Grace Line, Inc.

GRACE LINE, INC. 775 identifiable, distinct, and homogeneous grouping entitled to separate representation. As to the machine shop, I would find, contrary to both my colleagues of the majority and Member Fanning, that the em- ployees in the machine shop constitute an appropriate unit. The ma- chine shop is made up of tool-and-die men, designer-draftsmen, and machinists. These employees perform traditional machinist functions, are separately supervised, separately located, do not interchange with other employees, have separate seniority, perform no production func- tions, and perform only incidental maintenance functions. They constitute, therefore, a readily identifiable, functionally distinct and homogeneous department to which the Board has traditionally granted the right of separate representation .9 MEmBER Ronaiu s, concurring : I concur in dismissing the petitions. 6 The Electronic and In8trumentation Divi8ion of Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corporation, 118 NL1IB 917. Grace Line, Inc. and Union Naccional de Marinos de Colon Rep. de Panama, Latin American Maritime Federation, Petitioner. Case No. 2-RC-11013. January 31, 1962 DECISION AND ORDER Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before Carl B. Davidson, hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed. Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds: 1. The Petitioner seeks a unit of some 48 employees who in groups of about 8 are hired as "coast crews" on the Employer's vessels as they pass through the Panama Canal Zone for South American ports. The Employer, for reasons set forth below, contends that the Act does not cover the maritime operations involved and moves that the petition be dismissed. The Employer, a Delaware corporation, owns and operates, insofar as is material here, a fleet of vessels, registered under, the laws and flying the flag of the United States, which sail between United States and various South American ports. On trips to the west coast of South America, the ships pass through the Panama Canal and there pick up a "coast crew" of some eight employees, who are hired by the Employer at its Cristobal, Canal Zone, office, which apparently assigns them to the particular vessels. The coast crews, which are composed of citizens of Panama, work on the vessels doing such jobs as raising, lowering, and securing hatches. Their principal function is, however, 135 NLRB No. 70. 776 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD to prepare the vessels for loading and unloading at South American ports of call. On a ship's return trip to the United States, its coast crew is discharged or laid off in the Canal Zone. -At no time while the coast crew is aboard does a ship call at a United States port. The Employer concedes that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act and the record shows that its annual gross income from its oceangoing transportation services exceeds $500,000 annually. However, it contends, as noted, that the coverage of the Act does not extend to the maritime operations specifically involved in this proceed- ing. In explicating its position', it maintains that the petition covers only voyages beginning and ending in Panama and reaching only to nations foreign to the United States, and, therefore, that commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) of the Act-that is, transportation between a State and foreign nation-is not involved in this proceed- ing. It maintains further that these maritime operations involve pri- marily points of contact which relate to the jurisdiction of Panama and not to that of the United States. In this regard, it relies not only upon the position that the voyages here concern only transportation between Panama and other foreign nations but also upon the facts that the coast crews are composed of Panamanian nationals and that the Petitioner is a Panamanian organization. As noted above, the ships here involved sail between domestic ports and those in South America. The obvious fact that such voyages are trade or transportation between a State and foreign nation cannot be destroyed by ignoring the point of departure or by considering only a segment of the voyage beyond United States territories simply be- cause the petition is restricted to employees who sail only on such seg- ment.' The voyages must be considered in their entirety and, as so viewed, clearly come within the definition of commerce as set forth in Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Consequently, these maritime opera- tions involve a domestic employer and its American-flag vessels en- gaged in commerce as defined in the Act. As the United States contacts of the Employer's maritime operations are substantial 2 the facts that the petitioning organization and the requested employees are Panamanian and that the ships touch upon the territory of Panama do not render what is essentially United States shipping a Panamanian maritime operation subject only to the laws of that nation a Accord- ingly, we conclude that the maritime operations subject of the com- plaint are in and affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act 1 See, Baer Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Denver & R.G.R. Co, 233 U.S . 479, 480 ( 1914) ; Missouri, T.S T.R. Co. v. Texas, 245 U.S. 484 ( 1918 ) ; also Baltimore S.O.S.W .R Co. v. Settle, 260 U S 166 ( 1922). z See , West India Fruit and Steamship Company, Inc , 130 NLRB 343. 8 See, West India Fruit and Steamship Company, Inc., supra; Hamilton Bros. Inc., 133 NLRB 868 ; United Fruit Company, 134 NLRB 287. GRACE LINE, INC. 777 to assert jurisdiction in this proceeding. The Employer's motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds is, therefore, denied. 2. The labor organization 4 involved claims to represent certain em- ployees of the Employer. 3. As set forth above, the Petitioner seeks a unit of employees who are employed by the Employer in its coast crews. The Employer con- tends that the requested unit is inappropriate. Though the record indicates that the unlicensed seamen on the Employer's ships are rep- resented by a union, it is not contended that the coast crews are so represented or that there is any other bargaining history affecting them. The general nature of the coast crews and their work is described above and there is, in fact, little other evidence bearing on the appro- priateness of the proposed unit. Nothing in the record suggests that the coast crews once aboard a vessel are separately supervised, that they perform work not done by other employees, or that they work together in any separate area. In fact, the evidence, though at best ambiguous, tends to suggest that at least some of the work performed by the coast crews is similar to that performed by some of the regular crew. There is, however, no evidence as to the scope or composition of the unit which includes the regular crew. Nor is there any evidence to establish whether the coast crews are composed of a group of regu- lar employees, or whether they are casual employees. Thus, there is no basis in the record before us for finding that the employees com- prising the coast crews constitute an appropriate unit either on the basis of special, separate interests, or on a residual basis. Accord- ingly, we find that no question affecting commerce exists concerning the representation of certain employees of the Employer within the meaning of Section 9(c) (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. We shall, therefore, dismiss the petition. [The Board dismissed the -petition.] MEMBER RODGERS, concurring : For the reason stated in my dissents in West India Fruit and Steamship Company, Inc., 130 NLRB 343, and Hamilton Bros. Inc., 133 NLRB 868, I concur in the result. MEMBER FANNING took no part in the consideration of the above Decision and Order. 4 The Employer contends that the Petitioner is not a labor organization but only an "organizing committee." The record shows, however , that the Petitioner admits em- ployees to membership and exists in whole or in part for the purpose of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment . Accordingly, we find that the Petitioner is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. The fact that the Petitioner is a foreign organization , that it presently does not yet have agreements with employers, and that it may not be in compliance with the provisions of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 does not require a contrary holding. See, Hamilton Bros. Inc., supra ; Plains Cooperative Osl Mill, 123 NLRB 1709, 1710; Terminal System, Inc, et al., 127 NLRB 979, 980.