V. C. Britton Co.

220 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD WE WILL bargain collectively on request with Seafarers International Union of North America, Atlantic, Gulf, Lakes and Inland Waters District, Puerto Rico Division, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all our employees, and, if an understanding is reached, we will embody such understanding in a signed agreement. WE WILL NOT negotiate with Teamsters , Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 901, IBTCW & H of America, or any other labor organization, concerning employee grievances without the Seafarers having been given an opportunity to be present at the adjustment thereof unless or until Teamsters Local 901 shall have been certified by the National Labor Relations Board. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with , restrain, or co- erce our employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form labor organizations , to join or assist Seafarers International Union, Puerto Rico Division, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through repre- sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activity for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities. WE WILL withdraw and withhold recognition from Teamsters Local 901 as the representative of our employees for the purpose of dealing with us concern- ing employee grievances, unless and until said labor organization shall have been certified by the National Labor Relations Board. All our employees are free to become or remain, or to refrain from becoming or remaining, members of the above-named or any other labor organization. VALENCIA BART EXPRESS, INC., Employer. Dated------------------- By-------- --------------------------- (Representative ) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 1506 Ponce de Leon, Santurce, Puerto Rico, 00910, Telephone No. 723-3200 , if they have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions. V. C. Britton Co. and Agricultural Workers Organizing Com- mittee, AFL-CIO. Case No. 00-CA-2417. June 97, 1963 DECISION AND ORDER On April 25, 1963, Trial Examiner William E. Spencer issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Intermedi- ate Report. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the In- termediate Report and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three- member panel [Members Leedom, Fanning, and Brown]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Interme- diate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in this 143 NLRB No. 44. V. C. BRITTON CO. 221 case, and hereby adopts the Trial Examiner's findings, conclusions, and recommendations.' ORDER The Board adopts the Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner, with the following addition as the last paragraph of the order : It is further ordered that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dismissed, insofar as it alleges other violations of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act not specifically found herein. I Contrary to the Respondent's exceptions to the Intermediate Report, we agree with the Trial Examiner's findings that the Respondent engaged in independent violations of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act and [that it discriminatorily discharged George Gonzales in violation of Section 8(a) (3) and (1). We are convinced, after a careful review of all the evidence, that the Trial Examiner's credibility resolutions resulted from a fair appraisal of the evidence as a whole and the demeanor of the witnesses Accordingly, we reject as wholly unwarranted Respondent's assertion that the Trial Examiner was biased or prejudiced. INTERMEDIATE REPORT AND RECOMMENDED ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE This proceeding, brought under Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act as amended (61 Stat. 136; 73 Stat. 519), herein called the Act, was heard before Trial Examiner William E. Spencer at Fresno, California, on January 21, 22, 23, 1963, pursuant to due notice. The complaint, issued on October 31, 1962, by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, the latter herein called the Board, upon a charge dated September 14, 1962, filed by Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, alleged in substance that V. C. Britton Co., the Respondent herein, discharged an employee in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, and engaged in conduct independently violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Respondent in its duly filed answer denied the unfair labor practice allegations. On or before March 12, 1963, the General Counsel, the Respondent, and the Charging Party filed briefs. Upon the entire record in the case, from my observation of witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed with me, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT The Respondent, a California corporation with its main office and principal place of business in Firebaugh, California, is engaged in the business of processing and manufacturing alfalfa pellets. During the calendar year 1961, in the conduct of said business, it caused to be manufactured, sold, and distributed at its Firebaugh plant products valued in excess of $500,000, of which amount, alfalfa pellets in excess of $50,000 were sold and shipped directly to places and points outside California. H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. IH. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Preelection statements and conduct In March 1962, George Gonzales, a truckdriver employed by the Respondent since about September 1960, met with Hector Abeytia, a business representative of the Union, and through Abeytia arranged for an organizational meeting of Respondent employees. This meeting occurred about March 23, 1962, off company premises, and a number of Respondent's employees signed union authorization cards at this meeting. Gonzales was among those most active in getting cards signed, at the meeting and elsewhere, and among those whose signatures he obtained was, accord- 222 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ing to his testimony, Raymond Brown , who was later to become his immediate super- visor, and the latter's son.' Subsequent to the March 23 meeting, the Union filed a representation petition with the Board, and on April 17 a conference on the petition held at the Board's Regional ,Office in San Francisco , was attended by Abeytia and Gonzales , representing the Union, Dan Street, Respondent's office manager, representing the Respondent, and others. It was Gonzales' undisputed testimony that the Respondent would not permit him to work on the day following this conference, and the Respondent offered no explanation for this 1-day layoff. On the following day, according to Gonzales, when he reported for work, Jake Cline, whom I find to be a supervisor,2 said, "George, I hear you are an official." When Gonzales responded, "Official9" Cline said, "Yes. you are an official stool pigeon ." Gonzales replied , "No, I am not a stool pigeon," whereupon Cline said, "Well, that's what I hear, they tell me that." Bill Eppler, a supervisor, was present at the time these statements were made. Jake Cline was not available to testify Eppler, though testifying, was not questioned on this incident. Pursuant to the Union's petition, an election was conducted by the Board among Respondent's employees in an appropriate unit on May 16, 1962. The Union won the election by a vote of 47 to 7 and was thereafter certified as the employees' bargaining representative. During the period immediately preceding the election, supervisors of the Respondent allegedly made statements and engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act The Union's victory at the polls cannot be held to have immunized such statements and conduct, if engaged in, from a finding that they constituted a violation of the Act, or to obviate the need, in such case, of remedial measures. Several employees testified that on the last payday before the election, instead of receiving their checks from the dispatchers as was customary, they were handed them, individually, by Dan Street or other company official, and told, in effect, that contrary to reports being circulated, they would be making as much or more money in 1962 than in the prior year, and were shown certain wage computations purporting to establish that fact. It appears that a unsigned notice had been posted on the bulletin board indicating that the employees were actually receiving less in wages than previoi'sly. The Respondent was free to present its argument on wages to its em- ployees, either individually or collectively, and to the extent that such presentation was free of coercive remarks or implications, no violation of the Act is involved. However, some of the testimony, if believed, shows the Respondent's presentation of its argument on wages to have been accompanied by, or followed with, statements of a more dubious character. Thus Employee Richard Martinez testified that Bill Eppler, superintendent, after asking him how he felt about the election, told a group of employees that if the Union came in they would be cut to a 40-hour week, that dues would be taken out of their checks , and as a consequence they would be losing money instead of gaining it through union representation; and that Jake Cline, in referring to the wage argu- ment, said they had been bearing talk that Gonzales had said the company was cheat- ing them out of money; that the company wanted to show them that they were getting the same amount in wages as in the previous year , and getting 1 day off. Employee Lou Garcia testified that Dan Street, office manager, in giving him his last check before the election, said that be would be making more in 1962 than in 1961, and that Gonzales was not as bright as he thought he was. "Ask that man if he can guarantee you $176 00 for two weeks work," Street said. according to Garcia. "You can come to me and I can guarantee you that much " Street further said that Britton had plenty of money: he did not have to operate but could always shut the mill down. Street denied having made these statements attributed to him by Garcia. Employee James A. Goin, discharged by the Respondent in September for absenteeism, testified that Eppler talked to him about the wages he was then making in comparison with what was made in 1961. "He just said that we would make more." Goin testified. "and he said then that anyone having anything to do with the Union would be fired, that Mr. Britton would never work under union contract " On a later occasion, but still before the election, according to Goin, Eppler looked at a sample ballot on the company's bulletin board, laughed, and said that "anybody that had anything to do with the Union was going to be fired, Mr Britton would never work under a union contract " Edward Sierras, another employee discharged by the 1 Brown denied that Gonzales obtained his signature but after much equivocation ad- mitted that he obtained the signature of Brown's son. 2 Raymond Brown testified that Take Cline was his immediate superior at a time when he. Brown, admittedly was a foreman. Eppler testified that he was truck superintendent. V. C. BRITTON CO. 223 Respondent in November 1962, was present at the time and gave corroborative testimony. Eppler specifically denied statements attributed to him by Goin and Sierras and made a sweeping disclaimer of having engaged in any discussion of the Union with employees in answer to some question bearing on wages. Gonzales testified that on the last payday before the election he was summoned to Street's office. Street told him that he was wrong in advising the men that they were not making more money this year than last; that if it had been up to him, Street, he would have fired Gonzales at the San Francisco hearing on the petition; that Britton did not want the Union, could not afford to pay $3 or $4 an hour in wages; that Britton did not have to keep the men on through the winter months, but could lay them off. These statements Street denied having made; he admitted calling Gonzales to his office for purposes of presenting the company's side of the wage question. Further according to Gonzales, Eppler, on an occasion, told him, "I don't want you talking to these guys around here The next time I see you talking to somebody, I am going to tan your butt." Eppler further said, "You are trying to destroy this organization, if you don't like it, you can get the hell out of here." Eppler denied the threats but testified that on an occasion in July, on entering one of Respondent's agricultural fields, he observed that Gonzales had left his truck idle and was talking to the driver of a chopping machine; that when Gonzales saw him approach he returned to his truck and left. Back at the plant on the same day, according to Eppler, he told Gonzales that he was not stop the choppers in their work and talk to them, "he was supposed to go to the field, get his load of hay, and come back with it, that's what we paid him for." Israel Chapa testified that on the day before the election, Superintendent Richard Cline asked if Chapa knew anything about a Union, and on Chapa answering in the affirmative, said, "What do you like about it." Chepa replied, "Put yourself in my place and then you tell me " Cline then told Chapa that Britton had given him a home, a job all the year 'round, and "if this thing blow up you are one of the lucky ones, you are still going to have a job around here"; that Britton would not accept the Union, that he would raise the rent on the house Chapa occupied Cline then turned to Pete Torres, another employee present, and told him that he had been telling Chapa that if the Union came in the company would have to raise the rent on its houses. Further discussion ensued on the cost of housing, at the conclusion of which Chapa told Cline, "I am not sure yet what side I am going to vote; if I did, I couldn't tell you." Cline replied, "No, no, I don't want you to tell me. Just give it a thought." Richard Cline did not testify? Chapa, an observer for the Union at the election, is still employed by the Respondent. Employee Lupe Olague testified that a few days before the election, Richard Cline asked him what he thought about the election, if he thought the Union would be a good thing, and if he liked the Union. When Olague replied, "I don't like the Union because I have never been in one," Cline said "Well, I am kind of glad you think about the same way I do." On a later occasion, Cline asked Olague, "Have you heard anything about the Union?" and when Olague replied, "I know just about as much about the Union as you do," there followed a discussion about wages and the rental of company houses, at the conclusion of which Cline disavowed any intention of discharging any employee because of the Union. B. Post election statements and conduct Employee Joe Murrillo, a truckdriver, testified that about a month after the election, while he was on his way to the field, accompanied by his foreman, Raymond Brown, Brown told him that if he did not want to go along with the Union. Jake Cline would give him year-round work; that the Company was going to "fire the Union guys one by one"; that about 14 "guys that were involved in the Union had already gone and talked to Jake so they could keep their jobs." Garcia testified that on about June 10, Brown told him that if he would withdraw from the Union he could continue working and suggested that he talk to one of his supervisors. Brown said, "They have four men to be fired which are George Gonzales, George Barrios, Pete Torres, and Israel Chapa " Garcia admitted that Brown was not a foreman at the time this latter conversation occurred. Brown testified, however, that he was told by Jake Cline on June 10 that he was to be promoted to foreman rank and that he assumed his duties as foreman on June 11. Employee Henry 'It was Respondent's contention that it did not charge rent on its houses occupied by its employees However, admittedly, there was a wage differential on those who occupied, and those who did not occupy company owned houses, obviously an indirect but sure way of collecting rent on the houses 224 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Cortez testified that in July Brown told him, "In case of a strike why don't you stick with the Company," and then said, "You guys are going to be blackballed, you won't get a job around Firebaugh." Employee Gerald Burnsed, hired by the Respondent after the election, and who quit or was laid off in December 1962, testified that in October he was approached by employee Cecil Bridgeford with respect to signing a petition to repudiate the Union as bargaining representative; present at the time, according to Burnsed, was his foreman, Brown. Burnsed testified with respect to Brown, "Well, he told us that if we did sign it, that it would be a guarantee of us a job for the winter months when usually the people were laid off," and those not signing "would probably not be working there next season." Bridgeford, according to Burnsed, said with respect to the petition, that others had helped in getting it up but would not say who. Some 2 weeks later, still according to Burnsed, Brown asked him if he was planning on signing the petition; that it was almost definite that the Union "was not coming in"; that those signing it would be guaranteed a job, naming Bridgeford, Melton, Russell, and Burnsed as employees who would be "working in the shop that winter" if they signed the petition. After a layoff which occurred about Thanks- giving, Burnsed, according to his testimony, asked Brown what had happened to Eddie Sierras, a dispatcher, and Brown replied that Sierras was laid off because he was a "union guy." Further according to Burnsed, Brown said, "If you will look, you won't see very many of the guys that were in the union, had anything to do with the union, around here." Burnsed admitted that he signed the petition in question and that his employment was thereafter terminated. Brown denied all antiunion statements attributed to him and testified that he had no conversations with employees about the Union, or the petition repudiating the Union, with these exceptions: (1) In July, while he was riding with Cortez to the field, Cortez said he was sorry he got mixed up with the Union and wanted to know if he, Brown, could help him get out. Brown testified that he replied in the negative and referred Cortez to Jake Cline; (2) on an occasion in October, while driving with Garcia, Garcia mentioned the antiunion petition and said he had gotten in trouble by signing one petition and did not want to sign another. Brown, according to his testimony, replied, "Why do you tell me those things? I dont want to know about it." Bridgeford, David C. Melton, and Russell, employed after the election, testified, contrary to Burnsed's testimony, that on no occasion was Brown present during a discussion of the antiunion petition. Bridgeford testified that he, Burnsed, Melton, and Walter Russell prepared the petition in question and that Melton's wife made a typewritten copy of it. The petition appeared in this form: DEAR Six: We the undersigned truck driver and mill worker employees of V. C. Britton Co. Firebaugh, Calif. Do here by request that the A.W.O.C. be excluded as our bargaining Agents in matters pertaining to wages working condition & hours or anything concerning our employment with the V. C. Britton Co. this request is of our own free will and accord without pressure or coercion from any person or group of persons. It was dated October 6, 1962, and bore the signatures of 12 employees. In support of an allegation of surveillance of a union meeting, the Union's repre- sentative, Abeytia, testified that a union meeting held in the Union's hall or office in Firebaugh on the evening of July 11, was observed by Street, Jake Cline, and Eppler. According to Abeytia, Street drove by the hall in his car, accompanied by his family, at least twice, and again in a company car driven by Cline. Eppler, according to Abeytia, drove by the hall at least twice. Street admitted that he drove by the hall once with his family; that he then drove to the company plant where he saw Jake Cline, told the latter that an employee they were checking up on might be at the union meeting, and that they then returned to Firebaugh and observed cars to see if the employee in question was present . Eppler admitted driving past the union hall on the occasion in question, but denied that he did it for purposes of observing the union meeting. Admittedly, the union hall is situated on a corner of one of the main thoroughfares of Firebaugh , a small town. C. The discharge of George Gonzales Gonzales testified that on July 2, when he reported for work, Jake Cline handed him his paycheck, saying, "If you are short, tell me." Cline followed him out of the office, and outside, in the presence of a group of employees , told Gonzales, "You have been hustling these guys to get into the Union, there are good guys, they don't want to have anything to do with the Union. You'd better straighten yourself out; if you don't, my boss is going to call you in and work you over." According to Gonzales, he made no response, and Cline, continuing, called him "chickens-t" V. C. BRITTON Co. 225 repeatedly. Thereupon, Dan Street, who was present, said, "I wouldn't take that, I wouldn't let anybody call me chickens-t." Further according to Gonzales, Street "kept saying he wouldn't let anybody call him `chickens-t' and get away with it, he wouldn't stick around . . Street further said, "under the law we are not even supposed to talk to you," whereupon Gonzales asked him, "Why are you doing this?" to which he made no reply. Then Eppler, who was also present, said, "Why did you come back?" Gonzales answered that he wanted to work there, that was the reason. Street's version of the July 2 episode follows: One of the truckdrivers had come in and asked for his check in the office. At that time Jake Cline was in there and Jake asked him why he was quitting, and he said because he couldn 't take any more guff from George Gonzales, and so we asked him what he meant , and he said that George had threatened him and had kept calling him chicken and had written things on the trucks about him, and Jake told him that he didn't have to put up with that kind of stuff and to go back to work. At that time we reported it to Mr. Hayes, and we decided I should go out and at least explain our position , that he was not to threaten an employee. I approached George Gonzales in the truck shack and told him that we had heard about some threats that he had made to individual employees in the truck department and that the Company would not tolerate this, and he had no business talking to any truckdrivers at any time concerning their activities in his organization or our organization, and that it would have to cease immedi- ately, and that was the crux of what I told him. George Gonzales kept saying, you are the boss, and he walked outside the truck shack, and of course we followed him out, and there were quite a few truckdrivers around, and he would pass back and forth and say, "You are the boss, you are the boss," and finally Jake Cline, who is the truck superintendent, said to George, "You are chicken." George, all he said was, "You are the boss, Jake." And then I also added that if any boss called me chickens-t, if I couldn't whip him, I'd quit. Eppler did not testify concerning the incident. Gonzales' discharge occurred on August 29. On that date, when Gonzales re- turned from the field, Eppler, in Brown's presence, handed him a previously prepared letter bearing this text: This date, August 29th, 1962, you were advised by me, in the presence of Mr. Ray Brown, that Mr. Brown is your immediate superior and you are to take orders from Mr. Brown without derogatory comment. On dates August 14th and August 27th, you demonstrated insubordination by not properly obeying orders issued by Mr. Brown. Any further insubordination to Mr. Brown will result in your immediate discharge. According to Eppler, when Gonzales read this letter, he said, "What does all this mean? I don't understand these dates . 1 don't have to take this crap . If Mr. Brown says I did these things, he is just a God-damn liar." Eppler replied that the letter meant what it said, whereupon according to him , Gonzales repeated that Brown was a liar and pushed against Brown with one hand as he started from the shack . Eppler then told Gonzales, "you can't talk to the boss like that and work here , you will have to go up to the office and get your check." Brown's version of the incident substantially corroborated Eppler. Gonzales went to Respondent's office where he was asked to affix his signature to a memorandum containing this text: Subject : Termination of George Gonzales, Truck Driver. Reason : Insubordination. The office was informed on August 27th, that the above employee was being insubordinate to one of the Company's Truck Fore- men, Raymond Brown. On August 29th the company issued a letter (attached) to George Gonzales which he refused to take and called Raymond Brown a "Liar" and said it was all a "damn lie." Eppler signed both of the above communications . Gonzales refused to affix his signature to the memorandum, as requested by Street. According to Street, he snatched his check out of Street's hand, saying, "Let me have it . . . You bastards, you are going to fire me anyway ." Eppler, who was present in Street's office at the time, testified only that Gonzales refused to affix his signature to the memorandum and took his check. 226 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Gonzales was not convinced that the letter, which text is given- above, was identi- cal with the one he was shown by Eppler and Brown, but admitted' that the letter in question accused him of insubordination. According to him Eppler said that on August 14 he was sent out to get a load and all he did was "go in and f-k around" and that on August 27 Gonzales threatened Brown with "great bodily harm." Gonzales replied that he knew Brown was his "boss" and if Brown had sent him out for a load on August 14 he would have gone, because if he did not go out Brown' could use that as an excuse to fire him. He denied calling Brown a "damn liar" or pushing him with his hand as he started from the shack. According to him, as he was leaving Eppler called to him, "Well, you can't call him a damn liar and get away with it. Go down to the office, pick up your check." He testified that in Street's office he heard the latter dictating a memorandum to his secretary and that when Street asked him to sign the memorandum, he told Street, "All I want is my check, I know what's in that letter, I wouldn't sign it." Admittedly, the warning letter presented to Gonzales on August 29 was prepared at the suggestion of H. Joseph Specht, industrial relations consultant with the Valley Employers' Association, an organization of which the Respondent is a mem- ber, after he had been contacted in the matter by Dan Hayes, an officer of the Respondent. Since Gonzales was known to the Respondent to be a leader in the organizational movement, it would reasonably assume that a discharge for whatever cause might well lead to the filing of a charge of unfair labor practices. I do not- therefore infer an improper motive in the making of the discharge from the bare fact that the Respondent asked for, and received, advice from Specht in the matter of issuing a warning letter before effectuating the discharge. Specht's advice, given on the basis of information furnished him by the Respondent was entirely proper. It strikes me as unusual however that an employer would seek such advice and issue such a warning letter without prior notice to the employee involved and without- affording that employee any opportunity to state his own position in the matter, unless something more was involved than appeared in the letter. While the precipitating cause of Gonzales' discharge, according to Eppler who. made the discharge, was his denunciation of Brown as a "damn liar," this situation would not have been brought about except that Gonzales was being charged with two instances of insubordination. We must look then- to the matters occurring on August 14 and 27 which, according to the Respondent, constituted insubordination. As to the August 14 incident, there are only the two witnesses, Brown and' Gonzales, or, since Gonzales testified that he had no recollection of such an incident as testified to by Brown occurring, one. At about 4 p.m. on that date, according to Brown, Gonzales was in the shack where truckdtivers gather to fill out their cards and get their trip orders. He instructed Gonzales to make a trip which, according to Brown, would require about 25 minutes. Gonzales left the shack and drove to the butane tanks, about an eighth of a mile distance from the shack, where the trucks were serviced. He remained there, without making the trip to the fields which Brown had ordered, until about 10 minutes of 5 when he returned to the shack. According to Brown he then asked Gonzales why he had not made the trip, and Gonzales replied that he did not have time, and that his "relief" was there. Ap- parently he was relieved of his duties at 5 o'clock, and Brown testified that he did' not then order him to make another trip inasmuch as his "relief" driver had arrived. He admitted that he issued no reprimand to Gonzales, did not then accuse him of having wasted time at the butane tanks, and that nothing more was said of the in- cident between him and Gonzales. On the following day, however, he reported the matter to Eppler. Eppler admittedly never approached Gonzales for his version of the incident. As previously indicated, Gonzales did not testify concerning the in- cident because, according to him, he had no recollection- of such an incident ever occurring. On August 27, according to both Brown and Bppler, the latter called Brown from a truck on which he was repairing the horn, and told him to send a driver to a crew that was then working in the field. Brown motioned to Gonzales, who was walking toward the shack some 40 feet away, to come over, and also, according to his testi- mony, called out to him and honked the horn of the truck on which he had been working. According to both Brown and Eppler, Gonzales merely waved his hand at Brown, with a gesture which they construed as one of rejection, and continued on into the shack. Eppler suggested that Brown follow Gonzales into the shack and find out why he had ignored Brown's call. According to Brown, he then went into the shack where Gonzales and several other employees were gathered; and asked Gonzales, who was leaning or half reclining on a table, why he did not answer Brown's sum- mons At that point. according to Brown, Gonzales "just jumped off the table and said if he caught me off the Company property he would knock the hell out of me."- V. C. BRITTON CO. 227 Brown testified that he replied that they could go out then and there and settle the matter that way, and nothing more was said. He admitted that Gonzales remained on duty for the balance of the day, carrying out his regularly assigned functions; that he never delivered Eppler's instructions to send a driver to the field indicated by Eppler either to Gonzales or to anybody else. He testified that he reported on the incident to Eppler on the following day. On the next day the communications previously mentioned were issued and Gonzales discharged. Brown admitted that prior to August 14 he had had no trouble with Gonzales who had been a truckdriver under his immediate supervision since he became a truck foreman in July. Gonzales testified concerning the August 27 incident, that the first he knew of it was when Brown came into the shack, asked him, "Why didn't you come out?" and accused him of "acting like a damn sneak." Gonzales replied, "If you want to talk to me like that, don't do it on company time, but do it off the ranch." Then, accord- ing to Gonzales, Brown kept telling him to go on out and have it out with him, saying, "You have got your car, I have got my car." Brown on leaving the shack addressed Gonzales with a remark in Spanish, which, according to Gonzales, meant "something like, 'You stupid son-of-a-bitch'." Brown, of at least part Mexican ancestry, denied having used the Spanish phrase attributed to him. He testified that the Mexican equivalent of son-of-a-bitch was son-of-a-bitch. Goin testified that he was in the shack on August 27 when Brown entered; that prior to Brown's entrance he had heard a horn honking outside but that Gonzales was already in the shack when he, Goin, entered. He did not hear the opening ex- change between Gonzales and Brown, but heard Brown say, "George, why don't you and I just go out and have this out, just me and you?" and Gonzales replied, "Oh, I can't do that. I will get fired. We are on Company property." As Brown left the shack he said something in Spanish which Goin, not knowing the language, did not understand. Garcia, also in the shack at the time the incident occurred, like Goin, heard only that part of the exchange between Gonzales and Brown in which Brown challenged the former to go outside and have it out. Garcia testified to the epithet in Spanish which Brown hurled at Gonzales as he, Brown, left the shack. The Spanish words as testified to by Garcia were not the same as those testified to by Gonzales. After considering all the testimony on this, a minor point, including Goin's, I am convinced that Brown directed an uncomplimentary epithet to Gonzales on leaving the shack, but whether or not it was the equivalent of son-of-a-bitch I do not know. D. Concluding findings on the discharge There is no question that Gonzales initiated the organizational movement among the Respondent's employees and was the employee leader in that movement. That Respondent was well aware of his position of leadership is established in his at- tendance at the meeting in San Francisco on the petition, Jake Cline's thereafter addressing him as an "official stool pigeon," and preelection remarks of Cline, Ep- pler, and Street associating Gonzales with what they deemed to be a misrepresentation of the wage issue, in their conversations with various employees. Respondent's resentment of Gonzales because of his leadership in union activities, is forcibly illus- trated in the July 2 incident, when Cline, in the presence of Street and Eppler, as well as a group of employees, attempted to humiliate Gonzales by referring to him in vulgar terms, and Street, by his own admission, taunted him by saying that if any "boss" addresed him in such manner he would either whip him or quit. Assuming that this incident was initiated by information the Respondent had received that one of its employees was quitting because of harassing tactics by Gonzales, such informa- tion-about which Gonzales clearly was not informed or questioned in private- furnished no justification for the ridicule which the Respondent heaped on him in the presence of his fellow employees, and no justification for Street's admitted admoni- tion to Gonzales that "he had no business talking to any truck drivers at any time concerning their activities in his organization or our organization, and that it would have to cease immediately . . The animus with which the Respondent regarded Gonzales because of his union activities being clearly established, we necessarily scrutinize closely the circumstances attending his discharge in August. As more than one court has stated, while the existence of such views does not "compel the conclusion that a particular discharge was prompted by an antiunion animus . it may supply shape and substance to otherwise equivocal circumstances." N.L.R.B. v. Davidson Rubber Co., 305 F. 2d 166 (C.A. 1). See also, N.L.R.B. v. W. M. Chambers Truck Line, Inc., 306 F 2d 549 (C.A. 5). 717-672-64-vol 143-16 228 DECISIONTS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD After a close study of the evidence proffered in this case, and the arguments ad- vanced by Respondent's able counsel, I am convinced that the circumstances attend- ing Gonzales' discharge were, to say the very least, equivocal. Brown's testimony on both the August 14 and 27 incidents was far from convincing. If on the afternoon of August 14 he gave orders to Gonzales to make a trip requiring some 25 minutes, I think he would not have stood idly by while he observed Gonzales spend some 40 minutes idling at the butane tanks or would have registered no protest with Gonzales when the latter returned to the shack without having made the trip and too late to go out again before the end of his shift. At one point he testified that Gonzales was at the butane tanks only some 10 or 15 minutes, and if we accept this as fact, and Gonzales returned to the shack immediately after servicing his truck, by Brown's own testimony it was then too late for him to make another trip that day. It is my opinion and finding that no such incident as Brown testified to occurred on August 14. Brown's testimony on the August 27 incident was equally unsatisfactory. He testified that he waved to Gonzales, called out to him, and honked his horn, and Gonzales-walking toward the shack at one point in Brown's testimony, at the door of the shack in another-ignored all this except to wave back in a deprecatory or negative manner. Brown's further testimony that when he entered the shack and asked Gonzales why he had not responded to Brown's call, Gonzales immediately got to his feet and challenged him to a fight, is simply not credible. Gonzales knew that he was not in favor with the Respondent, and being at least an averagely intel- ligent person would surmise that any serious infraction of company discipline on his part would result in his discharge. As he told Eppler on August 29, if Brown had di- rected him to go to the field on August 14 he would have gone because he knew that Brown was his supervisor and that if he refused Brown's orders he would be discharged. Furthermore, Street's version of the July 2 incident, as well as Gonzales', shows that the latter could take jibes and insults from Respondent's supervisors with- out losing his head and replying in kind. Why, then, on August 27, in answer to a simple question from Brown as to why he had not answered Brown's summons, would he fly suddenly into a rage and challenge Brown to a fight, or "threaten him with bodily harm," as he was accused of doing by Eppler on the occasion of the dis- charge. On the other hand, if Brown was abusive in tone and manner and accused Gonzales of "acting like a damn sneak," as Gonzales testified he did, Gonzales may have been goaded into challenging Brown to meet him off company premises for a showdown. Brown was himself of at least part Mexican ancestry and, on the lowest level of the supervisory hierarchy, might more readily provoke a retort from Gonzales than Cline, Street, or Eppler, but that Gonzales was fully aware of his supervisory status is shown by the unquestioned fact that from the time Brown was made a foreman until at least August 14, Gonzales worked under him and was responsible to Brown's directions. Further doubt is cast on Brown's version of the August 27 incident, by his admis- sion that though directed by Eppler to send a truck out to a certain field, he not only did not carry out this order with respect to Gonzales but did not pass it on to any other employee and in fact did not know what occurred with respect to the situation in that field. He also referred in his testimony to giving the assignment to Gonzales to go out "when his turn came," though the assignment apparently did not relate to a crew on which Gonzales was regularly employed. As admitted, Gonzales went out with his regular crew for the balance of that day. When questioned, on the crew to which Gonzales was regularly assigned, Brown showed further confusion by naming, in succession, two different crews. Brown's credibility being a foremost factor in a consideration of the discharge, I must refer to his general denial that he ever discussed the Union with any employee, before or after the election, except in two isolated instances which occurred after the election, though, admittedly, he himself, before he was made foreman, signed a union card. Goin testified, and was corroborated by his wife, that shortly before being made foreman, Brown on a visit to the Goin home, said that the Union was "washed tip"; that some of the "guys" had pulled out, naming several; that Jake Cline had promised work for the ones that had already pulled out and were pulling out, for the coming winter; that he and Goin were both getting old and jobs would not be too easy to find any more, especially with their union activities, and "he felt that it would be best to go along with the Company and be assured of their jobs." This testimony was not specifically disputed. Also without specific denial was Garica's testimony that on June 10, before Brown assumed his duties as foreman, Brown suggested that Garcia talk to one of his supervisors about withdrawing from the Union, and said that the Respondent wanted to fire the leaders in the organizational movement, naming George Gonzales, George Barrios, Pete Torres, and Israel Chapa in that connection. V. C. BRITTON CO. 229 Aside from such testimony, it could hardly be believed that Brown, through signing a union card, in all the time preceding his promotion to foreman, engaged in no union discussions with his fellow employees. Further bearing on his credibility, was his denial of knowledge that Gonzales signed up his, Brown's, son in the Union. He gave a card to your son, didn't he? A. I don't know whether he did or not. Q. Do you know where your son got the card he signed? A. No, I don't. Q Do you have any idea? A. No, sir, I haven't. After this portion of his cross-examination, Brown was shown a pretrial affidavit given an agent of the Board, in which he stated: "Gonzales gave a blank card to my son. My son signed and returned it to Gonzales." Brown then testified, "I didn't see him give to him"; that he knew it "Because my son told me." It is difficult to see why, if Brown was straightforward in his testimony on the circumstances of Gonzales' discharge, he would have been so evasive and self- contradictory about the manner in which his son came to sign a union card, or should enter such sweeping denials of all conversations with fellow employees about the Union, even during the period before he was made a foreman. Eppler's testimony supports Brown, in part. He was present with Brown, he testified, when Brown gestured to and called out to Gonzales, and Gonzales ignored the summons except with a negative wave of the hand. Apparently, Respondent would have us believe that Gonzales question Brown's supervisory status. Assuming this to be the fact-through the evidence indicates the contrary-he could have had no question of Eppler's status. It hardly makes sense that he would deliberately have ignored a summons made in Eppler's presence, and replied with a gesture of dismissal or defiance. I am convinced that no such summons was made as testified to by Brown and Eppler, or, if made, was not directed to Gonzales, who was some 40 feet away, in such manner that he understood that he was directed to approach Brown for receiving job instructions. Although instructions Eppler testified he issued to Brown were never executed by Brown, Brown was never called to account in the matter, a strange oversight on Eppler's part if such instructions were actually issued. Also, Eppler gave no explanation of why he did not ask Gonzales for his version of the August 14 incident, although, according to him, on being informed of the matter by Brown he told the latter that he would look into it. Instead of making an independent investigation, on August 29 he confronted Gonzales with a letter accusing him of insubordination, and vocally accused Gon- zales of threatening Brown with bodily harm. Gonzales denied the accusations, and whether in doing so he called Brown a liar, or a damn liar, it is obvious that the stage had already been prepared for his discharge. He could not have denied the accusations without, inferentially at least, calling Brown a liar. I think he was not required to stand by in silent or vocal acquiescence, when such charges were leveled at him, if, in fact, the charges were false or loaded with false emphasis and motivated by his union activities, as I am convinced they were. If he said, as Eppler testified he said, that he "did not have to take this crap," he was but stating his rights under the Act. The Respondent had already, on July 2, with Eppler participating, attempted to goad him into making violent retort or quitting, and I think and find that the confrontation on August 29 was different only in degree, not in kind. I find that the Respondent discharged Gonzales because of his union activities .4 * In reaching these conclusions I have weighed carefully testimony offered for the sole purpose of attacking Gonzales ' credibility. Bridgeford, according to his testimony one of the authors of the antiunion petition circulated by himself and others in the fall of 1962, testified that he observed Gonzales making pornographic drawings and obscenities directed at Foreman Brown on the walls of Respondent's toilet while, he, Gonzales, was occupying a toilet seat. The inscriptions attributed to Gonzales employed the word "nigger" as a term of opprobrium . This testimony was denied by Gonzales in toto. Bridgeford testified that he reported on the matter to Eppler and Hayes. Neither Eppler nor Hayes, however, questioned Gonzales about the matter, though the obscenities as de- scribed by Bridgeford were of a particularly scurrilous and disgusting character . After a careful observation of the two witnesses I am of the opinion that the pornography, as described by Bridgeford, was more likely his handiwork than Gonzales'. Gonzales, a Mexican, would have been less likely than Bridgeford to employ the term "nigger" as a term of opprobrium , or to employ that term at all. Furthermore, If Gonzales were to en- 230 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD E. Conclusions on interference, restiauit, and coercion On my observation of the witnesses and a full consideration of conflicting testimony, where present: I find on the undisputed testimony of Chapa and Olague that Superintendent Richard Cline questioned each concerning his interest in the Union, and on Chapa's undisputed testimony, threatened Chapa and employee Torres with increased costs on the company houses they occupied, if the Union came in On Martinez' credited testimony, I find that Eppler questioned him about his interest in the bargaining election, and threatened him and a group of employees with a loss of wages in the event of a union victory. On the credited testimony of Goin and Sierras, I find that Eppler, on observing an election notice, threatened that the Respondent would never work under a union contract. On Gonzales' credited testimony I find that Eppler and Street each threatened him with reprisals if he continued to discuss the Union with his fellow employees, and that Street made the coercive statement that if it had been up to him, Street, he would have fired Gonzales for representing the Union at the hearing on the Union's petition in San Francisco. On Gonzales' credited testimony I further find that Street implied that the Respondent would not continue its policy of affording its employees work through the winter months if the Union won. On Garcia's credited testimony I find that Street implied that the Respondent would close its operations rather than deal with the Union .5 On Murrilo's credited testimony I find that Brown, while occupying the status of foreman, offered inducements if he, Murrilo, would withdraw from the Union, and made the threat that the Company would "fire the Union guys one by one " On Cortez's credited testimony I find that Foreman Brown after suggesting that in event of a strike Cortez should "stick with the company," made the threat that union employees would be blackballed and would not be able to get a job around Firebaugh, the town closest to Respondent's operations Such threats and promises of benefits are entirely consistent with statements, not specifically denied, Brown made to Goin and Garcia a day, or a few days, before he was made foreman. On Burnsed's credited testimony I find that Brown questioned him if he had signed the antiunion petition; promised him if he did sign it it would be a guarantee of a job through the winter months when most employees were laid off; that those not gage in such scatological depictions, he would have taken some pains to see that he was unobserved. He knew how be stood with the Respondent Ernest D Rowe, a former employee of Respondent, hired after the bargaining election and admittedly antiunion, although shown on cross-examination to be capable of slanting his statements to suit his resentments of the moment, was a more credible witness He testified that on two occa- sions he saw Gonzales making inscriptions on trucks, one linking Brown and Rowe as SOB's, the other bearing the words, "Rowe is a damn queer " Concerning this latter in- scription , Rowe testified that he confronted Gonzales ; accused him of being its author ; and Gonzales merely laughed. I have no doubt Rowe believed that Gonzales made the in- scriptions, though, as Rowe admitted, there were inscriptions of various character on the dashboard and elsewhere on the trucks all the time Gonzales denied that he made the inscriptions in question, admitted that Rowe accused him on the one occasion , and testified that he met the accusation with a denial . I credit Rowe that Gonzales did not make a denial but laughed, as Rowe testified he did. I also believe that Gonzales made the in- scription on the dashboard descriptive of Rowe as a "damn queer " I have taken this into account in evaluating conflicting testimony on 'the circumstances of the discharge where I havecredited Gonzales over Brown Unfortunately, not all witnesses tell all the truth all the time, but fortunately some tell it with more frequency than others That Gonzales admitted on cross-examination that he on occasion used vulgar language, was not a deciding or persuasive factor in the credibility resolution ; had he testified other- wise I would not have believed him. Neither of the incidents referred to above were advanced by the Respondent as entering into its discharge decision c Eppler's denials of all discussions with employees concerning the Union except when questioned by them, and of any recollection of such isolated conversations if they actually occurred, were too sweeping for credence The combined testimony of the General Counsel's employee witnesses convinces me, beyond question, that the Respondent, through its supervisors, systematically interviewed employees for the purpose of presenting its position on the wage issue. I have no doubt that Eppler engaged in such discussions and knew that he engaged in such discussions when he testified The antiunion statements attributed to him fit into the pattern of Respondent's resistance to the organizational movement among its employees. Street's antiunion bias and the lengths to which he would carry it is shown by his own admission in his baiting of Gonzales because of the latter's union leadership. V. C. BRITTON CO. 231 signing it "would probably not be working there next season", and implied that most "of the guys that were in the union" had been discharged.6 On other disputed testimony either I am not convinced that a predominance of credibility supports the General Counsel's allegations, or findings would be merely cumulative. With respect to alleged surveillance of a union meeting, the meeting held in the unions' hall on a public street in Firebaugh, the small town where Re- spondent's plant is located, was not actually attended by any officer or supervisor of the Respondent, and while perhaps there was an unusual passing back and forth in the public streets outside the hall by Respondent's officials, I think they had a right to the use of such public streets whether or not a union meeting was in progress and I see nothing wrong in the naked fact that they observed the cars parked along the streets adjacent to the hall and doubtless identified some of them as belonging to their employees. There is no evidence that these supervisors stopped their cars at any time to peer into the union hall for the purpose of observing the meeting, or in any way, by surveillance or otherwise, trespassed upon the right of their employees to attend such meeting, or molested them in doing so. On the basis of the above findings and the entire record, I conclude that the Respondent by interrogating its employees concerning their union interests and ac- tivities; by threatening them with reprisals if the Union won the election, or if they persisted in their union activities; by attempting to restrict Gonzales' union activities without reference to working time; and by offering inducements to its employees to withdraw from the Union or to abstain from union activities, interfered with, re- strained. and coerced its employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.7 IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of the Respondent described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY It having been found that the Respondent discharged George Gonzales because of his union and concerted activities, it will be recommended that the Respondent offer him immediate and full reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority and other rights and privileges, and make him whole for any loss of pay suffered because of the discrimination against him, by payment to him of a sum of money equal to that which he normally would have been paid in Respondent's employ from the date of the discharge to the date of Re- spondent's offer of reinstatement, less his net earnings, if any, during said period Loss of pay shall be computed upon a quarterly basis in the manner established by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289. Backpay shall include the payment of interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum to be computed in the manner set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1 The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act 2. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of its em- ployee, George Gonzales, thereby discouraging membership in the Union, the Re- spondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. O To the extent that the testimony of Bridgeford, Melton, and Russell, all employees hired after the election, all instrumental in the circulation of an antiunion petition, con- flicts with this finding I do not credit it The antiunion petition which according to them they authored together with Burnsed, while erratic in its (typing and punctuation, was worded in a manner legally sufficient to their purpose and I am convinced upon my observa- tion of these employees and listening to them testify that neither singly nor in combination could they have worded this petition without advice and assistance from someone who had a better command of language. 7 No findings of Independent 8(a) (1) activities are based on statements and conduct attributed to Jake Cline who was not named in the complaint and who was not available to testify. 232 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 3. By the said discharge; by interrogating its employees concerning their interest in and activities on behalf of the Union; by threatening them with reprisals because of their union activities or in the event of a union victory at the polls; by promise of benefits if they withdrew from the Union and refrained from union activity; and by prohibiting union activity on an employees' own time, the Respondent has inter- fered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act, and thereby has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, it is recommended that the Respondent, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discouraging membership in the Union, or in any other labor organization of its employees, by discharging its employees or by discriminating in any other man- ner in regard to their hire, or tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment. (b) Interrogating its employees in an unlawful manner concerning their interests in and activities on behalf of the Union or any other labor organization; threatening its employees with reprisals because of their union activities and/or in the event of a union victory at the polls; offering inducements and benefits to its employees if they withdrew from the Union or refrained from union activities; and prohibiting union activities on its employees' own time. (c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist the Union, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representa- tives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer George Gonzales immediate and full reinstatement to the position he held at the time he was discharged, or an equivalent position; without prejudice to his seniority and other rights and privileges, and make him whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered as a result of the discrimination against him in the manner set forth above in the section entitled "The Remedy." (b) Upon request make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of back pay due under the terms of this recommended order. (c) Post at its plant in or near Firebaugh, California, copies of the attached notice as Appendix.8 Copies of said notice to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Twentieth Region, San Francisco, California, shall after being duly signed by a representative of the Respondent, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon' receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for a period of sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that such notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for the Twentieth Region in writing, within twenty (20) days from the date of the receipt of this Intermediate Report and Recommended Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.9 8 In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, the words "A De- cision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "The Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further event that the Board's Order be enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "A Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "A Decision and Order." e In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, this provision, shall be modified to read' "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith " LOCAL 50 , AMERICAN BAKERY, ETC., UNION APPENDIX 233 NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT discourage affiliation with Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, by discharging our em- ployees, or by discriminating in any other manner in regard to their hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment. WE WILL NOT interrogate in an unlawful manner our employees concerning their union affiliation, interests, and activities; threaten them with reprisals be- cause of union affiliation and activities, or hold out inducements or promise of benefits if they will withdraw from, or refrain from union affiliation and ac- tivities; prohibit union activities on our employees' own time; or in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist the above- named Union, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as authorized by the National Labor Rela- tions Act. WE WILL offer George Gonzales immediate and full reinstatement to the po- sition he formerly held, or its equivalent, without prejudice to seniority or other rights and privileges, and make him whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered as a result of the discrimination against him. V. C. BRITTON CO., Employer. Dated------------------- B3'- ----------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) NOTE.-We will notify the above-named employee if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of his right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, as amended , after discharge from the Armed Forces. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 830 Market Street, Room 703, San Francisco, California, 94102, Telephone No. Yukon 6-3500, Extension 3191, if they have any question concerning this notice or compli- ance with its provisions. Local 50, American Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, AFL-CIO [Ward Baking Company] and Charles Fisher. Case No. 2-CB-3600. June 27, 1963 DECISION AND ORDER On March 26, 1963, Trial Examiner Ivar H. Peterson issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent Union had engaged in and was engaging in certain un- fair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist there- from, and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Intermediate Report. Thereafter, the Respondent and the General Counsel filed exceptions and supporting brief s.1 '.The Respondent's request for oral argument is hereby denied as the record, exceptions, and briefs adequately present the issues and positions of the parties. 143 NLRB No. 41.