The Hamilton Plastic Molding Co.

THE HAMILTON PLASTIC MOLDING COMPANY 371 The Hamilton Plastic Molding Company and Local Union No. 156, Upholsterers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO. Case No. 9-CA-2116. January 22, 1962 DECISION AND ORDER On March 22, 1961, Trial Examiner William F. Scharnikow issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the Intermediate Report attached hereto. The Trial Examiner also found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices and recommended that the complaint be dismissed with respect to such allegations. Thereafter, the Respondent and the General Counsel each filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report with supporting briefs. The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter- mediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this proceeding, and finding merit in the General Counsel's exceptions, hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner to the extent that they are consistent with our Deci- sion and Order. 1. The Trial Examiner concluded that the Respondent had not- violated Section 8(a) (5), as alleged in the complaint, by refusing to bargain with the Union, which claimed to be the designated represent- ative of a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit. The basis for his conclusion was that, of 10 authorization cards which the Union relied on for its majority showing, 3 had been signed by super- visors, and 6 of the remaining 7 cards could not be considered as free designations of the employees because they had been procured by the supervisors. The General Counsel's exceptions put in issue the status of Frank Papania and Lawrence Heis, two of the alleged supervisors. If they are not supervisory employees, their authorization cards and the cards of those employees whom they solicited establish the Union's majority status.' The Respondent is a manufacturer of plastic toys. During its busy season from August until shortly before Christmas, it employ's as many as 30 employees. During the events involved herein, in May 1960, there were employed a total of 19 persons, including supervisors and 1 clerical employee. The 13 or so production employees are di- vided among 3 shifts with no more than 4 or 5 employees on any shift. 1 Other issues, relating to the adequacy of the Union 's demand, the appropriateness of its unit request, and a subsequent loss of the Union's majority , are discussed below. 135 NLRB No. 39. 372 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Papania had been a foreman on the third (midnight to 8 a.m.) shift until May 2, 1960, when he was transferred to the day shift (8 a.m. to 4 p.m.) with the tible of assistant foreman. Heis was the assistant foreman on the second shift (4 p.m. to midnight) under Foreman Stemmerding. No one was designated as foreman on the day shift. This shift was supervised by Babbitt, the plant superintendent, who was responsible generally for production on all shifts. Papania testified that his duties on the day shift were substantially the same as they had been on the third shift except that, since Babbitt was present most of the time, his responsibilities were limited. Most of his work was in such routine tasks as filling hoppers, relieving machine operators, mixing materials, repairing machines, and even, at times, sweeping the floor. At no time from May 2, when Papania was assigned to the first shift, until May 10, when the Union made its bargaining request, was Papania left solely in charge of the machine operators. Babbitt was always near at hand and gave Papania instructions which he then relayed to the operators. The Trial Examiner concluded, upon the basis of Babbitt's testimony, that Papania was in complete charge of the day shift when Babbitt was not there, and that Papania did in fact have authority responsibly to direct the work of employees on his shift. As it is admitted that Heis' job was identical with Papania's, the Trial Examiner found that Heis also was a supervisor. In the same connection, it also appears that Heis' superior, Foreman Stemmerding, was rarely away from his station during the second shift. In addition to supervising directly the operations of the day shift, Superintendent Babbitt's workday overlaps the last hour of the third shift and the early hours of the second shift. In view of the routine work of the assistant foremen and the machine operators, the small number of employees working on each shift, and the fact that during each shift there was an admitted supervisor on duty at all times, we are satisfied that the authority and responsibility delegated to Papania and Heis were extremely limited. Even admitting that they may have made some assignments or transfers of machine operators, we believe that the Trial Examiner erred in concluding that this con- stituted an exercise of authority responsibly to direct the work of other employees. We find, therefore, that Papania and Heis are non- supervisory employees and that the authorization cards they signed on behalf of the Union should be counted. 2. Papania made the first contact with the Union by calling Cook, its business agent, by telephone on May 6, 1960. Cook arranged to meet him at the union office, and asked Papania to bring several co- workers with him for a meeting on May 9. On that day, Papania and Heis, together with Michaels, the foreman on the third shift, and Whitaker, a machine operator on that shift, met with Cook and signed THE HAMILTON PLASTIC MOLDING COMPANY 373 authorization cards. There is no doubt that Papania provided the original impetus for the organizational campaign an that it was through his efforts that the other three were encouraged to sign with the Union. Although Papania and Heis signed their cards in the presence of Michaels, a supervisor, we are of the opinion that the validity of their authorization cards was not thereby destroyed 2 The next day, Papania and Reis signed up six of the Respondent's pro- duction employees. Michaels solicited an employee on his shift, Anglian, to sign a card. As of this time, therefore, the Union had procured 11 signed cards out of a total of 16 employees. In deter- mining whether the Union had a majority, the Trial Examiner prop- erly rejected the cards of Foreman Michaels because he was a super- visor and of Anglian because she had been solicited by a supervisor. The other authorization cards, however, having been obtained either by Papania or Heis, constitute valid designations for purposes of determining the Union's majority. We find it unnecessary to determine the validity of Whitaker's card. He was employed on the third shift under Foreman Michaels, but had signed up as one of the group which had voluntarily visited union headquarters, rather than at the solicitation of his supervisor. In any event, even if his card is excluded from the count, the Union was in possession of 8 valid cards in a unit of 15 production employees, when the Union's request for recognition was made on May 10. 3. We agree with the Trial Examiner that the Union's letter stating that it represented a majority of the employees, which Cook, the Union's business agent, delivered to Respondent's president on May 10, constituted a request for recognition in an appropriate unit, even though it failed to specifically exclude supervisors and clerical em- ployees. Even if we assume that the Union intended to seek repre- sentation of the one office clerical employee and of the supervisors, we find the variance from what would otherwise be an appropriate unit of production and maintenance employees to be minor and subject to modification.' Moreover, at no time did the Respondent raise any question, in refusing to meet and discuss the Union's request for recog- nition, as to unit inclusions or exclusions. On the contrary, by its refusal to consider the Union's request for recognition and its offer to prove its majority, it foreclosed any clarification by the Union as to the scope of its requested unit. 4. On May 10, 1960, Cook personally delivered a letter requesting recognition to Mistler, the Respondent's president. The letter was 2 Orange Premium Stamps (Division of Alfred M. Lewis, Inc ), 127 NLRB 1491, 1501-1502 . Cf Insular Chemical Corporation, and Rubber Corporation of America (Insular Division), 128 NLRB 93, 98. 3 Mrs Homer E Ash, et al., d/b/a Ash Market & Gasoline, 130 NLRB 641. 374 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD addressed to Carter, the Respondent's vice president, but Cook in- formed Mistier of its contents and discussed the organization of the plant employees. During the conversation, according to the testimony credited by the Trial Examiner, Mistier stated that Respondent could lay off most of its employees and operate the plant with no more than two or three men. Two days later, Cook called Vice President Carter and repeated the Union's request for recognition. Carter said he would have to consult his attorney and Cook agreed, provided that the matter was settled soon. The same day, Carter interrogated em- ployee Ohmer as to whether she had been asked to sign a card and by whom. Before and after May 17, when Carter refused to accept a card check and flatly refused recognition of the Union, Superintendent Babbitt engaged in the threats, promises of benefits, and interrogation .of employees which are fully detailed in the Intermediate Report. In agreement with the Trial Examiner, we find that these acts were in violation of Section 8(a) (1).4 Furthermore, we are of the opinion that Respondent's conduct, beginning on May 10, was designed to delay or avoid recognition of the Union in order to enable it to dis- sipate the Union's majority. Accordingly, we find that Respondent's refusal to recognize and bargain with the Union beginning on May 10, 1960, was in violation of Section 8 (a) (5). Shortly after May 10, 1960, the Respondent, for nondiscriminatory reasons, terminated Papina, Heis, and two other employees who had signed union authorization cards. Although the discharge of these four employees caused the Union to lose its majority status some time after May 10, we find, nevertheless, that the Union is entitled to be recognized as the exclusive representative of the Respondent's pro- duction and maintenance employees, since the right to recognition is -determined as of the date the Respondent wrongfully failed to grant it and undertook to dissipate its majority, through interference, re- straint, and coercion.' The Remedy Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, we shall order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. As we have found merit in the General Counsel's exceptions to the failure of the Trial Examiner to find that Respondent refused to recognize and bargain with the Union at a time when the Union repre- + In the absence of exceptions we adopt, pro forma, the Trial Examiner's finding that Respondent was not responsible for Foreman Michael's statement to employee Kichler and therefore Respondent did not violate Section 8 ( a)(1) by such conduct. 5 Franks Bros . Company v. N L R B ., 321 U S. 702. THE HAMILTON PLASTIC MOLDING COMPANY 375 sented a majority of its employees in an appropriate unit, we shall order the Respondent, upon request, to bargain collectively with the Union. Because the conduct of the Respondent evinces a purpose to thwart the right of its employees freely to select their collective-bargaining representative, it is likely that such purpose will be effectuated in the future by the continuance of the unfair labor practices found herein or by the commission of other labor practices. We shall therefore order the Respondent to cease and desist from violating the Act with respect to the specific violations found, as well as in any other manner. Upon the basis of the foregoing, and upon the entire record in this case, the National Labor Relations Board hereby makes the fol- lowing additional: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 5. All production and maintenance employees in the Employer's plant at New Burlington, Ohio, excluding office clerical employees and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section (b) of the Act. ,6. At all times since May 10, 1960, the above labor organization has been, and now is, the exclusive representative of all the employees in the above appropriate unit for the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act. 7. By refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union on and after May 10, 1960, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) of the Act. 8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. ORDER Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, the Hamilton Plastic Molding Company, New Burlington, Ohio, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall : 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Local Union No. 156, Upholsterers' International Union of- North America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of its employees in the following unit which the Board finds appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining : 376 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD All production and maintenance employees excluding office cleri- cal employees and supervisors as defined in the Act. (b) Interrogating employees concerning their union membership and activities ; telling its employees that it knows the identity of em- ployees who are adherents of Local Union No. 156, Upholsterers' International Union of North America, AFI-CIO ; threatening a plant shutdown and loss of jobs if the aforesaid Union should succeed in organizing the Respondent's employees ; holding out to employees an expectation of a raise or other benefits if they should refrain from joining or supporting the Union ; threatening discriminatory work assignments to employees who support the Union ; creating the im- pression that the activities of the employees are under surveillance; and in any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condi- tion of employment as authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of the Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the above -named labor organization as the exclusive representative of the employees in the aforesaid unit, and, if an understanding is reached , embody such understanding in a signed agreement. (b) Post at its plant at New Burlington , Ohio, copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix." 6 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Ninth Region , shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 con- secutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for the Ninth Region, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps have been taken to comply herewith. MEMBERS RODGERS and FANNING took no part in the consideration of the above Decision and Order. 6 In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order." THE HAMILTON PLASTIC MOLDING COMPANY APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 377 Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that : WE WILL NOT interrogate you concerning your or other em- ployees' union activities or sympathies on behalf of Local Union No. 156, Upholsterers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT create the impression that your union activities are under surveillance. WE WILL NOT threaten you with closing our plant, discontinu- ing operations, or discharging you in the event a union becomes your collective-bargaining representative. WE WILL NOT promise you a raise in pay, paid lunch periods, paid holidays or other benefits to discourage you from engaging in union activity or selecting a union as your collective bargaining representative. WE WILL NOT threaten you with more difficult and less desirable assignments because you have engaged in union activities. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of your rights to self-organization, to form, join or assist the above-named or any other labor organiza- tion, to bargain collectively through representatives of your own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring member- ship in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of said Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. WE WILL bargain collectively upon request with the above- named labor organization as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of all of our employees in the bargaining unit de- scribed below with respect to rates of pay, hours of employment and other conditions of employment and if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. Said bargaining unit is : All production and maintenance employees, excluding office clerical employees and supervisors as defined in the Act. All of our employees are free to become, remain, or refrain from becoming members of the above-named or any other labor organiza-' 378 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tion, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agree- ment requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. THE HAMILTON PLASTIC MOLDING COMPANY, Employer. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative ) ( Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office (Transit Building, Fourth and Vine Streets, Cincinnati 2, Ohio; telephone number, Dunbar 1-1420) if they have any question concern- ing this notice or compliance with its provisions. INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE As amended at the hearing,' the complaint alleges that the Respondent (The Hamilton Plastic Molding Company ) committed unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections 8(a) (1) and (5) and 2(6 ) and (7) of the Act by (a) refusing to bargain in good faith with the Union (Local Union No. 156, Upholsterers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO) as the exclusive bargaining representative of an appropriate unit of the Respondent 's employees, and (b) various acts of its officers and supervisors interfering with its employees' organi- zational activities, viz, interrogating employees concerning their interest in, and activities in support of, the Union; telling employees it knew which employees were union adherents; telling employees that an employee who had quit would be treated by the Respondent as being on leave of absence so that she could vote against the Union in a representation election; threatening employees with assault , discharge, layoff, plant closure, and other reprisals if they selected the Union as their bargaining representatives; and promising employees wage raises and other benefits if they re- frained from supporting the Union as their bargaining representative . In its answer, the Respondent generally denies the allegations of the complaint concerning these asserted unfair labor practices. Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held in Cincinnati, Ohio, on September 13, 14, and 15, 1960, before William F. Scharnikow, the Trial Examiner duly designated by the Chief Trial Examiner. The General Counsel and the Respondent appeared by counsel, and the Union by its representative, and were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing upon the issues. The General Counsel and counsel for the Respondent have sub- mitted briefs on the issues. Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: i At the beginning of the hearing, the Trial Examiner granted a motion by the General Counsel to strike from his complaint the language of two paragraphs which alleged that the Respondent had committed unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by discriminatory layoffs of four employees , I e., Frank C Papania , Jr, Lawrence J. Heis , Robert J. Kichler, and Lonnie Whitaker. During the hearing the Trial Examiner also granted another motion by the General Counsel to amend the complaint by setting forth the unit of the Respondent 's employees which the Union claims it represents and which the General Counsel and the Union contend is appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (a) and (b) of the Act. THE HAMILTON PLASTIC MOLDING COMPANY FINDINGS OF FACT 379 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT The Respondent, The Hamilton Plastic Molding Company, is an Ohio corporation engaged in the manufacturing of plastic products gat its plant and principal place of business in New Burlington, Ohio. During the year preceding the issuance of the complaint, the Respondent sold products of a value in excess of $50,000 to other persons, firms, and corporations, each of whom during the same year had 'a direct outflow of their respective products in interstate commerce in excess of a value of $50,000. I find, as the parties stipulated at the hearing, that the Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. U. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Local Union No. 156, Upholsterers' International Union of North America, AFL- CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. M. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The alleged refusal to bargain 1. The Union's cards The Respondent manufactures plastic toys with its busy season from August or September until shortly before Christmas, and a slack period during the rest of the year. It employs a single clerical employee, a toolmaker, and a varying number of machine operators. Its complete staff, including supervisors, ranges from 8 in the slack season to as many as 30 during the busy season. On May 10, 1960, the critical date in the present case, there was a total of 19 people, including supervisors, on the Respondent's payroll. (General Counsel's Exhibit No. 5.) On May 9, 1960, four of these people went to the Union's office and told Arthur Cook, the Union's business manager, "that they were interested in trying to put a union into their plant." One of the four men, Anthony Michaels, was foreman of the Respondent's third shift, and was unquestionably a supervisor. The status of two others, Frank Papania and Lawrence Heis, is in dispute. The General Counsel and the Union claim that they were merely machine operators and nonsupervisory em- ployees, but the Respondent contends that they were assistant foremen and therefore were supervisors. It is agreed by all parties that the fourth man, Lonnie Whitaker, was a machine operator and an employee within the meaning of the Act. The four men each signed one of the Union's combination bargaining authorization and checkoff cards and returned to Cook the next day with similar cards signed by seven more of the Respondent's machine operators. Since the Respondent's payroll list of 19 people for May 10, 1960, included the plant superintendent, Foreman Michaels, and another shift foreman (who were admittedly supervisors) and also the only clerical employee, the Union thus had in its possession on May 10, 1960, the apparently valid bargaining authorizations of either 10 out of 15 or 8 out of 13 of the Respondent's production employees,2 depending upon whether Papania and Heis were employees or supervisors within the meaning of the Act. 2. The Union's bargaining request On May 10, 1960, the same day he received the bargaining authorizations, Business Manager Cook visited the Respondent's plant and asked for Nicholas Carter, the Re- spondent's vice president. In Carter's absence, Cook spoke with Eldon Mistler, the Respondent's president, and gave Mistier the following letter which Cook had addressed to Carter: This will officially notify you that the Upholsterers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, through its agent Local 156, represents a majority of your employees and is desirous of meeting with you for the purpose of negoti- ating a contract covering their hours, wages and working conditions. I trust that you will consider and recognize the Employees' rights to organize under the law without fear of intimidation and coercion and will act accordingly. 2 Michaels and his card , of course , are not to be counted since he was admittedly a supervisor. 380 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD In their conversation on this occasion, Cook also asked Mistier to negotiate a contract with the Union, but was no more specific about the employee unit which the Union claimed it represented than he was in his letter to Carter. According to 'Cook's testimony, he told Mistier merely that the Union had "a majority of the people signed up" and was "desirous of ... negotiating a contract." According to Mistier Cook said, "I represent ninety-eight percent of your employees and I want to get together with your people and sit down and draw up a contract." After some dis- cussion, in which Mistier spoke of his own union membership in the past but made no definite reply to Cook's request, Cook asked that either Carter or Mistier get in touch with him in a few days, and then left the plant. Cook and Mistier gave different versions of their discussion of Cook's request during this conversation on May 10. Cook testified that Mistier said he "didn't think a company this small would be bothered by a union" and that the Respondent could "lay everybody off in this plant and operate it with two or three people"; and that Cook thereupon warned Mistier that this would be an unfair labor practice, cautioned Mistier generally against discriminating against employees because of their union activities, and referred to a "mistake" which he said had already been made by the Respondent in attempting to discourage the organizational activities of Frank Papania.3 Mistier, on the other hand, testified that he told Cook he did not believe the Union represented 98 percent of the Respondent's employees and that he thought that "before we could sit down and really discuss or talk about this, . we are entitled to an election." Neither Cook nor Mistier specifically claimed that his version set forth their entire discussion of the Union's request for recognization on May 10: Nor did he deny the substance of the version given by the other. This latter fact seems to me to be of especial significance in view of the generally guarded and cautious manner in which each of these two witnesses gave his testimony and his obvious concern lest he make any contribution to the support of the other's case. For, in my opinion their respective versions of the conversation are not necessarily inconsistent. Moreover, from my observation of them as witnesses and in the context provided by the rest of the record, the remarks attributed to each of them, in both versions appear to be entirely in character. Accordingly, since the two versions appear to be equally plausible and not inconsistent, I credit the testimony of both men as to their conversation on May 10 and, upon a composite, find not only that Mistier spoke of the possibility of laying off the Respondent's few employees and thus triggered a warning by Cook against the commission of unfair labor practices, but that Mistier 3The incident to which Cook referred occurred during a visit by Mistier and Carter to Papania's home on or about April 20, when Papania was foreman on the third or night shift Papania testified that Carter charged him with "talking about something in the shop" ; that Papania said he was "trying to get the Union" started ; that Carter said he wanted Papania "to work for the Company, be a Company man"; and that Papania promised he "would forget about the Union " But Carter and Mistier testified that they spoke to Papania about Superintendent Lew Babbitt's complaints concerning Papania's work and also about a radio which belonged to one of the girl employees and which had disappeared on the third shift; that Papania denied knowing anything about the radio and asked for a transfer back to the first shift ; and that Carter and Mistier agreed to the transfer Neither in the complaint nor in his brief does the General Counsel refer to this incident, much less contend that Carter's and Mistler's conduct amounted to an unfair labor practice But, since the testimony of Papania was proffered by the General Counsel at the hearing in support of the Section 8(a) (1) allegations of the complaint and Carter's and Mistler's evidence was also received, it seems to me to be advisable to state my reasons for not making an unfair labor practice finding based upon the incident. On May 2, Papania was transferred back to the first shift and his place as foreman on the third shift was taken by Anthony Michaels. The complaint alleges and the Respond- ent admits in its answer that Michaels is a supervisor within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act. Moreover, the complaint alleges Michaels' commission of unfair labor prac- tices as a supervisor "from May 2, 1960 until May 21, 1960 " It is thus undisputed and clear that at the time of Carter's and Mistler's visit to Papania's home on or about April 20, Papania was also a supervisor within the meaning of the Act Accordingly, although I credit Papania's testimony, I specifically conclude that Carter's and Mistler's insistence that Papania as a supervisor refrain from organizational activities and "work for the Company rand] be a Company man" was not an unfair labor practice and is not indicative of opposition on the part of the Respondent to the organizational activities of its employees. THE HAMILTON' PLASTIC MOLDING COMPANY - -381 also asserted a doubt as to the employees' support of the Union's claim to recognition and a right on the part of the Respondent to an election under the circumstances. On Thursday, May 12, Cook repeated the Union 's request' for -recognition in a telephone call which he made to Vice President Carter.' Carter said he would have to consult his attorney. Cook agreed to this -and said he would give Carter until Tuesday, May 17? But Carter was unable to confer with his attorney before May 17. According to Carter's testimony, which I credit, his attorney had been unable to meet with him and President Mistier on the intervening Saturday , and they had arranged to meet on Monday morning, May 16. Their meeting at that time then became impossible because, in response to a telephone call on Saturday , Carter had to take blueprints to an Akron toolmaker for a rush job early on Monday morning and returned home only at 7 or 8 o'clock on Monday evening. On the following day, Tuesday, May 17, Cook again telephoned Carter. Carter testified that he explained to Cook why he had been unable to confer with his attorney and have an answer .to Cook's request for recognition ; that Cook threatened National Labor Relations Board action or picketing ; that both men became excited; and that, although Carter could not remember all that Cook said before the con- versation ended, he did not believe that anything was said about an election or that Cook made any offer of a card check. He stated however, that if Cook had offered a card check, he believed that he would have remembered it. Cook, on the other hand, testified that Carter said he did not believe that the Union had a "majority of our people signed up" and asked Cook to show him the cards; that Cook refused but offered a card check by a disinterested third party chosen by Carter, if Carter would agree to recognize the Union and negotiate a contract upon the checker's confirmation of the Union's majority; and that Carter said, "Absolutely not." Here again, Cook's and Carter's testimony (like Cook's and Mistler's testimony concerning their conversation on May 10) presents no clear-cut, definite conflicts as to the material elements of their May 17 telephone conversation . The substance of Carter's testimony was not denied by Cook nor was it inconsistent with Cook's version of the rest of the conversation . Actually, the only apparent conflict is as to whether Cook offered a card check of the Union's majority if Carter would accept the result, and Carter refused. As Carter himself said in his testimony, he certainly would have remembered whether or not such an important exchange had occurred during a conversation . And yet, instead of flatly denying it, he testified merely that he did not remember . Under the circumstances I do not find this in- ferential denial to be persuasive and credit Cook 's testimony as to his offer of the card check and Carter's refusal. Accordingly, as in the case of Cook's and Mistler's conversation on May 10, I make my specific findings as to what was said on May 17, upon a composite of what I regard as the credible elements of both witnesses' testimony . In the absence of denial by Cook , I credit Carter's testimony and find that Carter explained his failure to meet with his attorney and have an answer to Cook 's requests for recogni- tion, and that Cook thereupon threatened to take the matter to the Board and to picket the Respondent's plant. I further find, upon Cook's testimony , that Carter said that he did not believe that the Union represented a majority of the Respond- ent's employees and asked Cook to show him the cards ; that Cook refused and offered a card check by a third party if Carter would agree to recognize the Union and negotiate a contract upon the confirmation of the Union 's majority; and that Carter rejected this offer. On the same day May 17, 1960, the Union filed its charge in the present case. There were no communications between the parties about the Union 's recognition by the Respondent or the negotiation of a contract , after Cook's and Carter's tele- phone conversation on May 17. 4 On either the same day or the preceding day, Cook had also telephoned President Mistier and protested the layoff of Frank Papania on Wednesday , May 11 In their testimony concerning this telephone conversation , cook made no mention of any reference to recognition and ^Mistler denied that the matter came up, although in a pretrial state- ment he had said that Cook had again asked him for recognition I credit Mistler 's testi- mony at the hearing and find that Cook did not repeat his request for recognition in his telephone call to Mistler on May 11 or 12, but merely protested Papania's layoff. As to Papania's layoff, it will be recalled that, although the complaint originally alleged that Papania and three other men were discriminatorily laid off, these allegations were struck from the complaint on the General Counsel's motion at the beginning of the hear- ing. (See footnote 1, above ) 382 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 3. The defect in the Union's claim to recognition In arguing that its failure to accede to the Union's bargaining request was not violative of Section 8(a) (5) of the Act, the Respondent not only asserts and relies upon an honest doubt as to the Union's majority, but also raises the fundamental defense that, upon the facts shown by the record, it was under no obligation to bar- gain with the Union. In brief, it challenges the sufficiency of the Union's bar- gaining request and the Union's majority. According to the Respondent, the Union's bargaining request was defective and created no bargaining obligation on the part of the Respondent, because it failed to set forth any claim that the Union represented and was seeking to bargain on behalf of a unit of the Respondent's employees which would be appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) and (b) of the Act. Specifically, the Respondent contends that, by claiming all the Re- spondent's "employees" and failing to exclude supervisors and clericals, the bar- gaining request must be regarded as having included both supervisors and clerical employees along with the production employees. But I am not convinced that any such confusion did result, or could possibly have reasonably resulted, from the Union's use of the term "employees," or its failure expressly to exclude the Respondent's single clerical employee from a unit otherwise properly composed of production employees. So far as the solitary cleri- cal employee was concerned, her apparent inclusion in the Union's request was obvi- ously inadvertent, was such a minor matter that it could have caused no real difficulty, and should not, in my opinion, defeat the Union's request for recognition. And the Respondent's argument that the term "employees," when used in a union's bargaining request, must be construed "in its dictionary sense" and thus include supervisors, is contrary not only to the definition of "employees" in Section 2(3), but also to the common, everyday usage of unions and employers. Accordingly, I conclude, con- trary to the Respondent's arguments, that the Union, in requesting the Respondent to bargain on behalf of the Respondent's employees, thereby effectively claimed to represent what was an appropriate unit of the Respondent's production employees for the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) and (b) of the Act, viz, all the Respondent's employees, excluding its office clerical employees and its supervisors. The Respondent also attacks the validity of the bargaining authorizations sub- mitted by the Union at the hearing, because of handwritten insertions made upon the cards after they were signed; because of the predating of Heis' card; because of the supervisory status of Papania and Heis; and because of the participation of Papania and Heis, along with Foreman Michaels, in soliciting and thereby "coerc- ing" the signatures of employees on the other cards. , For the following reasons, I find merit in some, but not all, of these arguments of the Respondent. All the cards were in fact signed on either May 9 or 10. It is true that at Cook's suggestion Heis' card was dated May 4, 1960. According to Cook, this was done because Heis and Papania had made an earlier inquiry as to the possible organiza- tion of the Respondent's employees and Cook believed that in order to protect Heis from discrimination by the Respondent, it was advisable to have this appear from the date given on his card. It is also true, as Cook testified, that on the other cards the date, May 9 or 10, 1960, was inserted after the cards were signed, as were the name of the Respondent as the employer and the Union's Local as its agent, in the blanks provided in the checkoff authorization. Contrary to the Re- spondent's contention, however, neither these insertions nor the predating of Heis' card changed the fact that the cards were signed on either May 9 or 40, 1960, and that they do show the intent of the subscribers to designate the Union as their exclusive bargaining representative. Although the predating of Heis' card is not to be condoned, I conclude that the predating of his card and the completion of all the cards in accordance with the apparent intent of the subscribers do not invalidate their cards as bargaining authorizations. Coming now to the disputed question of whether Papania and Heis were super- visors, on May 10, 1960, it appears that Papania was then working on the first shift from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., that Heis was working on the second shift from 4 p.m. until midnight, and that the functions and duties of the two men were the same on their respective shifts. At the time, the Respondent was running, three shifts, with from three to five machine operators on each shift. Superintendent Lew Babbitt was in overall charge of the plant and, since Babbitt was normally in the plant from 7 a.m. until 5 p.m., there was no foreman for the first shift on which Papania worked. Apparently because of Babbitt's absence during the other .two shifts, Foreman Ray Stemmerding was in charge of the second shift on which Heis worked, and Fore- man Anthony Michaels was in charge of the third shift from midnight to 8 a.m. THE HAMILTON PLASTIC MOLDING COMPANY 383 Until May 2, 1960, Papania had been foreman of the third shift but , at his own request, he was then transferred to the first shift and replaced by Michaels as foreman on the third shift. According to Papania 's testimony, upon his transfer to the first shift, he was told by Superintendent Babbitt that he was to be an "assistant foreman." Although Papania also testified that his wage rate was reduced 10 cents per hour, it appears from his canceled wage check that his wage rate remained the same as it had been when he was foreman on the third shift. In performing their work on their respective shifts after May 2 (and thus on May 10, the critical date in this case ), Papania and Heis sometimes operated the ma- chines, relieved the other operators for dinner and other work breaks, mixed materials, filled the hoppers, repaired machines when they broke down , and even swept the floor.5 In these respects, Papania's job after May 2 was the same as it had been before May 2 when he was foreman on the third shift. The evidence is in conflict, however, as to whether Papania and also Heis had any such authority in directing the work of the machine operators as would make them supervisors within the meaning of Section 2 ( 11) of the Act. According to Papania, his job on the first shift was the same as his job as fore- man on the third shift "except for the responsibility." He explained that, as third shift foreman, he assigned operators to machines and to new jobs, unless on special work Babbitt made a particular assignment to -an operator , and that he also per- mitted operators to go home when they were sick. But 'according to Papania, Superintendent Babbitt was always in the plant during the first shift, although perhaps in another room, and Papania, during his short service on the first shift, merely relayed Babbitt's instructions to the girl operators . But Babbitt testified that he had informed Papama, Papania was in complete charge of the first shift when Babbitt was not there . Upon Babbitt's testimony to this effect and Papania's admission that Babbitt had said he was to be an assistant foreman when he was transferred to the first shift on May 2, I conclude that Papania did in fact have authority responsibly to direct the work of employees on his shift and that not only he, but also Heis, whose job was identical on the second shift, were supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act. Consequently they were not employees within the appropriate unit which the Union sought to represent and neither they nor their cards may be counted in determining whether the Respondent was designated as bargaining representative by a majority of the employees in the unit. I further find that, with the proper exclusion of Papania and Heis as super- visors, the appropriate bargaining unit of production employees which the Union seeks to represent, consisted on May 10, 1960, of.only 13 employees. My conclusion that Papania and Heis, as well as Foreman Michaels, were super- visors has an even broader significance affecting the Union 's claim of majority. For these three supervisors along with employee Whitaker not only started the Union's organization of the Respondent's employees by their visit to Business Manager Cook's office on May 9, but thereafter procured the signatures of employees on the re- maining seven of the bargaining authorization cards submitted by the General Counsel and the Union at the hearing . Thus, according to uncontradicted evidence, Foreman Michaels procured the signature of Louise Anglian; 6 Papania procured the signatures of employees Fay Gullett, Eve Fowlie, Rosie Thompson , and Joyce Stoelting ; and Heis, in the company of employee Whitaker, procured the signatures of employees Betty ' Jo Noah and Robert Kichler. In this situation , I find that the seven cards procured by Supervisors Michaels, Papania, and Heis are not to be counted as clearly free designations by the employees of the Union as their exclusive bargaining representative , and that the only apparently free and effective bargain- ing authorization submitted by the Union was that of employee Lonnie Whitaker. Upon the foregoing considerations , I conclude that the Union has shown only one effective bargaining authorization from the 13 employees composing the production unit appropriate for collective bargaining . Since the Union was therefore not freely designated as exclusive bargaining representative by a majority of the em- ployees in the unit, the allegation of the complaint that the Respondent has refused to bargain with the Union in violation of Section 8(a) (5) and ( 1) of the Act, has not been proved. I shall therefore recommend a dismissal of this allegation of the complaint. r. These findings are made upon uncontradicted evidence given specifically as to Papania's job. As has been noted , Heis' job was the same as Papania's 9 Mrs Anglian had earlier been asked to sign a card by Whitaker She testified, but Whitaker denied, that Whitaker had grabbed her hand to force her to sign. I find it unnecessary to resolve this conflict in the testimony in view of my finding that Mrs Anglian's card is not, in any event , to be counted toward the Union ' s possible majority, because it was procured by Foreman Michaels 384 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD B. Interference, restraint, and coercion In support of his contention that the Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of their right to join and support the Union as their bargaining representative, the General Counsel relies upon the testimony of employees concerning numerous statements made, and questions asked by, Superintendent Lew Babbitt. There was also testimony concerning several inci- dents involving Foreman Michaels and Vice President Nicholas Carter. As to Foreman Michaels, employee Robert Kichler testified that about a week after May 11, Michaels told Kichler that, ",if the Union did not get in, he thought that . [the Respondent] would fire the men and hire women because they would be less apt to join the Union." Since Michaels did not appear as a witness, this testimony is uncontradicted and I accept it. But I do not find, under the cir- cumstances in this case, that Michaels' statement to Kichler was an unfair labor practice chargeable to the Respondent. For, although a foreman, Michaels was one of the instigators of the union movement among the employees, and his state- ment was obviously intended to encourage rather than discourage affiliation with the Union. It was therefore squarely opposed to the opposition which the General Counsel contends was the position of the Respondent. It is clear, and I conclude, that the Respondent was not responsible for Foreman Michaels' statement to Kichler. The testimony as to a single incident directly involving Vice President Nicholas Carter is quite different. Employee Dorothy Ohmer, who did not sign a union card, testified that while she was riding to work with Carter on May 12, Carter asked her whether anyone had asked her about joining the Union, and that she told Carter that Larry Heis had asked her twice, the second time when Heis and Lonnie Whitaker had visited her home, but that she had refused to sign a union card. Carter denied questioning Mrs. Ohmer or referring to the Union in any conversation with Mrs. Ohmer. He testified that Mrs. Ohmer told him that Heis and Whitaker had visited her and asked her to sign a card; that Carter asked her, "Did you?" and that Mrs. Ohmer did not answer but just smiled. I credit Mrs. Ohmer's testimony. Further- more, in view of the credible evidence of Superintendent Babbitt's interrogation of the employees and his antiunion statements to employees which is considered below, I find that Vice President Carter's interrogation of Mrs. Ohmer tended to interfere with the Respondent's employees' free exercise of their right to self-organization and was therefore an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. We come finally to a consideration of the evidence relating to Superintendent Lew Babbitt's interrogation of employees, his statements to some of them that the Re- spondent knew the names of employees who were supporting the Union; his threats of a plant shutdown and loss of jobs if the Union succeeded in organizing the Re- spondent's employees; his statements to employees that the Respondent was con- templating a wage increase and paid lunch periods and holidays; and an instance in which he allegedly assigned difficult work to employee Eve Fowlie , because she had signed a union card. To a surprising extent, Babbitt in his testimony either admitted or failed to deny having questioned employees and having made some of the remarks attributed to him in the testimony of the employee-witnesses. He at- tempted to explain this in some instances by saying that he was "kidding around" with the employees with whom he was apparently quite friendly, although at one point he blunted this explanation and the likely effect of his remarks with the comment that he had spoken to the employee "not in a laughing manner, [but] I meant it as a joke more or less." In other cases, he claimed that apparent threats of a plant shutdown and loss of jobs were not actually made in exactly the manner or language to which the employees testified, but were mere statements of what the Respondent might be forced to do if the Union were successful and made it difficult for the Respondent. But his explanations are not persuasive. On the contrary, in view of the apparent truthfulness of the General Counsel's witnesses and the num- ber of incidents which unquestionably occurred and which Babbitt either admitted, failed to deny, or attempted to explain , it appears to me and I find in the detail set forth below, that Babbitt did in fact interrogate employees, tell employees the Respondent knew who were supporting the Union, threaten a plant shutdown and loss of jobs, hold forth a reasonable expectation of a raise and paid lunch periods and holidays , and, in one instance, tell an employee that he had discriminated against employee Fowlie by giving her a difficult job assignment. Upon Superintendent Babbitt's admission of the first of the following four inci- dents and the uncontradicted testimony of the employees involved in all four incidents, I find that Babbitt interrogated employees in the following cases: THE HAMILTON PLASTIC MOLDING COMPANY 385- (1) In May 1960, Babbitt asked employee Robert Kichler if he had signed a union card.? (2) On Saturday, May 14, Babbitt asked employee Louise Anglian whether anyone had requested her to sign a union card. (3) On May 16, Babbitt asked employee Gladys Barger whether Papania had contacted her about the Union while she was sick and away from work. (4) About the same time and also at other times Babbitt asked Gladys Barger whether she was going to vote for the Union. Upon the credible testimony of two employees, I also find that Superintendent Babbitt told each of these employees, in effect, that the Respondent knew which employees were, or had been, supporting the Union. Thus, I find, upon employee Eve Fowlie's testimony, that Babbitt told her that Frank Papania was the leader of' the union group and had been seen at the union hall when he had taken time off' from work for a leg or foot injury.8 Upon employee Gladys Barger's uncontra-- dicted testimony, I find that on or about May 16, Babbitt told her that if Barger and employee Joyce Stoelting voted against the Union, they would not have anything- to worry about because they knew how almost everyone was going to vote. I also find upon employee Barger's further testimony that Babbitt also told her that employee Dorothy Ohmer had made a report to President Mistler and Vice President Carter concerning a visit made by Papania, Heis, and Whitaker to her home to get her to sign a union card and the Respondent knew six of the employees who had' signed cards. Five of the employees testified as to six separate conversations in which Babbitt threatened a plant shutdown or a loss of jobs if the Union should succeed in organiz- ing the employees. Babbitt admitted having made the statements attributed to him' in the first three incidents as they are summarized below, did not testify as to the fourth, and sought to explain the remaining two by claiming that he merely told'. the employees what the Respondent might do if the Union were successful and' the employees went on strike. Upon my appraisal of the evidence in this situation, I credit the testimony of the employees as to these incidents and find that: (1) Babbitt told employee Gladys Barger that "before [the Respondent] let the Union in, they would sell out and move to California." (2) Superintendent Babbitt told employee Eve Fowlie that if the Union got in, they were all going to be out of work, and that the Respondent would shut the plant down. (3) Superintendent Babbitt told employee Robert Kichler that "if the Union would get in . Nick and Eldon would close down the company." (4) Superintendent Babbitt said to employee Louise Anglian that "none of us would have a job if the Union came in." (5) Superintendent Babbitt told employee Gladys Barger that if the Union got in, they would lay off all the girls and that the foremen, the tool and diemaker, and, the two owners would operate the machines. (6) Superintendent Babbitt told employee Betty Jo Noah in a telephone conversa. tion that there was a "stink" around the plant; that it was the Union; that Noahi could vote for the Union but if the Union got in "there was going to be lot of people out of work down there." Employees Gladys Barger and Eve Fowlie also testified that Superintendent Babbitt spoke to them about a raise and paid lunch periods and holidays.9 According to. Mrs. Barger, Babbitt told her that "if the Union didn't get in," the girls would probably get a raise and would be paid for a half hour lunch period and holidays. Eve Fowlie's testimony was that Babbitt told her that although he did not have too, much against the Union, a small place like the Respondent's plant did not need a union; that the Respondent's plant was a new plant and the Respondent had "hoped to work something out"; and that they had considered giving the employees a raise and paid lunch periods and holidays. In his testimony, Babbitt admitted having told about 90 percent of the employees on or about May 20, 1960, that the Respondent 7 Babbitt admitted that he asked whether Kichler had signed a card and that, by this reference, he meant a union card 8 Babbitt denied merely that he told Fowlie that Papania had been seen at the union. hall and that there was nothing wrong with Papania's foot. He admitted, however, that after Papania's layoff had been protested by Business Manager Cook, he had told Fowlie that "Frank was the leader in trying to get the Union in." 9 Counsel stipulated the substance of Eve Fowlie's testimony on this point by quoting. from a pretrial affidavit given by her to the General Counsel 634449-62-vol. 135-26 386 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD was considering giving the employees holiday pay. He denied, however, that he had mentioned the Union. He testified that Barger had asked him why the employees were not paid for their lunch periods; and that he had replied that the girls worked only 7V2 hours, that the men, who worked 8 hours, were paid for a 15-minute lunch period, and that the Respondent had been considering a paid lunch period for the girls but had "never got around to straighten any of these things out." I credit Bazger's and Fowlie's testimony, and find that Superintendent Babbitt by the re- mazks he made to them held out the possibility that, if the Union did not succeed in organizing the employees , the Respondent would grant a raise and paid lunch periods and holidays. One further incident requires discussion. Employee Gladys Barger testified that, after she returned to work on May 16 following an illness, she told Superintendent Babbitt that employee Eve Fowlie's hands were sore from working at a particular job "for quite a few days in a row"; that Babbitt said, "That's not the half of it. When I get a harder job, I am going to put her on that"; that Barger asked, "Why?" and that Babbitt said, "Because she signed one of the Union cards." Although Eve Fowlie appeared as a witness, she did not testify concerning her work nor the difficulty of any particular job to which she had been assigned. Babbitt denied that Barger or Fowlie had complained to him about Fowlie's job or that he made the statements which Barger attributed to him. He further testified that Fowlie's job was one of the easiest in the shop. In the absence of any testimony by Fowlie as to her job, I find no satisfactory basis for a finding that the work assigned to her was in fact unusually difficult . But, on the conflict in the testimony of Barger and Babbitt as to their conversation, I credit Barger and find that, regardless of whether Fowlie's assignment was in fact unusually difficult and wearing, Barger did tell Babbitt that Fowlie's hands had gotten sore at the work, and that Babbitt did tell Barger that he had given Fowlie the assign- ment and would give her even a more difficult assignment if one presented itself, all because Fowlie had signed a union card. I further find that this statement of Babbitt was such calculated interference, restraint, and coercion of the employees' exercise of their rights to self-organization, as to be an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. In sum, upon my foregoing detailed findings of fact, I conclude that the Respond- ent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, and thereby committed unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act, by Vice President Car- ter's interrogation of employee Ohmer, and by Superintendent Babbitt's (1) interro- gation of employees; (2) telling employees that Respondent knew who were support- ing the Union; (3) threatening a plant shutdown and loss of jobs if the Union were successful in organizing the employees; (4) holding out to the employees of a reason- able expectation of a raise and paid lunch periods and holidays if the Union were not successful; and (5) informing employee Barger that he had assigned, and would continue to assign, difficult and wearing work to employee Eve Fowlie because Fowlie had signed a union card. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in con- nection with the operations of the Respondent set forth in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com- merce and the free flow thereof. V. THE REMEDY It has been found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Since the Respondent's unfair labor practices included threats of a plant shutdown and a loss of jobs, it appears to me that they constitute a threat of other unfair labor practices in the future. I shall therefore recommend not only that the Respondent cease and desist from the unfair labor practices committed by it and take certain affirmative action in order to effectu- ate the policies of the Act, but also that it cease and desist from infringing in any manner upon the rights of their employees guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.io 10 See May Department Stores d/b/a Famous-Barr Company v. N L R B , 326 U.S 376, affg. as mod 146 F. 2d 66 (C A 8) ; N.L.R B. v. Entwistle Mfg Co., 120 F. 2d 532, 536 (C.A. 4) ; NLR.B. v. Globe Wireless, Ltd., 193 F. 2d 748 (C.A. 9) ; Liberty Coach Company, Inc, 128 NLRB 160. MOVING STORAGE NEGOTIATING COMMITTEE, ETC. 387 Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact , and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Local Union No. 156 , Upholsterers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. 2. By interrogation of employees, by telling employees that it knew who the adherents of the Union were , by threatening a plant shutdown and loss of jobs if the Union were successful in organizing the employees, by holding out to the em- ployees a reasonable expectation of a raise and paid lunch periods and holidays if the Union were unsuccessful , and by informing an employee that difficult work had been assigned and would be assigned to an employee because of her support of the Union, the Respondent has interfered with , restrained, and coerced its em- ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and has thereby engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. 4. The Respondent did not commit an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] Moving Storage Negotiating Committee and its Employer Mem- bers and Van & Storage Drivers Union, Local 389, Inter- national Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse- men & Helpers of America, Ind.; General Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Union, Local 692, International Brother- hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, Ind.; General Truck Drivers, Warehousemen & Help- ers Union, Local 235, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen &• Helpers of America, Ind.; and General Teamsters, Sales Drivers, Food Processors, Ware- housemen & Helpers Union, Local 871, International Brother- hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 'Warehousemen & Helpers of America, Ind. Case No. 21-CA-3891. January 22, 1962 DECISION AND ORDER On August 31, 1960, Trial Examiner Howard Myers issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report together with a supporting brief, and the Gen- eral Counsel filed a brief in support of the Intermediate Report. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Interme- diate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the 135 NLRB No. 54.