Anchortank, Inc.

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Anchortank, Inc. and Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union. Cases 23-CA-6460 and 23-CA-6547 November 22, 1978 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS JENKINS, MURPHY, AND TRUESDALE On June 21, 1978, Administrative Law Judge John C. Miller issued the attached Decision in this pro- ceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed limited exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, as modified herein. Pursuant to a Stipulation for Certification Upon Consent Election an election was held on January 7, 1977.' On November 29, after the resolution of deter- minative challenges and objections to conduct affect- ing the election, the Union was certified as the collec- tive-bargaining representative. Respondent admits that on March 25, Supervisor Jerry Rose required employee Herbert Charles to at- tend an investigatory interview and that Plant Man- ager Melvin Steger refused Charles' request to be represented by the Union during the interview. Re- spondent further admits that on May 29, Steger re- quired employee Yoshinobu Kittley to submit to a disciplinary interview and that Steger denied Kittley's request to permit his union representative to be present during the interview. The interview culmi- nated in Kittley's discharge. The Administrative Law Judge observed that the requests of employee Charles and Kittley for union representation at the interviews occurred after the election but prior to the Union's certification. He noted that Respondent has no obligation to bargain with the Union during the period prior to certifica- tion and concluded that Respondent likewise has no obligation to permit an employee union representa- tion at an investigatory or disciplinary interview dur- ing such period. He therefore found that Respondent lawfully denied the requests of Charles and Kittley. The General Counsel contends otherwise and argues I All dates are in 1977 unless otherwise indicated. that under N.L.R.B. v. J. Weingarten, Inc.,2 the status of the union as a bargaining representative has no bearing on the employees' right to have a representa- tive present during an investigatory or disciplinary interview. We find merit in the General Counsel's position. In N.L.R.B. v. J. Weingarten, Inc., supra, the Su- preme Court affirmed the Board's construction that Section 7 creates a statutory right in an employee to refuse to submit without union representation to an interview which he reasonably fears may result in his discipline. The Court found that "the right inheres in Section 7's guarantee of the right of employees to act in concert for mutual aid and protection."3 The Court then pointed to the Board's decision in Mobil OilCorporation,4 Folding that an employer violates an employee's right to engage in concerted activity by seeking the assistance of his statutory representative if the employer refuses the employee's request and compels the employee to appear unassisted at a disci- plinary interview. There, the Board stated, "Such a dilution of the employee's right to act collectively to protect his job interests is, in our view, unwarranted interference with his right to insist on concerted pro- tection, rather than individual self-protection, against possible adverse employer action.' The central issue of the Weingarten decision was whether the employee's Section 7 right to engage in concerted activity extended to the encounter between employee and employer in an interview which could reasonably be expected to result in disciplinary ac- tion. In that case, the concerted activity took the spe- cific form of a request for assistance from a statutory representative. 6 However, the Court and the Board placed the emphasis upon the employee's right to act concertedly for protection in the face of a threat to job security, and not upon the right to be represented by a duly designated collective-bargaining represen- tative. This is evidenced by the Court's holding that the employer has no duty to bargain with a union representative who attends the interview.7 Indeed, the union representative's role is limited to assisting the employee and possibly attempting to clarify the facts or suggest other employees who may have knowledge of them. Thus, the union representative is 2420 U.S. 251 (1975). Id. at 256. 4 196 NLRB 1052 (1972). 5 Weingarten, supra at 257. qiLoting from Mobil Oil Corporation. 196 NLRB 1052 (1972). 6 The Court foulid that the request for such a representative constituted concerted activity because it gave assurance to other employees that the) could obtain similar protection, just as an employee who strikes in support of another employee's grievance insures similar support for himself in the event he has a grievance Weingarten at 261. 7 In addition. the Court further held that if an employee requests repre- sentation the employer is free to forego the interview (420 U.S. at 258) This the Respondent could have done here by taking the disciplinar) action without the interview. 430 ANCHORTANK, INC. not permitted to use the powers conferred upon the union by its designation as collective-bargaining agent, and, in essence, may do no more during the course of the interview than could a fellow employee. For these reasons we are persuaded that, in Wein- garten, the Court's primary concern was with the right of employees to have some measure of protec- tion when faced with a confrontation with the em- ployer which might result in adverse action against the employee. These employee concerns remain whether or not the employees are represented by a union.8 Here, employees Charles and Kittley request- ed union representation at a time when the Union had been selected by a majority of employees in a Board-conducted election, but had not yet been cer- tified as bargaining representative. Their request was an exercise of the right guaranteed to them by Sec- tion 7 to act in concert for mutual aid and protection. In these circumstances, the status of the requested representative, whether it be that of Union not yet certified or simply that of fellow employee, does not operate to deprive the employees of the rights which they enjoy by virtue of the plain mandate in Section 7. Accordingly, we find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by refusing employee Charles' request for representation by his union representative at an investigatory interview and compelling Charles to appear unassisted at the interview. We further find that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) by denying employee Kittley's request to be represented by his Union at a disciplinary interview and compelling Kittley to appear unassisted at the interview. In addi- tion, we find that Respondent's discharge of Kittley was unlawful inasmuch as it was the result of an in- terview wherein Kittley was unlawfully prevented from securing the assistance of his union representa- tive.9 We shall, therefore, order that Kittley be rein- stated to his former position or, if that position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent job, and that he be made whole for any loss of pay suffered by him as a result of the discrimination against him.' 0 as prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Companre. 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest thereon to be computed in the manner prescribed in Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977)." ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modified below, and hereby orders that the Respondent, An- chortank, Inc., Bayport, Texas, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order, as so modified: I. Insert the following as paragraph l(b) and relet- ter the subsequent paragraph accordingly: "(b) Requiring that employees participate in em- ployer interviews or meetings without union repre- sentation, when such representation has been refused by Respondent, when the employees have reasonable grounds to believe that the matters to be discussed may result in their being the subject of disciplinary action, and actually imposing such disciplinary ac- tion on employees." 2. Insert the following as paragraph 2(b) and relet- ter subsequent paragraphs accordingly: "(b) Offer Yoshinobu Kittley, immediate and full reinstatement to his former position or, if such posi- tion no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, and make him whole for any loss of earn- ings he may have suffered as a result of the discrimi- nation against him, in the manner set forth in the above Decision." 3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the Administrative Law Judge. S See Glomac Plastics. Inc. 234 NLRB 1309 (1978). 9 In this connection we note that Respondent's unlawful refusal to allow Kittely union representation. in the circumstances here rendered unlawful what was an otherwise lawful discharge for cause. Potter Electric Signal Company, 237 NLRB No. 209 (1978). to See Certified Grocers of California, Ltd.. 227 NLRB 1211 (1977) See, generally. Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with the Union by unilaterally: reclassifying employees job clas- sifications: adding a swing or fourth shift to three existing shifts; changing the working hours from 8-1/2 to 8 hours; promulgating a rule re- quiring employees to punch in and out for their lunch breaks; and eliminating a paid holiday and reducing vacation benefits. WE WiL.L NOT require any employee to take part in an interview or meeting where the em- ployee has reasonable grounds to believe that the matters to be discussed may result in his or her being the subject of disciplinary action and where we have refused to permit him or her to be represented at such meeting by a labor orga- nization. WE WIL.. NOT in any like or related manner 431 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. WE WILL. make employees whole for any loss of earnings they may have suffered as a result of unilateral changes in wages, hours, and working conditions, with interest. WE WILL. offer Yoshinobu Kittley immediate and full reinstatement to his former job or, if such job no longer exists, to substantially equiv- alent employment without prejudice to his se- niority or other rights or privileges enjoyed by him, and make him whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of our discharge of him, plus interest. AN(CHORTANK, INCT. DECISION SIAIEMENI 01: IIE CASI JOHN C MILLER. Administrative Law Judge: A hearing in these consolidated cases was held in Galveston, Texas, on March 29, 1978. In Case 23-CA-6460, as amended, Re- spondent is charged with making certain unilateral changes in working conditions in January 1977, subsequent to a union demand for recognition and a union election but prior to certification, and so doing without giving notice to or consulting with the Union, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (I) of the Act. Respondent is further alleged to have required employee Herbert Charles to attend an investiga- tory interview and refusing to permit said employee to be represented by the Union at such interview, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. In Case 23 CA-6547, Respondent is alleged to have dis- criminatorily discharged employee Kittley for his union or concerted activities and, in addition, failed to permit Kitt- ley to be represented by the Union at a disciplinary inter- view at which he was terminated for horseplay and exces- sive absenteeism, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Respondent is further alleged to have made changes in employees' vacation and holiday benefits with- out notice to or consultion with the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. After the close of the hearing, briefs were received from the parties and have been duly considered. Upon the entire record, including my observation of the witnesses de- meanor, I make the following: FINDIN(iS Oi FA( I I. JURISDI I ION Respondent is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the State of Texas and has its principal office and place of business in Bayport, Texas, and has another facil- ity in Texas City, Texas, where it is engaged in bulk liquid storage terminal operations involving loading and unload- ing ships, tank cars, and tank trucks. During the past 12 months, Respondent purchased goods valued in excess of $50,000, from firms located outside the State of Texas which goods were shipped directly to it from points located outside the State of Texas. The Respondent admits the above facts, and I find that the Respondent is an Employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II STATUS OF THE LABOR ORGANIZATION Respondent's answer admits, and I find, that the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. 111 TilE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACT(rCES A. Background and Sequence of Events in the Representation Case 23 RC-4461 Pursuant to a Stipulation for Certification Upon Con- sent Election, an election was held on January 7, 1977, and the tally of ballots disclosed 15 votes for the Union, 10 against, and 5 challenged ballots. The challenged ballots were sufficient to affect the election and the Employer filed timely objections to the election on January 14, 1977. On February 18, 1977, the Regional Director issued his Report on Challenges and Objections recommending that the ob- jections to the election be overruled, the challenge to the ballot of Pete Mancusco be overruled, and his ballot be counted. He further recommended that in the event Mancusco's ballot was cast against the Petitioner, that the remaining challenged ballots of Jackson, Luhning, Jr., and Vayette be held in abeyance pending the outcome of pro- ceedings in Case 23-CA-4292, as the voting eligibility of Jackson and Luhning, Jr., would be determined by the findings as to their supervisory status in that case. On July 13, 1977, a panel of the Board issued a decision remanding to the Regional Director for investigation of the challenged ballots of Herrmann and Vayette and for is- suance of a supplemental report as to their eligibility, and held in abeyance the challenges to the ballots of Pete Man- cusco, John Jackson, and James Luhning pending the out- come of Case 23-CA-6292. In a supplemental report issued November 7, 1977, the Regional Director, relying on the Board's decision in An- chortank, Inc., 233 NLRB 295 (1977), which found John Jackson and James Luhning to be supervisors and there- fore resulted in the challenges to their ballots be sustained, found it unnecessary to resolve other challenged ballots as they were no longer determinative and recommended that the Board issue an appropriate certification. On November 29, 1977, a Board panel adopted the Re- gional Director's supplemental report and certified the Union as the collective-bkrgaining representative. B. Case 23 CA 6460 In Case 23-CA 6460, Respondent is alleged to have re- fused to bargain commencing on or about November 10, 1976. On January 7, 1977, a representation election was conducted to which eight objections were filed and there 432 ANCHORTANK, INC. were five challenged ballots. While these objections and challenged ballots were pending determination Respon- dent, on or about January 15, and thereafter, made a num- ber of changes in wages and working conditions. Those changes included: (a) Employees were reclassified from general laborers to other classifications: (b) employees were granted wage increases; (c) a fourth or swing work shift was added to three existing shifts on or about January 29, 1977; (d) the working hours were changed from 8-1/2 to 8 hours a day on or about January 29, 1977: and (e) promulagation of a rule requiring employees to punch in and out for their lunch breaks on or about January 29, 1977. By amendment dated August 5, 1977. counsel for the General Counsel alleged that Jerry Rose, Respondent's supervisor, required employee Herbert Charles to attend an investigatory interview at its plant and during that pro- cess refused Charles' request to be represented by his Union at such interview. Such refusal is alleged to be viola- tive of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Respondent admits all the above allegations but denies that its unilateral changes are violative of Section 8(a)(5) because "the Union was not yet certified as the bargaining representative for Respondent's employees." Respondent did not know then whether the Union represented a major- ity of its employees and Respondent did not want to risk committing an unfair labor practice by recognizing and bargaining with a labor organization which did not repre- sent a majority of its employees.' Consequently, there being no issues of fact, only issues of law remain to be resolved. Thus, the two major issues in this numbered case involve: (1) Whether the enumerated changes in working conditions which occurred subsequent to a representation election but prior to certification amount to a refusal to bargain within the meaning of Sec- tion 8(a)(5) of the Act. (2) Whether the refusal of Respon- dent to permit employee Charles to be represented by the Union at an investigatory interview on or about March 25, 1977, which was subsequent to the election but prior to certification, constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. With respect to whether the five admitted changes in working conditions made by Respondent in January 1977, subsequent to the election but prior to certification, the Board reiterated its rule in Mike O'Connor Chevrolet-Buick- GMC Co., Inc., 209 NLRB 701, 703 (1974), that "absent compelling economic considerations" for doing so, an em- ployer acts at his peril in making changes in terms and conditions of employment in the interim period after an election but prior to certification. If the final determination of objections and/or determinative challenges results in a certification of the bargaining representative, unilateral changes in working conditions by the employer will have violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. In this case the Board issued its Certification of Representative in a decision in 23-RC-4461 on November 29, 1977, some 10 months and 22 days after the election. The issue posed, therefore, is whether the 10 months and International ladies' Garment Workers' LUnon, AFI. ( /0 RBernhard-.A41- mann Tevas (orp v N LR.B. 366 I.S. 731 (1961). 22 days lapse of time between the election and certification justifies Respondent's implementation of some or all of these changes. Dale Blanchard, administrator for Anchortank, credibly testified that historically, pay raises were given around the first of the year but that on advice of counsel no changes were made that might be prejudicial to the election. How- ever, he then stated that based on past practice, Respon- dent announced and put into effect a wage increase. Actual paychecks did not reflect the increase in employees' checks until after the election. In response to one inquiry why Respondent had put these changes into effect, Blanchard stated: The point was, your Honor, that the wages had been established. We knew what we were going to do-the classifications had also been established. We took a calculat2d-we made a calculated decision very frankly to put it into effect because the employees had in the past known that they were going to get a pay raise at that time of the year. Classifications, we were going along with the fact of making sure that each then had a classification that he could be assigned to. And because there was a constant questioning of how much money am I going to get; how much money to get from the employees to me, and to the supervisors. It was a decision made to go ahead and make the announcement prior to the election based on historical data I mean historically procedures. In view of past precedent by which Respondent normal- ly granted pay raises the first of each year and the addi- tional fact that the Union filed no objections to the elec- tion based upon the announced pay raise, I find that the granting of the pay raises was not violative of Section 8(a)(5) and (l) of the Act. Moreover. since the raises were granted before the election and before Respondent became aware that the election was in dispute, I find it unnecessary to consider whether "compelling economic considerations" would have warranted the granting of pay raises at some point in time prior to issuance of the Board's certification. With respect to other changes, however, Respondent has not cited compelling economic considerations as a justifi- cation or in some instances, an) justification at all for its other changes. I refer particularly to Respondent's promul- gation of a rule on or about January 29, 1977, requiring employees to punch in and out for their lunch breaks; changing working hours per day from 8-1/2 to 8 hours; reclassification of employees: and the adding of a fourth shift to the three existing shifts. In light of the Board's subsequent certification of the Union, I find that the above-cited unilateral changes are violative of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 2 I turn to the issue of whether the refusal to permit em- ployee Herbert Charles to have a union representative at an investigatory interview on or about March 25, 1977, at a time subsequent to the election but prior to the Union's MAke 0 ( onnor ( hetrolt. vupra l i 7103; Aing Rzad. ( rpoiratm.n In,- 166 NLRB 649, 652 i 1967): Li'nev & D)uAe Stolrag Warehouse ( Co, Inc and lanw & I) uke lerminai 1aIrehotuw ( o, Inc, 151 NL RB 248. 266 267 ( 196) 433 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD certification, is violative of Section 8(a)(1). I conclude it is not. Respondent has no obligation to bargain with the Union during the period prior to certification although as dis- cussed earlier; he may be obligated not to make any unila- teral changes in working conditions during any interim pe- riod. As Respondent has no obligation to bargain with the Union about wages, hours, and working conditions prior to certification, he likewise has no obligation to permit an employee union representation for an investigatory inter- view. Accordingly, I shall recommend that this allegation be dismissed. C. Case 23-CA-6547 This case involves three major allegations. They are: (I) On or about May 29, 1977, Respondent denied employee Yoshinobu Kittley's request that a union representative be present at a disciplinary interview in Superintendent Mel- vin Steger's office which culminated in Kittley's discharge; (2) the discharge of Yoshinobu Kittley was motivated by his union or concerted activities; and (3) Respondent, through Administrator Blanchard, did, on or about Janu- ary 20, 1977, change its holiday policy, by eliminating San Jacinto Day as a paid holiday; and thereafter, on or about February 22, 1977, Respondent, through Administrator Blanchard, changed the method of computing employees vacation benefits which resulted in a reduction of vacation benefits to employees. As in the prior case, the facts are largely admitted. Re- spondent admits that it denied Kittley union representa- tion at his disciplinary interview and also concedes that it made the changes in paid holidays and in vacation benefits without notice to or consultation with the Union, contend- ing that since the Union was not certified as bargaining representative, it had no right to be present at Kittley's disciplinary interview nor was Respondent required to give either notice to or bargain with the Union about the changes in holiday and vacation benefits. As to item (2), Respondent denies that it discharged Kittley for union or concerted activities and contends that Kittley was dis- charged for cause, namely, for horseplay and excessive ab- senteeism. For the reasons previously stated in Case 23-CA-6460, Kittley is not entitled to be represented by the Union prior to its certification. Kittley's disciplinary interview was on May 29, 1977, and the Union was not certified as bargain- ing representative until November 29, 1977. As the Union has no bargaining rights until certification, it likewise has no rights to represent employees prior to certification. Ac- cording, this allegation shall be dismissed. As to (2), counsel for the General Counsel offered no evidence that Kittley was engaged in union or concerted activities. Kittley himself conceded that during working hours, he and Cox, a fellow employee, were engaging in a water fight and that both individuals were spraying each other with water hoses when foreman Richard Vagette came onto the dock and ordered them to stop. He subse- 3In these circumstances, I find it unnecessary to reach the question of whether denial of a request for a fellow employee to be present as a repre- sentative or a witness is violative of the Act. quently sent both employees home and they were told to report to Superintendent Steger's office the following morning. After being interviewed, both Kittley and Cox were terminated. Kittley stated that he was told he was discharged primarily for "horseplay" but also because of his absenteeism. Steger credibly testified that Kittley was terminated for both reasons and that Kittley was absent 23 times and late 10 times. He had three previous warnings for absenteeism since September 9, 1976. There is no evidence that Kittley was discharged for other than the reasons giv- en to him by Respondent and no evidence was submitted that Kittley was either a union member or had engaged in union or protected concerted activities. Accordingly, this allegation shall be dismissed. As to item (3), in view of the Board's subsequent certifi- cation of the Union, and the absence of compelling eco- nomic reasons for changes in working conditions in the interim period, Respondent's changes in vacation and holi- days benefits is held violative of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.4 Upon the foregoing findings of fact and the entire rec- ord, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. By reclassifying employees' job classifications; by adding a fourth or swing shift to three existing shifts; by changing the working hours from 8-1/2 to 8 hours a day; by promulugating a rule requiring employees to punch in and out for their lunch breaks; by eliminating a paid holi- day; and by changing the method for computing vacation benefits resulting in a reduction of vacation time for em- ployees, Respondent, on varying dates in January and Feb- ruary 1977, subsequent to a union election on January 7, 1977, but prior to the union certification on November 29, 1977, engaged in unfair labor practices violative of Section 8(aX5) and (1) of the Act by making such changes without notice to or bargaining with the Union. 3. Respondent did not violate either Section 8(a)(3) or (I) of the Act by discharging Kittley or by failing to permit employees Charles or Kittley union representation at their investigatory or disciplinary interviews prior to the Union's certification. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 5. The Respondent has not otherwise violated the Act. THE REMEDY The recommended Order will contain the conventional provisions requiring the Respondent to cease and desist from engaging in the unfair labor practices found, to bar- gain with the Union with respect to all such matters found, including the subject of wage increases, and to post a no- tice to that effect. Respondent shall make whole any em- ployees who incurred any monetary loss as a result of the unilateral implementation of these changes, with interest 4 Mike O'Connor Chevroler. supra. 434 ANCHORTANK, INC. thereon to be computed in the manner prescribed in F W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977), until such date as Respondent bargains in good faith or to impasse. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER 5 The Respondent, Anchortank, Inc., Bayport, Texas, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: I. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to bargain with the Union by unilaterally engaging in the following: reclassifying employees jobs; by adding a swing or fourth shift to three existing shifts; by changing the working hours from 8-1/2 to 8 hours a day; by promulugating a rule requiring employees to punch in and out for their lunch breaks; and by eliminating a paid holiday and reducing employees vacations benefits, all in violation of Section 8(aX5) and (1) of the Act. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, of coercing employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef- fectuate the purposes of the Act: 5 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. (a) Bargain with the certified Union with respect to all the above-mentioned items and any other matter concern- ing wages, hours, and working conditions of its employees, and if agreement is reached thereon, incorporate such agreement in a contract if so requested. (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all pay- roll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records neces- sary to determine the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (c) Post at its premises in Texas City, Texas, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 6 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 23, after being duly signed by Respondent's repre- sentative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 con- secutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily post- ed. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to in- sure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 23, in writ- ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges unfair labor practices not found herein. 6 In the event that this Order is enforced by a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals. the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National l.abor Relations Board" 435