Burlington Industries, Inc.

272 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the Board's certification of the CIU) I should have granted the General Counsel's motion to strike that portion of the answer raising that defense is unnecessary to decide since I would not find assistance or domination of Local 11 and the CIU on the facts in this record. Nassau & Suffolk Contractors Association, 118 NLRB 174. Nor would I find on,the facts herein that Kopp-Evans' employees were coerced into joining the CIU Union. Respondent also makes the contention in substance that the handling of the various charges herein by the Regional Office was unfair and prejudicial to its rights and reflected "at least on the part of certain individuals in the General Counsel's office, a hostility to legitimate, lawful conduct by labor organizations." If such be the case, this is not the proper place to dispose of it. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III , above, occurring in con- nection with the operations of the Respondent described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, it is recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, the Trial Examiner makes the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Alton District Independent Contractors and Associates and Kopp-Evans Con- struction Company are employers within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act. 2. Alton-Wood River Building and Construction Trades Council, and Local No. 11, Congress of Independent Unions, are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By picketing Kopp-Evans' construction projects when Kopp-Evans had law- fully recognized another labor organization and a question concerning representation could not appropriately be raised under Section 9(c) of the Act with an object of such picketing being to force or require Kopp-Evans to recognize and bargain with it as the representative of Kopp-Evans' employees, Respondent has engaged in un- fair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b) (7) (A) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. [Recommended order omitted from publication.] Burlington Industries, Inc., Vinton Weaving Company Plant and Textile Workers Union of America , AFL-CIO. Cases Nos. 5-CA-2255 and 5-CA-2295. August 27, 1963 DECISION AND ORDER On April 10, 1963, Trial Examiner Thomas A. Ricci issued his In- termediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices violative of Section 8(a) (1) and (3) of the Act, and recom- mending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Intermediate Report. The Trial Examiner also found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor practices violative of Section 8(a) (3) and (4) of 144 NLRB No. 38. BURLINGTON INDUSTRIES, INC., VINTON WEAVING CO. 273 the Act and recommended that the complaint with respect thereto be dismissed . Thereafter, the Respondent , the Charging Party, and the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and the Charging Party filed a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with these cases to a three- member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Rodgers and Leedom]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The Board has considered the Intermediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record i in these cases , and hereby adopts the Trial Examiner's findings , conclusions, and recommendations. ORDER2 The Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner.3 1 The Charging Party's request for oral argument is 'hereby denied as the record, includ- ing the exceptions and brief, adequately presents the issues and positions of the parties. a The 'Charging Party has requested the Board to issue a broader remedial order than is usual in unfair labor practice cases of this type. For the reasons stated in Burlington Industries, Inc, Vinton Weaving Company Plant, 144 NLRB 245, issued this day, we do not believe that in the circumstances presented here, a remedial order broader in scope than is actually decreed here is justified. The Charging Party has also moved that the instant case be consolidated with the Vinton Weaving Company Plant case referred to above so that we will have the complete record of the Respondent's unfair labor practices and pattern of conduct before us to aid in fashioning a remedial order which will effec- tively prevent the repetition of such violations As we have already considered and re- jected the Charging Party's proposed remedial orders for the present, we see no need to consolidate the separate cases The motion is therefore denied 3 The notice is hereby amended by the addition of the following note to appear immedi- ately below the signature line at the bottom of the notice: NOTE -We will notify the above-named employee if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of his right to full reinstatement upon applica- tion in accordance with the 'Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, as amended , after discharge from the Armed Forces. INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE A hearing before Trial Examiner Thomas A. Ricci was held in the above-entitled proceeding at Roanoke, Virginia, on February 19, 20, and 21, 1963, on com- plaint of the General Counsel against Burlington Industries, Inc., Vinton Weaving Company Plant, herein called the Company or the Respondent. The issues litigated are whether the Respondent violated Sections 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act. After the close of the hearing, briefs were received from the General Counsel and the Union. Upon the entire record, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT The Respondent, a Delaware corporation, is engaged in the manufacture and sale of textile fabrics, and operates a plant at Vinton, Virginia. During the past 12 months, a representative period, the Respondent shipped products valued at in ex- cess of $50,000 from its plant to points located outside the Commonwealth of Virginia. 274 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD During the same period it received raw materials and supplies valued at in excess of $50,000 at its plant in Vinton which were shipped to it directly from points outside the Commonwealth of Virginia. I find that the Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction herein. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Textile Workers Union of America , AFL-CIO, herein called the Union , is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES This is the third proceeding arising from an organizational campaign carried on by the Union among the employees of the Respondent 's Vinton plant during 1962. The campaign , aimed at enlisting employees into union membership and to achieve exclusive majority representative status, was started in January, a representation petition calling for a secret election among the employees was filed, and the election was held under Board auspices on August 31, 1962 (Case No. 5-RC-3872). The Union lost-226 votes to 184-and then filed objections, charging the Respondent with having improperly prevented a free expression of choice by its workmen. The election was set aside and a new one will be held after resolution of the issues raised by the two proceedings which followed The second case (Case No. 5-CA-2207 ) [ 144 NLRB 245 produced a complaint alleging that the Respondent , through a number of its supervisors , embarked upon a course of conduct which illegally restrained and coerced the employees in their self- organizational activities , in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act , and, in violation of Section 8(a)(3), discharged an employee to discourage his further activities on behalf of the Union A hearing on that complaint was held on October 16 and 17, 1962, before Trial Examiner Robert Mullin , who, in his Intermediate Report in the case , found that the evidence , largely testimony given by a number of employees, substantially supported the complaint ; he found that an employee had in fact been discharged because of his union activities, and that company supervisors had con- ducted an extensive, persistent , and repetitive campaign to discourage union activities among the employees'. More specifically the Trial Examiner found that in many instances supervisors illegally interrogated employees , threatened them with reprisals in their employment-including discharge-if they persisted, promised to close the plant in the event the Union prevailed, and in other ways intimidated them illegally. The third case-the proceeding with which I am concerned-rests upon a com- plaint alleging that the Respondent discharged David Henegar on September 15, 1962, because of his prounion conduct, and Robert Wright, on October 30 , 1962, because he had testified at the hearing in the earlier case and to put an end to his union activities among the employees At the hearing before me evidence was introduced bearing directly upon the facts surrounding the discharges of Henegar and Wright ; there is also some evidence intended to reveal the Respondent's illegal motivation in their release At the moment of their discharge these men were not told that their pro- union sympathies were the reason for the Respondent 's action; and , of course, the Respondent denies any improper motive. The General Counsel made clear on the record, however, that to support the ultimate allegations of this complaint with respect to Henegar and Wright, he relies not only upon the evidence adduced here, but also upon the facts as revealed in the transcript and exhibits of the hearing in Case No. 5-CA-2207, and as found by Trial Examiner Mullin. In assessing the total pertinent evidence for the purposes of deciding whether the critical complaint allegations are warranted by the preponderance of the evidence , I shall therefore consider both the evidence offered before me and those facts found in the preceding case A. The discharge of David Heneear The question whether Henegar was discharged for cause or because of the Respond- ent's general union animus is intimately intertwined with an issue of credibility ap- pearing between his testimony and that of his foreman , Walter Arthur, supported in part by another supervisor named Holland . During his last day at work-he was a night-shift man-Henegar had words with the foreman . If Henegar is to be believed he said nothing out of the ordinary, simply reiterating an old complaint that the fore- man was "riding" him unduly, and generally making his employment difficult. If the two foremen testified credibly instead , Henegar let loose a flow of vile profanity at his supervisor in the middle of the work floor and threatened him with physical violence. The Respondent advances this act of gross insubordination as the provok- BURLINGTON INDUSTRIES, INC., VINTON WEAVING CO. 275 ing cause of the discharge. The General Counsel insists Henegar did not misbehave; his view of the case is that the Company simply did not want Henegar in the plant any more because he was an active union supporter. There is no alternative con- tention that even assuming Henegar did behave offensively on that occasion the Re- spondent seized upon the incident only as a pretext to get rid of him, and that, but for his known prounion sentiments, the incident would have been overlooked. Henegar was released on September 15. Two weeks earlier he had acted as the Union's observer at the election. Before that he had widely solicited union authoriza- tion cards among the employees, succeeded in obtaining 30 or 35 signatures, and turned the cards over to Snyder, the Union's International representative. He testified that sometime in June, Arthur, the foreman, asked had he heard about the Union, were there any complaints by the employees, who were the active protagonists, and would Henegar report to the foreman anything he might hear. He went on to relate three other conversations with Arthur, who used to call him into the office to discuss the question of the Union. Arthur said that unions "cause nothing but hardship and trouble and cause families to even break up," and asked how did Henegar feel about it now. A week before the election, still according to Henegar, Arthur said he knew Henegar's mind was made up but that he wished to "straighten him out," and asked had he heard of the plant manager's speech about plants closing down on account of unions Arthur denied having asked Henegar how he or others felt about the Union, or to keep him advised of union activities generally. He admitted, however, that he dis- cussed the Union with him, that he called Henegar into the office for this purpose, that he told Henegar of his antiunion views, that he talked to him of certain pro- union leaflets that were being distributed, and that he knew Henegar favored the Union. These admissions by Foreman Arthur, as well as the more explicit words attributed to him by Henegar but which the foreman denied, are completely consistent with the pattern of conduct of a number of other supervisors as found by Trial Ex- aminer Mullin on the basis of the evidence taken in the earlier complaint proceeding. That record reveals a clear and studied overall company plan to have many of its supervisors engage in exactly the kind of illegal interrogation and intimidation which, according to Henegar, Arthur used in his efforts to dissuade this employee from his prounion resolve. I credit Henegar on the subject of these conversations with the foreman, and I find that by such conduct, Arthur committed violations of Section 8(a) (1) for which the Respondent must be held responsible. During the night shift of September 13 and 14, Henegar made a mistake in his work which triggered the chain of events leading to his discharge. In steaming a supply of yarns-valued at several hundred dollars-he failed to make a certain electrical connection required for wet steam, with the result that the yarn was proc- essed only with dry steam. The testimony shows that while corrective measures can be taken for such errors, the resultant product in most instances cannot be used as or;ginally intended. Henegar conceded this was a serious mistake. When he reported for work at the start of his shift the next evening at 11 p.m., on September 14, he was called into the office of Thomas Hill, the general overseer of the department, who, in the presence of Arthur, reminded Henegar of a previous mistake he had made, stressed the seriousness of his last error, and said he would overlook it this time but warned him to be more careful in the future. When Henegar left the office Arthur assigned him to select defective yarns that had been produced during the preceding shift so that they might be brought to the attention of the proper supervisors. Apparently Henegar misunderstood the instructions, and Arthur in a short time told him to hurry along the work, and then to leave it altogether and proceed to his regular duties. Henegar said he was selecting the yarns as he did in order not to "catch hell" the next day. As Arthur walked away Henegar hastened after him down the aisle. Henegar and Arthur gave conflicting testimony as to what Henegar said at that moment and shortly thereafter. According to Henegar all he said was "Why didn't he get off my damn back," and "he [Arthur] just stood there and looked like he was stunned." Forthwith Arthur told Henegar to go home, Henegar asked whether he was "fired," and the foreman replied, "No, you're not fired, come back tomorrow night at 11 o'clock and IT let you know if you have a job." Arthur accompanied Henegar to the gate to let him out, and there, still according to Henegar, as he was leaving, he said that if Arthur was "going to keep on riding people and pushing them, that somebody was going to knock his big head off his shoulders." In contrast, Arthur testified that when Henegar first caught up with him down the aisle, he said, "Why don't you get off my back." The foreman asked, "What's wrong with you, David?" and Henegar then cursed him in extremely vulgar lan- 7 2 7-0 8 3-6 4-vol. 144-19 276 DECISIONS OP NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD guage (which I find unnecessary to repeat here). Arthur said he then told the em- ployee to go somewhere to cool off and then return to his work. Again Arthur walked away and 25 feet or so further Henegar again caught up with him and continued to berate him in street gutter language. At this point Arthur told him to go home, that he was not discharged, but that when Henegar returned the next night the matter would be decided. As the two of them walked out of the room toward the exit, they passed Henegar's brother, and, as Arthur continued to testify, Henegar, speak- ing to his brother, again referred to the foreman aloud in offensive language. When they reached the gate and Henegar was outside, he again spoke offensively to Arthur and invited him outside: "You lunk head s- o- b-, if you'll just step outside this gate, I'll just beat the damn hell out of you." There was no love lost between these two men. The foreman wanted the em- ployee to report on the union activities of his fellow workmen; instead Henegar be- came the union observer at the election. Henegar felt that after the election Arthur set out to make life in the plant unpleasant for him, and in some respects the testi- mony as a whole supports his complaint. The work in this plant is a continuous operation and the employees eat, smoke, and otherwise take rest breaks whenever their duties permit, with the rule of the Company in theory allowing 35 minutes per 8-hour shift for all these purposes. Management representatives insisted at the hearing that 15 minutes of this time is always used for cleaning up at the end of the shift and about 20 minutes for lunch. It is clear, however, that additional breaks for smoking or for the restroom are also taken . Henegar said that after the election Arthur attempted to limit him and two other employees to only 10 minutes for lunch. Arthur denied this and insisted all he said was that the breaks should be limited to 10 minutes each. I do not believe him, else the entire asserted scheme of 35 minutes total allowable personal time becomes meaningless. Henegar also testi- fied generally that Arthur gave him "more work than I could do," inspected his product more than in the past, "found something wrong all the time," and spoke to him "with a tone of voice that I wouldn't care to hear." Whether the basis for Henegar's resentment was real or fancied, therefore, it is clear that he felt deeply antagonistic toward the foreman. Given the resentment accumulated in Henegar by September 14, the criticism by his supervisors on that very evening , the degree of misbehavior appearing by admis- sion in his own testimony, and a certain amount of corroboration of Arthur's story found in the testimony of other witnesses, I can only conclude that the foreman's version of the total incident that night is the more reliable of the two . Overstreet, another employee , testified that he saw Henegar walk after Arthur and heard him tell the foreman to stay off his "damn back"; Overstreet added he recalled no other bad language . On cross-examination he said that when , before the discharge, Hill, the overseer, asked what he knew of the incident, he, Overstreet, told Hill that Henegar had "cussed" the foreman, and later, in relating the event to the Labor Board attorney, he recalled that Henegar had "cursed" Arthur. Two other employ- ees, Charlotte Pagans and Shirley Patsel , said they too saw Henegar walk hastily after the foreman and heard him raise his voice while talking to him . Employee Audrey Short testified that during the same evening Henegar said to her "he was going to knock hell out of W. J. [Arthur] before the night was over." And finally there is the testimony of Holland, another supervisor, who accompanied Arthur and Henegar to the gate ; Arthur had called Holland to go with him when Henegar was about to leave. Holland testified that Henegar spoke offensively as they all walked to the gate and again from outside the gate, where he also invited Arthur outside to fight. The incident was discussed the next day by Hill and Arnold , the plant manager, and it was decided to discharge Henegar. Because the night shift was not scheduled to operate that evening, he was called by telephone and at 4 p .m., when he arrived, he was released . Had Henegar said no more than a "damn" or a "hell" the night before, it is unlikely that the Respondent would have seized upon such a pretext to discharge the man. The record as a whole shows that such expletives are not un- usual among both employees and lower supervisors. More important, had manage- ment been predisposed to get rid of him for cause in any event , it would more likely have done so the night before, when Henegar's mistake furnished what was ostensibly, at least, a much more plausible ground than just "damn" or "hell." On the basis of the testimony I heard , and on appraisal of the demeanor of all the witnesses, I find that Henegar did use very abusive and offensive language to his superior in hearing of other employees, and threatened to injure him bodily, as Arthur testified. I do not think the foreman would simply have stood "stunned," as Henegar himself testified, if all he had heard was the word "damn." BURLINGTON INDUSTRIES, INC., VINTON WEAVING CO. 277 Does the preponderance of the evidence as a whole-including the factual findings made in Case No. 5-CA-2207-warrant a conclusion that Henegar was discharged because of his union activities and in order to discourage them? I think not. The clear union animus of the Respondent has a direct pertinence here. Foreman Arthur's attempt to prevail upon Henegar to spy upon the union activities of other employees, his illegal interrogation and the consistency of such conduct with the widespread pattern of other illegal statements and threats made by other supervisors to many employees throughout the plant, followed by Henegar's deliberate refusal to be intimidated and his decision to act as the union observer instead, logically suggest that the Respondent would continue its course of conduct by both harassing him and eventually discharging him to curb his union activities . Balancing these incriminating facts, however, are Henegar's gross misbehavor in the plant and the more immediate sequence of events , with the discharge following precipitously upon the incident . As stated above, the General Counsel rests his case squarely upon the contention that Henegar did not misbehave , and insists there existed no adequate legal basis to explain the discharge . He does not advance the alternative theory that even if Henegar did offensively berate the foreman in hearing of other employees the Respondent would have ignored the offense but for the man 's persistent attitude towards the Union. Nevertheless , in his brief the General Counsel obliquely insinuates that perhaps Arthur's harassment, or riding of Henegar during the 2-week period after the election, was planned to provoke the very outburst which management later advanced as sufficient cause for discharge . The brief stresses the foreman's apparent vacillation in his orders to Henegar to select defective yarns, and the criticism that the em- ployee was devoting too much time to it, and then says : "All that transpired there- after was the result of Respondent 's repeated goading." Implicit in this assertion is the thought that an employee's outburst, however offensive , if provoked by the employer's deliberate annoyance of the man, must be disregarded , just as, in a proper case, his deliberate quitting is sometimes viewed as a constructive , illegal discharge instead. And, conceivably, when the record as a whole convincingly shows an overall plan to create an excuse to discharge a man, and to bring about a super- ficially intolerable situation, such a conclusion might be fully warranted . The weak- ness of that argument here, however, stems from the fact that the more disturbing irritation to Henegar that night seems to have been the reprimand he received at the hands of the general overseer, after Foreman Arthur had reported the error on the steaming machine the night before . And that warning, on Henegar's own ad- mission, was not fabricated . Moreover, if it can be said that the entire goading of Henegar, even assuming that such it was, by Arthur , was to bring about a colorable pretext for discharge, the serious mistake Henegar made presented the Respondent with a much more plausible ground for such final action. Instead, still with knowl- edge of Henegar's union activities , the Respondent overlooked that incident and forgave him. But such leniency, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with any pervasive design which the General Counsel would now attribute to Arthur and to Hill. Henegar's discharge gives reason for pause , but, suspicion apart, I cannot say that the evidence as a whole supports the complaint allegation as to him . I shall therefore recommend that the complaint be dismissed in this respect. B. The discharge of Robert Wright Wright was a smash hand whose work required him to circulate among about 240 looms in the weaving department. He had been an employee for 6 years, progressed in his pay from $1.23 to $ 1.40 per hour, and a month before his Octo- ber 30 discharge had been transferred to Foreman Johnson's section because of his greater experience as a smash hand. Wright favored the Union and took steps to assist its campaign . He signed an authorization card himself and successfully solicited four or five additional signatures. He wrote three prounion leaflets for distribution, participated in the preparation of the Little Jasper cartoons intended to arouse interest in the Union , and used a bul- letin board in his uncle's welding shop for posting union notices and attracting addi- tional employee signatures. In the Respondent's plant he photographed two pictures which management had put on display-one showing a plant in operation and the other an abandoned closed factory. The legend appearing read: "The Union often makes the difference between these two pictures." On October 16, 1962, he testified in Case No. 5-CA-2207 in support of the com- plaint; he related how he had taken that photograph and how his foreman , Tillotson, had called him into the office to discuss Wright's union activities. 278 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The Respondent, of course, knew of Wright's activities on behalf of the Union. Tillotson admitted that at or about the time of the election he interrogated Wright about his union sentiments, and asked whether the Little Jasper notes about the plant belonged to him. According to Wright, Tillotson did more than this; he also said he felt Wright had something to do with union cards being distributed, that he thought Wright was "pretty strong" for the Union, and that he was "in the middle of a hornet's nest." Wright also testified that shortly after this conversation, but still before the election, Tillotson said to him: "I can't fire you now, but I'll fire you when the election is over." Tillotson denied some of Wright's testimony, including the remark that he would fire him after the election; he did not otherwise contradict any of the other above quotations attributed to him by Wright. Wright's version of his talks with Tillotson comport fully with the consistent pattern of illegal in- terrogation and coercion practiced by many supervisors in the plant, including Tillotson himself, as found by Trial Examiner Mullin. I credit Wright in this respect. On the afternoon of Sunday, October 28, there was a union meeting in a hall in Roanoke; Wright attended. When he reported for work at 11 p.m. for his night shift, Foreman Johnson engaged him in conversation. Wright's testimony is that the foreman asked had there been a good crowd at the meeting, and when Wright asked how did Johnson know about it, he replied he had ways of finding out. Johnson also asked, according to Wright, why was Wright "sticking his neck out for somebody else," and added he was "sticking [his] nose into something [he] didn't have no business to." Johnson explained this conversation as follows: he learned of the meeting and somebody had reported to him that Wright had been present and "was going to get some of the fellows to sign up down at the plant." He approached Wright at the smash board-"where he works"-and engaged him in conversation "somewhere around 20 or 25 minutes." He started with "I hear you were at the union meeting"; he recalled saying: "I don't see why you stick your neck out like that." He said he did not remember asking what Wright thought about the Union but that the man did explain why he favored it. Beyond this, Johnson explained the long discussion simply with saying that he cautioned Wright not to "interfere" with the employees. He did not tell Wright of any complaints by other employees about any "interference." Johnson closed his comments respecting this conversation with saying that he called almost all his employees into his office to tell them of his op- position to the Union. During the night shift on October 30 and 31, Wright was called to the office where Johnson discharged him. He was told to report the next day for his pay but insisted upon being paid immediately. The men proceeded to the office of O'Shields, the general overseer of the weaving department, where Wright was given his final paycheck and asked to sign a separation slip which stated he was discharged "for interfering with other workmen." He refused to sign. As set out above, the complaint alleges that Wright was discharged because the Respondent wished to curb his union activities. The Respondent denies this to have been its motivation; it asserts instead that Wright's activities in the plant interfered with the work duties of other employees and that what it really found objectionable was such interference with production, as distinguished from interference with its own campaign, to convince the employees to stay out of the Union. At the moment of discharge Johnson said to Wright he was being released for "interfering with the people on the job." At the hearing he formally gave as his reason: "For interfering with the other employees." He never called Wright's attention to any written plant rule he was charged with violating, but on the witness stand stated unequivocally that he did have a rule in mind and that this was the only rule he knew of and which, in his view, Wright had violated. This shop rule has long been posted on the bulletin board, and reads, in pertinent part: "Abusive or threatening language, fighting, inter- ference with fellow workers, horseplay, and other objectionable or unsafe conduct will not be allowed." There is no contention that Wright violated any no-solicitation rule, either during or outside of working hours. There is no contention that talking-at any time, either at the machines or away from them-was against the rules. Indeed, the clearest thing shown by the record is that everyone, rank-and-file as well as supervi- sors, exercise complete freedom to talk with others in the plant, and that the very system of personal time allowance, as well as the nature of the work of most of the employees, permits such freedom. Foreman Johnson, who found fault with Wright and initiated the decision to discharge him, said there is no rule in the plant about not talking. And Wright's earlier foreman, Tillotson, said "You can talk to people. That's one thing that the Company is very liberal with, letting people talk." While testifying, Johnson and Tillotson, Wright's immediate supervisors, kept say- ing that Wright had "interfered" with employees, that they saw him "interfering," and that they as well as General Overseer O'Shields had received reports of Wright's BURLINGTON INDUSTRIES, INC., VINTON WEAVING CO. 279 "interfering" activities. This was a repetitive refrain in conclusionary phrases. The direct evidence, of what they in fact saw, what was in fact reported to them, and what in fact took place between Wright and the employees produced by the Respondent to prove the asserted "interference," does not support the contention that Wright's activities hampered production, kept people from their work, or in any way interfered with whatever other employees were doing when he talked to them. Instead, what it does prove affirmatively is that he talked union-but no more than any other subject was spoken among the employees-that all any employee ever reported to others was the subject matter of which Wright talked, and that all the Respondent was really concerned with was the subject in which Wright was interested and not the manner or means in which he discussed it. Wright said that between the time Johnson spoke to him for perhaps 25 minutes on Sunday night concerning the Union and the time of his discharge two shifts later, he spoke to only two employees during working hours and asked each of them to put his name and address on a slip of paper which he gave them; he told these two men that the information was desired so that the union representative could call upon them at home to explain the advantages of union activities. He did not know the names of these two persons. Wright insisted the talks did not take over a minute or two in each instance. Foreman Johnson started by saying he saw Wright interfering with Ronnie McGuire, a weaver, in one of the aisles. He said, however, that he was "from 25 to 50 yards" away and did not know what was said. Then he added that he really did not know that Wright interfered with McGuire, but that his impression, and his testimony, was based upon only what McGuire later told him Johnson went on to testify that the next evening, on the Monday night shift, Mike Robertson, another weaver, reported that Wright had "bothered" a young employee, trying to obtain his name and address. Again, he did not see anything himself. First he said there was no mention of any union, later he said Robertson did tell him Wright had asked the other workman to give his name for purposes of union solicitation Ronnie McGuire was the first witness produced by the Respondent to prove that Wright "interfered" with employees. McGuire told of how, as he walked along an aisle where Wright was working, Wright started talking to him. In relating the incident, McGuire found occasion to say that Wright physically restrained him from passing, that "I just sort of put my hand on his shoulder and went on around him." The intended import of McGuire's testimony-that Wright prevented him from per- forming his duty-is lost entirely in the light of the many other things that he also said. He detailed that he stayed there "from 5 to 10 minutes" listening. All this time, he said, he could have walked around the loom up another aisle, but did not. "Q. How was it you didn't go on and get your cut of cloth?-A. Well, I just wanted to see what he had to say, you know." He said that "up to a point" he stayed vol- untarily. And finally: "Q. Was he trying to deliberately block your path?-A. Well, I can't rightfully say about that, I don't know. But he was talking to me." Of greater significance, in its pertinence to the issue respecting Wright's discharge, is McGuire's testimony of why he reported the incident to Foreman Johnson and what he told Johnson. Johnson said this was one of the principal incidents of inter- ference with work reported to him. But it appears instead not only that Wright did not interfere with the other man's duties, but also that McGuire said no such thing to the foreman. Why did McGuire tell Johnson about it at all? "I thought it was the right thing to do. I was a Company man," and he explained that by "Company man" he meant "I wasn't for the Union." There is not a word throughout McGuire's testimony of his complaining to Johnson about interference with his work, or of being compelled to do a thing against his will. The only point he made to John- son, both that evening and when management spoke to him about this the next night for more details, was that he did not like the subject matter of Wright's comments. He admitted that others have talked to him at work about other matters, but that he never reported any other conversation to his superiors. Another man approached by Wright for name and address was Martin, also a weaver. Like McGuire, Martin said that Wright "interfered" with him, "shook him up," approached him "in a pushing manner." Again, however, his more precise answers to questions added up to no more than the fact Wright asked for his name and address, and that Martin does not like unions and is displeased when asked to take an interest. After Wright had spoken to him, Martin asked another weaver who Wright was, and proceeded with his work undisturbed. Sometime later, when Foreman Holland started talking to him about some other assignment, he said he was "shook up" because "the boy presented me with a union card out there." He did not go out of his way to report anything to management and he said nothing about any interference with whatever he was doing. More than once, when asked to state 280 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD precisely what Wright said to him, and what really took place, he made it plain that the total incident consisted of no more than Wright's asking him to put his name on a piece of paper and that he refused: "Q. Did either of you say anything more after this?-A. No, sir, he stood there a moment, and as I turned and walked on off, he went down the other way." Had Wright's invitation caused him to stop work at all? "A. Well, let's say I didn't exactly stop. I stepped back and glanced down and started to go again, but it interfered with me, you know . . . if you want to know the truth about it I don't care nothing about the union. I worked with a union, belonged to a union, for 3 years. That's my point of view. I just don't care nothing about a union." Henry Short, another weaver, said Wright approached him too, on Sunday eve- ning, and gave him a card to sign and return. He put it in his pocket and said nothing. Later Wright asked had he signed, and he said no and tore the slip and threw it away. He mentioned the fact to McGuire as the two smoked at the smoking bench, but never brought it to the attention of any supervisor. He went on to relate that the next evening Tillotson asked him about all this; then he said the whole thing happened the night Wright was discharged; lastly he said Tillotson first spoke to him, and he thus reported the incident after Wright was discharged. Again, Short also said it is not unusual for employees to speak to him, and him to them, about subjects other than working, but that what bothered him on this occasion was that Wright spoke about the Union. These were the incidents of interference which Johnson said led to his recom- mendation that Wright be released. On Sunday evening he told Wright he had "no business sticking his nose" into union affairs. On Monday he considered Mc- Guire's story sufficient to warn Wright against "interference." On the next succeed- ing shift the Martin conversation became cause for discharge. None of the incidents amounted to interference in any real sense. None was reported to management as "interference" and none of them differ, in terms of time consumed or effect upon work duties, from conversaitons that occur constantly throughout the plant and which, as the record clearly shows, are often initiated by the supervisors themselves. All that distinguished these talks from the many others is that they were about the Union and were started by Wright, instead of by Johnson, or Tillotson, or any of the other foremen who, as this and the record in Case No. 5-CA-2207 show, engaged in a continuous campaign of talking to the employees during working hours in an effort to defeat the union campaign. At one point Johnson spoke of discharging Wright because of three incidents reported to him-McGuire, Martin, and Robertson. Whether by the "Robertson incident" he meant the fact Robertson reported the McGuire talk, and thus one became two, or whether he meant to speak of a conversation between Robertson and Wright, Johnson did not explain. Clearly he was deliberately trying to aggravate the supposed misbehavior of Wright, because Robertson also testified, but after Johnson did. Robertson said that some time a week or two before October 30, Wright started talking to him while the two were smoking on the smoking bench during a break. Wright asked Robertson to discontinue his contribution to the UGF; Robertson refused and took offense at Wright's language, or manner. A little while later Wright passed Robertson at work and apologized, saying he meant no offense. Apparently he resumed his attempt to persuade Robertson to his point of view. Robertson told Johnson about this then and there. Like other witnesses called by the Respondent, Robertson stated the conclusion that Wright "interfered" with him. However, both his and the foreman's version of what Robertson reported is that all Robertson complained of was Wright's view of the propriety of contribut- ing to the UGF. He did not say to the foreman that there had been interference with his duties. Robertson said his reason for telling Johnson about it was ". . I just didn't want any trouble out of it. I mean, if Wright wanted to stop his, that was his right, but I didn't want him to bother me with it. I figured I had my own opinion about it." Robertson also added it is not unusual for employees to talk to him while he is at work. Finally, Lipscomb, a smash hand, testified like Robertson about Wright's request to him to discontinue UGF contributions. He said that sometime during the last 2 weeks of October Wright talked to him 4 or 5 minutes on the subject, that they "talked back and forth," that he disagreed and that he, Lipscomb, "just walked off." Because the men later discussed the UGF question generally, be later told Johnson about this: "I didn't mention Wright's name. I said had be heard anything about it. He said no, why, and that's when I told him Wright asked me last night to stop mine that he was going to stop his . that's all that was between us " Lmscomb said he did not tell Johnson where Wright had talked to him• "I couldn't say I was complaining." BURLINGTON INDUSTRIES, INC., VINTON WEAVING CO. 281 Foreman Johnson learned that Wright planned to try to persuade other employees to his union views. His extended talk with him immediately after the Sunday union meeting, in which he said the employee had no business "sticking his nose" into union business, was a virtual admonition to stop it. Wright continued nevertheless. He did not interfere with anyone's work; he talked to a few people, not too long, just as employees are always talking among themselves during working hours in this plant. Johnson himself thought nothing of keeping Wright in conversation with him 20 to 25 minutes, as he testified, "where he works," while trying to persuade him to abandon the Union. This too was during Wright's working time and I can hardly hold that the foreman intended to, or in fact interfered with whatever Wright was supposed to be doing then. And so with the many occasions during the preelection campaign when any number of supervisors called employees into the offices to discuss union activities with them, always during the round-the-clock working hours. These conversations also must not have interfered with work duties. Why then was Wright singled out for discharge from among all other employees who talk in this plant? He had never been warned of the danger of discharge for talking to others. Johnson said that during the 23 years he worked there no other employee had ever been discharged for such conduct. I think that, viewing the record as a whole, the preponderance of the evidence requires the conclusion that Wright was released because he persisted in his prounion activities and to discourage them. The Respondent's strong union animus is clear; it resorted to repeated illegal interrogations and threats to implement its resolve. The discharge came immediately upon Johnson's warning based on the union meeting. The asserted economic basis to explain the discharge fails of support- ing evidence. I can reach no other conclusion but that it was Wright's interest in prevailing upon others to join the Union which the Respondent viewed as interference. I find that by discharging him the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. I also find that Johnson's statement to Wright that he had ways of knowing about union meetings, and his statements that the employee should refrain from union activities, created the impression of surveillance and constituted a threat, each a sep- arate violation of Section 8(a) (1) attributable to the Respondent. Moreover, I hold that Foreman Tillotson's interrogation of Wright, and his statement that the employee would be discharged after the election constituted further unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. The complaint also alleges that the discharge violated Section 8(a) (4) of the Act. This allegation rests on the fact that Wright had testified in the preceding case 2 weeks before. Wright's appearance as a witness in support of the earlier complaint is, of course, cumulative evidence of his union activities and of the Respondent's knowl- edge thereof. I cannot say, however, that the evidence supports a specific finding that the Respondent discharged him for such reason, apart from any other of Wright's union activities. In any event, the remedy would be the same. I therefore make no finding of violation of Section 8(a) (4). IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in con- nection with its operations as set forth in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY As usual, in view of the unfair labor practices that have been committed, the Re- spondent must be required to take appropriate remedial action in order to dissipate the coercive effects of its illegal actions. The discharge of Wright because of his union activities can only be undone by reinstatement to his previous employment together with payment of whatever loss of earnings he has suffered in the interim in consequence of the discrimination against him, with interest at 6 percent per annum. When he was called to the office in the middle of his shift, without advance notice and summarily discharged, his first reaction was to demand his money. He insisted and Vaughn, the office manager, was called. Vaughn prepared Wright's final check and filled in a form separation slip which stated that Wright had been released "for interfering with other workers"; at the bottom of the slip there also appeared a printed statement saying that by his signature the employee agreed with the correc- ness of the stated reason for discharge. Wright was given his check and asked to sign the slip. He refused, asked to see it, and put it in his pocket. Asked to return it, he did not want to part with it To satisfy him, he was offered a copy of the slip for himself; for this purpose Wright, Foreman Johnson, Vaughn, and O'Shields, the general overseer, proceeded into an office where there was a duplicating machine. 282 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD After he was convinced the machine could produce the copy, Wright gave up the slip he held and a copy was made. Before anything else happened, O'Shields placed both the original and the copy in his pockets and told Wright he could have neither. The three company supervisors all testified that at this point Wright became incensed and seized O'Shields' wrists in a fit of anger. They said he also threatened that if some day he were to meet O'Shields or Johnson in the street he would assault them. Wright denied categorically that he touched anyone in that room or that he voiced any threat at all. Whatever occurred at the moment of Wright's irritation, first at being asked to confess, in writing, misconduct which he knew he had not committed, and then at being tricked into parting with a useless form which he reasonably believed might have helped vindicate him later, has nothing to do with his discharge, or with the Respondent's motivation in firing him. All this occurred after he had been released and paid off. Indeed, counsel for the Respondent did not advance at the hearing any reason for having the company supervisors testify on this matter at all; he did not file a brief and therefore the record stands barren of any contention concerning it. By implication, however, I assume that the Respondent's purpose must have been, as it could only be, an argument that Wright's indignant outbrust, and the fact that he momentarily held O'Shield's hands, now disqualifies him from any reinstatement rights and, in consequence, must serve as sufficient cause to permit the Respondent to enjoy the fruits of its clear unfair labor practice. I do not believe that what happened at that moment was so serious a matter as to warrant departure from the Board's normal remedial order. O'Shields had his hands in his trouser pockets, with a copy of the slip in each one. Despite Wright's denial, I do believe the concerted testimony of the three supervisors that he reached over and grabbed O'Shields' hands at the wrists in anger, for a fleeting moment held them, and, as he left, even exploded in some kind of menacing words. I do not, however, credit as gospel the details of the supervisor's description of Wright's behavior. That they were attempting to color the facts so as to put Wright in the most unfavorable light is shown both by their varied stories of the incident, and by the tenor of the supervisor's testimony on this record generally. Johnson said Wright held O'Shields "3 or 4 minutes or seconds." O'Shields said it was "15 or 20 seconds"; Vaughn, after him, repeated the exact phrase. All three of them said that while Wright held his hands on those of O'Shields none of them moved or said anything. This certainly could not have been 3 or 4 minutes. But even 20 seconds cannot be explained, with the other two men saying and doing nothing. More likely, and what I really believe is the fact, Wright did not have his hands on O'Shields' wrists more than 3 or 4 seconds, as Johnson also said. And he quickly thought the better of it and realized his error. The supervisors did not agree on what Wright said to O'Shields when he reached over and held his hands to his pockets. According to Vaughn he said, "Give me that paper and give it to me now." Johnson would have it that as he seized O'Shields' wrists, Wright was "using very profane language, cursing." But O'Shields, the central figure of this incident, was sure Wright said not a word in that brief moment of frustra- tion. Again I can only see in all this a studied attempt by these witnesses to build up the incident far beyond the realities. They also testified that as he was leaving immediately thereafter Wright threatened to assault O'Shields and Johnson if he should meet them outside the plant. Again the most violent and abusive phrases were put in Wright's mouth by Johnson, his fore- man. But this was the man who had put the finger on Wright because of his union activities, and whose request that Wright spy on other employees had been flouted. I am convinced, on the basis of all the testimony given by Johnson and O'Shields, that they were pursuing an overall plan to remove Wright from the plant and to keep him out. In these circumstances I doubt their details of Wright's language is truly reliable. I am satisfied, however, that Wright did give vent to resentment at being denied at least a copy of the slip he wanted and did explode with some kind of threat against O'Shields and Johnson. And it was the supervisors who provoked him. There was no reason for great concern over Wright's desire to keep the slip in the first place. It was only an un- signed form and another could have been filled out in its place with no trouble at all. The very fact of asking him to sign such an incriminating paper necessarily aroused his resentment And he had basis for worrying, for in the earlier hearing, in Case No. 5-CA-2207, a similar separation slip was used, unsuccessfully, to contradict the testimony of another employee who had also been separated under questionable circumstances. O'Shields said at the hearing that no one ever asked Wright to sign the slip. He insisted that all he did was place it before Wright. "Q. Did you want him BURLINGTON INDUSTRIES, INC., VINTON WEAVING CO. 283 to sign it?-A. I do not. Q. You asked him to sign it did you not9-A. I asked him was he going to sign it." O'Shields impressed me as a very intelligent man; I do not believe he could seriously have expected that Wright would himself want to sign such a document. This sort of hair-splitting, suggesting a most illogical explanation, hardly serves to make the overseers' story of Wright's conduct a convincing one. I by no means condone Wright's fit of anger, especially the liberty he took, albeit only temporarily, of putting a hand on one of his supervisors. I think in fairness, however. that the total situation of the moment must be considered. He had just been discharged without advance notice after 6 years of satisfactory work, he knew the Company's real objective was to put a stop to the union campaign and not to punish him for any misbehavior, and he had just been asked to confess to misconduct of which he was not guilty. It must be recognized, as the Board has held, that "tempers are aggravated and attitudes hardened in the stress and strain of hotly contested labor disputes." i The question to me is not whether an employer could discharge a workman, be he for or against a union. on the ground of such an incident; he certainly may. Wright had already been discharged, and the illegal motivation is clear and has been found. The question here, as sometimes phrased, is whether his act was of so reprehensible a nature as to render him unfit for further employment with this Company. More fundamentally, perhaps, the true consideration is whether his conduct on that one occasion ought to outweight the paramount importance of effectuating the policies of the Act by remedying unfair labor practices committed. In this instance, the illegal discharge of Wright constitutes the third of a series of unfair labor practice cases against the Respondent involving this very plant. See Burlington Mills Corporation (Roanoke Weaving Plant), 102 NLRB 252, and Trial Examiner Mullin's Intermediate Report and Recommended Order in Case No. 5-CA-2207.2 All things considered, therefore, I do not believe the incident sufficient reason for now overlooking the premeditated act of the Respondent in removing from its employee complement a very active and outspoken union adherent 3 I shall therefore recommend the usual reinstatement and backpay order against the Respondent. In view of the nature of the unfair labor practices committed, the commission of similar and other unfair labor practices reasonably may be anticipated I shall therefore recommend that the Respondent be ordered to cease and desist from in any manner infringing upon rights guaranteed to its employees by Section 7 of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I Burlington Industries, Inc., Vinton Weaving Company Plant, is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act 2 Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act 3. By discharging employee Robert E. Wright, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 4 By the foregoing conduct, by Foreman Arthur's interrogation of employee Henegar and Supervisor Tillotson's and Supervisor Johnson's interrogation of em- plovee Wright concerning the union activities of these employees, by Foreman Arthur's request to employee Henegar and Supervisor Johnson's request to employee Wright that these employees report to management concerning the union activities of other employees, by Supervisor Tillotson's statement to employee Wright that he would be discharged after the election, and by Supervisor Johnson's statement to employee Wright that the supervisor had ways of learning who attended union meetings, the Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and thereby has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 5 The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 'National Furniture Manufacturing Company, Inc, 134 NLRB 834 2 See also Cleveland Woolens, a Division of Burlington Industries, Inc 140 NLRB 87, and Burlington Mills Corporation , Randleman Hosiery Plant, 82 NLRB 751 3 Georgia Rua Mill, 131 NLRB 1304, 1313. 284 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in the case, I recommend that the Respondent, Burlington Industries, Inc., Vinton Weaving Company Plant, Roanoke, Virginia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against its employees because of their exercise of the right to self-organization or to join labor organizations. (b) Interrogating employees concerning their union activities, asking employees to report to management concerning the union activities of other employees, telling employees that they will be discharged for union activities, and telling employees that their union activities are under surveillance by management. (c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist any labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of col- lective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 2 Take the following affirmative action which is designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Offer to Robert E. Wright immediate and full reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and make him whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against him in the manner set forth in the section of the Intermediate Report entitled "The Remedy." (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, time- cards, personnel records and reports, and all records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (c) Post at its plant in Vinton, Virginia, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 4 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Fifth Region, shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent's representative, be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for the Fifth Region, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Intermediate Report and Recommended Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.5 It is further ordered that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dismissed as to the allegation of unlawful discrimination with respect to David Henegar. ' If this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "A Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "The Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" In the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order be enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "A Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "A Decision and Order." 5In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT discourage membership by any of our employees in Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO or in any other labor organization, by discharging or in any other manner discriminating against any employee in re- gard to his hire or tenure of employment, or in any other term or condition of employment, except as authorized by Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act. ATLANTIC RESEARCH CORP., DESOMATIC PRODUCTS DIV. 285 WE WILL NOT interrogate employees concerning their union activities, ask employees to report to management concerning the union activities of other employees, tell employees that they will be discharged for union activities, or tell employees that their union activities are under surveillance by management. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with , restrain, or coerce our em- ployees in the exercise of their right to self-organization , to form, join, or assist any labor organization, to join or assist Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, to barga*n collectively through representatives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid- or protection , and to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment , as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act. WE WILL offer Robert E. Wright immediate and full reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent position , without prejudice to his seniority and other rights and privileges , and make him whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered as a result of the discrimination against him. All our employees are free to become, or remain, or to refrain from becoming or remaining members of any labor organization , except to the extent that this right may be affected by an agreement executed in conformity with Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. BURLINGTON INDUSTRIES, INC., VINTON WEAVING COMPANY PLANT, Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 707 North Calvert Street, Sixth Floor, Baltimore, Maryland, Telephone No. 752-8460, Ex- tension 2100, if they have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions. Atlantic Research Corporation, Desoratic Products Division and International Union of Electrical , Radio and Machine Workers, AFI,-CIO. Case No. 5-CA-2183. August 27, 1963 DECISION AND ORDER On May 6, 1963, Trial Examiner Paul Bisgyer issued his Interme- diate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Re- spondent had not engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommending that it be dismissed, in its entirety as set forth in the attached Intermediate Report. Thereafter, the Gen- eral Counsel and the Charging Party filed exceptions to the Interme- diate Report and a supporting brief, and the Respondent filed a reply brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Rodgers and Fanning]. The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Interme- diate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in this 144 NLRB No. 39.