Harvey Probber, Inc.

HARVEY PROBBER, INC. 683 Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. North Country Motors, Ltd., is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Local 259, International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agri- cultural Implement Workers of America (UAW, AFL-CIO), is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The Respondent has not engaged in any unfair labor practices as alleged in the complaint. RECOMMENDED ORDER It is hereby recommended that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety. Harvey Probber, Inc. and United Furniture Workers of America, AFL-CIO. Case No. 1-CA-4132. April 6, 1964 DECISION AND ORDER On November 7, 1963, Trial Examiner James V. Constantine issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Decision and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Fanning and Jenkins]. The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Decision, the exceptions and the brief, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER The Board adopts as its Order the Recommended Order I of the Trial Examiner.2 ' The Recommended Order is hereby amended by substituting for the first paragraph therein the following paragraph: Upon the entire record in this case , and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended , the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that Respondent, Harvey Probber, Inc., its officers, agents , successors, and assigns, shall: 2 Amend the notice to all employees by changing the first sentence below the signature line to read : "This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting . . ." 146 NLRB No. 84. 684 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION - STATEMENT OF THE CASE This case is before Trial Examiner James V. Constantine of the National Labor Relations Board upon an unfair labor practice complaint issued on April 30, 1963, by the General Counsel of the Board, through the Regional Director for the First Region (Boston, Massachusetts), against Harvey Probber, Inc. The complaint, based on a charge filed on March 25, 1963, in substance alleges the commission of one unfair labor practice forbidden by Section 8(a) (1) and (3 ), which affects com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7), of the National Labor Relations Act. Respondent has answered admitting some facts but putting in issue the unfair labor practice. Pursuant to due notice, a hearing on the complaint was held before me on August 15 and 16 at Fall River, and on August 19, 1963, at Boston, Massachusetts. All parties were represented at and participated in the hearing and had full oppor- tunity to introduce evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses, submit briefs, and offer oral argument. A brief has been received from the Charging Party. No brief was submitted by Respondent although it requested and was granted an exten- sion of time in which to file one At the hearing I granted in part and denied in part Respondent's motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum served upon it. Upon the entire record in the case, including the stipulations of the parties, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT Respondent, a Massachusetts corporation, is engaged at Fall River, Massachusetts, in manufacturing, selling, and distributing furniture. Annually it receives materials valued at more than $50,000 directly from, and ships furniture valued at more than $50,000 directly to, points located outside the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. I find that Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and that it will effectuate the aims of the Act to assert jurisdiction over this proceeding. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED United Furniture Workers of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization as defined by Section 2 (5) of the Act. It is herein called the Union. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE Many of the factual issues were controverted and ably contested. Where dispute exists, it has been resolved in accordance with my evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. In ascertaining credibility I have credited some witnesses in part only without narrating evidence in connection therewith. However, all evidence has been considered; that consonant with the facts found herein has been credited, and that inconsistent with such findings has been rejected. Cf. Trumbull Asphalt Co. of Delaware v. N.L.R.B, 314 F. 2d 382, 383 (C.A. 7). This case centers around the admitted refusal of Respondent to grant employee Americo Ramos, president and chief job steward of the Union's Local 159, a leave of absence to study at Harvard University from February 20 to May 20, 1963.1 The question is whether such refusal was lawfully denied or was prompted by discriminatory motives so that Section 8(a)(3), and derivatively, 8(a)(1), was contravened. A. Ramos' request for leave is denied In August 1962, Americo Ramos, employed by Respondent as a' frame assembler, was notified by letter that he had been awarded a scholarship to study at Harvard University in the spring of 1963. Ramos immediately posted this letter on the 1 Respondent signed a collective-bargaining agreement with the Charging Union on October 1, 1961, for a 3-year term. Article 28 thereof provides that employees will be granted leaves of absence for "valid reasons" if they "can be spared from production." Respondent's upholstering division employees are represented by Upholsterers' Inter- national Union of North America, AFL-CIO HARVEY PROBBER, INC. 685 bulletin board at Respondent 's plant. It was read in August or September 1962 by Edmond R. Souza, Respondent's executive vice president and comptroller, while it was so posted . In late August 1962, Ramos spoke to Souza and Factory Manager Elijah Saber about his scholarship , informing them that the course of study would take him away from his work for 3 months. Besides congratulating Ramos, these two officials also asked him about the course in some detail , but uttered no state- ments suggesting that he could not be spared from work. On or about January 8, 1963, Ramos, in writing, requested Souza for a leave of absence in order to attend, on the scholarship, a special course of study known as a Trade Union Program conducted by Harvard University. Not long thereafter Souza discussed this request with Factory Manager Saber and Factory Production Superintendent Don Freeman . Souza testified that, following this discussion, he decided that, because the Company was "experiencing difficulty and had a huge backlog of orders," the request should be denied. According to Souza, "We could not spare [Ramos] from production" because of the backlog . Souza further testified that, in order to reduce the backlog in a "relatively short period of time," the Com- pany was faced with the alternative of working overtime or adding a second shift, and that a second shift was ultimately employed. By letter dated January 10, 1963, Souza, in writing, denied this request of Ramos without giving any reason therefor.2 A week later, when President Probber visited the plant, Ramos discussed with him the foregoing denial by Souza. But I am unable to find that an abnormal backlog existed or that it was the reason for denying the leave requested by Ramos, as more fully set forth in the concluding findings below. B. The alleged abnormal backlog Respondent's business fluctuates according to a rough pattern . Ordinarily, in- coming orders 3 are slow in the summer months, whereas they increase in the fall to meet Christmas deliveries . Generally orders fall off about the first of the year and pick up again toward the latter part of April . A tendency away from this has become noticeable, so that the Company "is now competing on a year round basis." While the findings in this paragraph are made on oral testimony which I have credited, no oral or documentary evidence- was introduced as to when the new tendency began , and no evidence was offered as to the relative size of the incoming orders at the various seasons of the year. Souza's oral evidence fails to reveal an unusual backlog. At most it discloses that a "backlog fluctuates according to incoming business ," and that "we had a backlog a year ago, six years ago." While it is true that Souza testified that in early 1963 the backlog was different from that in other years , he was unable to be more specific than to describe it as "it might range anywhere from three, four, five, or six million dollars in backlogs," without comparing it with backlogs of prior years. In fact, Souza claimed his memory failed him as to more precise identifying data No documentary evidence was offered (1) as to the actual current backlog, or (2) to show that the current backlog was abnormally high compared with past backlogs, or (3) that the current backlog was so great that it exhausted or affected storage facilities. However, oral evidence which I credit reveals that Respondent does not stock completed chairs and sofas, although it does stock some components thereof, including frames. In recent years, the most layoffs for lack of work were made in 1963. On March 12, 1963, 30 people out of a working force of 70 were so laid off. In the last week of March Foreman Gustafson told Ramos, who was about to complete his assigned work, that things were very slow and he did not know what job to have him do when his current task was finished. The following week, when Ramos was again out of work, he asked Gustafson for another assignment. Gustafson replied that he "didn't see any reason " why a leave of absence had been denied to Ramos because Gustafson had four assemblers and could not keep four assemblers "going if it continues like this." During the period from February 20 to May 17, 1963, Ramos did other work than assembling frames, including cutting frames between April 24 and May 15. In the period between April 24 and May 15 only two frame assemblers were employed. During the period from February 20 to May 17 some of the other three frame assemblers were absent from work for various reasons. 2 Other employees had been previously given leaves of absence , one for 3 or 4 months 3 Orders received by Respondent become commitments by its letters of acceptance These commitments constitute the backlog Such backlog is continuous , although It varies with the time of year 686 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD In January 1963 the employees of Respondent's cabinet assembly, metal, and machine departments were asked to work overtime . Frame assembly department employees were not so asked . After that, about February 8, a second shift from 6 to 10 p.m. was instituted in some departments because the day shift employees refused to work overtime. About 40 employees were hired for this second shift. It was abolished about April 1, 1963, about 5 weeks after its inception. C. The union activity of Ramos On September 24, 1962, Ramos informed Vice President Souza that the employees would possibly walk out at noon over an unsatisfied grievance. Thereupon, by letter dated September 27, 1962, Souza wrote to the Union, in part protesting the imminent walkout as a violation of the collective-bargaining contract, warning that Respondent would hold the Union "financially responsible for any act, or acts, by your members contrary to our interests," and strongly urging the Union to notify Ramos that as president of Local 159 he was charged with the responsibility of preventing breaches of the contract by the members of Local 159. Souza testified that such walkout was "wild cat" and that he regarded Ramos responsible for the "wild cat activity" re- ferred to in the foregoing letter; but the evidence does not support this contention. Hence I find, if material, that Ramos did not initiate or inspire the "wild cat activity." By letter dated November 21, 1962, Ramos wrote to Respondent's president, Harvey Probber, complaining that Vice President Souza and Factory Manager Saber refused to discuss grievances pursuant to the mandate of article 15 of the contract. In a letter dated November 29, 1962, President Probber replied to Ramos, men- tioning, among other things, that Souza and Saber pointed out to Probber that, in addition to a recent "wildcat strike," the Company was "plagued with gripes and unwarranted grievances," and suggesting that, "in the future, you deal directly with Mr. Souza and Mr. Saber." This last letter was posted on the bulletin board. On January 25, 1963, Souza posted on the bulletin board and enclosed in the pay envelopes of the employees a letter in which among other things he stated, "We cannot allow ourselves to be placed in a position your union representative intends for his own gains." This was induced, according to Souza, by a meeting of employees at which Ramos advised them not to work overtime? But a formal meeting was actually held on January 29.5 This notice also advised employees that, under the contract, "we cannot compel any Employee to work overtime," but at the same time invited them to work overtime because of "the backlog of orders. ... In the fall of 1962 Ramos, as president of Local 159, presented five or six grievances to Souza which, in Souza's own words, constituted "pressuring" and caused "some problems" to the Company. In December 1962, Ramos was suspended for using profanity toward a foreman. He lodged a grievance on this suspension. There are still some outstanding unresolved grievances. In December 1959, when Ramos helped in organizing Respondent's employees, Max Probber, general manager of Respondent, blamed Ramos, as president of Local 159, for a strike of the employees in the preceding October. Not long after this conversation, Ramos was laid off as a frame assembler. As a result he filed a grievance on the ground that he was laid off out of seniority. Four and a half days later Ramos was reinstated in the shipping department From August 21, 1962, to January 11, 1963, Ramos filed 11 grievances on behalf of employees. Only Ramos was authorized to do so for them. Ramos told Saber, Respondent's factory manager in August 1962 that the employees were not pleased with the delay in "straightening out the different gripes." Thereupon Saber told Ramos to forget the men because "you and I can get along and settle all these grievances." In November 1962, Ramos presented an employee's grievance to Saber. This caused Saber to remark, "What, another one" and that "You are causing a lot of trouble in this shop and it is not going to do you any good because by the time we get through with you you will have ulcers." One of the above 11 grievances pertained to Respondent's refusal to grant the leave of absence sought by Ramos. This grievance was filed on January 11, 1963, by Ramos on his own behalf. At the discussion thereof with company officials on January 23, 1963, Vice President Souza for the first time informed Ramos that the leave had been denied because he could not be spared from production. When this grievance of Ramos was turned down, Ramos requested Foreman David Gustafson, 41 find no insubordination in this advice of Ramos since article 16 of the contract pro- vides that "no employee shall be compelled to wort: overtime hours " 5It may be that an informal meeting was held before January 25 HARVEY PROBBER, INC. 687 foreman of the frame assembly department, to tell Vice President Souza that Ramos desired to process the grievance to the second step under the contract. But Souza could not be located by Souza's secretary. After work that day, Ramos returned to the plant seeking Souza. Although Saber and Superintendent Freeman, whom Ramos encountered together, assured him that Souza had left for the day, Souza soon walked into the room while the other three were conversing. Souza told Ramos, "Don't give me any of your nonsense," and stated he was unable to meet on the second step in the next day or two. The parties met on the next step on February 19 when the grievance was again denied. On January 30, 1963, Ramos signed and posted a notice on the bulletin board informing employees that at a special meeting held the day before the membership of Local 159 voted 44 to 0 not to work overtime unless the Company agreed to arbitrate grievances. That meeting had been called by Ramos as president of Local 159. About October 8, 1962, Ramos asked Foreman Gustafson, whom I find to be a supervisor under Section 2(11) of the Act, why Gustafson was constantly watching Ramos and writing down on a piece of paper while so engaged. Gustafson replied that he was recently made foreman in place of one Savage because Savage was "unable to handle" Ramos, that the Company was trying to "find something on" Ramos so as to fire him, that Gustafson kept Ramos under observation pursuant to orders from the Company, and that Ramos was "considered [as] the Union by the Company." D. Other relevant testimony Bertrande Pattenaude, a witness for the General Counsel, testified that during a conversation on December 26, 1962, Vice President Souza told him to get out of the Union. This evidence is not credited because: (a) Pattenaude, on cross- examination, (1) was unable to give the approximate date thereof, and (2) insisted that the conversation occurred a few days before a written statement he signed concerning this event, whereas said statement is dated April 18, 1963; and (b) part of Pattenaude's testimony clashes with the written statement.6 Hence I have not relied on the testimony of this witness in arriving at any findings of fact herein. Nor have I relied on the testimony of Searphim (Seraphim?) Machado, a witness for the General Counsel, who testified that production was very slow between February 20 and May 17, 1963. I have disregarded Machado's testimony prin- cipally because he was vague and unable to recall specifics on cross-examination.? E. Discussion and concluding findings 1. As to antiunion feeling While Respondent, on the record before me, did not exhibit a pronounced hostility to unions, it did display union animus; and I so find. This can be discerned, among other things, in Factory Manager Saber's remarks to Ramos, when Ramos presented another grievance, including the exclamation, "What, another one"; in Vice President Souza's letter of September 27, 1962, to the Union (General Counsel's Exhibit No. 2); in President Probber's letter of November 29, 1962, to Ramos (General Counsel's Exhibit No. 3); and in the notice to employees dated January 25, 1963 (Union's Exhibit No. 1). 2. As to the need for the services of Ramos Although extensive evidence was adduced to show the condition of Respondent's operations, it is inconclusive as to whether Respondent's orders were markedly larger than previously. Thus, Respondent's own evidence shows that (1) it wanted employees to work overtime and (2) a second shift was hired. But Respondent's evidence also discloses that the second shift worked but about 5 weeks (from about February 9 to April 1, 1963) and for but 4 hours a day during that period (from ,6 to 10 p.m.). Moreover, Respondent's Vice President Souza testified that back orders during early 1963 "were exceptionally slow." Hence the fact that a part-time second shift,was employed does not prove an increase in orders, and I so find. 9 For example, in his direct, Pattenaude testified that he complained of "aggravation" to Souza. In the statement of April 18, Pattenaude avers that he objected "to all this holloring [sic] going on." (See Respondent's Exhibit No. 7.) 7 Nevertheless I do find that in 1963 Respondent's layoff for lack of work was the biggest in the period from 1960 to 1963. This was testified to by others, including Respondent's executive vice president and comptroller, Edmond It. Souza. Indeed, as Souza also testified, the "back orders" during early 1963 "were exceptionally slow." 744-670-65-vol. 146-45 688 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD In addition, evidence of the General Counsel, which I credit, shows that work was slow during early 1963; that by March 12, 1963, 30 employees out of a working force of 70 had been laid off; that Ramos was assigned to nonframe assembly work from April 24 to May 15, 1963, because frame assembly work was slow; that between February 20 and May 17, 1963, the full complement of four frame assemblers was not always employed; that about 60 percent of the work of the frame assemblers during that time 8 was for stock to be stored on the third floor and not to fill orders; and the layoffs in early 1963 were the highest in recent times. Hence I conclude and find that Respondent has not sustained the burden of show- ing that its early 1963 production so greatly exceeded that of previous years that it could not spare Ramos from the frame assembly department in the spring of 1963. Moreover, Respondent has not established that, when Ramos asked for his leave on January 8, 1963, its orders had so magnified that it could reasonably foretell at that time it would inevitably need Ramos as an assembler; in fact no evidence was received as to the status of Respondent's orders on January 8 other than Souza's testimony, in conclusion form, that orders generally fall off about the first of the year and pick up again toward the latter part of April, and that more recently Respondent "is competing on a year round basis." 3. The reason for denying Ramos a leave of absence Although in the preceding subsection I have discredited Respondent's defense that increased orders required the services of Ramos at the plant, it does not follow that this suffices to sustain the General Counsel's burden of proof. Rejection of an opponent's defense does not establish a proponent' s case; the proponent must never- theless adduce evidence which affirmatively supports his allegations. However, the record discloses evidence on which I find that the real reason for denying the re- quested leave to Ramos is that, as president and chief steward of Local 159, he assisted the Union and processed grievances on behalf of the members of Local 159. In this connection, I have relied on the whole record and the following factors, which I find as facts: (a) At least one other employee, Donald Maynard, had been granted a leave of absence to attend school in late 1961. If, as Respondent contends, its fall production becomes enlarged to meet the demands of Christmas business, it would 'be reasonable to infer that Maynard could not be spared at that time of year. (b) Others have also been granted leaves of absences in the past for diverse reasons. These leaves, as well as Maynard's, demonstrate that no one production employee is so essential that production would be crippled by his absence. In fact, no evidence was offered by Respondent showing total production and the individual contribution of Ramos toward that production. (c) Respondent knew as early as August or September 1962 9 that Ramos had been awarded a scholarship. This, together with Ramos' conversation with Souza and Saber, put Respondent on notice in the fall of 1962 that Ramos would apply for leave to attend Harvard University. But at no time prior to the application of Ramos for leave on January 8, 1963, did Respondent suggest to him that future busi- ness conditions might necessitate his forgoing study at Harvard. While I recognize that no obligation rested on Respondent to put Ramos on notice that his attendance at school was subject to a possible impediment caused by increased production sched- ules, I find it is significant that such a possible obstacle was not mentioned to him, especially in view of Respondent's contention that in late 1962 it could not spare Ramos from production because it desired to reduce the backlog in a relatively short time. Moreover, I find that when Vice President Souza first learned of Ramos' good fortune he congratulated Ramos and asked details concerning the course. Notwith- standing that Ramos at this time told Souza that attendance at school would take him away from his work for 3 months, Souza did not mention the possibility of a refusal of leave because future business conditions might interfere with it. I find that it is significant that Souza refrained from adverting to this possibility. (d) Beginning in July 1962, Ramos presented a greater number of employee grievances, including his own, and insisted upon arbitration of those prosecuted un- successfully before management, and Respondent resented this. Such antipathy is not only expressed in some of the exhibits introduced in evidence, but also in Fore- $ In this period the second shift stocked frames, but did not assemble them 9 Souza so testified, and I credit him in this respect. HARVEY PROBBER, INC. 689 man Gustafson's statement to Ramos that the Company "considered Ramos as the Union," that the Company was unable to handle Ramos, and that the Company di- rected Gustafson to find something on Ramos warranting a discharge . I do not credit the contradictory testimony of Gustafson. I find, therefore, that this resentment against the union activities of Ramos motivated Respondent in denying him the re- quested leave and that the denial on the asserted ground that Ramos could not be spared is a pretext. Cf. Nachman Corporation, 144 NLRB 473. It is no defense that Ramos may have vigorously prosecuted the grievances. His activities did not amount to insubordination, and I so find. Film Inspection Service, Inc., 144 NLRB 1040. Nor does the execution of duties connected with protected activities justify employer reprisals therefor absent evidence of misconduct. Nach- man Corporation, 144 NLRB 473; The Bettcher Manufacturing Corporation, 76 NLRB 526, 527, and cases there cited. On the record before me I find no misconduct. Finally, I find that Ramos was engaged in protected union activity in representing the aggrieved employees, and that the denial of leave was discriminatory and related to hire, tenure of employment, or a term or condition of employment as those terms are used in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. United Aircraft Corporation (Hamilton Standard Division), 144 NLRB 492, is distinguishable on its facts. Also I find that such conduct derivatively contravenes Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The refusal of Respondent to grant the leave requested by Ramos set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of Respondent de- scribed in section I, above, has a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tends to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow thereof. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in an unfair labor practice proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Since Respondent's discrimination against Ramos neither goes "to the very heart of the Act" (cf. N.L.R.B. v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120 F. 2d 532 (C.A. 4)) nor reflects a flagrant disregard for the Act, a sweeping remedial order is not justified. It will be recommended, rather, that an order of narrower scope will be adequate to fulfill the legislative objectives described in the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. United Furniture Workers of America, AFL-CIO, and its Local 159 are labor organizations within the contemplation of Section 2(5) of the Act. 2. Harvey Probber, Inc., is an employer engaged in commerce as defined in Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 3. By discriminating in regard to the request of employee Ramos for a leave of absence, thereby discouraging membership in a labor organization, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practice is an unfair labor practice affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER By reason of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the entire record in this case, it is recommended that Respondent , Harvey Probber, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Discouraging membership in the Union, or in any other labor organization, by refusing to grant Ramos or any other employee a leave of absence , or otherwise discriminating in any manner against its employees in regard to their hire or tenure of employment or any other term or condition of employment. 690 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at its plant in Fall River, Massachusetts, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 10 Copies of said notice , to be furnished by the Regional Direc- tor for the First Region, shall, after being signed by a duly authorized agent of Re- spondent, be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter , in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Respondent shall take reasonable pre- cautions to prevent such notices from being altered, defaced , or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director for the First Region, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Decision, what steps have been taken to comply herewith." It is further recommended that, unless within the prescribed period Respondent notifies said Regional Director, in writing, that it will comply with the foregoing Recommended Order, the National Labor Relations Board issue an Order requiring the Respondent to take the aforesaid action. 10 If this Recommended Order Is adopted by the Board, the words "A Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "The Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice . In the further event that the Board 's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals , the words "A Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "A Decision and Order." n If this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board , this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the Labor Management Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT discourage membership in United Furniture Workers of Amer- ica, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, by refusing to grant Americo Ramos or any other employee a leave of absence or in any manner discriminat- ing against our employees in regard to their hire or tenure of employment or any other term or condition of employment. HARVEY PROBBER, INC., Employer. Dated---------------- --- By-------------------------------------- (Representative ) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date thereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Employees may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, Boston Five Cents Savings Bank Building, 24 School Street, Boston, Massachusetts, Tele- phone No. 523-8100, if they have any question concerning this notice or if they have information that its provisions are being violated. G.C. Lingerie Corporation of Alabama, Respondent and Inter- national Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, Charg- ing Party. Case No. 10-CA-5379. April 7, 1964 DECISION AND ORDER On December 13, 1963, Trial Examiner Jerry B. Stone issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and 146 NLRB No. 86.