Florida Sugar Corp.

460 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Florida Sugar Corporation and United Packinghouse, Food and Allied Workers, AFL-CIO. Cases Nos. 12-OA-2345 and 12-CA- 0438. May 6, 1963 DECISION AND ORDER On January 30, 1963, Trial Examiner David London issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled consolidated proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Intermediate Report. The Trial Examiner also found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other alleged unfair labor practices and recommended dismissal of these allegations of the complaint. Thereafter, the General Counsel and the Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and supporting briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with these cases to a three- member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Leedom and Brown]. The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.' The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter- mediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record herein, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda- tions of the Trial Examiner with the following exceptions and additions. 1. The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that the Respondent engaged in unlawful conduct, as alleged in the consolidated complaint, both prior and subsequent to a settlement agreement, which was entered into by the Respondent and the Union on June 14, 1962, and which the Regional Director set aside on or about October 12, 1962.2 'The Respondent , at the opening of the heating, requested a postponement on the ground that emergency repairs being made on its machinery requiied supervision by some of its key witnesses The Trial Examiner denied the request , but advised the Respondent that, if it wished to stagger the attendance of its witnesses , he would recess the hearing to permit those present to return to the plant and to summon others to the hearing In addition , the hearing n as recessed, after the General Counsel completed his presenta- tion, from 3 30 p in until 1 30 p in the next day , on which day the hearing was com- pleted. The Respondent excepts to the Trial Examiner's denial of its request and to his description in the Intermediate Report of what occurred, and has moved to reopen the record to introduce evidence on this matter However, the Respondent fails to show in what manner it was prejudiced in the presentation of its case by this ruling As the record shows that the Respondent was given ample opportunity to present evidence on all the issues of the case , and did so, we find that it was not prejudiced by any of the Trial Examiner's rulings, and its motion to reopen is therefore hereby denied. The Respondent's request for oral argument is also hereby denied as the record, the exceptions, and the briefs adequately present the issues and the positions of the parties. 21n agreement with the Trial Examiner , we approve and adopt the action of the Regional Director in setting aside the settlement agreement in Case No . 12-CA--2345. See Look Joint Pipe Company, 141 NLRB 943. 142 NLRB No. 57. FLORIDA SUGAR CORPORATION 461 The conduct which the Trial Examiner found violative of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act consisted of the following : (a) Lacalle, one of the Respondent's vice presidents, told employee Pritchard he had always felt that Pritchard was a loyal employee, but he now under- stood that Prichard was a union leader; (b) Williams, the other vice president, asked Woods, when he sought reemployment after a layoff, what Woods thought "about this union business"; 3 (c) Williams told .employee Crist that the Respondent planned,to run this plant exactly as it ran its plant in Cuba, that the Respondent did not want and did not intend to have a union, and thatby November it wanted to "get rid of all union men" and have them out of the plant; (d) Paris, the personnel manager and paymaster,' asked employee White, in a con- text of threats, discussed below, about the union movement in the plant; (e) George, the chief engineer, who admitted that he was "in charge of the overall operation of the plant," told employee Walker that he, George, would replace the union men with people from Lou- isiana who could not speak English and whom the Union could not organize; and (f) the Respondent instituted a rule prohibiting union -activities on its premises during its employees' nonworking time. The Trial Examiner made findings of fact that the Respondent ,engaged in other similar acts, but failed to include them in his con- cluding findings. Accordingly, we find that the Respondent further violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act by the following: (g) At the same time that Paris asked White about the Union, he stated that, if the Union came into the plant, the men would have a shorter workweek and no more overtime; (h) Carreno, one of the assistant engineers,5 8 Following this interrogation , in which Woods indicated that he favored the Union, he was not rehired although on the day before he had been given a physical examination and was told by Paris to report back the following day 4 The Respondent, who maintains that its vice presidents , Williams and Lacalle, are the only supervisors in an operation that employs at times as many as 170 employees, -excepts to the Trial Examiner's finding that Paris is a supervisor within the meaning of the Act Paris works with other management personnel, in an office building separate from the plant, and has the services of a private secretary He interviews applicants for employment While it is not clear whether be is authorized to hire , there is testimony that employees believed lie had such authority lie also discharged employees , although apparently upon Instructions to do so, and lie carried out the discharge procedure of obtaining release cards from discharged employees before giving them their final pay- checks Employees were directed to notify Paris when they were to be absent , and, after an absence , had to obtain their timecards from Paris. We find , upon the entire record, that Pails was a supervisor and/or a management representative for whose conduct the Respondent was responsible 6 The Respondent excepts to the Trial Examiner 's finding that Assistant Engineers 'Carreno and La Garde are supervisors La Garde testified that in August he was in charge of from 20 to 30 employees, and Carreno that he was in charge of from 25 to 30 during the busy grinding season and at least 5 during the slack season . They not only assign work to these employees and supervise their work , but, in addi-tion , the record shows that they have authority either to discharge or effectively to recommend the dis- charge of employees Furthermore , the Respondent employed approximately 65 employees at the time the alleged unfair labor practices occurred and approximately 170 employees during its grinding season An abnormally high ratio of employees to supervisors would -exist were we to find , as the Respondent contends , that its two vice presidents were the only supervisors . Accordingly we find , as did the Trial Examiner, that Carreno and La Garde are supervisors « ithin the meanine of the ket . li'onderknit Corporation, 123 NLRB 53. 462 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD told Walker that the latter "had taken several steps [on] the wrong road," and explained that he was referring to "the union business" ; (i) Carreno told Walker, a week or two after the above conversation between the two, that "the union members would be replaced during the grinding season .. . [and] there would not be one of the union men left in the plant," and, when Walker remarked that the Board notice posted on the Respondent's bulletin board gave employees the right to organize, replied that "the notice wouldn't always be there" ; (j) Carreno asked Crist in a conversation on August, 20, if he, Crist,, still had his union cards and buttons in his locker, and, when Crist admitted he did, told Crist some employees were to be laid off that day for not working the previous Saturday; (k) 3 days later, after three employees were laid off as Carreno had predicted, Carreno again asked Crist if he had cleaned out his locker, and, when Crist replied that he had not done so, told Crist that there would be additional layoffs that day; (1) La Garde, one of the assistant engineers, after seeing employee Miller, the vice president of the Union, discussing the Union and handing out union cards and buttons during his lunch hour, asked Miller whether he was not "doing plenty of union talk," and thereafter, on August 22, Lacalle discharged Miller, remarking that there was "lots of rotten stuff going on around here and we will have to get rid of it," which the Trial Examiner found, and we agree, was a veiled reference to Miller's union activities. 2. The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that the Respondent's discharge of Miller because of his union activities, and its failure to reemploy Woods following a layoff because of his expression of union sympathy, constituted violations of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act. The Trial Examiner found further that the Respondent did not violate Section 8(a) (3) of the Act by discharging Day, Carter, and Wilson on August 21,1962. We find merit in the General Counsel's exceptions to this finding. The Respondent posted a notice on August 17, as it frequently did, notifying all employees to report for overtime work the following day, a Saturday. A notice posted in February 1962, during the previous year's grinding season, announced that there had been an alarming increase in unexcused absences, that it was necessary to take "drastic action," that employees were to call Paris, whose telephone number was listed, when they were going to be absent, and that "In each AWOL case the employee's card will be picked up and turned in to Mr. Paris, the employee to claim it on his return to work. Each case will be considered immediately and action taken accordingly." 6 In addi- tion, the Respondent had a document entitled "Factory Personnel Policy Effective December 28,1961," which provides in part as follows : O The record does not show how long this notice remained posted, or whether it was posted at the time of the events here in issue FLORIDA SUGAR CORPORATION 463 Discharge is the automatic penalty for the following : * * * * * Refusing to work overtime because of conflict with outside em- ployment or other unjustified reasons. There is no evidence, however, that employees received copies of this document or were otherwise apprised of its provisions. As indicated above, the Respondent notified all employees to report for overtime work on August 18. Day, Carter, and Wilson were absent on August 18. Day, who had been suffering from a back injury, as the Respondent knew, had a recurrence of this trouble on August 18 and telephoned the plant. Paris was out of the office, so Day notified Foreman Seyler, who answered the telephone, to tell Paris that he would be absent. Seyler, however, failed to give the message to Paris. Carter, who had sprained his ankle after work on August 17, and who did not have a telephone in his home, did not call the plant. Wilson, who had been working for the Respondent only 3 weeks, and who testified that he had not been told to telephone the Respondent when he was absent, also failed to call. On Monday, August 20, Day, Carter, and Wilson reported for work, but found their timecards missing. When Paris was asked about the missing cards, he said that employees who had failed to work the previous Saturday were dismissed and that, when George, the chief engineer, came in, they should see him about the matter. The three employees waited together for George. Upon arrival, George told Day, "Go on, you're fired. Hit the road." Day then went to Paris' office to get his paycheck. When he saw Seyler in the office, he asked Seyler to tell Paris about his call the previous Saturday, and Seyler did so. Paris then called Lacalle and, about 30 minutes later, told Day that he had been suspended and would be notified within the next few days if he was to come back to work. Carter explained to George that he had sprained his ankle and had been unable to get to a telephone to call. George replied : "Well, I hate to let you go. You're one of my very best workers around here." He -then told Carter to go home for a few days and "we will see." Wilson also was told that he would be notified by Paris what action was to be taken about him within the next few days. On the next day, however, Paris went to the homes of each of the three men, notified them that they were discharged for failing to work the previous Saturday, collected their badges and safety helmets, and gave them their paychecks. The Trial Examiner concluded that, although these discharges may have been a harsh application of the Respondent's rule, the General Counsel had not established that the discharges were unlawful. In our opinion, however, the record does not show that the application of the rule was the cause of their discharge. Thus, the Respondent's 464 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD rule requiring an employee to call in when he was to be absent had not been enforced in the past and its enforcement here occurred soon after the Union began organizing the plant, and was applied for the first time to three union members.' In this connection, Day and Carter both testified, without contradiction, that they had been absent pre- viously without calling, and no disciplinary action had been taken against either of them. In addition, George, the chief engineer in general charge of the plant, admitted that, prior to Day, Carter, and Wilson, no one had been discharged for failing to call in to report an absence. We note, too, that despite his prior lack of enforcement, the Respondent had not at the time in question warned its employees that this rule was about to be enforced. Significant also is the fact that the Respondent did not observe the literal provisions of its rule which, by its terms, was applicable to absences for "unjustified reasons." Nowhere does it appear that the Respondent took into consideration the reasons given by Day, Carter, and Wilson, for their absence, or the fact that Day had, in accord with the rule, called Paris' office. The Respondent contends that it had no knowledge of the union membership or sympathies of these three employees, but we find no merit in this contention. This was a relatively small operation, and Day and Carter had worn union buttons openly while at work since May. The Respondent's awareness of Day's membership is shown by Lacalle's remark, during a conversation about Day's getting compensa- tion pay because of his back injury, that "You can do fine without the union in the mill if you want to." While Wilson, who had been hired only 3 weeks before his discharge, had not worn a union button, he had signed a union card which Miller had given to him in the plant at noon. Miller, who had signed up a number of new employees during the lunch hour, as noted above, was told by La Garde, who saw him handing union cards to these employees, that he was engaging in "plenty of union talk around here," and was told by Lacalle, at the time of Miller's discriminatory dis- charge, that there was "rotten stuff going on" and the Respondent had to get rid of it. The foregoing factors, including the Respondent's extensive viola- tions of Section 8(a) (1), described above, the sudden application of the rule to conduct previously condoned, the fact that the rule was thus enforced against three union members, and Carreno's prediction, that these discharges would occur, made in a context of interrogation I The tie-in between union activity and the Respondent 's sudden enforcement of its rule is further demonstrated by the conversation between supervisor Carreno and Union President Crist, referred to in Section 1(j) above . In this conversation , according to Crist's credited testimony , Carreno asked Crest, "Do you still have your union buttons and cards in your locker ?" When Crist admitted that he did , Carreno told him that "there is some boys that are going to be laid off today . . for not working on the Saturday before " When 'Crest said he did not believe it, Carreno told him to "Wait and see." As Crist testified , "On the same morning, why I learned that these three of the members had been discharged." FLORIDA SUGAR CORPORATION 465 of Crist about union cards and buttons, indicate clearly that the Re- spondent seized upon the rule as a pretext to get rid of union adher- ents.8 Accordingly, we find that the Respondent, by discharging Day, Carter, and Wilson, violated Section 8(a) (3) and (1) of the Act.' ORDER The Board adopts as its Order the cease-and-desist recommenda- tions of the Trial Examiner in his Intermediate Report. The Board adopts as its Order the affirmative action recommendations made by the Trial Examiner with the modification of provision 2(a) to read : Offer to James R. Miller, John L. Woods, O. C. Carter, Paul M. Day, and James Wilson immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges, and make each of them whole for any loss of earnings that each may have suffered because of the discrimina- tion against him, with backpay computed in the manner set forth in the section of the Intermediate Report entitled "The Remedy." 10 O we agree with the General Counsel, under all the circumstances , that, even if the Respondent had no direct knowledge of Wilson 's union membership and sympathies, his discharge comprised a part of the Respondent's plan to rid itself of union adherents. O See Local Union No 18, International Union of Operating Engineers , AF+L-CIO and its agent, George E. Miller ( Earl D. Creager, Inc.), 141 NLRB 512. 10 Member Leedom , for the reasons expressed in his dissent in Isis Plumbing d Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716, would not award interest on backpay. The notice attached to the Intermediate Report is amended by substituting as the second paragraph of the notice the following : WE WILL offer James R. Miller, John L. Woods, O. C. Carter , Paul M Day, and James Wilson immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make them whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of our discrimination against them. The notice attached to the Intermediate Report is further amended by adding the following immediately below the signature line at the bottom of the notice : NOTE' We will notify any of the above-named employees presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of their right to full reinstatement upon appli- cation in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Train- ing and Service Act of 1948 , as amended , after discharge from the Armed Forces. INTERMEDIATE REPORT STATEMENT OF THE CASE The consolidated complaint herein, issued by the General Counsel on October 12, 1962, alleges that Florida Sugar Corporation, Respondent herein , has engaged in unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. Sec. 151 , et seq.), herein called the Act.' In substance, that complaint, as amended at the hearing, alleges that since April 1, 1962, Respondent's supervisors and agents interrogated its employees concerning their union membership , activities, and desires ; threatened them with discharge or other reprisals if they became or remained members of the Union ; and promulgated a rule which would prohibit them from engaging in union activities at Respondent's premises during nonworking time. 1 The complaint was based on charges filed by the Charging Union in Case No. 12-CA- 2345 on May 7, 1962 , and the charge and the amended charge in Case No. 12-CA-24'38 filed on August 23, 1962, and October 5, 1962, respectively. 466 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The complaint further alleges that on and between August 20 and 22, 1962, Respondent discharged O. C. Carter, Mike Day, James Wilson , and James R. Miller, and, since on or about July 9, 1962 has refused to reemploy John L. Woods following his earlier layoff, all because of their membership in, or activities on behalf of, the Charging Union. The complaint also alleges that on June 14, 1962 , the Board's Regional Director approved a settlement previously entered into by Respondent and the Charging Union concerning the charge filed in Case No. 12-CA-2345, by the terms of which settlement Respondent agreed to refrain from interfering with , restraining, or coercing its employees in a manner violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. It is further alleged that Respondent, having thereafter violated the terms and conditions of that settlement, the Regional Director, on or about October 12, 1962, set that agreement aside and caused the instant consolidated complaint to issue herein. By its answer, Respondent admitted that it entered into the settlement agreement afore- mentioned that is discharged the four employees mentioned supra, and laid off John L. Woods on March 7, 1962, but denied it had committed any unfair labor practices. Pursuant to due notice, a hearing was held before Trial Examiner David London in Belle Glade, Florida, on December 4 and 5, 1962. All parties were represented by counsel or representative and were afforded full opportunity to be heard and to adduce relevant and competent evidence . At the opening of the hearing, Re- spondent renewed a motion previously made to the Acting Regional Director, and denied by him, to postpone the hearing herein for a period of 2 weeks because of the alleged required attendance of Respondent's witnesses at its sugar mill to supervise repairs to its machinery and equipment which repairs were then in progress. Because the testimony of Respondent's vice president offered in support of said motion dis- closed that these repairs were being made under the supervision of engineers provided by the manufacturer of that machinery and equipment under an existing warranty, I denied the motion for the postponement requested. Nevertheless, I indicated to Respondent's counsel that I would permit him to stagger the attendance of his wit- nesses so that only two witnesses would be required to be available in the hearing room at one time, and that I would recess the hearing after these witnesses testified to permit them to return to the mill and summon two additional witnesses. All this occurred at or prior to 3:30 p.m. on December 4, when the General Counsel rested his case and, at which time, the hearing was recessed . When it was next resumed at 1.30 p .m. on the following day, at least four of Respondent 's witnesses appeared at one time and remained in the hearing room for a substantial period of time after they testified, and after they were excused from further attendance herein. Since the close of the hearing, briefs have been filed by the General Counsel and Respondent and have been fully considered by me. Upon the entire record in the case, including my evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses based upon the evidence and upon my observation of their demeanor , I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION Respondent is a corporation duly organized under, and existing by virtue of, the laws of the State of Florida . At all times material herein Respondent has main- tained its office and principal place of business at Belle Glade, Florida, where it is engaged in the planting, growing, harvesting, and milling of sugar cane into raw sugar. During the 12 months preceding the filing of the consolidated complaint herein Respondent has shipped from its Belle Glade, Florida, plant finished products valued in excess of $50,000 to points outside the State of Florida. I find that Respondent is, and at all times material herein has been , an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED United Packinghouse, Food and Allied Workers, AFL-CIO, hereafter referred to as the Union, is now, and has been at all times material herein, a labor organiza- tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES On March 29, 1962, the Union filed its petition in Case No. 12-RC-1430 seeking an election to determine a collective-bargaining representative for Respondent's production and maintenance employees . Following a hearing on that petition on April 12, 1962, the Board's Regional Director for the Twelfth Region, on April 26, FLORIDA SUGAR CORPORATION 467 1962, ordered that such an election be held at or about the time of the employment peak of the next season? A. Interference, restraint, and coercion On or about April. 19,3 Woodrow W. Pritchard, employed as an electrician, was called to the engineer's office where he found Hadley Williams, executive vice president of Respondent, and Jose M. Lacalle, also a vice president of Respondent and manager of the mill. After Lacalle closed the door of the office, and following a discussion of some technical problems, Williams told Pritchard that he "always thought [he] was a loyal employee" but that he now understood that he was "one of the leaders of the Union." Pritchard replied that it was his understanding that "everybody that signed a card was a leader in the Union." About a week later Pritchard, who, while the representation proceeding was pend- ing, wore a large button reading "I AM A MEMBER OF UPWA, AFL-CIO, ARE YOU?" was called to Lacalle's office and again found Williams present. There he was told that the two executives understood that "there was a collection going on for the Union" and, when Pritchard stated that the only collection he knew about was for the benefit of one Stuckey, an engineer, he was told that was not what they were talking about. One of the executives said "that there was union activity" on company time which Pritchard denied, adding that the men only talked "about it during the lunch hour." About the same time, employee Roscoe Lay was called to Respondent's conference room where he also found Williams and Lacalle. Williams told Lay that they "had been informed that [he] was going around during lunch period talking to the men about union activities, encouraging union activities, and he wanted to know if that was so." When Lay replied that it was, Williams told him he could not "do that on company time and on company property." Though Lay protested that he considered the lunch period his own time, and that it was during that period that he talked to the men and distributed union buttons, Lacalle told him he could not do it on company property, and Williams added that Respondent was "very disap- pointed in him." During the course of the conversation, Lay told Williams that he had been elected to office in the Union and that, according to "the figures [he] showed" Williams, the Union "could win an election [by] . . . about 85 or 90 percent at the least." During the same month, April 1962, John W. Paris, Respondent's paymaster and personnel manager, for the first and only time, came to the home of employee DeWitt White and asked if he could have a confidential conversation with him. During the course of that conversation he asked White when the union movement started, and told him that if the Union came into the mill that employees "would have a short week, 40 hours to take home and no overtime, and that the Company would just hire more men, shorten the hours with enough men." 4 Paris did not deny that he made this threat. On May 7, 1962, the Union filed its charge against Respondent in Case No. 12-CA-2345 charging that since March 1, 1962, Respondent had interfered with, coerced, and restrained its employees in the exercise of their rights as guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. On June 14, the Board's Regional Director approved a settlement previously entered into by Respondent and the Union concerning that charge. Pursuant to that settlement, Respondent posted a notice on its bulletin board notifying its employees that it would not (a) threaten them with economic reprisals or promise them benefits, to discourage membership in the Union; (b) interrogate them regarding their union activities; and (c) promulgate or enforce any rule which would prohibit them from engaging in discussion of union activities on its premises during nonworking hours. In June or July, employees Dewey Walker was engaged in conversation with Manuel Carreno, one of Respondent's assistant engineers, concerning discrimination among the employees in the amount of money they had received. During the ensuing discussion, Carreno told Walker that he, Walker, "had taken several steps [on] the wrong road, or was doing the wrong thing." When Walker asked what he was referring to, Carreno replied: "The union business." 2 The facts pertaining to this representation proceeding have been officially noted by me from the Board's file in that case. Unless otherwise specified, all reference to dates are to the year 1962. Lacalle testified that commencing the latter part of July the men worked every Satur- day, and that a week later they also worked on Sundays. 712-548-64-vol . 142-31 468 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD A week or two later, Walker had another conversation with Carreno during which the latter told him that "the union members would be replaced before the grinding season [and] there would be not one of the union men left in the plant." When Walker remonstrated that the Board notice, which was then posted on the bulletin board pursuant to the settlement agreement aforementioned, gave the men the right to organize, Carreno replied that "the notice wouldn't always be there." 5 In the latter part of July, Chief Engineer A. P. George told Walker that he had seen union buttons being worn by the men, and that "he would replace the workers in the mill with people from Louisiana who couldn' t even speak the language, and that the Union would not be able to organize it." On or about July 1, employee Sam H. Crist, while walking home from Respond- ent's mill, met one Minuel Ruez who, Crist testified, "had been suspended for union activity or union work." Because he considered himself "a good friend" of Williams, and that he might be of assistance to Ruez, Crist suggested to Ruez that they return to Respondent's offices and talk to Williams. Upon entering Williams' office, Lacalle, who was present, engaged "in a heated argument in Spanish with Ruez," the subject of which was not disclosed by the record. While that argument was in progress, Williams told Crist that Respondent was going to run the mill at Belle Glade exactly as they ran their mill in Cuba; that they did not want, and did not intend to have, any union at Belle Glade; and that by the time of the grinding season, which usually began in November, they wanted to "get rid of all union men" and have them out of the plant. About a week later, Crist, Pritchard, and Ruez went to George's office to talk to him about the Ruez case. When Crist told George that he felt that Ruez got a bad deal, George "practically threw [the three men] out of his office," and told them that he did not want to hear anything about their union. Later in the day, George called Crist away from his job and walked out behind the mill where the two men engaged in conversation. There, George told Crist that the men did not need an International union, that if they had come to him, "he could have brought [them] a union from Louisiana that would have been a good union, one that the men could live with, that all an international union done [sic] was have a representative ride up and down the road in a Cadillac automobile, and spend the money." On or about August 20, Carreno asked Crist whether he still had union buttons and cards in his locker. When Crist replied he did, Carreno told him that some employees were to be laid off that day. Crist asked why, and was told "for not working on the previous Saturday." Crist replied that he did not believe it and was told to "wait and see " Two or three days later, Carreno asked Crist whether he had yet cleaned out his locker. When Crist replied in the negative, Carreno told him that there would be additional layoffs that day. Crist, becoming fearful, removed the union paraphernalia from his locker and locked it in his toolbox. B. The discharge of Miller James Miller, vice president of the Union, began work for Respondent on June 6, 1961, and was discharged on August 22, 1962. About a week before he was fired, during a lunch period which he generally spent near the boiler where he worked, Miller talked about the Union to several recently engaged employees who gathered there and gave them union cards and buttons. Upon meeting LaGarde, assistant engineer, the latter asked him whether he was not "doing plenty of union talk," to which Miller made no reply. On August 22, while Miller and another employee, Jerome Bryant, were working with an air hammer in the boilerroom, a light bulb blew out. To enable him to continue his work, Miller went to the toolroom, procured another bulb, and placed it in the proper socket. He then went to the bathroom, and upon his return to the boiler, found Assistant Engineer Carreno there. Carreno had previously asked Bryant where Miller was and was told he did not know. Carreno then asked Miller where he had been and Miller told him about his trips to the toolroom and the bathroom, and that he returned to his work immediately thereafter. Carreno told him that whenever he, Carreno, returned, he expected to find him there. Miller remon- strated that, whenever necessary, he would, nevertheless, have to go to the bathroom and Carreno replied, "There' s nothing wrong with that " About 2:30 p.m. of the same day, LaGarde asked Miller and Bryant to follow him out of the boilerroom to a point where there were three piles of sand which the two men were asked to spread with the use of shovels. While Miller was so engaged , and while "LaGarde was right there," a boy who formerly worked for The notice required that it remain posted for 60 days from June 18, 1962. FLORIDA SUGAR CORPORATION 469 Respondent approached, asked Miller for a match, and engaged him in a brief conversation of three or four sentences. A few minutes later, LaGarde asked Miller to follow him to the other side of the boiler where the two men were joined by George, Lacalle, and Carreno. LaGarde and George exchanged a few words which Miller did not hear or understand . Being unable to get an explanation for the confrontation from LaGarde, Miller asked Carreno what the difficulty was. Carreno talked to LaGarde "quite a while" and, upon returning to Miller, told him he was fired. When Miller asked why, Carreno told him to follow him to the office. There, Miller remained outside, While Carreno and Lacalle were closeted in an office. After about 10 minutes, Lacalle called Miller and asked him what was wrong. Miller reported to him the events found above commencing with the moment when he began work on the sandpile. When Miller completed his narrative of these events, Lacalle said: "Well, Miller I don't know what to say, but there is lots of rotten stuff going on around here and we will have to get rid of it." Miller asked him what he meant by "rotten stuff" and Lacalle merely repeated: "Lots of rotten stuff." Though Miller remonstrated that he had worked there over a year, under three engineers, without a complaint, all that Lacalle replied was that they had "to get rid of . . . a lot of rotten stuff." Miller went to the personnel office, told Paris what had happened at the sandpile, and asked him to intercede in his behalf with Lacalle. Paris declined to do so, stating that Lacalle would not help him. Before giving Miller his pay, Paris asked him to sign a card reading: "Dismissed for loitering on job after being duly warned." Miller refused to sign the dismissal slip, insisting that he was not loitering Respondent, in its brief, contends that "Miller was discharged for absenting himself from his work without permission, and loafing." I find no credible, probative evidence to sustain either contention. It certainly cannot be contended on the record made here, that Miller's first trip away from the boiler, to get the bulb in order to provide the necessary illumination at that location, furnished Respondent with any cause for criticism or discipline of Miller. Nor can I conclude that his trip to the bathrom supplied any basis for such action. Indeed, it was undenied, with respect to that trip, that Carreno told Miller "there's nothing wrong with that." Likewise there is no significance to the fact that Bryant was unable to tell where Miller was when Carreno inquired about him. It seems reasonable to conclude that Carreno made this inquiry after the bulb was replaced and Miller was again absent. Otherwise, Bryant would have known, or at least surmised, what took Miller away from the boiler on his first trip. Nor it is unreasonable to conclude that the purpose of Miller's second trip, this time to the bathroom, was not disclosed by him to Bryant, thereby resulting in the latter's disclaimer of any knowledge as to Miller's whereabouts when Carreno made his inquiry. I am also not convinced that Miller's conduct near the sandpile on August 22 when, according to LaGarde, he caught Miller loafing, "leaning on his shovel . 2 or 3 minutes more," was any part of the real reason he was discharged. I find it incredible to believe that if, as LaGarde testified, he had previously warned Miller "several times about loafing on the job" that he would further engage in such conduct on August 22 while "LaGarde was right there." 6 On the entire record, and my observation of Miller, Carreno, and LaGarde as they testified, I find that Miller's conduct on August 22, on which Respondent now relies as the reasons for his discharge, was not the real reason for terminating his employ- ment. Instead, I find that these two incidents played no real part in the decision to discharge him other than as a subterfuge to cover the true reason for that action, and to lend an air of plausibility to Respondent's defense. In arriving at this conclusion I have been fully mindful of the admonition that an employer may discharge an employee "for good cause, or bad cause, or no cause at all," except only that he may not do so for a reason proscribed by the Act. Nor have I failed to bear in mind the universally recognized principle that the burden rests on the General Counsel to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Re- spondent has violated the Act as alleged in the complaint. Miller had been employed for more than a year, since prior to the time that Respondent began its first milling operations. He was vice president of the Union, wore its button, and, during lunch periods, talked with other employees about the E I do not credit LaGarde's testimony that he had previously warned Miller as reported in the text Instead, I credit Miller's statement to Lacalle that he had worked at the mill for over a year "without a complaint" from any of the three engineers, a statement which Lacalle did not challenge when Miller protested his discharge. 470 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Union and distributed union applications and buttons.? About a week before he was discharged he handed out applications for union membership to a number of recently engaged employees. It was then that LaGarde told him, as previously found, that he was engaging in "plenty of union talk" around there. Having discredited the only reasons relied upon by Respondent for discharging Miller, consideration of the entire record compels the further finding that Lacalle's statement to Miller, at the time he was discharged, that Respondent had to get rid of a "lot of rubbish" was a subtle method of letting Miller know he was being discharged because of his union activities. In the field of labor relations, "subtleties of conduct play no small part." N.L.R.B. v. Express Publishing Company, 312 U.S. 426, 437. Though Respondent, in its brief, apparently anticipating the inference and meaning I have attributed to Lacalle's statement concerning "rubbish" now urges that what Lacalle really said was "that there was too much loafing going on . . which Miller may have translated in his own mind into 'rotten stuff,' " Respondent's counsel did not subject Miller to a single question on cross-examination concerning his conversa- tion with Lacalle, nor indeed, to any part of his direct testimony. By reason of all the foregoing, considered in the light of Respondent's hostility to the Union, its efforts to discover the extent of the union activities carried on by its employees, its threats of reprisals, and the absence of a convincing reason for his dis- charge, I find that Respondent discharged Miller on August 22 because of his union activities thereby violating Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. C. The discharge of Carter, Day, and Wilson O. C. Carter was employed by Respondent in June 1961 and continued that employ- ment during the construction and sugar grinding seasons of that year until he was laid off in March 1962. He was recalled to work during the latter part of May and, about 2 weeks later, began wearing the union button heretofore described. On Friday, August 17, he was notified to report for work on the following day. He failed to do so, however, having sprained or wrenched an ankle the evening before while engaged in a ball game. Though required to contact Respondent if unable to report for work, Carter, having no telephone, failed to do so. When he reported for work on the following Monday, August 20, his timecard was was missing from the rack. Upon making inquiry of Paris, the latter told him to see George and added that the employees who didn't work on Saturday had been dis- missed. When Carter told George of his mishap of the previous Friday evening, George said he hated to let him go because he considered him one of his best workers, that he go home and rest for a few days, and that he would then see what could be done for him. On the following day, Paris came to Carter's home and, allegedly without paying .,any attention to it," the latter signed a "discharge order" indicating that he had been terminated "for failure to report on Saturday, 8-18-62, for essential work on overtime pay and failure to notify management." Paris asked for, and received, Carter's safety helmet and badge, and then gave him his pay envelope. Paul M. Day was employed by Respondent from August 1961 until the end of the grinding season in the following March when he was laid off. About 3 weeks later he was recalled and thereafter wore the union button. At an undisclosed date, while employed as a rigger, he suffered a back injury which incapacitated him for 8 weeks. When he returned to work, it was with a doctor's permit indicating that he could only do light work. He was engaged in such light work for about a week, when George asked him to return to work as a rigger cleaning the smoke stacks on the boilers. Day remonstrated that his doctor had instructed him not to engage in such heavy work, following which the two men engaged in a "pretty hot argument." Day went to the office for his pay and told Paris about his argument with George. Upon Paris' suggestion, Day went to Lacalle's office where he reported his experience with George earlier that day. Lacalle told him the situation arose out of a mis- understanding and that he would put him back "on compensation" and that he was not to return until his doctor competely released him. He again remained away from work about 4 weeks and returned, on an undisclosed date, presumably able to perform all types of heavy work. Day testified that his back "bothered" him on Saturday, August 18, and that it was for that reason that he failed to report for work on that day as ordered. He telephoned Respondent's office, asked for Paris, and was told that he was not there but that Seyler, a foreman, was. Day asked Seyler to inform Paris that he had called. 7 Respondent, in its brief, concedes, and Chief Engineer George testified, that "union buttons were all over the place 'shining like silver dollars."' These very vivid buttons were similar to the button worn by Pritchard previously described FLORIDA SUGAR CORPORATION 471 When Day reported for work on Monday, August 20, he found his timecard miss- ing from the rack. Paris, who was standing nearby, told him his card was missing because he had not come to work on the previous Saturday and that he could see George about the matter. After waiting a short while with Carter "and another boy whose card had been pulled," George appeared. Day began to talk to him, but George merely motioned to him with an upraised thumb and said: "Go on, you are fired. Hit the road." Day asked Seyler to inform Paris that he had called in on the previous Saturday and Seyler did so. Paris, in turn, called Lacalle and, after a wait of more than a half hour, Day was informed that they decided to suspend him and that he would be informed within 2 or 3 days if he was to come back to work. On the following day, August 21, Paris came to Day's home and handed him his pay envelope and a discharge notice reading exactly as the notice that was handed Evans, heretofore described. When Day asked whether "that was the reason" and Paris replied that it was, Day signed the notice. The men then engaged in "just personal talk" and Paris departed. On some earlier occasion, when Day had not reported on Saturday or other work- days, he called in, but on other such occasions he did not. However, no disciplinary action was imposed for his failure to call following his earlier absences. James Wilson was hired on or about August 1, and discharged on August 20, a brief period which he characterized as not "long enough to know who was boss." At Miller's request, he signed a union card but did not wear one of its buttons. Although he was expected at work on Saturday, August 18, he failed to report on that day. On the following Monday he also failed to find his timecard in the card rack and, similarly to Day, was told he would hear from the office in 3 days. On August 21, someone in behalf of Respondent, but who Wilson was unable to other- wise identify, called at his home and asked for and received his helmet and badge. Wilson then signed a dismissal notice, and exact duplicate of that signed by Evans and Day, was handed his pay envelope, and told he was being discharged for "failing to make overtime." Though Wilson testified he did not know that he was supposed to work on the previous Saturday, in an affidavit he earlier gave to a Board representative, he swore that "[he] knew [he] was supposed to come to work on the Saturday [but] did not come in." On the entire record I am not persuaded that the General Counsel has established by the necessary preponderance of the evidence that Carter, Day, or Wilson were discharged for the reasons alleged in the complaint. The record fails to disclose that except for mere membership, that any of these three men were in any respect active in union affairs on or off of Respondent' s premises. Wilson did not even wear a union button and, there being no evidence to the contrary, I must assume that Respondent was without knowledge that he was even a member of that organization. With respect to Carter, Day, and Wilson, it is axiomatic that union membership grants no special working privileges or exemptions, and that an employer is not required to withhold disciplinary action for cause merely because the employee is a member of a union, or indeed, if he is its most active proponent. In July and August, Respondent was extremely anxious to complete the necessary construction work in which it was then engaged so that its mill would be ready for operation when the grinding season opened several months later. Its schedule was apparently so tight that it assumed the added financial burden of having its employees work, and being paid overtime, on the Saturday in question. Whether or not the default of these three men justified the extreme disciplinary action imposed, their complete discharge, is not for me to judge. It is sufficient to find, as I do, that it has not been established by a preponderance of the evidence that they were discharged because of their union membership or activity. It will, therefore, be recommended that the allegations of the complaint charging that these three men were discriminatorily discharged be dismissed. D. John L. Woods Woods was employed by Respondent from the beginning of the 1961 grinding season and was laid off on March 7, 1962, at the close of that season. When he was laid off, he was given a statement announcing that Respondent had been fortunate in "having a capable and loyal group of employees," that the layoff was imposed "with sincere regret," and asking him to keep Respondent informed of his where- abouts so it could contact him "when more men [might] be needed for plant construction." On July 9, while such construction work was in progress, Woods went to Paris' office to apply for employment and was referred to George. The latter told him 472 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD he was in need of men but that he would have to get an okay from Lacalle before he could be employed. Woods conveyed this word to Paris who called Lacalle following which he sent Woods to the doctor's office for a physical examination, a recent requirement of Respondent. Woods did as requested, brought the doctor's report back to Paris, who then instructed him to report for work on the following morning. When he reported as requested, Woods met Paris who told him to "talk to Mr. Lacalle." Woods did so and told Lacalle he was in great need of a job, whereupon Lacalle asked him what he thought "about this union business." Woods replied that he thought it was "a good thing for the working man," following which Lacalle told him contrary to what George, the chief engineer in charge of construction, had just told him, that there were no openings and that Respondent was not in need of any help. Though he contacted the Company a number of times thereafter, he was never employed though others were. The only explanation offered by Respondent for its refusal to employ Woods was Lacalle's testimony that it had been reported to him "during the crop," by Carreno, who rode in the same car pool with Woods, that Woods "was pilfering, . that Mr. Carreno found in the back of his car some centrifugal screens." Though Car- reno testified as a witness in behalf of Respondent, he was not questioned about this alleged pilfering, and I do not credit Lacalle's hearsay testimony having reference thereto. It is noteworthy that this pilfering allegedly took place while Carreno and Woods were riding in the same car pool, and therefore, presumably, while Woods was work- ing for Respondent in the preceding spring. Nevertheless, he was notified thereafter that he was being laid off, for economic reasons, "with sincere regrets," and given an invitation to return when work would again be available. It also seems highly doubtful that Woods would have been sent for a physical examination if there was no available work. Significant also is the fact that Paris sent Woods for his physical examination on July 9 after first talking to Lacalle, and that it was only after the latter obtained Woods' views about the Union, that the decision to give him available employment was reversed. On the entire record I find that Woods was denied employment because Lacalle suspected, after hearing him express his views concerning the Union, that he either was, or would become, a union adherent. By that denial, Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (3 ) and (1) of the Act. Concluding Findings Having found that Respondent violated the Act after settlement of the charges contained in Case No. 12-CA-2345, I conclude that the Regional Director was warranted in setting that settlement aside, and that it is incumbent on me to make findings and conclusions pertaining to all the allegations in the consolidated com- plaint. The Wallace Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 323 U. S. 248 , 253; International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., Local 554, AFL-CIO ( Clark Bros. Transfer Co., et al.) v. N.L.R.B., 262 F. 2d 456, 459, enfg. 116 NLRB 1891 ; Bowman Instrument Corporation , 124 NLRB 1. Accordingly, I find that the interrogation of Pritchard, White, and Woods , by Wil- liams, Lacalle, and Paris, concerning the employees ' union membership , activities, or sympathies, as heretofore found, was in violation of the rights guaranteed these em- ployees by Section 7 of the Act. By that conduct, Respondent violated Section 8(a) (1) thereof. Respondent also violated the same section by the threats of re- prisals directed to Walker and Crist by George and Williams as heretofore found, and by imposing a company rule which denied its employees the right to carry on union activities on company premises during nonworking time. Stoddard-Quirk Manufacturing Co., 138 NLRB 615; The Bendix Corporation, Research Laboratories Division, 131 NLRB 599. Though Respondent, in its answer, denied that Paris, George , LaGarde, and Carreno were agents or supervisors of Respondent within the meaning of the Act, no issue pertaining to that classification of these four men, other than Paris, is tendered by Respondent's exhaustive brief. In any event, I find that each of them is, in fact, a supervisor within the meaning of the Act and that their conduct must be attributed to Respondent. Paris, according to his own testimony, was "paymaster and personnel manager" of Respondent who. its counsel stated , had 170 employees at the time of the hearing herein. To assist him in his tasks, he had the services of a secretary . It was Paris who actually discharged Carter and Day. Persons serving in similar capacity as Paris have heretofore been held by the Board to be supervisors within the meaning FLORIDA SUGAR CORPORATION 473 of the Act. Armour and Company, 119 NLRB 122 ; The B. F. Goodrich Company, 115 NLRB 722. George was Respondent's chief engineer "in charge of the overall operation of the plant" and has exercised the authority to discharge employees . LaGarde, employed on a salary basis, not by the hour, was one of Respondent's assistant engineers "in charge of the labor under Mr. George" and, in August , supervised the work of 20 to 30 employees . Carreno was also an assistant engineer employed on a monthly salary. During the grinding season, he had charge of 20 to 25 men . During other seasons, while maintenance and repair of equipment was in progress , he assigned work to at least five other employees. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of Respondent described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic , and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY I have found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, involving discrimination against employees in regard to their hire and tenure of employment . Since Respondent's unfair labor practices "go to the very heart of the Act." 8 and constitute a threat of other unfair labor practices in the future , I recommend not only that Respondent cease and desist from the unfair labor practices committed by it and take certain affirmative action in order to effectuate the policies of the Act , but also that it cease and desist from infringing in any manner upon the rights of its employees guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. I have found that Respondent discriminated in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of James R. Miller and John L. Woods in violation of Section 8(a) (1) and (3 ) of the Act. I therefore recommend that Respondent offer the two afore- mentioned employees immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions , without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make each of them whole for any loss of earnings that each may have suffered because of the discrimination against him , with backpay computed in the customary manner,9 and with interest added thereto at the rate and compounded in the manner prescribed in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact , and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The operations of Respondent occur in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By interrogating its employees concerning their union membership , activities, or sympathies, by threatening them with reprisals if they engage in such activities, and by imposing a rule which denies its employees the right to carry on their union activities on company premises during nonworking time, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. 4. By discriminating in regard to the tenure of employment and hire of James R. Miller and John L. Woods, thereby discouraging membership in a labor organiza- tion, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a)(3) and ( 1) of the Act. 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 2 ( 6) and (7) of the Act. 6. Respondent has not, as alleged in the consolidated complaint , violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act with respect to the discharge of 0. C . Carter, Mike Day, and James Wilson. e N L R B. v. Entwistle Mfg Co., 120 F 2d 532, 536 (C.A. 4). F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289. 474 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in the case, I recommend that the Respondent, Florida Sugar Corporation, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discouraging membership in United Packinghouse, Food and Allied Workers, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, by discharging any employee, or in any other manner discriminating against any individual in regard to his hire, tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment. (b) Interrogating its employees concerning their union membership, activities, or sympathies in a manner constituting interference, restraint, or coercion in violation of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. (c) Threatening its employees with discharge, layoff, or other reprisals in order to discourage their union activities. (d) Maintaining, enforcing, or applying any rule or regulation prohibiting its employees from engaging, during nonworking time, in solicitation on behalf of the Union, or any other labor organization, or otherwise engaging in union activities. (e) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist the above-named Union, or any other labor organization, to bargain collec- tively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities. 2. Take the following affirmative action which I find is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer to James R. Miller and John L. Woods immediate and full reinstate- ment to their former, or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges, and make them whole in the manner and according to the method set forth above in the section entitled "The Remedy." (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, time- cards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary or useful to analysis of any backpay due under the terms of this Recommended Order. (c) Post at its plant or mill at Belle Glade, Florida, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 10 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Direc- tor for the Twelfth Region, shall, after being duly signed by a representative of Respondent, be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for the Twelfth Region, in writing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Intermediate Report, what steps Re- spondent has taken to comply herewith." I further recommend the dismissal of the consolidated complaint herein insofar as it alleges that Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by terminating the employment of O. C. Carter, Mike Day, and James Wilson. 10 If this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" In the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "Pursuant to a Decision and Order." 11 If this Recommended Order Is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read : "Notify said Regional Director, In writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith " APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: GORBEA, PEREZ & MORELL S. EN C. 475 WE WILL NOT discourage membership in United Packinghouse, Food and Al- lied Workers, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, by discharging any individual, or in any other manner discriminating against any individual in re- gard to the hire, tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment. WE WILL offer James R. Miller and John L. Woods immediate and full rein- statement to their former or substantially equivalent positions , without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges , and make them whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of our discrimination against them. WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees concerning their union membership, activities, or sympathies or threaten them with reprisals for engaging in such conduct. WE WILL NOT maintain, enforce, or apply any rule or regulation prohibiting our employees, during nonworking time , from soliciting their fellow employees to join or support United Packinghouse, Food and Allied Workers, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce em- ployees in the exercise of their right to self-organization , to form, join, or assist any labor organization , to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted activity for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection , or to refrain from any or all such activities. All our employees are free to become , remain, or refrain from becoming or re- maining, members of any labor organization. FLORIDA SUGAR CORPORATION, Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative ) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Ross Building, 112 East Cass Street, Tampa, Florida, 33602, Telephone No. 223-4623, if they have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions. Gorbea, Perez & Morell S. en C. and Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO. Case No. 24-CA-1373. May 6, 1963 SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION ON REMAND On September 26, 1961, the National Labor Relations Board issued a Decision and Order in the above-entitled proceeding, 133 NLRB 362, in which it found that the Respondent had violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act by offering its employees a wage increase in order to defeat the Union's organizational efforts, and Section 8(a) (5) by refusing to bargain with the Union which had been designated, as bargaining representative by a majority of its employees. The Board specifically rejected the Respondent's contention that the authoriza- tion cards, upon which proof of majority was based, had been ob- tained by the Union on the promise that they would be used only for the purpose of filing a petition for an election. The Board or- dered the Respondent to cease and desist from the unfair labor prac- tices found and to bargain with the Union. 142 NLRB No. 55.