General Service Employees Union Local 73

GENERAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION LOCAL 73 General Service Employees Union Local No. 73, affil- iated with Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO and Andy Frain, Inc. and Allied Securi- ty, Inc. Cases 13-CC-963, 13-CC-990, and 13 CC-964 November 17, 1978 DECISION AND ORDER By MEMBERS PENELLO, MURPHY. AND TRUESDAI.E On March 20, 1978, Administrative Law Judge Robert A. Giannasi issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep- tions and a supporting brief, and the General Coun- sel filed a brief in response to Respondent's excep- tions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings.' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, as modified herein.2 ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge. as modified below, and hereby orders that the Respondent. Gen- eral Service Employees Union Local No. 73, affiliat- ed with Service Employees International Union. AFL-CIO, Chicago, Illinois, its officers, agents. and representatives, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order, as so modified: 1. Substitute the following for paragraph I(a): "(a) Engaging in, or inducing or encouraging indi- viduals employed by Braniff International Airlines or any other individual employed by any person en- gaged in commerce or in an industry affecting com- merce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process. transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods. articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any service; or threatening, coercing. or restraining Bran- iff International Airlines or any other person en- gaged in commerce or in an industry affecting com- merce, where in either case an object thereof is forcing or requiring Braniff International Airlines or any other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of Andy Frain. Inc., or any other producer. processor. or manufacturer or to cease doing business with Andy Frain, Inc.. or any other person, or forcing or requiring Andy Frain, Inc., or any other employer to recognize or bargain with Respondent as the repre- sentative of its employees unless such labor organiza- tion has been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of Section 9 of the Act." 2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the Administrative Law Judge. Respondenl has excepted to certain credibility findings made bs the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to over- rule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibdlit, unless the clear preponde ance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dri Wall Products. Inc. 91 NLRB 544 (1950). enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefull) examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings In affirm- ing the Administrative Law Judge's credibility findings with respect to Da- vid l oewenberg. however. we disavow his partial reliance on similar resolu- tions coincerning Loewenberg's credibility made in prior Board cases hb olher Administrative Law Judges. 2 In par. 1(a) of the recommended Order, the Administrative Law Judge prosided. inter aina, that Respondent shall cease and desist from certain actlts ts where an object thereof is "forcing or requiring And) Frain. Inc.. or ans other emploser to recognize or bargain with Respondent as the repre- sentatise of such employees under the provisions of Section 9 of the Act." We shall modify the recommended Order to conform to the language of Sec 8(h)(4)(B) of the Act, which proscribes such activity by a labor organi- zation "unless such labor organization has been certified as the representa- tive of such emplosees under the provisions of Section 9 of the Act." Member Murph), contrar) to her colleagues. concludes that the notice- posting requirements of the recommended Order. in addition to the broad cease-and-desist provisions. are sufficient to remedy the unfair labor prac- tices found herein and that an order that Respondent publish the notice herein il a newspaper of general circulation in the Chicago area is neither warranted nor justified. In this regard. Member Murphy points out that she dissented from the Board majority's holdings in previous cases that Respon- dent iolated Sec 8b)t7)((C) of the Act (Generul Service Emplorees Local t monll ,, '1. alfihlated with Service Emplouiees Inlernational Union. A4F (l0 i4 I Sici'uriti S'reice (Co . 224 NLRB 434 (1976). and General Serice Limpt lcc, Il , o nLocal iso. 73. affiliated with Service Emploqees Iniernational t 1 1m. 41. ( 10. 230 NLRB 351 (1977), and concludes that Respondent's previous s.lolations of Sec 8(b)(4) do not establish such a propensity to disregard the strictures of the Act as to require the extraordinary remed) of ncwspalper publication of the notice. APPENDIX No IC'E To EMPI.O(YEES ANI) MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NAIIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing in which all sides had the opportunity to present evidence, the National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post this notice. Wli WILL NOT engage in. induce, or encourage any individual employed by Braniff Internation- al Airlines or any other individual employed by 295 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD any person engaged in commerce or in an indus- try affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or other- wise handle or work on any goods, articles, ma- terials, or commodities or to perform any ser- vice; or threaten, coerce, or restrain Braniff International Airlines or any other person en- gaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is forcing or requiring Braniff International Air- lines or any other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of Andy Frain, Inc., or any other producer, processor, or manufacturer or to cease doing business with Andy Frain, Inc., or any other person, or force or require Andy Frain, Inc., or any other employer to recognize or bar- gain with Respondent as the representative of its employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the representative of such em- ployees under the provisions of Section 9 of the Act. WE WILL NOT engage in, or induce, or encour- age any individual employed by Hertz Corpora- tion or any other individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any service; or threaten, coerce, or restrain Hertz Corporation or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is forcing or requiring Hertz Corporation or any other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or other- wise dealing in the products of Allied Security, Inc., or any other producer, processor, or manu- facturer, or to cease doing business with Allied Security, Inc., or any other person, or force or require Allied Security, Inc., or any other em- ployer to recognize or bargain with Respondent as the representative of employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the rep- resentative of such employees under the provi- sions of Section 9 of the Act. GENERAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION L(OCAL No. 73, AFFILIATED WITH SERVICE EMPLOY!ES INTERNATIONAL UNION. AFL-CIO DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE ROBERT A GIANNASI. Administrative Law Judge: This case was heard before me from June 27 through June 30, 1977, in Chicago, Illinois. The case is based on a consoli- dated complaint which issued on February 4, 1977, alleging that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act by certain conduct directed against neutrals and their employ- ees in two diaputes, one with Andy Frain, Inc. (herein Andy Frain), and the other with Allied Security, Inc. (herein Allied).' Subsequently, charges were filed in an ad- ditional case, Case 13-CC-990, alleging that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(4)(B) by picketing the same neutral employer, Braniff, involved in one of the earlier charges, in furtherance of its dispute with Andy Frain. As a result, an Order was issued consolidating this case with the outstand- ing consolidated matter. Respondent filed answers denying the critical allegations in the complaint, and the parties filed proposed findings and briefs. Upon the entire record in this case and from my obser- vation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I hereby make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I THE LABOR ORGANIZATION General Service Employees Union Local No. 73, affiliat- ed with Service Employees International Union, AFL CIO, herein called Respondent or Union, is a labor organi- zation within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 11. THE BUSINESS OF IHE EMPLOYERS A. The Andy Frain Case In accordance with the stipulation of the parties, I find that Andy Frain, Inc.. has been and is now an Illinois cor- poration engaged in the business of providing personnel for crowd control, baggage inspection, passenger screening, and other services. During the past calendar year, a repre- sentative period, Andy Frain, Inc., has performed services valued in excess of $50,000 for United Airlines and Braniff International Airlines. During the same period of time, United and Braniff have each purchased and received goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly across state lines. Although Respondent made no objection to assertion of jurisdiction in an earlier case involving Andy Frain and United Airlines, at the hearing herein, Respondent argued that Andy Frain was so "intimately connected" with Bran- iff, the secondary employer herein and an air carrier sub- ject to the Railway Labor Act, that Andy Frain shares One of the cases, (ase 13 (CC 963. Inv.olving Andy F rain was settled by agreement on January 24, 1977. Fiow.ever. the settlement agreement was set aside after new charges were filed in Case 13 (CC 964 and the consolidated complainlt issued. 296 GENERAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION LOCAL 73 Braniff's exemption as an employer under Section 2(2) of the Act. I disagree. Although later in this Decision I reject the premise of this contention in connection with a sub- stantive defense to the alleged secondary activity, it is quite clear that even assuming, arguendo. that Andy Frain was a Railway Labor Act employer, as Respondent alleges. the Board has jurisdiction. Section 8(b)(4) of the Act prohibits the conduct of labor organizations with respect to "per- sons" engaged in commerce, even if those "persons" are not "employers" within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act. See Local 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO (Mansfield Contracting Corporation), 205 NLRB 559, 563 (1973); Local No. 16, International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union (Citr of Juneau). 176 NLRB 889 (1969).' In view of the above, I find that both Andy Frain and Braniff are persons engaged in commerce within the mean- ing of Sections 8(b)(4) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act and that assertion of jurisdiction herein is warranted. B. The Allied Case Respondent stipulated that at all times material Allied was and is an Illinois corporation engaged in the business of providing contract security guard services; during the past calendar year, Allied has performed services valued in excess of $50,000 for Arthur Rubloff & Co.. and during the same period Rubloff has rendered services in excess of $50,000 directly across state lines. Respondent also admit- ted that Allied was an employer within the meaning of the Act. Accordingly, I find Allied is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and a person within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4) of the Act and that assertion of jurisdiction is war- ranted. III. THE FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Prior Litigation On December 27, 1974, in R. R. S., Inc., Security and Investigation Service Division, Cases 13-CC-836 and 13- CP-277 (unpublished), Administrative Law Judge George J. Bott found that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act by threatening to picket, and picketing, neutral clients of R. R. S. with an object of forcing R. R. S. to recognize or bargain with it, although it was not and could not be certified under the Act. The Administrative Law Judge further found that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) by threatening to picket, and picket- ing, neutral employees with an object of having them cease doing business with R. R. S. and forcing R. R. S. to recog- nize or bargain with it. The unlawful conduct therein in- volved, inter alia, telephone conversations between Re- spondent's attorney, David Lowenberg, and neutral 2 Respondent's reliance upon The Wackenhut ( orp.. 203 NL RB 86 1973}. is misplaced. since that case did not deal with the issue of whether an entiit is a "person" for purposes of Sec 8(h)(4) of the Act. the section inollved in this case. employers. In that case Judge Bott rejected Respondent's contention that its conduct was based on area standards objectives. No exceptions were filed to this Decision. and it was adopted by the Board by Order dated January 22, 1975. On September 23. 1975, in A-I Securitv Service Co., Ad- ministrative Law Judge James 1. Barker found that Re- spondent violated Section 8(b)(7)(C) by threatening to picket A-I Security for recognition at a time when it could not file a valid petition for certification. The evidence in- volved Lowenberg telephone conversations with neutrals and Union representatives' concurrent visits to these neu- trals. Respondent was also found to have had a recogni- tional object, despite the fact that it sent area standard letters to A-I Security disclaiming any recognitional object. The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the 8(bX4)(ii)(B) allegations, finding that Respondent had limited its recog- nitional activities to( A-I Security and had assured its client that any picketing would be directed to A-l. No picketing occurred in that case. However, based on Respondent's violations in R. R. S. Security, Judge Barker found that Respondent had a proclivity to violate Section 8(b)(7)(C) and issued a broad remedial order. The Board, with Chair- man Fanning and Member Murphy dissenting, at 224 NLRB 434 (1976), affirmed the findings of Judge Barker but limited the breadth of the Order, stating that the evi- dence at that time failed to establish "proclivity" to violate Section 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act. In November 1976, the parties to the present proceeding were involved in a proceeding before Administrative Law Judge Walter Maloney. On November 8, 1976. Respondent withdrew its answer in Case 13-CC-942 (Andv Frain, Inc.) and Cases 13-C-947 and 13-CP-327 (Allied Securitv Inc.) and agreed to the issuance of a 10(1) injunction. On No- vember 29, 1976, Judge Maloney found that all complaint allegations were deemed admitted and accordingly found that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) by threat- ening to picket United, a customer of Andy Frain. with the proscribed cease-doing-business and recognitional objects and Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) by threatening to picket, and picketing, other neutral customers of Allied and Hertz with the proscribed cease-doing-business and recognitional objects. Exceptions to this decision were filed by both Re- spondent and the General Counsel, and on June 21, 1977, the Board affirmed the decision. Members Jenkins and Walther, with Member Murphy dissenting, also agreed that Respondent's threat to picket and picketing of Allied was violative of Section 8(b)(7)(C). 230 NLRB 351 (1977). 3 O(n Jul 25. 1977. in .Itanaigement Safeguards. Inc., 13 CA 15928. Ad- ministrative law Judge Robert C. Batson found that Respondent siolated Sec 8(b)( I A) and (2) of the Act when Respondent requested and accepted recognition from the emploer when it did not represent a majorits of the cormpany's employees and subsequently entered into and enforced a collec- sive-bargaining agreement with a union-securitS clause. lie concluded that. because of Respondent's past conduct and its violation of the settlement agreement in Case 13 CC 963 herein. the Region did not act improperly in refusing to take an informal settlement in that case On the basis of Respon- denl's past conduct, as well as its siolation In the case before him. Judge Baltson found that Respondent exhibited a "prochvity" to violate the Act and issued an appropriate cease-and-desist order No exceptions were taken to this Decision, and on September 9. 1977. the Board aidopted it 297 DECISIONS OF NATIONAl LABOR RELATIONS BOARD B. The Andy Frain Dispute 1. Background Andy Frain, Inc., which has been in existence since 1924, provides personnel to enterprises to perform as ush- ers, doormen, chauffeurs, hostesses, badge checkers, bag- gage inspectors, and wheelchair attendants. Since about 1970, Andy Frain has recognized Local 236, Service Em- ployees International Union, as the exclusive representa- tive of its employees. In August 1972, Local 236 and Andy Frain executed an addendum to the then-existing contract whereby the classification of baggage inspectors was in- cluded in the recognition clause of the contract as an accre- tion to the existing unit. This classification covered the em- ployees of Andy Frain who performed various functions for certain airlines at O'Hare Airport in Chicago. Andy Frain is to be distinguished from Andy Frain Se- curity Services, Inc., a separate corporation that has been in existence since about 1967. This company provides guard services to various enterprises but does not employ passenger screening employees or other employees who work at O'Hare Airport. Andy Frain Security Services, Inc., is party to a master contract with Respondent. The contract's recognition clause covers guards "who are per- manently assigned to fixed positions at a customer's prem- ises . . . regardless of the particular job classification or title" in the Chicago metropolitan area. About August 1975, David Loewenberg, Respondent's counsel, had a conversation with Michael Frain, president of Andy Frain. Loewenberg said that there was a matter of urgency concerning the airport about which he wished to talk to Frain, and they agreed to meet in person. Three or four days later, Loewenberg met with Frain at Andy Frain's offices. Loewenberg stated that the Andy Frain personnel at the airport were guards and that, therefore. they had to belong to Respondent. According to Frain, Loewenberg also may have mentioned that he considered that Respondent's contract with Andy Frain Securities Ser- vices, Inc., already covered the employees at the airport. Frain objected and stated that they were not guards and that they were members of Local 236. He suggested that Loewenberg discuss the matter with Local 236. Loewen- berg said that the issue involved only Respondent and Andy Frain. Loewenberg then asked Frain to sign a con- tract covering the employees at the airport, but Frain re- fused. Loewenberg responded by saying that if Frain did not sign a contract, he would have to take "appropriate action." Frain asked what Loewenberg meant by that, and Loewenberg responded that "he would have to put pickets at the airport." Loewenberg further stated that since, in his view, the employees were guards, they had to be licensed by the State of Illinois. About the same time, Frain received a call from Harry Kirshenbaum, Respondent's Director of Staff Activities. Kirshenbaum stated that the airport employees were guards and had to belong to Respondent. Frain again ob- jected to that assertion. Kirshenbaum said he wanted Frain to sign a contract covering those personnel and that, if Frain did not, he would have to take action on behalf of Respondent. Picketing was mentioned. Kirshenbaum said that if Frain agreed to transfer the employees to Respon- dent he was sure Respondent could "work it out" so that Andy Frain was not hurt financially. 4 On September 17, 1975, Loewenberg sent a letter to Frain charging that Andy Frian was failing to abide by the contract between Andy Frain Security Services and Re- spondent because the contract was not being applied to the airport employees. Loewenberg continued by stating, "So that there can be no misunderstanding as to what Local 73 desires with respect to both items, it is our contention that any person performing duties at the airport is covered by our agreement." Loewenberg then again claimed Respon- dent was the bargaining agent of the employees and re- quested certain information. Loewenberg contended in the letter that even though the employees may have had non- guard responsibilities in addition to guard responsibilities they were nonetheless covered by the contract with Re- spondent. Loewenberg concluded by asserting that all the terms and conditions of the contract must be applied to the airport employees. On December 12, 1975, Andy Frain, through its attor- ney. responded to Loewenberg's letter by informing him that the baggage inspection employees at the airport were covered by a contract with Local 236 and that, therefore, Andy Frain could not recognize Respondent. By letter dat- ed December 16, 1975, Loewenberg responded to the Andy Frain letter. Loewenberg stated Respondent's "contention" that Andy Frain had a contract with Respondent which covered the airport employees. He also stated that Respon- dent would "take whatever steps are necessary to enforce our contract with your client." 2. The Braniff incidents By letter dated December 30, 1976, Braniff notified Andy Frain that, effective January 31, 1977, Andy Frain would provide the passenger screening services for Braniff, replacing Guardsmark Services, which had previously per- formed this work for Braniff. At about the same time, Guardsmark was informed that Braniff would no longer be using its services. Shortly thereafter, on or about January 5, 1977, Rod Ruppel, manager of passenger services for Braniff at O'Hare, received a telephone call from Loewenberg. Loew- enberg asked if Braniff was planning to terminate its con- tract with Guardsmark and use Andy Frain. Ruppel said that there was such a possibility and asked why Loewen- berg was interested. Loewenberg responded by asking if Ruppel realized that if he used Andy Frain he would be "in violation of what State Attorney Carey was investigat- ing." Ruppel said he did not want to get into any union disagreements, to which Loewenberg replied that he was a counsel representing Respondent. Loewenberg continued by asking Ruppel if he would hire a concern and jeopar- dize the passengers knowing that they were not "in compli- ance," apparently referring to the state licensing statute. Ruppel said that he would not but that Andy Frain had represented itself as a certified screening organization. 4 Kirshenh;baim did not testify. 298 GENERAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION LOCAL 73 Loewenberg said. "Well. the' are not. If you go with And, Frain. we are going to picket Braniff and pass out pam- phlets to the passengers stating that Braniff is hiring a con- cern that is not in compliance." Ruppel asked if Loewen- berg was sure he could do this, because it had to be cleared with the airport management. Loewenberg said he could by simply getting a permit. After some further conversa- tion. Loewenberg asked. "Why don't you cooperate with me because TWA and United cooperated with me." Rup- pel said he didn't know what "their policies were." and the conversation ended.5 On May 3. 1976. Respondent wrote Andy Frain stating that Andy Frain did not meet area standards for the em- ployment of guards. Respondent claimed that the letter was being submitted "for the sole purpose of determining whether your Company meets area standards." The letter continued. informing Andy Frain that it was necessary to respond to the letter promptly if it did meet area standards in order to avoid "lawful area standards picketing" and that unless Andy Frain responded in 10 days Respondent would conclude that Andy Frain did not meet area stan- dards and would "take appropriate action." The letter ac- knowledged the existing contract with Local 236 but stat- ed, "our object in pursuing this matter is not for the purpose of attempting to organize or represent your em- ployees." Andy Frain responded to this letter by letter dat- ed May 7, 1976, stating that its current contract with Local 236 met area standards for all classifications and referring Respondent to Local 236. About a month later. Booker LaGrone. a representative of Respondent, had a conversation with Michael Frain at Andy Frain's office. LaGrone said he felt sure he could be helpful in working out an agreement with Local 73 if Andy Frain simply agreed to transfer coverage of its airport em- ployees, who at the time numbered 200 to 250, to Local 73. On about June 30. 1976, Loewenberg met with Michael Frain. Loewenberg stated that Respondent was the Union that had to represent the Andy Frain employees at the 5 The above is based on the candid testimons of Ruppel. most of which was corroborated by Locwenberg. Loewenberg admitted that he called Ruppel. and he testified that Ruppel confirmed the rumor that Andy Frain was going to be hired to do the securitb work for Braniff. Loewenherg told Ruppel that there was a lawsuit pending by the Stale's Attorney that Ands Frain was unlicensed. Loewenberg admitted that he asked Ruppel to hold oft doing business with Andy Frain until the licensing question was re- solved. Ruppel responded that he was not concerned and that Andy Frain was going to do the security work. Loewenberg told Ruppel that if Braniff retained Andy Frain Respondent would leaflet the patrons of Braniff and advise them that they were using an unlicensed carrier. The only significant conflict is Loewenberg's denial that he threatened to picket Braniff. I credit Ruppel. who appeared to me to be a reliable witness whose testimony was unimpeached and detailed. The testimon. concerning the threat to picket is consistent with Board findings that Loewenberg made similar threats in two prior cases. R. R. S. Inc.. and A-i Securnr-. supra. Indeed. Loewenberg's testimony was reJected by Administrative Law Judge Barker in A-i Security (224 NLRB at 444. fn. 9). Moreover. Loewenberg's testimony seemed more tailored to supporting Respondent's litigation theo- ry than to candidly describing the events about which he testified. For example. Loewenberg testified that he could not have used the work "pick. et" because he had made the "mistake" of using that word before in the United Airlines matter. Yet Loewenberg apparently had made the same "mistake" in two earlier cases. and Respondent did actualls picket Braniff. lending further credence to the fact that Loewenberg did indeed make the threat as Ruppel testified. airport. and he once again demanded that And, Frain sign a contract covering those employees. Frain said that if he did not sign a contract with Respondent he was certain Local 236 would charge Andy Frain with breach of con- tract. since the employees were alread, covered b, Re- spondent's sister local. Kirshenbaum. who was also pres- ent. then stated that Respondent would be willing to indemnify Andy Frain against an) claims bs l.ocal 236. Frain asked about the contents of a contract. The union representatives had a conference and then said that if the conversation on the contract were to continue. it would have to be an off-the-record type of conversation. Frain rejected this suggestion. Before the meeting ended. Loew- enberg said that he had information that the State's Attorney's office was going to place charges against Andy Frain. apparently for noncompliance with the state licens- ing statute. unless this matter was settled. Frain then said that he could not Understand how the State's Attorne)'s office would get involved in what appeared to be a union dispute. 6 3. The picketing at Braniff's ticket counter at O'Hare Airport On May 31. 1977. Union Agents Wesles and Piecos ap- peared at the Braniff ticket counter located at O'Hare Air- port. Piecos displayed a sign about 24 inches by 36 inches which was carried on his chest and held by a string around his neck. The sign displayed by Piecos read as follows: NOTICE TO PATRONS OF BRANIFF AIRLINES ANDY FRAIN IN(' GUARIDS EMPLOYED BY THE ABOVE COMPANY ARE NOT BEING PAID THE PREVAILING AREA STANDARDS OUR ONLY DISPL TE IS WITH THE ABOVE COMPANY WE HAVE NO DISPUTE WITH ANY OTHER EMPLOYER AT THIS LO- CATION GENERAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION LOCAL ?73 Piecos was located about 20 to 30 feet from the Braniff ticket counter. and he patrolled the area by walking back and forth.7 This occurred in plain view of the Braniff em- ployees who work at the ticket counter issuing tickets. checking baggage. and assigning seats. With the exception of the June 1976 conversation between Frain and LaGrone. all of the above evidence stands undenied. Although Respondent called Loeenberg to testify. it failed to question him concerning these evenls. Kirshenbaum was not called to testifs. Moreover. the above lesti- mon. was unimpeached and is logicall5 consistent. I also credit Frain's version of the June 1976 conversation with LaGrone It is consistent with the entire sequence of events. and Frain impressed me as a straightforward and reliable witness. LaGrone's testimons. on the other hand. is not credible. For example. it seems incredible that Frain would ask LaGrone who Loewenberg was. as LaGrone testified Also. LaGrone glossed over key parts of the consersalion when he testified that Frain said "in regard to sou know. somethine." Wesles testified that neither he nor Piecos walked back and forth in front of the Braniff ticket counter However. this testimons is clearls Incor- recl. The pictures taken on this and other occasions and received into csl- dence clearly show both Piecos and Wesley walking back and forth in front of the Braniff ticket counter. In view of this. and because neither witness impressed me as candid or reliable in his demeanor. I discredit their testi- mon, where it conflicts with that of other witnesses. 299 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Andy Frain's baggage and passenger screening employ- ees for Braniff flights were situated in another corridor of the airport some three city blocks away from the Braniff ticket counter: those checking Braniff passenger baggage were one floor below. Thereafter, on June 2, 1977, Piecos again appeared at the same location with the sign, and he patrolled the area, again with the assistance of Wesley. Piecos also appeared with the sign on June 7, 9, 10, 16. 17, and 21. On June 17, the sign was modified so that the portion which read "No- tice to Patrons of Braniff Airlines" was deleted. At various times leaflets were distributed concurrently with the picketing. One such leaflet, addressed to the pa- trons of Braniff, discussed Respondent's concern over the wages paid by Andy Frain to its employees. Earlier, begin- ning about February 1, 1977, Respondent had distributed various other leaflets at the airport. These dealt with a con- cern that Braniff's "security contractor." Andy Frain, Inc., was not licensed under Illinois law. In February 1977, Andy Frain registered under Illinois law. C. The Allied Dispute I. Background Allied performs uniform security services for businesses in the Chicago metropolitan area, as well as private investi- gatory and security consulting work for individuals and corporations. Allied maintains its business office at 1130 Garfield Street, Oak Park, Illinois, where it interviews, hires, schedules, trains, and pays its employees, bills its customers, and receives all business supplies. Allied re- ceives no deliveries at any location other than its Oak Park office in the Chicago area. Since May 1972, Respondent has repeatedly attempted to have Allied sign a contract with it. By letter dated May 30, 1972, Union Representative Les Carter stated, "For a number of months, I have made repeated visits to your office concerning our request to obtain recognition as the union bargaining agent for your employees." The letter continues, noting that George Wilson. an Allied official, claimed throughout these contacts that he had no authority to "discuss terms of a union contract" but would arrange a meeting when Allied's president came to Chicago. The let- ter also states: We have no alternative other than to notify the public and your clients that a labor problem exists between your company and this union, and we will urge ev- eryone to support the working men and women of Chicago by insisting that work performed should meet union standards. Carter ended the letter by stating "I am sorry that we have been unable to resolve our problems in a peaceful manner" and noting that he was still prepared to meet with Allied. In 1973, the Respondent had two meetings with Allied officials in an attempt to secure a contract. Jack Carpenter, Allied's regional manager at the time, testified that the first of these meetings took place in April 1973 in Respondent's office. Present were various Allied officials and officials of Respondent, including Irv Kurasch. The Allied officials made inquiries about the terms of the contract or agree- ment which Respondent had previously presented to Wil- son. They mentioned that Allied had three clients, includ- ing Skill Corporation, which would not employ a union guard force, whereupon Kurasch assured them that these three could be excluded from any agreement signed. Car- penter then asked Kurasch where the employee pledge cards were, and he stated that it was not his understanding that a vote had been taken. Kurasch's reply was: They' didn't do it that way in Chicago. . . the normal thing was to solicit the companies and the company would sign the agreement with the union and then the guards would automatically fall into the union at the management's direction. After discussing how the parties had reached the stage of a written agreement, Carpenter asked why Allied had been contacted. Kurasch replied that a number of Respondent's member agencies had complained that Allied was soliciting some of their accounts and had been successful in obtain- ing one. When Allied inquired of what benefit it would be for them or anyone to join the Union, Kurasch replied that Respondent tries to protect its members "when they hear that a non-union agency is soliciting a union account, they go to the prospective client and they present him a list of all the member agencies." Carpenter asked the purpose of presenting an approved list, and Kurasch replied, "Well, they usually get the message." Carpenter then asked what happened when a firm refused to sign an agreement with Respondent, and Kurasch stated, "Well, we picket them . . . we usually picket some of their clients and they usual- ly lose the business." After Carpenter explained that Allied wanted to analyze the proposed agreement prior to another meeting, he asked Kurasch what would happen if they couldn't agree. Kurasch said, "Well, naturally we'll picket you." On July 31, 1973, Allied officials again met with Respon- dent's officials, including Les Carter and Irv Kurasch. Ku- rasch opened the meeting by stating, "Well, finally we are here. Let's wrap this whole thing up." At that point, Allied's labor attorney made a statement telling Respon- dent that he had advised Allied not to sign the contract because he believed it was an illegal agreement. Kurasch replied, "What the hell does that mean?" When Carpenter informed him that Allied was not going to enter into an agreement with Respondent, Kurasch jumped up and pounded his fist on the table and said, "God damn, what the hell?... all these months we have been waiting for this?. . . We are going to put you out of business." Car- penter explained that Allied was not going to sign a con- tract with Respondent. Upon leaving this meeting, Ku- rasch looked at Carpenter and said, "You know what we are going to do." Respondent's next communication with Allied was by form letter dated August 27, 1974, in which Respondent requested wage and fringe benefit information from all nonunion guard agencies in Chicago. This letter was signed by Respondent's attorney, David Loewenberg. Although this letter claimed that it would not be necessary for Re- spondent to take further action against companies it con- sidered in compliance with area standards, it stated: 300 GENERAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION LOCAL 73 If we do not hear from you within 72 hours of the date of this letter, we can only assume that you choose not to answer this inquiry and we shall proceed to imme- diately advise customers of your substandard wage and beniefit rates and take whatever action is neces- sary to alleviate this situation. On September 6, 1974, Allied's counsel responded to Loewenberg's letter requesting wage information, stating that it believed that Respondent was still interested in rec- ognition. On July 6, 1976, Respondent sent out another "area standards" letter to Allied stating "We have reason to be- lieve that your company does not comply with area stan- dards in the employment of guards in this area." This letter gave Allied 10 days to reply in order to avoid "lawful area standards picketing" but again admonished that failure to reply would lead Respondent to conclude that Allied was not in compliance and therefore "to act accordingly." 2. The Hertz incidents in September 1976 The Hertz car rental facility at O'Hare Airport employs security guard services to check all vehicles leaving its lot for authentic paperwork on a 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week basis. Prior to September 15, 1976, Hertz used the guard services of Knight Patrol and effective that date changed its security services to Allied. The security guard stationed at Hertz is located in a booth adjacent to the Hertz exit gate. The exit gate is approximately 360 yards distant from the Hertz entrance. On August 18, 1976, while Hertz was using the services of Knight Patrol, Patricia O'Brien, Hertz city manager at O'Hare Airport, received a phone call from Respondent's agent, Charles Bonesz, who identified himself and asked O'Brien if she was aware that Knight Patrol and Allied (whom Avis was using at the time) were not meeting "area standards." O'Brien asked what that meant, and Bonesz replied that it involved pay and benefits. Bonesz also men- tioned that Hertz would be picketed but stated that the picketing would be directed against the security service, not against Hertz. Bonesz also told O'Brien that Respon- dent was not interested in getting new members and that it already had enough members. On September 1, 1976, O'Brien sent a letter to Knight Patrol informing them that their services would be termi- nated as of September 15, 1976. On September 13, 1976. O'Brien received a phone call from loewenberg, who iden- tified himself as general counsel for Respondent. Loewen- berg informed O'Brien that Knight Patrol was "coming in to work things out" and that Allied was not, and he repeat- ed this a number of times throughout the conversation. O'Brien inquired what the area standard was, and Loewen- berg told her it was $3.60 per hour, including fringes. Loewenberg asked where the guard booth was located, and O'Brien informed him that it was located at the Hertz exit gate. Loewenberg then asked O'Brien when Hertz was making the changeover in guard services, and O'Brien told him it would be that Wednesday, September 15. Loewen- berg stated that there would be possible picketing, that the picketing would be directed at the security service, not at Hertz, and that it would take place at the guard booth. O'Brien replied that she hoped the picketing would not interfere with her business, and Loewenberg replied to the effect that some people do not like to cross picket lines. On September 22, 1976, just I week after Allied took over the security work at Hertz, O'Brien was visited by Respondent's agent. LaGrone. LaGrone told O'Brien that Respondent would be picketing her location. Hle asked O'Brien if she had spoken to anyone from Respondent be- fore, and O'Brien told him that she had spoken to Bonesz,. who told her that Respondent was not interested in new members. LaGrone replied, "That's not quite true. We do have 18,000 members, and we are always interested in new' members." LaGrone asked O'Brien where the guard booth was located, and she told him it was at the exit gate. La- Grone stated that Knight Patrol had "come in and worked things out" and that Allied had not. Then laGrone told O'Brien a "story" about a woman he had visited the previ- ous da\ who was in a position similar to O'Brien's and that Respondent was going to picket her. LaGrone continued, stating that this woman asked him if Respondent would give her a few days, since she did not want to be picketed, and that she would try and find a way of working it out so she could avoid the picketing. LaGrone told O'Brien that there were about 80 security services which met area stan- dards in the phone book, and that he would not suggest which one to use, but there were others which met area standards. LaGrone also told O'Brien he was sorr: to see her in the middle of this, since his problem was with the security service, not with Hertz. O'Brien stated that she hoped the picketing would not interfere with her business, and l.aGrone replied that some people do not like to cross picket lines. After LaGrone left her office, O'Brien called an official of Allied and told him she was told that Hertz would be picketed. Respondent did not picket at the exit gate on that date, but two cars owned by Respondent's agents were parked at the entrance gate, and six or seven individuals with picket signs appeared at the entrance gate to the Hertz facility. These individuals walked back and forth of the Hertz entrance gate carrying picket signs. TIhe entrance gate is used by Hertz customers and employees. In the early afternoon, while Respondent's pickets were at the Hertz entrance gate, John Bettini, Hertz assistant city manager at O'Hare, saw a car carrier truck parked on the road in front of the Hertz entrance gate. Bettini noticed that the driver of the truck was out of the truck talking to someone, and that his truck was blocking the passage of Hertz customers and the courtesy buses belonging to Hertz and other car rental companies. Bettini went to the Hertz entranc- and approached the truckdriver. who was en- gaged in a conversation with LaGrone. Bettini asked the truckdriver what the problem was, and the truckdriver, who was delivering new cars to Hertz, asked Bettini if any of his employees were on strike. Bettini stated that none of his employees were on strike and that Hertz did not have any labor problems. At this point LaGrone protested, "but you do have a labor problem here." Bettini replied. "No, we don't. None of our employees are engaged in any strike." The truckdriver stated that he could not cross the picket line and enter the Hertz lot if any of their employees 301 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD were on strike. Bettini assured the driver that none of his agents at the same location at the Hertz entrance gate. The employees were on strike and directed the driver into the same signs were posted in the window and windshield of Hertz lot. the cars. Respondent's agents remained at the Hertz en- After the driver entered the Hertz lot, Bettini and La- trance gate on this occasion until about 4 p.m. Grone had a further conversation at the Hertz entrance Respondent's agents returned to the Hertz facility at ap- gate. LaGrone asked Bettini why he had approached the proximately 8 a.m. on December 27, 1976, and stationed gate and Bettini replied that he saw a traffic problem and themselves and their cars at the same location at the Hertz wanted to find out what the problem was so he could cor- entrance gate. The same signs were posted in the window rect it. Bettini credibly testified as follows: and windshield of the cars. O'Brien credibly testified that it He had told me that he wanted to make people aware was on this occasion that Bonesz' car was parked too close of the problem that we had there. I told him we didn't to the entrance gate, making it difficult for buses and cars have any problem. He told me that we did have a to enter the Hertz lot. She approached the entrance gate problem, and our problem was with the security ser- and asked Bonesz to move his car back, explaining that it was difficult for buses and cars to enter the lot. Bonesz directly at to e guard shack] weren't brothers or moved the car a few feet, and O'Brien requested that he weren't union men. . . he told me he wanted to make move it a little further, since traffic was backing up and the the other people coming in aware of that problem. location of Bonesz' car was still creating entry problems for Hertz buses. Bonesz refused to move his car any further, stating that O'Brien should call the police if she wanted it Respondent continued its picketing at the Hertz entrance moved. O'Brien called the police, and Bonesz' car was gate after Bettini left. 8 moved across the road facing the Hertz entrance gate, and the sign was placed in the front windshield. O'Brien also 3. The December 1976 and January 1977 picketing testified that she noticed Respondent's agents at the en- trance gate the next day, December 28.9 The evidence reveals that on three of four occasions in On two or three occasions during the December picket- late December 1976 Respondent's agents, Bonesz, Wesley, ing, Bonesz photographed or appeared to photograph and Workman, picketed and handbilled at the entrance Hertz employees and customers entering the Hertz facility gate of the Hertz facility at O'Hare. On or about December through the entrance gate. On one day he did this the en- 22, 1976, Respondent's agents arrived at Hertz about 10 tire day, photographing a Hertz courtesy busdriver who a.m. and parked two automobiles at the entrance gate: the was transporting customers as well as the customers them- car belonging to Wesley was parked about 5 feet east of the selves. According to O'Brien, on one day he also raised a entrance gate, and the car belonging to Bonesz was parked camera pointed to her as she approached the entrance gate just west of the entrance gate. Bonesz' car had a sign post- and appeared to be taking her picture. ed on its side window, and Wesley's car had a sign posted On January 24, 1977, Hertz established reserved gates at on its front windshield. These signs were placed so they its O'Hare facility and posted signs so designating its gates. were visible to all individuals entering the Hertz lot and The sign at the entrance gate stated that the gate was to be bore the following language: used by Hertz customers, employees, and vendors and not ALLIED SECURITY by Allied and its employees. The sign at the exit gate stated that this gate was to be used for Allied and its employees. Since that date, Allied employees have used only the exit Guards employed by the above company are not gate at Hertz facility being paid the prevailing area standard. Our only dis- gate at Hertz facility. betg paidw the prevailing area standard. Our only dis- Respondent's agent, Bonesz, testified that he appeared at pute is with the above company. We have no dispute the Hertz entrance gate on at least five occasions in Janu- ation isth appny other employer at this location. Your cooper- ary 1977. On these occasions Respondent's agents parked their cars and displayed their signs in the same manner as General Services Employees Union they had in late December. Local 73 On January 26, 1977, Respondent's agents returned, SEIU AFL-CIO parked their cars, and displayed their signs at the entrance gate. They also passed out leaflets and "milled around" the The cars remained parked at the entrance gate for 3 or 4 hours, and Respondent's agents alternated sitting in entrance gate. At no time on January 26 did the agents Wesley's car and getting out of the car to hand leaflets to appear at the exit gate. There was no picketing between Hertz customers entering the Hertz lot. Respondent's January 26 and March 16, 1977, when Respondent's agents Hertz customers entering the Hertz lot. Respondent's again appeared at the Hertz facility at the exit gate. o- agents returned to the Hertz facility at approximately I p.m. on December 23, 1976, and stationed their cars and Bosncsz testimony is not substantially different from that of O'Brien. To the extent there is an inconsistency between O'Brien's and Bonesz' accounts S The above is based on the testimony of O'Brien and Beitinl. sshom I of the conversation. I credit O'Brien. She recalled the specifics of the con- have found to be reliable and candid witnesses. O'Brien's testimonN regard- versation and candidly stated that Bonesz voluntarily moved his car a few ing the phone conversations with Loewenberg and Bonesz stands uncontra- feet. On the other hand. Bonesz admitted he dicd not recall the conversation, dicted. LaGrone did deny and contradict certain aspects of their testimony. denied any voluntary action on his part, and exhibited a clear hostility However. I found his testimony not to have been as specific or as candid as toward O'Brien. stating, "I think her idea of moving the cars was some place that of Bettini and O'Brien and, as I have indicated before. I did not find around Central and Madison." I aGrone to be a credible witness. 0 Respondent's witnesses Wesley and Piecos testified that the) last ap- 302 GENERAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION LOCAL 73 IV DISCt SSION ANI) ANAL.YSIS Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act essentially pro- hibits inducement of neutral persons to stop work and re- straint or coercion of neutral persons with the object of forcing a cessation of business between a neutral and one with whom the offending union has a dispute. These provisions reflect "the dual congressional ob- jective of preserving the right of labor organizations to bring pressure to bear on offending employers in pri- mary labor disputes and of shielding unoffending em- ployers and others from pressures in controversies not their own." N. L. R. B. v. Denver Building and (Construe- lion Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692. Thus, a union is permitted to picket a primary employer with whom it has a labor dispute but runs afoul of Section 8(b)(4) if it pickets or threatens to picket a neutral employer with a proscribed object of enmeshing the neutral employer in a controversy not its own. It is unnecessars ito find that the so, hobject of picketittg 1s unI;:ti- ful; an unlawful object is enough. A L.R B I D)nivr Buddlirn .il (C ontruclion Irades ( ,ou.til, 341 t.S. 67. 688 (t89: ; L R?.B I .lA DrietIe & DairL Liplp )t'uc I1, ,o1 l f , t i ,i 5s4. /IBf 10hl lit h, Farmns. Inc]. 341 F.1 2d 29. 32 (( A 21. cert denired 382 t S Xlh1 h I. R B. . MilA Brgon Drivers' I in / 5 t /Pit re l//A 1 s, tO rion]/. 355 F.2d 326, 329 (( A 71: ,S n iorA Wfle,', f ,t,t %,, 6I [A'te York lierald 7rlbunt. hi,] S . 1 R H. 310 i Id 371. t72 (C-A. )D.C.) General Teamsters, Warehousenmen and Dair AEnmplolvees Union Local 126, affiliated wirth the International Brother- hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousenien and HItelpers of America, el al. (Ready Mixed Concrete. Inc.), 200 NI RB 253, 254 (1972). The General Counsel asserts that Loewenberg's state- ment to Braniff's representative Ruppel in January 1977 was a threat to picket and thus violative of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act and that the subsequent picketing of Braniff's terminal at O'Hare airport was both an induce- ment and coercion and thus violated subsections (i) and (ii) of Section 8(b)(4)(B). The General Counsel draws on back- ground and other evidence to show that the primary dis- pute herein was between Respondent and Andy Frain and that it was essentially a dispute whereby Respondent sought recognition as the representative of Andy Frain em- ployees at a time when Andy Frain recognized another peared at the Hiertz fjililt a.nd u lent ti the cxlt i[le III Ji.,lIIr. 197 " .IId nl, l in March Hlowever. I do noll credit their testinoltis For esClllple. \c,\lc teslified and Piecos agreed -that he spoke oii ar ullidentified plhtIe 'ftlcer who limited his picketing at the cxit gate. 'et he adilitted he did n1t CepIlrt this alleged encounter to Respondent's altornrit. ae. he norlt.llx tih c s hCii he has a confrontationl with the police Fiert7 official (O'Brien testified ihIit she saw Respondent's agents at the exil Late in Ma.rch 16 ter tleilitlln nII the whole was motre credible Ilthan that of SSeshles and Ple,,i .iand sihe ilalde a contemporanenous notiatlon f Ihe d.ate She also Itctiflld that ihelc ;.. a. female guard on duti for Allied )in thai dal, She u. i cortlhurc.lel d bh documentary esidence thait Ihere was nto x mian enipl, cc of i.licd oirk- mig at the hertz facility during the ucek oif Januarir 26 at the tinte RKespol- dent's agertis were allegedls .t the csit eatte I hi, refute, tihe eltillloti of Wesle) that a woma;n gualrd Uas presitt (oil tie lat dat.le thl.l RespIlidei appeared at the Hiert. facilits and confirmt that the date u,. \. li,.h It. a O'Brien testified union as representative of these employees. The General Counsel thus asserts that an object of the pressures placed upon Braniff was to force a cessation of business with Andy Frain and recognition of it by Andv Frain. The G(en- eral Counsel also alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(4li) and (ii)(B) by picketing at the entrance gate of Hertz, a neutral employer, in December 1976 and January 1977 with an object of forcing a cessation of business be- tween Hertz and Allied and obtaining recognition from Allied. For the reasons set forth below. I find that a pre- ponderance of the evidence herein supports the complaint allegations. A. The Braniff Incidents As I have found, the credited testimony shows that Re- spondent's agent Loewenberg told Ruppel, the representa- tive of a neutral with whom Respondent had no dispute, that if Braniff contracted with Andy Frain "we are going to picket Braniff." Such threats to picket a neutral are vio- lative of Section 8(b)(4(ii)(B) if an object is unlawful. See General 7Teamsters, W/arehouse and Dairy Employees Union, Local 126 (Ready Miled Concrete. Inc,), supra at fn. 2. An object of the threat was clearly an effort to force a cessation of business between Braniff and Andy Frain. The evidence shows that Respondent has long sought to repre- sent Andv Frain's airport employees. The threat to Braniff did not state the picketing would be limited to Andv Frain or its operations. The threat also came shortly after Braniff had announced its intention to cease using Guardsmark, a firm swhich had a contract with Respondent to conduct passenger screening services. and instead to use And) Frain, whose employees were not represented by Respon- dent. l.oewenberg admittedly asked Ruppel to hold off us- ing Andy Frain until an alleged licensing dispute was re- solved. lie also implored Ruppel to cooperate with him as other airlines had done. In this context, cooperation could only mean interference with the business relationship be- tween Braniff and Andy Frain. Accordingly, whatever the nature of the primary dispute between Respondent and And' Frain, Respondent's object was to force Braniff., a neutral. to cease doing business with Andy Frain in order to further Respondent's dispute with Andy Frain." I now turn to the May and June 1977 activity by Re- spondent's agents at the Braniff ticket counter at O'Hare airport. The evidence shows that Respondent's agents dis- played placards on their bodies and patrolled the area in front of the ticket counters. The General Counsel alleges that this activity was picketing and thus an unlawful in- ducement and coercion under subsections fi) and (ii) of Section 8(4)(B). Because the agents also distributed leaflets on these occasions. Respondent contends that this was leafleting rather than picketing and that the purpose of the placards was to distinguish the Respondent's agents from 4I he ;d1o .I rIdIte I1h x1111 s i tII uiIihJ el eof CasIe I ( ( 9631 a, scl tIcd h icreeeileni iof lil pot iic, I lie etctlement agreme ntt pror tiled Ihat Rc'lpoldlenr t oiuld nlolt threlln,. coercr . or re'tr;aln ain person In Niolatlon if St,. (hH)(4)) hi, i .er. e the sciele niilt ..s set alide bh the Regiional D)clolll.r hen til h (Ocnie.l] (i ,Oll zc] lcN td il shseqtien: soniplallni III \Ccl If [I\ dilxp tltl(!11 Of tile Llhd I l]C [ lonpiplint illegations sxIhillch i effect coin lield .a hleacth of the igrecrtient I find thit Ihc selemtient .aCreecn ii atIs pr,i~crlx set aildc 303 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD other groups soliciting at the airport. Respondent relies on Teamsters, Local Union No. 688, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (Levitz Furniture Company of Missouri. Inc.), 205 NLRB 1131, 1133 (1973), where the Board found that the distribution of handbills in the circumstances of that case did not constitute picketing within the meaning of Section 8(b)(7)(C). I find Levitz distinghishable, and I also find that the facts herein show that Respondent's agents were picketing at Braniff's ticket counter. Here. unlike the case in Levitz, the evidence shows that Respondent's agents patrolled the site with signs. Moreover, Loewenberg had threatened to picket Braniff, and the neutral parties regarded the con- duct at the airport as picketing. It is clear from the testi- mony as well as photographs received into evidence that the two agents patrolled the area at times when they were not also handbilling. It is thus obvious that their presence operated as the type of signal "which provokes responses without inquiry into the ideas being disseminated and dis- tinguishes picketing from other forms of communication and makes it subject to restrictive regulation." Levitz, su- pra, 205 NLRB at 1133. See also Local 182, Teamsters. Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (Wood- ward Motors, Inc.), 135 NLRB 851, 857 (1962) (presence of union agents in parked cars with signs in snowbank; no patrolling). Since picketing is both an inducement of indi- viduals and coercion, such picketing as occurred here vio- lated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) if an object thereof was unlawful. See Ready Mix Concrete, supra, 200 NLRB 254, fn. 6. I also find that the picketing at the ticket counter of Braniff was undertaken for an unlawful object. First, the background evidence shows a primary dispute with Andy Frain. There was an unlawful threat to picket Braniff in circumstances which indicated that the object was to cause a cessation of business between Braniff and Andy Frain. It is reasonable to infer that the subsequent picketing itself had the same object, particularly since the licensing dispute which had allegedly concerned Respondent earlier was re- solved. This inference is strengthened by the locus of the picketing. There was no picketing at the main office of Andy Frain. See Ready Mix Concrete, 200 NLRB at 255 256, fn. 10. Moreover, evidentiary guidelines established for proper primary picketing at secondary or common situs locations requires, inter alia, that the picketing clearly dis- close that the dispute is with the primary employer and be limited reasonably close to the location of the primary at the site.'2 Neither of these tests under the Moore Dry, Dock decision was met here. Until June 17, the picket signs were addressed to patrons of Braniff, thus failing to clearly re- strict the dispute to Andy Frain. Furthermore, the Andy Frain employees were located at the Braniff departure gate, far from where the picketing took place. There were also Andy Frain employees one floor below in the baggage claim area, but the picketing took place elsewhere. This warrants the inferences that Respondent's efforts were di- rected to Braniff, a neutral, rather than to Andy Frain, the 2 Suailrs' Union of the Pafll itlr.. r D D o)n A),, ( o . 92 Nl.RB 547 (195(1) primary, and that these efforts had as at least one object a cessation of business between Braniff and Andy Frain. Respondent sought to escape the implications of its fail- ure to picket near the Andy Frain employees by reference to certain testimony that it attempted to picket at those locations but was deterred by airport authorities. Thus, Union agent Wesley testified that on June I he stationed a picket at the Braniff departure gates where Andy Frain employees worked. Wesley also testified that " [a] representative from Northwest Orient . . ." said something to one of the "leafletters." The "leafletter" re- ported to Wesley that he was told he would be arrested if he didn't move. Wesley, in turn, reported this to Attorney Loewenberg, who told Wesley to position the man back at the Braniff ticket counter. Respondent never returned to the concourse area. Later in his testimony, Wesley stated that a police officer had approached the "leafletter" at the gate, although he admitted that he was not present there. I do not credit Wesley's testimony as to what was said at the departure gate. First of all, the testimony was in re- sponse to leading questions and constituted hearsay. Re- spondent failed to call the picket as a witness, and it did not explain its failure to do so. Wesley's testimony is also ambiguous. First, he testified that a representative from Northwest Orient was involved; he later testified that it was a police officer. The evidence is also ambiguous as to what the "leafletters" were told they could or could not do and what it was that the "leafletters" were doing that pro- voked whatever occurred. Finally, Wesley's testimony is uncorroborated in any respect. In these circumstances, and in view of his unreliable testimony on other matters in this case, I cannot accept Wesley's testimony as establishing what took place at the departure gate. Loewenberg also gave testimony, apparently to justify Respondent's picketing at the Braniff ticket counter. Wes- ley had testified that on May 31, 1977, a Sergeant Pribble told him that pickets could not "wear placards" inside the airport and that if they did so they would be arrested. Loewenberg testified that in late May or June he received a telephone call from Sergeant Pribble, who told Loewen- berg that if Respondent's agents continued to leaflet and "wear placards" they would be arrested. Loewenberg ob. jected. claiming that he knew of a court decision which held that only activity in the fingers of the concourse could he prohibited. Later, Pribble called back and said that he was going to allow Respondent's agents to conduct their activity so long as they did not go into the concourse or the fingers. Loewenberg promised to stay away from that area. I do not accept Loewenberg's testimony that Respon- dent was prohibited from picketing or handbilling at the departure gate. Loewenberg's testimony is unclear as to the date of his encounter with Pribble and particularly in spell- ing out exactly where, in relation to Braniff's operation, the conduct was prohibited. These ambiguities could have been resolved if Respondent had called Pribble. That it did not leaves the matter sufficiently in doubt that I must reject Respondent's contention that it was prohibited from pick- eting at the departure gate. In any event, even if Loewenberg and Wesley's testi- mony is accepted, it does not refute a secondary object. Although Loewenberg's testimony is not entirely clear, I do 304 GENERAL SERVICE EMPtOYEES UNION LOCAL 73 not believe it establishes a prohibition against picketing the departure gate. Braniff. unlike the other airlines, uses the "gate plan" instead of the concourse plan in screening pas- sengers. Under the gate plan. the members of the public go unobstructed to the Braniff departure gates, where the screening is performed. This is unlike the "concourse plan," where the screening is performed at the head of the concourse, resulting in a "sterile concourse." Thus. it ap- pears that the public, including Respondent's agents. were free to approach a point closer to Andy Frain's operation at the Braniff departure gate. The testimony of Wesley and Loewenberg simply shows Respondent's lack of interest in limiting the secondary effects of its picketing. When con- fronted with an objection to picketing at the departure gate where the Andy Frain employees worked, Respondent readily withdrew the pickets; however, when confronted with Pribble's apparent objections to picketing anywhere. the Respondent insisted on its right to picket at Braniff's ticket counter and made no effort to assert a right to picket at the departure gate, even though the public was appar- ently permitted to approach the area. Moreover, there is no evidence that Respondent was restricted Irom picketing the baggage claim area downstairs from the Braniff ticket counter, which is not in the concourse area, but where Andy Frain employees do work. Yet Respondent made no effort to picket at this location. In these circumstances, I must reject Respondent's explanations concerning the lo- cation of its picketing. Respondent also contends that its conduct cannot be violative of Section 8(b)(4) because Braniff and Andy Frain were joint or coemployers and thus it could picket Braniff as a primary employer. In certain situations where one employer becomes the ally of the primary employer, most notably by performing its struck work or where the operations of the secondary employer are so intertwined with those of the primary that they are essentially a single employer, a union is provided a defense to application of the literal language of Section 8(b)(4)(B). See Local 282, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware- housemen and Helpers of America (Acme Concrete & Supply Corp.), 137 NLRB 1321 (1962). There is no issue of struck work here, but there was evidence taken concerning the relationship between Braniff and Andy Frain. I find the evidence insufficient to show a joint employer relationship or any relationship which would impair Braniff's status as a neutral in Respondent's dispute with And)y Frain. In determining whether a joint employer relationship ex- ists, the Board will consider all relevant circumstances, par- ticularly the following factors: (I) interrelation of opera- tions; (2) centralized control of labor relations; (3) common management; and (4) common ownership or fi- nancial control. See, for example, Cabot Corporation et al., 223 NLRB 1388 (1976), enfd. sub nom International Chemi- cal Workers Union Local 483 v. N.L.R.B., 561 F.2d 253 (C.A.D.C., 1977). Cowles Communications. Inc., and Sufsun Co., Inc., 170 NLRB 1596, 1599 (1968). The evidence shows no common ownership or financial control between the two firms. And)' Frain is owned by six members of the Frain family, none of whom owns any part of Braniff. There are no common officers. Nor is there any evidence of centralized control of labor relations or com- mon management. Each company has its own supervisory staff. and neither plays any part in determining the labor relations, wage, or hiring policies of the other. The head- quarters of each firm is in a different location, and the firms are in wholly different businesses. The wages, hours. and working conditions of the Andy Frain airport employ- ees are governed by the collective-bargaining agreement between l.ocal 236 and Andy Frain which covers these em- plo ees. Respondent focuses on the interrelationship of opera- tions of the two firms at the airport. However, the evidence is insufficient to show that the relationship rises to a joint emplover status or that the firms are so intertwined that a strike against one is to be considered a strike against both. lhis evidence does not show that the firms have anything but a typical contractual relationship. Braniff is required to provide passenger screening proce- dures by the Federal Aviation Administration. the FAA does not prescribe which contractor the airline must use, hut the security program must be approved by the FAA. Braniff does not have any staff which is involved solely in security work. There is an FAA security officer at O'Hare Airport whose responsibility it is to see that all the airlines comply with the security regulation. Andy Frain employs between 1,000 and 1,300 employ- ees. only 25 to 30 of whom provide services to Braniff. And)' Frain has been performing baggage claim check ser- vices for Braniff since 1975, and in 1977 it began to provide passenger screening services for Braniff. Pursuant to a con- tractual arrangement between Andy Frain and Braniff, Andy Frain provides inspectors to conduct the predepar- ture screening of Braniff passengers. The number of in- spectors, posts, locations, and hours of duty are agreed upon by the parties as determined by Braniff to meet its requirement. Andy Frain is responsible, at all times, for the courteous conduct, appearance. and demeanor of its em- ployees. The agreement specifically provides that the in- spectors shall be exclusively employees of Andy Frain. an independent contractor, and that Andy Frain will pay all salaries and expenses of the employees, including Federal Social Security taxes and Federal and state unemployment taxes. Andy Frain is also required to maintain workmen's compensation insurance for its employees. While Braniff reserves the contractual right to request Andy Frain to re- move employees from service, it has never actually done so: nor has Braniff issued any directives or memorandums to Andy Frain. The actual duties of Andy Frain employees are guided by certain standard rules set forth in an appen- dix to the agreement. The standards refer to appearance and the good character required of Andy Frain employees. They require uniforms and express an intolerance for late- ness. Andy F[rain has the responsibility for providing re- placements. Training is to be provided by Andy Frain, and copies of the training program are to be submitted to Bran- iff for its approval. Andy Frain's employees perform their passenger screening services in an area that is leased by Braniff and use equipment which is owned by Braniff. Braniff does not supervise the Andy Frain employees but merely observes the operation occasionally to insure that Andy Frain is complying with its agreement and with the security program. 305 I)'LCISIONS OF NAI IONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD I'hc evidence set forth above shows that the realtionship between Andy Frain and Braniff is simpl a contractual one. The employees of Andy Frain are independent from control by Braniff or Braniff officials. The only purpose for Braniff officials observing Andy Frain employees is to see that Braniff's contractual agreement with Andy Frain is being followed. Indeed, the contract between Braniff and Andy Frain specifies that Andy Frain is an independent contractor and the employer of the airport employees. I'he evidence confirms this status.'3 In sum, Andy Frain is a person and an employer separate and apart from Braniff, and Respondent may not extend its primary dispute with Andy Frain to Braniff. In its brief Respondent objected to my refusal at the hearing to grant a continuance to enforce its subpena to a witness, one Guerin, a representative of another security agency in Chicago. According to Respondent, (iuerin's tes- timony would have established Braniff as an ally of Andy Frain, and it made an offer of proof of certain evidence allegedly to that end. I indicated that I would not grant a continuance to hear the testimony of Guerin. who appar- ently had not answered the subpena, because, in my view, his testimony was not relevant to the issues in this case. Later Guerin did make himself available, but said he could not testify before talking with his attorney. Respondent's attorney stated on the record that he released Guerin be- cause the matter "had been disposed of" by my ruling that the evidence would not be received. I reaffirm my ruling that Respondent's proffered evi- dence is not relevant to an asserted ally or joint employer defense. Respondent made an offer of proof that Guerin's employer had a labor agreement with Respondent and that he approached an unnamed official of Braniff to attempt to obtain a contract to perform security screening services for Braniff. It is alleged that this Braniff official stated that under no circumstances would Braniff do business with any security agency which had a labor contract with Re- spondent and that Guerin was free to tell the world about this. Such evidence does not tend to show the type of inter- relationship which the Board has recognized in either the ally or the single-employer doctrine. Respondent has cited no cases which would require a holding on the proffered evidence that Braniff so aligned itself with Andy Frain as to permit them to be considered a single entity for the purpose of Section 8(b)(4), and I reject such a contention. I have also considered the application of N.L.R.B. v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 [Tree Fruits Labor Relations Committee], 377 U.S. 58 (1966), to the Braniff picketing. In that case, the Supreme Court held that Congress did not, in Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). intend to prohibit all secondary consumer picketing but only to forbid picketing to prevent all trading with the sec- ondary. I find that the Tree Fruits exception does not apply to the circumstances of this case. The picketing of Braniff could in no way be characterized as limited to persuading customers of Braniff not to purchase a struck product, as opposed to an effort to completely boycott Braniff. I'he l See ('arpet, l inoleum, Soft 7l and Rew/hent F: oor (' ocrintg La;lctl I /, cal Union No. 419 v N.I R.B, 467 F.12d 392, 405 (D. ('. ('ir 1972): (i,d,, ( orporaillon .lspra evidence the location of the picketing and the broad threat to Ruppel clearly shows that the picketing was "designed to inflict injury on the secondary employer's business generally, for an object of forcing or requiring the secondary employer to cease doing business with the pri- mary employer. ..." International Union of ()perating En- gincers. Local N'o. 139, AFL-CIO (Oak (Construction, Inc.. 226 NI.RB 759 (1976).14 B. 771e Hert. Incidents I find that the conduct of Respondent's agents at the llertz location in December 1976 and January 1977 consti- tuted picketing. T wo or three agents walked about the Hertz entrance passing out leaflets protesting Respondent's dispute with Allied. Signs publicizing this dispute were clearly visible on the windows of two of the agents' cars parked at either side of the entrance. On two occasions. one of the agents acted as if he were photographing neu- trals passing through the entrance. This activity was car- ried out in the context of earlier incidents, in September 1976. of actual picketing. In these circumstances. I find that the conduct of Respondent's agents constituted pick- eting and thus came within the proscription of subsections (i) and (ii) of Section 8(b)(4). See Lumher and Sawmill i orker.s I.ocal Union No. 2797 (Stoltze land & I.umber ('onlpantv). 156 NILRB 388, 394 (1965). I he next question to he considered is whether an object of the picketing was secondary, i.e., to cause a cessation of business between Hertz., the neutral, and Allied, the firm with whom Respondent has a primary dispute, within the meaning of subsection (B) of Section 8(b)(4). I find that the Respondent's conduct at Hertz was for an unlawful object. First of all, the background evidence, in- cluding the earlier picketing of Hertz in September 1976, shows that Respondent was intent on enmeshing neutrals in its dispute with Allied. Second, the activity was not lim- ited to a location near the primary, thus indicating a sec- ondary object under the Moore Dry Dock rules. And third, in conjunction with the picketing, Respondent's agents photographed employees and customers of a neutral Hertz as they crossed the picket line. In September 1976. Respondent's agent LaGrone ap- proached Hertz official O'Brien and told her about possi- ble picketing-which later eventuated---and the Respon- dent's dispute with Allied. He then told her there were about 80 security firms that met area standards in the phone book. The import of this statement was obvious: Hertz, a neutral, was to stop using Allied and utilize a guard service more favorable to Respondent. Moreover, the September picketing, which took place at the Hertz entrance gate, actually resulted in the interference of deliv- eries to Hertz by a neutral truck driver. Indeed, as early as April 1973, Union Representative Kurasch stated that Re- spondent's general practice was to picket the "clients" of unfavored employers. This evidence of unlawful object is '1 Since I cainnilt colcllude thatl the sole object of ihe plcketing herein was to adcanlice n1 area standalds dispute with Andc [:rn In n a primnary was (,cc itl-il. Sec I 111.1) I alsot conclude that Ixioal i'nio9n (99, IUnied Brither ,d C (1,' o.pniers and Jinnct of Imleria .4i 4 F, (' ( (A & A C(onirwution ( oIn( ) 233 NLiRB 718 1977). is distinguishable 306 GENERAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION LOCAL. 73 buttressed by the location of Respondents actual picketing of Hertz later in December. The picketing was at the Hertz entrance gate used by Hertz customers and employees. The gate was at a considerable distance from the location of the Allied guard on the Hertz premises and a legitimate site at which Respondent could have publicized its primary dis- pute without enmeshing neutrals. Indeed, Respondent's agents were present at the en- trance gate even after Hertz. placed signs designating the entrance gate for Hertz employees and customers and the exit gate for Allied employees. That it continued to picket at the entrance gate after Respondent's agents knew the location of the Allied guard station shows that the Respon- dent deliberately chose a site where its impact would be solely on neutrals. In view of LaGrone's earlier statement to O'Brien, it is obvious that Respondent sought the re- moval of Allied and the substitution of a more favored employer. The evidence clearly shows an unlawful cessa- tion-of-business object under Section 8(b)(4)(B) and it is reasonable to infer that the December and January picket- ing-which took place at the same Icoation had the same object. In an apparent reliance upon Local 761 International Union of Electrical Radio & .Machine Workeri. .4 FI-( 10 [General Electric Companlia v. N.L.R.B., 366 IU.S. 677 (1961), Respondent argues that the exit gage was not truls a reserved gate after January 24. 1977, because Hertz cus- tomers also used the gate to leave the Hertz facility. Re- spondent misperceives the significance of the reserved gate in this case and misapplies the General Electric case. In General Electric. the Supreme Court held that despite the fact that a struck primary employer sets up a reserved gate on his premises for use by neutrals. a union may lawfully picket that gate in certain circumstances. One such circunm- stance is where the use of the reserved gate is mingled hb use of a primary or a neutral who performed work neces- sary to the normal operations of the primary. Here, as was not the case in (;eneral Elh'ctri both Htertz gates were at the site of the neutral employer with whom the Respondent had no dispute, and, since both primary and secondary employers were present, the Moore D)ri l)oc rules go,- erning common situs picketing apply. Moveover, Respon- dent relies on the alleged mingled use of the exit gate, not the gate which was reserved for neutrals. There is no evi- dence that employees of Allied, the primars, used the en- trance gate which Respondent did picket and which was reserved for neutrals. Thus, Respondent made no effort to limit its appeal to the primary employer even after its agents knew that there was a gate reserved for use b, the primary. The inference is justifiable that Respondent did this in order to cause Hertz to put pressure on Allied. Respondent also argues, based on the testimonv of Pie- cos and Wesley, that on January 26, 2 days after the re- served gate signs were posted, Respondent sought to picket at the exit gate reserved for Allied but was precluded from doing so because a police officer stopped them. According to Respondent, this was the last day its agents appeared at the Hertz facility and the only day the' appeared at the exit gate. Of course this argument fails, because I haie discredited the testimony that these exents took place on January 26. Rather. I credit O'Brien that these events took place on March 16 and that the Respondent's agents pick- eted at the entrance gate which was at that time marked for Hertz all(ie on January 26 and on that date made no effort to picket the exit gate reserved for Allied. Thus. according to the credited testimony. Respondent's agents appeared twice at the Hertz facility after January 24. Moreover, I have discredited the testimony of Wesley that he spoke to a police officer who limited his picketing at the exit gate on January 26. In addition, Respondent never mentioned this alleged limitation to Hertz officials as a possible justifica- tion for picketing at the entrance gate. Respondent's picketing after January 24. like its earlier picketing. took place at a location far from the known situs of the primary, thus indicating Respondent's total lack of interest in making a primary appeal. What is significant ahbout the picketing in late January is that there was a for- mral notice that the entrance gate uwas reserved for neutrals and yet Respondet's agents again picketed at the en- trance. Such ai disregard for a gate reserved for neutrals is the strongest possible evidence of unlawful object. Paragraph IX(b) of the complaint alleges that on De- cember 27 and 28 Respondent's agent, Bonesz, acted as if he were taking pictures of neutrals crossing the picket line at the entrance gate of lertz' facility. The General Counsel also alleges that such conduct was for an unlawful object and thus constitutes a separate violation of Section 8(b)(4). TIhe basic evidence on this issue is not seriously in dis- putte. Bonesz on seeral occasions in late December point- ed a camera at a Hertz driver, Hertz official O'Bnen. and Hertz customers as they were entering the Hertz facility past the picketers. Hie used a movie film on one day and a still camera on the other. There was no film in the cameras. The General Counsel alleges that such conduct is inherent- Is coercive. citing a numbter of cases. most of which involve a union's photographing eimployees crossing a picket line, which has been found to constitute a violation of Section 8(h)( 1 )(A) I find that photographing of neutrals had an object of stopping neutrals from crossing the picket line and stop- ping Ilertz from doing business with Allied. While there is the suggestion in the record that Bonesz used cameras as a retaliation against the use by Hertz employees of camera, to photograph the picketers, this reason does not really explain Respondent's actions. The Hertz employees used a camera to obtain cxidence of activity which was later charged to be unlawful, and such evidence was introduced in this proceeding. More important, perhaps. Bonesz ad- mittedly had no film in his cimerai,, thus negating any legitimnte purpose for the activity. TIhe act of photograph- ngt! neutrals crossing a picket line has the reasonable ten- dencs to lead neutral persons to believe that photographs ma) he used in some was, to retaliate against them for crossing the picket line and doing business with another neutral here. Iertz. 'I'his is inherently coercixe and inhi- hits not only the customers but necessarily the neutrtal lcrtz. Boniesz also pointed his camera toward O'Brien. a direct approach to a neutral emplover. Fhe activlts took place at a location utilized hby neutrals and had no possible relationship with Allied except that it tended to cause an interference in the business relationship between Hertz and Allied. an unlau ful object. It is no answer that the use to 307 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD which the photographs may be put is not immediately ap- parent to the neutrals, for this very ambiguity tends to coerce and to inhibit the business relationship in a manner which the Act proscribes. This analysis applies as well to the employee of the neutral, the Hertz driver. Even though she was not induced by the cameras to refuse to cross the line, it is not necessary that an inducement directed at a neutral employee be successful to be proscribed. In these circumstances, I find that Respondent's use of a camera in December 1976 to photograph or apparently photograph neutral persons crossing the picket line con- firmed the illegal object of the picketing and was itself vio- lative of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B). C. The Recognitional Object The General Counsel alleges that Respondent also vio- lated the Act because another object of its appeal to the secondaries-Braniff and Hertz--was to have them require "any other employer"-Allied and Andy Frain--"to rec- ognize or bargain with a labor organization as the repre- sentative of his employees unless such labor organization has been certified .... " Although application of this pro- vision requires some inquiry into the nature of the primary dispute, it does provide an additional basis for violation of Section 8(b)(4)(B). See Retail Clerks Union Local 770, Re- tail Clerks International Association, AFL CIO [United States Hardware and Paper Company, Wesco Merchandise Company, and Food Employers Council, Inc., Intervenors] v. N.L.R.B., 296 F.2d 368, 374-375 (D.C. Cir. 1961)."5 I find that the Union's recognitional object is established by the record evidence. Since May 1972, Respondent has sought recognition of the Allied employees. Its agents at- tempted to obtain a contract with Allied, indicating that those employers who refused to sign contracts would be subjected to picketing. In September 1976, when Respon- dent first picketed at the Hertz facility, Attorney Loewen- berg told a Hertz official that Knight Patrol, another guard service, was "coming in to work things out" but Allied was not; and LaGrone stated that Respondent was interested in new members. LaGrone also told a Hertz official that Hertz' problem was with Allied, whose men were not "union men or brothers." As to the And), Frain dispute, the evidence shows that on numerous occasions, beginning in August 1975, Respondent insisted that Andy Frain rec- ognize it as bargaining representative of employees it knew were represented by a sister local. In neither case was Re- spondent certified as representative of the employees it sought to represent. Respondent objects to the admission and consideration of certain background evidence in both Allied and Andy Frain matters-much of it having to do with establishing a recognitional object-on the grounds that the events oc- curred beyond the 6-month statutory limitations period set forth in Section 10(b) of the Act. It also alleges that some i Before the 1959 amendments. Sec. 8(h)(4)(A) prohibited seiondll .a- tivit) with a cease doing husiness object aind Sec. 8(b)(4tB) prohibitcd .e- ondary activitl with a recognitional object the 1959 amendmentls added a provision. Sec. 8(b)(7). dealing with recognitionail picketng ;and comlbined the language of subsections (A) ;and (B) of 8 4)(4) Inll Sec 8(hl4)(4lB). of this evidence was the subject of a "settled" case, 230 NLRB 351 (the case before Administrative Law Judge Ma- loney), mentioned above. Neither objection is meritorious, and I adhere to my ruling at the hearing that such evidence is admissible and probative. As to the first point, Section 10(b) bars complaints based on untimely charges; it does not bar evidence. The evi- dence was taken to shed light on specific conduct which took place within the 10(b) period and which was properly charged as a violation herein. Whether the evidence was stale depends on whether intervening events made the ear- lier evidence less probative; I find that it did not and that Respondent's course of conduct over the entire period from 1972 to the present is relevant to the matters litigated herein, particularly the object of Respondent's conduct and activities. As to the second point, there is some doubt in my mind as to whether the eairlier case involving 8(bX4) and 8(b)(7) charges and, incidentially, the same secondary and primary employers involved in this case, was actually a settlement. If so, it was a peculiar type of settlement, because Respon- dent withdrew its answer but, as the Board's decision states, did not admit it had committed any unfair labor practices. Thereafter, upon a motion for summary judg- ment, the Board adopted findings that Respondent com- mitted unfair labor practices and entered an agreed-upon order. However, even assuming that the matter was settle- ment, I conclude that there is no impediment to use of the underlying evidence to shed light on the Respondent's ob- ject in connection with violations alleged and litigated in this case. See Northern California District Council of Hod- carriers and Common Laborers of America, AFL-CIO, et al. (Joseph's Landscaping Service), 154 NLRB 1384 (1965), enfd. 389 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1968). This is true even where the settlement agreement has not been formally set aside. Local Union 613 International Brotherhood of Electric Workers, AFL-CIO (M.H.E. Contracting, Inc.), 227 NLRB 1954, fn. 1 (1977). D. Respondent's Area Standards Defense Respondent alleges that its object in both the Andy Frain and the alleged Allied cases was not the prohibited objects set forth in 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) but rather a primary ob- ject to protest so-called lower area standards, alleged non- competitive wage and fringe benefits, of Andy Frain and Allied. In order to succeed in rebutting the evidence I have discussed above, which shows cease-doing-business and recognitional objects, Respondent must show that the sole and real object of its conduct was the primary protest of an area standards dispute.t 6 Although there is some evidence that union representa- tives, particularly Loewenberg, mentioned area standards to Allied and Andy Frain representatives and the picket signs identified the primary disputes as being area stan- dards disputes, I am not persuaded that this was the sole or , See L.o, l 0.i) Plllrluher. U!nited A .oIi' iion ol Journemien and Appren- itt . ic It ' t i Plullnwg and Pipr Fitring I ndu lnt of the LU nited Slater and (Can idta A iL ( 1). ei. o(Mte r Plimlbing. Inc . 187 NLRB 652. 657 (1970). enfd 469 1: 2d 403 (7th ( ir 1972). 308 GENERAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION LOCAL 73 even the real reason for Respondent's picketing of second- ary employers. First of all, whatever the nature of the primary disputes with Allied and Andy Frain, Respondent's statements to secondary employers clearly show that it sought to enforce its primary disputes by causing a cessation of business be- tween those primary employers and neutral secondary em- ployers. This is buttressed by the location of the picketing and the absence of any real evidence that Respondent was making appeals to the primary employers at the location of the primaries. Furthermore, the trier of fact is not bound by the lan- guage on the picket sign in assessing the real object of the picketing." I find that the Respondent injected the area standards language on the signs and in its letters and re- marks to Allied and Andy Frain in an attempt to insulate its threats and picketing from chargeable violations. Twice before in Board proceedings its area standards defense to unlawful conduct was rejected. Moreover, its area stan- dards inquiries were first made in the midst of efforts to obtain recognition. Thus, even after Respondent's May 3, 1976, area standards letter to Andy Frain. Respondent's agents sought, in two separate meetings with Andy Frain officials, to obtain a contract with Andy Frain. And in Loewenberg's January 1977 threat to Ruppel there was no mention of area standards. With respect to Allied. Respon- dent's very first letter in 1972 requested recognition and threatened to notify the public of Allied's failure to meet "union standards." Subsequent conversations show a de- termined effort to have Allied recognize Respondent. In- deed, even after its specific "area standards" letter to Al- lied, dated August 27, 1974, Respondent's agents had conversations with Hertz officials in September 1976 clear- ly showing Respondent's continued recognitional object. Significantly, in December 1976, Respondent's agents photographed employees and customers of Hertz, a neu- tral, at the Hertz entrance gate. This was inconsistent with a primary area standards objective. Thus, Respondent nev- er clearly eschewed a recognitional object and has failed to show that its only object in picketing the secondary em- ployers was to force adherence by the primaries to area standards. In connection with its asserted area standards defense, Respondent made two offers of proof. First, Respondent offered to prove that Representative Bonesz would testify that on November 8, 1976, he received a report from Rich- ard Wesley, whom he directed to apply for a job with Al- lied, that "Allied paid approximately the same hourly rate of pay as the area standard except that the rate fluctuated up and down according to different locations . . ." and that Allied's benefits were different in other respects. The second proffer was that Respondent's counsel, Loewen- berg, would testify that if at any time after March 1977 Andy Frain had met area standards by improving its wages and monetary fringes, Respondent would have engaged in no further action against Andy Frain and that he men- tioned this to the General Counsel's Regional Office per- sonnel. Although I excluded such evidence at the hearing, I 17 See N.L.R.B. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical WVoreris. Af I CIO, Local 453. 432 F.2d 965. 969 (8th Cir 1970) shall, for the purposes of this decision, assume that the proffer constitutes evidence in this case. I note the hearsay nature of the first proffer and the conclusionary nature of the second. In these circumstances, the reliabiity of this testimony is highly suspect, especially since I have discred- ited witnesses Bonesz. Wesley, and Loewenberg at other points in this decision. Nevertheless, I conclude that this evidence would not establish that Respondent's sole object in picketing Hertz and Braniff was to further a lawful and primary area standards dispute. As I have indicated, the evidence with respect to the Allied dispute shows that since 1972 Respondent sought recognition as the representative of Allied's employees, and its picketing in September 1976 was accompanied by state- ments clearly showing a cease-doing-business and a recog- nitional object. It is a reasonable inference that Respon- dent's December picketing was part and parcel of the same conduct and that its objects were the same, particularly in view of the location of the picketing and its photographing of neutrals who crossed the picket line. Respondent argues that since it obtained wage and benefit information from Allied on November 8. prior to the December picketing, its object in the December picketing must have been different and solely for area standards, as its picket signs indicated. Respondent also relies on a self-serving letter sent on No- vember 8 to Allied renouncing a recognitional object. This letter was sent pursuant to a provision in the agreed-upon Board order in Administrative Law Judge Maloney's deci- sion.'8 This argument, which is essentially that, notwith- standing earlier evidence of unlawful object, Respondent changed its object solely to a benign one after November 8. is unpersuasive. There is no evidence that Respondent made any new effort to notify Hertz that its purpose was not to interfere with the Allied-Hertz business relationship, and it did not take steps to keep its activity as close as possible to the site of the primary dispute. Respondent did not, except briefly, picket Allied at its situs. Moreover, Respondent's effort on November 8 to obtain wage and benefit information from Allied was not an indication of a change in position or tactics. Respondent had requested such information in Au- gust 1974. when it gave Allied 72 hours to respond or face the prospect of picketing; and as early as May 30, 1972. Respondent had threatened to publicize that Allied was not meeting "union standards." On the contrary, the very fact of an inquiry as late as November 1976 confirms that earlier area standards pronouncements by Respondent were made without foundation. There is no reason to be- lieve that the events of November 8 meant that the earlier unlawful objectives had been abandoned completely or that there was a change in Respondent's objectives. Most significantly, however, in December 1976-well after the alleged change of position on November 8-Respondent's agents photographed neutral employees of Hertz and its 1I After the close of the hearing, the Respondent moved to enter into evidence a slipulation hetween it and Allied that on November 8. 1976. Respondent sent Allied a letter as specified in Ihe decision of Administra- \ive L.iaV Judge Maloney in 230 NLRB 351. 354. The General Counsel opposed this motion. Because the matter is the subject of stipulation and was related to compliance with requirements in an earlier decision. and In the interests of a full record, I hereby grant the motion. 309 DECISIONS OF NAT IONAL I.ABOR RELATIONS BOARI) customers, conduct completely inconsistent with the pub- licizing of a lawful and primary area standards dispute. The November 8 letter, of course, said nothing about Hertz or the avoidance of a secondary cease-doing-business ob- ject. As to the Andy Frain Braniff dispute, the proffered evi- dence is that Attorney Loewenberg would not have author- ized the picketing if Andy Frain had complied with area standards in March 1977. Of course, Loewenberg's conclu- sionary testimony is, like the language on the picket sign, self-serving and not entitled to great weight. His unlawful threat to Ruppel of course occurred before his alleged change of heart. Moreover, in Loewenberg's last conversa- tion with Michael Frain, he sought recognition. There is no evidence that Loewenberg made any effort to get in touch with Frain to indicate a change of position: nor did he attempt to neutralize his threat to Ruppel. Thus, I must conclude that even though an object of Respondent's conduct may have been to protect area stan- dards, this was not the sole object of its conduct directed toward Braniff and Hertz. and its object was certainly not limited to primary appeals. CONCi.USIONS 01 LAW I. Andy Frain, Inc.. and Allied Security, Inc.. are, re- spectively, an employer and a person engaged in com- merce, or in an industry affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) and Section 8(h)(4) of the Act. 2. General Service Employees Union Local No. 73. affi- liated with Service Employees International Union. AFL- CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By threatening to picket, and picketing, Braniff Inter- national Airlines with an object of forcing Braniff to cease doing business with Andy Frain, Inc., and for the further object of forcing Andy Frain, Inc., to bargain with Re- spondent as the collective-bargaining representative of its employees, Respondent violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act. 4. By picketing the Hertz Corporation with an object of forcing Hertz to cease doing business with Allied Security, Inc., and for the further object of forcing Allied Security, Inc., to bargain with Respondent as the collective-bargain- ing representative of its employees, Respondent violated Section 8(b)(4)i) and (ii)(B) of the Act. 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices have a close, inti- mate, and substantial effect on commerce and are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirma- tive action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. The General Counsel urges that Respondent's conduct herein, taken together with its past history, requires the issuance of a broad order prohibiting not only unlawful secondary activity directed to the secondary employers in this case with regard to disputes with the primary em- ployers in this case, but also such activity directed to all secondaries with respect to all primaries. I agree with the General Counsel that such a broad order is necessary and effectuates the policies of the Act. Such broad orders are required where the Respondent's conduct, both in the record and in the past history of liti- gated cases, warrants a finding that the Respondent has shown a proclivit\ or a general scheme to violate the Act.i I believe that such a finding is justified herein. Respondent has been found to have violated Section 8(b)(4)(b) in an earlier case and it has been shown that, despite the Board's recent findings of additional violations of Section 8(b)(4)(B) and the agreement to entry of a nar- row order in 230 NLRB 351, it continues to use secondary methods to settle disputes. The instant case involved lenghty picketingagainst two secondaries, photographingof neutrals, and a threat to a neutral. This history shows a pro- clivity to violate the secondary boycott provisions of the Act. I also note that Respondent has twice before been found to have violated Section 8(b)(7)(C) by improperly picketing for recognition. an object of its conduct in the instant case. Moreover, the facts in this case demonstrate that the Respondent is bent on utilizing secondary pres- sures in order to obtain a general goal, i.e.. the representa- tion of all security personnel within its jurisdiction. For example, the evidence in this case shows that Loewenberg told a Braniff representative that other airlines had cooper- ated with him, presumably in utilizing favored employers; LaGrone told a Hertz representative that Respondent was always interested in getting new members; Kurasch told an Allied representative that Respondent's practice was to picket the clients of firms which did not sign a contract and "the) usually lose the business." In these circumstances it is reasonable to anticipate future violations and it is neces- sary to prohibit such unlawful conduct directed against all persons in connection with disputes with any and all pn- mary employers or persons. In view of the scope and breadth of the Respondent's activities and, because of this, of the Order, I also find it necessary to insure that notice of Respondent's conduct and the Board's remedy reach all interested and potentially affected persons. I raditional notice posting at places where employees of the parties involved herein or members of Respondent congregate is insufficient to notify all potential primaries and secondaries or members.20 I therefore will recommend that Respondent publish the notice at its own expense in a newspaper of general circulation in the Chica- go area. See United Association of Journeymen and Appren- tices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, Local 428 AFL (Frank W. Hake), 112 NLRB 1097, 1102 (1955). I lo i n tt, rolo,,,a Broliherhood u J El ctricl ar f orkerr, 1oeal 5)01, et a ISrniu- /l I.aLyir] v. ; L.R B. 341 Ui.S. 694. 7(15 706 (1951): N L.R.B. v. Interna riuorlo I otncm t' ()p erattng, tignin nere. I ,moa 571 [l.a e tie 1 st,5rln (u. ], 317 F.2d 638. 644 (8th (ir. 1963): .L. R B. v. loeal 282. Internatiional Brother hdn cc ITnowern, (C hoffft;rrs, 14'archouenien, and c Helpers of Aicrida /S' S lri( l, ig ( oyr . 428 : 2d 994. 999 (2d (Cir. 1970) -(I here is testimony that Respondent has 18.000 members 310 GENERAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION LOCAL 73 Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the entire record in this case. and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act. I hereby issue the following rec- ommended: ORDER 21 Respondent General Service Employees Union Local No. 73, affiliated with Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, Chicago, Illinois, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Engaging in, or inducing or encouraging individuals employed by Braniff International Airlines or any other individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of their employment to use, man- ufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to per- form any service; or threatening, coercing. or restraining Braniff Internaional Airlines or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is forcing or requiring Bran- iff International Airlines or any other person to cease us- ing, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of Andy Frain, Inc., or any other producer, processor, or manufacturer or to cease doing business with Andy Frain, Inc., or any other person, or forcing or requir- ing Andy Frain, Inc., or any other employer to recognize or bargain with Respondent as the representative of such employees under the provisions of Section 9 of the Act. (b) Engaging in, or inducing or encouraging individuals employed by Hertz Corporation or any other individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufac- ture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to per- form any service; or threatening, corecing or restraining 21 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board. the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall. as pros vided in Sec 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted b) the Board and become its findings. conclusions, and Order. and all objections thereto shall he deemed waived for all purposes. Hertz Corporation or any other person engaged in com- merce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is forcing or requiring Hertz Corporation or any other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the prod- ucts of Allied Security, Inc., or an) other producer, pro- cessor or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with Allied Security, Inc., or any other person. or forcing or requiring Allied Security, Inc., or any other employer to recognize or bargain with Respondent as the representative of its employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of Section 9 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to ef- fectuate the purposes and policies of the act: (a) Post at its business office and meeting halls copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 2 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 13. after being duly signed by Respondent's repre- sentative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reason- able steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Deliver to the Regional Director for Region 13 signed copies of said notice for posting by Andy Frain, Inc.. Allied Security, Inc., Braniff International Airlines, and Hertz Corporation, if they are willing, at all locations where said employers normally post notices to their em- ployees. (c) Publish, at its expense, the terms of the notice in a form and size approved by the Regional Director for Re- gion 13 in a daily newspaper of general circulation in the Chicago, Illinois, area. Publication is to be made on 3 sepa- rate days within a 3-week period at a time designated by the Regional Director. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 13. in writ- ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order. what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. : In the esenl that this Order is enforced hb a judgment of Ihe Uniled States (Court of Appeals. the sords in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Ilabor Relaions Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the t nited States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relatins Board" 31 1