulated, in the totality of Gehri's testimony, and in the closing oral argument of Respondent's counsel, that the company officers .were thinking an employer could start bargaining negotiations with a union by offering to contract for less than employees are enjoying at the moment , just as a union may open by demanding increases in benefits. This, clearly, was not the thought conveyed to the employees in the prepared statements. But even assuming this to have been the Company's underlying but unexpressed position, the Board has already held that even an equivocal statement about "starting from scratch" in such a situation necessarily coerces employees in advance of an election. In The Rein Co. case, '114 NLRB 694, the respondent employer claimed his statement meant that existing benefits would be discontinued only after bargaining with the union, and only in the event the union were unsuccessful during negotiations in winning their continuance. The pertinent language of the notice in that case read: "We deem it only fair to tell you that we have this right and that we do not propose to do anything but start- from scratch if the Union becomes your bargaining agent, . but [we] will not, feel bound to voluntarily offer in any contract which the Union may negotiate any benefits which may have heretofore been given." The Board deemed this language as necessarily imparting the thought that the company, before starting to bargain with the union, would withdraw benefits previously enjoyed. More so is such a con- clusion required from a fair reading of the prepared statement read. by Gehri and Pregont here. Accordingly, as alleged in the complaint, I find that in their respective speeches to employees. on May 4, 1960, both President Alvin Gehri and Vice President Jack Pregont violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. B. The alleged unlawful discharge of Warren Bouton Bouton was hired by the Company in the fall of 1959 by Leonard Wyss, an officer of the Respondent, as a favor for a friend. Bouton suffers from epilepsy and, ap- parently, it was somewhat difficult for him td' obtain employment. He was taken on as a maintenance and general handyman; with time, he was given additional duties, including the setting of very elementary and simple molds in some of the machinery. His employment seems to have been satisfactory, he was given a 5-cent raise on one occasion, and, so far as appears definitively, what criticism the employers had of him was not different than the usual urgings upon employees to do a better job. Bouton signed a card in favor of the Union on April 20; it does not appear that he did anything else to help the organizational drive. _ During the afternoon of May 4, after the company officers had read their pre- pared statement to all employees in the morning, Bouton went to the office of Vice President Pregont and asked about details of the Company's loan plan, which the vice president had mentioned as one of the benefits in the morning. Pregont ex- plained it to him. Bouton also asked for the "White Book," purportedly listing em- ployee benefits, and Pregont said he would obtain it for him. As the discussion con- tinued, Pregont asked Bouton why the employees desired to have a union, and Bouton said they thought they could obtain higher wages and more seniority. According to Bouton's uncontradicted-testimony Pregont became bitter, slammed the table, and said "damn." Bouton also testified, without contradiction, that during this conversa- tion Pregont said to him "it would be harder on me than it was now, if the Union did come in." About 9 p.m. on May 5, Bouton telephoned Wyss at home to complain of a rumor he had heard that the Company was going to dismiss him because of union activities. He asked Wyss if this was true, and Wyss assured him it was not so. Bouton was persistent on the subject, and when Wyss tried to discontinue the conversation, asked could he speak to Wyss again later that evening "about these rumors." Wyss said he was busy, and asked Bouton to come to his office the next morning if he wished. 1 Bell Bakeries, Inc., 126 NLRB 522. PAN-O-RAMIC PACKAGE CO., INC. 1179 Bouton reported to work 40 minutes late the next morning . One of his first duties was to turn on the production machines so that they would warm up and be ready .for operation at 7 o'clock when the operators arrived. In consequence of Bouton's lateness, production that morning ran about three-quarters of an hour behind schedule. . Shortly after 9 o'clock that morning Bouton was in the office of Vice President Wyss, where he found Vice President Pregont and Foreman Stoker. There is dis- agreement in the testimony as to what was said during this conversation. Bouton's version is as follows: He went to the office without being asked. Wyss started by referring to the rumors which Bouton had mentioned the night before, and said he wanted them straightened out; he then listed the things the Company had done for Bouton, such as giving him a job, being at his bedside when he was ill, trying to obtain. a driver's license for him, and ended by saying Bouton apparently did not like his job, and even accused him of standing around talking to the employees and 'wasting their time. Bouton protested this was not so, and that he liked his job. .Bouton went on to testify that Vice President Pregont then told him he had been late that day and gave him a warning slip for such tardiness, with the warning he would be discharged if the offense were repeated. Still according to Bouton, at this point he raised his voice to Pregont and said the Company itself had advised the employees to go to the union meeting. Bouton ex- plained at the hearing that he made this statement because in his mind during that morning's conversation the thought came to him that by "talking and wasting time" the company officials were referring to his union activity . Bouton also said Pregont refused to discuss the Union, tried to terminate the conversation, and urged every- one to return to work. Bouton nevertheless continued to persist to Wyss and Pregont that they tell him, before he left the room,, whether the Company was going to discharge him or not, and they replied by saying it depended on the way he acted. Bouton, still insisting on a final answer to his question, then said: "Well, I suppose if you were going to fire me I could call my union representative in Kenosha, and we could sue you for it." At this point, according to Bouton, Pregont leaped to his feet with a flushed face and said: "That's it, that is insubordination, the threat of a union within our office, get out of here, take everything you own, you are fired." Bouton left the room, tore up the tardy slip as he was departing, and hurled a dirty phrase back to Wyss. The testimony of Wyss and Pregont as to this conversation is significantly different. According to them, they were discussing certain business matters in the office when Stoker, the foreman, entered to say that production was 45 minutes behind because .Bouton had arrived late.' Wyss decided a tardy slip should be given to Bouton formally as a warning' against future errors of this kind, and Bouton was therefore called in. Both of them testified that as soon as Bouton entered the room, he began to insist that the Company's concern over him was because of his union activities. As Wyss recalled, Bouton quickly said the reason for the conference was not to give him a tardy slip. According to Pregont, before they could tell Bouton why he had been called, he said to them they could not' fire him because of union activities. The two vice presidents testified that their attempts to change the, subject to the question of tardiness were rejected by Bouton, who continued to persist that the Company could not discharge him for union activities. Gehri entered the room after a while and Bouton again asked all of them whether he was fired or not. As Wyss recalled, he assured Bouton he had not been called in to be discharged, but Bouton refused to let the matter rest there: With Bouton 'not relenting, Wyss told him his continued employment was' "strictly up to you," and Bouton became increasingly excited. Wyss conceded that in the conversation he accused Bouton of idling and wasting the time of other employees; he explained he did it because he had heard that during the morning Bouton had been discussing the "rumors" with other employees. Finally, as both Wyss and Pregont recalled, Bouton announced that if he were fired, 'he would 'call Kenosha. Both company officials 'conceded they understood Bouton to mean he would call the Union to his help. And Pregont also admitted'that upon being told this: "I told him he couldn't threaten us with a union ... that does it, you're fired." Finally, Pregont admitted on-the stand that he had no intention of discharging Bouton that day, and had the employee not said he would "call Kenosha," he would not have been fired. 'I think a fair appraisal of the entire record must lead to a conclusion that, for real or fancied reasons, it was Bouton who chose to ' discuss with his employers-even to the point of irritation-his union activities, and not that the Company wished to raise -that'subject with him. There is nothing in the record to indicate that any' of the cbmpany officers had any particular concern with Bouton' s union 'activities before 1180 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD these two conversations, or were even aware that he had signed a union card . . Bouton first raised the question of union activities to Wyss on the telephone, and, despite Wyss' assurance he would not be- fired , and advice not to believe everything he heard, persisted that he wished to call later again the same evening to continue to discuss the "rumor." And again , the next day, it was Bouton, on his own admission, who injected and refused to discontinue the subject of the Union in the conversation. He conceded that he had been late, that the question of his lateness was thrown up to him that day, that he was served with a formal notice of tardiness , and that he became excited, raised his voice , and again and again refused to be responsive to the subject his superiors wanted to speak about . Indeed, the entire subject of discharge was never mentioned by a company officer, either the night before or the next morning, but instead was injected into the conversation repeatedly by the employee. On these facts, and from observing the witnesses themselves , I find that the conversation of May 6 occurred substantially as related by Wyss and Pregont. Essentially, the General Counsel's contention that the discharge was motivated by a desire to discourage union activities , centers upon the fact that Bouton said he would turn to the Union if he were discharged, and that Pregont conceded that had Bouton not threatened the Company with resort to the Union, there would have been no discharge. In substance, this argument is an attempt to limit consideration of the main issue to a-single word of all that happened and was said , and to exclude from the record the total context of Bouton's behavior and all of his remarks to his superiors. There was no threat or talk of discharge by the managers , yet Bouton threatened them with suit, through the Union, if they should release him. And this, in the very teeth of a warning that he must not again delay production by his late arrival in the morning . I am asked to consider only the fact that the threat was to go to the Union, and to ignore the language of threat. In the total context of the conversation , considering particularly Bouton's persistent provocation, bordering very closely upon if not virtually amounting to insolence , I cannot say Wyss and Pregont were concerned with Bouton 's union penchant, and were unaffected by the fact that he was threatening all the company officials. For reasons sufficient to him, Bouton saw fit to dare the officers of the Company to take action against him, and without provocation or threat of any kind having been , voiced to him, to promise them litigation if they should rise to his defiance. It is one thing to say an employer is obligated to tolerate union activity , to refrain from punishing employees because they chose to join unions, or because they turn to a union for help in improving their conditions of employment . It is quite another to require him to hold still in the face of unwarranted and unprovoked taunts merely because they are couched in terms of union activity. In any event , here, as in every case presenting the question of motivation in a dis- charge, the ultimate question is whether or not the preponderance of the evidence as a whole suffices to prove that the true reason in the discharge was antiunion purpose. On the entire record I am unable to reach that conclusion here. In support of the inference of illegal motivation sought by the General Counsel, there is the fact that 2 days before the discharge company officials had threatened to withdraw economic benefits from the employees if they chose a union . And, on Bouton's uncontradicted testimony-which in this respect I must credit-Pregont also told him continued union activities would make it "harder" upon the employees. Both of these incidents reflect antiunion animus by the Respondent and amounted to independent violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. They were both, however, directed to the employees as a whole, and , in the case of Bouton's conversation of May 4, it was he who inquired of Vice President Wyss, the officer had no knowledge of Bouton's individual membership or activity for the Union , and at no point did the conversation between the two show personal animus toward the employee. Indeed, Wyss' statement that it would be "harder"- with a union was but a repetition of what Gehri and Pregont had announced that same morning. Apart from the foregoing, I see no positive affirmative evidence in the record. even were I to accept Bouton's version of the May 6 conversation to be correct, of illegal motive for the discharge. Bouton said that Wyss started the conversation by listing the various favors the company officers had done for him, including the initial hiring.. He said the vice president complained of Bouton's talking about among employees and causing them to lose time . The officers had occasion to say to him that whether or not he remained with the Company would depend upon how he behaved. It is suggested that I should infer that by the phrase "talking around," the officers im- pliedly meant "discussing union activities." I am asked to presume that past favors were thrown up to Bouton as reason for him not to join the Union, out of a sense of reciprocal obligation. When Pregont and Wyss told Bouton his continued em- ployment would depend upon "how he behaved ," were they necessarily saying to him LOCAL 5881 , UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA 1181 it all depended upon how he behaved with respect to adhering or staying away from the Union? I find all these but tenuous arguments, based more upon suspicion and unsupported implication than on positive probative proof. Like all records in cases of this type, the ultimate finding must be based upon the totality of the record. Upon consideration of all .the evidence, I find it insufficient to support, as required by law,2 the allegation that Bouton was discharged because of union or other protected con- certed activities, and I shall therefore recommend that the complaint be dismissed in this respect. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III , above, occurring in con- nection with the operations of the Respondent described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices, I shall recom- mend that it cease and desist therefrom, and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Upon the basis of the above findings of fact , and upon the entire record, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Pan-O-Ramic Package Co., Inc., is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. 2. United Textile Workers of America , AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Statutes. 3. By threatening to deprive employees of existing economic benefits in their conditions of employment, and to make it "harder" upon them if they choose to engage in collective bargaining through a union, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] 2 Glen Raven Silk Milla, -Inc., 101 NLRB 239, enfd. as mod. 203 F. 2d 946 (C.A. 4). Local 5881, United Mine Workers of America and Grundy Min- ing Company. Case No. 10-CB-1225. March 3, 1961 DECISION AND ORDER On November 21, 1960, Trial Examiner C. W. Whittemore issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the. Intermediate Report and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman Leedom and Members Rodgers and Jenkins]. The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds no prejudicial error was committed. The 130 NLRB No. 112.