International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union

INTERNATIONAL LADIES' GARMENT WORKERS' UNION I I I I do object to the use of this extrinsic evidence for purposes of com- puting the 30-day grace period allowed to old nonmember employees as of the effective date or new employees hired between the effective date and actual execution date, without also affording the contract- ing parties an opportunity to show that the rights of employees were not infringed or interfered with by the difference in dates. If the rule against extrinsic evidence is to be relaxed, it should be relaxed for all parties. Here the new contract was executed during the exist- ing term of a 3-year contract, which also contained a valid union- security clause. Accordingly, whether or not the new contract was executed on September 27 or October 11, all nonmember employees on September 27, and new employees hired between that date and October 11 were in fact given at least 30 days in which to decide whether to join the union. This was a right given them under the initial 3-year agreement. This right was not taken away by the new 2-year agreement. Since the law requires no more, I would find the new contract to be a bar to an election at this time 4 4 The majority clearly errs in stating that "it is the contracting parties themselves, and not some third party, who are in effect attacking their own contract." The contracting parties admit that their contract was executed on October 11, 1960, rather than on the date shown on the face of the contract. This is not an attack on the contract , because, even using that date, the petition was untimely filed As for this being a situation not encompassed within the intent of the Keystone rule, I refer my colleagues to the deci- sion in Benjamin Franklin Paint & Varnish Company, a Division of United Wallpaper, Inc, 124 NLRB 54, where the Board held it to be its policy that a "contract to consti- tute a bar must be sufficient on its face, without resort to parol evidence , such as would often be necessary to determine the actual execution date. As with union-security clauses, and in determining the adequacy of a contract , the Board will be governed by the con- tents of the contract on its face in determining whether the contract constitutes a bar to a representation proceeding." As indicated I agree that evidence of the actual execu- tion date is admissible to preclude possible collusive predating of contracts , in order to bar petitions filed before the actual execution date. However, if the rule is to be relaxed for that purpose it should also be relaxed to permit a showing that the union-security clauses are not violative of the Act. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union and Federation of Union Representatives, Petitioner. Case No. 2-RC-11158. April 14, 1961 DECISION AND DIRECTION OF ELECTION Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before A. Gene Niro, hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from prej- udicial error and are hereby affirmed. Upon the entire record, the Board finds :1 1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. i The American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations , herein called the AFL-CIO, and Field Representatives Federation , AFL-CIO, DALU #3017, were permitted to file amious briefs, and such briefs were duly considered by the Board. 131 NLRB No. 25. 112 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2. The labor organization named below claims to represent certain employees of the Employer. 3. A question affecting commerce exists concerning the representa- tion of certain employees of the Employer, within Section 9(c) (1) and Section 2 (6) and 7 of the Act 2 4. The following employees of the Employer constitute a unit ap- propriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within Section 9(b) of the Act: All individuals on the payroll of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (as distinguished from its locals) who serve as busi- ness agents, organizers, educational directors, and who do union label, and political work excluding office clericals, supervisors, professionals, watchmen, and guards as defined in the Act.3 [Text of Direction of Election omitted from publication.] 2 We find no merit in the contentions raised by the Employer and the AFL-CIO, that the business agents here involved are managerial employees , or for other reasons , should not be considered employees under the Act. In Air Line Pilots Association , International, 97 NLRB 929 , and the American Federation of Labor, et al., 120 NLRB 969, we con- sidered similar contentions with respect to negotiators , organizers , lawyers , and other individuals employed directly by labor organizations and concluded that such individuals were employees under the Act and entitled to the right of self -organization. In our opinion, the holdings in these cases , which we reaffirm , are controlling herein . Accord- ing, we find that the business agents, whose duties and authorities are substantially the same as those of the organizers in the American Federation of Labor case, and the other individuals in the unit described herein, are employees within the meaning of the Act who may be represented for collective -bargaining purposes. 3 We find on the basis of the record as a whole, particularly in view of their duties, responsibilities , lines of progression and training , that all the employees sought by the Petitioner have sufficient community of interest to warrant their inclusion in the single unit as herein provided . We find no merit in the contention of the Employer that the unit is inappropriate because it excludes employees on the payroll of the locals. Altamont Shirt Corporation and Region 30, District 50, United Mine Workers of America and Jimmy Hammers and Pauline Morrison. Cases Nos. 10-CA-4455 and 10-CA-4.466. April 18, 1961 DECISION AND ORDER On September 26, 1960, Trial Examiner George A. Downing issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Inter- mediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report. The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Intermediate 131 NLRB No. 23.