Local 825, Int'l Brotherhood of Operating Engineers

452 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 4. By laying off Jimmy T. Gale, Dorris Potts, and Wilbur L. Vick pursuant to rule 31 , the Respondent has discriminated with respect to their hire or tenure of employment, thereby discouraging the free exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act and discouraging membership in and activities on behalf of the above-named Union, and has thereby engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] Local Union 825, International Brotherhood of Operating Engi- neers, AFL-CIO [Carleton Brothers Company ] and Peter A. Neuffer. Case No. 2-CC-581. May 10, 1961 DECISION AND ORDER On November 29, 1960, Trial Examiner A. Norman Somers issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in certain unfair labor practices. The Trial Examiner also found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices and recommended that the com- plaint be dismissed with respect to such allegations. These findings, conclusions, and recommendations,are more fully set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respond- ent and the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Intermediate Re- port and supporting briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Board has delegated its powers in con- nection with this case to a three-member panel [Members Rodgers, Leedom, and Fanning]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committeed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Intermedi- ate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this case and hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions, and recommenda- tions of the Trial Examiner with the following modifications : (1) The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that the Respondent violated Section 8(b) (4) (i) (B) of the Act by inducing and encour- aging employees, members of Respondent Union, to engage in a work stoppage on July 7, 1960, with an object of forcing or requiring Carle- ton, the prime contractor on the Hillcrest construction project, to cease doing business with Peter A. Neuffer and A. E. Kollman, two nonunion contractors engaged in operations at the same project. The i We correct the Trial Examiner 's apparently inadvertent error in footnote 4 of the Intermediate Report that it was Johnson, Instead of Tobin , who "described himself as 'office manager'" 131 NLRB No. 67. LOCAL 825, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF OPERATING ENGINEERS 453 Trial Examiner also found, inter alia, that the Respondent violated Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) by impliedly threatening Carleton with a further refusal by its members to perform services if the two non- union contractors were restored to the job. While we agree that the Respondent violated Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) of the Act, we do not deem it necessary to pass upon what the Trial Examiner characterized as an "implied threat" to Carleton. Rather, we predicate our finding on the strike of July 7 against Carleton, Frontino, and Wright, which necessarily restrained and coerced all and each of them in order to force Carleton to cease doing business with Neuffer and Kollman. A work stoppage engaged in for such a purpose clearly violates Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) of the Act.' (2) The Trial Examiner recommended that the Board issue an order limited to prohibiting further secondary boycott action against only the Employer involved in this case, citing the Supreme Court's Communications Workers 3 decision. The General Counsel filed ex- ceptions to the Trial Examiner's recommended order on the ground that such a limited order is not an adequate remedy for the violations found. We have recently had occasion to consider what is an ade- quate and appropriate remedy in cases involving violations of Section 8(b) (4). On the basis of, and for the reasons stated in, W. D. Don Thomas Construction Company,4 we find merit in the General Coun- sel's exceptions and will, accordingly, issue an appropriate order,' prohibiting like or related conduct involving any other secondary employer. ORDER Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Local Union 825, International Brotherhood of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, its officers, agents, representatives, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Engaging in, or inducing or encouraging any individual em- ployed by Carleton Brothers Company, or Frank Frontino Excavat- ing Co., Inc., or Wright Excavators, Inc., or by any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manu- facture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities, or to perform any services, where B International Hod Carriers, Building and Common Laborers' Union of America, Local No. 1140, AFL-CIO (Gilmore Construction Company), 127 NLRB 541. 8 Communication Workers of America, AFL-CIO, et at. v. N.L R B , 362 U S 479 4130 NLRB 1289 (Supplemental Decision and Amended Order) 5 Member Fanning dissents from the application of a "broad" order on the basis of his separate opinion in United Association of Journeymen, etc. (W D. Don Thomas Con- struction Company), supra, footnote 4 454 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD an object thereof is to force or require said companies or any other employer or person to cease doing business with Peter A. Neuffer and/or A. E. Kollman. (b) Threatening, coercing, or restraining Carleton Brothers Com- pany, or Frank Frontino Excavating Co., Inc., or Wright Excavators, Inc., or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where an object thereof is to force or require said companies or any other employer or person to cease doing business with Peter A. Neuffer and/or A. E. Kollman. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Post in conspicuous places in the Respondent's business offices, meeting halls, and all places where notices to members are customarily posted, copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix." B Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Second Region, shall, after being duly signed by the Responde'nt's authorized representative, be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days there- after. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that such notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Furnish to the Regional Director for the Second Region signed copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix," for posting by Carleton Brothers Company and the said excavating companies referred to above, they being willing, at places where they customarily post notices to their employees. (c) Notify the Regional Director for the Second Region, in writ- ing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Re- spondent has taken to comply herewith. 6In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order " APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF LOCAL UNION 825, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF OPERATING ENGINEERS AFL-CIO Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that : WE WILL NOT induce or encourage employees of Carleton Broth- ers Company, or Frank Frontino Excavating Co., Inc., or Wright Excavators, Inc., or of any other employer, to engage in a strike or a refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufac- ture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any LOCAL 825, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF OPERATING ENGINEERS 455 goods, materials, articles, or commodities or to perform any serv- ices, or threaten, coerce, or restrain Carleton Brothers Company, or Frank Frontino Excavating Co., Inc., or Wright Excavators, Inc., or any other employer or person, in order to force or require said companies, or any other employer or person, to cease doing business with Peter A. Neuffer a'nd/or A. E. Iiollman. LOCAL UNION 825, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, AFL-CIO, Labor Organization. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE This case was heard before Trial Examiner A. Norman Somers in New York City on September 12, 15, 20, and 21, 1960, on complaint of the General Counsel and answer of Respondent. The issue was whether Respondent, as alleged in the com- plaint, engaged in secondary strike activity and threats in violation of Sec- tion 8(b) (4) (i) and (ii) (B) of the Act, as amended by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Public Law 86-257, 86th Cong, 1st sess.).i Previously, the matter had been presented to a district court on petition by the General Counsel under Section 10(1) for a restraining order (limited, of course, to whether a showing of probable cause had been made). The district court on September 19, 1960, issued its decision granting the restraining order.2 The General Counsel and Respondent presented oral argument, which has been duly considered, and waived filing of briefs. Upon the entire record, and my obser- vation of the witnesses, I hereby make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. COMMERCE JURISDICTION Robert Carleton, the prime building contractor at the projects involved in the events here considered, is engaged in the construction business under the name and style of Carleton Brothers Company. He has his principal office in Palisades, New Jersey, and during the year preceding the events here involved, purchased and caused to be transported across State lines to various jobsites materials exceeding $150,000 in value. Hudik-Ross, Inc., the prime plumbing contractor on the projects here involved, is a New Jersey corporation, which in the same year bought and caused to be transported across State lines to its various projects materials exceeding $50,000 in value. Frank Frontino Excavating Co, Inc., subcontractor of Carleton on the project, and Wright Excavators, Inc., subcontractor of Hudik-Ross on the project, are New York corporations engaged in excavating services, and affect the operations of their respective contractors. It is found that Carleton and Hudik-Ross, the prime contractors, and Frontino and Wright, their respective subcontractors, are employers and persons engaged in commerce or in industries affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 2(2), (6), (7), and 8(b) (4) of the Act. The relevant portions of Section 8(b) (4) are set forth In Appendix A of this report. 2 Samuel M. Kaynard, Acting Regional Director v. Local Union 825, International Union of Operating Engineers, 46 LRRM 3118 (D.C.S.N.Y.). 456 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Respondent, Local Union 825, International Brotherhood of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. M. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The issue involved The case presents the narrowest of factual issues. Certain employees at a school construction site, of which Carleton was the building contractor, stopped work part of an afternoon and of the next morning because two' of Carleton's subcontractors at the site were nonunion. One of them was Peter A. Neuffer, the Charging Party, and the other A. E. Koliman. The men returned after Carleton got nd of these subcontractors. The Union denies that it induced or encouraged the action and claims it to have been a spontaneous manifestation of solidarity inspired by union members' traditional aversion to working on the same job with nonmembers; and it further disclaims having threatened Carleton with a work stoppage if he retained or recalled the subcontractors in question. B. The evidence 1. General observation The issue is close because the credited evidence relating to the cause of the stop- page presents a question of the inference validly to be drawn from a combination of circumstances. In the main, they consist of telephone conversations of various persons with Robert Tobin, the representative of the Union normally reached when that medium of communication is used. The persons talking to Tobin included the two nonunion subcontractors and an employee of one of them; also Bruno Scalabrin, general superintendent for Carleton, and Carleton himself. If Carleton's testimony were to be taken at face value, nothing need be left to inference, for it crosses every t and dots every i of potential liability. Carleton attributed to Tobin, in an alleged conversation the morning after the stoppage started, an explicit statement that Tobin ordered the stoppage and an express threat by him that it would continue until Carleton came to some understanding with the Union, and he attributed the same statement to two union delegates with whom he met several days later. His testimony was marred by exaggerated accounts of the duration of the stoppage and eccentricities of response, which gave the events a puzzling overcast, until they were restored to proper perspective by his general superintendent, Scalabrin, who followed him on the stand. Carleton was recalled for 'further examination after Scalabrin completed his testimony, and accepted Sacalbrin's version of the length of the stoppage in place of his own. We must also conclude that Carleton, in his con- versation with Tobin (and later with two business agents of the Union), received no more explicit statements concerning the Union's Tole in the stoppage than did Scalabrin. The result is that our determination must rest less on direct evidence, which, as has been judicially noted, is in any event "rarely obtainable" 3 in labor relations cases, but on a record in which the controversy is less over the individual parts than over their sum when taken as a whole. 2. Background; the two school construction sites and the nonunion contractors For over 8 months preceding July 7, when the stoppage occurred, Carleton had been engaged as prime 'building contractor at two public school 'construction sites in New York. One was in Clarkstown, known as the North Hillcrest School or jobsite. The other was at North Monsey, 5 miles away, known as the North Monsey School. The employees of the various subcontractors belonged to some union in the building trades. Those who operated machinery were members of Respondent Union. These consisted of the employees of Frontino Excavating Company, Inc., and Wright Excavators, Inc., who have been previously identified as the subcontrac- tors, respectively, of Carleton and of Hudik-Ross, Inc., the prime plumbing con- tractor. The principals of these subcontractors, themselves, as in the case of Frank Frontino, either belonged to the Union, or, as in the case of Russell Wright and William R. Fisher, the two coowners or "partners" of Wright, were "permit men," whom the Union specially permitted to engage in the same work as their employees. 8 Hartsell Mills Company v N.L R B., 111 F. 2d 291, 293 (C A. 4). LOCAL 825, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF OPERATING ENGINEERS 457 The exceptions to the above were Peter A. Neuffer, the Charging Party, and A. E. Kollman. They were self-employed persons who, under contract with Carleton, engaged in excavation work with their own equipment, Neuffer by himself without any employee, ,and Kollman, when the amount of work warranted, with an employee who would operate extra equipment owned by Kollman -for that purpose. Their work alternated between the North Mousey and the North Hillcrest sites, but for the last month preceding the stoppage, they were at North Hillcrest, where the stop- page occurred. Neuffer and Kollman neither belonged to the Union ,nor were "permit men" from the Union. Despite this, during all the 8 months that Kollman and his employee worked on the jobs and the 3 months that Neuffer was there, they experienced no repercussions at either site concerning their union status. The matter was first raised on July 6, 1960, the day before the stoppage in a telephone conversation between Roger Johnson, employee of Kollman, and Robert Tobin of the Union. This is detailed below. 3. The conversations with Kollman's employee on July 6 relative to union status Johnson testified that on July 6, while he was on the job at North Hillcrest, he was told by William Cable, a member of the Union, whom he had met a month earlier while working at a different site for some other employer, that Tobin of the Union wanted to speak to him or to Kollman, his employer, and that Cable gave him the Union's number for that purpose. We discuss Cable's role in the events in a later context. Preliminarily, we indicate that Cable, on July 6, was hired at the North Monsey School by Superintendent Scalabrin to operate the welding machines at that jobsite, on which he began July 7. Johnson called Tobin, told him of Cable's message, and informed him that he was calling because Kollman was not "available." 4 According to Johnson, Tobin, after ascertaining from him the extent of Kollman's equipment and the size of the work force (consisting only of Kollman and Johnson) inquired whether Johnson or Koll- man "was Union," to which the answer was no; Tobin asked for the ,name of the contractor, and when told it was Carleton, remarked, "He is union," and that "as long as we [Kollman and Johnson] weren't Union, we would have to get off the job; we could not work for a Union contract. If we didn't get off the job, he would have to send somebody around to see about it." Tobin, in substance, corroborated Johnson, except the portions attributing to him the ultimatum that Johnson and Kollman would have to get off the job. He quoted Johnson as saying that he wanted a meeting with one of the union delegates in order to get "squared away" because "it looked like there might be some difficulty there" (on the North Hillcrest site), and that he replied he would be "happy to take that information" but that he thought that the person to talk to would be the contractor himself. There is no evidence that until July 7, when the stoppage occurred, there was any "difficulty" experienced by either Kollman or Neuffer, the other nonunion contractor. Additionally, Johnson, a mere employee of Kollman, would hardly have been likely to initiate a talk with Tobin on the subject of such a difficulty. As 4 At the outset, there was an intimation of a dispute over Tobin's authority to speak for the Union in the various conversations here involved, Respondent' s counsel describing him as "a clerk and member of the Union [who] as such answers the telephone." Johnson described himself as "office manager, I run the office," qualifying it, however, with the explanation that he was subordinate to Henry McArdle and Robert Fanning, the Union's business representatives , for whom he claimed to act as liaison with persons call- ing on union business . If the testimony of the various witnesses in the case is a fair criterion , then it would appear that this intramural gradation was lost upon the world outside. It would seem to have eluded not only the witnesses who testified to conversa- tions with Tobin concerning the events here in issue, but also witnesses who testified con- cerning their regular dealings with Tobin on union matters Subcontractors Frontino and Wright testified they hired their help on referral from the Union, and that their dealings were mostly with Tobin and at times with McArdle and Fanning This was done indiscriminately and, apparently without awareness of any difference in his status from that of the other two To Frontino, himself a member, Tobin was "the business agent; one of them," and to Wright be was a "delegate " At any rate, as the hearing progressed, the early portents of dispute over Tobin's status would seem to have faded and given way to a concession . Several times the Trial Examiner stated on the record that he under- stood Tobin's authority to be conceded and that he would understand from counsel's silence that be was not misstating Respondent's position This observation was not challenged Independently of this, the evidence warrants the finding, here made, that Tobin had authority to speak for the Union in the manner ascribed to him. 458 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the record indicates, after the difficulty did break out the following afternoon, Neuffer and Kollman called Tobin directly to discuss their plights with him. The weight of probability is therefore on the side of Johnson's version, which attributes to Tobin the initiation of the subject of the "difficulties" to be expected if he and his employer, Kollman, remained on the job. This is quite apart from infirmities be- setting Tobin's testimony as a whole of which Johnson's testimony is free. Johnson's version of his conversation with Tobin is credited and so also is his testimony that it was Cable who gave him the message to call.5 4. The stoppage and the conversations with Tobin concerning it About 3:30 on the afternoon of July 7, or an hour before quitting time, all work at the North Hillcrest site stopped. General Superintendent Scalabrin, who had just come in from the North Monsey site, was informed by the respective stewards of the laborers' and of the carpenters' unions that they were ordered to do so because of the presence of Carleton's nonunion subcontractors on the North Hillcrest site, and Mike Rocca, an employee of the union affiliated subcontractor, Frontino, like- wise told Scalabrin that the Union asked him "why he was working on the job with nonunion men" and that he would not report next morning because he "couldn't afford to get in trouble with the Union." 6 Scalabrin summoned Carleton from North Monsey to try "to solve the problem." Meanwhile, Neuffer, one of the two non- union contractors, called Tobin after Frontino's employee Rocca had spoken to him and given him the Union's number.? Neuffer informed Tobin that Frontino's men had stopped work at the North Hillcrest site because of his presence at the job and asked what could be done to remedy this. Tobin replied he would talk only to Carleton. Neuffer communicated this to Carleton. Carleton and Scalabrin then called the Union, but could reach no one there. Carleton, however, did manage to reach the unions in the other trades. That night Carleton let Neuffer go and the following morning before scheduled starting time, Carleton's superintendent told Kollman he too would have to leave the job. Kollman did so, with Johnson, his employee. On the morning of July 8, at 8 o'clock, starting time, the employees in all the trades except that of Respondent Union resumed work. The engine operators in- formed Scalabrin that they asked Tobin if they could go to work, and he replied, "You can do what you want, I am not stopping you from going to work."' How- ever, they requested that Scalabrin "help straighten it out and get a definite answer from the union." Scalabrin called Tobin about 9 or 10, and Tobin, in effect, told Scalabrin substantially what the men had indicated he had said to them. On cross- examination, Scalabrin added that Tobin so stated to him after he indicated that Carleton had "dropped" the nonunion contractors. Respondent asks that this last not be given credence and treated as an afterthought I have weighed this in the light of the character of Scalabrin's testimony taken as whole, and have concluded that 5It is credited against Cable's denial that on July 6, the day he was hired at North Monsey, he had seen or spoken to Johnson or had even been at the North Hillcrest site. Cable's admissions of other parts of Johnson's testimony strongly corroborate Johnson. Cable admitted he had met Johnson on another job, as Johnson testified. He also admitted that as a longtime member and former steward of the Union, who would not work on the same job with a nonunion man, he questioned Johnson's union status while on that job The fact that Johnson's status was first raised on a Carleton job the day the person who had previously questioned his union status was hired supports Johnson's identification of Cable as the one who gave him the message leading to the same kind of inquiry from the Union 8 The testimony concerning what the men told Scalabrin was received subject to con- nection, and decision was reserved on later motions to strike it. My ruling is as follows : The testimony was not connected up, and as such is hearsay, and since it does not fall within any recognized exception to the hearsay rule, it may not be regarded as evidence that the statements attributed to the Union were in fact made by it. This and all other such testimony will therefore be given no weight as probative that the Union made the statements these persons attributed to it. The testimony is retained, however, for the limited purpose of describing the occurrence which prompted Scalabrin's and Carleton's efforts to communicate with the Union 7I excluded what Rocca said to Neuffer about the cause of stoppage, a matter which would seem mooted by Neuffer's ensuing talk with Tobin 8 This testimony was received under the same conditions as that described in footnote 6, above, and is retained for the same limited purpose (except as indicated in footnote 15, infra). LOCAL 825, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF OPERATING ENGINEERS 459 Scalabrin's omission thereof on direct was inadvertent , and that this additional testi- mony warrants being credited , and it is a Scalabrin then inquired whether Cable, who as mentioned before (footnote 5) had started on July 7 at North Monsey as a direct employee of Carleton, could work, and Tobin replied that that could not be done "until we have the meeting on Tuesday [July 12]." The above requires explaining . Implicit in this conversation is that Cable too had stopped working . The Respondent claims that the purpose in arranging for the Tues- day meeting and of suspending Cable's services was to make sure that Cable's em- ployment by Carleton was covered by Respondent's standard form of contract, which would guarantee certain requisite payments into a pension and welfare fund. Carleton, however, testified that in a call he made to Tobin not long after Scalabrin's, Tobin put it generally on the ground that it was to impress upon him what was required on a union job. Business Representatives McArdle and Fanning called on Carleton at North Hillcrest the afternoon of July 12. They presented a contract to him for his signa- ture, explaining that it was to guarantee certain minimal requirements in connec- tion with his direct employment of any person operating the welding machines (Cable's job). Carleton explained that he was covered by a master contract made between the Union and an employers' building association in New Jersey, to which he belonged, and that he was bound by its terms despite the fact that he was not a direct signatory to it. The meeting ended without Carleton 's signing the proffered contract or the representatives requiring it, and so Cable returned to his job at North Monsey the next day. The above are basically noncontroversial features of Carleton's testimony. The controversial and controverted features include his testimony, which, in the intro- ductory portion of this narrative, I have already discounted, namely, that Tobin, in the conversation of July 8, explicitly told him that he had ordered the stoppage at North Hillcrest and threatened that it would continue until the contract was signed on Tuesday. Tobin denied that Carleton had spoken to him at all that day, but the probabilities are strong that Carleton, as the principal directly involved and more particularly as the recipient of Tobin's admitted message to Neuffer that he wanted to speak directly to Carleton , would follow up Scalabrin's call in order to receive more particulars concerning the Tuesday meeting. Carleton also testified that at the outset of the meeting on Tuesday , Business Representatives McArdle and Fanning admitted , in the same manner as Tobin before , that the Union had ordered the stoppage at North Hillcrest, but I likewise discount that. Credited, however, is Carleton's testimony that Tobin told him on July 8 that the purpose of the scheduled meeting was to impress upon him his obligations on a union job. The meeting of the business representatives on Tuesday took place only with Carleton, except, as Carleton and Scalabrin testified , that Scalabrin joined it during the last 5 minutes . Scalabrin's contribution to the discussion was a request that the union delegates supply a list of contractors in good standing with the Union whom Carleton might take on in replacement of Neuffer and Kollman (Neuffer being the operator of a bulldozer, for moving of earth, and Kollman of a back hoe machine for digging trenches ). Fanning and McArdle said they would, but no such list has been forthcoming io For its bearing on the ultimate fact in issue, we turn to the conversations between the Union and the nonunion subcontratcors involved . On the morning of July 8, Kollman called Tobin and, in the same manner as Neuffer the afternoon before, 9 Some indication has been given in the introductory statement of this report of the contrast between Scalabrin 's objective testimony and the extravagant claims of his boss, Carleton It was obvious that this witness was given to understatement rather than the reverse, and he was easily the most creditworthy of the important witnesses in the case. His omission of the item in question on direct examination is understandable in the light of the pressures under which he took the stand This occurred late in the day after the protracted and taxing ramblings of his superior, and a question arose as to whether there would even be time for Scalabrin to testify. When he took the stand, it was apparent that he was cutting the fat with a swath wide enough to affect the meat When, on cross- examination, he mentioned that in the July 8 conversation he first told Tobin of having dropped the nonunion contractors , he did so in response to a request to repeat his talk with Tobin There was no prior suggestion to him concerning the newly included item. iU This version of the meeting is disputed by McArdle and Fanning Their claim is that Scalabrin did not participate at all in the meeting. Tipping the scales is the credible Scalabrin's corroboration of Carleton on that score Also to be considered are the con- versations of Neuffer and Kollman with the Union's Tobin relative to their union status, which we summarize in the ensuing text. 460 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD told him about the stoppage and its cause, and asked for the terms on which he could be permitted to stay. Tobin responded that he would have no information for him until after the meeting of the business representatives with Carleton on Tuesday. Neuffer called Tobin again on July 9, and on July 25 or 26 called at the Union's office. Kollman made a second call to Tobin on July 27. The substance of the talks in each instance is about the same. Neuffer and Kollman asked Tobin for a permit from the Union to perform the work which they had done for Carle- ton on the school sites until the stoppage. Tobin replied the Union would be will- ing to sign a contract with them to hire members of the Union to do the work, but would not permit them to engage in it. Each complained that this would be eco- nomically unfeasible for him. Tobin's explanation to Neuffer was that he had 600 members out of work and his obligations were to them" We return to Cable. He achieves significance from the fact that Respondent claims that his stopping work on July 8 at North Mousey and Respondent's keeping him off the job until after the July 12 meeting was unrelated to the situation at North Hillcrest and stemmed solely from Respondent's desire to insure that Cable's employment by Carleton conformed with standard contractual requirements, par- ticularly as they related to payments into the welfare and pension fund. Of course, if the dispute over whether Respondent induced or encouraged the stoppage of the persons at the North Hillcrest site were decided favorably to it, it would leave as a residual issue the question of whether its instructions to Cable to suspend work until after July 12 had as an object, apart from the one which Respondent claims was its only object, preventing Carleton from retaining the nonunion subcontractors at the North Hillcrest site. All of this is deferred to the conclusionary part of the discus- sion. At this time, we discuss merely the particulars of the occurrences which involve Cable. Tobin testified that he did not know that Cable had gone off the job until the morning of July 8, some time after Scalabrin had spoken to him. At that time, Tobin testified, Cable called and inquired whether Carleton had a contract with Re- spondent, and on Tobin's informing him that there was none in the files, Cable declared that he would not work for Carleton because his pension and welfare would be in jeopardy. Tobin's timing is a bit difficult to square with his testimony, sub- stantiating that of Scalabrin, that during the latter's call, which Tobin testified pre- ceded the one made by Cable, he had already told Scalabrin that Cable could not work until after the meeting set for July 12. It is also in conflict with the testimony of Business Representative Fanning that on the afternoon of July 7, he learned from Tobin that the North Hillcrest job was "down," but that even earlier that day, he had been told by Tobin that an appointment had been made "to go down and see about Mr. Cable and the welding machines." Scalabrin, in fact, testified that as early as 2 o'clock on July 7, relatively contem- poraneous with the stoppage at North Hillcrest, Cable had informed him that "as of that evening, he don't believe he will be able to start his machines in the morning pending a conversation with the union that evening," and that the next morning when he got to North Monsey between 10 and 11, after his talk with Tobin, he saw Cable "walking around," and asked Cable "what happened to the call with the union," to which Cable responded, that "they said I can't start until we have that meeting on Tuesday." All of this time would indicate that something was already brewing concerning Cable on July 7. This is further borne out by Cable's own account of what precipitated his asking the Union whether Carleton had a contract. Cable testified that toward the end of the workday on July 7, he overheard two laborers at the North Monsey site, whom he did not identify, talking about a work stoppage at a Carleton jobsite other than at North Monsey (which could only have referred to the North Hillcrest site) which made him feel he "might be wrong in working here for [Carleton], so I better find out," and that pursuant thereto, he called the Union before speaking to Scalabrin. But on a matter of that importance to him, Cable would hardly have temporized to the next day, and would expectably have called as soon as he experienced the misgiving. Scalabrin is thus corroborated in his testimony that it was on the 7th that Cable stated his working next morning hinged on his discussion with the Union that evening. n Tobin's version is in accord with Neuffer's and Kollman's except that the reason he testified they gave for seeking the Union's clearance was their interest in its benefits, more particularly the higher remuneration they would receive for their work Under that version, their importunities to Tobin would denote a sudden conversion out of keeping with their prior apparent contentment with their nonunion status This would be in- comprehensible except for their dislodgement from the Carleton construction projects because of it. LOCAL 825, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF OPERATING ENGINEERS 461 It would appear a fair inference, however, that Cable had been in contact with the Union about the Carleton job even earlier than the 7th. It has been previously found that on July 6, the day he applied for the job with Carleton, he informed Johnson that Tobin wanted to talk to him, which led to the call in which Tobin inquired of Johnson about his and Kollman's union status and the warning that they could not remain on a union job. Tobin, who did not know Johnson, could hardly have sent such a message through Cable unless the latter had made representations to him based upon his admitted acquaintance with Johnson as a person whose union status he had questioned on a prior job. Additionally, it was the custom for mem- bers of the Union, including Cable, to notify the Union when they were about to begin on a new job. Tobin and Cable testified that this time, as it happened, Cable departed from custom and started on the job with Carleton without prior notifica- tion. Yet Tobin testified that when Cable, as he asserted, notified him for the first time on July 8 of his working for Carleton, he did not call him to account for hav- ing failed to give advance notice, which rather indicates that Cable, sensitive to his obligations as a union member (supra, footnote 5), had been in previous touch with the Union concerning the Carleton job. When it is considered that until Cable's advent on the scene, the two nonunion contractors had worked on both sites with- out any incident relating to their union status, it would seem a fair inference that the sequence of events here was touched off by Cable's initial contact with Tobin on July 6. And this brings us to the resolution of the issue of ultimate fact in the case. C. Concluding findings What we have, -then, is a situation in which after two nonunion contractors are on a job for months without incident, the employee of one of them is summoned to the telephone by a representative of the Union through a member who recognized that employee as one whose union status he had questioned on another job. In the ensuing talk, the representative of the Union, after ascertaining that the employee and his employer are "nonunion" and are working on a job for a contractor who is "union," warns the employee that he and his employer must leave the job or the representative would see that it is done. The next day, there is a general stoppage on the project, which those engaging in it inform the general contractor's super- intendent is the result of their being called to account by their respective union representatives, including that of Respondent Union, for working with nonunion men.12 One of these subcontractors, that same afternoon, calls up the representative of the Union, who had issued the exit ultimatum of the day before. In that call, he informs the representative that the members of the Union stopped work because of his presence on the job and asks what can be done, but the union representative insists that he will speak only to the general contractor. The general contractor, after trying unsuccessfully to reach the Union, but reaching the unions in the other trades, dismisses the two nonunion subcontractors. The following morning, the employees in the other trades resume work, but not the members of this Union. The latter advise the superintendent that the union representative told them on the tele- phone that he was not requiring them to refrain from working, and request that the superintendent call to clarify the matter. The general superintendent calls the rep- resentative of the Union and tells him that the nonunion people have been "dropped," and the representative confirms that they are not being ordered to stay off the job. The general superintendent inquires whether the union member directly employed by the general contractor and working on the other project may work, and his reply is that this must await a later meeting with two union delegates in which he will learn what is required of him on a union job. The meeting thus held is devoted to discussion of the necessity of the general contractor's signing a contract with the Union, with the latter finally accepting the contractor's explanation that he is bound by the terms of a contract between the Union and an employer association, of which he is a member. At the end, the superintendent of the general contractor asks the union delegates for the names of subcontractors acceptable to the Union, who can replace the two nonunion subcontractors who had been let go, and the union dele- gates promise to supply such names. After this the dismissed subcontractors renew their requests to the Union for clearance to enable them to resume work on the job without precipitating a stoppage, and the Union advises that it will insist upon a con- tract with them for performance of the work solely from the ranks of its members. without participation therein by subcontractors as employers , the reason assigned v We repeat the caveat that this is not considered as evidence that the union repre- sentatives made the statements thus attributed to them supra, footnotes 6 and 8. 462 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD being that the Union must look after the interests of many members who are out of work. The Union candidly acknowledges that it was hardly pleased with the presence of the nonunion contractors on the job but insists that so far as the competent evidence in the record shows, stoppage by the men on the job, however inspired, was not its doing, and that there is no indication the Union or its representatives strayed from the fine line which separates an admitted aspiration, which is not pro- hibited, from action calculated to achieve it, which is. There is no question but that lending plausibility to the Union's position is the traditional aversion of members of unions, especially in the building trades, to work- ing with nonunion men, which will frequently cause them to stop work on a job without inducement or encouragement from their leaders. The Union's claim, of total spontaneity of the stoppage which occurred on July 7 is marred, however, by the showing in the record that it was the Union which initiated the inquiry concern- ing the status of the nonunion subcontractors and which made the first demand that they leave the job. This occurred in Tobin's conversation with Johnson, Kollman's employee. Whether or not Tobin's threat to Johnson is to be construed as a threat to Carleton within the proscription of (ii) of 8(b) (4) (B), it manifesty bears on whether the Union had a responsible hand in the next day's stoppage within the proscription of (i) of 8(b)(4)(B). Tobin's ultimatum to Johnson was a declara- tion of union propose, which was being accomplished by the stoppage. The action was taken by men who until then had worked in complete harmony with the per- sons against whose tenure it was directed. Their resorting to it so closely upon the heels of the Union's declaration of a purpose which the next day's action carried into effect rationally indicates a link between the Union's declaration of July 6 and the men's conduct of July 7. Respondent's position, in substance, is that the linkage thus envisioned is but a hypothesis, which does not attain the stature of a valid inference in the absence of positive evidence to support it, which is another way of underscoring the gap be- tween "suspicion" and "proof." Although these terms roll off the tongue as hostile categories dwelling in ironclad isolation, objective analysis would indicate that in fields concerned not with the certainties of mathematical theorems but with the uncertainties inhering in reconstruction of past event, the two concepts have a point of contact whereby the one can attain the honored status of the other, depending upon how a hypothesis rationally explaining a given sequence stands up against com- peting hypotheses. The competing hypothesis advanced by the Respondent is that the action of the men was self-motivated and inspired by a long tradition against working with nonunion men. But, since it is hardly conceivable that men would work many months together without becoming aware of their respective status, the competing explanation at once raises the question of why, despite such tradition, the men during all this time tolerated the nonunion contractors on the jobs, only to become intolerant of it for the first time the day after the union representative declared his purpose to have them removed. As against the hypothesis that this was sheer coincidence, the "probable inference which common sense, enlightened by human knowledge [would] draw from [this sequence]" 13 is that the declarant of a purpose which is effectuated the next day by men who are subject to his instruc- tions had a responsible hand in that action. Lending added force to that inference is the declarant's reception of the news of the stoppage when it occurred. When Subcontractor Neuffer specifically informed Tobin on the telephone that the Union's members had gone off the job because of his presence, Tobin's reaction was hardly one of either surprise or disassociation from it. His answer to Neuffer's plea to remedy this was that he would speak only to the general contractor. Tobin admitted that such a stoppage was "an unauthorized strike." It is reasonable to expect, therefore, that if informed of an unauthorized strike of another character, he would have acted in the instant to put a stop to it. Tobin's explanation that he had no authority to take action until given his instruc- tions by the business representatives is undermined by factors previously pointed out (supra, footnote 4). He is the only representative stationed in the office, and judging from the authority with which he spoke to all persons concerned, it is un- likely that he did not have the power to take immediate action to end an unauthor- ized strike But even if the facts were otherwise, Respondent's position would hardly be aided by the manner in which the business representatives received the news of the stoppage. As previously found, Tobin informed Fanning and MCArdle of the is Cf. Ma8terson v. Harrta County, 15 S.W. 2d 1011, 1014 (Tex.), 67 A.L R. 1324, 1329 LOCAL 825, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF OPERATING ENGINEERS 463 stoppage and the reason for it the afternoon of the 7th.14 Their instructions to him, as Tobin stated it, were "to contact the men if you can," and that "I could tell the men to go back, but I couldn't force the men to go back to work." This last is hardly a union's way of dealing with a wildcat strike. But Tobin's ensuing actions lend dubious support to the assertion that he received even the milder instructions. Tobin testified that he tried to reach the men at the job, but could not. Absenting oneself from the office so as to be utterly unavailable even to the general contractor is hardly the way to make contact. Tobin's statement that the men could go back came only after Carleton terminated the nonunion contractors' services. Scalabrin's account of what the men said to him before he called Tobin would indicate they had received this permission before the conversation in which he said to Tobin that he "dropped" the subcontractors.15 But it would seem unlikely that on a matter thus calculated to carry out the Union's pre- viously declared purpose, it would not have been in touch with the situation so as to know that purpose had already been accomplished. The occurrences after Scalabrin's and Carleton's talks with Tobin the morning of July 8 would seem fairly instinct with the premise that the retention or recall of the two nonunion subcontractors was incompatible with the continuance of the union members on the job. Thus, there is Tobin's response to Kollman, the morn- ing of the 8th when the latter, like Neuffer the evening before, pleaded for clear- ance to continue on the job, that this would await the meeting with Carleton on Tuesday. There is Scalabrin's request, at Tuesday's meeting, that the Union supply a list of contractors acceptable to it from which to select replacements for Neuffer and Kollman, and the Union's assurance that it would do so. Finally, there are the repeated requests of Neuffer and Kollman to Tobin for clearance to go back to the Carleton construction sites, and Tobin's as often-repeated insistence, in re- sponse thereto, that this could only be done on the basis of a contract under which the work would be performed exclusively by employees, because of the need to take care of the Union's many unemployed members. All of this could only have proceeded upon the premise that Respondent, at the very least, was adopting the action which brought about the dislodgment of the two nonunion contractors in the very manner portended by Tobin's ultimatum to Johnson the day before, and that their continued dislodgment was the condition of the members of the Union performing on the job. In the light of the above, it is not too important what Cable's role in the case was. Respondent's contention that the suspension of work by Cable at North Monsey was due to misgivings over whether his employment by Carleton was covered by the requisite contract and that that accounted for the Tuesday meeting, even if accepted, would not affect the conclusion concerning Respondent's role in the stoppage at the North Hillcrest site. But, as long as we are on Cable, it should be noted that the record hardly bears out Respondent's contention that Cable's case is completely insulated from the North Hillcrest situation. The contrary would appear from Cable's attributing his own misgivings to his having overheard two unidentified laborers at North Monsey talk about the North Hillcrest stoppage. As against this vague source, there is the fact, as previously found, that on July 6 Cable was already in communication with Tobin concerning Johnson at the North Hillcrest site. Cable's testimony that the situation at North Hillcrest created misgivings about whether his employment by Carleton was covered by the requisite provisions for payments into the pension and welfare fund, and Tobin's testimony that the doubt was aggravated by the absence in the files of a contract containing Carleton's signa- ture, is undermined by a number of objective circumstances. First, when Johnson, on July 6, in response to Tobin's inquiry, identified Carleton as the contractor at North Hillcrest, Tobin at once recognized Carleton as "union" and, indeed, assigned "This was the timing as given by Fanning, and it is credited as against Tobin's and McArdle's testimony that it was on the 8th. The nature of the instructions they assert- edly gave Tobin, as recited in the text, indicates that it could only have occurred in the contex of a still-current stoppage, which would no longer have been the case if the con- versation had been on the 8th. 35 Presumably Respondent does not oppose this departure from the limitation imposed upon receipt of hearsay testimony, as previously described (supra, footnote 6) Its use here to the detriment of the General Counsel is justified on the ground that it was he who introduced it. 464 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD that as the reason why Johnson and Kollman had no business being there. Secondly, as Tobin admitted, he assumed that Carleton, as the contractor on a job which was "union," despite the absence of a contract bearing his signature, was making the requisite payments into the pension and welfare fund. Cable, as an old union mem- ber and one-time steward (supra, footnote 5), could hardly have been under a dif- ferent impression, for it is unlikely that he would have started on a job other than one he knew to be "union." This is indeed confirmed by his recital of what he said to Scalabrin when he applied for the job at North Monsey. Cable testified that on seeing three welding machines there he said to Scalabrin that "these . . . call for an operating engineer, and we always cover them"-a point which he would hardly have expected to carry weight on other than a union job. Cable's announcement to Scalabrin on July 7 that his return the next day hinged on a pending conversation with the Union came at relatively the same time as the stoppage at North Hillcrest, and on his own version, that occurrence was what caused him to communicate with the Union. When we consider that in the conversation between Scalabrin and Tobin the morning of July 8, the reference was to whether Cable, no less than the strikers, could work, also that in response to Kollman's plea to Tobin the same morning for clearance to stay on the job, Tobin said that this awaited the outcome of the Tuesday meeting, and finally that at that meeting there was discussion, apart from the matter of whether Carleton was required to sign a contract, of supplying an acceptable list from which replacements could be chosen for Neuffer and Kollman, it becomes rather difficult to take at full face value Respondent's assertion that it acted solely to protect Cable's pension and welfare status. Even if the protection of Cable was truly a motivant for Respondent's action, this would hardly serve to erase from the slate the existence also of a motive on Respondent's part, which is written rather large by the "whole congeries of facts," 16 namely, to insure that Carleton, as a con- tractor who was "union," would refrain from the offense of having poeple on his job who were nonunion. And under Section 8(b) (4) it is sufficient that the termination of the nonunion subcontractors be an object of Respondent's action, even if not its sole object. One further observation might be in order. As indicated earlier, Respondent contends that it has managed to- walk the tightrope between attitude and conduct, its position being however it might have felt, and still does, about the presence of non- union people on a union job, it has not been proven on the record to have carried this aversion over into the field of prohibited action. In so contending Respondent argues that "the statute must be interpreted literally." Respondent's position, it seems to me, misconceives the nature of the proceeding and its purpose. A pro- ceeding before the Board is civil in nature and looks not toward punishment, but prevention and remedy only.17 The guideline in evaluating the record is not a "literal" interpretation of the statute, such as that contended for by Respondent, but, as the courts have long enjoined upon us, a "liberal" one in the interest of effectuat- ing its purposes and policies.is Under that standard, the Agency, in the discharge of its decisional function, exercises its powers in a manner comparable to a tribunal in equity, and is guided by equitable principles.19 As such, it looks to the situation as a whole, and seeks to achieve a fair balance between the protection of the rights of the accused and of the public interest, as embodied in the statute and as authoritatively inter- preted. Whatever the union or its members may feel about an interpretation of Section 8(b)(4) which cuts into a traditional aversion against working on a con- struction job with nonunionmen, it is the fact that Section 8(b)(4), as authorita- tively interpreted, forbids union inducement or encouragement of such stoppage and also (since the 1959 statute) threat of such stoppage, designed to force a contractor to dispense with the services of such subcontractor or subcontractors as he may see fit to use 20 If Respondent deems this restriction too onerous or as "upsetting to 1e N.L R.B. v. Link-Belt Company, 311 U.S. 584, 588. 17 Cf. Republic Steel Corporation v. N L.R B., 311 U S. 7 18 See N L R.B. v. Griswold Manufacturing Company, 106 F. 2d 713, 721 (C A. 3) ; Jeffery-DeWitt Insulator Co v. N L.R B., 91 F. 2d 134 , 139 (C A. 4) ; N.L R.B. v. Knoxville Publishing Co., 124 F. 2d 875, 881 (C.A. 6) ; North Whittier Heights Citrus Association v. N.L.R.B., 109 F. 2d 76 (C.A. 9) ; cf. Phelps Dodge Corporation v. NL.R.B., 313 U.S. 177. 18 N.L R B. v. United States Steel Corporation, 278 F. 2d 896, 901 ( C.A. 3), and cases cited. 20 Cf. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council et at . (Gould c6 Preisener), 82 NLRB 1195 , 1210 ; set aside 186 F. 2d 326 (C.A.D.C.), but enfd. ( reversing the C.A.D.C.) in 341 U. S. 675. LOCAL 825, INT'L BROTHERHOOD OF OPERATING ENGINEERS 465 the balance between the rights of employees and the rights of employers," 21 its recourse is to the legislature, and to it alone. Congress has, indeed, recently, on a selective basis eased some restrictions of the Act for specific industries. And while special exemptions have been made for the construction trades in some respects,22 they do not include a relaxation of the restrictions of Section 8(b)(4), such as has been made for the clothing and garment industry,23 which, if correspondingly ex- tended to the building trades, might perhaps have immunized the conduct here in question.24 However, until and unless Congress sees fit to extend this exemption to the construction trades, it goes without saying that they are and will continue to be subject to the same restrictions under Section 8(b) (4) as are all other unexempt trades. Cf. John F. LeBus Regional Director v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Hoisting and Portable, Local Union 406 (Baltimore Contractors, Inc.) 188 F. Supp. 392. (D.C. E. La.) Yet a shrunken appraisal of the record such as con- tended for by Respondent could, in effect, achieve for it by indirection an immunity not given it by statute. An insight into the potentiality of stalemate inhering in Respondent's position can be gleaned, perhaps, from a colloquy initiated by the Trial Examiner in an effort to clear up a seeming ambiguity in Respondent's position. This arose while Respondent was resisting the General Counsel's effort to establish that Carleton's nonrecall of the banished subcontractors was and is induced by a fear that Respondent will order a work stoppage if he recalls them. The relevant portion reads: TRIAL EXAMINER: . Is it your contention, Mr. Mooney, that so far as the union was concerned and so far as the union is concerned, Mr. Neuffer and Mr. Kollman can go right back to doing excavating if Mr. Carleton wants them? Is it your contention that is all right? Mr. MOONEY: It is my position that the Respondent Union in this case did not induce, encourage, instruct or appeal .to or direct any of the employees who were operating engineers on that jobsite to stop work or engage in a work stoppage, and with an object thereof of compelling Mr. Carleton to terminate the employment of Neuffer and Kollman. In the tensions and stresses of a hearing, it is possible that the failure precisely to reply to a specific question thus put by the deciding officer is inadvertent and does not stem from a desire to avoid it. The fact is, however, that this question remains unanswered. The result, if Respondent's conception of the record is accepted, is to put it atop the best of two possible worlds: the accomplishment of its purpose to keep Neuffer and Kollman indefinitely off the job, with immunity derived from an appraisal of the evidence founded upon an assumption that the law is somehow in- hospitable to the insights which commonsense, enlightened by experience, brings to a situation. The evidence taken as a whole establishes that the stoppage of July 7 on the part of the workers at North Hillcrest, following months of working in harmony with the nonunion subcontractors, was causally related to the Union's declared purpose of the day before, which the stoppage was calculated to effectuate; that inde- pendently of this, the Union, when informed of the stoppage by one of these sub- contractors, adopted and sanctioned it; and that the entire course of conduct con- stituted, and still does, a continuing, even if unarticulated, threat to Carleton of a work stoppage if the two nonunion contractors are restored to the job. The con- clusion, expressed in the language of the statute, is that with an object of forcing 21 Senator Goldwater during debate on the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. II Lgislative History of Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1,959 (Government Printing Office 1959) 1361. Z' E g., exemption from the restriction against "prehire" contracts, and a shortening of the grace period to employees for complying with the membership requirement of a union-security contract from 30 days to 7 (Section 8(f)); also, under the first proviso of Section 8(e), a qualified exemption from the prohibition against entering into "hot cargo" contracts. 23 See second proviso to Section 8(e). "Cf. Shalov, "The Landrum-Griffin Amendments : Labor's Use of the Secondary Boy- cott," 45 Cornell Law Quarterly 724. 599198-62-vol 131-31 466 ^ DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD or requiring Carleton to cease doing business with Peter A. Neuffer and A. E. Koll- man, the Union, in violation of Section 8(b) (4) (i) (B) of the Act, induced and en- couraged the employees of Frontino and Wright, at the North Hillcrest site, and employee Cable at the North Monsey site, to refuse in the course of their employ- ment to render services, and in violation of Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) of the Act, threatened Carleton with inducing and encouraging such refusal, thereby also coerc- ing and restraining him.25 IV. THE REMEDY It having been found that Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices in vio- lation of 8(b) (4) (i) and (ii) (B) of the Act, it will be recommended that Respondent cease and desist therefrom. In keeping with the principle of equity adjudication,26 that the injunction be no broader than what it is calculated to prevent a recurrence of the specific violation found and to remedy its effects,27 the recommended restraint and remedial action will be addressed to the specific situation here disclosed. On the basis of the foregoing findings and on the entire record, I hereby make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. By inducing and encouraging individuals employed by Frank Frontino Exca- vating Co., Inc., Wright Excavators, Inc., and Carleton Brothers Company, to refuse, in the course of their employment, to perform services, with an object of forcing or requiring Carleton Brothers Company to cease doing business with Peter A. Neuffer and A. E. Kollman, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (i) (B) of the Act; and by threatening, with like object, said Carleton to induce or encourage the said employees to engage in such refusal, thereby also coercing and restraining Carleton, Respond- ent has engaged in and is engaging in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) of the Act. 2. Said unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] ffi Wright, it is true, is a subcontractor not of Carleton , but of Hudik-Ross , the prime plumbing contractor. However, the employees of Wright and Frontino work on the same site and are subject to common instructions from the Union. A stoppage by Wright's employees could hardly occur without its engulfing Frontino 's employees in the same action, and like the stoppage of the latter's employees contributed to the economic pressure calculated to force Carleton's dismissal of Neuffer and Carleton. The complaint charges Respondent with having "threatened employees and individuals employed by Carleton, Frontino and Wright and other employees" and of having "threatened, coerced and restrained Carleton, Frontino, Hudik-Ross, Wright and the Board of Education [for which the schools were being constructed]." None of this ie established except the implied threat to Carleton, as found. The complaint also alleges that all of this, in addition to being designed to force Carleton to cease doing business with Neuffer and Kollman, was designed as well to force Wright to cease doing business with Hudik-Ross, and to force Carleton and Frontino, reciprocally, to cease doing business with each other. To be sure, a stoppage by the men for the purpose of forcing Carleton to banish Neuffer and Kollman from the job would pro tanto halt business operations between the employers of the striking employees and other employers. But this is plainly not an object, but a pure incident of the means of accomplishing it. The targets were Neuffer and Kollman. The means were economic pressure upon Carleton, and the embarrassment to the various contractors and sub- contractors were simply Incidents in the exertion of the pressure. The distinction between object and means is cogently pointed out by Judge Learned Hand in Douds v. International' Longshoremen's Association, Independent, et al. (New York Shipping Association), 224 F. 2d 455 (CA. 2), cert denied 350 US 873. The allegations of the complaint inconsistent with the findings made in the text are accordingly recommended for dismissal. 2b See N L R B. v. United States Steel, supra, footnote 18. n Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, et al. (Ohio Consolidated Tele. Co) v. N.L.R B., 362 U.S. 479.