Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Inc.

THOMPSON RAMO WOOLDRIDGE, INC. (DAGE TV DIV.) 993 performance Gull then decided to erect piecemeal, that is, in different locations on the project, rather than straight along from beginning to end as had been originally planned. Since this required the delivery of beams which it had not been anticipated Gull would need for some time, Respondent, because of pressure from Gull, re- opened its plant. Accordingly, I find that the Respondent truthfully and in good faith notified Local 46 in the letter of December 24 that it intended to close. There is no evidence to support the allegation in the complaint that since on or about and since December 1, 1959, the Respondent has refused and continues to refuse to negotiate and discuss in good faith with Local 46 with respect to the dis- charge of all its metal -lather employees and related matters. The record shows that the Respondent bargained and attempted to bargain in good faith with Local 46 until finally an impasse was reached. There is no evidence to support the allegation in the complaint that on or about December 1, 1959, and at various times thereafter to date, the Respondent has refused and continues to refuse to furnish Local 46 correct information relating to available employment for its metal lather employees and related matters. No- where does the record show any demand or request for such information by Local 46. 1 find no violation of Section 8(a) (5) by the fact that the Respondent, on and after reopening its plant on January 5, 1960, unilaterally changed existing wage rates, and other terms and conditions of employment of employees engaged in metal lather work because all this was done following a genuine impasse in bargaining negotiations. I further find that the Respondent did not discharge the aforesaid employees and thereafter failed and refused to recall or reinstate them in order to undermine Local 46's majority, and to avoid bargaining with Local 46 as the exclusive representa- tive of its metal lather employees. I have found, supra, that the Respondent was not motivated by discriminatory motives in discharging them and not recalling them in that the Respondent thereby practiced no discrimination to encourage or discourage membership in a union and accordingly did not violate Section 8(a)(3). Similarly here in discharging them and not recalling them thereafter, the Respondent's reason was entirely economic and Respondent's motive was not to undermine Local 46's majority or to avoid bargaining with Local 46 as the exclusive representative of its metal lather em- ployees. I therefore conclude and find that the Respondent did not violate Section 8(a) (5) as alleged in the complaint. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Inc. (Dage Television Division) and General Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers, Local Union No. 298, Charging Party and Dage Employees Association, Party in Interest. Case No. 13-CA-3592. August 16, 1961 DECISION AND ORDER On February 27,1961, Trial Examiner A. Norman Somers issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action as set forth in the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief.' i The Respondent's request for oral argument is hereby denied, as the record, including the exceptions and brief, adequately presents the issues and the positions of the parties. No exceptions were filed with respect to the Trial Examiner's finding that the Respond- ent violated Section 8(a) (3) and (1) of the Act by the discharge of Treece, and Section 8(a) (1) by promulgating a broad no-solicitation rule. These findings are hereby adopted pro forma. 132 NLRB No.,80. 994 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Leedom and Brown]. The Board has reviewed the rulings made' by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter- mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in this proceeding, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom- mendations of the Trial Examiner, with the following additions and modifications : 1. The Trial Examiner found that the Respondent violated Section 8(a) (2) and (1) of the Act by dominating and interfering with the administration of Dage Employees Association and by contributing financial and other support thereto. The Respondent contends that (1) the Association is not a labor organization, and (2) in any event, the Respondent did not unlawfully assist the Association or dominate or interfere with its administration. As to (1) Section 2(5) of the Act defines a "labor organization" as "any agency or employee representative committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning. grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment or conditions of work." [Emphasis supplied.] Thus, it is clear that, in determining whether the instant Association was a labor organization, the sole question is whether one of its purposes was to deal with Respondent concerning one or more of the matters enumerated above. The best evidence of the purpose of the Association may be found in its charter and bylaws. There it is stated that a primary purpose of the Association is to "in- form the management of members' problems, needs and desires" and to "counsel and advise with the management in all matters affecting human relations, harmony, safety, friendship and good living within the company." Clearly, as the Trial Examiner found, the foregoing statement of the function of the Association, is broad enough to en- compass (a) the communication by the Association to management of the employees' desires for higher wages or other improvements in their working conditions, and (b) the Association's "counselling and advising" of management as to what action it should take with respect to such matters. As against this primary evidence of the purpose of the Association, the Respondent cites statements made by management and by a repre- sentative of the Association, soon after it was formed, indicating agree- ment that the Association was not to operate as a "labor organization" or as a vehicle for "collective bargaining." However, any agreement that the Association was not to act as a "labor organization" is not enlightening in the absence of any evidence THOMPSON RAMO WOOLDRIDGE, INC. (DAGE TV DIV.) 995 as to what the parties to the agreement understood by the term "labor organization" as used by them. Any renunciation of "collective bar- gaining" is not material for the same reason, and, more especially, be- cause Section 2 (5) does not speak of "collective bargaining" but only of "dealing," a distinction stressed by the Supreme Court in the Cabot Carbon case .2 The Supreme Court there held, in effect, that the term "dealing" as used in Section 2(5) is broader than "collective bargain- ing" and embraces action by management on recommendations by em- ployee representatives. However, in its brief, Respondent contends that here, unlike Cabot Carbon, the Association did not even make recommendations, but' merely "expressed views and conveyed information" to management, which, in turn, merely announced to the Association its unilateral de- cisions relating to wages, hours, etc. It is true that the Court in Cabot Carbon did not pass on the precise question which the Respondent appears to raise here-namely, whether the presentation to management of employee "views," without specific recommendations as to what action is needed to accommodate those views, constitutes "dealing" with management under Section 2(5). We believe that it does. Moreover, General Manager Lahey admitted that he consulted the board of representatives 3 about their preference with regard to the selection of a day to be treated as a paid holiday. Finally, it is un- disputed that the Board presented to Personnel Officer Watkins a spe- cific grievance over the failure of an employee to receive a merit raise, which Watkins agreed to investigate, and that employees were en- couraged by management to, and did, enlist the services of Murray, a member of the board of representatives, to represent them in submit- ting their grievances to management. It is clear from the foregoing that, whatever role it expected the Association to play with regard to plantwide issues, management recognized that the presentation of individual grievances fell within the scope of the Association's respon- sibilities. Such function alone would suffice to constitute the Associa- tion a "labor organization" under the Act. Accordingly, we reject the Respondent's exception to the Trial Ex- aminer's finding that the Association was a labor organization' As to the Respondent's assistance of the Association, and domina- tion and interference with its administration, we believe that the Trial Examiner's findings are amply supported by uncontradicted evidence in the record and by Board and court precedent.' 2 N.L R B. v Cabot Carbon Company and Cabot Shops, Inc , 360 U. S. 203. 3 This was the governing body of the Association. 4 In so doing, we rely only upon the considerations stated above, adopting those cited by the Trial Examiner only insofar as they coincide therewith 5 The fact that even top management representatives were eligible to vote in the elec- tion of members of the board of representatives , in Itself, constitutes illegal interference 614913-62-vol 132-64 996 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2. The Trial Examiner found that the Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act by the interrogation of employees concerning their, and other employees', union sentiments. He relied on the undisputed evidence in the record that on January 20, 1960, immediately after the Union had distributed a circular in the plant, Supervisor Dalman in- terrogated a number of employees about their union attitudes and ad- herence, and asked at least one of them if she had heard what other employees thought about the Union. The Trial Examiner found this interrogation coercive when viewed in the light of the Respondent's entire course of conduct. The Respondent contends that such interro- gation was not unlawful because "it was a casual act of an inexperi- enced supervisor having no coercive context or purpose." Even if it be assumed, as Respondent appears to contend, that Dalman was moti- vated only by idle curiosity, we would still find the interrogation il- legal. Regardless of a respondent's motive, interrogation is generally deemed unlawful unless it is isolated. We do not regard the interro- gation here as isolated, since it was addressed to seven employees, by Dalman's own admission, and sought to determine not only their union sentiments but also that of their fellow workers, and the interrogation occurred in the context of other conduct found to be violative of Sec- tion 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act-namely, the promulgation early in February of an unduly broad no-solicitation rule, the discriminatory discharge of a prominent union adherent on February 17, and the Respondent's continuing illegal course of conduct with respect to the Dage Employees Association. Accordingly, we adopt the Trial Examiner's finding of unlawful interrogation by Dalman.6 3. The Respondent contends in its brief that the Trial Examiner participated unduly in the examination of witnesses, assuming the role of a "prosecutor" and displaying "antagonism" toward Respond- ent's witnesses. As a corrective measure, the Respondent urges that the Board remand the case, save for matters not excepted to, for hear- ing before another Trial Examiner. We do not deem it necessary to pass on this contention as we do not believe that the remedial action proposed by the Respondent is war- ranted, in any event. The Respondent has not excepted to certain of the Trial Examiner's violation findings and has indicated that it will remedy, or has remedied, those violations. The Respondent has ex- cepted only to (1) the findings of unlawful interrogation by Dalman, (2) the findings with respect to the Association, and (3) the form of with the administration of the Association. Detroit Association of Plumbing Contractors, 126 NLRB 1381 , enfd. as modified 287 F. 2d 354 ( CA.D.C.). This is likewise true of the fact that supervisors were eligible to serve as election officials in connection with the election of the board of representatives. 9 The Respondent excepts to the failure of the Trial Examiner expressly to find no un- lawful interrogation by certain supervisors other than Dalman who are charged in the complaint with such interrogation. As no evidence was adduced in support of such charge, we find that such other supervisors did not engage in unlawful interrogation. THOMPSON RAMO WOOLDRIDGE, INC. (DAGE TV DIV.) 997 notice required to be posted. As to (1), there is no issue of fact, the only contention by Respondent • being that, as a matter of law, the interrogation should be deemed innocuous. As to (2), we have relied only on uncontroverted evidence in disposing of the issues raised by the ' exceptions. As to (3) explained more fully below, we have re- solved this matter without passing on the Trial Examiner's underlying factual determinations. Accordingly, there is no question here of our having adopted any resolution by the Trial Examiner of conflicting testimony, or any disputed inferences drawn by him in determining the underlying facts; and, in deciding the legal points raised by the exceptions, we have examined de novo the applicable Board and court precedent and adopted the conclusions of the Trial Examiner only in- sofar as they coincided with those independently reached by us. Ac- cordingly, we believe that no useful purpose would be served, in any case, by remanding any part of this proceeding to another Trial Exam- iner, and the request that we do so is hereby rejected. THE REMEDY The Respondent excepts to various aspects of the Trial Examiner's recommended order, particularly the requirement that the Respond- ent's "main office" in Cleveland, Ohio, join in the signing of the notice to employees to be posted at the Michigan City plant here involved. The Trial Examiner deemed this to be necessary because of the signifi- cant role ascribed by him to the Respondent's director of personnel in Cleveland in formulating the antiunion campaign which culminated in the violations found herein. The Respondent contends that the Trial Examiner overstated the extent of the director of personnel's involvement herein. We need not resolve this point, for reasons stated below. The Trial Examiner would require that the usual form of notice be executed by "Dage Television Division, Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Inc.," as the employer, and that beneath this signature in the notice there he appended a statement to be signed by "Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Inc.," renouncing any interference with employee rights by the exercise of control over Dage Television Division. While such a procedure might be appropriate if we were dealing with two sepa- rate legal entities-e.g., a parent corporation and its 'subsidiary-that is not the case here, as the Trial Examiner himself recognized. It is not clear therefore what useful purpose would be served by having dif- ferent echelons of the same management execute the notice separately in the manner here proposed. If, as the Trial Examiner believed, the employees at the instant plant need reassurance against any reprisals by top management in Cleveland, as well as by local management, we feel that that purpose can be adequately served by requiring that the usual form of posted notices be signed by the Respondent under its 998 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD legal name only=namely, "Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Inc." That is the only entity to which our Order may properly be directed. The reference to "Dage Television Division" in the identification of the Respondent in the pleadings and the case caption is merely a matter of convenience and has no legal significance. It may appropriately be omitted from the Respondent's signature on the foregoing notices, and we will modify the Trial Examiner's recommendation accordingly. ORDER Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall : 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Dominating or interfering with the administration of Dage Employees Association, or any other labor organization of its em- ployees, or contributing financial or other support thereto. (b) Discharging or otherwise discriminating in respect to the hire, tenure, and conditions of work of Rachel Treece or any other employee for the purpose of discouraging membership in General Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers, Local Union No. 298, or any other labor organization. (c) Interrogating employees concerning their, or other employees', union membership, affiliations, or sympathies, in a manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights as guaranteed by the Act, or with a purpose of doing so. (d) Issuing, maintaining, or enforcing any rule prohibiting union solicitation or discussion by employees on plant premises during non- working periods; or issuing or using such a rule for the purpose of pre- venting activity on behalf of, discussion concerning, or expression of interest in the above or any other labor organization, by any employees during such times as they may lawfully do so; or under color of reports concerning activities or discussions occurring during such period, using such a rule to gather information concerning the degree to which em- ployees are vocal in support of or against the above or any other labor organization, or for any other discriminatory or illegal purpose. (e) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights as guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Withdraw and withhold all recognition from, and completely disestablish, Dage Employees Association, or any successor thereof (including its board of representatives or members thereof), as repre- THOMPSON RAMO WOOLDRIDGE, INC. (DAGE TV DIV.) 999 sentatives of any of its employees for the purpose of dealing in respect to grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work. (b) Rescind the rule prohibiting union solicitation or discussion on plant premises during nonworking time, as orally promulgated to the employees on February. 2, 1960, by William Relyea, assistant to Division Manager James L. Lahey, and as embodied in the no- solicitation notice of Division Manager Lahey, posted and dated February 5,1960. (c) Post at its plant in Michigan City, Indiana, copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix." I Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Thirteenth Region, shall, after being duly signed by an authorized representative of Respondent, be posted immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, in- cluding all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination or copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, or other data, and grant said agents such access to the plant premises, at reason- able times and without impairment of the Division's normal oper- ations, as may be necessary or desirable in connection with checking upon or reviewing compliance with the foregoing subparagraphs. (e) Notify the Regional Director for the Thirteenth Region, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Decision and Order, what steps have been taken to comply therewith. Rachel Treece has been offered immediate and full reinstatement to her former or substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges, and such offer has been re- jected; Rachel Treece has been made whole in the amount of $639.26 for loss of pay sustained by reason of the discrimination against her. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges violations other than those found herein. 7In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that : 1000 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD WE WILL NOT dominate or interfere with the administration of the Dage Employees Association, or any other labor organization, or contribute financial or other support thereto. WE WILL NOT recognize Dage Employees Association, or any successor thereto (including its board of representatives or any member thereof), and we hereby permanently withdraw recogni- tion from and disestablish it as representative* of any of our em- ployees for the purpose, in whole or part, of dealing with or dis- cussing grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work. WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate in respect to the hire, tenure, or working conditions of Rachel Treece, or any other employee, in order to discourage membership in or activity in support of or discussion concerning General Teamsters, Chauf- feurs & Helpers, Local Union No. 298, or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT interrogate any employees concerning their, or other employees', activities in support of, or attitude toward, the above or any other labor organization, in a manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing any employee or employees in the exercise of their rights under the National Labor Relations Act, or for the purpose of doing so. WE WILL NOT issue, maintain, or enforce any rule prohibiting union solicitation or discussion by employees on plant premises during nonworking periods; nor will we issue or use such a rule for the purpose of preventing activity in support of, or discussion concerning or expression of interest in the above or any other labor organization on plant premises during nonworking periods, or, under color of reports concerning activities or discussions oc- curring during such period, gather information concerning the degree to which employees are vocal in support of or against the above or any other labor organization. WE HEREBY RESCIND the prohibitions orally issued by William T. Relyea, assistant to Division Manager James L. Lahey, on February 2, 1960, and embodied in a written notice by Division Manager Lahey, posted and dated February 5,1960, against union solicitation or discussion by employees on company premises dur- ing nonworking time. The right of employees, under the National 'Labor Relations Act, to engage in such activity during nonwork- ing time will be duly respected. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights to join or sup- port any labor organization of their own choosing, or refrain from doing so, or in the exercise of the other rights guaranteed by Sec- tion 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, except to the extent THOMPSON ' RAMO WOOLDRIDGE , INC. (DAGE TV DIV.) 1001 that the same may be affected by any contract, if lawfully made in accordance with Section 8(a) (3) of said Act, which might re- quire membership in a labor organization as a condition of em- ployment. Under the guarantees of Section 7 of said Act, all our employees (subject to any lawful agreement under Section 8(a) (3) of the Act, previously mentioned) are free to become or re- frain from becoming members of, or applying for membership, assisting, or expressing interest in General Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers, Local Union No. 298, or any other labor organization. WE HAVE OFFERED to Rachel Treece immediate and full reinstate- ment to her former or substantially equivalent position , without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges, and such offer has been rejected ; and we have made Rachel Treece -whole in the amount of $639 .26 for loss of pay by reason of the dis- crimination against her. THOMPSON RAMO WOOLDRIDGE, INC., Employer. Dated------------------ By------------------------------------ (Representative ) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE This proceeding was heard before me in Michigan City, Indiana, on June 14, 15, 16, and 17, 1960, on complaint of the General Counsel, and answer of Respondent. The issues were whether Respondent dominated and supported Dage Employees Associ- ation, within the meaning of Section 8(a)(2), discriminatorily discharged Rachel Treece, within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3), and engaged in other specified acts of restraint and coercion of employees within the meaning of Section 8 (a)( I) of the Act.' All parties were present at the hearing and accorded full participation , of which the General Counsel, the Respondent , and the Charging Party availed themselves through respective counsel.2 The parties waived oral argument, and the General ,The 8 (a) (1) violations specifically alleged were interrogation of employees by super- visors concerning their union activities and preferences , and the promulgation by man- agement of a rule barring union solicitation on company premises at all times At start of bearing, the General Counsel , on motion granted , added a new specification to the effect that a supervisor threatened loss of employment if the Union represented the employees At the end of the General Counsel's case-in-chief, the Trial Examiner dismissed the alle- gation, ruling the supervisor 's statement to be an economic argument against unioniza- tion within the protection of Section 8(c), rather than a threat of retaliatory action within the ban of Section 8 (a)(1). 2 When the hearing opened , on motion of General Counsel , the Association , without objection, was formally included as Party in Interest The Trial Examiner advised Richard Loomis, chairman of the Association , that it had the right to appear by counsel or other representative , to examine and cross-examine witnesses, present evidence, and to have its position stated and considered on all matters . Loomis responded, in substance, that since the Association's defense in respect to the aspect of the case involving its interest was concurrent with that of the Company , it would rely on and adopt the defense as presented by company counsel , and hence, although he would attend the hearing as an observer on the Association's behalf, he would not enter a formal appearance for it. 1002 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Counsel and Respondent have filed briefs. Upon consideration thereof of the entire record, and my observation of the witnesses, I hereby make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT - I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT EMPLOYER Respondent, Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Inc. (formerly Thompson Products, Inc.), has its principal office and plant in Cleveland, Ohio, with divisions in other cities. Dage Television Division, here involved, has its plant in Michigan City, Indiana, where it makes electronic products, with annual out-of-State shipments exceeding $50,000 a year. Jurisdiction is undisputed .3 II. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Charging Party, General Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers, Local Union No. 298, is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. Dage Employees Association is an organization composed of all the employees of Dage Television Division in Michigan City, with at least 30 days' seniority. It is disputed, however, that it is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act, so this issue is left open pending consideration of the merits. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Domination and support of the Association within the meaning of Section 8(a) (2) 1. Introduction This aspect of the case, as indeed the case as a whole, concerns the conclusion to be derived from basically admitted facts. As applied to the Association, there is no dis- pute about the aspects of the relationship of management to it and of its functioning. Disputed rather is the conclusion that the Association is a "labor organization," within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act, and that Respondent's relationship is one of domination and support within the proscription of Section 8(a)(2) 4 2. Origin of the Association and management's current relationship to it James L. Lahey, general manager of Dage Division, testified that in 1956, in response to the interest of some employees in knowing about the Company's oper- ations and because he "was desirous of having a communication tool with [the em- ployees]" and of sponsoring "several social and recreational activities," he "suggested that they might like to organize an association for this purpose." Lahey further testi- fied that the employees asked how they could effectuate such proposal and that "knowing that one or more of our plants had a similar type organization we volun- teered to get copies of existing by-laws of an existing type organization and that we would furnish this to them." The bylaws as adopted and currently in effect contain eight articles dealing with purpose, membership qualifications, structure, etc. In briefest outline, membership in 3 For conveniences of reference, Respondent will, on occasion, be referred to as the Company or, simply as Thompson, and Dage Television Division as "Dage" or "the Divi- sion." There are occasional references in the record to Thompson or the main office in Cleveland as the "parent" body or company. This does not connote a dual corporate relationship of parent and subsidiary, but simply the locus of authority over all divi- sions within the single Company, including Dage. Section 8(a) (2) provides: It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer- s s s s r s • (2) to dominate or Interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it: Provided, That subject to rules and regulations made and published by the Board pursuant to section 6, an employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees to confer with him during working hours without loss of time or pay; [Emphasis supplied.] Section 2 (5) provides: The term "labor organization" means any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, In whole or In part, of dealing with employers con- cerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or ,conditions of work. THOMPSON RAMO WOOLDRIDGE, INC. (DAGE TV DIV.) 1003 the Association is automatic for all persons who are employed at Dage for at least 30 days, from the general manager on down to the rank-and-file. The governing body is a board of representatives and a chairman. These are elective offices for a term of 1 year, open only to nonsupervisory employees with at least 6 months' semority, but eligible to vote for them are all members, without regard to supervisory status, from the manager on down. The board of representatives holds regular periodic meetings jointly with representa- tives of management in Lahey's office. It also holds regular meetings of its own as a board, in the conference room of the Division, attended also by a representative of management. Lahey testified that the latter is either William Relyea, his assistant, or Bob Watkins, chief accountant, who, on December 1, 1959, was also made per- sonnel officer (the title given was "assistant personnel," presumably in deference to Relyea's chief responsibility in respect to personnel matters), a function of which was attending board meetings as management's representative. Chairman Loomis testified that this was pursuant to the request of the board of representatives to have a representative of management present at its meetings to help out and answer ques- tions as they came up. Loomis and Watkins testified these were in respect to matters not deemed important or basic enough for the joint meetings with the management body. By way of specific example, it was stated that it might be the details of some picnic or social event. On further inquiry, it was stated also that it might be a query over why, as between two specifically named employees, one received a raise and the other did not. The minutes show a rather more important role for the management representative at board meetings. The minutes of two such meetings show that mat- ters taken up at joint meetings with the management body immediately thereafter were decided upon as subjects for such meetings, at the respective board meetings attended by Watkins .5 It is not disputed that at these board meetings, Watkins has the full right of participation in all discussions of the board. At a joint meeting of the respective representatives of the board and of management on January 28, 1960, recorded in minutes of February 2, 1960, as amplified by the testimony of Watkins and Chairman Loomis, Watkins and Loomis were designated as a committee to "review and amend" the charter of the Associations The minutes of all meetings of the board, whether jointly with representatives of management or those held as a board with Watkins attending, undergo dual ap- proval-first by Loomis as chairman of the Association, and then by management through William T. Relyea, assistant to Lahey. It ,is not disputed that the Association is entirely subsidized by Respondent. All meetings of the board of representatives, whether as a board or jointly with the man- agement representatives, are held on plant premises, and the Association representa- tives receive their full pay for time consumed in attending. All elections are held on company time and premises, and all administrative expenses of the Association, including facilities, stationery, and clerical services, are borne by the Company. The Association has no provision for dues, and such treasury as it has is derived from but one source-the Company's share of the proceeds of a vending machine on the plant premises? 3. Purpose, function, and operation of the Association In denying that the Association is a labor organization, the answer alleges that apart from its recreational activities the Association acts "as a two way communication method to assist [the Company] in operating a harmonious and efficient plant." Article I of the bylaws states the purpose to be as follows: B. The primary purpose of Dage Employees Association shall be to work in the interests of friendship, harmony and safety among all employees of Dage Television Division by requiring its duly elected Board of Representatives and Officers to inform the management of members' problems, needs and desires which the Board may deem worthy of consideration; to counsel and advise with the management on all matters affecting human relations, harmony, safety, friendship and good living within the company, to plan and administer such ath- letic, social and recreational activities as are of general interest to the members, 5 The minutes of the meetings of the Board, dated February 29 and April 6, 1960, with Watkins in attendance at each, show preliminary decisions to take up certain problems relating to working conditions (described in the next subsection), which were discussed at the joint meetings with management, as recorded in the minutes, dated March 8 and April 11, 1960, respectively. 6 As of the date of the hearing, no action had as yet been taken by that committee 7 The vouchers produced by the Association indicate that this money is expended to defray the costs of social and recreational events 1004 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and to direct the raising of money for those purposes; and to determine how those funds subscribed by members for charitable purposes shall be apportioned among the several charitable organizations of this community. The Dage Employees Association shall also be the organization honoring continuity of employee service. C. The Chairman and Board of Representatives of this organization will also dedicate themselves to counsel and advise with the management on all matters affecting human relations, harmony, friendship and good living within the company. This issue turns upon what is comprehended by this generalized phraseology. "Members' problems, needs and desires," whatever else these terms embrace, do include the prime item in an employee's "needs and desires"-his emolument on the job and the conditions of his work. The testimony and the minutes of the meetings from September 25, 1959, to im- mediately before the hearing show that management and the board of representatives discussed wages and wage prospects, fringe benefits, and numerous matters relating to comfort and convenience of the job. Indeed, the advance notice of the meeting to be held September 25, 1959, shows a contemplated agenda therefor devoted to nothing else.8 The minutes of that meeting (dated September 28) show discussion of all these subjects, with a statement of the action on each as contemplated by man- agement, except that discussion of "wages and fringe benefits" was deferred pending receipt of the annual "wage survey review" from the Cleveland office. The next meeting as reflected in the minutes thereof, dated October 8, 1959, was devoted exclusively to discussion of the wage survey and fringe benefits. The minutes, amplified by the testimony of Division Manager Lahey and Association Chairman Loomis concerning the meeting, and Relyea's testimony concerning the board of representatives' function, indicate that the latter acted as spokesmen, or "communi- cators" to management of employee opinion concerning these matters and in turn to the employees of management's position in respect thereto. This function is rather pointedly suggested in the opening sentence of a letter from Lahey, to the force, dated June 6, 1956 (whose current applicability is not disputed but rather, asserted, Respondent having introduced it as embodying the subsisting grievance procedure, to which the remainder of the letter is devoted), as follows: I have been quite concerned over the problems of how all of us can get together to exchange ideas on many matters. I believe the Dage Employees Association will help in presenting your views to me; so that leaves the problem of keeping you informed on current events. The fringe benefits entailed the granting of an additional paid holiday, during Christ- mas week, with discussion of the specific day to be allotted, and changes in the coffee break procedure. The discussion of the wage survey included a description by man- agement of how it was prepared and a recital of its practical impact upon the em- ployees' wages. Wages and condition of the job were also discussed at meetings thereafter. It has been mentioned that pursuant to decision previously made at board of representa- tives' meetings attended by Watkins as management representative, certain matters were discussed at the respective joint meetings of the board with the management body immediately ensuing (supra, footnote 5). These meetings show that manage- ment and the board discussed "Fluctuation in Wages and Cost of Living" and a re- vision in the "Work Schedule," as well as matters concerning with certain physical conditions of the job, with a view toward their correction or improvement. Concerning grievances, just as the statement of purpose in the bylaws omits ref- erence to wages or working conditions as specifically encompassed within such phraseology as "matters affecting human relations . and good living within the Company," or within the opening sentence of Lahey's letter sponsoring the Associa- tion as a vehicle "to exchange ideas on many matters," so too does the ensuing The notice states The following subjects will be discussed at the next meeting with Management. 1. When will the speakers be connected so we can have music in the plant. 2 Wages. Hot water for machine shop rest room 4 Canopy or awning for the door at side entrance 5. Oil parking lot to reduce dust. 6 Company paid insurance plan 7 An additional paid holiday (Good Friday or day after Thanksgiving ) THOMPSON RAMO WOOLDRIDGE, INC. (DAGE TV, DIV.) 1005 grievance procedure as described in that letter omit specific reference to the Associa- tion as a means of taking up a grievance. But it describes what an employee may do if he feels he is "not receiving fair treatment regarding wages, hours, working conditions, or ha[s] any other problem." The procedure sets forth the familiar suc- cession, in taking up the problem, from supervisor to top management. It then states, "If you prefer you are entitled to appoint a fellow employee to act as your spokesman at any stage of the procedure ." Testimony of employees concerning management statements to them confirms what is rather implicit in the sequence in the letter itself concerning who that spokesman would be expected to be. Mary Ellen Hullinger testified that in the description of the grievance procedure orally given her by Superintendent Hedges when she was hired, she was told that a grievance is taken up through the Association representative; and she, Joan Sadler, Mary Ann Richter, and Rachel Treece testified that Division Manager Lahey in an address to the employees on the 1st or 2d of February 1960 (when Respondent was pur- suing, on a variety of fronts , countermeasures to a campaign touched off by a union circular), he, among other matters, described the grievance procedure in which he gave prime, if not exclusive, emphasis to using their Association representative for that purpose, specifically naming Dorothy Murray, one of the two representatives of the hourly paid female employees. Lahey testified that he explained the grievance procedure substantially as recited in the original description, but that he "might have used her [Dorothy Murray] as an example of an employee representative should they choose to use one." Whatever the emphasis or order of priority, it is not dis- puted that it is in the representative's capacity as the elected occupant of that office that such official's services are made available and used for grievance handling pur- poses. Lahey's assistant, Relyea, in testifying concerning his discussions with C. W. Robison, Respondent's director of personnel in Cleveland, immediately after the appearance of the Union's handbill of January 19, 1960, stated that also discussed as a countermeasure was the Association's "effectiveness as a communicator." On that score, Relyea made some comparison between the effectiveness of the Associa- tion's representatives in settling grievances concerning wages and working condi- tions of the hourly paid, as distinguished from the salaried, employees. It would seem hardly disputable that in the example cited by Personnel Officer Watkins of the kind of subject taken up with him in the Board's own meetings, the matter of the disparate treatment of two employees in respect to a raise was brought up by that body or one of its number in the capacity of representative or spokesman. In the only instance in the record of an Association representative's being asked as such to process a grievance, namely the enlistment by Rachel Treece of Murray's services to represent her in her grievance over fiber glass, which culminated in Treece's dis- charge, it was as her Association representative that she asked Murray to act and in which capacity the latter acted. And it was manifestly in a grievance handling capacity that the Association's representatives took up with management for cor- rection or betterment such matters as parking lot facilities (minutes of September 28, 1959, and February 29 and March 8, 1960 ), and "ventilation problems in module soldering area" (minutes of February 29 and March 8, 1960).9 That also was plainly its role in the matter reflected in the following extracts from the minutes 'of a joint meeting with management, dated June 7, 1960. The management was informed and expressed interest in checking into prob- lems both in the shop and in the office area which seem to need possible cor- rection. The feeling was expressed that some supervisors are a bit negligent in their efforts to promote harmonious working conditions among all employees. 4. Conclusion Controlling authority culminating in the Supreme Court's recent pronouncement in N.L.R.B. v. Cabot Carbon Company and Cabot Shops, Inc., 360 U.S. 203, would seem effectively to dispose of the grounds on which Respondent resists the conclu- sion that the Association is a "labor organization" and that it is dominated and sup- ported by the Respondent within the meaning of Section 8(a)(2). The specific question there, to be sure, was whether the organization in question was a "labor organization," but the issue of domination had already been passed upon affirmatively by the Board and upheld by the circuit court on the basis of indicia essentially the same as exist here, and the court cases cited by the Supreme Court in the Cabot Carbon opinion in footnotes 6 and 7 at page 212, are those in which the conclusion 9 Cf West Texas Utilities Co , Inc. v. N.L R.B., 206 F. 2d 442, 446-447 (C.A D C cert denied 346 U.S. 855 ; Northeastern Engineering, 112 NLRB 743, 748. 1006 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD of domination was based on the same kind of showing of total subsidization by the employer and a participating role in its internal operation as here.lo Basically, the defense seems to center upon the faith that the use or omission of key words nullifies whatever action might give them specific content: That if, the subjects concerning which the Association's representatives may advise with man- agement are described as "all matters affecting human relations, harmony, friend- ship and good living with the Company," a formula has been achieved for taking the Association out of the category of a labor organization even if, in actuality, the subjects discussed include the matters embraced within the definition of Section 2(5), such as grievances, wages, hours, and working conditions. The same faith in the transcendency of the word over the act would seem to inhere in the argument which Respondent advances that when the Association's representatives were "discussing" working conditions with management, as the minutes show them to have done, they were not "dealing" concerning them, as that term is used in Section 2(5)-an argu- ment which equates "dealing" with "collective bargaining," and in connection with which Respondent stresses that it has never had a collective-bargaining contract with the Association, and, indeed, that when Raymond Livingston, its vice president, as that official testified, came from Cleveland to Michigan City at the time of its formation to give the Association his blessing, he made it explicit that the Association may not be used for "collective bargaining." That argument is disposed of by the Supreme Court in Cabot Carbon and the body of authority, cited at page 212, to the effect that "the legislative history shows that the term labor organization was purposely phrased very broadly," 11 in order to encompass within the scope of Sec- tion 8(a)(2) organizations, such as committees, or plans, which, by reason of their dependence upon or subservience to the employer, could hardly do much more than "discuss." Respondent here resurrects such arguments as were unsuccessfully used in the Indiana and Matthews cases, supra, footnote 10, and ultimately disposed of by the Supreme Court in Cabot Carbon, that all the organization's representatives could do was recommend and that management made the final decision on these matters. The terminology used by Respondent in making the same point here is that management's decisions were "unilateral," which rather overlooks that dis- cussion, which admittedly took place, is inherently a bilateral act, and is a bit in the teeth of Respondent's avowal that the Association is a "two-way" communicator. Whether management's decision in such a situation be termed "final" or "unilateral," the answer thereto as given by the Supreme Court would seem manifestly the same (p.214): But this is true of all such "dealing," whether with an independent or a com- pany dominated "labor organization." The principal distinction lies in the unfettered power of the former to insist upon its request. Nor in the present state of the Act's authoritive interpretation is it open to serious dispute that an employer is dominating and supporting a labor organization, where every aspect of that body's existence is subsidized by the employer, where the em- ployer is the donor of its sole treasury, and the dominant position which an em- ployer attains through that kind of total dependency upon it 12 is additionally con- firmed by the cumulative force of the affirmative manifestations thereof-such as the automatic imposition of membership on every employee after 30 days without regard to his wishes; management's voice in the choice of the representatives through the right of every person, from the division manager on down, to vote for them; the presence and participation of management representatives at all meetings and the subjection to management approval of the minutes of all meetings, whether those held jointly with the management body or separately by the board of representatives in the latter's own capacity; and management's control over the organic charter and internal composition of that body, asreflected in the joint meeting at which a jointly composed committee was selected to "review and amend" the charter. These in combination hardly leave the conclusion of domination a subject of grave dispute.13 10 E g, Indiana Metal Products Corporation v N.L R.B , 202 F. 2d 613, 621 (C.A. 7) ; N L R B v James H. Matthews & Company, 156 F 2d 706, 707-708 (C.A. 3) u Indiana Metal Products Corporation v. N.L.R B , supra, footnote 10. The language is taken from Senate Report No 573 on S. 1958 (74th Cong, 1st sess.), p. 7. See Clegg Machine Works, 129 NLRB 1243, and cases cited. 18 See, among others, Clegg Machine Works, supra; N L.R B v. Stow Manufacturing Co, 217 F. 2d 900 (C.A. 2), cert. denied 348 U.S. 964; Indiana Metal Products and Matthews cases, supra, footnote 12; Harrison Sheet Steel Company v. N.L.R B , 194 F 2d 407 (C.A. 7) ; Pacemaker Corporation, an Indiana Corporation v. N L R B., 260 F. 2d 880, 883 (C.A. 7) ; Hotpoint Division General Electric Company, 128 NLRB 788, and THOMPSON RAMO WOOLDRIDGE, INC. (DAGE TV DIV.) 1007 The foregoing, indeed, would seem to exhaust every indicium of domination except two, which we discuss now. First is the fact that the impetus for the formation of the Association, on Lahey's admission, came from his own suggestion to the em- ployees for its formation and his supplying it, as the basis for its organic document, with the bylaws for like organizations in the Respondent's other divisions. This happened, to be sure, more than 6 months before the service of the charge in this case, and thus the finding of domination within the meaning of Section 8(a) (2) would be limited to the "administration" of the Association, rather than (if the forma- tion had also occurred within the 6 months' period) to the "formation" thereof as well.14 But the fact of the Association's deriving its initial existence from the initia- tive of the employer, taken in connection with evidence of domination inhering in a continuing course of conduct extending up to the present, simply underscores the Association's character as Respondent 's creature from the outset to the present.ie One detail sometimes found in other cases, and not present here, is that the organi- zation in question was formed at a time when an outside union had organized or was trying to organize the employees. However, what gives such a circumstance relevance is its bearing upon .the intended purpose of the supported organization, of preventing collective bargaining by using the sponsored organization as the means of "channelizing the employees' [impulses] or desires for representation [whether actual or potential] into directions of [the employer's] preference." 16 But that in- tention or purpose appears in the evidence of Respondent's use of the Association when the Charging Union made its appeal for employee support in a handbill issued January 19, 1960. We have previously alluded to the fact that, as testified by Relyea, assistant to Lahey, in the ensuing conference at the Division's plant between him and Respondent's director of personnel from Cleveland, among the items discussed in deciding upon countermeasures to the Union's leaflet campaign was the Associa- tion's "effectiveness as a communicator." Lahey's address on February 1 or 2, 1960, in which employees testified he espoused to the hourly paid girls the use of their Association representative, Dorothy Murray, for processing any grievances, was pre- ceded by the joint meeting with the board of representatives held January 28, de- voted to strengthening the Association, and in which the management-Association- composed committee was decided upon for reviewing and amending the charter. This was in a context in which Lahey, as Loomis testified, initiated the discussion of "recent union activity," noted that "we have been getting along .the way we were," and elicited agreement "that all employees should do their best to retain our present methods of operation," which Chairman Loomis testified meant their present form of representation. The other measures decided upon and employed are discussed in the later contexts, but it would seem manifest that the Association was used as an integral part of the program against the Union. Indeed the minutes, amplified by the testimony of Chairman Loomis, indicate that the meeting was used for reporting employee attitudes toward the Union. Representative Murray testified that Lahey cases cited ; Holland Manufacturing Company, 129 NLRB 776; NL RB v. Standard Coil Products Co, Inc., 224 F. 2d 465 (C.A. 1), cert. denied 350 US 902 ; Jackson Tile Manufacturing Co v NL R.B., 272 F 2d 181 (C.A. 5). 14 Axelson Manufacturing Company, 88 NLRB 761, 768; Northeastern Engineering, Inc , 112 NLRB 743, 755; Murfreesboro Pure Milk Co , 127 NLRB 1101, footnote 3. "Local Lodge No. 1424, International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO; at al. (Bryan Manufacturing Co.) v. N.L R B., 362 U.S. 411, is cited by Respondent on the proposition that an unfair labor practice finding may not be based upon Respondent's role in the formation of the Association. That, of course, is so, in that, as already in- dicated, the finding of domination can only be in respect to the "administration" of the Association, instead of also its "formation ." Supra, footnote 14 It is difficult to tell whether this is the extent of Respondent's reliance on Local Lodge No. 1424, IAM, or whether it also contends that under that case, Respondent's role in the formation may not be considered for any purpose. If the latter, the contrary is to be found in the very opinion on which Respondent relies. It is there held merely that prelimitation occurrences may not constitute the sole basis for impugning the legality of the within-limitation conduct at issue. But, as the Supreme Court noted (pp. 415-416), the prelimitation events "may be utilized to shed light on the true character of matters occurring within the limitation period," where the latter "in and of themselves may constitute, as a sub- stantive matter, unfair labor practices." On that point, the Court cited and quoted with approval from the Board's decision in the Accelson case, supra, footnote 14, where the Board made the same distinction in an 8 ( a) (2) case. 3s Ben Corson Manufacturing Co., at al ., 112 NLRB 323, 345. See also Frank R Cook Co, a Subsidiary of Telecomputing Corporation, 126 NLRB 805, and case cited in foot- note 25 thereof 1008 DECISIONS'OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD specifically asked whether there had been any union talk in the shop (398). This too was using the Association as a means of directing the employees' organizational, or representational desires, actual or potential, into channels of the employer's own establishment and preference, a preference which on Respondent's own avowal in regard to the purpose of the Association, rules out collective bargaining. It is found and concluded that since on or about August 29, 1959 (6 months before service of the original charge), Respondent has dominated and interfered with the administration of the Association and contributed financial and other support to it, in violation of Section 8(a)(2) of the Act, thereby also interfering with the em- ployees' statutory iights, in violation of Section 8(a) (1).17 B. The other unfair labor practices 1. Introductory statement: The issue as posed by certain admitted actions, and Respondent's contention pertaining thereto It is admitted that Richard Dalman, a foreman, on January 20, 1960, the day after a handbill was distributed by the Union, interrogated employees about their attitude in regard to the Union. Also admitted is that Respondent, the first week of February 1960, issued a prohibition against solicitation on plant premises, which ex- tended to union solicitation or discussion by employees at all times including non- working periods. Admitted also is that Rachel Treece was discharged, assertedly for refusal to perform an assignment on fiber glass, on the heels of a report to Re- spondent from the doctor to which it had sent Treece, that she was sensitive to fiber glass, and recommending she be relieved of that work, and that at the time the deci- sion to discharge her was made, Treece's leadership in the Union, as Relyea, assistant to Lahey, ultimately revealed on cross-examination, was both known and discussed. Respondent, in its defense, treats these items disconnectedly. It pictures Dalman's admitted interrogation as a casual act of an inexperienced supervisor having no coer- cive context or purpose . It admits that the no-solicitation edict, insofar as it applies to union solicitation or discussion by employees during their nonworking time, trans- gresses permissive bounds as established by controlling doctrine,18 but treats it as but a technical infraction, devoid of repressive intent. And it claims that the discharge of Treece was but an operationally motivated refusal to accord special or favored treatment to Treece in respect to her fiber glass difficulty. A proper appraisal of Respondent's actions here under review requires that they be considered in the light of the totality of its conduct. The initial item, already alluded to during the preceding discussion, as climatically revealed by Lahey's as sistant, Relyea, was his contact with the main office in Cleveland and the ensuing discussion of countermeasures against the appeal reflected in the union handbill. 2. The Division's contact with Respondent's director of personnel in Cleveland on appearance of the union handbill and the ensuing discussion of countermeasures When the union "flyer" or handbill appeared on January 19, Relyea, as he testified on cross-examination, at the suggestion of Division Manager Lahey, telephoned C. W. Robison, Respondent's director of personnel in Cleveland. The latter inquired about the updating of the Division's personnel practices, such as posting of the grievance procedure and preparation of a handbook, and following Relyea's reply, declared he was coming to Michigan City the next day. The next day, January 20, Robison came to Michigan City as announced, and held a conference with Relyea and Lahey (the latter attending part of the time). The dis- cussion was avowedly devoted to countermeasures against the union appeal, which wound up in a decision that there should be "all speed" concerning such matters as a 17 At Respondent's request I have taken official notice of and read a Government bulletin (Department of Labor Bulletin No. 1266), which compiles a list of clauses found in trade union contracts, In which employers, under certain limitations and qualifications ex- pressed in the contract, agree to compensate union stewards and other officials for time spent in grievance handling and processing. But these denote concessions won from the employer in a trade union contract arrived at through arms-length collective bargaining between two parties standing on equal footing, and as incidents to administering the contract. They are hardly equatable with a situation involving complete subsidization by an employer of an organization in all its aspects, where collective bargaining, on the employer's own avowal, is ruled out, and where genuine collective bargaining would in any event be aborted by the total dominance of one party over the other. 38 Republic Aviation Corporation v N L R B , 324 U.S 793. THOMPSON RAMO WOOLDRIDGE, INC. (DAGE TV DIV.) 1009 letter from Lahey to the employees, posting of the seniority policy and grievance procedure, and publishing a handbook acquainting the employees with Thompson and with Dage, and their personnel policies. Questioned as to his further recollection, Relyea testified that as part of the discussion of the Division 's personnel policies, Robison, as previously related, inquired about the Association's "effectiveness as a communicator," with Relyea indicating his satisfaction with the performance of that year's board of representatives as a two-way medium of exchange of opinion between management and employees , regarding employee problems, including wages and working conditions. Asked specifically what more he recalled, he testified that Robi- son's contribution to the discussion included also an exposition of the "usual sequence of events" in a union organizational drive, and that Robison outlined three basic steps-first "in the parking lot distributing literature"; second, "an attempt to sign up approximately 30 per cent of the employees" or more; and third and finally, filing a petition for an election. Relyea, after parrying the question, admitted that this in- formation was in connection with a plan of action to combat the union organizing campaign. He'admitted that also mentioned in that connection was that there might be an employee in the group who was "an inside man" for the Union, but the extent of Relyea's disclosure of the significance of that subject being gone into was that Robi- son told him an employee may not be discharged for union activity. The ensuing events, including Relyea's admitted later disclosure to Robison by long-distance tele- phone of the identities of persons discussing the Union and of Treece's leading role therein, again, as Relyea testified, being told by Robison of an employee's rights under Section 8(a) (3), raise the question of whether this legal caveat exhausted the purpose and extent of the discussion and later identification of the "inside man"-a matter to be considered in connection with the facts as a whole. 3. The steps in the antiunion campaign preceding Treece's discharge on February 17 The conference with Robison, ending with the "all speed" directive, galvanized management at Dage into an intense sequence of activity. Intermixed with activity within the immunity of Section 8(c) was action not thus immune . In the interest of comprehension , events will be narrated in their sequence, leaving the matter of the legal consequences to the conclusionary phase of our discussion. First in the sequence was the distribution on January 20 by Personnel Officer Watkins to Foremen Richard Dalman and Jay Cloud of a notice from Manager Lahey to the employees referring to "last night's unfortunate incident of the Teamster Union's attempt to organize the Dage employees" and anticipating his letter (as agreed upon in the conference with Robison ) to be mailed to them "more fully explaining our position in this matter." After this occurred apparently concurrent activity by Foremen Cloud and Dalman on their respective lines. The only conduct attributed to Cloud was a statement, as testified by one of the girls on his line, to the effect that an unorganized plant , such as Dage, received the bulk of customers' orders, because it can do the work cheaper, and as previously indicated (supra, footnote 1), the Trial Examiner at the close of the General Counsel's case-in-chief, dismissed the allegation based thereon that employees were thereby threatened with loss of employment if Dage became organized. Dalman, on the other hand, engaged, as is admitted, in questioning girls on his line concerning (to use his own expression) "where do we stand with the Union or what they thought of it." He testified he put that question twice-first to a group of five girls, and then to Rachel Treece and Mary Ann Richter (sometimes referred to by her married name of Honda, but generally known and referred to by her maiden name of Richter), who were working together.19 Dalman testified he did not recall the answers of the unidentified girls and corroborated Richter's and Treece's testi- mony, that the former replied she did not know because she had never worked in an organized plant, while Treece said she had done so and they treated her fine. Treece also credibly testified that in response to Dalman's specific query whether the union in that plant had been the Teamsters she answered it had been.20 "Treece testified that she heard a male voice at the time Personnel Officer Watkins distributed the Lahey notice of January 20 on Dalman 's line, and before the interrogation began, say , "I want some answers on my desk in the morning." She could not identify the voice, and since this item is of minor significance in the light of all uncontroverted matters, no weight is attached to it. 40 Dalman testified he did not remember that part of the conversation, but it may have happened. 1010 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD It should here be indicated that higher management at Dage knew that Treece 'had left Dage in 1956 to go to a plant under contract with Teamsters, and knew it at the time it rehired her on December 2, 1959, at a time when the Union had not loomed as an issue. Dalman's interrogation, with Treece expressing the only attitude favor- able to the Union, so far as the record shows, derives its significance in the light of later events. Treece was the first to respond to the union appeal by requesting an application for herself and also application blanks for other girls, her distribution thereof later coming to the attention of management. It also derives significance from the fact, appearing from the testimony of Dalman, of Plant Superintendent Carl Hedges, and of Lahey's assistant, Relyea, that the foremen were reporting to Hedges activities of girls on behalf of the Union and Hedges was passing this on to Relyea. The foremen, according to Hedges, named as their source, reports made to them by rank-and-file girls, Cloud indicating as his source concerning Treece's activity reports by Association Representative Murray. Dalman, indeed, testified that reports had come to him of union discussion by Treece and Mary Ellen Hullinger, another girl on his line. In connection with this last, there is Hullinger's credited testimony that within the week after the distribution of the Union's handbill, which would be several days after Dalman's interrogations of January 20 just discussed, he interrogated Hullinger concerning more than merely her own attitude toward the Union. He asked her what she thought about the Union and if she had heard of what other people thought about it. Hullinger replied that she had heard some were for it, others were not, but that she had no interest either way. To complete the recital of the countermeasures: On January 21, Lahey sent out his long letter to the employees, denouncing, as was Respondent's right to do, the motives and the affiliation of the Charging Union and inviting the employees to bring all their complaints and problems out "in the open." On January 28, he held the joint meeting with the Association's board of representatives, previously referred to, in which, in a context of discussion of "recent union activity" and an agreement to continue in the present mode of operation, a committee was appointed to review and amend the Association's charter. On February 1 or 2, he called a meeting of the force, and made the address in which, as indicated in the preceding section, he out- lined the subsisting grievance procedure, which included an espousal of the use of their Association's representative for that purpose, specifically naming Dorothy Murray 2t There was the preparation of the handbook (which as finally gotten out in March is an attractive and informative booklet, whose one questionable feature, so far as I can see, is the page, relevant only to the preceding phase of the case, which sponsors the Association). And then there was the issuance of a rule forbidding union solicitation or discussion on company premises, at all times, including nonworking time. The background and asserted reasons are discussed in the remainder of this subsection. It has previously been mentioned that reports had come to Relyea, relayed to him by Superintendent Hedges, from reports he received from foremen, and by the latter, in turn, from girls on the line, of Treece's activity on behalf of the Union. Other girls were mentioned as discussing the Union with her, but the sense of the record would indicate that this was in connection with her espousal of unionism, since, as appears, as of the time here considered, only she had signed up and, further, had obtained application blanks, which she was offering to other girls. On February 1, as Relyea revealed on cross-examination, Hedges had definitely identified her as distributing union cards. On February 2, Relyea came to Dalman's line and, after conferring privately with him, was introduced by Dalman to Treece and Richter. Relyea stated in substance that there had been union talk on company property and that it would not be tol- erated. Concurrently, Personnel Officer Watkins told the other girls that if they heard union talk on company premises, they were to discourage it and pass on to the girls that this was forbidden. During that week, as Relyea testified, he informed Robison of Cleveland of Treece's activity on behalf of the Union. On February 5, a notice was posted over Lahey's signature prohibiting "any unauthorized solicitations for any purpose on company time or on company property" on the ground, recited in the opening sentence, that management had learned that "solicitations for fund 11 The address also discussed the Division's business prospects and referred to its hav- ing been given the work of a New York company recently acquired by Thompson, by the name of Magnetic Recording Industries, the work of which was identified as MRI. Lahey indicated that there was interdivislonal competition within the Company for that work, and if Dage Division did not make good at it, the Company would transfer that work to the division in Columbus, Ohio. THOMPSON RAMO WOOLDRIDGE, INC. (DAGE TV DIV.) 1011 raising, passing the hat, tickets and organizational memberships have become more frequent in recent weeks." 22 There is nothing in the record to support the reference to recently ascertained in- creases in "solicitations for fund raising, passing the hat, tickets," and the only "so- licitation for organizational memberships," so far as the record shows, was that be- ing conducted in behalf of the Union by Treece. The attempt to explain this as but a restatement of an existing,rule against unauthorized solicitation on company premises rather failed under the)weight of Watkins' admission that though all com- pany rules are posted on the bulletin board, he could not say that there had been any prior rule posted concerning solicitation, the failure to produce any prior writing purporting to contain such a rule, and the manifest language of a new prohibition in which the notice is couched. The record persuasively indicates that this edict was newly invoked as part of the antiunion campaign and as an aid in it. Relyea's and Watkins' oral statement of the prohibition on February 2 was plainly aimed at activity on behalf of or dis- cussion as such concerning the Union. There is no credible indication that it was motivated by operational considerations, and every credible indication is the other way. Even the notice does not explain the edict on the ground of production or efficiency, but solely on the ground that some employees "regarded [it] as a nui- sance" (supra, footnote 22). No claim was made that the discussions interfered with production, except Hedges, who, in response to a specific question on that point on cross-examination, testified that Foreman Cloud had reported to him that the girls' "conversations ran over past the noon hour so therefore it was interfering with production." The implication would be that if the conversations did not run beyond the nonworking periods, it did not so interfere. On this score, Treece's testimony that apart from the morning after the union circular first appeared on January 19, all discussion of the Union took place only during nonworking time has no credible refu- tation in the record and is reinforced by the testimonies of Dalman and Relyea negating Hedges' testimony that Cloud indicated that the conversation he was re- porting ran "past" the noon hour. The three versions indicate that Cloud's report concerned a conversation reported to him by Association Representative Dorothy Murray, in which she identified Treece among others. Dalman testified Cloud men- tioned it occurred during lunch, and Relyea testified that "Mr. Cloud stated that one of the girls had told him that there were discussions or union talk during the lunch hour." 23 The manner in which the rule was applied indicates no interest whatever in any productive or operational purpose to be served by it, or in its actual enforcement except as a means of gathering information concerning the extent of employees' activity in support of or interest in the Union under color of reports concerning its alleged violation. One would normally have expected that if this rule was prompted by any operational considerations, the foremen would have been authorized or instructed to act upon any infractions by having it stopped. Hedges testified that when the infraction of the rule was reported to him by a foreman, he did not ask for or receive the names of the violators but simply told him to have it stopped. His testimony collides with Relyea's ultimate disclosure that Hedges both received and passed the names on to Relyea, with the further fact that no foreman, so far as appears, took any action in respect to any infraction except to report it higher up, and, finally, with Dalman's testimony that that is all the supervisors were instructed r+ The notice reads : It has been brought to the attention of your management that solicitations for fund raising, passing the hat, tickets and organizational memberships, have become more frequent in recent weeks. As you may know, this kind of thing is regarded by many people as a nuisance ; it may constitute a hardship on some, and may lead to ill feeling on the part of others. For these reasons, any unauthorized solicitations for any purpose on company time or on company property is prohibited. He testified, "I believe he named Dotty Murray as the source. I believe he named Dotty Murray and that Rachel Treece was involved in the discussion. Now I don't think so. I don't know whether he mentioned Rachel Treece or not." Hedges made it rather clear that in the report for which Cloud mentioned Murray as the source, the latter did name Treece Treece specifically named Murray as having been present at a lunch hour conversation she then had with some girls concerning the Union. All versions unite in discrediting Murray's timing of the conversation as occurring "after" lunch ; and it would seem rather clear that Murray, in reporting it, could hardly have omitted Treece. 614913-62-vol. 132-65 1012 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD to do. He testified that when Relyea announced the rule at a meeting of the super- visory force on February 2, his sole instruction to them was that they bring any infraction of the rule against union solicitation on company property "directly to his attention." Relyea (responding to a question as to the basis for his volunteered statement, during his version of Treece's discharge, that "other people were much more vocal" than Treece about the Union) testified "my information came from many sources"; yet there was no indication that after his oral announcement of the rule on February 2, he told Treece or any other girl that they had been reported as flouting the rule, as would be expected if the rule was deemed to serve an operational purpose, or even such as was represented in the notice. Providing further basis for inquiry concerning its purpose is that Respondent can hardly claim to have been unaware of its invalidity when it issued the edict. The kind of sophistication which embraces the capacity to expound upon the "usual se- quence of events" in a union campaign, with an awareness of the need for a 30-per- cent showing under Section 9(c), and of the presence of an "inside man," and of the rights of employees under Section 8(a)(3), would, it may be reasonably in- ferred, embrace an awareness also of the normal right of employees in a factory, under Section 8(a) (1), to engage in union discussion or solicitation on company premises during nonworking periods 24 The rule thus looms as a deliberately insti- tuted prohibition of employee activity during a protected period, in which the record shows lust about all of such activity was taking place.25 The definitive finding con- cerning its purpose, in the light of its timing and the knowledge that it was encroach- ing upon protected activity of employees, is deferred pending consideration of the facts of the case as a whole. We come to its final phase. 4. The discharge of Rachel Treece a. Her employment history and discharge on February 17, 1960 Treece had been employed at Dage Division for a half year, ending January 1956, when she left for another job. She was reemployed at Dage on December 2, 1959, following a check of her earlier record.26 Her work was electric wiring and soldering and all related activity incidental to work on motors of electronic products. When rehired, she was placed on what was termed the "MRI line." This, as indicated (supra, footnote 21), was a recently established line of about eight girls, engaged in working on products formerly handled by a New York company, which was ac- quired by Thompson, and whose functions Thompson assigned to its Dage Division in Michigan City. During Treece's first month, the MRI line was supervised by one Max Kinola, and from January 4 on, by Richard Dalman, a newly hired supervisor, who was Treece's foreman when she was discharged on February 17. The MRI line had a variety of operating facets, such as assembling chassis, making and cutting wires, soldering front panels, preparing materials for assembly, etc., to all of which Treece would be assigned as the work required. Dalman praised her performance, and on January 15, after she underwent a periodic review of her performance, she was granted a raise. About that time, i.e., the middle of January, the MRI line acquired a supply of motors, the electric wiring of which was insulated with fiber glass. Some girls' skins reacted to fiber glass and in varying degrees. Some experienced itching but no more. Others sustained irritations or rashes , which were painful , and the attendant discom- fort of which are aggravated if they continued to work with that material. Two of these were Mary Ellen Hullinger and Rachel Treece. When their sensitivity to fiber 24Peyton Packing Company, Inc, 49 NLRB 828, enfd 142 F. 2d 1009 (CA. 5), cert denied 323 U S. 730; Republic Aviation Corporation v NLRB, 324 U S 793 25 Additional insight into the pervasive character of the prohibition and its use is Relyea's including, among the "many sources " of his "information ," the "ladies' rest room " 26 Treece testified to certain conversations preceding her employment, which indicate, as previously stated, that Dage management knew she had left her first employment with it to take a job at a plant under contract with a local of the Teamsters union. Whether, as Treece testified and as the persons respectively implicated denied, Relyea turned down an earlier application of Treece for reemployment, because Dage could not pay her the wages she was "used" to, or she had assured Hedges, when she successfully applied for reemployment, that she would not try to organize the plant, looms, in the light of all uncontroverted facts, as too minor an item to concern us here. The Union was then not a live issue at Dage, and what was then said or not said about it would, for reasons apparent from the record as a whole , have too little significance to warrant consideration. THOMPSON RAMO WOOLDRIDGE, INC. (DAGE TV DIV.) 1013 glass insulation was first noticed by Foreman Dalman, he relieved them without prior request, upon each exhibiting a rash on her skin. Dalman did not again put Hullinger back at fiber glass. Dalman put Treece back again on it the first week of February. This time Treece's same sensitivity evoked a different response. Intervening were the events discussed in the preceding subsection-the appearance of the union circular on January 19, the conference with Robison of Cleveland con- cerned with countermeasure, including the exposition of the three steps in the "usual sequence" of an organizational campaign and the reference, in connection therewith to the Union's "inside man," Dalman's interrogation of Treece and other girls on his line, with Treece expressing, so far as appears, the only answer favorable to the Union, and the reports to management indicating Treece's leading role in the Union, and the ensuing prohibition against union solicitation or discussion on plant premises at all times. On the third day of working on this second assignment at fiber glass, Treece told Dalman the discomfort was causing her pain and loss of sleep. Dalman insisted she continue at it. She then asked Dorothy Murray to speak to him as her Association representative. The message Murray brought back from Dalman was that "it was all in [her] mind." 27 Treece continued at it -a fourth day, and, the job being inter- mittent, she did other work the following week. On February 15, which was Monday of the week ensuing, Dalman put Treece back on the fiber glass job. After working at it 1 day, she experienced irritation. She complained to Dalman on Tuesday morn- ing, and he told her to either "work it, or go talk to Carl [Hedges]." The latter told her he did not see anything wrong with her and that the decision lay with Dalman. She went back to Dalman, who replied, he would not "back down," and referred her this time to Relyea. Treece went to Relyea's office, accompanied by Association Representative Murray. Treece told Relyea of her sensitivity to fiber glass, and, in response to Relyea's inquiry, indicated she had taken all the precautions prescribed 28 Addressing herself to Dalman's statement that "it was all in [her] mind," Treece told Relyea of how she had consulted her doctor, who expressed a negative opinion on whether she could be relieved of sensitivity to fiber glass. Relyea asked Murray for a suggestion, and she stated that a doctor might prescribe a salve. Relyea asked if Treece would be willing to go to a doctor chosen by the Company. Treece replied she would. Relyea then had an appointment made for her for that morning, with a Dr. A. E. Weiss at the Doctors Hospital in Michigan City, which the Division uses in medical cases involving its personnel, and she was given a slip to him for that purpose. After consultation and examination of Treece, Dr. Weiss told her there was no relief for her, and handed her, for delivery to the Company, his report reading as follows: This lady's skin is apparently sensitive to fiberglass which she is in contact with in doing one particular job. Rec: She no longer do this particular job. (S) A. E. WEISS. 27 Dalman testified on direct examination that he observed a rash "on the inside of her arm" this third day of her second start at fiber glass. He may have been confused as to the occasion, so I attach no weight to this. 28 These were frequent washings, wearing a denim smock with long sleeves, and rubber (or some synthetic) gloves. The gloves had to be abandoned for reasons apparently satisfactory to Dalman. She testified the oversized fingers got caught in the motor and, additionally, glass particles got into them, causing perspiration and stinging. Dalman admitted that Treece explained that the gloves made it difficult to handle the motors, and also admitted that the fiber glass material would get into her gloves, with no way to get them out He gave no indication that he challenged Treece's explanation when given. As to the smock, Dalman testified that "she did not keep them [the sleeves] all the way down." Treece testified she kept them down full length. Her testimony (quite apart from the fact that on all major items she was singularly corroborated by manage- ment witnesses and Dalman's testimony that the Union was not discussed during the session with Relyea which culminated in the decision to discharge her was discredited by Relyea's revelation to the contrary) achieves credit from the dual circumstance that Dalman gave no indication that he took this up with her as he had with the gloves, and that Treece could hardly have been gratuitously seeking to aggravate her problem by exposing more of herself to the source of her trouble than the efficiency of the operation required, as in the case of the gloves. Overshadowing both is that Treece's sensitivity extended to areas other than those exposed by the removal of gloves and the asserted rolling up of the sleeves, and finally all these considerations would seem rather mooted by Relyea's action, in that interview, of sending her to a doctor of his own choice, as related in the ensuing portion of the text. 1014 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Treece returned to the plant and showed it first to Hedges and then to Dalman. Dalman read it and said he disagreed with it. She told Dalman that the doctor said the rash was caused by glass particles imbedding themselves in the skin. Dalman said he still disagreed. Hedges suggested she go to Relyea . In the latter's office, she showed Relyea the doctor's statement, and asked whether this would indicate that the trouble was only in her mind. Relyea replied definitely not, but told her to "go home this afternoon and we will make a decision to settle this and you come back in the morning." This was at noon on Tuesday, February 16. Treece asked to be permitted to finish out the afternoon, but Relyea declined saying he did not "want [her] going back and talking to the other girls and upsetting them." Treece reported for work the next morning. A few minutes before starting time, Dalman approached her and sent her to Relyea. The latter told her, "Rachel, we have a problem," to which Treece answered, "So do I." He replied, "Our problem is greater than yours," and paid her off for all work up to the preceding morning. On Treece's inquiry, he confirmed that this meant she did not "have a job." She then told him "there is more to this than fiber glass," and he acknowledged, "Yes, there is." He then had Dalman escort her back to get her things, and when she left, Dalman volunteered that the action was not his and had been decided upon after a 3' hour conference among "all company officials" the preceding afternoon. b. The asserted reasons for the action taken and their analysis The crucial elements are here admitted by the persons implicated-Dalman's ex- pression of disagreement with the doctor's statement, Relyea's acknowledging that there was more to this than fiber glass, Dalman's disclaimer to Treece of responsibility for the action, and the prolonged management conference concerning Treece in the afternoon culminating in the decision to discharge her. Viewed as a purely operational measure, the action raises the question of what could rationally have provoked it, a question rather underscored by the fact that in the Division's records this was entered as punishment for insubordination. The relevant entry made the next day on the personnel action card for Treece reads as follows: REASON FOR TYPE OF ACTION: Refusal to work on job assigned by her Supervisor. Company could not change work assignment without creating problem with others. Heightening the puzzling character of the action is that Treece had been pursuing the steps outlined in the subsisting grievance procedure, as described in Lahey's letter of June 6, 1956, which winds up with the assurance "that if you bring a problem to our attention it will never be held against you," and that its last step, proposed by Relyea and acquiesced in by Treece, culminated in the vindication of her complaint by the very doctor to which Respondent had sent her. As Superintendent Hedges, Foreman Dalman, and Relyea, in that order, related the deliberations in Relyea's office on Tuesday afternoon culminating in the discharge, one would have been led to believe that Treece's role in the Union had not even been mentioned. None of them made any reference to it in their accounts of the con- ference. Dalman and Hedges, when specifically asked about it on cross -examination, denied that it came up, and Relyea did not make the contrary disclosure until the end of his cross-examination, after there had been elicited from him the disclosure of his contacts with Personnel Director Robison of Cleveland and his report to the latter of the active role of Treece in the Union. The story as originally unfolded was first that of the two other line foremen present on the conference, Jay Cloud and Tom Peak (neither of whom testified), the latter said he had had fiber glass on his line for years, from which they concluded that the fiber glass problem was not as serious as Treece had made it out to be if she had observed the proper precautions , and secondly that Dalman's firm position on the fiber glass matter was the outcome of prior complaints by Treece on other assign- ments, which led him to the conclusion, claimed to have been expressed by him at the conference , that he could not again transfer her lest he appear to be sharing his supervision with Treece, and that because he was deemed by Superintendent Hedges to be a competent supervisor, it was necessary to back Dalman as a matter of "basic principle." We discuss each in turn. The phase of the conference challenging the gravity of Treece's fiber glass prob- lem impeaches the findings of the doctor to whom management had sent Treece ostensibly to settle the issue . In this connection Relyea avowed that the doctor's report .,was not considered important," for Treece was only sent to him to prescribe a salve. But one would reasonably have thought this was on the premise that the prevailing THOMPSON RAMO WOOLDRIDGE, INC. (DAGE TV DIV.) 1015 precautions against fiber glass were inadequate and that a medical opinion was being sought on whether there was any other effective preventive or relieving agent. That aspect of the defense is additionally in the teeth of management action, which attests to the gravity with which it viewed the fiber glass problem. Division Manager Lahey testified that after Treece's discharge, upon reports made to him that fiber glass was causing some employees to sustain rashes, he ordered the engineering department to investigate the matter and to explore alternatives, that the engineering department submitted its report to him confirming that it harmfully affected employees, and recommending that the use of the fiber glass insulation be discontinued.29 Dalman's own recognition of the gravity of the problem is indicated by his having relieved Treece and Hullinger of the work when they exhibited their sensitivity to it before the advent of the Union, as he admitted having done also with other girls who were sensitive to it.30 Also, at the time of Treece's complaint, Dalman, as Hedges testified, reported to him he had been in contact with the purchasing department, which was "seeking a new vendor" for these motors. Dalman, on redirect, testified that the stock of fiber glass insulated motors ran out the end of February and was not con- tinued, and that he had told all the girls, including Treece, that the supply would not be continued after February. This last hardly squares with Hedges' testimony that Dalman, in reporting on his contacts with the purchasing department, stated the quest for a "new vendor" was "as yet without results," or with Lahey's testimony, given 4 months after Treece's discharge, that he was not sure yet of what action had been taken on the engineering department's recommendation that the use of fiber glass insulation be discontinued (supra, footnote 29). But if Dalman in fact knew beforehand what Lahey 4 months later was not sure ever happened, the action is enshrouded with even deeper incomprehensibility. Dalman's testimony that the fiber glass on his line was discontinued the end of February and that he knew about it beforehand would indicate that Respondent knew on February 16 that it was discharging Treece on a matter which would become academic after 8 more working days (Washington's birthday falling within that interval), and all that was needed was to make an accommodation for that short period-even less of an accommodation than that given another employee who, as a result of a burn sustained on her leg at home, was relieved for "a good month" of her regular assignment, which had re- quired her to be on her feet, and transferred to a sitting job until her leg healed. On the same score, Dalman's unspecified testimony of having informed the girls of the anticipated discontinuance of the fiber glass must be weighed against the absence of any indication that this was specifically pointed out to Treece or even came up in any of the conversations culminating in her discharge, at the very latest at that very time, when it would have seemed "natural" (E. Anthony & Sons, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 163 F. 2d 22, 26 (C.A.D.C.), cert. denied 332 U.S. 773, to have pointed this out in turning down her grievance in order to give her the chance to make up her mind whether to abide by the adverse decision, instead of discharging her outright. The defense that Dalman's reversal of his original attitude toward Treece's diffi- culty was caused by her "complaints" on other assignments collapsed in his own telling of it. His testimony strikingly corroborated Treece on every essential point even up to his statement to Treece, disassociating himself from the decision. He ex- hibited little relish for the role of the obsessively hardened taskmaster, and step by step, supported her prior denials on cross-examination that she complained on other jobs more than the other girls or that he had ever told her he thought so. The alleged complaints, as he testified, concerned scratches sustained on various jobs by Treece in common with other girls, and which Treece, like the others, simply called to his attention, the distinction being that he thought the others did so "only in a joke." The details of these alleged complaints, as Dalman related them on cross- examination, indicated, contrary to his threshold characterization of them on direct 29 Lahey gave two conflicting accounts concerning whether and how the recommenda- tion was put into effect Early in the hearing, when called by the General Counsel, he indicated that he accepted the recommendation and directed that their use be dis- continued after the existing stock ran out, but that he could not say whether the stock had yet run out. Later, when called by Respondent, he testified, "I am not sure" that "we are [going to discontinue their use]," giving, as his explanation, that "this became a legal matter" and that "once we were served with a charge involving a dismissal, I made no further change or suggestions about it." 80 In that connection he named Richter as a person who complained to him without success The circumstances indicate the contrary. She testified about other matters, but was not asked about fiber glass Treece later testified that the limit of Richter's re- action was a slight itch on her arm. There is no indication she either complained or requested to be relieved of it. 1016 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD as "picky," that he deemed them to have substance.31 One more complaint, described by Dalman on direct examination, and somehow set adrift by him in his recapitu- lation on cross, was that when Treece was put to work on the "slide line" (supra, footnote 31), she "complained" the chair did not match the working table. What this involved, as Treece's undenied explanation disclosed, was that her knees could not get under the table, and Dalman thereupon adjusted the chair to make that possible. Interesting on that score is that he, in turn, expressed his approval of Treece's per- formance on every one of these jobs, and on the "slide line" job, he testified he "complimented her on her dexterity in her handling of tools," stating further that "she did quite well." After thus sustaining Treece on the score of the reasonableness of the alleged com- plaints, even if made, he supported her denial that he ever indicated to her otherwise. He admitted that he never told her she was complaining unduly on any one item or too much in the aggregate.32 Going further, he admitted she never demanded to be changed on any assignment on which she allegedly complained and that such changes as he made were in response to the variegated requirements of the work and motivated by his "attempt to better balance [his] department or [his] line." 33 How much Relyea genuinely thought of these alleged complaints can be gleaned from his testimony that during all of this time, he was in almost daily contact with Dalman, in the course of which Dalman discussed "personnel problems" with him, yet he, as the Division's chief personnel official, at no time, so far as appears, spoke to Treece about her alleged complaints either. This rather puts him in this dilemma: Either he did not regard her alleged complaining as serious enough to mention to her at any time, even during the interview with her concerning the fiber glass difficulty, or, as is more likely, Dalman did not mention it to Relyea for the same reason that si Dalman testified that in stripping and tinning transformer wires, Treece sustained scratches "because the wires were stiff and they were pricking her hand in the handling of them, they are a very stiff wire" ; that when working on the "slide line" (a "balanced" line similar to an assembly line), Treece would go home with scratches under her fore- arm sustained by the burrs in the chassis; and finally on the third job, at mechanical assembly, he described as "a difficult job . . ., to screw these screws in, and she was complaining . . that she was getting blisters on it." ii This stamps with improbability the testimony of Association Representative Murray that when, at Treece's request the first week in February, she spoke to Dalman about the fiber glass difficulty, he told her that the fiber glass assignment was the "last resort" after Treece's prior complaints, with a particularity whose fulsomeness outmatched Dalman's on the stand. Surely, If Dalman had told that much to Murray, he would expectably have mentioned something about it to Treece when she spoke to him alone immediately before, or, at the latest, when she made her unsuccessful complaint to him on February 16. The above is quite apart from the other discrediting elements in Murray's testimony. These include her interjection of a cause for Treece's difficulty not even claimed by management, such as her wearing woolen clothing two or three times a week, her ultimate admission that she had no "sympathy" with Treece's grievance, and, as already pointed out (supra, footnote 23), her discredited testimony that at the time she ad- mittedly reported to Foreman Cloud concerning union discussion, she did not mention Treece, when it appears that Cloud reported Murray as the source of his report which was the basis for the admitted ascertainment of Treece's leadership, and her fixing the time of the union conversation flatly as one occurring after the lunch hour, when, as Dalman and Relyea testified, Cloud, naming Murray as his source, reported it as having occurred during that hour, with even Hedges testifying that at most Cloud reported it as having merely run "past" it. 830n this score , it may be of interest to quote Dalman's answers to the last question put to him on cross and the first on redirect : Q. And each time she didn't demand and each time your primary consideration was your problem of running that department? A. That is right. Mr. SHEERIN : I have no further questions of this witness. REDIRECT EXAMINATION Q. (By Mr. SCHWARTZ ) Rick, if it had not been for these complaints of Mrs. Treece would you have moved her around , as you did , from job to job within the department? A. Not as much as I did. This last, not particularized, and with the premise of the suggestion contained in the question already destroyed by Dalman's prior admissions , can hardly be deemed to have detracted from the force of the latter. THOMPSON RAMO WOOLDRIDGE, INC. (DAGE TV DIV.) 1017 he admittedly never did to Treece-no such problem existed. And all of this is rather apart from the transcendent consideration of how these complaints, anymore than the fiber glass grievance, could genuinely have been held against Treece in the face of the assurance, in the subsisting grievance procedure already alluded to, that pre- senting a grievance will "never" be held against an employee, and the statement in Lahey's letter of January 21 that the employees had a "standing invitation to get their problems out in the open." 34 But if it was thought that she was making too much of that invitation, here too it would have seemed "natural" (E. Anthony & Sons, supra) for Dalman or Relyea, or both, to have told her about it when she took up with them her difficulty with fiber glass. Relyea gave no indication that he ever did, and Dalman, as indicated, made it explicit that he never did. Yet if management felt it necessary to back up Dalman's asserted position that Treece's prior complaints made it untenable to relieve her of the fiber glass job on Dalman's line, there is still the question of why she was not transferred to another line, a matter which, as previously indicated, would have involved an accommo- dation for but 8 more working days, if Dalman's testimony is to be accepted, and on which Respondent in fact relies, that it was then anticipated that the use of fiber glass insulation would not run beyond the month. Hedges testified that of the 30 girls engaged in Treece's work of electric wiring and soldering, only 6 to 8 were on MRI (3 of whom were working on fiber glass), and the other 22 to 24 were under Foreman Jay Cloud. Hedges also testified that health is a proper basis for transfer- ring an employee to another line, if she is competent to do the work. No one questioned Treece's capacity. Least likely to impugn it would have been Cloud, her foreman, during her first employment, and under whom she had also received a raise. Relyea testified that the possibility of transferring her to Cloud 's line was con- sidered and discussed at the Tuesday conference. If it was, it would seem to have been lost on Hedges and Dalman, neither of whom, when giving their versions, indi- cated it was discussed, and Dalman specifically testifying he did not remember that the subject even came up. The reason why may perhaps be gleaned from Relyea's account of his claimed discussion of the subject with Cloud. He testified, on direct, that Cloud said he did not "want Rick's problems," but on cross, he indicated that this was in response to his having broached the subject to Cloud with the statement, "Look, this gal is mean and hard to get along with." He then volunteered that he "imagine[d] that Cloud knew of this beforehand." Asked why, then, he needed it to tell to Cloud, he explained, "I didn't want Mr. Cloud to think that I was trying to put something over on him." Asked how that could be so if Cloud's honest opinion was being sought as claimed, he had no answer. Equally interesting is what could have brought him to that opinion. He first testified he based this on Hedges' telling him "Dalman seemed to be a good supervisor," and when asked whether that "leads you to the conclusion that the . employee involved is mean and hard to handle," he replied "as supported by what I might know from other sources." Asked to explain this, he abandoned the plural reference and based it on his "opportunity to listen to discussions back and forth between Mrs. Murray and Mrs. Treece in my office." Asked to name his "sources," he wound up where he came in-that it was based on Hedges' "opinion as to Mr. Dalman's capabilities." The facts rather pointedly indicate that if, despite Hedges and Dalman's not remem- bering it, the subject of a transfer for Treece came up, as Relyea testified it did, with Cloud's saying he did not "want Rick's problems," the "problem" in question was of a different character. Relyea's final testimony on cross-examination left little doubt of what it was. c. Relyea's ultimate disclosures concerning the role of Treece's union leadership in connection with the discharge action As previously indicated, until Relyea's ultimate disclosures, one would not have thought from Hedges' or Dalman's versions or Relyea's on direct that the Union was as much as mentioned in the deliberations of the fateful Tuesday afternoon. It all came about at some stage in Relyea's cross-examination in which he indicated 84 The pertinent extract reads : If you have any question, or if there is anything about your job or about conditions in this plant that is bothering you, I'd like to remind you of the standing invitation to get your problems out in the open-bring them to us, so that we can talk them over and fix anything that may be wrong. These are not merely empty words. This is part of our way of living and working together here at Dage-and this is the way I hope it will always be. 1018 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the Division's countercampaign was touched off by his call to Robison in Cleveland on January 19 and the latter's visit to the Division the next day. At that it would have appeared from Relyea's initial version that all that was discussed was Lahey's proposed letter of January 21, the posting of seniority and grievance procedures, and the preparation of the handbook. Only after further questioning did the aspects of the discussion come to the light in which Robison described the three steps in the "usual sequence of events" in a union campaign, and in connection with it, the dis- cussion of an "inside man" for it in the employees' ranks. The revelation that Treece's leadership in the Union was discussed at the Tuesday conference came after the following admission: Q. Do you recall if at the present time any of these conversations that came up that Rachel Treece was the union leader, was possibly the union leader in the plant? A. I would say that it came up several different occasions after the first of February. Q. Do you recall what was said regarding Rachel Treece when she was mentioned in these several conversations and who said them? A. I mentioned to Roby [Robison] Rachel's name. It seems that the people that are most active in this we have named two or three people, including Rachel. Relyea added that Robison "kept reminding me again here that there can be no dis- crimination against employees [because] of union activity," and that he did not "recall any more positive suggestions" from Robison. Finally, he testified: Q. Did you consider the problem that she was a union member or discuss it with anyone when you were discussing her discharge with other people? A. Yes, I discussed it with Carl Hedges, I believe. Q. Do you recall what was said? A. I certainly don't recall the exact words. I recall discussing with Mr. Hedges here whether or not he believed that Rick [Dalman] had a genuine problem and I also recall that one or the other was mentioned, her activity here for the union. One or the other of us brought up the matter of her activity with the union. I was primarily concerned with whether Rick had a genuine problem. * * * * * * * Q. Do you recall why it was raised at this point? A. It was raised as part of the general evaluation of the situation that I had with Mr. Hedges and I believe before we talked with other line supervisors. * * * * * * * Q. Well, did you consider this in evaluating whether or not the problem of her continuing to work for Rick Dalman could be worked out or settled? A. Yes, I believe so. Asked how that entered into the picture, the witness parried it with a statement that three considerations entered into the decision: That of "not impairing [Dalman's] authority"; Hedges' "opinion of [Dalman's] performance"; and finally "about their transferring her." The question of how Treece's union activity entered into any of these three considerations was answered as follows: A. I can't fit this into the first, second, or third slot. I was primarily con- cerned in discussing the order of considerations here, Mr. Somers, I was primarily concerned with not impairing Dalman's authority. TRIAL EXAMINER: Well, I am not thinking of slots so much as just what (sic] that entered into the picture, if you can't- MR. SCHWARTZ: If at all. TRIAL EXAMINER: If at all, and if you can't fit it into the first, second, or third slot, does it have a fourth slot all its own? The WITNESS: Maybe it has a seventh slot, sir? TRIAL EXAMINER: But it has some slot sir? The WITNESS: It came up in our general discussions sir. I can't remember specifically.35 a5 After a recess, which followed completion of his cross-examination, Relyea, on re- direct examination, answered "No" to the question of whether his knowledge of Treece's activity in the Union "enter [ed] into your decision to terminate"; and as the explana- tion for that subject's having been mentioned during the conference, he testified : "I wanted to be quite sure that there was no discrimination here. I also knew that this THOMPSON RAMO WOOLDRIDGE, INC. (DAGE TV DIV.) 1019 5. Concluding findings The result would seem to leave little to the process of inference. The entire con- duct under review is disclosed as part of an integrated campaign worked out under the guidance of Robison of Cleveland. His exposition upon the three steps in the "usual sequence" of a union campaign and his raising the subject of the "inside man" for it in the employees' ranks and his being informed, as Relyea put it, "on several different occasions after the first of February" concerning Treece's leadership in the Union, rather answer the question of whether their purpose was to be constantly reminded of the "inside man's" rights under Section 8(a)(3), as opposed to being alerted to the tactical precautions to be observed in finding an occasion to eliminate such person as the threat or barrier to the avowed objective of frustrating the Union's efforts to attain the crucial 30-percent showing for filing a petition. The ensuing course of action in respect to Treece leaves little question concerning the motivation which alone gives rational content to an otherwise rationally incom- prehensible action. Here was a concededly competent employee, deemed thoroughly acceptable on the basis of her prior employment during which she received a raise, whose competence was again recognized in a raise given her a month before her dis- charge and 2 weeks before the conceded discovery of her leadership in the Union, being discharged as the culminating step in a grievance in respect to which she had just been vindicated by the very physician to whom Respondent had itself sent her to resolve that issue. This strange treatment is not only disparate from that accorded every other employee who experienced such sensitivity but even from that accorded her when she first called attention thereto before the advent of the Union. The more this odd performance was sought to be explained on operational grounds the more rationally incomprehensible it loomed as an operational measure. The aspect of the Tuesday conference which belittled Treece's difficulty with fiber glass was in the teeth of the findings of the doctor chosen to resolve that issue, and of management's subsequently ordered investigation culminating in the as yet ambiguously acted upon recommendation that the use of that material be discontinued because of its harmful effect on employees. The claim that the discharge was needed to vindicate the deci- sion of Foreman Dalman that he could not tenably take her off fiber glass because of her "complaints" on prior assignments collapsed in the face of management's earlier "standing invitation to get [their] problems out in the open," and Dalman's admis- sion that these "complaints" consisted of her exhibiting, along with the other girls, scratches sustained by the materials entailed in those assignments, that she never demanded a change in assignment, that he never told her she was complaining un- duly, and that they played no part in the changes in assignments made. Relyea's testimony that a transfer to Foreman Cloud's line was considered as an alternative measure, uncorroborated by the other two witnesses to the conference, rather buckled under his own revelation of it as a dialogue opening with his statement to Cloud, her one-time supervisor under whom she had received a raise, that "this gal is mean and hard to handle," and terminating with Cloud's response that he did not "want Rick's problems." In view of Relyea's admission that the matter of Treece's leadership in the Union came up in connection with whether Dalman had a "genuine problem," and in view of the affirmative manifestations in Dalman's own admissions that the purported problem of prior "complaints" never existed, what other problem could Dalman con- ceivably have had and what other of "Rick's problems" could Cloud conceivably have sought to avoid than that of having on his line the person who met the descrip- tion of the "inside man" for the Union? And what could have accounted for Relyea's characterization of Treece as "mean and hard to handle" which he attributed, apart from the incomprehensible reason given, to "what I might know from other sources," woman's activities didn't necessarily protect her Job for her but it didn't give her any greater rights than any other employee." One may perhaps be forgiven for being unable to take this belated "slot," never mentioned on direct and in manifest conflict with the admissions on cross, at face value. Even on its own it fails to hold, in view of the baselessness of the premise that it would have been giving Treece "greater rights than any other employee" to have honored its own doctor's recommendation consistently with the action taken without a doctor's report in respect to girls experiencing similar diffi- culty, including Treece, before the advent of the Union, or after nevertheless deciding her grievance adversely, to have at least remembered its assurance that "bring[ing] a problem to our attention will never be held against you," and offering her the chance to try to abide by the decision, instead of terminating her out of hand , and by the use of the word "refusal," in effect stigmatizing her in its permanent record as an insubordinate employee. 1020 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD than the subject concerning which he previously testified "my information came from many sources"-the union activity and Treece's leadership in it? 36 While it would be enough that Treece's leadership in the Union, as Relyea testified, occupied some "slot" in the decision to discharge her, it is difficult to conceive what other "slot" there was. A conference of the length of the one held Tuesday after- noon would, under the circumstances considered, be in any event incomprehensible as an operational measure, and, in the light of Respondent's "manifest interest and purpose" 37 in opposition to the Union and Relyea's admissions, the length of the session would seem to have no rational explanation either, except as one devoted not to what decision to make but how to make one already arrived at stick-a matter already portended by Relyea's rejection out of hand of Treece's request to finish out her day upon showing him the doctor's report. It is found and concluded that Treece was discharged because of her role as the Union's leading proponent in the plant. Thereby Respondent discriminated in re- spect to her hire and tenure in violation of Section 8(a) (3) and (1) of the Act. . As to other violations, we need not elaborate upon the proposition that Dalman's admitted probing of employees concerning their attitudes toward the Union, and another employee, additionally, concerning the attitude of her fellow employees, had a coercive thrust and purpose, when viewed in connection with Respondent's entire course of conduct, and that it thereby invaded the employee's protected rights in violation of Section 8(a) (1). See N.L.R.B. v. Abrasive Salvage Company, Inc., 285 F. 2d 552 (C.A. 7). The entire course of conduct also furnishes the basis for the conclusion concern- ing the purpose of the prohibition of union activity on plant premises during the nonworking period. Its initiation during an avowed antiunion campaign, its exten- sion into the period in which the employees have a right to engage in union discus- sion and solicitation under the Act, and in which the record shows just about all such activity was being conducted, the failure to link it with any operational purpose and the affirmative demonstration that none existed, the secrecy enjoined upon fore- men in reporting infractions of the rule and the secrecy with which they were han- dled, would seem rather cogently to indicate that the sole purpose envisioned for it was its specific utility in the antiunion campaign, in two ways-to scare off the timid and ferret out the bold. It would cut off the normally conforming majority from all communication of views with fellow employees on the subject, which is an in- dispensable incident of the exercise of their freedom of choice, and serve to identify the nonconforming remnant under color of reports of their recalcitrancy or disobedi- ence. Treece's leadership, to be sure, was already known before the edict issued. However, Respondent's admitted interest in the subject and its attendant desire to keep its information current would and, as Relyea's admissions indicate, did impel it to seek an answer, calculated to be supplied by the reports on infractions, con- cerning what employees were still "vocal" about the Union despite the prohibition, and to what relative degree The secrecy imposed by Relyea upon the supervisors in dealing with infractions of the rule and with which their reports on that score were handled within the supervisory hierarchy right up to Relyea, and indeed out- side the Division on to main headquarters in Cleveland, point strongly to them as a As a concluding fillip, Relyea, in the course of naming the "many sources" from which "my information came," upon being asked who else brought him "information," replied, "Mr. Sheerin, I don't like the word information as such " Asked how that could be, since be introduced the term, he disclaimed having done so, and he finally explained his aversion to it on the ground that "it implies some sort of recording system or some- thing which was not in existence." This reflected the general pattern of his testimony-a belated realization of the implications of what he was admitting, followed by an effort to retrench, only to open up a new line of inquiry leading to additional revelations, up to the point of realization. These were exemplified by such items as the disclosure of Robison's exposition on the "sequence of events" in a union campaign with a parrying of the question of how that specifically fitted into the subject matter of the conference, of Robison's reference to the "inside man" and Relyea's later informing him of Treece's leadership in it, with the claim that the only context in which he could recall it being discussed was an exposition upon the contents of Section 8(a) (3) , of Treece's union leadership being discussed at Tuesday's conference, with a parrying of how that specifi- cally fitted into the factors which he claimed governed the decision, followed by an attempted belittlement of that factor with the volunteered statement that other girls were more "vocal" than Treece, the inquiry concerning the basis therefor leading to his statement that "my information came from many sources," and with the inquiry con- cerning particulars culminating in his expressed aversion to the very term he introduced. 87 Texas & New Orleans RR Co v. Railway Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 549. THOMPSON RAMO WOOLDRIDGE, INC. (DAGE TV DIV.) 1021 main fount for the "many sources" from which Relyea testified "my information came," on which he based his volunteered comparison of the extent of employees being "vocal" about the Union as well as for the "other sources" to which he attrib- uted his "mean and hard to handle" characterization with which he assertedly broached the subject of a transfer of Treece to Foreman Cloud, and whose specific identification he rather pointedly evaded. The rule prohibiting union solicitation or discussion during the nonworking period was thus an invasion of the employees' protected rights and a consequent violation of Section 8(a)(1) on the dual score of its overstepping the permissible limits of a valid no-solicitation rule, even when issued without a discriminatory purpose, and of its having been issued and used for a discriminatory purpose. An explanation may here be in order as to why the Trial Examiner has limited the finding of illegality of the rule to the nonworking period, despite the finding that the rule had a discriminatory purpose. It is true, of course, that a discriminatory pur- pose normally operates to deprive such a rule of its "presumptive" validity even when it is confined to the working period. Peyton Packing, supra, footnote 24. Walton Manufacturing Company, 126 NLRB 697. However, the relevant allega- tion of the complaint, to the effect that the employees were warned "that there would be no union solicitation on Company property at any time," is construed by me as attacking the rule on the basis of its extension into the nonworking period. The next question concerns the relevancy of motive where the rule is in any event "presumptively invalid" (Walton Manufacturing Company, supra) insofar as it reaches into nonworking time. The answer is that although it is true that certain conduct is illegal where it has a normally restraining effect upon employees inde- pendently of a specific motive to accomplish that result, as, for example, interroga- tion occurring in a context reasonably giving it a coercive significance, or a rule barring union solicitation or discussion by employees during nonworking time, a showing that such conduct also had the motive to accomplish such a result and was an instrument in achieving a discriminatory purpose is added datum bearing on its legality. This is especially so where the evidence was presented on the theory that all conduct alleged to be illegal was part of an integrated plan of action intended to make its own contribution to the antiunion objective, which is avowed. The mo- tive and purpose of all three actions, the interrogation, the promulgation of a rule against union solicitation reaching into a period where employees have the right to engage in that activity, and the discharge of Treece, were fully litigated as inter- connected instruments in the achievement of an avowed undertaking. The motive and purpose of each are therefore before us for consideration and determination. Cf. American Newspaper Publishers Association v. N.L.R.B., 193 F. 2d 782, 799- 800 (C.A. 7), cert. denied as to this point, sub nom. International Typographical Union v. American Newspaper Assn., 344 U.S. 812.38 88 Respondent , as the last point in its brief , includes a contention that by participating in interrogation of witnesses , the Trial Examiner abandoned his judicial role for that of "prosecutor " It would seem more appropriate to leave that issue for determination by persons free of involvement in it. However, insofar as Respondent has been good enough to raise the matter at this level for initial consideration, it cites two instances, with the statement that "at this time, we do not intend to go into more detail in this regard," which, it would seem fair to state, is hardly calculated to give one a fair chance "at this time" to evaluate the position on the basis of adequate information concerning what is relied on in support of it. Nevertheless, I have examined and considered the two in- stances cited and also the whole record. Upon careful consideration, and with due allow- ance for the personal involvement before mentioned, I am satisfied and I conclude that the interrogation served the clarifying purpose which Respondent concedes to be a proper basis for interrogation by a presiding officer. The record has been studied with utmost care to determine whether it fairly indicates a departure from the standards of a fair and impartial hearing. Again with due allowance for personal involvement, I can say that I am satisfied that no party has just cause for complaint on that score, and, it may be fairly observed from the rulings made and the indulgences shown to counsel, least of all this Respondent. Careful consideration has been given to the distinction essayed by counsel between "clarify[ing] a point" and "mak[ing] out a point." To compensate for counsel's own failure to clarify that distinction, I have read every implication into it favorable to his position, and, after doing so, I must nevertheless say that I cannot see its validity or perceive its pertinency here in the light of the conduct of the hearing as a whole, the manifestly clarifying purpose for the points "ma[dej," and the propriety, indeed the duty, of one vested with the decisional function to make inquiry when, in his sound discretion , it is needed or calculated to aid in arriving at an informed decision. The very use of the term "make out a point " assumes, without warrant, that the presid- 1022 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set out in section III , above, occurring in connection with the operations of Respondent described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow thereof. V. THE REMEDY It has been found that Respondent engaged in certain unfair labor practices and it 'will accordingly be recommended that they cease and desist therefrom 30 and take certain remedial action in respect to them. To remedy the discriminatory discharge of Rachel Treece as found, there will be the conventional reinstatement and make whole recommendation 40 Dage Employees Association, having been found to be dominated as well as supported by Respondent, the traditional recommendation applicable to such cases will be made,41 that Re- spondent disestablish and permanently withdraw recognition from it as representative of any of the employees in respect to matters embraced within the definition of a "labor organization" in Section 2(5), supra, footnote 4. Respondent urges that if the Association found to be dominated, it "may not be disestablished , but that any Order should be limited to restricting its role, leaving it free (in any event) to engage in social, welfare, and recreational activities , through [company-donated] funds." This assumes that "disestablished" means "dissolved," and perhaps it would be appropriate to restate a prior clarification of that term: 42 Such an order does not compel the dissolution of the Committee ; it means sever- ance by Respondent from the Committee of the kind of relationship which gives the latter identity as a labor organization . This means termination of all "dealing" between Respondent and the Committee concerning terms or con- ditions of the job or treating with it as representative of the employees at all as long as it continue to hold itself out as existing for the purpose in whole or part of discussing such matters with Respondent . Such dealing, under the statute, is reserved for representatives of employees who are free of domination or support by the employer. As further stated therein, such a recommendation or order does not reach into activities concerned with matters outside those indicated in Section 2(5), "if not engaged in to accomplish the forbidden by indirection." Ibid. As previously indi- cated, discussion of the terms of the job, in any of its aspects, with an employer domi- nated and subsidized organization or its representatives (supra, footnote 41), is not immunized under Section 8(a)(2) by the terminology under which it is subsumed, whether the words used be "human relations," "good living within the Company," "problems," or "matters." The prohibition against union solicitation or discussion on company premises at all times, pronounced orally by Lahey's assistant, Relyea, on February 2, 1960, and ing officer knows what the answer to his question will be The opposite must be presumed, which is why making appropriate inquiry is fair to all parties : It is fair , first of all, to the witness, because it gives him a chance to explain what in the presiding officer's reasonable opinion needs explaining before judgment is passed ; it is fair to all parties as a whole because of their presumed common interest In a judgment based upon an adequate record. Basically, Respondent's position stems from the concept of a hearing, adversary in character, as being a starkly gladiatorial adventure , in which the person having the burden of resolving the conflict has no legitimate interest in anything except what the combatants alone have chosen to lay before him, without regard to what ques- tions in his view need answering in order to enable him to come to a fair and under- standing resolution . It must be said, with all deference , that this reflects a notion at war with the authoritatively recognized view of the proper discharge of the decisional obliga- tion. See, e g., Board's Rules and Regulations , Section 102 .35(j); N.L.R.B. v. Bryan Manufacturing Company, 196 F. 2d 477, 478 (C.A. 7). "A broad cease-and-desist recommendation will be made because of the pervasive anti- union purpose demonstrated by the record . N.L R.B. v. Cheney California Lumber Com- pany, 327 U.S. 385. " The Chase National Bank of the City of New York, San Juan, Puerto Rico, Branch, 65 NLRB 827 , 829; P. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289. 11 The Carpenter Steel Company, 76 NLRB 670, 673. Within the scope of this non recognition requirement are, of course, the board of representatives and any member thereof. 42Northeastern Engineering, Inc., 112 NLRB 743, 756. PINELLAS PAVING COMPANY, INC. 1023 embodied in Lahey's notice of February 5, 1960, should be rescinded insofar as it applies to nonworking time, with the assurance that the right of employees to engage in such activity on plant premises during nonworking time will be respected. The recommendation will also include the customary posting of notices containing the appropriate assurance that Respondent will respect the employees' rights under the Act and remedy the found violations thereof. The role of the Company's director of personnel in Cleveland, revealed by Relyea to be the architect of the Division's strategy, which culminated in the violations found, cogently indicates a need for the main office to join in the assurances in the posted notice. A remedy is always adapted to the specific situation found.43 The need for the main office's joining in the notice, which stems from the evidence of its direct involvement in the events here in issue, is underscored by the frequent reminders to the employees that there is where the ultimate decision concerning their welfare rests. Thus, they are told that a grievance can be taken up beyond management of the Division to Cleveland, that the "annual wage survey," discussed at joint meetings of management and the Association, was made by the main office in Cleveland, and as Lahey reminded them (supra, foot- note 21), the main office can curtail the employment opportunities within the Division by reallocating its work to other divisions. All of these factors indicate that if the assurances are to have genuine meaning to the employees, they come not only from the Division, but from the source of control within the Company over the Division's actions and policies. On the findings made, and on the entire record, there are hereby made the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. By dominating and interfering with the administration of Dage Television Divi- sion, and contributing financial and other support thereto, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (2) of the Act. ,2. By discharging Rachel Treece because of her activity in support of the Union, Respondent discriminated in respect to her hire and tenure for the purpose of dis- couraging membership in said Union, thereby engaging in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. 3. By the above and by interfering with , restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7, in the other respects heretofore specifically found, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)( I) of the Act. 4. The said unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] 43 Phelps Dodge Corporation v. N.L R.B., 313 U.S. 177, 199; N.L .R.B. v. Brown-Dunkin Company, Inc., 287 F. 2d 17 (C.A. 10). Pinellas Paving Company, Inc. and Kenneth B. Marquis, Herbert T. Wilde, and Joseph N. Willoughby and International Hod Carriers', Building and Common Laborers' Union of America, AFL-CIO, Local Union No. 512.1 Cases Nos. 12-CA-1366-1, 12-CA-1366-2, 12-CA-1366-3, and 13-CA-1433. August 16, 1961 DECISION AND ORDER On December 6, 1960, Trial Examiner David London issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices violative of Section 8 (a) (5) and (1) of the Act and recom 1 Herein called the Union. 132 NLRB No. X85.