H.C. Ladd and Son, Inc.

30 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD are welders, punch-press operators, brakehand operators, layout men, assemblers, shear men, material handlers, and stockroom, receiving and shipping, and plant maintenance employees. The parties appar- ently agree that all employees,' except material handlers and stock- room, receiving and shipping, and plant maintenance employees, are properly within the unit. It is the Union's position that employees classified as material handlers and stockroom, receiving and ship- ping, and plant maintenance employees should be excluded as the Union has never before represented such employees in associationwide bargaining. The record shows that the employees in question are assigned to pro- ,duction work when time allows, helping assembling and running punch presses. They spend approximately 20 to 25 percent of their time in production work. When not engaged in production work, they assist production employees or work in close contact with the production employees. They, along with all production employees, are hourly paid, work in the same plant, and are covered by the same group in- surance plan.: Moreover, although not previously covered under the union multiemployer contract, these employees-4 in number-would be the only employees in a single-employer unit of approximately 40 employees not represented even though they presently work under the same working conditions. On these facts, and the record as a whole, we find that they are properly included and shall so include them in the appropriate unit. Accordingly, we find that the following employees constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the mean- ing of Section 9,(b) of the Act: All ordinary production and maintenance employees of the Em- ployer, including material handlers and stockroom, receiving and ship- ping, and plant maintenance employees, but excluding all office clerical employees, guards, professional employees, and supervisors as defined in the Act. [Text of Direction of Election omitted from publication.] 5 The parties stipulated, and we find, that four foremen, Tashman, Fraser, Dorta, and Vanderlip, have authority to hire and fire and that they , plus Plant Manager Mervyn Adirim and Bruno Onort , who has supervisory functions, are supervisors as defined in the Act. We shall, accordingly, exclude them from the appropriate unit. H. C. Ladd and Son, Inc. and Baltimore Building and Construc- tion Trades Council, AFL-CIO. Case No. 5-CA-P665. July 08, 1964 DECISION AND ORDER On April 10, 1964, Trial Examiner James V. Constantine issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent 148 NLRB No. 7. H. C. LADD AND SON, INC. 31 had not engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommending that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety, as set forth in the attached Decision. Thereafter, the General Counsel -filed exceptions to the Decision and a supporting brief. Respondent filed an answer to the exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Leedom and Jenkins]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error has been committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Deci- sion, the exceptions, the answer thereto, the briefs, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings and conclusions of the Trial Examiner only to the extent that they are consistent with the Decision herein. As set forth in the Trial Examiner's Decision, Respondent was en- gaged on December 3, 1963, as a mechanical contractor in the construc- tion of an apartment building, and was the only nonunion contractor on the job. About 6:45 a.m. on that date representatives of six of the Council's constituent locals arrived at the jobsite to organize Re- spondent's employees.' The union representatives went to Respond- ent's trailer as Respondent's employees were arriving and parking their automobiles, and began distributing union authorization, cards and union literature to them. A few minutes later Lee Hilderbrand, Respondent's job foreman and a supervisor under the Act, arrived at the jobsite. One of the employees saw Hilderbrand approaching and identified him as the "boss." When Hilderbrand joined the group, consisting of the union organizers and five or six of Respond- ent's employees, Business Representative James, L. McLain, Jr.,2 handed him a union authorization card and some union literature. Upon receiving the literature, Hilderbrand stated "that if he caught any of these people signing these cards or heard about it, they would be fired." McLain then asked Hilderbrand if the latter had charge of the job for hiring and firing purposes. When Hilderbrand replied in the affirmative, McLain asked him if he would fire employees he "caught :.. signing these cards." Hilderbrand said he would, and that they would be replaced by "people from Washington." McLain asked Hilderbrand to "repeat that last statement." Hilderbrand re- peated that "if any. of the people on this job signed these cards, he would have them replaced by people from Washington." Hilder- brand then ordered the employees to go to work, and the union officials left. 1 Representatives of at least one or two of the locals had visited the Jobsite for this organizational purpose about a week before. 2 McLain is business representative of Plumbers and Gas Fitters Local Union No. 48. 32 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The Trial Examiner found that Hilderbrand's statements would have violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act if made to any of Respond- ent's employees. He considered the evidence insufficient, however, to support a finding, either that any employee heard the statements, or that the threats were made under circumstances calculated to assure that the employees would learn of them, and, accordingly, recom- mended that the complaint be dismissed. We disagree, and find that Respondent unlawfully threatened its employees in violation of Sec- tion 8(a) (1). In our view, the undisputed facts plainly establish that Hilderbrand's threats were directed not only at McLain, but at Respondent's em- ployees as well. Hilderbrand's own testimony corroborates testimony, credited by the Trial Examiner, showing that Hilderbrand was aware that these employees were nearby when he uttered the threats. Thus, Hilderbrand testified that as he was talking to McLain "some of [his] men" were "around" and that after finishing his remarks he told the employees to go to work. He also testified that the employees and Mc- Lain comprised those "standing around in a group" when "the con- versation took place." Further, it is quite clear, from the content of Hilderbrand's remarks, that they were designed not as a response to McLain's offer of union literature, but as a direct and immediate warning directed to employees present not to sign the union cards they had just received. And the fact that Hilderbrand readily re- peated the threat twice, each time in a raised and loud voice, confirms that it was Hilderbrand's intent to address the entire group present.' The surrounding circumstances, moreover, are such as clearly to sup- port an inference that the intended listeners did hear the statements.4 Hilderbrand, McLain, the employees, and the other union officials were grouped together within not more than 25 or 30 feet when Hilderbrand spoke.' McLain had been talking to the employees when Hilderbrand approached him. As shown above, the employees remained until Hilderbrand completed his remarks and told them to go to work. We regard it as significant also that the Trial Examiner credited the tes- 3 The Trial Examiner made no finding on the manner or tone in which Hilderbrand spoke. We make the above finding on the uncontradicted testimony of McLain and Guy Loudermilk, business agent of the Carpenters local, whose testimony the Trial Examiner credited. I In view of-this finding, we do not find it necessary to decide whether , in any event, the threats were made under circumstances such as to insure that the employees would learn of them. 5 We make the above finding on the basis of McLain 's.and Loudermilk 's uncontradicted testimony, which was credited by the Trial Examiner. McLain testified that when Hilder- brand spoke "none of [the employees ] were further than 25 feet away" and that the group at Respondent's trailer was within a "vicinity of 25 feet ." Loudermilk testified that Hilderbrand and the group "were all together within 20 or 30 feet." We do not agree with the Trial Examiner that this testimony shows that all of the Respondent 's employees were 25 to 30 feet away from Hilderbrand when he spoke. H. C. LADD AND SON, INC. 33 timony of Union Official Loudermilk that he heard Hilderbrand utter the threats. Loudermilk had arrived at the jobsite after McLain and joined the group just in time to overhear Hilderbrand's statements. The Trial Examiner made no finding that Loudermilk was better situated than others in the group to hear Hilderbrand, and we find no evidence to support such a finding.6 The physical setting thus cor- roborates the uncontradicted testimony of both McLain and Louder- milk, witnesses whom the Trial Examiner expressly credited, that all of the employees present were within hearing distance of Hilder- brand's loud utterances. On the basis of the foregoing, We are fully satisfied that the record substantially supports a finding that the employees actually heard Hilderbrand when he loudly stated three times that he would discharge any employee who signed a union card? Accordingly, we find that Respondent violated Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor prac- tices, we shall order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing and the entire record in this case, the National Labor Relations Board hereby makes the following additional : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW s 4. By threatening to discharge and replace employees because of their activity on behalf of or interest in the Union, Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exer- cise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and thereby engaged in unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. - I . ' 5. The aforesaid unfair labor .practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that 6 We note, however, that in testifying that only McLain and the employees were present, Hilderbrand also testified that as he spoke he did not even see Loudermilk. 7 See, 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 460 (3d ed.). We find no merit in Respondent's con- tention that the General Counsel's failure to call the employees to testify establishes that they neither heard the threats nor were threatened thereby . Cf. Hendrix Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. N L.R.B:, 321 F. 2d 100 , 105 (C.A. 5) ; N.L R B. v. Donnelly Garment Company, 330 U.S. 219, 228-231 ; N.L.R.B. v. Illinois Tool Works, 153 F. 2d 811, 814 (C.A. 7). s The Trial Examiner's "Conclusions of Law" Nos. 4 and 5 are deleted 760-577-65-vol. 148-4 34 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Respondent, H. C. Ladd and Son, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Threatening its employees with discharge or replacement if they sign union authorization cards or otherwise engage in union or organizational activity for Baltimore Building and Construction Trades Council, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Sec- tion 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at its jobsite at the Ruxton Tower Apartments on Charles Street at the beltway in Baltimore, Maryland, and at all and any other construction jobsites where the Respondent may be engaged as the mechanical contractor, when this Order issues, copies of the at- tached notice marked "Appendix." 9 Copies of said notice, to be fur- nished by the Regional Director for Region 5, shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent's authorized representative, be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for at least 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ- ing all places where notices to employees are 'customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 9In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order" the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that : WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with, discharge or re- placement if they sign union authorization cards or otherwise engage in union or organizational activity for Baltimore Build- ing and Construction Trades Council, AFL-CIO, or any, other labor organization. H. C. LADD AND SON, INC. 35 WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re- strain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. H. C. LADD AND SON, INC., Employer. Dated---------------- By------------------------------------- (Representative ) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 707 North Calvert Street, Baltimore, Maryland, Telephone No. 752-8460, Extension 2100, if they have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE This is an unfair labor practice case initiated by a charge filed on December 4, 1963, by Baltimore Building and Construction Trades Council, AFL-CIO, against H. C. Ladd and Son, Inc. A complaint based on that charge was issued on Janu- ary 24, 1964, by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, through the Regional Director for Region 5 (Baltimore, Maryland), against said Employer, herein sometimes called the Respondent or Ladd. In substance the com- plaint alleges that Respondent committed unfair labor practices violating Section 8(a)(1), and which affect commerce as defined in Section 2(6) and (7), of the Na- tional Labor Relations Act. Respondent has answered admitting some, facts but putting in issue the unfair labor practices. Pursuant to due notice, this cause came on to be heard and was tried before Trial Examiner James V. Constantine at Baltimore, Maryland, on February 10, 1964. Respondent, the Charging Party, and the General Counsel were represented at and participated in the hearing. All parties had full opportunity to adduce evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses, submit briefs, and offer oral argument. None of the parties argued orally or filed briefs. When the General Counsel rested, Respondent moved to dismiss the case. This motion was denied on the ground that the General Counsel's evidence, if believed, warranted a finding that the alleged violations had occurred. , Upon the entire record in the case, including the stipulations of the parties, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT Respondent, -a Maryland corporation, is engaged at Silver Spring, Maryland, as a mechanical subcontractor in the building and construction industry. During a rep- resentative year, Respondent received goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000, some of which were received directly, and the remainder indirectly, from points lo- cated outside the State of Maryland. I find that Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and that it is consonant with the purposes of the Act to assert jurisdiction over this proceeding. H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Baltimore Building and Construction Trades Council, AFL-CIO, is a labor organi- zation within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. It is sometimes called the Council herein. Although this aspect of the case was contested, the foregoing find- ing is based on the uncontradicted testimony (which I credit) of Charles Muntain, president of the Charging Party, which need not be reiterated here in' detail. It is sufficient to point out that, on Muntain's testimony, I find that the Union deals with 36 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD employers in negotiating collective-bargaining contracts and processing grievances on behalf of its constituent unions or affiliates (19 in all, each composed of employees working at various trades), that such contracts and prosecutions of grievances are made for the benefit of employees, that employees participate in the Council and its affiliates, and that such collective-bargaining contracts and processing of grievances relate to wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, and conditions of work. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. General Counsel's evidence Respondent is the mechanical contractor on the construction of the Ruxton Towers Apartments, herein called the jobsite, on Charles Street at the beltway in Baltimore, Maryland. Respondent was the only nonunion contractor 1 on the job. About 6:45 a.m. on December 3, 1963,2 James L. McLain, Jr., business representative of Plumbers and Gas Fitters Local Union No. 48, a constituent or affiliate of the Council, visited the jobsite for the second time 3 to attempt to organize Respondent's employees. Upon ascertaining from employees in the vicinity of some cars parked around Respondent's trailer that they worked for Respondent, McLain distributed to them some organizing literature "from the . . . Council." At the same time he handed each employee a union authorization card and directed them to mail any completed cards to his office. McLain also spoke to these employees, about five or six in number, soliciting them to join his union. While McLain was speaking to the group, someone said, "Here comes the boss." Lee Hilderbrand, Respondent's foreman on the job, whom I find to be a supervisor under the Act, at that time approached, and McLain also gave Hilderbrand the same literature as that given to the men. The men to whom McLain had spoken were either in cars, or getting out of cars, or in the vicinity of McLain, at the time McLain handed Hilderbrand the literature. Upon receiving the literature Hilderbrand stated to McLain "that if he caught any of these people signing these cards or heard about it, they would be fired." McLain then asked Hilderbrand if the latter had charge of the job for hiring and firing purposes. When Hilderbrand replied in the affirmative, McLain asked him if he would fire employees whom Hilderbrand "caught . signing these cards." Hilderbrand said he would, and that they would be replaced by "people from Washington." McLain then asked Hilderbrand to "re- peat that last statement." Complying thereto, Hilderbrand answered that "if any of the people on this job signed these cards he would have them replaced by people from Washington." McLain testified further that when Hilderbrand uttered the above statements the Ladd employees were "in the same vicinity as myself," not farther than 25 feet away, and "in hearing distance." Other business agents were in the "same vicinity" when McLain engaged in the above conversation with Hilderbrand. Some of them were identified as Guy Loudermilk and Ralph Thomas 4 of Local 101 of the Carpenters Union; Norval Bower, from the Iron Workers Union; William Kirchoff, from the Operating Engineers Union; Jack Lawlor, from the Bricklayers Union; and one Griffin, from the Laborers Union. Guy Loudermilk, business agent of the Carpenters Union, testified that he heard the above conversation between Hilderbrand and McLain, and that Respondent's employees were "within 20 or 30 feet" of Hilderbrand. Loudermilk further testified that, in the conversation with McLain, Hilderbrand mentioned that he, Hilderbrand, had arrived from Florida as a union man, but, being unable to find employment in the District of Columbia area, decided "he would be nonunion . . . and anti- union . . . and that the Union was no good to him ...:. B. Respondent's case Respondent's only witness was Hilderbrand, whose relevant nand material testimony may be condensed as follows: When Hilderbrand arrived at the jobsite about 7 a.m. on December 3, he noticed" a "bunch of fellows there," one of whom stated to the others, "All the Union fellows- are here this morning." Then McLain handed him some pamphlets and spoke to him "about organizing the labor." Hilderbrand replied, "It was perfectly all right,"" 1 One of Ladd's employees was a member of Local 48 of the Plumbers. Unless otherwise noted all dates mentioned hereafter refer to the year 1963. 3 The first occasion was about a week before this. 4 Thomas was president of Local 101, and not a business agent. H. C. LADD AND SON, INC. 37 but since it was 7 a.m. and the men were scheduled to work at that time, McLain should speak to them before 7 a.m. or after the 4:30 p.m. quitting hour. Thereupon Hilderbrand ordered his men to work. Hilderbrand denies that he told McLain that he would dismiss any employee sign- ing a union card and that such employee would be replaced by men from Washington, D.C.; he further denies that he saw or spoke to Loudermilk on December 3; and he -categorically asserted that he has not fired or laid off any man on this job for signing .a union card. Further, Hilderbrand denies that other business agents were "around" when he talked to McLain. C. Concluding findings and discussion In general I have credited McLain and Loudermilk and I have rejected the contra- dictory testimony of Hilderbrand. In arriving at credibility findings, however, I have paid no heed to testimony, adduced on cross-examination of Hilderbrand, that Hilderbrand was once a member of a plumbers union in Florida and that he had difficulty in obtaining work in the Washington area because the local union refused to refer him to jobs. This last testimony, given by Hilderbrand on cross-examination, has been disregarded because I am of the opinion, and find, that it neither proves bias, as contended by the General Counsel, nor a union animus. However, I find that Hilderbrand entertained hostility toward unions. This finding is derived from the content of his conversation with McLain on December 3, 1963, as recounted below Hence, I find that shortly before 7 a.m. on December 3, 1963, McLain visited the jobsite for the purpose of organizing Ladd's employees. By prearrangement he met there officials of other locals affiliated with the Charging Party, Baltimore Building and Construction Trades Council, AFL-CIO. Said other union officials came to the site also to organize employees. While at the jobsite, McLain distributed union authorization cards and literature to Respondent's employees and to Hilderbrand, Respondent's foreman in charge of its employees there and a supervisor under Sec- tion 2(11) of the Act. Upon receiving the union card and literature from McLain, Hilderbrand told McLain, inter alia, that he, Hilderbrand, would discharge employees who signed a union card or who he heard had so signed, and would hire replacements for them from Washington, D.C. At the time Hilderbrand uttered these words Loudermilk and the other union officials were nearby and at least Loudermilk heard them. Whether the other union officials overheard Hilderbrand is a matter I do not pass on since it is not an issue in the case. Ladd's employees, about five or six in num- ber, were in the vicinity approximately 25 or 30 feet away. In the absence of any testimony from even a single employee, I conclude and find that the evidence is inadequate to show that one or more employees overheard Hilderbrand's conversa- tion with McLain. Accordingly, I expressly find that Hilderbrand's threat of dis- charge and replacement, spoken by him while addressing McLain, was not overheard by any of Respondent's employees, and that it was not otherwise brought to their attention at that time The next question is whether Hilderbrand's said statement, which undoubtedly would violate Section 8(a)(1) if spoken to one or more employees, transgresses the Act when made to a union official only and is not in any way apprehended by em- ployees. One line of Board decisions points to the conclusion that, lacking a show- ing that employees were actually aware of the threat, no unfair labor practice has been committed. See Norman E. Kopp, et al., d/b/a Kopp-Evans Construction Company, 143 NLRB 690; Max Silver, et al., d/b/a Max Silver & Sons, 123 NLRB 269. 276. These cases emphasize that it is essential that employees 5 have knowledge of an employer's threats before a finding of illegality may be predicated thereon. On the other hand, a different cluster of Board decisions stresses that, even when threats affecting employees are made to nonemployees only, an unfair labor practice has been perpetrated if "the statements were made under such circumstances as to insure that the employees would learn of them.. . [Emphasis supplied.] Reeves- Ely Laboratories, Inc., et al., 76 NLRB 728, 733. See Brooklyn Spring Corporation, et al., 113 NLRB 815, 822. In essence, these authorities require only a showing that the words or acts of the employer will reach the eyes or ears of his employees; but they seem to consider it fatal if the conduct under attack, without an affirmative showing of employee knowledge thereof, does no more than to discourage union or 5 The employees must be those of the employer involved. I find that McLain and Loudermilk were not Ladd's employees. Austin Company, 101 NLRB 1257, 1259, does not apply. 38 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD other protected activity by nonemployee organizers . Hence it is not enough, even under cases embracing this latter doctrine , to show that union officials were frus- trated in their organizing attempts and abandoned further union solicitation because such officials did not desire to subject employees to the risk of being discharged for signing union membership cards; an additional element must be also established, i.e., that employees will inevitably learn of the threat or coercive conduct. Ultimately, the problem then is to ascertain whether Hilderbrand's threats did more than cause McLain and other union officials to stop organizing Ladd's em- ployees. This narrows down the issue to whether the circumstances touching upon Hilderbrand's uttering of threats insure that Ladd's employees will learn thereof. It is reasonable to infer-and I draw such inference-that Ladd's employees were insulated against feeling the coercive impact of such threats because there is no evidence in the record that McLain ever returned to the jobsite or otherwise com- municated with Ladd's employees after December 3, 1963. Accordingly, I find that the General Counsel's case must fail because proof is missing that any employee knew or was bound to be cognizant of Hilderbrand's threats. It will therefore be recommended that the complaint be dismissed. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in this case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Baltimore Building and Construction Trades Council , AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Sections 2(5) and 8 (a) of the Act. 3. Respondent's foreman, Hilderbrand, is a supervisor under Section 2(11) of the Act. 4. Although Hilderbrand told McLain that Hilderbrand would discharge any em - ployees who signed union membership application cards or who he heard had signed the same, such statement standing alone does not transgress Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act; there must also exist :a showing that the circumstances insure that Ladd's em- ployees would learn about it. Upon the credible evidence , the conclusion must be drawn that such assurance is lacking. 5. On the facts found herein Respondent has not engaged in any unfair labor practice solely because Hilderbrand 's threat alluded to in the preceding paragraph was neither heard by nor communicated in any manner to Ladd's employees. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record in this proceeding, it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed. Savoy Laundry, Inc. and Food , Beverage and Express Drivers Local Union No. 145, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. Case No. 2-CA-8082. July 28, 1961 SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND AMENDED ORDER On May 24, 1962, the Board issued its Decision and Order in the above-entitled proceeding. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its decree, on March 2, 1964, enforcing the Board's Order in all respects except that: (a) The provisions of said Board's Order calling for the reopening of Respondent's wholesale shirt division are hereby deleted from said Order; and (b) the back- pay awards in said Order are hereby remanded to said Board for fur- ther consideration. 148 NLRB No. 5.