The Kroger Co.

564 DECISIONS Or NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT discourage membership in District No. 8 of the International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization of our employees, by discharging or otherwise discriminating against any employee in regard to his hire, tenure, or any term or condition of employment. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist the above-named Union, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos- ing, and to engage in collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement (the execution or application of which is not prohibited by State law) requiring membership in a labor organization as authorized by the National Labor Relations Act. WE WILL offer Walter Sangari immediate and full reinstatement to the position he formerly held, or its equivalent, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and make him whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered as a result of the discrimination against him. SYMONS MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Midland Building, 176 West Adams Street, Chicago 3, Illinois, Telephone No. Central 6-9660, if they have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions. The Kroger Co. and Retail Clerks Union, 1550; Retail Clerks Union, 1540; Retail Clerks Union, 1504; Retail Clerks Union, 1460 ; Retail Clerks Union, 1453; Retail Clerks Union, 98; Re- tail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO. Case No. 13-CA-474,0. March 18, 1963 DECISION AND ORDER On August 14, 1962, Trial Examiner C. W. Whittemore issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had not engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommending that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety, as set forth in the attached Intermediate Report. Thereafter, the Respondent, the General Counsel, and the Charging Parties filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and supporting briefs.' 1 The Charging Parties have requested oral argument. This request is hereby denied as the record, the exceptions, and the briefs adequately present the issues and positions of the parties 141 NLRB No. 46. THE KROGER CO. 565 The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and, finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter- mediate Report and the entire record in this case, including the excep- tions and briefs, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner insofar as they are consistent with the following. The charging locals represent employees of various grocery stores in the Chicago area, although elections under Board auspices have never been held among such employees. Since 1945, Respondent together with other retail grocery store operators in and about Chicago have bargained collectively with the charging locals on a group basis z The employers have no formal association, constitution, or binding rules of procedure. During negotiations from 1945 to 1954, the unions usually submitted their contract proposals to individual em- ployers who then met as a group with the unions. Each employer was represented by one or more individuals. The employer repre- sentatives usually caucused prior to meetings with the unions to dis- cuss the union proposals and to agree upon a common front vis a via the unions. In 1954, representatives of employers and unions partici- pating in negotiations increased in number to the extent that the groups became unwieldly. Thereupon, Saunders, representative of Respondent, without formal designation by other employer representa- tives, assumed the role of spokesman for the employer group and continued in this role until the fourth session of the 1961 negotiations. As the result of the joint negotiations, separate but substantially similar collective-bargaining contracts were signed between the local unions and the respective employers. In the fall of 1961, the unions served notice of contract reopening. At the first negotiating session the unions proposed, inter alia, a pension plan. Saunders, acting as spokesman for the employer group, said that Respondent and A & P had their own pension plans and were not interested in one which was jointly administered. The unions insisted upon a pension plan. Respondent was equally adamant in insisting that it would not agree to such a plan because it already had one. During the early stages of negotiations, the A & P representa- tive also strenuously opposed a pension plan for his company. At the 12th negotiating session held on February 22, 1962, the employer spokesman, Quirk, a representative of National Tea Company, said 2In 1945 the employer group consisted of Respondent, Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, National Tea Company, and Associated Food Retailers , an association of local inde- pendently owned retail food stores. In 1955, Eagle -Piggly Wiggly, and in 1961, Red Owl Stores joined the group. Although there were other locals participating in joint negotiations during the early history of bargaining, the union group was reduced to the six charging locals due to merger of seieral smaller locals . All the charging locals are members of Retail Clerks Chicago Area Council, District 3, except Local 1460, which is a Gary , Indiana, local. 566 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD that although the employers were willing to make certain wage adjustments some of them were unwilling to agree to a pension plan. The union representatives replied that the parties were bargaining jointly and each member of the group would be bound by any agree- ment reached. Quirk disagreed and said that if the unions felt that Respondent would be so bound, they should notify Respondent's representative personally. At the next meeting Respondent's repre- sentative said categorically that his company would be bound only by an agreement to which it specifically assented, and that it would not agree to a contract which included a pension plan. At this meet- ing the unions and the employers, with the exception of Respondent, reached agreement on terms of a new contract, including a pension plan. Separate meetings between Respondent and the unions failed to result in an agreement, the pension plan being the stumbling block. Thereupon the Unions struck Respondent. Although as stated, separate but substantially similar contracts resulted from joint bargaining, there is a history of individual adjust- ments between separate employers and separate unions which varied the jointly negotiated terms and conditions of employment. Thus: 1. Respondent's Representative Saunders testified without contra- diction that in 1952 he separately negotiated with the unions to exclude co-managers in Respondent's stores from the compulsory union mem- bership provisions in the then current contract and this agreement is .still being honored. 2. After the 1956 bargaining agreement was signed, Respondent separately negotiated with union officials so as to interpret the phrase "regularly employed" in section 6 of that agreement to mean that there would be a 4-week period after an employees' schedule change before his rate of pay would be adjusted. 3. In March 1956, Local 1453 asked that Respondent grant em- ployee members in its stores time and a half for overtime, contrary to the agreement in force. Respondent refused. 4. In December 1955, Respondent was party to a 2-year jointly negotiated contract with Local 1460 covering employees in its Indiana stores. The agreement did not provide for checkoff of union dues. However, upon being apprised by Local 1460 that it was having dif- ficulty collecting dues in a particular store, Respondent and Local 1460 modified the existing contract to provide for dues checkoff. No other local unions or employers participated in these supplementary negotiations. 5. In 1957, Respondent, National Tea, and A & P negotiated with Local 1460 for an extension of the union-security provision in the ex- isting bargaining contract because Indiana had passed a right-to-work law and Local 1460 was anxious to secure an extension of the existing clause before the new statute became effective. No other local par- THE KROGER CO. 567 ticipated in these negotiations . However, the tentative agreement reached was never reduced to writing or signed because the law be- came operative before the agreement could be presented to Local 1460's membership for ratification. 6. On February 8, 1960, Respondent signed a separate agreement with Local 1460 providing for an agency shop. In the fall of that year Respondent and Local 1460 negotiated and signed a supplement thereto providing for a checkoff under the agency shop arrangement, to begin 31 days after hire or execution of the supplement. 7. The 1959-61 bargaining contracts between Respondent, National Tea, A & P, and Associated Food Retailers provided for the estab- lishment of a health and welfare trust fund. After negotiations began in 1960 to establish the trust, Local 1460 notified Respondent that it desired a separate trust agreement for employees in the Lake County, Indiana, stores, in order to include under the trust employees of various independent grocers who did not participate in the Chicago bargaining. Thereupon Respondent, A & P, and National Tea nego- tiated a separate trust for the Indiana employees . Associated Food Stores did not participate in the negotiations for the Indiana trust. 8. From the beginning of joint bargaining , the Retail Clerks Inter- national has negotiated a separate understanding with Associated Food providing that only those employer-members of the Associa- tion employing members of its locals which are parties to the agree- ment shall be covered thereby. In 1955, the International negotiated a "rider" with the Association which provided that the 1955-57 agree- ment was entered into with the International through its authorized agent, the Retail Clerks Joint Council . The bargaining contracts between Respondent, A & P, and National Tea for the same years pro- vided that they were entered into with the International through the individual locals as its agents. 9. In 1958, National Tea negotiated a written supplement relating to uniforms for female employees which differed from the provision on the same subject in other employers' collective-bargaining contracts with the locals. 10. Before the 1954-56 agreements, Respondent, A & P, National Tea, and Associated Food Retailers had the classification "Bakery Department Head" in their bargaining contracts. However, the con- tracting union agreed to drop this classification from the 1954-56 contract with A & P, from the 1957-59 contract with National Tea, and from the 1959-61 contract with Respondent. The contract with Associated Food Retailers still includes this classification. 11. In 1959, the locals and the employers included in their contracts an "indemnification clause" whereby the unions agreed to indemnify the companies for any claims resulting from the agency shop agree- ment. After the 1959-61 agreement had been negotiated, A & P and 568 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the unions agreed to omit the indemnification clause from the A & P contract. 12. After the 1959-61 contracts had been signed, Respondent, A & P, National Tea, and Associated Food Retailers entered into certain understandings with the locals relating to the appointment of an assistant manager and other employees based on a review of average store sales, ". . . Provided that the store does not already have one employee in each classification." National Tea redrafted the langauge of the understanding and omitted the quoted phrase. This redraft was accepted by the locals as part of National Tea's contract for 1959-61. 13. With respect to the health and welfare clause in the 1959-61 agreements, A & P refused to sign until a change in wording was made to prevent the provision from being declared illegal. The Inter- national agreed and the contract with the A & P contained this modification. When National Tea and Associated Food Retailers learned of the modification, they prevailed upon the locals to incor- porate the same change in their own agreements. However, the unions rejected Respondent's request for a similar amendment to its own contract. The General Counsel contends that Respondent violated Section 8(a) (5) of the Act by refusing to sign the jointly negotiated collec- tive-bargaining agreement. The Trial Examiner recommended that the complaint be dismissed because the record failed to establish that in its 1961-62 negotiations "respondent manifested bad faith, or that it refused to bargain in violation of Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act." We agree with the Trial Examiner's conclusion, but for a somewhat different reason. During the 1961 negotiations Respondent made clear from the out- set that it would not agree to a pension plan even if other employers did so agree. As the Trial Examiner found, this position was taken in good faith. When the representatives of other employers in the bargaining group did agree after prolonged negotiations to a pension plan, they expressly disclaimed any authority to bind Respondent. Further, as set forth above, during the entire period of multiemployer bargaining, individual employers and individual unions had negoti- ated individual modifications in the jointly negotiated agreements without protest from other parties to the agreements. The evidence, we believe, justifies a finding, as in the J t H Food case,' that in jointly negotiating for a collective bargaining agreement, the parties mutually understood that individual variances in the agreement could be negoti- ated by the individual parties. Accordingly, in refusing to accede to the pension plan agree to by other employers and in insisting upon separate negotiations of this issue, Respondent exercised a prerogative 9J c6 H Food Inc., et al., 139 NLRB 1398. THE KROGER CO. 569 established by past practice and did not therefore refuse to bargain in violation of Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act .4 Accordingly, we shall dismiss the complaint. [The Board dismissed the complaint.] ' Subsequent to the Issuance of the Intermediate Report, Allen Alsip, petitioner in Case No 13-RD-494 [not published in NLRB volumes], filed a motion to intervene for the purpose of excepting to the Trial Examiner's failure to find that no multiemployer unit existed. Like the Trial Examiner, although for a different reason, we find it unnecessary to decide that the parties' practice of Individual adjustments precludes their having estab- lished an appropriate multiemployer unit. Accordingly, the motion is hereby denied. INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE On March 8, 1962, the above-named labor organizations filed a charge in the above- entitled case. On May 4, 1962, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board issued his complaint and notice of hearing thereon. Thereafter, the Respond- ent's answer, dated May 15, 1962, was filed. An amendment to the complaint was issued and served on May 18, 1962, and an answer to the amendment dated May 23 was received. The complaint alleges and the answers deny that the above-named Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8 (a) (5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. Pursu- ant to notice, a hearing was held in Chicago, Illinois, on May 28, 29, 30, and 31, 1962, before Trial Examiner C. W. Whittemore. All parties were represented at the hearing and were afforded full opportunity to present evidence pertinent to the issues, to argue orally, and to file briefs. Briefs have been received from all parties. After the close of the hearing a motion was received from the Respondent to correct the transcript as to numerous typographical errors. Said motion shows on its face that it was served upon the other parties. No objection having been received, the motion is granted, the record is hereby ordered corrected in accordance therewith, and the motion is hereby made a part of the record of these proceedings. Also after the hearing there was received, pursuant to agreement of the parties at the hearing, a written stipulation concerning certain contracts. Said stipulation is hereby made a part of the record as General Counsel's Exhibit No. 38. Disposition of the Respondent's motion to dismiss the complaint, upon which ruling was reserved at the hearing, is made by the following findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Upon the record thus made, and from his observation of the witnesses, the Trial Examiner makes the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT The Kroger Co. is an Ohio corporation with principal office in Cincinnati, Ohio. It maintains and operates retail food stores in various States of the United States, including Illinois and Indiana. During the year preceding issuance of the complaint the Respondent sold and dis- tributed food products valued at more than $1,000,000. During the same period it received goods at its Illinois and Indiana stores valued at more than $100,000 which were transported to such stores in interstate commerce directly from States other than Illinois and Indiana. The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. II. THE CHARGING UNIONS Retail Clerks Union, 1550, 1540, 1504, 1460, 1453, and 98, and Retail Clerks Inter- national Association, AFL-CIO, are labor organizations within the meaning of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Setting and major issue For a period of more than 15 years Kroger, together with a varying number of other national chains and an association of independent stores, has engaged in joint or 570 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD group bargaining with the Retail Clerks in the Chicago area. Within that area, dur- ing the 1961-62 negotiations, Kroger had some 63 stores and about 1,200 employees. In substance, it is General Counsel's contention that such custom and practice of group bargaining had effectively established the legal fact that all the employees of the participating employers constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. This contention the Respondent disputes. Thus is raised the issue of a multiple-employer unit. Negotiations looking toward new contracts between the participating locals and employers began in the fall of 1961 and continued until April 1962 when resultant agreements were executed with all such employers except Kroger. One or more Kroger officials participated in these negotiations, jointly with representatives of the other employers, until February 24-or, more accurately, the early morning of February 25, at which time it appeared that all parties except Kroger had reached agreement on contract terms. The one union demand which Kroger had consistently declined to grant, from the beginning of negotiations, but which the other employers finally agreed to, involved a pension program. General Counsel urges, and the Respondent denies, that by refusing to sign a contract containing the pension plan provisions Kroger refused to bargain within the meaning of Section 8(a) (5) of the Act. In preliminary summary the foregoing are the issues as raised by the original complaint, based upon the original charge filed by the locals. Although the charge was not amended, the complaint on May 18, 1962, was amended to allege that by the unfair labor practice of refusing to bargain the Respondent caused certain of its employees in the area to go on strike in April-a strike which apparently was continuing at the time of the hearing. While the fact of a strike is not disputed the question as to whether it was caused and prolonged by unfair labor practices is to be resolved only after a conclusion is reached concerning the legal character of Kroger's declining to sign the contract involved herein. At the opening of the hearing General Counsel again amended the complaint by alleging that the Respondent refused to bargain by threatening "its employees with loss of benefits in an effort to undermine the Union , to destroy the bargaining unit, and to avoid its obligation to execute the contract agreed to by the Employer group." The Respondent denies this allegation. B. Relevant facts 1. Bargaining history At the outset it is to be noted that this case does not depict a situation of employer- association bargaining : that is, where individual employers formally join, contribute financial support to, and empower an association to represent them in negotiating with labor organizations , delegating to such association expressly or by implication the authority to bind them in agreements reached as a result of such negotiations. More succinctly, none of the complicated questions of agency and scope of authority are here involved. Briefly summarized, the history of bargaining as revealed by the record is as follows: (a) Since 1945 one or more officials of Kroger have participated jointly with other representatives of Chicago area food chain or independent stores in negotiating for periodical contracts with representatives of the Charging Unions in this case. In 1947 and apparently for several years thereafter the employer group consisted of the Respondent, Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, National Tea Company, and Associated Food Retailers, an association of local food stores. The Unions were represented by their officials. During this period, according to the credible testimony of M. H. Saunders, Kroger's labor relations representative, there was no "spokesman" for the employer group, but representatives of each employer participated at will. (b) About 1954 the employer group was somewhat enlarged by representatives of additional chains and the Unions' representatives increased in number. As a matter of convenience, but with no formal delegation of power by other employers, Saunders acted as "spokesman" for the employer group. He continued in this capacity until the fourth session of the 1961 negotiations, when he dropped out because of other duties. Through other representatives, however, Kroger participated in the joint negotiations until, as noted in more detail below, the latter part of February 1962. (c) As a witness Saunders readily conceded that the purpose of these group nego- tiations was to seek a uniform agreement with the Unions as to wages, hours, and other working conditions. He also testified that after discussing problems and proposals among themselves, the participating employers agreed to "present a common THE KROGER CO. 571 point of view" in responding to union demands, and that it had been the practice to do so. (d) Throughout this history of group-employer negotiations with the labor organiza- tion here involved no employer, until Kroger did so in 1962, actually withdrew from such negotiations or refused to sign the same or similar contract agreed to by other employers in the same group. 2. The 1961-62 negotiations As noted earlier in this report contracts between the Charging Unions and all employers in the participating group except Kroger were finally executed in April 1962. Negotiations to that end were begun October 26, 1961, and frequent meetings were held thereafter until the early morning of February 25, 1962. Since there is no claim by General Counsel that Kroger failed to meet with the Unions at reasonable times, or that any other issue of unlawful bargaining except that concerning the pension program was involved at any time during the negotiations, it appears pointless to review in detail what was said and done at each of these several meetings. As to the pension program issue, the following pertinent facts are noted: (a) During the first five meetings , representatives of the participating employers met and negotiated directly with union representatives. (b) At and after the sixth meeting, on January 18, 1962, actual negotiations generally were carried on between subcommittees of both union and employer officials. However, other employer representatives, remained in adjoining quarters for con- sultation by their subcommittee. (c) For the first time in the bargaining history, this year the Union's initial demands included a pension program, the details of which are immaterial here. At the first meeting in October, according to the testimony of Victor Reysa, an official of Local 1550, Saunders put the Unions on notice that both Kroger and A & P were "not interested" in the pension program proposals since each chain "had their own pension programs." 1 (d) At most, if not all, following negotiating meetings the pension issue was discussed. (General Counsel makes no claim in his complaint that Kroger at any time refused to discuss or negotiate concerning a pension program.) (e) At the fourth meeting, in December, the A & P representative notified the union representatives that the pension proposal would be a "strike issue" with both his company and Kroger. According to Reysa's own testimony the union representa- tive replied: "If it was a strike issue, so be it." (f) At a meeting early in February 1962, Van Ausdall, a Kroger official, reminded the union representatives that his company's position of not granting any pension plan in any of its various contracts throughout the system was well known; effec- tively again putting the Union on notice that it would not accept a contract containing such provision. A union representative countered by voicing his opinion that they were negotiating a "uniform" contract (thereby implying that if other employers agreed to a pension program Kroger would have to do likewise), and warning Van Ausdall that it would be illegal for Kroger to withdraw from the negotiations without "timely notice." (g) It does not appear from the record that Van Ausdall was disturbed by this curb opinion. In any event, he did not abandon his position, and continued to attend the meetings-although, not being on the subcommittee of employers, he did not participate at all times directly in the negotiations. (h) On February 24 a meeting began which extended through until the early hours the next morning. Van Ausdall was invited into the direct negotiations, where he again voiced his refusal to be a party to any contract containing pension provisions, again contending that Kroger employees would lose, if such contract were signed, their accrued benefits under the Company's long-established profit- sharing and retirement plan. Van Ausdall also specifically stated that while the employers' representative on their subcommittee. Quirk, had his authorization to "negotiate" on other matters still involved, such authorization did not include the subject of pensions. When the union representative told Van Ausdall that his company would be "bound by whatever settlement was reached," Kroger's representa- i Although the record contains evidence concerning the nature of Kroger's so-called profit-sharing and retirement programs, set up many years earlier, it does not appear necessary here to describe them in any details. Whether their existence was a reasonable ground for Kroger's refusal to accept the Unions' pension program is not in issue. 572 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tive replied that his company would be bound only by settlement "that we specifically agreed to." (i) After further negotiations, at the same extended meeting, it appears that all employers except Kroger finally agreed, in principle , on all issues including the pen- sion program. Van Ausdall was again called in to state his position which was, in effect, that he was prepared to accept the settlement in all respects except the pension provisions . He offered, moreover, to continue meeting with the Union in an effort to reach agreement. The union representative responded that he believed Kroger was bound by the agreement reached by the other employers , and upon this note Van Ausdall left the meeting. (j) Although, as noted above, it appears that the Unions and all employers ex- cept Kroger believed agreement had been reached on a contract events proved further negotiations necessary . The written draft submitted to such employers by the Union contained provisions contrary to their understanding, and the employers' group, Kroger being absent , met with the Unions again on April 12. The employers left this meeting without signing contracts , apparently desiring more time for con- gideration. Thereafter, yielding to strike threats, all employers except Kroger signed contracts. (k) After the February 24-25 group negotiations , Kroger and union representa- tives met in two-party negotiations-no other employers participating, in an effort to reach some agreement, on at least three occasions : March 5, April 18, and May 3. Agreement was not reached. (1) On April 19 the locals began a strike against Kroger , which was continuing at the time of the hearing. 3. The alleged "threats" As noted in section III, A, above at the hearing General Counsel expanded his complaint to allege that Kroger also refused to bargain by threatening employees with loss of benefits in order to undermine the Unions. The Trial Examiner finds no oral testimony in the record to support this allega- tion. In his brief General Counsel fails to urge the point or to call attention to any documentary evidence which might support the allegation. It may be that he con- siders three company letters addressed to employees , all dated after the February 24- 25 meeting, which he placed in evidence , to be sufficient to sustain the allegation. The Trial Examiner discerns nothing in any one of the documents which may reasonably be considered to be even an implied threat. All deal, at least in part, with some phase of the Respondent's profit-sharing and retirement plans. C. Conclusions The record in this case is replete with contracts , excerpts from contracts, oral testi- mony, and arguments bearing upon the allegation of the complaint to the effect that all employees of the various companies , including Kroger, which have "jointly negotiated" with the Charging Unions down through the years since 1945 , constitute "a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining" within the meaning of the Act. The briefs devote many pages to the point. In view of his disposition of the chief issue-the refusal to bargain-it does not appear necessary to the Trial Examiner to review, weigh, and resolve the conflicting and extensive arguments set forth in the briefs. There is no real dispute that certain employers, including Kroger, have customarily met in "joint" or "group" fashion with representatives of the Unions for the pur- pose of reaching "uniform" agreements. At all times , however, it appears that Kroger, as well as other employers, participated as individuals in a group, and at no time delegated to any third party, such as an association or committee , the power to bind them separately or together . It is also well demonstrated in the record that in general these group negotiations , until 1961-62, have resulted in individual contracts which were , except in some respects , "uniform." 2 To reach the crux of the case, the Trial Examiner assumes that the unit alleged is an appropriate unit. He finds that the group negotiations , down through the years, have customarily culminated in "substantially" uniform but individual contracts. But it is not his opinion that this assumption and finding lead logically and inevitably to the conclusion that Kroger violated the Act by refusing to sign the same contract other employers signed in 1962 . The law itself only requires the signing of an agreement a In passing , the Trial Examiner notes that in his brief General Counsel retreats from his tight and precise allegation of the complaint-that the parties "executed uniform" contracts-to a lesser term • "substantially uniform " NEW YORK MAILERS' UNION NO. 6, ITU, AFL-CIO 573 when reached? However, that requirement, in Section 8(d) quoted below, is im- mediately followed by: "but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession." Since the law does not specifically prohibit an employer from refusing to make "concessions"-so long as he negotiates "in good faith" on mandatory issues-and does not specifically require each party in group negotiations to come to an identical agreement, recourse is necessary to the Board and court interpretations of that law. The Trial Examiner has considered fully the opposing arguments in the several briefs, and the many cases cited. None of the cited cases present facts identical with those established here, as viewed by the Trial Examiner. It appears that in most cases, wherein direct violation of the language of the law was not found, the Board's policy has been to weigh each case on its own merits, and to apply-in effect if not in specific terms-the test of "good faith bargaining." It is thistest which the Trial Examiner applies in this case, as was done in N.L.R.B. v. Insurance Agents' International Union (Prudential Insurance Co.), 361 U.S. 477, where good-faith bargaining by a labor organization was the chief issue. From the beginning of negotiations in the fall of 1961 Kroger's representatives at the group bargaining maintained, and made known to the union representatives, that they would not yield to the demand the pension provisions be included in any contract they signed. They did not refuse to discuss or "negotiate" the issue, so far as the record reveals, and as previously noted General Counsel does not so contend. They did, however, decline to make any concession on the point of including the provision in a contract, a privilege which the Act accords to any party to negotiations. And, as found, Kroger representatives continued to meet with union officials, seeking solution to the problems, after other employers had yielded to the union demands. The Trial Examiner has normal respect for the "voice of dissent," whether uttered by an individual, an employer, or a union representative. And he believes the conduct of Kroger in this case to have been no more than an exercise of this privilege. No mendacity was exhibited by that Respondent's representatives, nothing in their state- ments to union officials could reasonably be interpreted as indicating that they would agree to be bound by what other employers agreed to on the pension issue. They recanted in no fashion from any agreement previously made by them either ex- pressly or by implication, during the 1961-62 negotiations. As to the Union's expressed contention, in which General Counsel apparently joins, to the effect that majority rule must prevail in such group bargaining, the Trial Examiner finds no specific support for it in Board decisions. In short, the Trial Examiner concludes and finds that the evidence in this record does not establish that in its 1961-62 negotiations with the Charging Unions the Respondent manifested bad faith, or that it refused to bargain in violation of Sec- tion 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act. It will therefore be recommended that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety. RECOMMENDED ORDER On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Trial Examiner recommends that the complaint in this case be dismissed in its entirety. ' Section 8 (d) requires "the execution of a written contract incorporating any agree- ment reached if requested by either party." New York Mailers' Union No. 6, International Typographical Union, AFL-CIO and News Syndicate Co., Inc. Case No. 2-CD- 235. March 18, 1963 DECISION AND DETERMINATION OF DISPUTE This is a proceeding under Section 10(k) of the Act following a charge filed by News Syndicate Co., Inc., herein called the Company, alleging that New York Mailers' Union No. 6, International Typo- 141 NLRB No. 49.