Fetzer Television, Inc.

FETZER TELEVISION, INC. 821 its fleet of taxicabs ; (c) all but one of the dischargees were experienced drivers long employed by Respondent; (d) the timing of the discharges ; (e) the reason given for the discharges ; and (f) the gossamer defense advanced by Respondent. Conclusion Upon the foregoing, I find that the employment by Respondent, of the dischargees was terminated ; and Respondent engaged in surveillance in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) as alleged in the complaint. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent in violation of Section 8(a),(1) of the Act set forth in section III, above , occurring in connection with the operations of Respondent described in section I, above, have a close , intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices , I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Inter alia, since a source of income for taxicab drivers is tips, I shall recommend that the dischargees be reinstated by Respondent and made whole for any loss of commissions or tips which they suffered as a result of their respective discharges , less any amount earned from other sources in the period from the date of discharge to reinstatement to their former jobs as taxicab drivers. Since Respondent admits that it is always short of drivers, no question is presented concerning displacement of drivers hired since the respective dates of the discharges. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is engaged in commerce as defined in Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The dischargees were discharged by Respondent , in violation of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act, for having engaged in concerted activities guaranteed as protected legal rights by Section 7 of the Act. 3. Respondent engaged in surveillance of its employees in violation of Section 8(a),(1) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] Fetzer Television, Inc. and National Association of Broadcast Employees and Technicians, AFL-CIO. Case No. 7-CA-2766. May 29, 1961 DECISION AND ORDER On February 23, 1961, Trial Examiner Owsley Vose issued his In- termediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Inter- mediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed ex- ceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief. The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter- mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in this 131 NLRB No. 113. 822 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommen- dations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Fetzer Tele- vision, Inc., Cadillac, Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall : 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with National Association of Broadcast Employees and Technicians, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargaining representative of all the technical and production em- ployees in the certified bargaining unit. (b) In any manner interfering with the efforts of the National As- sociation of Broadcast Employees and Technicians, AFL-CIO, to bar- gain collectively with Fetzer Television, Inc. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with National Association of Broadcast Employees and Technicians, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all the technical and production employees in the certified bargaining unit. (b) Post at its station and downtown offices copies of the notice at- tached to the Intermediate Report marked "Appendix." I Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Seventh Region, shall, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicu- ous places, including all places where notices to employees are custom- arily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notice is not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. . (c) Notify the Regional Director for the Seventh Region, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps it has taken to comply herewith. 1 This notice shall be amended by substituting the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" for the words "Pursuant to a Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner." In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words "Pur- suant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order " INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE This proceeding, in which all parties were represented by counsel, was heard before the duly designated Trial Examiner in Cadillac, Michigan, on August 1 and FETZER TELEVISION, INC. 823 2, 1960, upon the complaint of the General Counsel and answer of Fetzer Television, Inc., herein called the Respondent. Helpful briefs were filed on behalf of all parties. The issue litigated at the hearing was whether the Respondent, in violation of Section 8 (a)(5) and ( 1) of the National Labor Relations Act, has refused to bargain collectively in good faith with National Association of Broadcast Em- ployees and Technicians , AFL-CIO, herein called the Union. Upon the entire record , and from my observation of the witnesses , I hereby make the following: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 1. JURISDICTIONAL FACTS The Respondent, a Michigan corporation, operates Station WWTV at Cadillac, Michigan, a television broadcasting station. The Respondent does a gross volume of business in excess of $100,000 annually, and operates by virtue of licenses from the Federal Communications Commission. Upon these facts I find, as the Respond- ent admits, that it is, engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act, and that it is appropriate for the Board to assert jurisdiction. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED National Association of Broadcast Employees and Technicians, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Sequence of events 1 1. The certification of the Union; the first bargaining meetings On November 2, 1959, the Board issued a certification of the Union as the exclu- sive bargaining representative of the Respondent's employees in the unit described below: All technical and production employees at Respondent's Cadillac, Michigan, tele- vision station, including the continuity director, switcher-technical director and reg- ularly employed part-time employees, but excluding on-the-air personnel, the pro- gram director, traffic department personnel, office clerical employees, salesmen, watchmen, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. At the first bargaining meeting, which was held on November 24, 1959, the Union's representatives presented the Respondent with a proposed contract, containing, among others, provisions for a union shop, dues checkoff, 90-day probationary pe- riod, a grievance procedure culminating in arbitration, a no-strike clause, and mis- cellaneous provisions covering hours, overtime payments, vacations and holidays, sick leave, and seniority. No wage proposal was included in the Union's proposed contract. Representing the Union at this meeting were Norman Bradshaw, an engineer; George Labbe, a cameraman; Gordon Stone, a maintenance employee and former part-time cameraman; and Donald Cheney, a representative of the Union from Chicago. Cletus Eugene Ellerman, a vice president of the Respondent and general manager of the station, was the principal representative of the Respond- ent at this and subsequent meetings. After explaining the Union's proposals and suggesting certain changes in them, the union spokesman protested the Respondent's action in relieving Stone of his part-time camera duties and threatened the filing of unfair labor practice charges. The meeting was a brief one, lasting only about 45 minutes. On November 30, 1959, the Respondent discharged George Labbe. The Union thereafter filed charges with the Board based on the discharge of Labbe, the Re- spondent's relieving Stone of camera duties, and certain other acts and conduct on the Respondent's part. These charges ultimately culminated in a decision and order of the Board holding in effect that the Company's action in discharging Labbe and relieving Stone of his camera duties was taken pursuant to its policy of having cam- era work performed only by engineers, and therefore was proper. The Board did find, however, that the Respondent had violated the Act by reducing Stone's working hours and by threatening certain employees with discharge and other reprisals because of their union activities .2 1 The following is a statement of the more significant facts bearing on the issues in- volved in the case It does not purport to be a complete statement of all the events in the case 2 Fetzer Television, Inc, 129 NLRB 660. A petition to review this decision is now pending In the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 824 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Representatives of the parties met very briefly on December 7, 1959. Ellerman took the position on behalf of the Respondent that Labbe should not participate in the negotiations. The union representatives informed Ellerman at this time that he was committing an unfair labor practice. The meeting broke up on this note, only 15 minutes after it had begun. 2. The January 25 meeting The parties again met at 1:30 p.m. on January 25, 1960. Commencing with this meeting, Mary Ellen Trottner, the Union's regional director at Chicago, assumed responsibility for conducting the negotiations for the Union. She was accompanied by another union official from Chicago, and by Stone, Labbe, and Bradshaw, who had been present at the previous meetings. Ellerman refused to take any part in the negotiations as long as Stone and Labbe were present, asserting that they were involved in the unfair labor practice proceedings which were then pending before the Board. Trottner sought to pursuade Ellerman to give her some information about the unit, explaining that she had come a long way for the meeting. Ellerman, however, re- fused, saying he would not do so "while the two were in the room." 3 Trottner then suggested that all of those named in the complaint be excluded from the discussion and Ellerman agreed. Since Ellerman himself was named in the com- plaint, Trottner and Bradshaw went into the office of Sebastian, the assistant man- ager of the station. The Union sought information of Sebastian concerning the names and titles of employees in the bargaining unit. Sebastian was uninformed about those matters, and several times had to leave to consult Ellerman. When Trottner sought to discuss the Union's contract proposals which had been submitted to the Respondent in November, Sebastian, after consulting Ellerman, said it would be impossible as Ellerman had an appointment in Traverse City at 4:30 p.m. Traverse City is about 50 miles from Cadillac. Trottner complained to Sebastian that the Respondent had not allowed enough time for the meeting. On January 27, Trottner urged Ellerman over the telephone to meet with the union committee. When he again refused, the Union filed charges with the Board based upon the Respondent's refusal to meet with the union committee. Subse- quently Ellerman agreed over the telephone to meet with the Union on February 11. In response to the Union's previous request, the Respondent, by letter dated Febru- ary 5, furnished the Union with a list giving the wages of the employees in the bargaining unit. 3. The February 12 meeting; the Union's modified proposals On the morning of February 12, Ellerman and one or more of his associates met with Trottner, Bradshaw, and the two individuals with whom he had previously re- fused to meet, Stone and Labbe.4 Trottner explained the provisions of the Union's proposed contract. Ellerman objected to some of the provisions and the Union agreed to eliminate several. Ellerman stated that he would never agree to a union shop, but consented to consider an agency-shop provision after it was explained to him. Ellerman tentatively agreed to include in an agreement a provision setting forth its present practice with regard to vacations, namely, giving 1 week after 6 months and 2 weeks after 1 year. He also tentatively agreed to pay time and one-half for any holidays worked. Trottner urged that the vacation provision should be liberal- ized in view of the fact that the employees were subject to being scheduled to work on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, and, accordingly, for all practical purposes, lost the benefit of holidays. With respect to the Union's so-called "turnaround" provision, the provision specifying the minimum number of hours elapsing between the completion of an employee's tour of duty on one day and the beginning of his tour of duty on the following day, Ellerman indicated that he might consider a 10-hour turnaround period rather than the 12-hour period set forth in the Union's proposed contract. However, Ellerman explained at this meeting that he was not making "any stipu- 3 Prior to this time Ellerman, as he admitted, had been advised by his attorney that he could not dictate the composition of the union bargaining committee * Trottner testified that there was also a meeting on February 11. I find that Trottner was mistaken in this regard, and that while Trottner had arranged for a meeting on this day, it was postponed until the next day because Trottner's flight was canceled. This is in accordance with Ellerman' s credited testimony. FETZER TELEVISION, INC. 825 lations on any particular subject" because he was opposed to negotiating "piecemeal," and would reserve- agreement until the whole contract could be agreed upon. Ellerman objected to the Union's wage demand as being "completely unrealistic." Trottner said that the Union had asked for more than it expected to be granted, and offered to revise the entire contract and submit it to the Respondent for its consider- ation. With this understanding, the meeting terminated at 3:25 p.m. By letter dated February 16, Trottner submitted to the Respondent copies of its revised proposals in which it had reduced its wage demands. In Trottner's letter en- closing its rewritten contract, she urged Ellerman to make any wage increase granted retroactive to January 1, 1960, and commented that she anticipated that the Re- spondent would have "a realistic counterproposal to submit" at the next meeting which was scheduled for March 4. In the Union's rewritten contract it proposed, among other things, a ban on strikes; a union shop; dues checkoff; a 90-day probationary period; a grievance procedure culminating in arbitration; an 8-hour day, 40-hour week, with 2 consecutive days off each week; a 10-hour "turnaround" period; vacations in accordance with the Re- spondent's present practice; double time for working on Christmas and New Year's; 12 days sick leave a year; and that seniority should govern the granting of wage increases, layoffs, and amount of severance pay. In connection with the Union's proposal that length of service should govern the granting of wage increases, it should be noted that on July 17, 1959, the Respondent had furnished to its department heads a wage guide for engineers, director-switchers, and announcers in which, as in the Union's wage proposal, periodic increases were based upon length of service. The scale of wages provided therein ranged from $80 per week for employees of less than 6 months' service to $105 per week after 3 years. 4. The March 4 meeting; the Union's efforts to obtain counter- proposals from the Respondent Trottner and the union committeemen met with Ellerman on Friday afternoon, March 4, as planned. They discussed various provisions of the Union's revised contract, including the 8-hour day, 40-hour week proposal, the seniority provision, and the Union's proposed wage scale. Trottner urged that the Respondent grant wage increases as of that day, so as to avoid a retroactive increase. Ellerman stated that he was not going "to agree to any retroactivity whatever," that "it was ridicu- lous " Trottner commented on the Respondent's failure to grant two employees, Bradshaw and Arrington, the wage increases to which their length of service en- titled them under the wage guide put out by the Respondent in July 1959. At this meeting Trottner asked Ellerman for counterproposals. He said he had none but would try to get some to the Union as soon as possible. Trottner then in- quired whether Ellerman would agree to any of the Union's proposals. Ellerman at first replied, "Well, maybe the opening paragraph," but he immediately stated that he would have to check it with his attorneys. Whereupon Trottner remarked, "Well you have had it for some time, and you really don't agree on anything." When Ellerman made no response, Trottner accused him of delaying and refusing to bargain. Ellerman disputed this and finally, after prodding from Trottner, agreed to furnish counterproposals early the following week. On Friday, March 11, the end of the week following the March 4 meeting, Eller- man sent Trottner a telegram proposing a bargaining meeting for Friday afternoon, March 18, and stating that the Respondent would have its counterproposal ready at this time. Trottner replied by letter dated March 14 in which she reviewed the negotiations , complained about his failure to live up to his promise to send its counter- proposal to the Union early the preceding week, and again accused him of stalling. She concluded with a request that she be furnished with the counterproposal im- mediately and stated that upon its receipt a date could be set for the next meeting. On March 15, Ellerman mailed the Union the Respondent's counterproposal, and at the same time reiterated his availability for a meeting Friday afternoon, March 18. Upon receipt of the counterproposal on March 17, Trottner informed Ellerman by telegram that it was impossible to schedule a meeting on such short notice, and re- quested a meeting for some time during the week of March 28. Hearing nothing further from Ellerman by March 25, Trottner wired Ellerman that day suggesting a meeting for March 31 and April 1. Ellerman's secretary replied by telegam stating that he would be available Friday afternoon, April 1. Ellerman's secre- tary subsequently rejected Trotttner's request that the meeting commence on Friday morning with the explanation that Ellerman had other appointments on Friday morning. 826 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 5. The Respondent's counterproposals The counterproposal submitted to the Union by the Respondent was in the form of a complete contract for a 5-year term. It included recognition and scope of work clauses and provided for an 180-day probationary period, for all employees, including those who had already been in its employ for over 180 days. With the ex- ception of its engineers, who were subject to a 180-day probationary period, the Re- spondent's practice was to require only a 90-day probationary period. In its pro- bationary clause the Respondent also provided that the employees would receive during the 180-day period the "minimum" scale of wages set forth in the contract. Since some of the employees were at that time receiving more than the minimum scale, this proposal rendered them vulnerable to a wage decrease. While the Respondent's proposed contract provided for a 5-day workweek, it did not provide for 2 consecutive days off. The Respondent's practice at that time, with respect to engineers, at least, was to grant 2 consecutive days off each week. The work schedules of the engineers for most of the first half of 1960 were introduced into evidence. These schedules show that with few exceptions, the engineers worked 5 consecutive days and had 2 consecutive days off. The wage scale proposed by the Respondent was in effect the same as set forth in its wage guide issued to department heads in July 1959, except that it was put in terms of hourly instead of weekly wages. The Respondent's wage provision author- ized it, in the case of employees whose work it deemed less than satisfactory, to reduce their wages up to $5 per week in 1 year. The Respondent offered time and one-half for 6 holidays, if worked. The Respondent's vacation proposal accorded with its practice at the time. The Respondent's contract igranted 2 weeks sick leave to employees who had completed their probationary period. Under the Respondent's present practice, it granted, in addition, 1 day a month noncumulative sick leave to probationary employees Under the Respondent's proposal, seniority was to be taken into consideration in connection with the granting of wage increases and the computation of severance pay, but not in the selection of employees for layoff, as was also requested by the Union. The Respondent's proposed contract provided for a grievance procedure which is applicable to discharges, except in certain situations including those where the Respondent is of the opinion that employees have engaged in "deliberate and aggravated misconduct." The Respondent's proposal omits any provision for ar- bitration of grievances which cannot be amicably disposed of by the parties. It includes a no-strike clause. The Respondent's contract contained no "turnaround" provision. 6. The April 1 meeting At the beginning of the meeting on Friday afternoon, April 1, Trottner asked that Bradshaw, the steward of the engineering department, be relieved of his duties, if necessary, to enable him to participate in the bargaining negotiations. Ellerman, as he testified, replied that "he did not feel obligated to change the operating pro- cedure of the station to allow any particular one to negotiate . `if it just hap- pens that Mr. Bradshaw is working while we are negotiating send somebody else, and when he is off he can come in.' " Bradshaw had been present at all bargaining meetings up to and including the April 1 meeting. The parties next discussed the opening clause. The Respondent agreed at the outset on the inclusion in this clause of phrase binding the Respondent's successors. After considerable discussion the parties also agreed on the unit description as stated in the Board's certification. However, the interpretation of this clause re- mained in dispute, with the Union contending that it properly covered building maintenance and janitorial work and the Respondent taking a contrary view. The parties also discussed the Respondent's increased use of "stringers." "String- ers" were freelance photographers who were located throughout the area served by the station. They were paid on a job basis for the pictures and stories which they sent in The Union objected to the farming out of this work to persons outside the unit. The Respondent explained that after its photographer voluntarily quit, it had decided to increase the use of "stringers" in order to provide better coverage for the station. The Union also protested the Respondent's use of salesmen, who were outside the unit. to do continuity writing. Ellerman stated that after its continuity writer quit in December 1959, it had not replaced him but instead had decided to have the salesmen expand on their notes, which they normally had previously prepared after talking with the customers. Thereafter the switcher-directors would polish these notes into acceptable copy which would be used on the air. This procedure, FETZER TELEVISION, INC. 827 Ellerman stated, resulted in the production of copy better suited to the customer's needs The Respondent at no time consulted the Union before increasing its use of "stringers"; nor did it confer with the Union before adopting the procedure of having salesmen do some of the continuity-writing work. Trottner objected to the Respondent's 180-day probationary clause, asserting that the Respondent only had a 90-day probationary clause at that time. Trottner also pointed out that the Respondent had failed to include any "turnaround" clause in its contract. The Union, in accordance with what it believed was Ellerman's position on this matter, had provided for a 10-hour "turnaround" period. Ellerman said that he would check into both of these matters. Trottner protested the Respondent's failure to provide for an 8-hour day and 2 consecutive days off each workweek Ellerman asserted that he needed more flex- ibility, that the Respondent had had employees working four 10-hour days in the past.5 Regarding the request for 2 consecutive days off each week, Ellerman said that he did not want to be tied down in that manner. Trottner urged that 2 conse- cutive days off was the Respondent's present policy. Ellerman, however, stated that he could not agree to such provisions in the contract. Ellerman did agree to post the work schedule 5 days in advance instead of 3 days, as provided for in the Respondent's proposed contract. In the past the Respondent had posted its schedules as much as 2 months in advance. With regard to sick leave, Ellerman stated on this occasion that he was willing to continue the Respondent's present practice of granting 1 day a month noncumu- lative sick leave to probationary employees and also allowing 2 week's sick leave to employees who have completed their probationary periods. However, when Trottner requested Ellerman to write the present sick leave practice into the con- tract, Ellerman refused to do so. The Union's request for double time for employees working on Christmas and New Year's Day evoked no response from Ellerman at this meeting, as he admitted. Trottner objected to the Respondent's proposed discharge clause because in cer- tain instances it left discharges up to ,the Respondent's uncontrolled discretion, with- out being subject to the grievance procedure. Respondent's proposed grievance procedure, as Trottner pointed out, was ineffectual since it did not end up in arbi- tration. Ellerman again stated that he would never agree to arbitration. Trottner took the position that without an arbitration clause the Union could not agree to a no-strike clause. Ellerman said he wanted a no-strike clause. The Union renewed its demand for a union or an agency shop. Ellerman ex- plained his opposition to such provisions, saying that such provisions deprive em- ployees of their freedom to decide whether to join a union. At one point Ellerman offered to give an 8-hour day, 40-hour week if the Union would yield on its seniority, union-shop, and arbitration provisions. Trottner again urged that the Respondent should agree to the Union's checkoff provision, commenting that the Respondent already was deducting various sums from the employees' wages. Ellerman agreed that this was true, and finally said, according to his own testimony, that if the Union would agree to a $5 reduction in the wage scale, he would go along with the Union's checkoff clause. Ellerman's bargaining philosophy, as exemplified by this latter proposal, was stated by Ellerman at the hearing as follows: By the philosophy I have always used in any of these negotiations is the fact that if a demand was made then I felt there should be a concession given. It couldn't just all be demands. I didn't feel I had to concede anything just because there was a series of demands given. Everytime there was a request made I asked for something back. On April 6, Trottner mailed Ellerman a counterproposal to the Respondent's dis- charge clause, adopting substantially the provisions of the Respondent's discharge clause, but providing for arbitration as the concluding step in the procedure if the parties were unable to agree on the disposition of the case. The next day, April 7, Trottner wrote Ellerman a letter strongly protesting the Respondent's position that janitor work did not come within the unit. In the letter she also asserted that the Union was "inclined to believe" that the Respondent's parceling out of continuity writing among switcher-directors and salesmen was "an attempt to water down the unit." Trottner also expressed concern about the Respondent's "farming out of" photography work and its elimination of the classi- fication of artist-film clerk. In conclusion, Trottner stated as follows: "We believe it is necessary to devote more than 2 hours at widely interspersed times to bargaining 5 Ellerman subsequently testified that employees had worked these schedules during 1955-57. 828 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and again request that you make more than a few hours and a single day available at our next meeting. I will be in touch with you by phone to set a date." 7. The meetings on April 19 and 20 Pursuant to Trottner's suggestion a further conference was held beginning at 10:30 a.m. on April 19. After adjourning for lunch the parties met again in the afternoon, and on the next day also. Ellerman stated at the outset that he had checked with his attorney, Mr. Howard, who advised that there was nothing in the proceedings in the prior representation case justifying the inclusion of the janitor on the unit.6 There was a further discussion of photography work, and when it de- veloped that some of the work previously done by the photographer would be done by newsmen, Trottner protested against this. Trottner again also expressed ob- jections to having salesmen doing continuity writing unless they were covered by the contract as to such work. In response to the Union's request, the Company furnished its proposal concern- ing the film clerk's wage scale which provided for $1.125 per hour for the first year. Having been informed by the Respondent that the film clerk was then re- ceiving $1.25 per hour, the Union argued that the Respondent's offer was less than the film clerk was presently receiving, and, accordingly, was wholly "unrealistic." Trottner asked Ellerman what he thought of the Union's revised discharge clause. Ellerman merely shrugged and said that the Respondent's discharge clause was satisfactory. Trottner thereupon informed Ellerman that the Union's revised clause was the one that the Fetzer station at Kalamazoo had with another union. Ellerman's reply is as follows: ". . well, we aren't going to buy that discharge clause. . . The Union has been in there, has been down there for twenty years . After you have been here that long you might get some of those things." Trottner urged that "it was necessary to-if they had a no-strike clause-to allow us to have our grievance procedure." Ellerman said that "no third party was going to decide. They would resolve it themselves. They were always fair." Trottner rejoined that "then the employees have no alternative other than a strike." The matter of the Union's demand for a union shop and dues checkoff was discussed. The Union proposed to accept either a union shop, agency shop, or dues checkoff, any one of the three provisions. Ellerman, after stating that there was too much bookkeeping involved under a checkoff arrangement, again offered to consent to a checkoff in return for a reduced wage scale. The parties again discussed the Union's proposal for a guaranteed 8-hour day and 40-hour week. Trottner pointed out that it would not cost the Respondent anything to grant this request since the employees were already working 8 hours a day and 40 hours a week. Ellerman offered to agree to a 40-hour week if the Union would drop its seniority, arbitration, and union-shop proposals. Trottner again requested 2 consecutive days off, reiterating that this was -the present practice. Ellerman, after questioning whether this was the present arrangement, said that he might want to change it. At this meeting the Union objected to the Respondent's probationary clause which provided for a 180-day probationary period for all, not just merely new, employees. The Company countered with a proposal for a 90-day probationary period for all employees. The Union protested that this penalized the union members, some of whom had long since served out their probationary period under the Respondent's practice at the time. Subsequently, after one of Ellerman's asso- ciates, informed him that production employees presently only had a 90-day pro- bationary period, Ellerman agreed to change the probationary period clause in ,the Respondent's proposed contract to conform to present practice. The meeting broke up with the understanding that the parties would meet again the following morning. At the session which commenced the next morning, April 20, the Respondent's wage proposal was one of the important topics of discussion. Trottner questioned Ellerman as to the significance of his couching of the Respondent's proposal in terms of hourly wages rather than weekly wages. His answer was that he could not guarantee either an 8-hour day or a 40-hour week. Trottner argued that the employees were on a 40-hour week at the present time. Ellerman replied, "Well, we might change that." Trottner contended that the Respondent's proposal would allow it "to take something away from them in the matter of working hours that they presently had." Ellerman reiterated that he would not agree to a 40-hour week, 8-hour day. 6I conclude that this position was well taken and accordingly make no finding based on the Respondent's stands regarding this issue FETZER TELEVISION, INC. 829 Trottner asserted that the wage scale included in the Respondents proposal was ridiculous, and mentioned that the top rate was less than the rate proposed by the Company in July 1959. She further asserted that the employees understood that the top proposal at that time was $115 a week. Ellerman, after first agreeing to raise the scale of the equivalent of $110 a week, finally agreed to make the top rate, to be reached after 4 years' service, the hourly equivalent of $115 a week. Trottner, however, refused to agree to the Respondent's proposed wage scale, in- sisting that the Respondent had previously promised the employees a higher top wage scale.? Trottner also referred to the fact that employees had previously been promised an increase after 6 months' service and that several employees had been told that their wages were frozen because of the Union. Trottner then as- serted that the Union had no objection to the Respondent's raising the wages of the employees who are enitled to such raises under its July 1959 wage schedule. Eller- man replied that he would not raise any wages until the contract was signed. Trottner brought up at this meeting for the first time the topic of mileage for employees driving their own cars on company business. She requested 12 cents per mile. Ellerman said the Respondent would continue paying 7 cents a mile, as it had been doing. When she requested him to provide for it in the contract, Ellerman said he did not think it was necessary and rejected Trottner's suggestion in this regard.8 The parties discussed the Union's "turnaround" provision which provided that time and one-half was to be paid for any hours which encroached upon the 10-hour minimum "turnaround" period between consecutive tours of duty. Ellerman ob- jected that this provision might result in the Respondent's having to pay time and a half on time and a half (if the employee were already on overtime). To resolve this Trottner offered to provide that if two premium pay rates were applicable only the higher one would apply. When this was unacceptable, Trottner commented that she had understood that agreement had been reached on the 10-hour "turnaround" period at a previous meeting. Ellerman's reply, according to Trottner's credited testimony, was that "she was putting words in his mouth." Ellerman admitted that he had told Trottner that he "had not agreed to any such thing." Ellerman further explained, "I had said 10 hours seems to be standard, because she kept comparing our contract to WKZO's contract at Kalamazoo, and in that contract there is a turnaround period of 10 hours. But I had not agreed to a turnaround period of 10 hours. I did not try to negotiate in a piece-meal fashion." Trottner again pressed for either a umon-shop or a checkoff arrangement, and also for an arbitration provision. The Union continued to seek these provisions throughout the negotiations. Ellerman again voiced his objections to such pro- visions, but announced that he would still stand by his offer to grant a checkoff arrangement if the Union would accept a wage reduction. Trottner stated as follows,' as she testified: I told him I didn't think their contract was any contract. We were actually getting less under this. We couldn't possibly sign this. The employees would be getting less than they were presently getting. They would have their wage scale reduced, and they couldn't be sure of an eight-hour day, forty hours a week, there was no arbitration procedure, and they were tied down for five years. I asked him why Fetzer operated so differently in Kalamazoo. They did have a union contract there. And he said, "Well, after twenty years you might be able to get something." The meeting broke up at 12:30 p.m. when Trottner stated she was going to leave and would file an unfair labor practice charge against the Respondent. Subsequently, a meeting between the parties was arranged for May 3, but this was canceled by Ellerman's secretary on April 27 in a telegram saying that Ellerman was in the hospital and that his schedule was indefinite for the next 2 weeks. Then followed an exchange of telegrams and letters between Trottner and Ellerman in an effort to arrive at a mutually agreeable date for further negotiations. One of these was a telegram sent Friday, May 6, and received by Trottner on Monday, May 9, in which a bargaining meeting was proposed for Tuesday morning, May 10. Upon receiving it Trottner wrote Ellerman charging him in effect with acting in bad faith 7 Trottner was apparently mistaken in this regard for under the Respondent's wage guide to department heads, which was issued in July 1959, $105 was the top scale, to be reached after 3 years' service. 8 Ellerman testified that he had offered to include this provision in the Respondent's proposed contract . I believe Ellerman was mistaken in this respect and , accordingly, find the facts to be as set forth in the text above. 830 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD in proposing meetings with so little advance notice. When Ellerman did propose a meeting with a few more days' notice, Trottner had a conflicting engagement. After further communication between Trottner and Ellerman, June 7 was finally agreed upon as the date for the next bargaining meeting. 8. The June 7 meeting At the June 7 meeting Trottner brought up the matter of wages at the outset. Trottner asserted that employees had been informed that the top wage scale under the Respondent's proposed schedule of July 1959 was higher, or was reached sooner, than under the schedule the Respondent was then proposing to the Union. Trottner also stated that the newly hired engineers had been offered a top wage rate higher than the Respondent had offered to the Union. Ellerman denied these assertions. Trottner continued to press Ellerman to agree to the schedule which she claimed had been adopted by the Respondent in July 1959. Ellerman continued to dispute Trottner's claims in this regard. Ellerman informed Trottner at this meeting that McDuffie and Bradshaw, two of the engineers, had been promoted to supervisory positions, and were not in the bar- gaining unit. For this reason Ellerman refused to give Trottner information con- cerning their wages. The Union had previously been informed, at the March 4 meeting, that Edberg, a third engineer, had been made a supervisor. Trottner renewed her request for 8-hour day, 40-hour week provisions. Eller- man stated that his position had not changed on any of these proposals. Trottner again argued that since the employees were presently working a 40-hour week, Ellerman was offering less than the employees presently had. After a discussion about the status of the part-time janitor, the meeting terminated about 40 minutes after it had begun. Then followed an exchange of letters between the parties. In Ellerman's letter to Trottner dated July 15, he stated that he was renewing the offer made at the last bargaining meeting, to be available at all reasonable times for negotiations for a collective-bargaining contract. Trottner's reply, dated July 20, challenged the Re- spondent's good faith throughout the negotiations. B. Conclusions concerning the unfair labor practices Section 8 (d) of the Act defines collective bargaining as "the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. .. . " This section, as the Board and the courts have held, imposes a mutual duty upon the parties to enter into the negotia- tions with an "open and fair mind and a sincere purpose to find a basis of agree- ment." 9 The Act condemns the taking by either of the parties to the negotiations of a "take it or leave it" attitude. Such a good-faith approach is required on the theory that discussions carried on in such an atmosphere "may narrow the issues, making the real demands of the parties clearer to each other, and perhaps to them- selves, and may encourage an attitude of settlement through give and take." N.L. R.B.,v. Insurance Agents' International Union, AFL-CIO (Prudential Ins. Co.), 361 U.S. 477, 487-488. Upon all of the facts of the case, I conclude that the Re- spondent did not enter into the negotiations with the good-faith approach required by the Act. The salient facts upon which this conclusion is based are summarized below. At the second meeting between the parties in December, Ellerman refused to meet with the union committee as long as Labbe, a former employee, was present, and Ellerman persisted in this position even though he was informed by the Union that this was a violation of the Act. Ellerman continued to adhere to this stand at the January 25 meeting, even after his attorney had advised him that he could not dictate the composition of the union bargaining committee. The Union's attempt at the January 25 meeting to discuss with the Respondent the terms of its proposed contract was rebuffed with the statement that Ellerman had an appointment in Traverse City at 4:30 p m. Since Traverse City was about an hour's drive from Cadillac, this meant that Ellerman had scheduled less than 2 hours for the meeting with the union representatives, although Trottner had come 450 miles from Chicago to take part. Despite Trottner's complaint that he was not allowing sufficient time for bargaining meetings, Ellerman set the March 4 and April 1 meetings for Friday afternoons, rejecting her request in the case of the April 1 meeting that the meeting be set for Friday morning. The Act requires that the OEg, N.L.R.B v. Darlington Veneer Company, Inc, 236 F. 2d 85, 89 (C.A. 4). FETZER TELEVISION, INC. 831 bargaining 'obligation be accorded the same serious attention as other business affairs of importance. J. H. Rutter-Rex Manufacturing Company, Inc., 86 NLRB 470, 506; Edward E. Gurian & Co., Inc., 128 NLRB 473. Ellerman's conduct in this respect not only evidences a lack of regard for this aspect of the Respondent's bargaining obligation, but also reflects adversely on Ellerman's sincerity in the bar- gaining negotiations as a whole. At the February 12 meeting, while accepting the Union's vacation clause, which set forth the Respondent's existing practice regarding vacations, and going along part way with the Union's holiday proposal, Ellerman voiced strong objections to the Union's other proposals at this meeting. To meet these objections the Union revised its proposed contract and mailed it to the Respondent on February 16. At the same time it suggested that the Respondent have counterproposals ready at the next meeting, which was set for March 4. No counterproposal was forthcoming from the Respondent at the March 4 meet- ing. However, at this meeting the parties discussed various provisions of the Union's revised contract. Ellerman would not accept any of them, but he indicated that he might agree to the recognition clause, after consulting with his attorney. After prodding by the Union the Respondent agreed to furnish counterproposals early the following week. At this time the Union's proposals had been in the Re- spondent's hands over 3 months. The Respondent's proposals were not furnished when promised and this prompted the Union to complain to Ellerman that the Re- spondent was "stalling." The Respondent's proposed contract was finally received by the Union on March 17. It proposed a ban on strikes for the 5-year term of the contract but omitted any provision for arbitration of grievances arising under the contract. With respect to the employees' probationary period and sick leave, the Respondent's proposals offered the Union less than the employees presently enjoyed. Under the Re- spondent's probationary clause, all employees had to serve their probationary periods over again, and in the case of production employees the period was double that which the Respondent had required in the past. And since the Respondent's probationary clause provided that all probationary employees would receive the minimum set forth in the wage schedule, several of the Respondent's employees actually would have had to take a wage cut if the Union had accepted the Re- spondent's proposed contract. The Respondent did not include in its proposed contract, as an offset to these dis- advantageous proposals, any of the provisions of which the Union was so desirous of obtaining, such as some form of union security, seniority to govern layoffs, and arbitration of undisposed-of grievances. Nor did the Respondent include any "turnaround" provision in its proposed contract, although Ellerman had previously given the Union the impression that a 10-hour period was acceptable. The wage schedule provided in the Respondent's contract was the equivalent of that which the Respondent had adopted in July 1959, before the negotiations began but which it had not fully put into effect because of the pendency of the prior pro- ceedings. In addition, the Respondent's wage provision expressly authorized it to reduce wages under certain circumstances, but provided a limit of $5 per week a year. Here, as in N.L.R.B. v. Reed & Prince Manufacturing Company, 205 F. 2d 131, 139 (C.A. 1), cert. denied 346 U.S. 887, "it is difficult to believe that the Company with a straight face and in good faith could have supposed that this proposal had the slightest chance of acceptance by a self-respecting union, or even that it might advance the negotiations by affording a basis of discussion; rather it looks more like a stalling tactic by a party bent upon maintaining the pretense of bargaining." By the time of the April meetings the Union had heard about the Respondent's farming out of photography work to "stringers" and its use of salesmen to do a portion of the continuity writing. The Union protested these moves, which had the effect of placing work within the certified unit in the hands of employees or per- sons outside the unit. The Respondent sought to justify these changes in terms of the operating problems with which it was faced. However, since such changes in- volved matters about which the Respondent was obligated to bargain collectively with the Union (N.L.R.B. v. Brown-Dunkin Company, Inc., 287 F. 2d 17 (C.A. 10) ), the Respondent was obligated to confer with the Union about these changes before putting them in effect, regardless of the justification for making them. The Re- spondent's failure to do so, in my opinion, further evidences the Respondent's failure to take seriously its obligation to bargain collectively with the Union in good faith. While agreement was tentatively reached at the April meetings on several in- nocuous clauses in the Union's proposed contract, as to matters of substance the Respondent continued to insist upon the provisions of its proposed contract. Under 832 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the Respondent's wage offer, several of the employees stood to suffer a wage cut, Only long-service employees, of whom there were but two, at most, in the unit, stood ultimately to gain from the Respondent's wage offer. Except with regard to the latter, the Respondent's proposed wage scale was the same as that set forth iii its July 1959 wage guide. Although, as the Union pointed out, the employees were then working an 8-hour day, 40-hour week, and, with rare exceptions , had 2 con- secutive days off each week, the Respondent refused to guarantee the continuance of such conditions. Respondent's explanation was that it might want to change these conditions . In effect, the Respondent was insisting on the right to take away beneficial working conditions which the employees were then enjoying. The Re- spondent refused to accede to the Union' s request that it include in the contract provisions setting forth its present practice regarding sick leave, and also as to the payment of mileage for the use of the employees' cars in the Respondent's business. The Board and the courts have held that an employer's insistence upon a reduction of employee benefits may properly be taken into consideration in appraising the employer's good faith in the negotiations . Cathey Lumber Company, 86 NLRB 157, 167-168; Northeastern Indiana Broadcasting Co., Inc., 88 NLRB 1381, 1382; N.L.R.B. v Deena Artware Inc., 198 F. 2d 645, 648, 650 (CA. 6), cert. denied 345 U S. 906. I find, in accordance with these decisions, that the Respondent's conduct summarized above is indicative of bad faith in the negotiations. The Union at the April meetings abandoned its insistence upon a union-shop clause and offered to accept either a dues checkoff or an agency-shop provision . The Re- spondent's answer was that it would accept a dues checkoff provision if the Union would agree to a $5 reduction in the weekly wage scale . Ellerman's "philosophy" in the negotiations , as he explained at the hearing, required that he insist upon some- thing in return for every concession given. Such an attitude hardly reflects a dis- position to consider proposals on their own merits. Consistent with this philosophy, the Respondent offered to guarantee a 40-hour week, which was the Respondent's practice at the time, if the Union would drop its demands for seniority in layoffs, union security, and arbitration of grievances under the contract . Since these were demands which were just as vital to the Union as were the Respondent's demands for a no-strike clause and the right unilaterally to effect discharges of employees it believed guilty of "aggravated misconduct ," the Respondent cannot have seriously entertained the belief that the Union would agree to surrender these significant pro- visions in return for a written guarantee to continue existing working conditions. The fact that the Respondent should make these offers, which had no reasonable possibility of acceptance, in my opinion , is a further indication that the Respondent was not genuinely interested in finding a basis for agreement with the Union. At one of these April meetings, Ellerman reneged on his prior tentative agree- ment to include a 10-hour "turnaround" provision in the contract. He did this in such a manner as to indicate that he was merely quibbling and was not concerned about the substance of the proposal in issue. Ellerman's disposition of the Union's argument in support of its revised discharged clause also shows the absence of any serious intention on his part to reach a common ground with the Union. Thus, when the Union urged that the Fetzer station at Kalamazoo had accepted just such a discharge clause in its contract with another union , Ellerman replied that perhaps after 20 years of bargaining the Union might be able to obtain such a clause at Cadillac. Earlier Ellerman had used the same explanation in dismissing the Union's protests against the Respondent 's efforts in the negotiations to curtail existing em- ployee benefits. Statements such as these warrant the inference , and I find that the Respondent still retained the hostility to the Union which it had displayed earlier in the drive to organize its employees when it threatened employees with reprisals on account of the Union and reduced the working hours of the president of the Union Local for antiunion reasons. The June meeting between the parties failed to effect any change in the bargaining picture. Ellerman adhered to his stand against the 8-hour day, 40-hour week, despite the Union's argument that this would be taking away from the employees working conditions which they already had. At this meeting Ellerman also announced that Bradbury, one of the principal union committeemen , and McDuffie , another of the engineers , had been promoted to supervisory positions and hence were no longer in the unit. The Respondent , however, failed to adduce any evidence of substance concerning McDuffie's supervisory duties. With regard to Bradbury, the Respondent showed that he was assigned to a regular night-shift position where he informed a junior engineer as to his duties each evening, and that he wrote up reports con- cerning the junior engineer 's performance on the job. I find this showing inadequate to establish Bradbury 's supervisory status. particularly in view of the Board's prior PETZER TELEVISION, INC. 833: decision in Sparton Broadcasting Company (WWTV), Case No. 7-RC-3697, 122. NLRB 1191, a case involving Station WWTV prior to its purchase by the Respond- ent. In this case the Board overruled the contention of the Respondent's predecessor that senior 'engineers at the station having duties very similar to Bradbury exercised- supervisory authority. In view of the prior course of the negotiations, I find, in, accordance with the Union's contention herein, that the Respondent's attempt to- exclude these two employees from this comparatively small unit (about 13 employ- ees), constituted an effort to "water down" or weaken the Union's representation.- in the unit, and that it further reflects the Respondent's bad faith in the negotiations. While in the foregoing summary, I have dwelt primarily upon the Respondent's- positions and attitudes in the negotiations, I am not unmindful of the fact that the Union's attitude also must be taken into consideration before any ultimate conclusion, can be drawn concerning the Respondent's state of mind in the negotiations. The- Union generally exhibited a conciliatory attitude throughout the negotiations, sought to explain the reasons for its demands, and frequently adjusted its positions in an effort to narrow the areas of disagreement. The Union was not seeking a wage- increase, but was merely asking that the Respondent put into effect the wage schedule which the Union believed the Respondent had adopted about a year earlier, before the negotiations began. As to vacations, sick leave, and mileage, the Union was seeking to have the existing conditions written into the contract. While the Union throughout the negotiations was seeking some form of union security, seniority in layoffs, and arbitration of undisposed-of grievances, in my opinion, the negotiations never reached the stage resolving the disagreement on these issues because of the- Respondent's general approach to the negotiations. Upon the entire record, I con- clude that the Respondent did not approach the negotiations as a whole with the "attitude of settlement through give and take" which the Act requires. Ellerman _ was willing to reach an agreement, but only upon his terms, and without interfering in any way with his complete flexibility of operations. While at times Ellerman briefly explained the reasons for the Respondent's positions and occasionally modi- fied the Respondent's proposals in the direction sought by the Union, with very few exceptions, Ellerman left up to the Union the making of the moves to narrow the areas of disagreement. This, in my opinion, is not mere "hard bargaining," as the Respondent contends, but rather bargaining with the "take it or leave it" attitude condemned by the Board and the courts. Accordingly, I conclude that the Re- spondent has not bargained collectively in good faith with the Union, as the Act- requires. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. All technical and production employees at the Respondent's Cadillac, Michi - gan, television station and officers, as provided in the certification heretofore issued by the Board, constitute a unit appropriate for collective bargaining within the- meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 2. The Union, on November 24, 1959, was, and at all times thereafter has been, the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in the certified unit for the purposes of collective bargaining. 3. By refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with the Union as the exclusive- representative of its employees in the certified unit on and after November 24, 1959, the Respondent has violated Section 8(a) (5) of the Act. 4. By engaging in the aforesaid unfair labor practice, the Respondent has inter- fered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of - Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to a recommended order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor- Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Re-- lations Act, as amended, we hereby- notify our employees that: WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with National Association of- Broadcast Employees and Technicians, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive represen- tative of all our technical and production employees. 599198-62-vol. 131-54 834 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with the efforts of National Associa- ation of Broadcast Employees and Technicians, AFL-CIO, to bargain collec- tively with us. FETZER TELEVISION, 'INC., Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Citizen's Hotel Company, d/b/a Texas Hotel and Frances John- son. Case No. 16-CA-1401. May 09, 1961 DECISION AND ORDER On March 7, 1961, Trial Examiner James F. Foley issued his Inter- mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and Was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Inter- mediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter- mediate Report,' the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions,' and recommenda- tions' of the Trial Examiner. 1 We correct certain nonmaterial inaccuracies in the Intermediate Report , none of which affects our concurrence in its ultimate findings: ( 1) The Union began its organizational drive at the Respondent 's hotel on or about July 26, not October 26, 1960 ; ( 2) Trial testified that he sat through the August 1 union meeting and told Catering Manager Duvall that none of Respondent 's employees had been present. Contrary to the Inter- mediate Report , he did not testify that he told Duvall what had gone on at the meeting ; (3) Manager Slack testified that when the business outlook began to improve , he discussed with Housekeeper Estes only the necessity of recalling more maids without referring specifically to Johnson and Williams ; ( 4) the statement in the Intermediate Report that Estes "would be unable to obtain maids who wished to stay nonunion" is not based on any statement attributed to Estes but is apparently a conclusion of the Trial Examiner based on the conversation between Estes and Washington ; ( 5) Williams and Johnson returned from their vacations August 15 and 22, respectively, rather than August 8 and 15 ; and (6 ) when Johnson returned to work she was reassigned to the 12th, not the 15th, floor. 2 The Respondent contends that Johnson and Williams were only temporarily laid off and were not discharged , as found by the Trial Examiner . We consider it unnecessary to decide whether Respondent initially intended to separate them permanently or tempo- rarily as, in either event, we agree with the Trial Examiner that their separation from Respondent's employ was caused by its opposition to their union activities. 3 In "The Remedy" section of the Intermediate Report, the Trial Examiner recommended that the Respondent offer Johnson and Williams reinstatement to the positions of maids on the sixth floor of its hotel, or substantially equivalent work , and that they be made whole for any loss of earnings they may have suffered from the date of their separation to the date of the reinstatement offer. The record shows that Respondent asked Johnson and Williams , on September 30 and October 1, 1960, respectively , to return to work Immedi- 131 NLRB No. 109.