Stinson Manufacturing Co.

260 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD gaining unit. Moreover, the purchase of supplemental coal enables the Employer to enter into contracts with customers which it might not otherwise obtain ; and, in this respect, the fact that the Union chose not to impose a complete prohibition on subcontracting (which ad- mittedly would have been lawful) has the effect of securing work for those in the unit. As to substitute coal, the elimination of subcon- tracting to producers who charge lower rates would almost certainly lead to the performance of the work by the Signatory's own em- ployees, since this is coal which the Signatory itself would ordinarily produce; and the work preservation effect is, therefore, plain. In short, my colleagues appear to be inferring facts or contract interpreta- tions which would render this clause unlawful (amounting to a per se rule), rather than presuming lawful effects and purposes where that is possible,,as Board precedent requires 28 . In the Board's prior decision on this matter (in which I did not par- ticipate), the wage clause was held invalid on the ground that it was not a work-protection provision because the Operators were left free to purchase the substitute and supplemental coal. In the present de- cision, the welfare clause is held invalid because they are not left free to do so.. It appears unlikely that both decisions can be correct. Had the present clause been placed in the industrywide welfare fund agreement, it clearly would have been valid under the majority's view because it would have protected the work and standards of an indus- trywide unit. To reach a different result because the clause was placed in the several wage agreements emphasizes form at the expense of substance.- For-these reasons, I would hold that the welfare clause is lawful under Section 8 (e) and would grant the motion. 28 N.L.R B. v. News Syndicate Company, Inc, et al, 365 U S. 695; Local 357, Inter- national Brotherhood of Teamsters etc. v. N.L.R.B. (Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express), 365 U.S. 667; Paragon Products Corporation, 134 NLRB 662. Indeed, if inferences are to be drawn, the practice of the Union and the Employers in executing uniform agreements after the initial agreement is reached warrants the inference of an industrywide bargain- ing unit as readily as the facts here support the majority's inference that, even though the language provides otherwise, the welfare clause is an inducement for nonunion opera- tors to sign union agreements. Stinson Manufacturing Company and United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, District No. 38, Sub-District No. 7. Case No. 19-CA-.745.. August 10, 1964 DECISION AND ORDER On May 4, 1964, Trial Examiner William E. Spencer issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices 148 NLRB No. 27. STINSON MANUFACTURING COMPANY 261 and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions and a support- ing brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Members Leedom, Fanning, and Brown]. - The Board has reviewed the-rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the entire record in this case, including the Trial Examiner's Decision, the ex- ceptions, and briefs, and hereby- adopts the findings,' conclusions,2 and recommendations of the Trial Examiner. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Board hereby adopts as its Order, the Order recom- mended by the Trial Examiner with the' following addition, and orders that the Respondent, Stinson Manufacturing Company,, its officers, agents, successors,,and assigns, shall 'abide by the terms of the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order with the following addition : Renumber paragraph 2(e) as.2(f) and add as paragraph 2(e), the following : . We will notify Gary Naefus and Lanny Crouse if presently serv- ing in the Armed Forces of. the United States of their right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance with the Selec- tive Service Act-and,the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, as amended, after discharge from the'Armed Forces. i The record reveals that Thomas Williams is the son of Oscar Williams , the Respond- ent's president and principal shareholder ; that Thomas Williams has been employed in various capacities in the Respondent's plant and office ; that he has been authorized by Oscar Williams to lay off and recall individual employees ; and that with Foreman Mika, he decides on, and issues instructions regarding , job assignments In view of his close relationship with management and the apparent authority vested in him by Respondent, we find that Thomas Williams was at all times material herein an agent of Respondent and we agree with the Trial Examiner that his conduct was binding upon the Respond- ent. Continental Motors, Inc., 145 NLRB 1075; Square Binding and Ruling Co., Inc, 146 NLRB 201 (TXD). ,'In adopting the Trial Examiner's conclusion that Respondent refused to bargain with the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, we find , as did the Trial Examiner, that the Respondent failed to answer the Union's request for recognition and bargaining in order to gain time in which to undermine the Union 's status as majority representative Joy- Silk Mills, Inc., 85 NLRB 1263, enfd. as modified 185 F. 2d 732 (C A.D C.) ; Permacold Industries, Inc., 147 NLRB 885. In the absence of exceptions thereto, we adopt pro forma the Trial Examiner's finding that the layoffs of Tilton and D. Crouse did not violate Section 8 ( a) (3) of the Act. Because it is clear that the General Counsel expressly disavowed any intent to litigate Thomas Williams' remark to Stella Ecklor as a violation of Section 8(a) (1), we agree with the Trial Examiner's failure to find a violation thereon. 262 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE On an original charge filed October 8, 1963, and amended charges filed on October 11 and 25, 1963, respectively, by United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, District No. 38, Sub-District No. 7, herein called the Union, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, the latter herein called the Board, issued his complaint dated December 2, 1963, alleging in substance that Stinson Manu- facturing Company, herein called the Respondent or the Company, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, herein called the Act, refused to bargain with the Union, the duly designated representative of its employees in an appropriate unit; discriminated against certain named em- ployees in violation of Section 8(a) (1) and (3) of the Act; and engaged in certain specified conduct independently violative of Section " 8 (a) (1) of the Act. The Respondent in its duly filed answer denied the commission of the alleged unfair labor practices. All parties participated in the hearing on the General Counsel's complaint con- ducted by Trial Examiner William E. Spencer in Spokane, Washington, on January 28 and 29, 1964, and the Respondent and the General Counsel thereafter filed memorandum briefs. Upon the entire record in the case, and upon my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT The Respondent, a Washington corporation, is engaged in the State of Washington in aluminum fabrication. During the year 1963, in the course and conduct of its business operations, it caused to be manufactured, sold, and distributed, products valued in excess of $85,000, of which products valued in excess of $50,000 were furnished in the State of Washington to Birdseye Division of the General Foods Corporation and Kaiser Aluminum Corporation, each of which ships goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly out of the State of Washington. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. M. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The refusal to bargain A first meeting of union representatives with Respondent's employees occurred at the home of Ronald Tilton, an employee, on September 27, 1963, and at a second meeting on September 30 seven employees , including the several employees alleged herein to have been discriminated against , signed authorization cards. These appear to have been all, or nearly all, of the production employees then employed. On or about October 1, the Union filed a representation petition with the Board and about the same time wrote a letter to the Respondent, received by the Respondent on October 3, requesting recognition and a bargaining conference . The Respond- ent has at no time made any response to the Union's request. It is agreed and found that the following is an appropriate unit within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act: All production and maintenance employees of Stinson Manufacturing Company, at its place of business at Spokane, Washington, excluding office clerical employees, guards, professional employees, and supervisors as defined in the Act. It is further found that the Union, as of October 3, 1963, had been designated collective-bargaining representative by a majority of Respondent's employees in the said appropriate unit. The issue at this point is whether the Respondent refused to recognize and bargain with the Union in violation of the Act. Its defense is that it received notice of the Union's representation petition at or about the same time as the Union's letter demanding recognition and assumed that the matter would be left to an elec- tion. At no time did Respondent raise a question of the Union's majority. A Board-directed election is but one way of disposing of an issue of representation. and normally is resorted to only if differences exist as to the composition of an appropriate unit, or the employer expresses a good-faith doubt of the union's majority status. Here there were no such differences and apparently the Respondent STINSON MANUFACTURING COMPANY 263 entertained no good-faith doubt of the Union's majority. Under such circum- stances, its duty to recognize and bargain with the Union as representative of its employees in the appropriate unit is clear, and its failure at any time to respond to the Union's demand for bargaining rights was a refusal to bargain . I would hold, therefore, without more, that the Respondent's refusal to recognize and bargain with the Union was violative of the Act. There is, however, evidence that the Respondent's failure to respond to the Union's demand for recognition was caused by a good deal more than a misunderstanding about the duty to bargain during the pendency of an election petition . This evidence embraces alleged coercive state- ments made by supervisors to rank -and-file - employees for the purpose of frustrating their- desire for union representation , and the alleged discriminatory layoff of certain employees. Respondent's owner and manager is Oscar Williams . Its one foreman, Joseph Mika, is a supervisor , with authority to hire and fire . The supervisory status of Thomas R. Williams, son of Oscar Williams, is an issue . Respondent claims that he was not employed by it but by a subsidiary or associated company, Stinson Sales Company, and at no time represented the Respondent in an official or supervisory capacity. Oscar Williams, who owns some 97 percent of the Respondent, owns more than 50 percent of Stinson Sales; - is president of each, managing officer of each, and controls the labor policies of each .- It was the credible and undisputed testimony of Stella Ecklor, employed by the Respondent at times material herein in the capacity of bookkeeper and secretary, that Thomas Williams was paid by check drawn against the Respondent . 'While he may at some later date have been placed on the ' payroll of Stinson Sales, he was, and I so find , employed by the Respondent at times crucial to the issues . herein. He occupied a private office in Respondent's plant, issued or relayed, as'the case may be, directions to employees, held himself out to employees as being a part of management as when according to his testimony, he told employees that he was responsible for getting them paid vacations, and as when, according to the testimony of various employees , he pur- ported to speak for management . I find that his position with the Respondent was such that the employees reasonably believed that he represented management and that his statements and conduct are attributable to management. It was Ecklor's testimony that on or about the date the Respondent received the Union's demand for recognition, Thomas Williams asked her if she knew that the men were going union, and said, "It wouldn't make any difference, anyway, that they had enough planks supplied in Danville, Virginia, that they would just close the doors and starve the men out and if they ran short he , Tom Williams, and Ed Mika would build planks." 1 Admittedly, on or about October 3, when Respondent apparently first learned of union activities among its employees , Tom Williams questioned several employees in the voting unit on their knowledge of union activities , and stated to one or more of them that he was "disgusted" on learning of these activities . He told employee Ronald M . Tilton, then in the voting unit and now a foreman , that his father, Oscar, "was not going to take any more bids or make any bids on the profile"-a mechanical operation and one of the mainstays of Respondent's production-"until after the union thing is over." He told employee Dennis Crouse , after asking him if he knew anything about the union activity, "You know if this plant went union, we would have to close it down and move back east"-a threat similar to that earlier uttered to Ecklor. On or about October 8, after having been advised by employee Henry Anderson that there was to be a union meeting that evening, he drove by the union hall for the purpose , as he expressed it to Anderson , of seeing "how many cars he could see out there of the guys that worked at the Stinson Manufacturing Company so he could find out exactly who all was there." 2 This conduct constituted surveil- lance within the meaning of the decisions. 1 This testimony was adduced, not for the purpose of establishing an independent viola- tion of the Act, Ecklor being outside the voting unit , but to establish the Respondent's antiunion attitude. 2 Williams denied generally the coercive statements attributed to him, but the total im- pact of the testimony of the General Counsel 's witnesses was impressive Testimony of Respondent's witnesses that Dennis Crouse had a reputation of exaggerating or falsifying the truth, lost some of its impact when Tilton admitted that Crouse's reputation for falsify- ing was no worse or better than the rest of the employees I have not, however, relied on Crouse's testimony that Williams offered him a $1,500 bonus if he would give Williams the names of the employees who initiated the organizing movement It may well be that Williams discussed the matter of a bonus with him, as he did with Tilton, and Crouse might have inferred that it was mentioned as a bribe, but I do not think that Williams made an explicit offer in the terms and amount testified to by Crouse. 264 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Statements of a like coercive character were attributed to Respondent 's foreman, Mika. Tilton testified that Mika told him "if the company went union Mr. Wil- liams would probably close down and move east due to competition costs." Dennis Crouse gave testimony to the same effect. Mika denied that he made such state- ments but his denials are not credited . Even assuming , as Respondent apparently would have me assume, that in reference to plant-closing Williams and Mika meant that if the Respondent had to meet exhorbitant demands by the Union it would not be able to compete in its present operation and would be compelled to discontinue or move it to another location , such statements made before the Union had been given an opportunity to present bargaining demands and without the explication the Re- spondent would now have me read into these statements , would be inherently coercive . Obviously, they were intended to, and had the reasonable effect of, under- mining the employees' confidence in the Union and frustrating their desire for bar- gaining representation. - Nothing is more firmly established in the decisions than that an employer may not procrastinate in recognizing and bargaining with its employees ' representative in order to gain time in which to destroy that representative's majority, and that is true even where the employer asserts a timely doubt of a union's majority. Here, lacking such an assertion , the case is all the stronger. It is accordingly found that the Respondent's refusal on and after October 3 , 1963, to recognize and bargain with the Union as representative of its , employees in an appropriate unit, was violative of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, and 'constituted interference , restraint, and coercion within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. This finding and conclusion is made independently of alleged discrimination , to which we now turn. B. Discrimination As previously stated , on October 3 Respondent received the Union's demand for recognition and bargaining . At the close of work on Friday, October 4, or the fol- lowing Monday, October 7, the Respondent discharged Gary Naefus and Creston and Lanny Crouse, the latter two brothers . At that time it had- a total of about seven, or eight production employees. Lanny Crouse, after a period of prior employment and a layoff, was recalled to work- by Oscar Williams in April 1963 . His work was irregular, with few 40-hour weeks. Foreman Mika told him that he saw no reason why he could not work into a steady job . During the week ending September 27 he worked 18 hours. He was off 3 days awaiting the arrival of some equipment needed on his job. He testified that there was enough work on hand to have kept him occupied for the week follow- ing his October 4 layoff. He further testified that when he picked up his final check on October 7, he told Tom Williams that there was no "security" in "temporary layoffs," and Williams replied , "Why don't you join the god damn union ." Williams further told him, "It would be a lot better for you in the long run and in the future if you went in and told my father about this union stuff and who started it." Crouse professed not to know anything about the matter. Lanny Crouse has not been re- called to work. Creston Crouse's last period of employment began in January 1963. He re= mained in Respondent's employ regularly thereafter until October 4 . He admitted that during the school year he worked on a part-time basis, but testified that during the summer of 1963 he worked "rather steadily." He admitted that he had discussed the matter of going to college in the fall of 1963 with Oscar Williams. He was recalled to work by the Respondent in December 1963 and has worked steadily since. Gary Naefus worked for the Respondent from August to December 1962; was laid off for a period; returned to work January 29, 1963; served a jail sentence-not as- sociated with his work-thereafter ; and was recalled to work by Tom Williams on May 5, after which, according to him, he worked steadily, though not necessarily a full 40-hour week, every week, until his discharge on or about October 4 . He asked to be trained in the operation of the "profiler" and apparently qualified to run this operation . Respondent recalled him to work on December 8 and he worked from that date to December 29, when he was again discharged. Aside from these discharges , it is alleged that the Respondent on or about Octo- ber 7 provided its employees, Ronald Tilton , Dennis Crouse, and Henry T. Anderson, with less employment than would have been accorded them except for their union activities . Tilton was laid off 2 days in the week of October 7, and twice after that for a peroid of 1 day. Dennis Crouse was laid off for a day or two apparently during the week of October 7, and for a day at a time thereafter, as best I can gather from his testimony which in the matter of his layoffs was vague to the point of point- lessness but apparently good enough for the General Counsel, who did not trouble STINSON MANUFACTURING COMPANY 265 to establish with any degree of certainty the dates or duration of his layoffs or the circumstances attending them. Anderson appears to have been laid off a few hours about October 8. Anderson, one of several employees Tom Williams interrogated on his knowledge of union activities, was informed by Williams at the time the latter laid him off, that he had already laid off two other employees , that Anderson was being laid off for lack of work , and that "it was a shame the union deal had come about." Williams said he didn't know why the employees hadn't "come in and talked to his father. If the employees had come in to talk to his father . they would come to some sort of agreement ." In rely to Williams' query if he knew "who all was involved in the union," Anderson said that "practically everyone that was employed there was involved in it. . Everybody had signed up for it." Williams then said, "You guys know we could possibly find work for you around here if we wanted to"; that it had been planned to give everybody a bonus after they had been there over a year, but "if the union got in it wouldn't be possible to give a bonus because of higher cost of overhead." Williams also told Anderson , after Anderson had in- formed him of a union meeting that evening, that he was going to drive by the union hall to see how many cars belonging to Respondent's employees were there, and later, told Anderson how many cars he had identified. Respondent's defense to the discharges and temporary layoffs was lack of work; that the employees discharged were temporary or part-time employees who were laid off from time to time as work slacked off, and, consequently , the discharges in question were normal in its operations . It established to my satisfaction that there was some slackening of work during the September-October period, but since it produced no production records the matter of its economic situation rests chiefly on the credibility of its witnesses who, in their disavowals of antiunion statements, I have found unreliable. In short there was no showing by the Respondent , which I can accept, that the economic situation was such that, except for the employees' union activities and the Respondent 's obvious desire to evade all dealings with the Union, it would have discharged three of them at once and without prior notice, and refused them reinstatement until months later, and then only two of the three . It may well be that the Respondent was in an economic position where it could let these em- ployees go without serious interruption of its operations, but this would not justify the discharges if a cause behind such action was in any substantial degree Respond- ent's union animus.3 Too, it would be singular if the need for economic retrench- ment ripened and became critical at almost the precise moment that the Respondent was served with the Union's demand for recognition . Finally, there is Oscar Wil- liams' admission that Respondent's sales increased 40 percent during 1963 and that the Company in that year experienced the best volume of business in its history. Such an admission would not necessarily negate an economic slackening in Sep- tember and October 1963, but called for an explanation a little more impressive than is contained in the record of this proceeding There is no question that the Respondent knew or inferred that the three employees it discharged were active in the Union's organizational drive. I find that the Respondent discharged Gary Naefus and Creston and Lanny Crouse on or about October 7, 1963, because of their union activities and because of its desire to evade its bargaining obligations. Creston Crouse is the only one of the three discharged employees who is now employed by the Respondent . He is now employed during the school year and nothing appears in the record to indicate that he would not have been available throughout the period of his discharge . The Respondent rests its second discharge of Gary Naefus on the ground that it did not like his "attitude." There is little to indicate a change in his "attitude" from previous periods of employment except his involvement in union activities and the fact that during the period of his reinstate- ment he sought a wage increase . As previously stated, he served a jail sentence in the spring of 1963 but the Respondent has twice since called him back to work and there is no showing of any relation between this matter and his employment record. I am unable to accept Respondent's version of the causes which led to his second discharge in December 1963, but on the contrary believe and find that this discharge, like the one which occurred in October, was due to Respondent's union animus and desire to evade bargaining obligations. 3 N L R B v West Stifle Carpet Cleaning Co. , 329 F 2d 758 (C.A 6), enfg 136 NLRB 1694 "Even though part of the motivation for Weber's discharge might have been a needed cutting of expenses , such circumstance could not be legally used to effectuate a companion motive to rid the company of a union protagonist" 266 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The 1- or 2-day layoffs of Tilton, Dennis Crouse, and Anderson, coming as they did almost simultaneously with the discharges discussed above, are naturally suspect, particularly so in view of statements made by Tom Williams to Anderson at the time of the latter's layoff to the effect that the employees should have talked to Williams' father before engaging in union activities , and that the Respondent "could possibly find work for you around here if we wanted to," but except for Anderson, who ap- parently was off no more than a few hours before he was called back, I do not find the evidence of discriminatory motive as impressive as in the case of the discharges. Tilton, now a foreman, admitted that his layoffs were, in his opinion, due to a work shortage, and while this may very well not have been his testimony , except that he is now a supervisor, I see no reason to find contrary to his admissions, and Dennis Crouse's layoffs were dealt with so cursorily by the General Counsel and are so vaguely defined that I am unable to conclude that he was a victim of discrimination. The remarks of Tom Williams in laying off Anderson reveal at the least a mixed motive for otherwise there would have been no occasion for him to make the refer- ences to the Union which he did make, as well as the reference to finding work for the laid-off employees if he wanted to. Oscar Williams, when he learned of Ander- son's layoff, ordered him back . He testified that the layoff was a "mistake" or a "misunderstanding" but Anderson was not compensated for the time he was off. I find his layoff to have been discriminatorily motivated. By discharging its employees Gary Naefus and Creston and Lanny Crouse, and by laying off its employee, Henry T. Anderson, because of their union activities, thereby discouraging membership in the Union, the Respondent engaged'in conduct violative of Section 8(a) (1) and (3) of the Act. I further find that by its interroga- tion of employees regarding the union affiliation and activities of themselves and others; by threatening economic reprisals if required to bargain with the Union; and by engaging in surveillance of a meeting of the Union, the Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in violation of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in con- nection with Respondent's operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com- merce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a) (1), (3), and (5) of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. The Respondent having refused to bargain with the Union, the duly designated representative of its employees in an appropriate unit , it is recommended that, upon request, the Respondent bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative of all its employees in the appropriate unit concerning wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment , and, if an understanding is reached , embody such understanding in a signed agreement. The Respondent having discriminatorily discharged employees Gary Naefus and Creston and Lanny Crouse on or about October 7, 1963; having thereafter reinstated Gary Naefus and Creston Crouse in December 1963, and having discriminatorily discharged Naefus again on or about December 29, 1963; and having discriminatorily laid off temporarily its employee Henry T. Anderson on or about October 7, 1963, it will be recommended that the Respondent offer Gary Naefus and Lanny Crouse immediate reinstatement to their former or equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges , and make whole Gary Naefus, Creston and Lanny Crouse, and Henry T. Anderson for any loss of pay suffered because of the discrimination against them , by payment to each of a sum of money equal to that which he normally would have been paid in Respondent's employ from the date or dates of their respective discharges in the case of Naefus and Creston and Lanny Crouse, to the date of their respective reinstatements or the date of the Respondent's offer of reinstatement, as the case may be , and, with respect to Anderson, for what he would have earned during the period of his temporary layoff, less his net earnings in the case of each, if any, during the said periods. Loss of pay shall be computed upon a quarterly basis in the manner established by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289. Backpay shall include the payment of interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum to be computed in the manner set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. STINSON MANUFACTURING COMPANY 267 Respondent's conduct violative of the Act is of such character and scope that a broad cease-and-desist order will be recommended. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and -upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. All production and maintenance employees of the Respondent at its place of business in Spokane , Washington, excluding office clerical employees , guards, pro- fessional employees, and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appro- priate for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 2. The Union, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act, has been at all times on and after October 4, 1963, and now is, the exclusive representative of all employes in the aforesaid appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.- 3. By refusing on and after October 4, 1963, to bargain in good faith with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (5) of theAct. 4. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of its em- ployees, Gary Naefus, Creston and Lanny Crouse, and Henry Anderson, thereby discouraging membership in the Union, the Respondent has engaged in and is engag- ing in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act. 5. By the foregoing conduct; by interrogating in an unlawful manner its em- ployees concerning their union affiliation and activities ; by threatening them with reprisals because of their union affiliation and activities; and by engaging in sur- veillance of a union meeting, the Respondent has interfered with , restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and thereby has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. 6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in the case , it is recommended that the Respondent , Stinson Manu- facturing Company, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in the previously described appropriate unit. (b) Discouraging membership in^ the Union or any other labor organization of its employees, by discharging its employees or by discriminating in any other manner in regard to their hire or tenure of employment , or any term or condition of employment. (c) Interrogating in an unlawful manner its employees concerning their union affiliation and activities; threatening them with reprisals in the event they choose union representation ; and engaging in surveillance of union activities. (d) In any other manner interfereing with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist the Union, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representa- tives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agree- ment requiring membership in a labor organization as authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer Gary Naefus and Lanny Crouse immediate and full reinstatement to their former or equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make whole Naefus, Lanny and Creston Crouse, and Henry Anderson for any loss of pay each may have suffered as a result of the discrimination against him, in the manner set forth above in the section entitled "The Remedy." 268 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, time- cards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Recommended Order. (c) Upon request, bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive repre- sentative of employees in the previously described appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment, and embody in a signed agreement any understanding reached. (d) Post at its plant in Spokane, Washington, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 4 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 19, shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent's authorized representa- tive, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be main- tained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 19, in writing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this Decision, what steps it has taken to comply herewith.5 'In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order be enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order." 'In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, In writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT discourage affiliation with United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, District No. 38, Sub-District No. 7, or any other labor organization, by discharging our employees or discriminating in any other manner in regard to their hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment. WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees concerning their union activities in a manner violative of the Act; engage in surveillance of union meetings or other union activities ; threaten reprisals because of union activities; or in any other manner interfere with, restrain , or coerce our employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist the above -named or any other labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, or to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro- tection, or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment , as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. WE WILL bargain collectively, upon request, with the above -named labor organization as the exclusive representative of employees in the bargaining unit described below, with respect to wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or other terms or conditions of employment , and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. The bargaining unit is: All production and maintenance employees of Stinson Manufacturing Company, at our place of business at Spokane, Washington , excluding office clerical employees, guards, professional employees , and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL offer Gary Naefus and Lanny Crouse immediate and full reinstate- ment to the positions they formerly held, or their equivalent, without prejudice to seniority or other rights and privileges , and make them , and Creston Crouse and Henry Anderson , whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered as a result of the discrimination against them. WILKES-BARRE TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION NO. 187 269 All our employees are free to become, or refrain from becoming, members of the above-named or any other labor organization. STINSON MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative ) (Title) NOTE.-We will notify the above-named employees if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of their right to full reinstatement upon applica- tion in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, as amended , after discharge from the Armed Forces. This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 327 Logan Building, 500 Union Street, Seattle, Washington, Telephone No. 682-3300, if they have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions. Wilkes-Barre Typographical Union No. 187 and Llewellyn & McKane, Inc. Wilkes-Barre Printing Pressmen and Assistants Union No. 137, and International Printing Pressmen and Assistants Union of North America and Payne Printery, Inc. Wilkes-Barre Printing Pressmen and Assistants Union No. 137 and Llewellyn Brothers, Inc. Cases Nos..-CD-99, 4-CD-100, and 4-CD-102. August 10, 1964 DECISION AND DETERMINATION OF DISPUTE This is a proceeding under Section 10(k) of the Act following charges filed by Llewellyn & McKane, Inc., Llewellyn Brothers, Inc., and Payne Printery, Inc., alleging that Wilkes-Barre Typographical Union No. 187, hereinafter referred to as ITU, and Wilkes-Barre Printing Pressmen and Assistants Union No. 137, and International Printing Pressmen and Assistants Union of North America, herein- after referred to as Pressmen, had violated Section 8 (b) (4) (D) of the Act. The charges allege, in substance, that Respondent Unions threatened to engage in a strike or refusal to work with an object of forcing or requiring the Employers to assign particular work to em- ployees represented by their respective unions. A consolidated hear- ing was held before Hearing Officer William J. Davis on April 6 and 7, 1964. The Employers, the Pressmen, and ITU appeared at the hearing and were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to adduce evidence bearing on the issues.' The rulings of the Hearing Officer made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed. Thereafter, the Pressmen and the ITU filed briefs. 1 At the hearing the parties stipulated to incorporate in the record herein by reference the testimony of certain named witnesses given in other 10(k) proceedings before the Board. Such testimony accordingly is made part of the record herein and has been con- sidered by the Board in reaching its determination. 148 NLRB No. 26.