The Standard Oil Co.

690 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The Standard Oil Company (An Ohio Corporation) and Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union and Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 11-395 and The Standard Oil Company (An Ohio Corporation) Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union and Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 11-624 and The Standard Oil Company (An Ohio Corporation). Ca.ees Nos. 8-CA-2316, 8-CA-2317, 8-CA-2318, 8-CA-2321, 8-CB- 495, 8-CB-496, and 8-CB-197. June 20, 1962 DECISION AND ORDER On November 1, 1961, Trial Examiner Ramey Donovan issued his Intermediate Report finding that the Respondents had engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the Intermediate Report attached hereto. He also recom- mended that certain other allegations of the complaint be dismissed. Thereafter the Respondents filed exceptions to the Intermediate Re- port and supporting briefs.' The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Intermediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby affirms the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, with the following exceptions and modifications.' We agree with the Trial Examiner that the Respondent Company violated Section 8 (a) (5) and (1) by refusing to meet with the bar- gaining agents of the certified representatives of its employees because "Temporary International Representatives" were present. In so con- cluding, we need not consider whether the temporary International representatives were, in fact, the representatives of the employees in the units at whose bargaining sessions they appeared. Assuming arguendo that they did not represent such employees, the Respondent Company was not thereby relieved of its duty to meet with the duly appointed representatives of the various units simply because the temporary representatives were also present. We also agree with the Trial Examiner that Local 395 violated Sec- tion 8(b) (3) 3 by refusing under the circumstances herein to sign, 'As the record, exceptions , and briefs adequately set forth the issues and positions of the parties , the Respondents' requests for oral argument are denied. 2 In view of our decision herein, the Respondent Company's motions to dismiss the complaint are hereby denied. s As the complaint, as amended, contained no allegation that the Respondent Unions violated Section 8 (b) (1) (A), we do not adopt the Trial Examiner's finding of such violation. 137 NLRB No. 68. THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (AN OHIO CORPORATION) 691 upon reaching agreement, contracts covering its bargaining units at refineries Nos. 1 and 2. In reaching this result, the Trial Examiner concluded, at least in part, that it was unlawful for Local 395, the cer- tified representative, to defer signing until the contracts were ap- proved by both the International Union and the Council, pursuant to the Council's and the International's constitution and bylaws. We disagree with this conclusion. Rather, we find that the delay in sign- ing was unlawful only because, as Local 395 knew, the International's and Council's withholding of approval was unrelated to any dissatis- faction with the contract terms themselves but was based upon the unilateral decision to approve no agreement with the Company until negotiations were satisfactorily concluded by another local at the Company's Toledo unit. By thus importing this extraneous issue into the bargaining situation at refineries Nos. 1 and 2, Local 395 clearly failed to meet its bargaining obligations under the Act.4 For the same reason, we conclude, as did the Trial Examiner, that the Interna- tional, the certified representative at Lirna, failed to comply with its statutory bargaining obligations in refusing to sign its completed agreement at that location. Our dissenting colleague is of the opinion, however, that the holding out by Respondent Unions for agreement at Toledo was a "reasonable" bargaining tactic, and thus not unlawful. However, the issue here is not simply the reasonableness of the Unions' course of conduct but whether they met their bargaining obligations under the Act when they interposed agreement at Toledo as a condition precedent to exe- cuting the contracts at Cleveland and Lima, the terms of which had already been settled. The dissenting opinion takes exception to our conclusion that agreement at Toledo was an extraneous issue at Cleve- land and Lima. Significantly, however, our colleague does not allude to the fact that the Respondent Unions did not seek at those locations to bargain over agreement at Toledo, but rather, without any consulta- tion with the Company, made such agreement a sine qua non of their signing the fully negotiated contracts. It is on this point, as well as others, that the U.S. Pipe case,' so heavily relied upon in the dissent, is distinguishable from the situation here. In that case, the court held it was not unlawful for the unions involved to seek common termina- tion dates for contracts covering the various units they represented. But in their separate negotiations with their common employer they placed this demand upon the bargaining table with the others they sought, and did not, as here, unilaterally and after all the terms of their agreements had been settled, make it a stumbling block to execu- tion of such agreements. ' See N.L R B. v. Retail Clerks International Associateon, AFL and Retail Clerks' Union, Local 648 ( Safeway Stores ), 203 F. 2d 165 , 169-170 (CA 9) 6 United States Pipe and Foundry Company v. N L R B., 298 F. 2d 873 (C A. 5). 692 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Furthermore, we cannot agree with our dissenting colleague 's argu- ments that the Unions at Cleveland and Lima were seeking to strengthen their own bargaining position or to carry out the Sohio Council's plan in refusing to sign. They had reached agreement at variance with the council program and immediately executed such agreements wholly unchanged when the Toledo situation was settled. Thus, it is evident that the refusal to sign was merely a device intended to increase the Toledo Union's bargaining power and was unrelated to achieving the Council program at Cleveland and Lima or to affect- ing changes in "terms and conditions " of employment at such loca- tions which alone encompass the proper subjects of bargaining. Lastly, we find nothing inconsistent, as the dissent contends, be- tween our concluding that a local union can properly delay signing a contract until approved by superior union bodies pursuant to the provisions of a union's constitution and bylaws and our result here that the specific reason for withholding was unlawful because it was an improper precondition to the execution of agreements already reached. Accordingly, we find in view of the foregoing that Local 395 at refineries Nos. 1 and 2 , and the International at Lima refused to bargain in good faith and thereby violated Section 8 (b) (3) by refus- ing to execute the contracts negotiated at their respective locations until agreement was reached at Toledo. ORDER The Board adopts the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner with the following modifications: 1. In the Recommended Order directed toward the remedy of the Company's unfair labor practices , delete the words "including tem- porary International representatives " in paragraphs numbered 1, 3, 5, and 7 of the Order (the notice is to be conformed to this change). 2. In the Recommended Order directed toward the remedy of Local 11-395's unfair labor practices ; delete the words "unless and until permitted to do so by Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Interna- tional Union and" in paragraphs numbered 1 and 3 of the Order, the words "and Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union permitted the signing of the aforesaid contractual agreement" and substitute the word "reaches" for the word "reached" (the notice is to be conformed to this change). 3. In the Recommended Order directed toward the remedy of the International's unfair labor practices, delete the words "to approve and" in paragraph numbered 5. 4. Substitute for the text of paragraphs numbered 2 (c), 4(c), 6(c), and 8(c) in the Order directed to the Company and paragraphs num- THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (AN OHIO CORPORATION) 693 bered 2(d), 4(d), and 6(d) in the Order directed to the Unions the following : Notify the aforesaid Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 5. (a) In the title of each notice, substitute for the words "Pur- suant to the Recomendations of a Trial Examiner" the words "Pursu- ant to a Decision and Order." (b) Add, at the bottom of each notice, the following : Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Re- gional Office, 720 Bulkley Building, 1501 Euclid Avenue, Cleve- land 15, Ohio, Telephone Number Main 1-4465, if they have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions. (c) In the title of the notices directed to the remedy of the Unions' unfair labor practices, change the word "Employees" to the word "Members." (d) In the event the Board's Order herein is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order" on each such notice. CHAIRMAN McCuLLOCH, concurring in part and dissenting in part : I agree with the majority's decision except insofar as it finds that Respondent Local 395 did not bargain in good faith with Respondent Company. The facts are not seriously in dispute. Respondent Company op- erates four refineries in the State of Ohio : two in Cleveland, one in Lima, and one in Toledo. Employees at these refineries are organized in separate collective-bargaining units and are represented by Re- spondent International or one of its locals.6 In 1960, collective- bargaining negotiations began at all four refineries for new collective- bargaining agreements. Before the start of negotiations the Sohio Council 7 adopted a program of demands which was binding upon all the unions involved in this proceeding. On January 8, 1961, Re- spondent Local 395 and the Company reached agreement on terms a new contract for the No. 1 refinery at Cleveland. Employees at this refinery ratified the terms, but union officials refused to sign the writ- e Local 395 represents employees at the two Cleveland refineries in separate units ; Local 346 represents employees at the Toledo refinery; and the International represents employees at the Lima refinery, although the employees are members of Local 624 7 Sohio Council is composed of the locals which are involved in this proceeding and is intended to coordinate collective bargaining with the Respondent Company. Its con- stitution provides, inter alia, that all agreements executed by local unions comply with both Council and International policy and be approved and signed by proper International officials. 694 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ten contract embodying these terms until agreement was also reached at the Toledo refinery where some difficulty was being experienced in agreeing upon a new contract. The officials explained that the union was part of the Sohio Council and that they could not sign a contract until all members of the Council had made agreements. The same train of events occurred at the No. 2 refinery in Cleveland and at the Lima refinery, that is, the respective unions and the Company reached agreement at these refineries, but union officials refused to sign con- tracts until agreement was reached at Toledo. When such agreement was reached, the unions signed the previously approved contracts for the Cleveland and Lima refineries. At the present time, therefore, signed collective-bargaining contracts cover employees at all four refineries. The majority finds that Local 395's delay in signing contracts for the Cleveland refinery units as unlawful because it- ... was unrelated to any dissatisfaction with the contract terms themselves but was based upon the unilateral decision to approve no agreement with the Company until negotiations were satisfac- torily concluded by another local at the Company's Toledo unit. By thus importing this extraneous issue into the bargaining situa- tion at refineries Nos. 1 and 2, Local 395 clearly failed to meet its bargaining obligations under the Act.' To support this conclusion the majority cites only one case, N.L.R.R. v. Retail Clerks International Association, AFL and Retail Clerks' Union, Local 648 (Safeway Stores), 203 F. 2d 165, 169-170 (C.A. 9). In that case the respondent union, which was the bargain- ing representative of a unit of retail clerks, refused to bargain for employees in the unit unless the employer simultaneously bargained for certain supervisors who were excluded. The court upheld the Board's finding that the union's conduct violated Section 8(b) (3) saying (203 F. 2d 165,170) : The Board could well have concluded that the injection by re- spondents, directly or indirectly, of the interests of supervisory employees as a consideration in the negotiations for a bargaining agreement was so extraneous to the terms and conditions of employment of those within the proper bargaining unit that the demands constituted a refusal to bargain in good faith. [Empha- sis supplied.] I do not think that it can be said that the refusals to sign contracts at the Cleveland refineries until agreement was reached at the Toledo 8 The majority has rejected the Trial Examiner 's finding that it was unlawful for Local 395 to defer signing of its contracts until they were approved by both the International and the Sohio Council, as required by the constitution and bylaws of those organizations. I agree with the majority on this point. THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (AN OHIO CORPORATION) 695 refinery was "so extraneous" to the terms and conditions of employ- ment of employees at the Cleveland refineries as to constitute per se a refusal to bargain in good faith, which in substance is what the majority is holding. The employees at all four refineries obviously had a community of interest. Unless they stood together their posi- tion vis-a-vis the employer would be weak. Thus if employees at only one refinery struck while the other refineries continued to op- erate, the employer could replace the products of its struck refinery from its operating refineries. Also, if employees at one refinery agreed to certain contract terms it is extremely unlikely that employees at other refineries would be able to secure more favorable terms. It was to prevent this very dissipation of bargaining strength and undercut- ting of one another that the Sohio Council was formed. The ma- jority has recognized the legitimacy of the Council's role by holding, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that it was not unlawful to require Council approval of contracts before they became effective. It seems to me inconsistent now to find that in carrying out a Council policy or instruction that no individual contracts were to be signed until agreements were reached at all refineries, Local 395 violated the bar- gaining obligations of the Act. I think that a recent decision 9 of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals is directly contrary to the holding of the majority in the present case. In the case referred to, United States Pipe and Foundry Company, the respondent company had three plants organized in three separate bargaining units. Two of the plants were represented by locals of the Steelworkers and the third by a local of the Molders. During separate negotiations for new collective-bargaining agreements at the three plants, each of the bargaining representatives insisted upon a common termination date for the three contracts. The court posed the question presented by the case as follows : ... whether by prearrangement among themselves, each of three unions, certified representatives of three separate plant bargain- ing units, simultaneously negotiating separate contracts with the same employer, may insist as a condition to its agreement that all three contracts under negotiation shall expire on some common date. The court answered the question in the affirmative explaining : Under the facts of this case viewed realistically, a common ex- piration date of all three contracts had a vitally important con- nection with the "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment" of the employees at each plant. Without a com- Y Unnted States Pipe and Foundry Company v. N L R.B., 298 F. 2d 873 (C.A. 5), cert. denied 370 U.S. 919. 696 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD mon expiration date, any union striking for a new contract on a different date might have to "bail with a sieve" while the em- ployer shifted its production activities to the other plant or plants. With a common expiration date, it is obvious that each union might be able to negotiate a more advantageous new con- tract for the employees represented by that union. In such a situation, as presented by the facts and circumstances of this case, it seems to us that the importance of collective bar- gaining on questions affecting "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment" overrides the apparent expansion of the scope of the bargaining unit. That expansion is more ap- parent than real, for the very real, hard problem faced by each of the three unions, acting as the exclusive representative of the employees in its unit, is that a common expiration date for all three contracts vitally affects the ability of each union separately to bargain. Every reason which the court recognized as justifying insistence upon a common expiration date for all three contracts in United States Pipe is equally applicable to the present case where the unions insisted, according to previously established policy, that agreement be reached at all four refineries before any individual contract be signed. Realistically such a policy "vitally affects the ability of each union separately to bargain." Without such a common policy any of the unions striking one plant might have to "'bail with a sieve' while the employer shifted its production activities to the other plant or plants." With such a policy each union might be able to negotiate more advantageous terms for the employees whom it represented. In other words, it was relevant and important to the terms and con- ditions of employment being sought by employees within each bar- gaining unit, that a common policy with respect to signing of individ- ual contracts be adopted. In point of fact, this is both a usual and a reasonable tactic when bargaining is proceeding simultaneously for employees at separate plants of the same employer and there is a possibility of shifting production from one plant to another. Accordingly, I perceive no basis for finding that Respondent Local 395 showed bad faith in its bargaining by delaying signing of bargain- ing contracts covering employees at the Cleveland refineries until agreement was reached at the Toledo refinery. As I noted before, as soon as the parties came to terms at Toledo, Respondent Local 395 signed its own contracts. I would therefore dismiss the 8(b) (3) allegations of the complaint. MEMBER RODGERS took no part in the consideration of the above Decision and Order. THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (AN OHIO CORPORATION) 697 INTERMEDIATE REPORT STATEMENT OF THE CASE This proceeding was held before Trial Examiner Ramey Donovan at Cleveland, Ohio, on July 10, 11, and 12, 1961. The General Counsel had issued a consolidated complaint against The Standard Oil Company (an Ohio Corporation), herein called the Employer or Standard, in Cases Nos. 8-CA-2316, 8-CA-2317, 8-CA-2318, and 8-CA-2321, alleging viola- tions of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. A separate consolidated complaint against Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union , herein called the International, and Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 11-395 and Local 11-624, herein called Local 395 and Local 624, respectively, was also issued alleging violations of Section 8(b)(1) (A ) and (3 ) of the Act. Both Standard in its answer and the International and the Local Unions , aforementioned, in the one answer filed on behalf of the International and the Local Unions, denied as Respondents in the respective cases that they had committed unfair labor practices. During the course of the hearing , the General Counsel , with all parties in agreement, moved to consolidate the CA cases ' hearing and the CB cases' hearing. The motion was granted and the hearing was conducted accordingly. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER Standard is and has been at all times material herein a corporation duly organized and existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Ohio. Standard has been and is engaged in the refining, processing, sale, and distribution of petroleum products at several plants in the State of Ohio. In the course of its business operations, Standard causes and has caused raw materials valued in excess of $1,000,000 annually to be purchased, delivered, and transported from points outside Ohio directly to its plants in Ohio, and Standard causes finished products valued in excess of $1,000,000 an- nually to be sold, delivered, and transported to points directly outside Ohio from its various plants in Ohio. The particular plants of Standard involved in these proceedings are No. I refinery, Cleveland, Ohio; No. 2 refinery, Cleveland, Ohio; Lima refinery, Lima, Ohio; Toledo refinery, Toledo, Ohio. Standard is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. No. 1 refinery; No. 2 refinery; Lima refinery; and Toledo refinery are each in- dividually engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED The International and Local 395, Local 624, and Local 346 are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The facts 1. History of bargaining Local 395 has been since 1941 the certified bargaining representative of the em- ployees in the following appropriate unit: All production and maintenance employees at Standards No. 1 refinery, Cleve- land, Ohio, including the storekeepers and assistant stock and purchase clerks in the warehouse, the pipeline gaugers, the control laboratory, but excluding all supervisory, clerical, and technical employees, graduate chemists and engineers working as such, and guards. Since 1943 Local 395 has been the certified bargaining representative of the em- ployees in the following appropriate unit: All production and maintenance employees at the No. 2 Cleveland refinery, excluding all salaried, clerical, supervisory, and technical employees such as graduate chemists and engineers who are working as such, and guards. The International, since 1956, has been the certified bargaining representative of the employees in the following appropriate unit: 698 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD All production and maintenance employees at Standard 's Lima, Ohio, refinery, including the laboratory employees and storekeepers, but excluding office cleri- cal, plant clerical , and professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act. The employees in the above unit at the Lima refinery are members of Local 624 which like Local 395 and Local 346 is affiliated with the International. At Toledo, Ohio, Local 346 has been, since 1943, the certified bargaining repre- sentative of the employees in the following appropriate unit: All the process or production employees and maintenance employees at Stand- ard's Toledo refinery, including process clerks, the boiler shop clerk, machine shop clerk, clerks in the engineering department, warehouse clerks, laboratory personnel, but excluding clerical employees (other than those included above), supervisory employees, graduate technical employes and chemists, and guards. Over the years, separate contracts have been negotiated and have been in effect at No. 1 refinery, No. 2 refinery, Lima refinery, and Toledo refinery. In practice, the signatory parties to the respective contracts have been the International and the local at the particular refinery. This is true with respect to Nos. 1 and 2 refineries where Local 395 is the certified representative; it is true at the Toledo refinery where Local 346 is the certified representative; and it is true at the Lima refinery where the International is the certified representative . With changes reflecting the name of the refinery and the name of the local, the following phraseology in the 1959 contract at No. 1 refinery is typical of the contracts at the other three refineries: Agreement between The Standard Oil Company (Ohio) No. 1 Refinery, Cleveland, Ohio, hereinafter referred to as the "Company" and The Oil, Chemi- cal and Atomic Workers International Union (AFL-CIO) and its Local 11-395', hereinafter referred to as the "Union." Article II * * * * * * * Section 2-Recognition The Company recognizes the Union as the exclusive bargaining agency.. . . The signatories of the respective contracts over the years were, with one exception, the participants in the contract negotiations . Thus, the 1959 Toledo refinery contract was signed on behalf of Standard by the manager of the Toledo refinery and the Lima contract was signed by the mangaer of that refinery. The respective contracts at Nos. 1 and 2 refineries in Cleveland were signed on behalf of Standard by the manager of the particular refinery, Dalton at No. I and Laird at No. 2, and by W. K. Bergen, operations manager of Standard's manufacturing department. Bergen is located in Standard's main or home office and apparently he is not physically present during the actual contract negotiations . The particular International representative assigned to the local, who services the local and who participates in the local's con- tract negotiations with the Standard management at the individual refinery, signs the contract on behalf of the International . At Nos. 1 and 2 refineries the International representative aforedescribed is Phillips. At the Lima refinery the International rep- resentative is Bachmann and at Toledo it is Flowers. In addition to the participation of management and the International representa- tive as aforedescribed , who take part in negotiations and sign the contract, the local at each refinery is represented by a local committee composed of employees from the particular refinery. The local committee generally, if not always, includes one or more officers of the local as well as nonofficer employees . Local 395, which is the certified representative at Nos. 1 and 2 refineries , has one set of officers. During the 1960-61 negotiations , Rowe, an employee at No . 1, was president of Local 395 and Sepik, an employee at No. 2, was secretary-treasurer. Although Rowe as presi- dent of the local was a member of the employee negotiating committee at Nos. 1 and 2, No. 1 has otherwise a different employee negotiating committee than No. 2, the two committees being composed of employees of the particular refinery and ap- parently selected by their resnective refineries. There is, in effect, a No I group and a No. 2 group of Local 395 , each group being limited to its respective refinery but both groups of course being part of Local 395 . As we shall see hereinafter there is evidence that the No . 1 group and the No. 2 group are responsive, respectively, to the union members in their individual refineries , at least initially , on the matter of THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (AN OHIO CORPORATION) 699 contract terms; apparently day-to-day administration of the Nos. land 2 contracts is handled on an individual plant basis.' In connection with the above description of the participants in contract negotia- tions, it will be noted that the tripartite picture of management, International, and local participation exists at all four refineries regardless of whether a local union is the certified representative, as at No. 1, No. 2, and Toledo, or whether the Inter- national has been certified, as at Lima Notwithstanding the foregoing, Standard has consistently denied that any organi- zation except the certified representative is the representative of employees in the various appropriate units While Standard, over the years, was willing to include the uncertified International in the recognition clauses of the No. 1, No. 2, and Toledo contracts and had no objection to the International being represented in negotiations and signing contracts with Standard and the locals, it never conceded that the uncertified International had the same status as the certified locals. This is shown by the litigation of 1950, The Standard Oil Company (An Ohio Corporation) 92 NLRB 227, 228, 235-236, wherein Standard denied that, at Toledo, the International and the certified local were jointly the bargaining representatives of the employees in the unit. The com- plaint had alleged that Local 346 and the International were "jointly the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees" in the Toledo unit. A violation of Sec- tion 8(a) (5) of the Act was involved. The General Counsel based his position, that both the local and the International were jointly the bargaining representative, on the fact that the members of the local were also members of the International and that both organizations participated in contract negotiations and executed contracts with Standard, as parties thereto. The Trial Examiner, affirmed by the Board, dis- missed the complaint to the extent that it alleged that the International was, with the local, the bargaining representative of the Toledo unit, and that there was an illegal refusal to bargain with the International. A violation was found with respect to a refusal to bargain with the local. In 1954 and 1955 Standard executed and put into immediate effect contracts ex- ecuted by Standard and certified locals alone, the International not signing the con- tracts until several months later. The conclusion is warranted that Standard regarded the local as the important factor with whom contracts had to be negotiated and did not accord the Interna- tional equal status as bargaining representative. As Refinery Manager Dalton testi- fied, he bargained with the representatives of the local and, over the years, when he reached agreement with the local "this was it [the contract] . . . I did not worry about the International. If I could get my boys [the local representatives] on it [sign the contract,] this is good enough for me." Evidence as to the 1960-61 negotiations, as we shall see, also supports the view that as far as Standard was concerned the individual locals were the bargaining rep- resentatives with whom a contract was to be negotiated and signed. This attitude and position was evident at all four refineries, including Lima. As far as participa- tion in negotiations, inclusion in the recognition clause of a contract, and signing contracts was concerned, Standard apparently was willing to have the International 'The bylaws of Local 395 provide that the local will hold its regular meeting on the fourth Friday of each month. SFc 6. The Local may authorize separate plant or bargaining unit group meetings. . . . Sec 7 Whenever the members of this Local Union working in any plant or bargaining group are for any reason authorized by the Local to meet as separate units, no question affecting the terms of an agreement or the working conditions of the plant or bargaining unit as a whole may be decided by any one section of the membership alone [With respect to the two refineries, Nos 1 and 2, each, as we have seen , is a separate plant and a separate bargaining unit although Local 395 Is the representative of each unit I On such questions, every member in the plant or bargaining group affected shall be allowed a voice and a vote. . . . SFc. 8. Whenever the membership of any plant or bargaining group is author- ized as set forth above, to hold regular unit meetings of their membership, then such meetings shall be for the purpose of considering any union business pertaining to the welfare of the particular unit, provided that such business does not conflict with the By-Laws of the Local 11-395 or the International Constitution All actions not specifically authorized and all agreements negotiated by any affili- ated group shall be subject to review and concurrence or non-concurrence of the Local Union. 700 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD participate, but not as a determining factor coequal with the locals as bargaining representative. In the instant proceeding the complaint against Standard (the CA cases) alleges that as Nos. 1 and 2 refineries the International and Local 395 have been and are the representatives of the employees in the appropriate units under Section 9(a) of the Act and that Standard has refused to bargain with these representatives The same allegation is made with respect to the Toledo refinery and with respect to the Lima refinery, with the International and Local 346 and with the International and Local 624, respectively, being the alleged bargaining representatives. The com- plaint against Locals 395 and 624 and the International also contains the same al- legations as above described, although, of course, in the complaints against the Union, the International and the respective refinery local are respondents in each instance, with the exception that no allegation is made regarding Local 346 and the International since the Toledo refinery unions are not involved in the CB cases as respondents. Standard's answer to the instant complaint admits that Locals 395 and 346 are the collective-bargaining representatives of employees in appropriate units at No. 1, No. 2, and Toledo refineries, respectively, but denies that the International is or was such a representative. With respect to Lima, the answer admits that the Interna- tional is the collective-bargaining representative in the appropriate unit but denies that Local 624 is or was such a representative. Standard's answer also states that at Nos. 1 and 2 refineries it has bargained with the International as agent for Local 395; it is denied that Standard refused to bargain with Local 395; it is admitted that Standard "refused to meet and negotiate with Local 395 until certain representatives were no longer in attendance, on the grounds that such representatives were not the bona fide representatives of the employees in the appropriate unit." Regarding the Lima refinery, Standard alleges that it has bargained with the International as agent for Local 624; it is denied that Standard refused to bargain with the International; it is admitted that Standard "refused to meet and negotiate with the International . until certain representatives were no longer in attendance on the grounds that such representatives were not the bona fide representatives of the employees in the appro- priate unit." The answer with respect to the Toledo Refinery contains the same allegations as set forth above regarding the Nos. 1 and 2 refineries except that the name of Local 346 appears instead of the name of Local 395. The Unions' answer to the complaint admits the allegations of the complaint as described regarding the joint collective-bargaining representative status of the International and the locals. Another aspect of the bargaining history between the parties is the fact that in 1957 Buchanan, district director of the International, whose jurisdiction and authority encompassed the local unions at the four refineries herein involved as well as other Ohio plants of Standard, proposed companywide bargaining to Standard's top man- agement. Under the proposal the Union would negotiate through a team com- posed of a representative from each bargaining unit. Presumably management would have a similarly broad negotiating team and the parties would negotiate a master contract covering basic features, with local conditions in individual refineries taken care by addenda or supplementary agreements? Standard rejected the pro- posal for companywide bargaining. A strike ensued. Standard filed unfair labor practice charges under Section 8(b)(3) of the Act against the International and Locals 395 and 346. The charges alleged, inter alia, that the Unions were attempting to coerce Standard into bargaining in a single multiplant unit and that the Unions were refusine to enter a contract with Standard except upon prior approval of the Sohio Councils Subsequently, in 1957, an agreement was entered into by Standard and the International, on behalf of itself and its locals. Insofar as pertinent herein the agreement provided: The International Union and its Locals and the Company recognize and ac- knowledge that they are obligated to bargain in good faith in the various and separate bargaining units certified by the Board . and the International Union and its Locals recognize that the Company is not obligated to bargain 2 The sentence is prefaced with the word "presumably" since the instant record does not furnish details of the 1957 proposal other than as stated in the preceding two sen- tences. Although the essential finding is the fact that Buchanan made a proposal for companywide bargaining, I have additionally indulged in an inference, compatible with the nature of overall or nonseparate-unit bargaining, that appears reasonable although not essential to disposition of the instant case. 3 The Sohio Council is discussed in the following section of the instant report. THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (AN OHIO CORPORATION) 701 on a "company-wide basis" in the absence of certification of a company-wide bargaining unit by the National Labor Relations Board. The unfair labor practice charges that Standard has filed against the Unions were withdrawn. 2. The relationship of the International and the Sohio Council inter se and their relationship with the affiliated local unions Under provisions of the International 's constitution, a national bargaining policy committee is authorized to formulate a national bargaining program . The national committee reviews proposals resulting from area meetings and then submits a program to local unions for ratification. The constitution provides that upon ratification by 75 percent of the bargaining units affected by a proposed program, the president of the International may initiate the program, which then becomes mandatory upon the affected bargaining units. No bargaining unit may then enter into a contract with an employer that is contrary to the policy except upon permission of the national committee. It is also provided in the constitution that when employees of a company are represented by various locals, these locals may establish a companywide council. The constitution and rules of such councils require approval by the International. Further, when "the rank-and-file" of a council adopts a bargaining program it is binding on all bargaining groups within the council that adopt the program and the International is empowered to enforce and coordinate such a program. The Standard Oil Company (Ohio) or Sohio Council has been in existence since 1948. Buchanan, International district director, is the coordinator of the Sohio Council's programs. Article XIII, section 1, of the International's constitution provides that no con- tract with an employer entered into by the International or any subordinate body shall be legal or binding unless it has been "(1) approved by majority vote of those members voting who are covered by the terms of the agreement and (2) approved by the International President or his duly authorized representative . . . [who in the Ohio district is District Director Buchanan]." The constitution of the Sohio Council lists various objectives, such as "coordina- tion of the action of all groups," organizing the unorganized, and other items, including (article II, D), "To work toward a National Standard Oil Company (Ohio) agreement." It is also provided in the same instrument that the mandates of the International will be obeyed as set forth in the International's constitution and by- laws, as promulgated, and that no council program will be inconsistent with Inter- national programs. The Sohio constitution states that no local affiliated with the Council may accept less than the established bargaining policy without approval of the coordinator. All agreements are to be in compliance with the International and Sohio Council policy, approved and signed by proper International officials. On some date shortly before July 4, 1960, the national bargaining policy com- mittee of the International adopted a mandatory bargaining program for the petro- leum section of the Union. Prior to September 5, 1960, three-fourths of the petro- leum bargaining units had ratified the aforementioned program which called for a wage increase of 18 cents per hour. As we have seen, the program could not there- after be departed from by any union bargaining unit, including the Ohio refineries, without approval by the national committee. By September 19, 1960, the Sohio Council had adopted its own supplementary bargaining program. According to Buchanan, the Sohio program entailed a 1 year contract; an 18 cents wage increase without relinquishment of existing benefits; an agency shop clause; inclusion of all benefits in the contract. Buchanan also testified that the Nos. 1 and 2 and the Lima and Toledo refineries were bound by the Sohio Council program. Thereafter, contract negotiations were commenced at the four refineries. At each unit the union negotiators consisted of the International representative regularly assigned to the particular local and the local bargaining committee. The employer was represented by the manager of the particular refinery involved and additional management personnel. This aspect will be dealt with in greater specificity in the following section when the actual bargaining negotiations are considered. By November 5, 1960, a number of bargaining sessions had been held by the union representatives and the four refineries. No agreements had been reached. Either at or shortly before a November 5, 1960, meeting of the Sohio Council, Buchanan had suggested the appointment of representatives from the various locals 702 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD to participate in negotiations at the individual refineries.4 This procedure had also been discussed in past years although it had not been placed in effect with respect to the Sohio refineries. Such representatives were used in negotiations between the Union and other oil companies. In 1960 when Buchanan made the aforedescribed suggestion to the Sohio Council he testified that he was discussing with the Council delegates the lack of progress that was being made in the current refinery negotiations. He stated to the meeting that, in the past, communications between union bargaining groups had not been good and that a resort had been made to conference telephone calls. While the latter system did facilitate communication in some degree Buchanan explained to the Sohio Council that the conference telephone method was difficult of operation since committeemen in the various refineries worked different shifts and to set up a conference telephone call under such conditions was awkward. At the November 5 Sohio Council meeting, Rowe, president of Local 395, seconded by Weiss, chairman of Local 395's bargaining committee, proposed as follows: 5 Each group select a representative to sit in on pilot negotiations with the Com- pany. Its expenses to be borne by the respective Locals. Each representative will have credentials as a Local representative; carried unanimously. Thereafter delegates from the various locals were selected and Knight, president of the International, issued credentials to each in the following written form: This is to advise that (name of designee appeared here) has been appointed a temporary representative of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union for the purpose of attending and participating in negotiations with the Standard Oil Company of Ohio. O. A. KNIGHT, President. Miller, president of Local 624, who was a Sohio Council delegate at the Novem- ber 5 meeting, testified that at the meeting the delegates had approved a motion to have representatives from the various refineries attend negotiations at No. 1 refinery as International representatives He also said that No. 1 was to be a pilot plant for negotiations. In any event, it is clear that representatives from the various refineries were selected and that the decision to have such representatives was an action by the delegates from the various locals that comprised the Sohio Council.6 The repre- sentatives were designated as temporary International representatives. Their title is not material in the instant case since, presumably, the subsequent situation that de- veloped would have been the same regardless of the representatives' title, including that of local representative. As we shall see, Standard based its position regarding the temporary International representatives on the fact that they were not members of the regular bargaining group in the particular refinery and were not employees of the refinery, nor were they the regular International representatives assigned to the particular refinery, and because Standard asserted that the entire matter of "foreign" representatives from other Sohio refineries constituted an illegal maneuver to accomplish companywide bargaining. The temporary International representatives, chosen in the latter part of 1960 as described above, were: Rowe, president of Local 395 and an employee at No. I refinery (since Local 395 was the bargaining agent at both Nos. 1 and 2 refineries, Rowe, in the past, was a member of the bargaining committees at each of these refineries or he was a member of the No. 1 committee and had participated also in No. 2 negotiations); Jaskalowski, chairman of the local bargaining committee at No. 2 refinery and an employee at that refinery; Mack, president of Local 626 at Sohio Chemical Company, Lima, Ohio, a subsidiary of Standard (he was on the bargaining committee at Sohio Chemical); Local 626 was a member of the Sohio Council (but neither it nor Sohio Chemical are involved in the instant case); Miller, president of Local 624 and chairman of its bargaining committee (he was an 4 Such representatives were to be in addition to the regular representatives from the particular refinery 5 The cited portion is from the minutes of the November 5 meeting. 'Weikel, vice president of Local 346 and on its bargaining committee, was one of the delegates at the November 5 Sohio Council meeting. He stated that at the meeting it was felt that, in the past, communication between the bargaining groups had not been good and that the temporary representatives were appointed to improve the situation He testified that the representatives from the different locals were to attend the various bargaining sessions at the hefineries other than their home refineries and would know what was going on. THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (AN OHIO CORPORATION) 703 employee at the Lima refinery); Weikel, secretary-treasurer of Local 346 and chair- man of the bargaining committee at the Toledo refinery where he was an employee; and Sepik, secretary-treasurer of Local 395 and a member of the bargaining com- mittee at No. 2 refinery where he was an employee. 3. Standard's alleged refusal to bargain in 1960 and the Union's alleged refusal to bargain in 1961 a. The No. 1 refinery negotiations No agreement on a contract having been reached in prior bargaining sessions, a meeting had been scheduled for December 15, 1960, for the No. I refinery Present for the employer were the manager of No. 1 refinery, Dalton, who was the top man- agement representative in charge of the refinery, members of the No. 1 industrial relations staff, and Bambrick from the home (main) office of Standard.? The union representatives were the regular employee bargaining committee from No. 1 re- finery, Phillips, the regular International representative assigned to No. 1 refinery, Buchanan, district director of the International, and Rowe, Mack, Miller, Weikel, Jaskalowski, and Sepik. Dalton knew the members of the regular No. 1 commit- tee, as well as Phillips and Buchanan; he knew Rowe, president of Local 395, a member of the committee and an employee at No. 1. From his testimony, I believe that Dalton also knew the other unionmen, at least to the extent that they were employees at the respective Standard refineries, other than No 1. Buchanan, more- over, introduced Mack, Miller, Weikel, Jaskalowski, and Sepik, both as to name, where they worked, their local union positions, and that they were duly accredited temporary International representatives.8 Dalton refused to proceed with the negotiation meeting as long as Mack, Miller, Weikel, Jaskalowski, and Sepik were present He objected to their presence since they were not employees at No. 1 refinery and he stated to Buchanan that he believed the Union was thereby employing chicanery, trying to force him into companywide bargaining. Buchanan told Dalton that the Union had no intention of forcing the Company into companywide bargaining and that since the agreement of 1957 the Union had never requested companywide bargaining. None of the temporary In- ternational representatives nor any other union representative had asked Dalton to engage in companywide bargaining. Dalton testified that Buchanan told him in effect that the temporary International representatives were there to assist the other union representatives in their negotiations with Dalton. Dalton refused to proceed however and the meeting was adjourned .9 Precise detailing as to all the employer representatives present at negotiations at the various refineries is not essential to the issues in this case Buchanan testified that Rover was also present for the employer on December 15 but Dalton in his testimony did not list Rover It is my view that the following stipulation of the parties is sufficient on this general aspect In the various bargaining sessions at the respective refineries no more than one home office representative was present for the employer in addition to the local refinery management Bambrick is assistant manager of labor relations from the home office ; he was at various negotiating sessions at No. 1, No 2, and Toledo negotia- tions. Rover Is on the employee relations staff of the home office; during part of 1960-1961 Rover functioned as labor relations manager for the regular occupant of that position Rover's function In connection with the negotiations was to counsel the various refinery managers, assist them in drafting contract provisions, and inform them as to practices in the petroleum industry. Smart is also on the employee relations staff at the Lima refinery In the fall and winter of 1960-1961 Smart performed some of Rover's duties in the home office while continuing to function in his regular capacity at Lima Smart participated in negotiations at Lima and Toledo 8 This was the first meeting with Standard at which the temporary International representatives appeared O By telegram of December 21, 1960, Knight, president of the International, advised Spahr, president of Standard, as follows: Understand negotiations between our local unions and your company have bogged down due to a misunderstanding on Company's part I wish to advise as follows: 1) we are aware of our signed agreement pledging out Union not to attempt companywide bargaining with your company unless and until we have certification on companywide basis, 2) we are willing to bargain plant by plant with Standard of Ohio on the current wage issue, 3) we are willing to schedule bargaining sessions at the various points one at a time to meet the reasonable needs of company as to their assignment of negotiators, 4) use do insist upon our tight to select our own 704 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Another meeting was scheduled for December 22. On that date, the only tem- porary International representative who was present was Weikel . Dalton again re- fused to engage in face-to -face negotiations and he testified that his position was attributable to Weikel's presence. Subsequently, on Sunday, January 8, 1961, Dalton and his people negotiated with Phillips, the regular International representative, together with the union commit- tee from No. 1 refinery. The Union had sent no representatives from the other re- fineries to this meeting in view of Dalton 's prior refusals to meet.io At the conclusion of the January 8 meeting the Federal conciliator, who had been present, wrote down the matters on which the parties had agreed and Dalton and Byrne, chairman of the No. I committee, affirmed the items. Dalton testified that the committee informed him on that occasion that there was to be a meeting of the No. 1 group on Friday, January 13, and they would present the agreement to the No. 1 group for ratification. On January 9, 1961, Dalton sent to all employees of No. 1 refinery a letter or bulletin which recounted that the parties had met on January 8. The bulletin stated: "The Union and management reached agreement on the following terms subject to ratification by the union membership:" The items of agreement are then listed including, inter aka, "1. One year contract effective the date of signing. 2. Fourteen cents (140) across the board wage increase, effective January 2, 1961. This stipulation is made on the basis that the package would be presented to the union body at its January 13, 1961, meeting." In reconstructing the events subsequent to January 9 involving No. I refinery, I have substantially credited the testimony of Dalton who impressed me generally as a truthful witness. The only other testimony concerning these events is that of Rowe. In many respects Rowe's testimony appeared to me to be vague and his recollection was not particularly good. This may be due to the fact that he testified that in January 1961 he was ill. Neither Byrne nor Phillips nor any other union participant in the January 8 or subsequent events involving No. I refinery testified. Following the January 8 meeting of the minds between management and the No. 1 refinery union bargaining committee, and the January 9 bulletin from Dalton to the No. 1 employees, management, by mutual consent, prepared a draft of the agree- ment. Dalton went over the draft with Rowe and Byrne on January 12. All present were satisfied that the draft reflected the January 8 agreement of the parties. Rowe and Byrne said they would present the agreement to the membership of No. I group at a meeting scheduled for Friday, January 13. They also said that if their people ratified the agreement they could sign it and bring it back on Monday, January 16. It will be noted that Dalton's communication of January 9 to all the No. 1 employees, including Rowe and the other members of the Union negotiating com- mittee, referred to agreement subject to ratification by the union membership and that the agreement was to be presented to the union body for ratification at its January 13 meeting. There is no question that the union membership and the union body that both sides had in mind was the No 1 membership of Local 395. No member of the committee ever protested the accuracy of the foregoing and the January 12 conversation between Dalton, Byrne, and Rowe is confirmatory thereof Dalton testified that on January 16 he heard that the agreement had been ratified by the No. 1 membership. When Dalton spoke to Byrne on January 16 and asked about the contract being signed, Byrne said that on January 13, after the membership ratified the agreement, the committee had gotten away before he could have it sign the contract. Byrne stated that he was having a committee meeting the following night, January 17, and would have the contract signed at that time. On January 18 Byrne informed Dalton that the signing of the contract was being held up by Phillips, the International representative. That same day Dalton called a meeting between himself and the No. 1 union bargaining committee, including Byrne and Rowe. When Dalton asked why the contract had not been signed Rowe said "they" were part of the Sohio Council and part of the International and even though they had reached agreement at No. 1 they could not sign until all members of the bargaining representatives . I have issued credentials to several employees of the Standard of Ohio Company in order that we might properly coordinate our positions with respect to wage issues Spahr answered Knight on December 22 and did not recede from the company position that the temporary representatives were part of a campaign to force companywide bargaining. ioThe International had filed its charge of refusal to bargain at No. 1 refinery against Standard on December 20, 1960, alleging that Standard had refused to bargain with the duly accredited representatives of its employees. THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (AN OHIO CORPORATION) 705, council program reached agreement and the Council had modified its program. Upon further questioning by Dalton, Rowe said that the Toledo refinery group had not reached agreement and in view of the Sohio Council program and the Interna- tional constitution his people could not sign. Byrne, who was also present, said substantially the same thing as Rowe. Dalton had a later conversation with Byrne and was told that the Sohio Council was to meet on Sunday, apparently January 22. On Monday, Byrne informed Dalton that the Council had not modified its program and he therefore could not sign. During the conversation Dalton asked if Toledo, was the "fly in the ointment" and Byrne said he believed so. Subsequently, as we shall see, the Toledo situation was worked out, the Sohio. Council modified its program, and the No. 1 refinery contract was signed on January 31, 1961, embodying the terms agreed upon on January 8 between the No. 1 commit- tee and management. b. The No. 2 refinery negotiations After a series of bargaining meetings between Laird, manager of No. 2 refinery, and', a management team, on the one hand, and the No. 2 refinery union bargaining com- mittee and Phillips, the regular International representative assigned to No. 2 as well as to No. 1, a meeting was scheduled for December 19, 1960. On that date, the meet- ing, with the above-mentioned parties participating, had commenced, when Buchanan. entered with temporary International Representatives Miller, Mack, and Rowe. When Laird saw the four men he called for a recess. Following the recess the man- agement team did not return but Laird came in and said he was terminating the meet- ing. He said he would not meet with the Union as long as outsiders who were not employed at No. 2 refinery were present. Laird referred to Mack and Miller. He had no objection to Phillips whom he considered the regular International representa- tive or to Buchanan whom he recognized as an International official with whom he had previously negotiated. Laird also testified that he had no objection to Rowe who was president of Local 395 and who had participated in negotiations at No 2. Laird was aware of the identity of Mack and Miller and that they worked at other Sohio plants. His refusal to meet while these individuals were present was stated at the hearing to be on the ground that participation with them in bargaining at No 2 would indicate company willingness for companywide bargaining. As a consequence of Laird's position the meeting of December 19 was terminated. No union representative asked for or said anything about companywide bargaining on December 19 or at any other point in the negotiations. At the time when he thus refused to meet, Laird was aware of what had occurred at No. I refinery a few days earlier regarding the appearance of the temporary International representatives, as previously set forth in this report." The next meeting was held on January 3, 1961. Considerable progress was made and the next session was on January 5. Only the No 2 bargaining committee was present with management on January 3 and 5. The sole testimony offered regarding the January 3 and subsequent meetings is that of Laird. I believe he was generally a credible witness. According to Laird, on January 5 a "tentative agreement" was reached. The union committee said that the No. 2 group or body was meeting on the following day and the committee said that it would take the agreement to the No. 2 body for approval. On the evening of January 6, Vitale, chairman of the No. 2 committee, advised Laird that the body had accepted or approved the agreement. Vitale said that the ratification action taken by the No. 2 body was subject to the approval of Local 395.12 Laird testified that "we" learned that the No. 1 refinery group, which Laird knew was part of Local 395, had ratified its agreement.13 In view of the foregoing, when Laird spoke to Vitale, around January 16 or 17, Laird suggested that Vitale come in with Rowe, president of Local 395, and sign the contract. Vitale replied that he had been in touch with Rowe and that Rowe had not been released by the Sohio Council and therefore could not sign. A day or so later Laird suggested to Vitale that he (Vitale) and the negotiating committee should come in and sign the contract and that Laird would be satisfied and would honor the contract. Vitale said he was not "The International filed its charge of refusal to bargain at No 2 refinery against Standard on December 20, 1960 12Vitale did not testify at the hearing. Sepik testified that at the January 6 meeting of the No 2 group of Local 395 he moved for ratification of the agreement subject to the approval of the local and the International The motion carried. i$ It is not clear to whom "we" refers in the above context It is probably a reference to Laird and the others of the No. 2 management. 64985G-63-vol. 137-46 706 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD free to do this since they had not been released by the Sohio Council. Substantially the same conversation occurred on January 20 On January 25 Laird called in the No 2 committee and advised them that the Company was filing unfair labor practice charges; he again suggested that the committee sign the contract but was informed that they had not been released by the Council and could not sign. Vitale said that they could not sign until they all got the same thing. Presumably this reference was to all the refineries bound by the Sohio Council program. The contract was eventually signed on January 31 and embodied the same terms as the agreement of January 5 except that the effective date was January 31. c. The Lima refinery negotiations At a meeting scheduled for December 16, 1960, between the Lima refinery manage- ment and the Union, Buchanan appeared , together with Bachman, the regular Inter- national representative assigned to Lima, Phillips, another regular International representative , the Lima refinery bargaining committee of Local 624, and temporary International Representatives Rowe, Sepik, Mack, and Weikel. No meeting was held on that day . The Federal mediator informed the union representative aforedescribed that the Company refused to meet with them. Although the evidence regarding the aforesaid abortive meeting is meager, the general policy of Standard at its other refineries , plus evidence of subsequent con- versations between Lima management and union representatives , and the answer to the complaint, warrant the conclusion that it was the presence of the temporary International representatives that caused the Company to refuse to meet for nego- tiations on December 16. On December 23 or 24, 1960, Bolles, Lima plant manager, telephoned Miller, president of Local 624, who was an employee at Lima and a member of the bargain- ing committee . Bolles said he wished to meet with the local bargaining committee and that he had a proposal to make. The manager said that he did not want repre- sentatives from the other refineries to be present , evidently a reference to the tem- porary International representatives.14 On January 7, 1961 , the Lima management, including Bolles, Smart, and Loffman, met with the local union bargaining committee and Bachman , the regular Interna- tional representative .15 Management made what it termed a final contract proposal, including a 14-cent wage increase. 16 It was also proposed by management that the increase would be effective January 2 if the union bargaining committee would notify management on January 8 that it would recommend the company proposal to the local membership body for ratification. On January 8 Miller telephoned Bolles and said that he would recommend the company proposal to the local membership for ratification and with the ratification being ultimately subject to "approval from the International and its attendant body." 17 Bolles indicated no dissent. The local held its meeting on January 17. The following day, January 18, Loff- man spoke to Miller at the refinery . Miller informed Loffman , according to the latter's credited testimony, that the local membership had ratified the Company's contract proposals subject to approval by the International.18 Apparently that 14 From this point on , I have used a synthesis of the testimony of Miller, Loffman, personnel assistant on the management staff at the Lima refinery , and Bolles, the Lima refinery manager 15 Miller thought the meeting was the latter part of December , "somewhere in there" 16 Loffman testified that management had been in contact with the other refineries and knew what was going on both with respect to the other managements and with respect to the other unions on the matter of contract negotiations He stated that on January 7 he knew that at refineries Nos. 1 and 2 and at Toledo they were prepared to agree on the 14 cents 17 This Is Miller's testimony which I credit in this respect Bolles testified that Miller simply said that he would recommend the proposal of the company to the local body for ratification Although both Miller and Bolles impressed pie favorably as witnesses I be- lieve that Miller , president of the local since 1953 and a delegate to the Sohio Council, was fully aware of the relationship of the local to the Council and the International. Moreover, as we shall see in a later conversation with Loffnian, the latter testified that Miller did refer to the necessity of International approval of the contract 16 Miller testified that the ratification vote of the local membership regarding the agree- ment had been made on the basis that the action be approved by the International and its attendant bodies I credit Millers testimony on this aspect although I have also credited Loffman ' s testimony as to his conversation with Miller The variance is the omission of the phrase "attendant bodies" which I do not regard as of major significance. THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY ( AN OHIO CORPORATION) 707 same day, January 18 , at Miller's request, he and Dornick, secretary of the local, met with Loffman to go over the draft of the contract that had been typed up by the Company . With the exception of a few typographical errors that were corrected the contract was found to be in accordance with the understanding of the parties. It was tentatively agreed that the contract would be signed on January 20 since Miller indicated that he hoped to have International approval by that time. On January 19 Miller told Loffman he had not heard from the International but that he would probably hear something that evening after the Toledo local meeting. Later that evening Miller informed Loffman that the Toledo situation was still un- settled. Both parties understood that the Lima meeting of January 20, at which they had tentatively agreed that the Lima contract would be signed , was therefore canceled. The meeting was not held. Loffman spoke to Miller again on January 20. He asked Miller where they stood about signing the contract. Miller said they would probably sign at all places at the same time and would not sign at No 1 or No. 2 or Lima until agreement had been reached at the Toledo refinery. Loffman testified that he also, on this occasion, asked Miller about the Sohio Council meeting "and he affirmed " that it would be held on Saturday.19 On January 24 Bolles asked Bachman , "How can we get the contract signed." Bachman replied that his hands were tied and other people were involved in the matter. The contract that had been approved by the local membership on January 17 was executed on January 30, 1961. d. The Toledo refinery negotiations As in the other refineries , bargaining commenced at Toledo on October 1960. At a meeting scheduled for December 23 at which the Union was represented by the local bargaining committee and Flowers, the regular International representative, and by Sepik, one of the temporary International representatives who was employed at No. 2 refinery , the Company refused to meet while "outsiders" were present. The reference was apparently to Sepik. Thereafter, in meetings between the Company and the Union the latter had no temporary International representative present.20 Other than the foregoing uncontroverted and credited testimony of Flowers, our knowledge of the Toledo negotiations rests upon the testimony of Buchanan which is also uncontroverted and substantially credited. According to Buchanan , no agreement was reached in the Toledo negotiations until January 26 or 27, 1961 . Although there were a few local issues , the principal obstacle at Toledo was the fact that the Toledo local, Local 346, had instituted a lawsuit against the Company for discontinuing a discount plan whereby the employees were entitled to discounts in purchasing company products . The Union regarded this discount plan as protected by article II, section 3, of the 1959-60 Toledo con- tract which provided that the Company would not discriminate against the Toledo employees with regard to benefits provided by the Company . A similar clause ex- isted in the other refinery contracts. The sister locals of Toledo had obligated them- selves to contribute to the cost of the Toledo lawsuit. The Toledo situation had been discussed at meetings of the Sohio Council on many occasions. During the Toledo negotiations the Company had requested that the lawsuit be withdrawn. The Company was also requestion deletion or changes in the contract clause aforedescribed. The Sohio Council considered the Company's request for a change in the contract to be contrary to the Council 's 1960 program to obtain, inter alia, an 18-cent wage increase without surrendering existing benefits. 39 In addition to Loffman's testimony on these events Miller testified that he indicated to Loffman that it was possible that approval by the International for signing at No. 1, No 2, and Lima was being withheld until agreement was reached at Toledo Miller ad- mitted that he did tell Loffman that it was the policy of the Sohio Council that no agree- ment could be signed at any location until agreement had been reached at all locations N B.: The transcript of testimony , pp. 145-147, at pp 146 and 147, has the name "Bachmann " at several points where it is clear to me that Miller was being asked and was testifying to conversations with Loffman. Bachman , the International repiesenta- tive at 'Toledo , was not asking Miller why the Union did not sign the contiact nor did Miller have any reason to tell Bachman about International and Sohio Council policy Also, on page 147, line 6, Miller is being asked, " . did you not tell Mr Miller it was the policy of the Sohio Council. . . I am satisfied that the question referred to "Mr Loffman" and not Miller. 20 The International on December 23, 1900 , filed charges under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act against Standard with respect to the Toledo refinery. 708 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD At the 15th meeting, on January 26, 1961, between the Toledo management and the Local 346 committee, with Buchanan also participating , the Company "presented to the Union a package proposal to settle the contract . the committee said they would take the proposal to their membership meeting that night." 21 After the aforementioned company proposal had been approved by the Local 346 membership on January 27, it was Buchanan 's testimony that the proposal was sub- mitted to the Sohio Council on January 28 for approval . The witness also testified that on January 28 the Council, with representatives of Local 395 (Nos. 1 and 2 refineries ) and Local 624 (Lima refinery ) participating, "modified its program on the 28th so that contracts could then be accepted at all four locations ." Buchanan stated that approval of the International then followed and that he was the one who gave approval on behalf of the International . The aforementioned "approvals" pre- ceded the signing of the Toledo contract on February 7, 1961 , and the signing of the other contracts on January 30 (No. 2 and Lima ) and 31 (No 1), 1961. In connection with the foregoing , Buchanan testified that the Sohio Council pro- gram had not been modified prior to January 28. He stated that there were four points in the original program.22 Buchanan said that two points had been attained at the respective refinery negotiations prior to the January 28 modification of the program and two points had not been attained . It is Buchanan's testimony that the two points that had not been attained by January 28 were the agency shop and the incorporation of all existing benefits into the contract . The action of the Sohio Council on January 28, according to Buchanan , was the decision "to drop those two remaining issues and settle with the Company.. This then by Buchanan's testimony was the modification of the Sohio Council program that took place on January 28. Before completing the picture of negotiations at the four refineries it is pertinent to mention that at all relevant times management was aware of the existence of the Sohio Council, its general nature, and was of course also familiar with the general nature of the International and its relationship to its subordinate bodies. It would indeed be surprising if such were not the case in view of the long period of relations between Standard and the Unions and the daily contact between refinery manage- ment representatives and the employees who were members and officials of one or more of the union bodies. The record, moreover, contains specific testimony regarding management awareness of the intraunion structure. At the time of the 1960 contract negotiations , Laird testified that he was aware of the existence of the Sohio Council and knew that employees from No. 2 refinery were among the delegates thereto; he had heard that the Council had adopted a bargaining policy applicable to the various refineries and that there was a policy to coordinate the bargaining goals of the Union ; he knew that all the locals were seeking the same wage increase . Dalton was also aware of the Sohio Council and of intraunion coordination ; he testified that he had a pretty good idea that "they" had meetings and they were all for one and one for all. Dalton had a copy of the International constitution and was aware of pertinent parts thereof. He testified that he knew that the International had to approve contracts before they became effective but that in past negotiations the union negotiators had never seemed concerned with such matters and that if he reached agreement at the local level "that was it." Bolles was also generally familiar with the International constitution and with corresponding laws of the Sohio Council. B. Analysis and conclusionary findings 1. Standard's alleged refusal to bargain Initially, in order to reach a conclusion as to whether there has been a refusal to bargain on the part of Standard , it is necessary to determine to whom Standard owed a legal obligation to bargain . As we have seen, the complaint alleges that at each refinery the International and the particular local are the representatives of the employees in the appropriate unit under Section 9(a) of the Act and that Standard has refused to bargain with these representatives. It is my opinion and I find that at No. 1 refinery Local 395 is the certified col- lective-bargaining representative of the employees in the appropriate unit under a The quoted extract is from it bulletin , dated January 27, signed by Peterson manager of the Toledo refinery, addressed to the employees of the Toledo refinery This exhibit was introduced by the Union at the hearing Its contents are not controverted 23 As mentioned previously , the four points were : ( 1) 1-year contract , ( 2) an 18-cent wage increase without giving up existing benefits , ( 3) agency shop, and (4 ) incorpora- tion of all existing benefits into the contract THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (AN OHIO CORPORATION) 709 Section 9(a) of the Act. I find that Local 395 is also the certified bargaining rep- resentative at No. 2 refinery. At the Toledo refinery I find that Local 346 is the certified bargaining representative. The International, I find, is the certified bar- gaining representative at the Lima refinery. Under the terms of the Act and numerous decisions of the Board and the courts a labor organization that represents the majority of the employees in an appropriate unit and is certified as the collective-bargaining representative is the exclusive rep- resentative of such employees.23 There is no evidence and no contention that the certified unions in the instant case have become defunct or have ceased to be the certified unions of their respective units or that the certifications have been amended, altered, or clarified by the Board in any way that would affect the exclusive status of the certified representative at each refinery.24 A labor organization attains its status as certified representative by virtue of a Board-sponsored election in which the employees cast a majority of their votes for that labor organization. The certified labor organization may of course be a local union, an International union, or an unaffiliated union. Equally feasible is the certification of two unions jointly. Thus, two local unions or two International unions or a local union and an International union may be certified 25 But certi- fication of one union is not certification of two unions and a joint certification pre- cludes the claiming of separate certified status26 Nor may we close our eyes to the fully recognized distinction between an International union and its affiliated local unions. One is not the other. The contractual rights and liabilities of one are not those of the other and responsibility for tortious and other conduct must rest upon the rules of agency. The same is true with respect to status as certified bargaining representative and we may not assume that certification of an Inter- national union or a local union is without significant distinction or that in certifying one, the Board thereby certifies its parents or affiliates, as the case may be.27 The choice of a particular labor organization by ballot of the employers is peculiarly the act of the employees. The Board in effect simply certifies the choice made by the employees. The unit determination on the other hand is a Board determination based on the actual situation in the particular company. This is so even in the Globe type election where the choices open to the employees have been determined by the Board. The Board has therefore, in particular circumstances, given weight to a subsequent bargaining history of the parties and has recognized, in a representation proceeding, assimilation of employees in a small single unit into a broader unit. Owens-Illinois Glass Company, 108 NLRB 947, 590; General Motors Corporation, Cadillac Motor Car Division, 120 NLRB 1215. This situation is quite distinguishable from allowing anyone but the employees to determine their choice of a certified bargaining representative by secret ballot, although the Board has permitted the parties, when both are willing, to add, for instance, a local union as coparty to a contract together with the certified International and the employer. (Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corporation, 113 NLRB 1288, 1293.) There is no explanation by the General Counsel of the theory on which he has alleged that labor organizations other than the certified unions at the particular refineries are in effect the corepresentatives of the employees together with the certified unions. I would assume that the arguments are those advanced and rejected by the Board in The Standard Oil Company (an Ohio Corporation), 92 NLRB 227, including the evidence of participation in contract negotiations and signing of contracts by the noncertified union. The evidence in the instant case, however, includes additionally, as we have seen, employer and certified representa- tive execution and effectuation of contracts in various years without execution of 2'Section 9(a). The certified representative also is accorded special protection under Section B(b) (4) (1) and (11) (C) of the Act that is not available if the labor organization has simply been recognized by the employer as the representative of the employees. "Certifications may, of course, be amended under appropriate circumstances by motion to the Board. The Procter and Gamble Manufacturing Company, 130 NLRB 633. 25 Vanadium Corporation of America, 117 NLRB 1390 m Id ; Bethlehem Pacific Coast Steel Corp., Shipbuilding Division, San Francisco Yard, 117 NLRB 579. n "The overwhelming weight of judicial authority, including the Supreme Court of the United States, is that a local union is a legal entity apart from its international and that it is not a mere branch or arm of the latter [citations omitted]. This too has been the position of the Board [citations omitted]. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, and International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 5, AFL-CIO (Franklin Electric Construction Company and Utilities Line Construction Com- pany, Inc.), 121 NLRB 143, 146." 710 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the contract by the noncertified "representative" and other evidence that Standard was not willing to accept the uncertified union as a coequal representative. Coming now to Standard's admitted action, on December 15 at No. 1, December 19 at No. 2, December 16 at Lima, and December 23 at Toledo, in refusing to bargain with the respective certified bargaining representatives and their agents, it is clear that the refusal was attributable to the presence of temporary International representatives as additional agents of the bargaining representative at each refinery. The objection to the presence or participation of the temporary International repre- sentatives was based on the fact that they were neither employees of the particular refinery where their presence was objected to, nor were they the regular International representative assigned to the particular refinery; this objection to the temporary representatives was in turn based on the expressed belief that their presence at or participation in the bargaining at the separate refineries would be tantamount to companywide bargaining or would evidence an acquiescence in such bargaining and that the appointment and attempted participation of the temporary Interna- tional representatives in contract negotiations was part of a plot to bring about companywide bargaining. The legal principle that the union bargaining representative of the employees may select the personnel of its own bargaining team is clear 28 although under exceptional circumstances an employer may validly object to some representative or agent of the Union 29 Without repeating the previously described details regarding the selection of addi- tional temporary representatives, it is evident that the decision to have such repre- sentatives was arrived at and adopted by delegates from the various local unions, including the certified locals, comprising the Sohio Council. The locals and the. Council were constituent bodies of the International All proceedings were in ac- cordance with the internal laws and rules of the various bodies. The personnel selected were members of the constituent locals. Each bargaining representative at the four refineries was to have the assistance of the temporary representatives in addition to the regular International representative and its own refinery bargaining committee. The minutes of the Council indicate that the temporary representatives were considered to be representatives from the locals. They were also representa- tives of the International and were designated as temporary International repre- sentatives Standard, at the various refineries, did not object to the temporary International representatives because they were local representatives or International representa- tives or both. The objection was based on the fact that they were not employees at the particular refinery where they had appeared to participate in the bargaining, with the rationale for this objection being as described above Prior to the appearance of the temporary International representatives and after their withdrawal Standard was at all times willing to and did bargain with the team of negotiators representing the bargaining agent at each of the four refineries. In each instance these teams consisted of a permanent International representative and a local committee, plus in many or most instances, District Director Buchanan, the highest ranking International representative in the area. If Standard was opposed to the right of the Unions to have any overall program of bargaining objectives and to have internal coordination of effort, it would appear that the permanent Inter- national representatives who were employees and full-time agents of the Interna- tional posed a far greater threat in that direction than did the temporary representa- tives against whom Standard took its stand The same observation is even more in order with respect to Buchanan. district director for the International, who unques- tionably was mindful of the overall policies of the International 30 28 The Oliver Corporation, 74 NLRB 483 ; N L R.R v Roscoe Skipper, Inc, 213 F 2d 793 (C.A 5) ; Deena Artware, Incorporated, 86 NLRB 732 enfd 198 F 2d 645 (CA 6) Herbert L Wade, Jerry Paxton and G. F McGee, Co-Partners, d/b/a Wade d Paxton, 96 NLRB 650; Deeco Inc , 127 NLRB 666, American Vitrified Products Company, 127 NLRB 701, The Prudential Insurance Company of America, 124 NLRB 1390. 0i N L R R v Kentucky Utilities Company. 182 F. 2d 810. 813 (C A 6) 30 Interestingly enough, Manager Dalton testified that if on December 15 the temporary International representatives had not entered the bargaining room but had remained in another adjacent room, he would not have objected Under such an arrangement, of course, the regular bargaining committee of the Union could, during various recesses, have conferred with the temporary representatives and could do so by telephone or in person in any event, whether or not the temporary representatives were in the next room or sitting back in the union hall THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (AN OHIO CORPORATION), 711 Ihave carefully considered the evidence and the arguments advanced by Standard. It is quite likely and I believe from the evidence that the International and its con- stituent bodies regard multiplant or companywide bargaining as a desirable goal. But as far as the evidence shows there has been no request to Standard for such bargaining since 1957. There certainly was no such request in 1960 or 1961,, in- cluding December 1960, when Standard refused to negotiate. No union repre- sentative, including the temporary International representatives, even broached the subject to Standard. Companywide bargaining cannot be a unilateral matter. Surely Standard would have to be asked for such bargaining or the bargaining in form or in substance would have to be in effect bargaining for a single companywide unit. It is of course possible that if Standard had not objected to the temporary repre- sentatives the latter would have asked for companywide bargaining. Such a request could have been refused by Standard and undoubtedly would have been, in view of the Company's basic position. It is also possible that without making a formal re- quest for companywide bargaining, the temporary representatives would have pro- posed at the first session on December 15 that the contract to be negotiated at that time for No. 1 refinery would be the contract that the parties would adopt at each of the other three refineries, in effect a master contract. But, as in the case of a putative formal request for companywide bargaining, there was absolutely nothing that would oblige the Company to agree to such a proposal or any indication that it would so agree. All of the foregoing possibilities were no more than possibilities and in view of the positive evidence regarding Buchanan's and Knight's assurances to the contrary and the lack of any evidence that the temporary representatives were to do any more than to assist the bargaining representative at each refinery and to enable each bar- gaining team to know what was occurring at the other refineries, I am unable to even speculate reasonably that companywide bargaining would either have been, requested or would have ensued if the temporary representatives had been allowed to participate in the bargaining. It is also clear and admitted that the respective refinery managers, with whom Standard says that the Union, by bringing along the temporary representatives, was attempting to bargain on a companywide basis, had' no authority to bargain on anything except their individual refinery. I regard it as logical to assume that if the Union was attempting to change the bargaining unit and to bargain on an overall basis it would have sought to meet with a committee- from Standard's top management above the local refinery level, but possibly sup- plemented by the refinery managers as a group At any rate, Standard refused to bargain before there was evidence that the temporary International representatives were intent upon doing anything but participate in the bargaining on a refinery-by- refinerv basis as auxiliaries of the respective certified representatives. In this connection I find no valid support for Standard's legal position by reason of the fact that there is evidence that at the Sohio Council meeting at which it was decided to have temporary International representatives, there was a reference to the coming negotiations at No 1 refinery as "pilot negotiations " It is my opinion that the phrase alone and absent other evidence is not to be equated to bargaining en a companywide unit basis The initial negotiations, whether they be the first nego- tiations between an employer and a union in an industry or in a company, quite naturally have significance to the parties. If the Union obtains a particular wage increase in negotiating a contract at the first company plant where negotiations occur, there is in effect a sort of precedent or "pilot" situation created. It will be difficult for the company not to give the same increase in subsequent negotiations at other plants absent important differences in operations or market operations involv- ing the latter. So, too, if the company succeeds in enacting a term or condition favorable to itself at the initial plant negotiations there is a precedent-making or pilot type situation created. But these situations are not industrywide or companywide bargaining. In industrywide or companywide bargaining the unit for which the parties bargain is industrywide or companywide as the case may be. The parties negotiate a master contract which is binding upon all parts of the unit as a matter of law. Single unit bargaining does not result in one contract binding upon other sepa- rate units as a matter of law. The separate units may arrive at their own terms even though there may be a natural tendency not to depart from what has been agreed upon either in the initial pilot or pattern-setting contract in the industry or in the particular company. The evidence in the instant case is clear enough that both on Standard's part and' on the part of the Unions there is intramural communication and coordination with respect to bargaining positions. The chief company negotiator, the manager at the particular refinery, does not evolve his bargaining position in a vacuum. The wage 712 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD increase that each refinery offered the union bargaining representative was determined not at the local plant level but by top management of Standard. There is credible testimony by one of Standard's managerial personnel that Standard's offer of a 14- cent wage increase was in turn based upon or in conformity with the industry pattern. The same is true with respect to the Union with its national program for the petroleum industry. These are the facts of economic life and whether it is a good situation or a bad situation is not before us. We determine simply whether Standard has refused to bargain with the representative of the employees. Intra- union cooperation and coordination and intracompany cooperation and coordination are not inconsistent with single unit bargaining and do not by their existence establish bargaining on a companywide basis or an attempt to bargain on a companywide basis. Nor is suspicion as to ultimate union objectives, absent evidence of a demand and attempt to bargain on a companywide basis, justification for refusing to negotiate with duly chosen representatives of the certified Union In the light of the factual findings I have made and for the reasons set forth above by way of analysis and conclusions, I find that Standard, by refusing to bargain as long as temporary International representatives were present, has refused to bargain with Local 395 at Nos. 1 and 2 refineries, the said local being the representative of the employees in the appropriate unit. For the same reasons I make the same find- ings with respect to the Toledo refinery, where Local 346 is and was the representa- tive of the employees in the appropriate unit and with whom Standard refused to bargain. Also, for the same reasons, the same findings are made regarding Lima refinery, where the International is and was the representative of the employees in the appropriate unit and with whom Standard refused to bargain as long as the temporary representatives were present. I further find and conclude that by refusing to bargain as described above Standard has violated Section .8 (a) (1) and (5) of the Act. Insofar as the complaint alleges refusals to bargain by Standard with respect to other unions than those above described dismissal is recommended. 2. The alleged refusals to bargain by the Unions a. Local 395 at Nos. 1 and 2 refineries Previously in this report it has been found that at the four refineries Standard owed a duty to bargain with particular unions as the respective representatives of the employees in the appropriate units under Section 9(a) of the Act. It is the conduct of these same bargaining representatives at No. 1, No. 2, and Lima refineries that we now examine to determine whether or not they have refused to bargain with Standard at the respective refineries. More specifically, as I view the matter, Local 395 is the principal and the respondent regarding the alleged refusal to bargain at Nos. 1 and 2 refineries and the International is the principal and the respondent regarding the alleged refusal to bargain at Lima refinery. With respect to the question of whether or not there has been a refusal to bargain at Nos. 1 and 2 refineries by Local 395, the certified bargaining representative, I have reached several conclusions that are preliminary to a resolution of the main issue aforementioned. First of all, I find that by January 16, 1961, Local 395 had reached agreement with Standard on a contract for No. 1 refinery and on a contract for No. 2 refinery. No later than January 16 these two agreements had been approved by Local 395's mem- bership but subject to the approval of the International and the Sohio Council31 I believe that Standard and its bargaining agents , Dalton, manager of No. 1, and Laird, manager of No. 2, were generally familiar with the overall composition of 33 In other sections of this report there has been a delineation of the International and the Sohio Council insofar as pertinent to the case . They are two organizations but in the present context of contracts , wage programs , and internal control, when I refer to the necessity of International and Council approval, I regard testimony that International approval ( or Council approval ) of a local contract was necessary as tantamount to say- ing that International and Council approval were required The two organizations are interlocked with the International exercising the ultimate right of approval or dis- approval with respect to the basic bargaining program. Buchanan is the key man; he, on behalf of the International , gives approval or disapproval to contracts and changes in program ; he is coordinator of the Council and is a paramount factor in its actions ; he -is, of course, district director of the International for the Ohio area and realistically is the top union representative. Moreover, the issues in this case do not turn upon whether there was a requirement for International rather than Council approval or vice versa; -there are, however, issues of whether the approval of the International (and Council) was involved in relation to different stages of the collective bargaining. THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (AN OHIO CORPORATION) 713: the Unions, the International , the Sohio Council , and the locals, and the Unions' internal relationships . It is also apparent that management was aware that there was an International program regarding basic contract matters such as the amount of wage increase to be sought by the International and by its constituents and affiliates , includ- ing area councils, such as the Sohio Council and the locals. Further , I believe that management was generally aware of local union laws and that there were internal laws and rules of the unions aforementioned that required International and Sohio. Council approval of contracts negotiated by local unions. Awareness of the fore- going internal controls and interdependencies of the Unions does not of course mean that Standard was, or recognized that it was, bound to accept such internal union, rules as binding upon itself with respect to contract negotiations , with particular certified bargaining representatives. In concluding, as set forth above, that Local 395 and the employer had agreed on contracts for Nos. 1 and 2 refineries , subject to International and Sohio Council approval, I have expressly rejected one of the contentions that Respondent Unions raise in their brief. That contention is that Local 395 had not approved the contracts before January 27, the date of its regular monthly meeting; therefore, so the con- tention goes, there were no contractual agreements between Standard and Local 395 covering Nos. 1 and 2 refineries and no obligation to sign any contract until after January 27. Although the facts in this case have been previously described, it is necessary to, bring them into sharper focus in order to show the basis for the initial conclusions that I have made as set forth above. At No. 2 refinery on January 5, 1961 , as we have seen , management and the union bargaining committee, representing the No. 2 refinery employee group of Local 395, reached agreement on the terms of a contract. It was mutually under- stood that the agreement was subject to the approval of the membership body of the No. 2 group and that it would be submitted to that body. Laird, who headed the management team, was aware, of course, that Local 395 was the certified bargaining representative ; he knew that Local 395 was an amalgamated local consisting of group I of the No. 1 refinery and group 2 of the No. 2 refinery ; Laird knew that an agreement negotiated by the union bargaining committee as agent for Local 395, the certified representative , required, under the bylaws , approval by Local 395. In any event, on January 6, Vitale, chairman of the No. 2 bargaining committee, in informing Laird that the No. 2 membership body had approved the agreement, told him that the approval had been made with the understanding that it, in turn, was subject to the approval of Local 395 .32 Although the No . 2 group had approved the contract on January 6, Laird did not ask for union signature on the No. 2 con- tract before January 16 or 17 , by which time he was aware that the No. 1 group had approved the No. 1 contract . Local 395 was composed entirely of the Nos. 1 and 2 groups. Sepik, whose uncontroverted testimony I credit on this point, testified that at the January 6 meeting of the No. 2 group membership , he made the motion that the No. 2 Local 395 members approve the contract subject to approval of Local 395 and the International and that the motion carried. One of the reasons why I credit Sepik is because I am convinced that, as secretary-treasurer of Local 395 and one of the temporary International representatives credentialed by the International through Buchanan and the Sohio Council, Sepik was thoroughly aware that the contract required the approval of the International , which of course would operate through Buchanan and the Council. The situation at this point is therefore that Vitale told Laird that the No. 2 group. of Local 395 had approved the contract subject to approval of Local 395. The No. 2 group approval, however, was actually subject to Local 395 and International approval . As stated previously, I believe that Laird, prior to his conversation with Vitale on January 6, was aware of the International 's and the Council's ratification control over locally negotiated contracts . Following the conversation with Vitale, it is my opinion that Laird was assuming that the contract would be signed when approved by Local 395 , apparently, in effect, because that was what Vitale had told him that the Local was prepared to do. The record in this case indicates that Laird (Standard ) was quite prepared to do business on this "Local" basis. Before proceeding further with an analysis of the No . 2 situation we will examine what was happening at No. 1. At No. 1, management and the No. 1 union bargaining committee reached agree- ment on the terms of a contract on January 8. Rowe, president of Local 395, and' sr The bylaws of Local 395 provide that "all agreements negotiated by any affiliated" group shall be subject to review and concurrence or non -concurrence of the Local Union." '714 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD an employee of Standard at No . I refinery, was a member of the bargaining com- mittee. It was mutually understood that the agreement would be submitted by the committee to the Local 395 No. 1 membership body at a meeting on Friday, Janu- ary 13. On January 12, there was a conversation between Manager Dalton, Rowe, and Byrne, the latter being chairman of the Union's No. 1 bargaining committee, at which the three had checked and agreed upon a typed draft of the contract. After thus going over the contract, Rowe and Byrne told Dalton that if the membership approved the contract at the meeting on January 13 they could sign the contract and bring it in to Dalton on Monday, January 16. Prior to this, as we have seen, the No I group of Local 395 had approved its contract. When Dalton learned that the contract had been approved by the Local 395 No. 1 membership, he asked Byrne, on January 16, about getting the contract signed. Byrne said that on Friday, January 13, when the agreement had been approved by the membership, the committee had gotten away before he could have them sign the contract. Byrne stated that the committee was meeting the following night, January 17, and that the contract would then be signed.33 On January 18 and succeeding dates, Dalton spoke to Rowe, Byrne, and the No. 1 union committee about having the contract signed. He was told that, al- though they had reached agreement at No. 1, they could not sign because they were part of the Sohio Council and the International and, until all members of the Council reached agreement with the Company, and the Council modified its program and gave permission for the contracts to be signed, such could not be done. During these conversations with Rowe and Byrne, Dalton was also told that Toledo was the "fly in the ointment" since the Toledo local had not yet reached agreement with the Company on the terms of its contract. At neither the foregoing period, or at any time or at the hearing did Rowe, pres- ident of Local 395, or any officer, representative, committeeman, or anyone else, in- cluding Buchanan, state otherwise than that the contracts at Nos. 1 and 2 were not signed before the end of January because the Council and the International had not approved signing and had not modified the Council program and permitted signing until agreement had been reached at Toledo. It is also clear that as far as Rowe, the president of Local 395 was concerned, and the Local 395 committees at Nos. 1 and 2 were concerned, and the membership of Local 395 at both plants was concerned (which was the only membership Local 395 had), an agreement had been reached at No. 2 on January 6 and at No. 1 on January 13 when the membership approved the contracts, subject only to International and Council approval. Equally clear is the fact that, in view of the foregoing, the contracts, as far as Local 395 was concerned , would have been signed no later than a few days after January 13 at the latest, absent the block existing by reason of the International, the Council, and the Toledo situation 34 ss Customarily the contracts for Nos . 1 and 2 refineries were signed by Local 395 in the following manner. At No. 1, under the name, Local 395, would appear, without title, the signatures of the members of the No 1 union committee The same procedure was fol- lowed for the No. 2 contract except that the signatories were the No . 2 committee. On the 1959 contracts , for instance , the only signature ( also without title) that is common to both committees is that of Rowe, president of Local 395. As president, Rowe was ex officio a member of both committees according to the bylaws. He was an employee at No. 1 and an active member of the No. 1 committee Laird testified credibly that in the past, Rowe had participated in No. 2 negotiations Rowe in testifying could not remem- ber whether he had or had not participated at No. 2. Whether Rowe signed as president or committee member or both, his signature on both contracts is the only indication that the respective contract signings at Nos 1 and 2, insofar as Local 395 was concerned, was not wholly a matter for the respective committees of Local 395 group 1 and Local 395 group 2 84 The normal signatories , as has been pointed out, were the president of Local 395 and the two committees , all of whom considered that they had reached agreement on the con- tracts subject to International and Council approval Thus, Rowe's testimony regarding No 2 refinery, which was the identical situation to that at No. 1, was: Q. Mr. Rowe, as president of Local 11-395 of the 011, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union are you aware that a tentative agreement was reached at No 2? A. Subject to council approval. If the council approved the agreement they had an agreement. Q. Alright. Now then , and the signing of that agreement was held up until the council program was to be modified? A. Well . . . that's right . . . THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (AN OHIO CORPORATION) 715 Respondents' argument, on the technical ground .that Local 395 had not approved the contracts until it formally voted thereon at a regular monthly meeting on January 27, is not material to the issue herein of a refusal to bargain. It is not necessary to decide as a matter of contract law whether, if the normal signatories for Local 395 and the Company had signed the contracts on, for instance, January 16, there was a contract binding at law. What is in issue is the question of good- faith bargaining. Local 395, the certified representative, through its authorized agents, agreed with the Company on the terms of the contracts and these contracts were approved by the members of Local 395. The normal signatories for the Company and Local 395 were thereupon prepared to sign the contract except for the sole fact that the Local 395 agents withheld action because they had not received International and Council approval and the said approval was withheld be- cause of the Toledo situation.35 Does refusal to sign the contract for such a reason, under all the circumstances, constitute bargaining in good faith? Aside from the foregoing, Respondents' technical contention, aforedescribed, would mean, at most, that if the Local 395 contracts at Nos. 1 and 2 had been signed by the parties on January 16, Local 395, on January 27, could approve or disapprove the contracts. There is no prohibition in the bylaws for such nunc pro tune action and it is highly unrealistic to suppose that the resulting approval could have been anything but what it was, since the same membership that had approved the contracts on January 5 and 13 was voting. In addition to the fact that from the standpoint of collective bargaining as en- visaged by the Act there had been approval and agreement by Local 395 no later than January 16, there is a substantial ground on which it can be said that the by- laws of Local 395 had been complied with by that date. Section 7 of the bylaws is clear that on matters "affecting the terms of an agree- ment" the important vote is that of the "bargaining group affected." Nos. 1 and 2 of Local 395 were each separate bargaining groups or units and Local 395 was certified separately at each refinery. The respective memberships had approved the contracts. The bylaws prescribe that the president of Local 395 "shall interpret the local union bylaws and local union mandates subject to the approval of the membership and it shall be his duty to enforce compliance with same." Rowe, as president, had quite evidently interpreted the bylaws as permitting or requiring the signing of the contracts after the membership had approved the same. He was prepared to sign long before January 31 but for the International and Council re- quirements. Realistically, in the present connection, Local 395 was composed en- tirely of members at Nos. 1 and 2. The two contracts in the past and in 1961 had identical basic provisions. If the contracts had been different and one was under- cutting the other or one was securing a higher wage increase the approval by the local might be more than a formality. But such was not the case. It is perhaps significant that although the No. 2 group approved its contract on January 5, neither the No. 2 committee offered to sign immediately thereafter nor did the No. 2 man- agement request such action. It was not until both the Nos. 1 and 2 contracts had been approved that management at both refineries and President Rowe and the committees got into a discussion about signing as previously described. And it was at that stage that the Local 395 representatives, including the president, stated in effect that they could not sign the contracts because the International and Council had not approved. The lack of approval by the latter two bodies had nothing to do with whether or not Local 395 had held its monthly meeting and voted formal approval of what had previously been approved by the members. It is also my opinion that, in the circumstances of this case, if the representatives of Local 395 at Nos. 1 and 2 had testified that the Nos. 1 and 2 contracts had not been signed before the end of January because Local 395 had not held its regular monthly meeting and approved the contracts, such contention would have been a pretext and not consistent with good-faith bargaining. Of course, as we have seen, no such contention was made, so the argument raised in the brief is not even a plausible pretext36 But assuming that such contentions had been made, they would have been pretextuous. When the members of a union vote to approve contracts, with a 14-cent wage increase, after negotiations extending over 3 months and the ffi It is clear that International and Council withholding of approval had absolutely nothing to do with whether or not Local 395 had held its monthly meeting and had formally voted on the contracts previously voted on by the members 8° If an employee is discharged for protected union activity under the Act and the evi- dence from management and the union is such at the hearing, it cannot be urged effectively in a brief that there was a legitimate basis for such discharge even assuming that such legitimate cause did exist. 716 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD president and other signatories are prepared to sign, the Union, in my opinion, absent ulterior motives, would not say that execution must be deferred until we hold our regular monthly meeting several weeks hence. It is fortuitous with regard to the facts of this case that Local 395's monthly meeting was the fourth Friday of the month. It could as well have been the second Friday of the month which would of course have entailed a delay of a month in the signing. A delay in signing an agreed-upon contract for weeks or a month would impugn the good faith of a party to a contract taking such a position. The contract in the instant case would ordi- narily have been signed within a matter of days, either because it had been already approved by the membership, or because the contract could be formally approved at a later date, or there would be a special meeting called to approve the contract without waiting weeks for the regular monthly meeting. Lest it appear that I am underestimating a union's adherence to formal in pref- erence to practical considerations and overestimating a union's flexibility and ability to have a contract consummated when it so desires, let us consider the major action of officially modifying the Sohio Council program, the International program, and giving clearance for the signing of contracts at four refineries. The foregoing action was strictly down-to-earth in the speed and informality with which it was accom- plished. Although the International and Council programs were enacted at duly held meetings of each organization, and, although each body ordinarily functions through meetings of the International executive board and quarterly meetings of the Council, respectively, a very informal procedure was used when Local 346 reached agreement at Toledo on January 26 and 27. By the latter date, Toledo had reached the same essential agreement that had been previously agreed upon at the other three refineries. Within a matter of hours, Buchanan and the delegates from the other locals, including Local 395, modified the International and Sohio programs, and gave permission to sign the contracts, by simply talking together about the matter on the telephone on January 28, as Buchanan testified. Since Local 395 representa- tives as delegates to the Council acted in this informal manner when they and the Council decided to sign the contracts, it is difficult to say or to believe that they could not have been expected to act with equal realism around January 16 to call a special meeting of Local 395 if they considered it necessary and if they were at that time free to sign the contracts; or, in the alternative, to have signed on the basis of approval already given by the membership, or on the assumption that formal approval was no more than a technical dotting of "i's" and would be appropriate as either subsequent or nunc pro tunc approval Finally, even if all the considerations, heretofore stated, be ignored and Respond- ents' contentions regarding the January 27 regular monthly meeting of Local 395 be accepted, I am not persuaded that a different ultimate conclusion on this aspect of the case is required. Thus, even on January 27 when Local 395 at its regular meeting formally approved by a vote of its members the contracts that the members had previously approved, Local 395 was not willing to sign the contracts. The formal approval like the prior de facto approval was subject to International and Council clearance. The fact that the clearance came on January 28 was entirely fortuitous since if the Company had not reached agreement at Toledo until Feb- ruary there would presumably have been no International and Council clearance and no act of signing by Local 395 until February. This would be so notwithstand- ing the fact that by January 27 there was not only the prior de facto approval of the contracts by Local 395 but also the formal and technical approval at the regular monthly meeting. In the last-mentioned connection, it is obvious that a delay in signing a contract between January 27 and 31 would be in itself of no significance in establishing a refusal to bargain. However, when it is clear that on January 27, notwithstanding full formal agreement and approval by both parties, Local 395 was still unwilling to sign the contract, it is the principle or the cause of the delay in signing that is important and not the duration of the delay. As already mentioned, the Toledo agreement on a particular date and the resulting clearance given by the International and Council on January 28 was fortuitous. The important factor is that, even in accepting Respondents ' contentions arguendo, as I have in the last two paragraphs, a delay of merely days in signing the contracts after full formal agreement by the local, establishes that the issue in the case is not whether or not Local 395 had reached agreement with the Company prior to signing the contract. It is clear that such agreement had been reached. In my opinion, for reasons previously stated, agreement was reached no later than January 16. But if agreement was not reached until January 27 it is clear under both approaches that there was refusal to sign the contracts (for whatever length of time) solely because International and Council clearance had not been received. This now takes us to the crux of the case, namely, the legality of a refusal to sign a contract under these circumstances. THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (AN OHIO CORPORATION) 717 The complaint with respect to the Union Respondents, as we have seen, alleges that Respondents violated the Act by refusing to execute the respective written contracts incorporating the agreements previously reached with the Company. Re- spondents' answer denied that agreements had been reached as alleged in the com- plaint. In its brief it argues with respect to the Nos. 1 and 2 contracts that no com- plete agreement was reached for two reasons: (1) the local did not approve the contracts until January 27; and (2) the contracts were subject to International and Sohio Council approval, as the Company knew, and under such circumstances there was no refusal to bargain since the contracts were signed promptly after such ap- proval. Respondents also admit in their brief "that the failure of the parties to reach agreement at Toledo was a substantial contributing factor to the delay, not the re- fusal, in the execution of the written contracts." The brief of Respondents deals at some length with the justification for the requirement of International and Council approval of contracts, such as the danger of one local agreeing to a contract with "sub-standard" provisions. The common goals of the various locals that are in the Council are stressed, including their interest in the terms of the contract under negotiation at Toledo even when agreements had previously been approved at the other refineries subject to International and Council approval. It is also asserted that the Company possessed centralized control over the various refinery units and bargained as one unit but "fought jealously to keep the union from ever attempting to act in the same manner." Finally, it is said that the General Counsel's theory seeks to "regulate the choice of economic weapons that may be used as a part of collective bargaining," all contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in N.L.R.B. v. Insurance Agents' International Union, AFL-CIO (Prudential Ins. Co.), 361 U.S. 477. Earlier in this report, in considering the allegations against Standard, I have set forth my views regarding .the identity of the certified bargaining representative with whom Standard was obliged to bargain at each refinery. These same bargaining representatives, in my opinion, are the proper Respondents in the Section 8(b)(3) allegations. Having found that at Nos. 1 and 2 refineries the employer and Local 395, the certified bargaining representative, had reached agreement by January 16, 196.1, on the terms of the Nos. 1 and 2 contracts through negotiations conducted on behalf of Local 395 by authorized agents and after approval of the contracts by the mem- bership of Local 395 at the two refineries, I found that the sole reason why Local 3,95 refused and delayed signing the contracts was because it had not been given permission to do so by the International and Sohio Council. Such permission or approval was required by internal union laws of the International, the Council, and the local. The reason why the International and the Council withheld permission to sign the contracts at No. 1, No. 2, and Lima was because agreement had not been reached by Local 346 at the Toledo refinery Agreement had not been reached at Toledo because the Company was seeking a deletion or change in a contract clause relating to discount privileges. When, finally, agreement was reached at Toledo on the aforementioned aspect, then the Toledo contract contained the same basic terms as the other three refinery contracts, a 14-cent wage increase and a 1-year term, and Buchanan, acting for the International and through and with the Council, gave ap- proval for the signing of all four contracts. It is not material whether or not some of the foregoing is described in terms of modifying the Council program, in addition to the description set forth above. As a practical matter, the rubric of modifying the Council program on January 28 by a telephone call between Buchanan and the local union representatives who comprised the Council was forecast by the successful negotiation of a contract at Toledo and the approval thereof by the Local 346 membership on January 26 and 27. While the Council program originally called for four items to be achieved in bargaining, including the 18-cent wage increase that was part of the International program, I am convinced that there was at least a tacit understanding among the various union bodies and their representatives, early in January 1961, that the Unions would settle for less than 100 percent of the International and Council programs. It is surely more than coincidence that when the Company, in January, offered a .14-cent wage increase and a .1-year contract, at No. 1, No. 2, and Lima, all three locals speedily agreed to and ratified such terms, although the terms omitted entirely two points in the Council program (agency shop and incorporation of existing benefits) and provided 14 cents, instead of 18 cents, as an increase. The local representatives throughout this period were in close touch with each other; they were the constituents that comprised the Council and Buchanan was the overall coordinator. Like the local representatives, the permanent International rep- resentatives, who participated in what was going on at each refinery, were in accord 718 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD with,the various contracts that had been negotiated. The evidence shows that these various union bodies were well disciplined and coordinated and they all appeared to act as if they were confident that their contracts, with terms embodying less than 50 percent of the original program, would be approved when the Toledo situation was settled and when they were told by the International and Council that they could sign their contracts. If all the union representatives concerned knew in January that the International and the Council were adamant on all points of the programs and would not settle for less, it is unlikely that they would have negotiated and approved the contract terms that they did. Perhaps if the locals had not all agreed upon identical basic terms there would be room for contending that they had not received informal word as to the terms on which the contracts would be approved, e.g., if one local secured and agreed to 16 or 14 cents and a 2-year contract; or if one secured and agreed to 12 cents, an agency shop, and a 1-year contract, etc. Any doubt that the January 28 modification of the Council program was but the formal imprimatur on the four refinery contracts, the terms of which were ac- ceptable to the International and the Council before January 28, is found in the fact that the Company did not make a wage offer until January, after it had determined, as Loffman testified, that 14 cents was the pattern in the industry. If 14 cents was the industry pattern the International had surely been a participant in the evolution of that pattern. The locals in Ohio, no more than the local refinery managers, had not all arrived at agreement on 14 cents by purely local happenstance. Even at Toledo ,the failure to reach agreement was not on the ground that the local would not agree to less than 100 percent of the unmodified Council program. As the "minute" of the 16th bargaining session at Toledo on January 26 stated, ". . . both parties made a number of proposals in an effort to reach an agreement satisfactory to both sides on the one issue remaining in dispute [management's request for deletion of a contract clause relating to existing benefits]." The failure to reach agreement at Toledo had not been due to the fact that the Council had not modified its program and therefore Local 346 was battling down to the wire for all four points in the program, including an X18-cent increase. Management had apparently offered 14 cents at Toledo as early as January 8, as it had done at the other refineries (Union Exhibit No. 2, 2d series). As a matter of fact, on January 26 Buchanan participated in negotiating the contract at Toledo which had the 14-cent and 1-year provision of all the other contracts and did not include the other Council program demands. This was of course prior to the modification of the Council program on January 28. For the foregoing reasons and in view of the other evidence, I have stated the situa- tion to be as set forth in the fourth paragraph, above, of this report, beginning with the words, "Having found that at Nos. 1 and 2. . The legal issue is whether the refusal and delay by Local 395 to sign the Nos. 1 and 2 contracts prior to January 31, 1961, constituted a refusal to bargain under Section 8(b)(3). The refusal, as previously noted, was wholly attributable to the fact that the International and the Council withheld permission for Local 395 to sign the contracts pursuant to the internal laws of the union bodies, including Local 395. The International and the Council withheld permission to sign the contracts because agreement on a contract had not been reached at the Toledo refinery. The representa- tives of Local 395 were aware of the Toledo situation 37 The statutory bargaining representative of the employees has both the right and the obligation to represent and bargain for the employees in the unit for which it is the representative.38 The representative aforementioned has neither a statutory right nor obligation to bargain for employees outside the unit for which it is the rep- resentative.39 It is the statutory bargaining representative that has the full responsibility and right of discharging the obligation to bargain imposed by Section 8(b)(3) of the Act just as the employer has the corresponding responsibility under Section It is in fact a part of the defense raised by Respondents in their brief that the negotiations and contract terms at Toledo were "a matter of important concern to all the other local unions" who had common aims and purposes 38 Section ( a) (5) of the Act insures the right and Section 8(b) (3) imposes the obligation IOAnheuser-Busch, Inc , 102 NLRB 800 , 812-813 , where the Board held that its unit determination imposed upon the union "the duty to bargain only on the basis of the unit or units hereafter found appropriate At the same time, our unit findings relieve the Employers of all responsibility to deal with any representative hereafter certified, on the basis of any unit or units different in composition or scope from those we determine to be appropriate. . . . Local 19, International Brotherhood of Longshoremen, AFL-CIO ( Chicago Stevedoring Co., Inc. ), 125 NLRB 61, 69. THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY ( AN OHIO CORPORATION) 719 8(a)(5).40 While the bargaining representative, of course, may be affiliated with, associated with, or be a member of other groups and organizations, and may be a participant in various programs and subject to internal, nonpublic rules and regula- tions, these private arrangements and obligations cannot assume priority over public. obligations imposed by the Act. It is by now axiomatic that when parties to collec- tive bargaining reach agreement on the terms of the contract they are obligated to execute a written contract 41 The certified bargaining representative, Local 395, may not, in my opinion, excuse its refusal to execute the Nos. 1 and 2 contracts by reason of its having ceded to a group or organization, that is not the statutory bargaining representative, the ultimate decisional control over whether or not Local 395 will discharge its statutory duty by signing the contracts to which it has agreed. By the same token, the employer could not excuse its failure to fulfill its statutory obligation to execute a contract by reason of the fact that it was a member of or affiliated with some group or or- ganization, the rules of which forbade execution of the contract. More specifically, if Standard and the certified Union had reached agreement on a contract, under the same circumstances as here, including separate bargaining units, and Standard re- fused to sign because it was a member of the N.A.M , or the Chamber of Commerce, or a petroleum association whose rules required their approval of contracts, and approval was withheld because another member of these employer organizations had not yet reached agreement on a contract with the same union or another union, the conclusion expressed above would apply. Administrative rulings of the General Counsel and a Board decision are cited by Respondents for the proposition, apparently, that when an employer negotiates a contract with an agent of the union bargaining representative, and the employer is aware that the rules of the union bargaining representative require approval of the contract by the Union, the employer may not insist upon the contract being signed prior to such approval 42 There is no dispute, in my opinion, that as a rule of agency law the principal may require that its agent's acts be subject to the principal's approval and, if a third party is aware of such limitations on the agent's authority, he is bound thereby; conversely, if the agent has unfettered apparent authority he may bind his principal as to third parties who are unaware of any limitations on the agent's authority. fhe inapplica- bility of the foregoing rule to the Nos. 1 and 2 situation involving Local 395 is due to the fact that Local 395, in its status as the certified bargaining representative, is not the agent of the International or the Council or anyone else. As certified repre- sentative Local 395 is the principal. As principal it could of course act through agents, such as the Nos. 1 and 2 bargaining committees; since the committees were agents their acts were subject to approval by the membership of Local 395, the principal. But, to repeat, Local 395, in negotiating and reaching agreement with the employer, was the principal, the certified representative. The distinction be- tween a local and an International union with which the local may be affiliated is clear. Certification of the local is not also certification of the International. If certification of a local, by reason of its affiliation with the International and by reason of the rules and regulations existing between the union bodies, implies or means that the International is the principal and the local the agent is discharging the duties of certified representative, then, in effect, certification of the local is tantamount to certification of the International. I do not believe that this is the law. 401n Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corporation, 113 NLRB 1288, 1293, the Board had certified an International union as the bargaining representative Thereafter, the International proposed a contract recognition clause which included both the Inter- national and a local union. The employer insisted on a recognition clause that named only the local union The Board found a violation of Section 8(a) (5), noting that al- though "the Respondent had the right to retuse to contract with the Local as a co- representative" this was not the issue The Board held that respondent by insisting on recognition only of the local was acting "in complete derogation of the certificate." The Board observed that "The designation of representatives pursuant to a Board election is the function of this Board This Agency, accordingly, designated and ceitified the bar- gaining agent in the case." A unanimous Supreme 'Court was in agreement with the Board's position on the foregoing aspect. NLRB v Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corporation, 356 U S. 342, 350. 411[. J. Heinz Company v. N L R B., 311 U.S. 514, 525-520. Section 8 (d) of the Act *' Sheet Metal Workers Union, Local No 65, AFL-CIO (Inland Steel Products Com- pany ), 120 NLRB 1678, where the certified local negotiated a contract through its business, representative or agent 720 DECISIONS Or NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Although the evidence, previously described, has convinced me that Local 395 refused to sign the contract because it had not received International and Council approval, and would not have signed without such approval (as required by the various union laws), regardless of what happened at Toledo, I believe the case may be considered from another aspect. Local 395 refused to sign the contracts because the International and Council had not approved and because Local 395 knew that such approval was being withheld because of the Toledo situation and Local 395 was in sympathy with the International and Council position regarding Toledo and believed that what occurred at Toledo was important to its own interests. While it is not the factual situation supported by the evidence, I am prepared to assume, arguendo, that Local 395 refused to sign the contracts, to which it had agreed, solely because it had determined that it had a common interest with Local 346 in Toledo and believed that its own interest warranted the exertion of pressure upon the em- ployer at Toledo by withholding signature on the Nos. 1 and 2 contracts until the employer agreed to the same terms at Toledo as it had at No. 1, No. 2, and Lima. In this connection Respondents assert that "the Unions had a right to make common cause with the Toledo local for the mutual aid and protection of their members" and that a union's "action to influence events outside its unit which would have a bearing on its own conditions is . . . no more than concerted action for mutual aid and protection." It is further contended that "a refusal to conclude an agree- ment . until conditions were cleared up in other units having an effect upon the unit where the refusal was involved, would be an economic weapon of the refusing party. The Board must not curtail this choice of weapons." It is quite evident that unions can have programs and common causes and may cooperate with and help one another. As a result of conferences, conversations, resolutions, and anything else, with the International, the Sohio Council, other locals, and other unions, Local 395, as the certified representative at Nos. 1 and 2, can bargain for the contract terms it deems desirable. It can bargain for 18 cents or 14 cents or any other economic demand. It has no obligation to accept less from the employer than what it has demanded. The same is true of the other bargaining representatives at Lima and Toledo. Local 346, the Toledo representative, had no obligation to agree to the contract proposals of the Company at Toledo. It could take the position, as it apparently did, that it would not agree to delete a particular clause from the contract and that it wanted the same terms as Local 395 had been granted at Nos. 1 and 2 and that had been granted at Lima. It could ask for an agency shop or any other point in the Council program. Local 395, and the Inter- national and the Council, could ask the Company to accede to Local 346's demands and they could render financial and other support to Local 346 so that the latter could bargain successfully with the Company. Absent a no-strike clause I see no reason why Local 395 could not go on strike in support of a strike that Local 346 may have called at Toledo in an effort to achieve its bargaining 'objectives. But I do not believe that Local 395 can violate its own legal obligation under the Act simply because of its sympathy and interest with Local 346 in the latter's Toledo negotiations and because it believes that what happens at Toledo ultimately can af- fect the situation at Nos. 1 and 2. Local 3,95 had reached agreement with the Com- pany at Nos. I and 2 and the law is clear that in such circumstances both parties have the obligation to sign the contract. Not a word or a line in the Nos. 1 or 2 contract could be changed by what happened at Toledo. If the Company secured a contract with no wage increase at Toledo, this would not alter the earlier agree- ment for a 14-cent increase at Nos. 1 and 2. Surely, Local 395's sympathy and interest in the Toledo situation would not justify a secondary boycott on Local 395's part in order to exert pressure on the Company at Toledo. Nor, as stated, may Local 395 violate its obligation to sign its own contract however great its interest in Toledo. Quite clearly, a secondary boycott and a refusal to sign an agreed-upon contract may be a form of union or concerted activity for what a union considers to be its legitimate and mutual interest but such is not an excuse for violation of a legal prohibition or a legal obligation. There is no doubt that one union is interested in conditions in other plants of the employer; it also has an interest in the kind of contracts negotiated in other plants in the industry or the contracts negotiated in other industries, or the wage rates and conditions in nonunion plants. However, in my opinion, a union representing the employees in a New York City plant of an employer cannot refuse to execute a con- tract with that employer until or unless the employer agrees to pay the same wage rates in its South Carolina plant contract where another union is the certified repre- sentative or where there is no union.43 The South Carolina plant bargaining repre- 43 In Local 19, International Brotherhood of Longsho3emen, AFL-C10 (Chncago Steve- doring Co , Inc.), supra, the Board , at page 69 of its decision, stated ". . if we assume THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (AN OHIO CORPORATION) 721 sentative, on the other hand, can demand for the unit it represents the same wages as are paid in New York or any other contract terms that it deems appropriate. The foregoing conclusions do not, in my opinion, in any way represent an attempt to regulate the choice of economic weapons used by a union bargaining representative nor is such a representative restricted to economic weapons that minimize pressure upon the employer.44 Local 395 has not been restricted in bargaining with the em- ployer for the contract covering the employees in the unit for which Local 395 has the right and the obligation to bargain. Local 395 is simply being held to be bound by the well-established principle under the Act that when the parties to a contract reach agreement they are obliged to sign the contract and the union bargaining rep- resentative may not condition the fulfillment of its own statutory obligation upon condition that the employer agree to a contract for another unit, not represented by the Union but, in fact, represented by another certified union. It is also to be noted that, unless Section 9 of the Act and the phrase "unit appropri- ate for collective bargaining" are meaningless, there is a difference between bargain- ing for a single plant unit and a multiplant unit 45 If, in the instant case the unit consisted of all four refineries or of No. 1, No. 2, and Toledo, and if Local 395 was the bargaining representative for such multiplant unit, it could negotiate one contract for the entire unit or it might decide to negotiate separate but basically identical contracts for each refinery. With a multiplant unit, Local 395 could refuse to execute any contract until terms applicable to the entire unit were agreed upon or could refuse to execute single contracts at Nos. 1 and 2 until agreement was reached in all plants of the multiplant unit. But the foregoing is not the posture in the instant case. One of the headings in Respondent's brief is that "the Company bargained as one unit through its centralized control" and it is stated thereafter that "the Company, as one institution, had firm control over what each plant manager was doing in collective bargaining with different local unions... Although centralized control by either a company or a union is not, in my opinion, the equivalent of multiplant or companywide-unit bargaining,46 the short answer to the foregoing portion of Re- spondents' brief is that the complaint allegations against the Company do not charge a refusal to bargain on such grounds and in any event we are here considering the al- legations against the unions. If the Company had refused to sign the contracts with Local 399, when both parties had reached agreement, and had done so because the main office of the Company would not give approval until the same contract had been agreed upon at Toledo, and if the Company was charged with violating Section 8(a)(5) thereby, we would have the situation that is before me in this case. It may be further observed that any violations of law on the employer's part would not excuse the Union's illegal conduct. In the light of the evidence, the analysis, the reasons, and conclusions hereinabove stated, I find that Local 395 has refused to bargain within the meaning of Section 8(b) (1) (A) and (3) of the Act by refusing and delaying in signing contracts for the Nos. 1 and 2 refineries on January 16, 1961, and at all times thereafter until it re- ceived permission from the International to sign; and until agreement had been that Chicago Stevedoring might have prevailed upon Wacker Warehouse to furnish such guarantee [a work jurisdiction guarantee], we would still find that the Respondent has violated Section 8(b) (3) of the Act by conditioning its contract with Chicago Stevedoring upon obtaining a commitment from Wacker regarding future work assignments which would have impinged upon the terms of the existing contract between Wacker and its employees. Such a commitment would necessarily have involved recognition of the Re- spondent by Wacker for purposes of regulating the condition of work of its employees, even though the Respondent did not represent such employees. Thus, compliance with Respondent's `work jurisdiction' demand would have required Wacker to engage in an unfair labor practice-recognition of a minority union." It is apparent that the vice in the foregoing situation does not depend upon whether there are one or two employers but upon the fact that a union that is the certified representative for one unit of employees may not seek to bargain for another unit where it is not the representative 44 N.L R B. v. Insurance Agents' International Union, AFL-CIO (Prudential Ins. Co ), 361 11 S. 477 65 The Board has recognized in representation proceedings, where such matters are appropriately raised , that the parties, by mutual agreement and by reason of a long history of bargaining on a multiplant basis, have brought into existence a multiplant unit al- though the original certifications were for successive single plant units General Motors Corporation, Cadillac Motor Car Division, 120 NLRB 1215. 49 It is not the control itself but how, when, and for what purpose it is exercised that is the important consideration. 649856-63-vol. 13 7-4 7 722 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD reached at Toledo and the International had given permission to sign, as more fully described above. I recommend dismissal of the complaint allegations against the International Union as a co-Respondent and coprincipal with Local 395, the latter being the exclusive bargaining representative. b. The International Union and Local 624 Lima refinery Details regarding the Lima negotiations have been previously set forth. Suffice for present purpose to state that negotiations for a contract had been carried on at Lima by the Company with a bargaining committee of Local 624, composed of em- ployees from the Lima refinery, and with Bachman, the International representative assigned to Lima. As at the other refineries, the membership of Local 624 voted on January 17 to approve the contract that the Company had previously submitted to the aforedescribed committee and Bachman, the International representative. The approval voted by the local was subject to International approval, of which fact the Company was aware. It is appropriate to observe that, in the past and in 1960-61, negotiations and other union affairs at Lima were conducted in exactly the same way as at the other three refineries. In other words, Local 624 participated in negotiations through its com- mittee and the International participated through Bachman. Although Local 624 and Bachman were in agreement with the Company on January 17 regarding the terms of the contract, they did not sign the contract. In former years and eventually in 1961, Bachman signed the contract for the International and the committee signed the contract for the local. They were the normal signatories. They did not sign the contract and refused to sign in 1961 until agreement had been reached at the Toledo refinery and until Buchanan, acting for the International and with the Council, gave approval. Between January 17 and 30, company representatives spoke to Miller, president of Local 624 and a member of the bargaining committee, asking about getting the contract signed. Miller said that until agreement was reached at Toledo all the con- tract signings were being held up. The Lima refinery manager, Bolles, asked Bach- man, "How can we get the contract signed." Bachman said that his hands were tied and other people were involved, i.e, Bachman was saying he could not sign because of factors outside Lima, which, as we know from the evidence, amounted to the fact that Toledo had, up to then, been unable to secure the same contract terms as had the other refineries. Buchanan's testimony that after agreement had been reached at Toledo "the Council modified its program on the 28th so that contracts could then be accepted at all four locations" is conclusive proof that at Lima the situation was the same as at the Nos. 1 and 2 refineries, i.e., agreement had been reached but the union representative refused to sign because the International was witholding approval for such action until agreement was reached in Toledo. At Lima, the International was the certified bargaining representative. It acted, however, with respect to the matter of contract negotiations, through agents, namely, Bachman, a permanent International representative, and through Local 624. The International as the certified bargaining representative and as the principal could, at Lima, properly require that the acts of its agents be subject to its approval or ratification. For this reason that portion of my prior analysis and conclusions re- garding the fact that Local 395, as certified bargaining agent at Nos. 1 and 2, could not subject or cede its own responsibility as bargaining agent to the uncertified International's approval, is not applicable to the Lima situation. However, while the agreement arrived at between the company and the representa- tives of the International was validly subject to the International's approval, that approval was withheld for precisely the same reason as approval had been withheld at Nos. 1 and 2 refineries. What I have stated previously in regard to Local 395 making common cause with Toledo is applicable here and I incorporate the said reasoning and conclusions with respect to the International and its conduct at Lima. I find that the International by refusing and delaying to sign the Lima contract and by refusing and delaying to approve the Lima contract and to sign it until Local 346 and the Company at Toledo had agreed to a contract the same as at the other re- fineries, has refused to bargain within the meaning of Section 8(b) (1) (A) and (3) of the Act. Since the complaint, in my opinion, has named Local 624 as a principal in the allegations against the unions, I shall recommend dismissal with respect to Local 624. While Board orders may be directed to agents as well as principals, I do not recommend such in the instant case, as more fully explained in the section of this report entitled "The Remedy." THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (AN OHIO CORPORATION) 723 IV. THE REMEDY Having made findings of fact and conclusions of law upon the entire record in the case, I now consider the remedy for the unfair labor practices found. The remedy, I believe, should be the conventional one requiring the respective Respondents to cease and desist from the conduct found to be illegal and to take affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act. In my opinion the order should be limited to the Employer's legal obligations to the respective certified bargaining representatives and to the certified baigaining representatives' legal obligations to the Employer. Since the statutory rights of, and the statutory obligations owed by, the certified representatives as principals can- not be obliterated or avoided at this stage by the action of agents, I see no reason to include agents or others in the Recommended Order. Further, the very issues in this case make it desirable that the statutory rights and obligations be set forth in terms of precise parties and not be complicated by the addition of other parties in. various roles. Once this has been accomplished the participation of other entities in bargaining and in contracts will be for the most part a matter for mutual understand- ing between the parties. In the event that either or both of the parties desire clarifica- tion, amendment, or redetermination of either the certified representatives or unit or both, it would appear that the Board itself is the appropriate forum either in a rep- resentation proceeding or by other acceptable means. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that: A. The Respondent, The Standard Oil Company (an Ohio corporation), No. 1 refinery, Cleveland, Ohio; No. 2 refinery, Cleveland, Ohio; Lima refinery, Lima, Ohio, Toledo refinery, Toledo, Ohio; its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from refusing to bargain collectively with Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 11-395, and its representatives, includ- ing temporary International representatives, as the exclusive representative of all production and maintenance employees at its No. 1 refinery, Cleveland, Ohio, in- cluding the storekeepers and assistant stock and purchase clerks in the warehouse, the pipeline gaugers, the control laboratory, but excluding all supervisory, clerical, and technical employees, graduate chemists and engineers working as such, and guards. 2. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act- (a) Upon request, at an appropriate time, bargain collectively with Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 11-395, and its representatives, including temporary International representatives, as the exclusive representative of its employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement if requested by Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 11-395. -(b) Post at its No. 1 refinery, Cleveland, Ohio, copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix A." Copies of said notice. to be furnished by the Regional Di- rector for the Eighth Region, shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent's representative, be posted by the Respondent upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director aforesaid, in writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of this Intermediate Report, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 3. Cease and desist from refusing to bargain collectively with Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 11-395, and its representatives, includ- ing temporary International representatives, as the exclusive representative of all production and maintenance employees at its No. 2 refinery, Cleveland, Ohio, ex- cluding all salaried, clerical, supervisory, and technical employees such as graduate chemists and engineers who are working as such, and guards 4. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, at an appropriate time, bargain collectively with Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 11-395, and its representatives, 724 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD including temporary International representatives, as the exclusive representative of its employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement if requested by Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 11-395. (b) Post at its No. 2 refinery, Cleveland, Ohio, copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix B." Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Eighth Region, shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent's representative, be posted by the Respondent upon receipt thereof, and be main- tianed by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reason- able steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director aforesaid, in writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of this Intermediate Report, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 5. Cease and desist from refusing to bargain collectively with Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, and its representatives, including temporary International representatives, as the exclusive representative of all production and maintenance employees at the Company's Lima, Ohio, refinery, including the labora- tory employees and the storekeepers, but excluding all office clerical, plant clerical, and professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act. 6. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, at an appropriate time, bargain collectively with Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union and its representatives, including temporary International representatives, as the exclusive representative of its employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such under- standing in a signed agreement, if requested by Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 11-395. (b) Post at its Lima, Ohio, refinery, copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix C." Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Eighth Region, shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent's representative, be posted by the Respondent upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director aforesaid, in writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of this Intermediate Report, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 7. Cease and desist from refusing to bargain collectively with Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 11-346, and its representatives, in- cluding temporary International representatives, as the exclusive representative of all the process or production employees and maintenance employees at the Toledo refinery of the Company, including process clerks, the boiler shop clerk, machine shop clerk, clerks in the engineering department, warehouse clerks, laboratory per- sonnel, but excluding clerical employees (other than those included above), super- visory employees, graduate technical engineers and chemists, and guards. 8. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, at an appropriate time, bargain collectively with Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 11-346, and its representatives, including temporary International representatives, as the exclusive representative of its employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement if requested by Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 11-346. (b) Post at its Toledo, Ohio, refinery, copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix D." Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Eighth Region, shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent's representative, be posted by the Respondent upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, de- faced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director aforesaid, in writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of this Intermediate Report, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (AN OHIO CORPORATION) 725 B. The Respondents, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 11-395; Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 11- 624; and Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, their officers, agents, representatives, successors, and assigns, shall: Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 11-395 1. Cease and desist from refusing to bargain collectively with The Standard Oil Company (an Ohio Corporation) No. 1 refinery, Cleveland, Ohio, regarding the No. 1 refinery unit, by refusing and delaying to sign a contractual agreement unless and until permitted to do so by Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union and unless and until a union representing employees in a different appropri- ate unit reached agreement with The Standard Oil Company (an Ohio Corpora- tion), Toledo, Ohio, refinery, and Oil, Chemical and Atomic workers International Union permitted the signing of the aforesaid contractual agreement. 2. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act: ,(a) Upon request, at an appropriate time, bargain collectively as the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit found herein to be appropriate at No. 1 refinery, Cleveland, Ohio, and if an agreement is reached embody such agreement in a signed agreement. (b) Post at Respondent Local I1-395's business office and meeting hall, copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix E." Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director of the Eighth Region, shall, after being duly signed by an official representative of Respondent, be posted by Respondent upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days-thereafter, in con- spicuous places, including all places where notices to its members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. ,(c) Mail to the Regional Director, Eighth Region, signed copies of the aforesaid notice for posting by The Standard Oil Company (an Ohio Corporation), No. 1 re- finery, Cleveland, Ohio, the Employer willing, in places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director, after being signed by Respondent, to be returned to the Regional Director for disposition by him. (d) Notify the Regional Director aforesaid, in writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of the Intermediate Report, what steps Respondent has taken to com- ply herewith. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 11-624 3. Cease and desist from refusing to bargain collectively with The Standard Oil Company (an Ohio Corporation), No. 2 refinery, Cleveland, Ohio, regarding the No. 2 refinery unit, by refusing and delaying to sign a contractual agreement unless and until permitted to do so by Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union and unless and until a union representing employees in a different appropri- ate unit reached agreement, with The Standard Oil Company (an Ohio Corpora- tion), Toledo, Ohio, refinery, and Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union permitted the signing of the aforesaid contractual agreement. 4. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, at an appropriate time, bargain collectively as the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit found herein to be appropriate at No. 2 refinery, Cleveland, Ohio, and, if an agreement is reached, embody such agreement in a signed agreement. (b) Post at Respondent Local 11-624 business office and meeting hall, copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix F." Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Eighth Region, shall, after being duly signed by an official representative of Respondent, be posted by Respondent upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in con- spicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Mail to the Regional Director for the Eighth Region, signed copies of the aforesaid notice for posting by The Standard Oil Company (an Ohio Corporation), No. 2 refinery, Cleveland, Ohio, the Employer willing, in places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Copies of said notices, to be furnished by the Regional Director, after being signed by Respondent, to be returned to the Regional director for disposition by him. (d) Notify the Regional Director aforesaid, in writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of the Intermediate Report, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 726 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union 5. Cease and desist from refusing to bargain collectively with The Standard Oil Company (an Ohio Corporation), Lima, Ohio, refinery, regarding the Lima, Ohio, unit, by refusing and delaying to approve and to sign a contractual agreement unless and until an affiliated union reached agreement with The Standard Oil Company (an Ohio Corporation), Toledo, Ohio, refinery. 6. Take the following affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, at an appropriate time, bargain collectively as the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit found herein to be appropriate at Lima, Ohio, refinery, and, if an agreement is reached, embody such agreement in a signed agreement. (b) Post at Respondent Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union's business office, copies of the notice attached hereto marked "Appendix G." Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Eighth Region, shall, after being duly signed by an official representative of Respondent, be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecu- tive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Mail to the Regional Director for the Eighth Region, signed copies of the aforesaid notice for posting by The Standard Oil Company (an Ohio Corporation), Lima, Ohio, refinery, the Employer willing, in places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director, after being signed by Respondent, be returned to the Regional Director for disposition by him. (d) Notify the Regional Director aforesaid, in writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of the Intermediate Report, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. It is further recommended that unless within 20 days from the date of receipt of this Intermediate Report the Respondent notifies the said Regional Director, in writing, that it will comply with the foregoing Recommended Order, the National Labor Relations Board, issue an order requiring Respondent to take the aforesaid action. APPENDIX A NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Rela- tions Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify you that: WE WILL bargain collectively, upon request, with Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 11-395, and its representatives, including temporary International representatives, as the exclusive representative of all the employees in the bargaining unit described herein. The bargaining units consists of: All production and maintenance employees at our No. 1 refinery, Cleve- land, Ohio, including the storekeepers and assistant stock and purchase clerks in the warehouse, the pipeline gaugers, the control laboratory, but excluding all supervisory, clerical, and technical employees, graduate chem- ists and engineers working as such, and guards. THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (AN OHIO CORPORATION), Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. APPENDIX B NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, we hereby notify you that: WE WILL bargain collectively, upon request, with Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 11-395, and its representatives, including THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (AN OHIO CORPORATION) 727 temporary International representatives, as the exclusive representative of all the employees in the bargaining unit described herein. The bargaining unit consists of: All the production and maintenance employees at the No. 2 Cleveland refinery of the Company, excluding all salaried, clerical, supervisory, and technical employees such as graduate chemists and engineers who are working as such, and guards. THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (AN OHIO CORPORATION), Employer. Dated-------- ----------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. APPENDIX C NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, we hereby notify you that: WE WILL bargain collectively, upon request, with Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union and its representatives, including temporary International representatives, as the exclusive representative of all the employees in the bargaining unit described herein. The bargaining unit consists of: All production and maintenance employees at the Company's Lima, Ohio, refinery, including the laboratory employees and the storekeepers, but excluding all office clerical, plant clerical, and professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act. THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (AN OHIO CORPORATION), Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. APPENDIX D NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, we hereby notify you that: WE WILL bargain collectively, upon request, with Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, Local 11-346, and its representatives, including temporary International representatives, as the exclusive representative of all the employees in the bargaining unit described herein. The bargaining unit consists of: All the process or production employees and maintenance employees at the Toledo refinery of the Company, including process clerks, the boiler shop clerk, machine shop clerks, clerks in the engineering department, warehouse clerks, laboratory personnel, but excluding clerical employees (other than those included above), supervisory employees, graduate tech- nical engineers and chemists, and guards. THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (AN OHIO CORPORATION), Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 728 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD APPENDIX E NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, we hereby notify you that: WE WILL bargain collectively, upon request, with The Standard Oil Company (an Ohio Corporation ), No. 1 refinery, and if agreement is reached with the Company on the terms of a contract we will not refuse or delay signing a written contract because of lack of approval by Oil , Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union or by the Sohio Council and because agreement has not been reached by some affiliated union in some other bargaining unit. The bargaining unit is: All production and maintenance employees at the Company's No. 1 refinery, Cleveland , Ohio, including the storekeepers and assistant stock and purchase clerks in the warehouse, the pipeline gaugers, the control laboratory, but excluding all supervisory , clerical, and technical employees, graduate chemists and engineers working as such , and guards. OIL, CHEMICAL AND ATOMIC WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 11-395, Labor Organization. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative ) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. APPENDIX F NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board , and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, we hereby notify you that: WE WILL bargain collectively , upon request, with The Standard Oil Com- pany (an Ohio Corporation ), No. 2 refinery, and if agreement is reached with the Company on the terms of a contract we will not refuse or delay signing a written contract because of lack of approval by Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union or by the Sohio Council and because agreement has not been reached by some affiliated union in some other bargaining unit. The bargaining unit is: All the production and maintenance employees at the No. 2 Cleveland refinery of the Company, excluding all salaried , clerical , supervisory, and technical employees such as graduate chemists and engineers who are working as such, and guards. OIL CHEMICAL AND ATOMIC WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 11-395, Labor Organization. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof , and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. APPENDIX G NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board , and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, we hereby notify you that: WE WILL bargain collectively , upon request, with The Standard Oil Com- pany (an Ohio Corporation ), Lima, Ohio, refinery, and if agreement is reached CHICAGO PRINTING PRESSMEN'S UNION NO. 3, ETC. 729 with the company on the term of a contract we will not refuse or delay signing a written contract because agreement has not been reached by some affiliated union in some other bargaining unit. The bargaining unit is: All production and maintenance employees at the Company's Lima, Ohio, refinery, including the laboratory employees and the storekeepers, but excluding all office clerical , plant clerical , and professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act. OIL, CHEMICAL AND ATOMIC WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, Labor Organization. Dated------------ ------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative ) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof , and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Chicago Printing Pressmen 's Union No. 3, and Franklin Union No. 4, International Printing Pressmen & Assistants Union of North America, AFL-CIO and Moore Laminating, Inc. Chicago Printing Pressmen's Union No. 3, and Franklin Union No. 4, International Printing Pressmen & Assistants Union of North America, AFL-CIO and American Fit-All Book Covers, Inc. Cases Nos. 13-CP-12 and 13-CP-14. June 20, 1962 DECISION AND ORDER Upon charges duly filed on June 2,1960, by Moore Laminating, Inc., herein called Moore, and by American Fit-All Book Covers, Inc., herein called American, against Chicago Printing Pressmen's Union No. 3, and Franklin Union No. 4, International Printing Pressmen & Assistants Union of North America, AFL-CIO, herein called Re- spondents, the General Counsel for the National Labor Relations Board by the Regional Director for the Thirteenth Region, issued a consolidated complaint alleging that the Respondents had engaged in and were engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b) (7) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Copies of the charges, the complaint, and notice of hearing were duly served upon the Respondents and the Charging Parties. With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint alleged, in substance, that on or about May 3, 1960, Respondents commenced pick- eting the premises of Moore and American with the objective of forc- ing or requiring Moore and American to recognize and bargain with the Respondents as the collective-bargaining representative of the em- ployees of Moore and American, and also to force and require the em- ployees of Moore and American to accept and select the Respondents as their collective-bargaining representative. The complaint further alleged that notwithstanding the fact that Respondents were not the currently certified collective-bargaining representatives of the em- 137 NLRB No. 88.