Henry I. Siegel Co., Inc.

386 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Upon the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent is, and at all times material herein has been , engaged in com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, Local 601, AFL-CIO, and The Manuela Co., Employees Grievance Committee, are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. 3. The Respondent did not in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act threaten its employees with the closing of its plant in the event the Union successfully or- ganized its employees ; request each of its employees to indicate by a show of hands whether or not he desired the Union to represent him for collective-bargaining pur- poses; nor unlawfully interrogate its employees concerning their union desires and activities. 4. The Respondent did not, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) or (2) of the Act, initiate, sponsor, assist, or support The Manuela Co., Employees Grievance Com- mittee, as alleged in the complaint. RECOMMENDATION Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, I recom- mend that the complaint herein be dismissed. Henry I. Siegel Co., Inc. and Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO. Cases Nos. 26-CA-1256, f6-CA-1304, and 26-CA-1371. June 28, 1963 DECISION AND ORDER On April 15, 1963, Trial Examiner W. Gerard Ryan issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Inter- mediate Report. He also found that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other alleged unfair labor practices and recommended dis- missal of those allegations of the complaint. Thereafter, the Respond- ent and the Charging Party filed exceptions to the Intermediate Re- port and supporting briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Rodgers and Fanning]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter- mediate Report and the entire record in this case, including the excep- tions and briefs, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, with the additions and modifications noted below.' 1 The Trial Examiner found in effect, and we agree, that in the circumstances described by,him at Respondent 's Bruceton plant, Respondent made "demands " for pretrial employee 143 NLRB No. 38. HENRY I. SIEGEL CO., INC. 387 ORDER The Board adopts as its Order the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, with the modification noted below.' affidavits Inhibitive of an effective Board investigation within the intendment of Hilton Credit Corporation, 137 NLRB 56 We also agree with the Trial Examiner's conclusion that, by obtaining copies of such pretrial Board affidavits, which Respondent actually did in some instances, Respondent violated Section 8(a) (1) However, as clearly indicated In the Hilton case, It is the demand for such affidavits which interferes with the Board's efforts to secure vindication of employees' statutory rights and thus interferes with the enjoyment of such rights in violation of Section 8(a) (1), without regard to whether such demands are successful. And this is so particularly in a situation as here where employees are instructed prior to giving such affidavits to obtain copies for delivery to the employer. Accordingly, we find further that even in those instances where Respondent attempted to but was unsuccessful in obtaining pretrial affidavits, its demands therefor violated Sec- tion 8(a) (1). As Respondent's interrogation of employees at the Bruceton plant was not for any legitimate purpose, and as it occurred in a context of other unfair labor practices, we re- ject Respondent's contention that such interrogation was lawful under Blue Flash Express, Inc., 109 NLRB 591. See P-M Garages, Inc., et al., 139 NLRB 987; Brownwood Manu- facturing Company, 140 NLRB 1027. The Board will honor a settlement agreement and will not set it aside unless there Is a breach of the agreement or a subsequent independent violation of the Act by the parties to the agreement. Lincoln Bearing Company, 133 NLRB 1069, 1073, 1074, and cases cited There is no contention of any breach of the settlement agreement with respect to Respond- ent's Trezevant plant or of a subsequent independent violation there, and we concur in the Trial Examiner's finding that the record does not establish sufficient interrelation ship between the Bruceton and Trezevant plants to establish an integrated enterprise. Accordingly, we also concur in his conclusion that no basis exists for setting aside the settlement agreement and litigating alleged presettlement unfair labor practices at Trezevant because of the polstsettlement unfair labor practices at Bruceton. For similar reasons, we also adopt the Trial Examiner's recommendation that the Order and posting of the notice apply only to the Bruceton plant where the violations found herein occurred. Chairman McCulloch and Member Rodgers do not, as did the Trial Examiner, find Superintendent Hurt's statements to employee Dorothy Brendon violative of Section 8(a) (1), because they were made in response to Brendon's questions and were not, in their view, clearly a threat to her job security. They likewise do not find, as did the Trial Examiner, that the speech to the employees by supervisor Sam Siegel at his home in early October, considered in its entirety, contained such threats of economic loss as to constitute interference, restraint, and coercion In violation of Section 8(a) (1), Member Fanning agrees with the Trial Examiner that a query by Brendon to her employer as to the con- sequences of joining a union did not "privilege nor mitigate" a threat of reprisal in re- sponse, and that there was a clear threat here ; and also agrees with the Trial Examiner that part of Siegel's speech contained a clear threat of layoff rather than an "economic prediction" in the event of unionization, which the speech in its entirety did not mitigate Member Fanning would therefore adopt both of the Trial Examiner's findings of violations of Section 18(a) (1). 2 In paragraph 1(a), and In its counterpart In the notice, delete "Requiring" and sub- stitute therefor "Demanding of." INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE This proceeding was held before Trial Examiner W. Gerard Ryan at a hearing in Huntingdon, Tennessee, on December 19, 20, and 21, 1962, and January 8 and 9, 1963.1 'The charge in Case No. 26-CA-1256 was filed on April 4, 1962; the charge in Case No. 26-CA-1304 was filed on June 18, 1962; and the charge in Case No. 26-CA-1371 was filed on September 10, 1962. In Cases Nos. 26-CA-1256 and 26-CA-1371 a consolidated complaint was issued on November 2, 1962. In Case No. 26-CA-1304 a complaint Issued on November 7, 1962, and on the same date Case No. 26-CA-1304 was consolidated with Cakes Nos. 26-CA-1256 and 26-CA-1371 717-672-64-vol. 143-26 388 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The issues presented were whether the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act (1) by requiring employees to give it copies of their affidavits given to the Board agent; (2) by conveying the impression of surveillance; (3) by unlawful interrogation; and (4) by threats of reprisal. The parties waived oral argument and have filed briefs.2 Motions to dismiss the complaints upon which decision was reserved are disposed of as appears hereinafter in this report. Upon the entire record in the case and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT The Respondent is now and has been at all times material herein a New York corporation operating plants located at Trezevant, Bruceton, and Gleason, Tennessee, where it is engaged in the manufacture of men's trousers, men's coats, and men's wearing apparel, respectively .3 During the 12 months preceding the complaints, the Respondent manufactured, sold, and shipped from each of the plants above referred to, directly to points outside the State of Tennessee, finished products valued in excess of $50,000. The complaints alleged, the answers admitted, and I find that the Respondent is now and has been at all times material herein an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, is now and has been at all times material herein a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Bruceton plant (Case No. 26-CA-1371) With respect to the Bruceton plant, the consolidated complaint alleged and the answer denied that the Respondent committed unfair labor practices at the Bruce- ton plant in violation of Section 8(a) (1) in that (1) it required employees to give it copies of their affidavits made to a Board agent; (2) on or about April 16, 1962, Supervisor W. G. Ozier and Floorlady Kathryn Allen conveyed the impression of surveillance to employees; (3) interrogated employees on or about September 19, April 15, and April 26, 1962, by Assistant Foreman Richard Louis Hurt, Assistant Supervisor Mike Corrado, and Floorlady Sue H. Lowe, respectively; (4) on August 24, 1962, Assistant Foreman Hurt and on August 31, 1962, Floorlady Gertie Kee threatened employees with reprisals; and (5) Sam Siegel, vice president in charge of production, told employees a substantial number would lose their jobs if the Union was selected as bargaining representative. 1. Section heads or floorladies are supervisors within the meaning of the Act It was stipulated at the hearing that John Hogin, Kathryn Allen, Mike Corrado, and Richard Louis Hurt are supervisors within the meaning of the Act. The remain- ing question is whether or not section heads or floorladies are supervisors. The General Counsel introduced evidence that section heads or floorladies control quality and production of rank-and-file employees; they see that the work is moving and take up production twice a day; each section head has 30 or more employees under him or her; they lay off employees temporarily, train employees, and recommend layoffs; they transfer employees from one job to another, report unsatisfactory work to the manager, and attend supervisory meetings. From the foregoing it is clear that section heads meet several of the criteria for supervisory status enumerated in Section 2(11) of the Act. Furthermore, Vice President Sam Siegel admitted in a pretrail affidavit that the floorladies and foremen are considered supervisory employees "with the name of NLRB Act." Attached to his affidavit was a page marked "Exhibit B" in which he set forth a list of all supervisory personnel in the Bruceton plant which included the section heads. That 2 On January 24, 1963, the time for briefs was extended to February 25, 1963, by the Chief Trial Examiner. 3 The Respondent also operates other plants in the United States which are not involved in this proceeding. HENRY I. SIEGEL CO., INC. 389 affidavit was given by Siegel to the Board agent and Siegel signed it in the presence of his attorney, William Abramson. Accordingly, I find that the section heads or floorladies are supervisors of the Respondent within the meaning of the Act. 2. Obtaining affidavits from employees Pursuant to arrangements made with the investigating Board agent, Respondent's attorney, William Abramson, went to the Bruceton plant on or about July 10, 1962, in order to question witnesses with relation to the charge in Case No. 26-CA-1304. Abramson instructed Sam Siegel to pick out groups of employees from each group who had attended certain luncheons given by Siegel. Abramson then talked to each group separately, on company time, advising them of the basis of the charge and inquiring as to their recollection of what Siegel said at the luncheons. These inter- views took place in Sam Siegel's office and during such interviews management offi- cials would come in and out of the office. It was not until after the interviews that Abramson told the employees that an agent of the Labor Board would be around and possibly some of them might be questioned. When the Board agent arrived the next day Abramson submitted to her a list of the persons with whom he had talked and then he instructed supervisory personnel to obtain copies of affidavits given by employees to the Board agent. Employees were notified by their super- visors that they were to be interviewed. The Board agent took affidavits from the employees on July 11 and 17, 1962. Supervisor Christine Smothers told employee Maud Douglas there was a woman downstairs who wanted to talk to her and Smothers told Douglas to get a copy of her statement. When Douglas returned to work, Mike Corrado asked to see a copy of her statement. When Douglas did not answer him he told her to "think it over." Corrado also asked Margaret Prince if he could see a copy of her statement and she gave it to him without saying anything and had no objection to Corrado's read- ing it. Mary Ann Cole was told to get a copy of her statement when notified of the interview and was also asked to show her statement to Corrado who said, "Do you mind if I see a copy of your statement?" She testified that she told him she did not care and gave it to him willingly. Vernon Smothers 4 asked Barton Carey if he had obtained a copy of his state- ment but Carey replied that he had not. Although as a matter of fact Carey had a copy, he did not give it to Smothers because the Board agent had told him he did not have to show it to anyone. Kathryn Allen notified Lessie Carden that she was to be interviewed by the Board agent and told Carden to be sure to get a copy of her statement. Carden requested the Board agent to mail a copy of her statement to her home because she did not want to give a copy to Kathryn Allen. As Carden returned to work at her machine after the interview, Kathryn Allen heard her tell Mig Allen, a presser, that she did not get a copy. Kathryn Allen then questioned her and Carden replied she did not get a copy, to which Kathryn Allen replied, "Well, I told you to; why didn't you?" Carden answered, "The woman said she was not giving them out." A few min- utes later Kathryn Allen returned to Carden and told her the Board agent was giving out copies and for Carden to go back and get her copy but not to tell the Board agent that Allen had told her to do so. Carden then told Kathryn Allen she did not want to go back for a copy and to forget it. Kathryn Allen also notified Vernelle Tucker that she was to be interviewed and to be sure to get a copy. When Tucker returned to her machine after the interview, Kathryn Allen asked if she had received a copy of her statement. Tucker said she had a copy, whereupon Allen told her that Carden had not obtained one. After Allen left, Supervisor Gladys Lowe questioned Tucker as to what the Board agent had asked. As she did not want to be asked for her statement, Tucker tore up her copy in the restroom after the conversation with Lowe. * I find that Vernon Smothers was a supervisor notwithstanding that Sam Siegel denied that Smothers was a supervisor. Siegel admitted that Smothers directed other employees when so instructed by higher supervisory personnel and that Smothers' wages were higher than those of other employees in the stockroom. Barton Carey testified that Smothers was the only employee in the stockroom who had a desk and that Smothers instructed stock- room employees on the making up of orders and that Smothers regularly went in and out of the main office. Arthur Doyle, who also was a stockroom employee, testified that Smothers assigned overtime work, the makeup of orders, and the transfer of employees within the stockroom. Vernon Smothers did not testify I credit the testimony of Carey and Doyle and upon their testimony and the admissions of Sam Siegel find that Vernon Smothers was a supervisor within the meaning of the Act 390 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Kathryn Allen told Arzelle Douglas that he was wanted in the office. While Douglas was waiting to be interviewed, Allen called him out of the hallway and told him to get a copy of his statement. After the interview Allen asked him, "Did you get it?" When Douglas replied that he had a copy of his statement Allen said, "Well, let me have it." In Hilton Credit Corporation, 137 NLRB 56, footnote 1, the Board stated: It is quite obvious that the Board's ability to secure such vindication depends in large measure upon the ability of its agents to conduct effective investiga- tions of matters alleged to be unfair labor practices, and to obtain relevant information and supporting statements from employees. Such statements are, and must be, treated as confidential matters until, and unless, the employees in- volved testify in subsequent proceedings, at which time, and upon proper de- mand, the pretrial statements of witnesses become available to respondent. Employer demands of employees that their statements be disclosed to it be- fore trial, and without the safeguards afforded by trial procedure, necessarily exerts an inhibitory effect on employees' willingness to make such statements and to otherwise cooperate with Board agents. It is therefore clear from the Hilton case above that if Respondent demanded that its employees deliver to it copies of their statements, it has engaged in conduct viola- tive of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Here, no overt threat was made to any em- ployee in connection with the obtaining of a copy of the affidavit nor was any "de- mand" made on any employee in haec verba. It appears in the Hilton case that the Board intended to proscribe conduct by Respondent which would inhibit the conduct of an effective investigation of matters alleged to be unfair labor practices. I find the conduct in this case which in inhibitive of the conduct of an effective in- vestigation consisted in the employer's attorney advising employees who have been assembled in the office of the impending visit of a Board agent and thereafter are advised, instructed, or reminded by their supervisors, before they have given their statements, to procure copies and after they have given their statements to deliver copies to supervisors. This record shows moreover that the Respondent interfered with the employees' rights to the point where one employee requested the Board agent to mail the copy to her home, another employee tore up her copy so that she would not have to surrender it to Respondent and another employee was told "to think it over" when she did not answer the request of her supervisor to give him a copy of the statement. On the basis of the credited testimony of Maud Douglas, Barton Carey, Lessie Carden, Vernelle Tucker, and Arzelle Douglas, I find that by obtaining the copies of pretrial affidavits from employees in the circumstances and situations set forth above, the Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees, thereby violating Section 8 (a)( I) of the Act. 3. Alleged impression of surveillance The consolidated complaint alleged that on or about April 16, 1962, the Respond- ent by statements to and interrogation of its employees by W. G. Ozier and Kathryn Allen conveyed to said employees at the Bruceton plant the impression of surveil- lance by the Respondent of their union activities. Employee Arzelle Douglas testified on direct examination that the evening be- fore his conversation in April 1962 with Supervisor W. G. Ozier, union representa- tives had visited his home; that while Douglas was talking to a man (Glenn Phillips, a union representative) in front of his house, Ozier drove by and tooted his horn. Douglas testified that he and Ozier saw each other and there was a strange auto- mobile in the driveway. Douglas testified that the next morning he had had a conversation with Ozier and that Douglas told Ozier that the man with him on the previous evening was the union representative. Douglas testified that Ozier said, "Was that a union man?" and Douglas said, "Yes, sir." Douglas then said, "Well I guess they thought I was following them." Douglas testified further that Ozier said that he had seen him (the union representative ) at a garage in the last few days and he wondered who he was; that he did not know who it was when he was over there. On cross-examination Douglas testified that he opened the conversation with Ozier the next morning by saying, "Did you see my company?" Ozier said, "Yes" and then said, "Who was it in the car?" Douglas testified he said to Ozier, "That was Mr. Glenn Phillips, a union representative." Ozier said, "A union man?" and Douglas said yes and then Ozier said, "I saw that fellow, I believe over at the service station or garage and I was wondering who it was. I didn't know who it HENRY I. SIEGEL CO., INC. 391 was." Douglas further testified on cross-examination that he volunteered the in- formation to Ozier that Phillips was a union man. Warren G. Ozier testified that he is a supervisor at the Bruceton plant and is also a part-time salesman for Pontiac automobiles; that he had seen the 1961 Pontiac which was in Douglas' yard in the Pontiac garage and since it bore registra- tion plates showing it was an automobile from an outside county asked the foreman of the garage whose car it was and the foreman told him it belonged to Glenn Phillips, a union organizer. Ozier testified that as he drove by Douglas' house he recognized the automobile as the one he had seen in the Pontiac garage. Ozier testified that the next morning Douglas started the conversation by asking Ozier what he was doing over in his stamping grounds the evening before; that Ozier replied that he was trying to sell automobiles and was on his way to show prospective customers an automobile. Douglas then said, "I had company but I didn't pay no attention to them; I didn't try to talk to him very long and they went on." Ozier testified further that Douglas did not tell him who it was, but did say he had a union organizer, company, there. I interpret this testimony to be that Douglas did not identify the union organizer by name but did say the man was a union organizer. Ozier testified that he later that day told Kathryn Allen about his conversation with Douglas. On direct examination Douglas testified as shown above that Ozier asked, "Was that a union man?" to which Douglas replied, "Yes, sir." On cross-examination he testified that he volunteered the information to Ozier that it was a union repre- sentative; that he asked Ozier, "Did you see my company?" and that Ozier replied yes and Ozier asked, "Who was it in the car?" It was then that Douglas replied, "That was Mr. Glenn Phillips, a union representative." Ozier then said, "A union representative?" and Douglas said, "Yes." On the basis of Douglas' testimony on cross-examination I find that Douglas opened up the conversation with Ozier on April 16, 1962, and volunteered the in- formation to Ozier that he had a union representative visit him on the previous evening. There is no proof of the allegation that Ozier by statements to and inter- rogation of Douglas on April 16 conveyed to him the impression of surveillance by the Respondent of employees' union activities. The consolidated complaint to that extent should be dismissed After the conversation with Douglas, Ozier testified that he told Supervisor Kathryn Allen about his conversation with Douglas. Later that same day Douglas testified that Allen asked him, "Did you have com- pany last night with the union men?" and that he replied, "Yes " Douglas testified that was the entire conversation between him and Allen. Kathryn Allen testified that in April she was at the water fountain when Douglas came by to get a drink and she asked him if he had company the night before and he said yes, that he had a union organizer. Allen testified further that she had re- ceived her information from Ozier. She further testified that she and Douglas were close social friends and that she had gotten his job at the plant for him. Whether Allen asked Douglas if he had company last night with the union men or whether she asked him if he had company the night before and he replied that he had a union organizer, it is my opinion that in view of the prior conversation with Ozier, Allen's question, whichever it was, did not constitute interrogation, as alleged in the complaint, which conveyed the impression of surveillance. I have considered the argument in the brief of the Charging Party to the effect that by the question Douglas could well have asked himself how did Allen know about it and then conclude that the Respondent must have a system of surveillance. I attach no weight to such argument because Douglas made no secret of the visit of the organizers since he volunteered the information to Ozier and after Allen had asked him Douglas could just as easily have concluded that Ozier had told Allen about it. Accordingly, I find that the General Counsel has failed to prove by the required preponderance of evidence the allegation contained in the consolidated complaint that on April 16, 1962, by statements and interrogation by Allen, the Respondent conveyed the impression of surveillance. The consolidated complaint to that extent should be dismissed. 4. Interrogation The consolidated complaint alleged and the answer denied unlawful interrogation at the Bruceton plant by Supervisor Richard Louis Hurt on or about September 19, 1962; by Mike Corrado on or about April 15, 1962; and by Sue H. Lowe on or about April 26, 1962. I find upon the credited testimony of Floy Rushing that Hurt, on or about September 19, 1962, inquired of her as to who the "ringleader" was after she had given him the names of the employees who had joined the Union, 392 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and also asked her why the employees had decided all of a sudden for the Union. Preceding this questioning Floy Rushing, accompanied by several other employees, had advised Hurt on September 13 and again on or about September 19 that they were for the Union. Later in the day on September 19, Hurt went to Rushing and asked her for a list of the employees who had earlier that day and. on September 13 advised him in the groups that they were for the Union. Hurt explained his reason for asking for the list of names from Rushing by testifying that Rushing had told him when the groups had advised him they were for the Union that they were telling him because they wanted Sam (Siegel) to know, and that he was obliging them in that respect. Rushing denied that she had said to Hurt that she wanted Sam Siegel to know. Although it may be questionable whether Hurt's asking for the list under these circumstances was a violation of the Act, he had no right to ask for the identity of the ringleader nor to inquire into the reason for their union sympathies. I do not credit Hurt's denial that he had asked who the ringleader was or had asked the reason why they had decided for the Union. I find Hurt's inter- rogation as to the identity of the ringleader and why they had decided for the Union to be violative of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. I find upon the credited testimony of Ennie Edwards that in April 1962 Mike Corrado went to her at her machine and asked her if any union organizers had been around to see them; and on cross-examination it was brought out that Corrado had asked if she had had a union organizer at her house. I do not credit Corrado's denial. I find such interrogation violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Employee Lora Ridings testified that near the last of April 1962 Floorlady Sue Lowe came to the worktable where Ridings and two other employees were working and said, "There was two ladies in the collar section that was for the Union." That is all that Lowe had said. I fail to see any unlawful interrogation in that lone remark by Lowe and, accordingly, I shall recommend that the allegation in the com- plaint to the extent that Lowe interrogated employees in violation of Section 8(a) (1) be dismissed. 5. Threats The consolidated complaint alleged and the answer denied that Supervisor Richard Louis Hurt on or about August 24, 1962, and Supervisor Gertie Lee Kee on or about August 31, 1962, threatened employees at the Bruceton plant with reprisal concerning their terms or conditions of employment if they became or remained members of the Union or otherwise engaged in union activities. Employee Dorothy Brendon testified that she is a machine operator at the Bruceton plant, and her immediate supervisor is Richard Louis Hurt. On August 24, 1962, about 3:50 o'clock in the afternoon, she went to Hurt and asked him what he thought about a union. He replied, "Take the Huntingdon job, for instance, they are only getting 4 days and a half a week." She then told him she had signed a union card the evening before Hurt replied, "If you don't tell no one but me, I won't have to tell Sam [Siegel] because if Sam finds out he will want to know why I didn't tell him." She then asked him if Sam would fire anybody if he found out they had signed a card, and Hurt replied, "No, Sam wouldn't fire you, but he might not give you as good a showing as you once have had." She replied, "That's too bad; I signed a card," and the conversation ended. Hurt denied that Brendon ever talked to him concerning the above. I credit Brendon's testimony. Although Brendon initiated the conversation with Hurt and his statements to her were in response to her questions, such facts do not privilege nor mitigate the unlawfulness of Hurt's statements which clearly threatened her job security. I find Hurt's state- ments to her to be violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I credit the testimony of employee Milton Turner who testified that on August 31, 1962, he was told by Supervisor Gertie Kee that if Respondent found out that he had signed a union card he would be fired or laid off Kee was not called as a witness because of illness. I find that such a threat is violative of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. The consolidated complaint further alleged that Respondent by Sam Siegel, its supervisor and agent, on or about October 1, 1962, told its employees at the Bruce- ton, Tennessee, plant that if the Union were selected as bargaining representative of the employees, a substantial number of employees would lose their jobs. The transcript of a tape recording of a speech given during a meal at Sam Siegel's house in Bruceton has been received in evidence as General Counsel's Exhibit No. 2. The whole transcript covers 35 pages of lettersize paper. In addition to the Bruceton employees, representatives of the Government in connection with a bond drive were also present. The Respondent contends that there was nothing in this speech of a coercive or threatening character, and it was, therefore, protected by the first amend- HENRY I. SIEGEL CO., INC. 393 ment and Section 8(c) of the Act. General Counsel contends the following part of Siegel's speech unlawfully threatened its employees with loss of employment if the plant became unionized in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) : It is my honest belief that a union cannot and will not work in Bruceton, profitable for you . . . . We'll work all the people we can work, but it is my belief that we cannot work 1,400 people. It is my belief that I cannot even work a 1,000 people. I don't believe we can work 500 people. What's going to happen to the other people . . . . Now what's going to happen when we have to cut the shop back. The General Counsel contends and I agree that such statement of Siegel conveyed to his employees the threat of plant cutback or other fear of loss of jobs and that the inevitability of economic loss as distinguished from a prediction is illustrated by Siegel's statement, "What's going to happen when we have to cut the shop back?" In that Siegel thereby indicated that it was a foregone conclusion that layoffs would result if the Union came in. Siegel also stated to them, "You work here because you can't get a better job than this is. That's why you're here." I find that such. a threat of economic loss as a result of unionization constitutes interference , restraint, and coercion of employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. Accordingly, I find that the Respondent violated Section 8(a) (1) of the Act on or about October 1, 1962, by the statements of Sam Siegel to its employees as alleged in the complaint. B. The Trezevant plant (Case No. 26-CA-1256) In this case, the Union filed a charge on April 4, 1962, that the Respondent had interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. The Trezevant plant was the only plant named in the charge. The- charge did not set forth any specific facts for the basis of the charge. As alleged in the consolidated complaint the Respondent executed and entered into a settlement agreement on May 11, 1962, which was approved by the Regional Director on May 16, 1962. The settlement agreement provided, inter alia, that the Respondent would comply with all the terms and provisions of the "Notice to All Empoyees" attached to and made a part of the settlement agreement, which notice provided, inter alia, as follows: WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees as to their union activities or tell our employees that we know which ones are going around with the union- organizers. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor or- ganizations, to join or assist Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and to refrain from any or all of such activities. All our employees are free to become or remain, or refrain from becoming or remaining members of the above-named Union or any other labor organization. The Respondent complied with the terms of the settlement agreement and the General Counsel stated at the hearing that he does not contend that the agreement was violated by any unfair labor practices at the Trezevant plant subsequent to the- agreement.5 On October 31, 1962, the Regional Director set aside the settlement agreement at the Trezevant plant by reason of the charge filed in Case No. 26-CA-1371, alleg- ing unfair labor practices at the Bruceton plant and by reason of the acts at the Bruceton plant set forth in paragraphs 12, 14, 17, and 18 of the consolidated complaint. 5 Although the General Counsel so stated at the hearing, he argues in his brief "that because no subsequent violations came to light at Trezevant, the Trial Examiner is not- precluded from going behind the settlement agreement in light of the closely knit set of facts in this case" From this it appears to me that he would have the Trial Examiner- infer or speculate that because no subsequent violations came to light at the Trezevant plant there were violations which were successfully hidden from detection. I decline to- draw such an inference. Since there is no contention that subsequent violations occurred, I conclude that the General Counsel after his investigation was satisfied there were no, subsequent violations; otherwise he would have alleged them in the consolidated complaint. .394 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD On November 2, 1962, the consolidated complaint issued in Cases Nos. 26-CA- 1256 (Trezevant plant) and 26-CA-1371 ( Bruceton plant). Thus the question is presented whether the unfair labor practices at the Bruceton plant in violation of Section 8 (a)( I) are a basis to set aside the settlement agree- ment arrived at for the Trezevant plant in the absence of any unfair labor practices ,at the Trezevant plant subsequent to the agreement. The General Counsel contends that subsequent independent violations of Sec- tion 8 (a) (1) occurring at the Bruceton plant are sufficient to set aside the agreement at the Trezevant plant and therefore the unfair labor practices alleged to have occurred at the Trezevant plant prior to the settlement agreement should be litigated .6 Although only three of the Respondent's plants are involved in this consolidated proceeding, the General Counsel in his brief submits that an appropriate 8(a)(1) .order be issued applying to all seven of Respondent's plants in Kentucky and Ten- nessee. As hereinafter appears in this report the Recommended Order applies only to the Bruceton plant. The Respondent contends that since the violations , if any, occurred at the Bruceton plant such violations have no effect on the settlement agreement covering only the Trezevant plant. The Respondent at the hearing moved for dismissal of paragraphs 16, 19, 21, and 22 of the consolidated complaint . Decision was reserved on the motion. On the basis of the entire record, I now grant the motion to dismiss paragraphs 16, 19, 21, and 22 of the consolidated complaint for the reasons which follow: The Bruceton plant is approximately 23 miles distant from the Trezevant plant. The record shows there is no interchange of goods between the Bruceton and Trezevant plants. Although Sam Siegel, vice president in charge of production, is in charge of all the plants , each plant has its own separate supervisory staff. Each manager hires and fires and lays off employees . Each plant manages its own produc- tion; wage rates are different because the prices are different for different operations; and each plant has its own managerial staff meetings . However, union meetings are attended by employees from different plants. For the most part there is no interchange of employees among the plants although there have been instances of two employees transferring from Trezevant to Bruceton, e.g, when the shipping department was moved from Trezevant to Bruceton two employees continued to live in Trezevant and travel to Bruceton. I do not belive that the record establishes sufficient interrelationship between the Bruceton and Trezevant plants to establish the integrated enterprise for which the General Counsel contends . Accordingly no basis exists for litigating alleged presettlement unfair labor practices at Trezevant because of unfair labor practices violating Section 8 (a)(1) having occurred at the Bruceton plant and Respondent 's motion to dismiss paragraphs 16, 19, 21, and 22 of the consolidated complaint is granted . The settlement agreement should be reinstated. C The Gleason plant (Case No. 26-CA-1304) Case No. 26-CA-1304 refers only to the Gleason plant. It stems from a charge filed by the Union on June 18, 1962, which listed 12 locations for the Respondent .and charged with respect to the Gleason plant that since March 12, 1962, the Re- spondent has interrogated employees as to union adherence and activity, has en- gaged in surveillance of union activity, and has threatened employees with loss of employment and other deprivation for adherence to the Union. The charge was dismissed by the Regional Director . The Union appealed such dismissal to the Gen- eral Counsel who sustained the Union's appeal on November 2, 1962. The com- plaint issued on November 7, 1962. The complaint alleged as an unfair labor practice only that the Respondent con- veyed to employees the impression of surveillance of their union activities and the activities of the union organizers. According to the complaint, this impression of surveillance was conveyed to em- ployees by statements to, and interrogation of, employees at the Gleason plant made by Plant Manager Leslie McElhiney on or about May 3, 1962, and by Floorlady Beauton Wilson on or about June 15, 1962 Thus the sole question presented is whether or not the alleged statements and interrogation conveyed the impression of surveillance in violation of Section 8 (a)( I) of the Act. O The General Counsel also claims that independent violations occurred at the Gleason plant but I have hereinafter found that the Respondent did not violate the Act at the -Gleason plant HENRY I. SIEGEL CO., INC. 395 Employee Louise Cardwell testified that in June 1962 Floorlady Wilson asked her if she was working for the Union and had she signed a card. Cardwell testified that in reply to those questions she told Wilson "it is none of your business" and walked on. Floorlady Wilson denied that she had ever asked Cardwell whether she was working for the Union or had signed a union card, and that she had never ques- tioned any employees in the Gleason plant concerning their union activities or sentiments. I find it unnecessary to resolve the question of credibility between Cardwell and Wilson for, assuming that Wilson did ask Cardwell if she was working for the Union and had signed a union card, I fail to see how such questions could or did create the impression of surveillance by the Respondent. Accordingly, the com- plaint with respect to the allegation that Wilson on June 15 conveyed to employees the impression of surveillance should be dismissed.? Russelene Galey testified she is a final inspector at the Gleason plant; that on May 2, 1962, McElhiney came to her in the morning and he asked if she had had company the night before; she asked him what he meant and he said a union rep- resentative. She answered yes, that she came to see Galey and McElhiney then wanted her to describe the woman but Galey said she could not describe her except that she was a middle-aged lady and it was the first time she had met her; that McElhiney said it was his understanding that she had visited four other girls the night before. Galey testified she did not ask him how he knew. She continued that McElhiney told her the Union would not help them by lowering or raising production; that was all he said and walked away. On cross-examination Galey said she made a note of the date May 2 and also notes of what McElhiney said to her because the union organizer told her when a supervisor asked such questions to make a note of it. Galey was not asked to produce the notes to which she referred. Galey testified that no one else was present at the conversation between her and McElhiney. Leslie McElhiney, called by the Respondent, testified that he became plant manager at Gleason on March 15, 1962; denied ever asking Russelene Galey if she had com- pany the night before and that she had asked, "What do you mean in particular?" and that he said, "A union representative." He testified further that Russelene Galey once told him (date unknown) that she had had a visitor. The occasion for her telling him that was after be had finished talking to Galey about the quality of her work she mentioned that she was visited by an organizer the night before; that he does not remember what he said in reply and might have said "You was?" or "Oh yes?" and then he passed on to the next inspector. McElhiney testified that Floorlady Beauton Wilson was present at the time. Beauton Wilson testified that she was present and heard Russelene Galey tell McElhiney she had had a visitor. Wilson testified she did not hear McElhiney say anything. Wilson further testified that Galey earlier that day had already told the same thing to her. As shown above, Galey testified that no one was present during her conversation with McElhiney. McElhiney testified that Floorlady Wilson was present. Wilson corroborated McElhiney that she was present. I credit Wilson's testimony that Galey had told her earlier in the day that she had had a visitor the night before and that she heard Galey mention it to McElhiney that she had had a visitor (union organizer). I also credit McElhiney's denial that 7 The General Counsel also introduced testimony from Cardwell that in March 1962 Plant Manager Baker Cosby came to the workplace about 7.05 in the morning and said, "Well, they are trying to get the Union back in the factory, ain't they"" And that Cardwell replied that she did not know. Cardwell testified that Cosby then said, "I wish you would sort of look around and if the union woman comes to your home to find out all you can " He continued, "If anybody in here has signed a union card and if I can find out who it is, we are going to fire them." The General Counsel does not contend that the Respondent committed any unfair labor practice by Cosby's statements. The record Shows that Cosby has not worked at the plant since February 26, 1962, and has been incapaci- tated by illness since then. Cosby did not testify because of his illness. The General Counsel stated that he was introducing testimony of Cosby's statements only as back- ground evidence. I do not consider that background evidence, if it be such, to be helpful in explaining or throwing any light on the question as to whether or not Wilson's alleged' statements and questioning created the impression of surveillance as alleged in the complaint. .396 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD he had ever asked Galey if she had company the night before, or that she had asked him whom he meant in particular and that he had replied, "A union ,representative." Accordingly the complaint with respect to the allegation that McElhiney on or ,about May 3, 1962, conveyed to employees the impression of surveillance should be dismissed. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The operations of the Respondent described in section I, above, in connection with the unfair labor practices described in section III, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the ,free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act at its Bruceton, Tennessee, plant in certain particulars, it will be recommended that it -cease and desist therefrom and that it take certain affirmative action designed to -effectuate the policies of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organiza- tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 2. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices at the Bruceton, Tennessee, plant within the meaning of 'Section 8 (a)( 1 ) of the Act. 3. The Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act at its Gleason, Tennessee, plant and the complaint in Case No. 26-CA-1304 should be dismissed. 4. The Respondent did not violate Section 8(a) (1) of the Act by unfair labor practices committed at the Trezevant, Tennessee, plant subsequent to the settlement agreement and the said agreement should be reinstated. 5. The unfair labor practices committed in violation of Section 8(a)(1) as found above to have been committed at the Bruceton, Tennessee, plant did not operate to effect the settlement agreement executed with respect to the Trezevant plant. 6. The consolidated complaint to the extent that it alleged that Floorlady Sue Lowe interrogated employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) should be dismissed. 7. The consolidated complaint to the extent that it alleged that Supervisors Ozier and Allen by statements to and interrogation of employees on or about April 16, 1962, created the impression of surveillance should be dismissed. 8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and upon the entire record in the case, I recommend that Henry I. Siegel Co., Inc., its officers, -agents, successors , and assigns , be ordered to: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Requiring its employees in a manner constituting interference, restraint, and coercion to give to it copies of their affidavits given to an agent of the Board. (b) Interrogating employees concerning their union membership, activities, or desires in a manner constituting interference, restraint, or coercion within the mean- ing of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. (c) Threatening employees with reprisals because of their interest in or activity on behalf of the above-mentioned or any other labor organization. (d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist the above- .named labor organization, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted -activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection or to refrain from any or all such activity. HENRY I. SIEGEL CO., INC. 397 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at its plant in Bruceton, Tennessee,° copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 9 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Twenty-sixth Region shall, after being duly signed by a representative of the Respondent, be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director for the Twenty-sixth Region, in writing, within 20 days from the date of receipt of this Recommended Order, what steps have been taken in compliance1e 8 The General Counsel in his brief requests an appropriate order covering Respondent's seven plants in Tennessee and Kentucky . In Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Company, 140 NLRB 1359, the Trial Examiner had recommended that notices to all employees be posted at the Employer's main office, at its plant in Key West, Florida, and at its premises at Marathon, Florida. The Board modified the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner stating, "As the violations of the Act in this case occurred only at Key West, Florida, we shall require that the notice be posted only in Key West, Florida" Accordingly, since the violations of the Act in this present proceeding occurred only at Bruceton, Tennessee, it is required that the notice be posted only at Bruceton, Tennessee. 8In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "A De- cision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "The Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "A Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "A Decision and Order." "In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board , this provision shall be modified to read : "Notify the said Regional Director , in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps have been taken in compliance." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES AT THE BRUCETON, TENNESSEE, PLANT Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, we hereby notify you that: WE WILL NOT threaten with reprisals nor interrogate our employees in con- nection with their interest in, knowledge about, or activity in behalf of, any labor organization. WE WILL NOT require employees in a manner constituting interference, restraint, or coercion to submit copies to us of their affidavits given to a Board agent. WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to join or assist Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to en- gage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities. HENRY I. SIEGEL CO ., INC., Employer. Dated---------- --------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative ) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office 7th Floor, Falls Building, 22 North Front Street, Memphis, Tennessee, 38103 , Telephone No. Jackson 7-5451, if they have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions.