Electric Motors and Specialties, Inc.

ELECTRIC MOTORS AND SPECIALTIES, INC. 131 tor, in writing, that it will comply with the foregoing recommendations, the National Labor Relation Board issue an order requiring the Respondent to take the action aforesaid. APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended , we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization , by discharging or refusing to reinstate any of our employees, or in any manner discriminating in regard to their hire or tenure of employment , or any term or condition of employment. WE WILL NOT interrogate employees concerning their interest in, and inten- tions with respect to , joining the above-named or any other labor organization, in a manner constituting interference , restraint, or coercion violative of Sec- tion 8 (a)(1) of the Act. WE WILL NOT threaten discharge of employees who are identified with the above-named Union, or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT promise economic benefits to employees for refraining from union activities. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist the above-named or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing , to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection , and to refrain from any and all such activities. WE WILL offer to Steve Harden immediate and full reinstatement to his former or a substantially equivalent position without prejudice to seniority and other rights and privileges , and make him whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result of the discrimination against him. All our employees are free to become , remain, or refrain from becoming or re- maining, members of the above-named Union, or any other labor organization. MANGEL STORES CORPORATION AND SHOPPER'S FAIR OF COLUMBIANA, INC., Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative ) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 614 ISTA Center, 150 West Market Street , Indianapolis, Indiana, Telephone No. Melrose 3- 8921 , if they have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions. Electric Motors and Specialties, Inc. and International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, and its Local 997. Cases Nos. 13-CA-5692 and 13-CA-5838. October 26, 1964 DECISION AND ORDER On April 8, 1964, Trial Examiner Benjamin B. Lipton issued his Decision in the above case, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recom- mending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirma- tive action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. 149 NLRB No. 16. 132 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD He also found that Respondent had not engaged in other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommended that those alle- gations of the complaint be dismissed. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Decision and a supporting brief and the Gen- eral Counsel filed a reply brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Members Fanning, Brown, and Jenkins]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions, and recom- mendations of the Trial Examiner, except as modified herein.2 We find merit in the Respondent's exceptions to the Trial Ex- aminer's finding that Respondent discriminatorily reduced employee Hirschbiel's rate of pay from her premium pay on another job from which she was transferred. In so finding, the Trial Examiner relied particularly upon the Respondent's hostility toward Hirschbiel's un- ion militancy and her vigorous presentation of grievances in her role as the Union's chief steward, and concluded that the reasons ad- vanced by the Respondent for the wage reduction were fallacious and discredited. From January 1951 to November 1962, Hirschbiel worked in the machine shop. She received premium pay of $1.671/2 for her classi- fication in wage group IV and was 1 of only 5 women of some 100 to 150 women in the plant who received this top pay. In November 1962 she was transferred to the punch press department into a classi- fication in wage group VI for which the standard rate is $1.50 and the premium rate is $1.57. At that time she was told that her rate would remain at $1.671/2. 'The Respondent has excepted to the credibility findings made by the Trial Examiner. It Is the Board 's established policy, however , not to overrule a Trial Examiner 's resolu- tions with respect to credibility unless, as is not the case here , the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions were incorrect . Standard Dry Wall Prodacts, Inc., 91 NLRB 544, enfd 188 F 2d 352 (C.A. 3) In the absence of exceptions by the General Counsel to the Trial Examiner's findings that Respondent did not violate the Act with respect to the issuance of a reprimand to Grace Baker , we shall adopt such findings , pro forma, and shall dismiss that allegation of the complaint. 2 Member Brown would not reach the merits of the case at this time The charges filed by the complainants herein alleged discriminatory treatment by Respondent . But, the complainants had previously filed grievances about the very same conduct under a contractual grievance procedure available to them and then, without exhausting that grievance procedure, filed these charges. For reasons stated by him in Thor Power Tool Company, 148 NLRB 1379 , he agrees with Respondent that the "purposes of the Act will be better served by leaving the parties to the remedies " of their grievance procedure and would defer a decision on the merits of this case until the complainants process their grievances through the grievance -arbitration procedures of the contract. ELECTRIC MOTORS AND SPECIALTIES, INC. 133 A formal grievance on this transfer was processed through final arbitration and the arbitrator held that the transfer of Hirschbiel in November 1962 was not discriminatory. Hirschbiel was unable to make the standard of production on this job, and she was transferred to another job in another department on June 24, 1963. At that time she was informed that, although her rate of pay was over the standard rate for the job to which she was assigned, her pay would be kept at the same rate subject to reconsid- eration at a later date. After 1 month on this job, during which she had not met the production standards, on August 22 Hirschbiel's rate was reduced to $1.50, the standard rate for the classification in which she had been working since November 1962. It is clear that, as found by the Trial Examiner, Hirschbiel was a very active and vigorous spokesman for the Union, and we have affirmed the Trial Examiner's conclusion that the Respondent had discriminated against her in violation of the Act by its written repri- mand of September 11, 1962, which was prejudicial to her job se- curity. These facts, at most, may raise suspicions that the Respond- ent was unlawfully motivated, but suspicion will not support a find- ing that the Act has been violated. The initial transfer in November 1962 from a job in a higher wage classification to one in a lower wage group has been held by an arbi- trator, under the procedures provided for by the contract, not to have been discriminatory, and it is not alleged in this proceeding to have been so. The record, therefore, shows that Hirschbiel was lawfully transferred to lower paying jobs, that for approximately 9 months she was continued at a rate of pay higher than that allocated to the jobs despite her inability to attain the standard of production, and that finally the Respondent reduced her rate of pay to the rate of the job she was performing. On these facts, we find that the General Counsel has not sustained his burden of proving that the reduction was discriminatorily motivated and shall dismiss this allegation of the complaint.' ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby adopts, as its Order, the Order recommended by the Trial Examiner and orders that the Respondent, Electric Motors and Specialties, Inc., its of- 3 In adopting the Trial Examiner 's finding that Respondent issued an Unwarranted reprimand to Betty Gaff which under Respondent 's rules might detrimentally affect her employment status, we do not pass on or adopt his finding that even if Respondent had a good-faith belief that Gaff violated a valid published rule of Respondent , it would still have violated the Act. Inasmuch as we agree with the Trial Examiner 's finding that Respondent had granted Gaff permission to leave the plant and therefore did not have a good-faith belief that she had violated the rule , we deem it unnecessary to consider such a hypothetical matter. 134 DECISIONS OR NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ficers, agents, successors , and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, with the following modifications : 1. Delete in paragraph 1(a), on the fourth line thereof, the fol- lowing : "by reducing their wages,". 2. Delete paragraph 2(a) in its entirety and renumber the remain- ing paragraphs accordingly. 3. Delete from the first, substantive paragraph of the notice, on the third line thereof, the following : "reducing their wages, or". 4. Delete paragraph 5 of the notice. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE A hearing was held before Trial Examiner Benjamin B . Lipton on December 3, 1963,' in Garrett, Indiana, involving allegations by the General Counsel that Re- spondent violated Section 8(a)(1), (3 ), and (4 ) of the Act.' All parties partici- pated in the hearing , waived opportunity to argue orally on the record, and filed briefs with me which have been duly considered. Upon the entire record in the cases , and from my observation of the witnesses, including their demeanor on the stand, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT Respondent is engaged in the manufacture of electric motors and specialties in Garrett, Indiana. During the year preceding issuance of the complaint , Respondent sold and shipped directly in interstate commerce materials valued in excess of $50,- 000. Respondent admits, and I find , that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Charging Party, International Union of Electrical , Radio & Machine Work ers, AFL-CIO, and its Local 997 , herein jointly called the Union , is a labor organi- zation within the meaning of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Issues; contentions; prefatory findings In substance, three instances of unlawful discrimination are alleged : ( 1) the issu- ance of a written reprimand to Betty Gaff because she left the plant during working hours to attend and give testimony , under subpena, at a prior Board unfair labor practice hearing, "and/or" because of her union activities ; (2) the issuance of a written reprimand to Grace Baker because she assisted in locating Gaff during working hours at the plant when Gaff was being summoned to testify , "and/or" because of Respondent's "belief" that Baker was engaged in union activities; and (3) the reduction of the pay rate of Virginia Hirschbiel because she gave testimony at the prior Board hearing, "and/or" because of her union activities . In addition, a written warning to Hirschbiel because she engaged in union "and/or" protected concerted activity is alleged independently as an act of restraint and coercion. ' All dates are in 1963 , unless otherwise indicated. 2 In Case No 13-CA-5692 , the charge was filed on June 18 and served on June 21; in Case No. 13-CA-5838 , the charge was filed on August 26 and served on August 29. The consolidated complaint herein was issued by the General Counsel on October 22. Re- spondent's objection , In its answer, to the consolidation of the cases is denied as without merit. ELECTRIC MOTORS AND SPECIALTIES, INC. 135 The significance of a formal reprimand or warning is reflected in the schedule of plant "regulations" posted by Respondent. The following excerpts illustrate the degrees of discipline provided for specific offenses: Regulations 1st offense 2d offense 3d offense 2. Insubordination. --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - • • r 10 Fighting on premises-------------------------- Discharge 1 week off to discharge. 11. Use of abusive, threatening, or profane lan- guage to superior. 12 Leaving plant during working hours without permission. 13 Leaving place of work during working hours 3 days off----------------- Reprimand--------------- Reprimand--------------- Discharge Discharge. Reprimand- ischarge except for reasonable time spent in going to restrooms and clunking facilities 14. Loitering ni,estrooni or in plant during work- Reprimand --------------- 3 days off--- Discharge. ing hours ♦ 19. Rest period regulation violations-------------- Reprimand --------------- Warning---- Discharge. • • r 22. Habitual tardiness-reporting late for wort:--- r ♦ Warning------------------ Reprimand- Discharge. • ♦ r 24 Individual who is unable to meet production standards and quotas. r • Warning------------------ Discharge As reflected in its pleading and in its brief, Respondent denies that it committed any unlawful conduct and affirmatively defends, as follows: Gaff and Baker were reprimanded for violation of specific plant rules, numbered 12 and 13, respectively, supra. Hirschbiel was given a written warning for cause (i.e., allegedly for loud talking and disrespect to a supervisor while discussing a grievance as the Union's chief steward). Her wages were reduced to the proper pay rate on the job to which she had been transferred, and the transfer itself is not alleged by the General Coun- sel as a discrimination. All these matters, involved in the present case, were formally presented as grievances and finally disposed of as provided in the grievance-arbitra- tion procedure of the existing contract with the Union. Respondent further asserts that the Union filed these charges with the Board deliberately to harass Respondent, to avoid trial of these matters before "the impartial tribunal selected by the par- ties" under the contract, and "to avoid an election to determine the wishes of" Re- spondent's employees as to the identity of their bargaining representative under the Act.' The Union (certitfied by the Board on October 31, 1961) executed with Respond- ent on March 9, 1962, a collective-bargaining contract which expired on Febru- uary 26, 1963, but which the parties thereafter continued in force on a day-to-day 3 The parties requested that notice be taken of a Trial Examiner's Decision involving Respondent (issued August 23, 1963, in Case No 13-CA-5368 [149 NLRB No. 1251) follow- ing an unfair labor practice hearing held May 15 through 17, 1963. That case involves in part alleged violations of Section 8(a) (1) in connection with warnings and reprimands to employees, including Hirschbiel and Gaff. (The Trial Examiner's Decision states that five of these disciplinary actions were made the subject of grievances and processed pur- suant to the contract procedure.) Also involved in the prior case are allegations of inter- rogation, surveillance, threats, and company sponsorship of a decertification petition , dis- criminatory discharge of two employees ; and a refusal to bargain by Respondent. The Trial Examiner found violations only as to the company sponsorship of the decertifica- tion petition and the refusal to bargain, and recommended dismissal of all other allega- tions. Exceptions were filed by all parties and the case is presently pending before the Board (The formal (and public) files of the Board reveal that a decertification petition in Case No. 13-RD-533 was filed on December 16, 1962, and dismissed by the Regional Director on March 15, 1963, on the ground of inappropriate unit ; and on October 14, 1963, a certification petition was filed in Case No. 13-RC-9728 by the International Union ) I am, of course, not bound by the findings of the Trial Examiner in the earlier case, and take notice only of formal and undisputed facts in that proceeding and matters of public record as are relevant to the issues herein. 136 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD basis. The contract in substance provides, inter alia, that the Company shall not discriminate against any employee because of his union membership or activity (article II) or for any reason (article III, section 3 ), and that employees shall comply with the posted rules (article III, section 2.) The pertinent portions of the detailed grievance procedure under article IV may be summarized, viz: Section 1 . "Should any grievance arise between the Company and any employee in the bargaining unit, in regard to the meaning or application of the provisions of this agreement, there shall be no lockout , strike, . or other interference with operations . . .; but such grievance shall be settled in accordance with the following procedure...." Under step 1 , the employee presents his grievance to his immediate supervisor for adjustment. Under step 2, the grievance is reduced to writing by the employee and referred to the local union president or vice president who presents the grievance to the plant superintendent or assistant superintendent for decision. Under step 3, the grievance is referred to an International representative of the union who pre- sents it for decision at a meeting with management representatives . Under step 4, if the grievance "is not settled during the first three ( 3) steps," then the matter in dispute "shall, at the request of any interested party ," be submitted to final and binding arbitration, as described in detail. Specific time limitations , varying from 2 to 10 days, are provided between each step of the procedure from the occurrence of the grievance to the appointment of an impartial arbitrator . Section 2 provides that-"Any claim, difference or dispute not presented or prosecuted within the time allowed at any step shall be deemed abandoned and shall not thereafter be the basis of any claim , or grievance. Any grievance not appealed from the decision made by the company representative at any one step of the foregoing grievance procedure to the following step within the time provided shall be deemed to have been abandoned and to have been conclu- sively settled upon the basis of the last decision of the company representative. If the Company does not answer a written grievance within the time provided the grievance shall be treated as allowed." Section 3 provides that-"... no claim or grievance of any party under this contract , including all employees in the bargain- ing unit, shall be recognized or given any consideration unless it is presented and prosecuted in accordance with the grievance procedure provided in this Article." Section 4 provides that-"All settlements of grievances shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by a representative of each party ." Section 7 provides that- "No employee shall pursue any remedy at law against the Company or the Union under any provision of this contract, until as a condition precedent to such action, he shall have first exhausted his remedies under the grievance procedure hereinabove provided." Pursuant to the contract , grievances (on the Union's "Grievance Form") were filed by Gaff, Baker, and Hirschbiel concerning the reprimands, warning and wage reduction, the same as are in issue herein . The Gaff and Baker grievances pro- gressed to step 3 , under which an inconclusive meeting was held between manage- ment and union representatives . As to both Hirschbiel grievances , documents in evidence reflect actions taken under step 2 . It is clear that all four grievances were denied by Respondent , that no actual solution or settlement (pursuant to article IV, section 4) was effected, and that no party submitted a request for arbitration under provisions in step 4. Board and court decisions , particularly those of more recent vintage,' have placed increasing emphasis upon congressional policy indicating the desirability 5 of resolv- ing grievance disputes through media devised by the parties themselves in the col- lective-bargaining process, such as in the form of contract grievance procedures leading to binding arbitration . This policy, however, was nowhere held to detract from the exclusive authority given the Board to adjudicate unfair labor practice charges, as expressed in Section 10(a) of the Act' In those cases in which the Board has declined to proceed and has instead deferred to the grievance-arbitration A E g., Steelworkers V. Warrier f Gulf Co , 363 U . S. 574 ; Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 375 U. S. 261 ; Smith v. Evening News, 371 U.S. 195; and Board cases cited , infra. 51n Title II of the Act ( the Board ' s authority is embraced in Title I ), Section 203(d) provides that "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby de- clared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective -bargaining agreement " 0 In Section 10(a) it is provided that the Board 's power to prevent unfair labor prac- tices "shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement , law or otherwise." ELECTRIC MOTORS AND SPECIALTIES, INC. 137 machinery of a contract , it has done so on the basis of its "considerable discretion" to give effect to broad congressional objectives and to fundamental purposes of the National Labor Relations Act. Such Board decisions appear to fall generally into three groups: (1) Refusal-to- bargain issues: For example, where a party sought to avoid the grievance provisions in a contract and filed charges to have the Board intervene in the matter, the party was held to have violated its statutory bargaining obligation and required to pro- ceed under the contract.' And where a party insisted that the dispute be settled within the framework of the contract's grievance machinery, which specifically covered the subject and had been properly invoked, the Board dismissed the refusal- to-bargain allegation against such party, and required that "full play" be given to the procedures of the contract.' (2) Honoring an arbitration award, to which the parties were bound, rendered on the same subject matter as that before the Board, where the arbitration procedures were fair and regular and the result was not clearly repugnant to the policies of the Act.' (3) Withholding Board decision to permit exhaustion of grievance-arbitration procedures in a contract." Respondent's position " is that the four grievances involved were "finally dis- posed of," i.e., "conclusively settled" by default of the employees in failing to press their cases further within the grievance machinery. There is thus no situation here for deferring decision on the merits to permit "full play" or exhaustion of the contract procedures. The actual question presented, therefore, is whether the asserted "settlement" of the grievances on the basis of an imputed abandonment by the grievants, or the operation of a contractual waiver, may be honored under Board doctrine." It would appear not. As shown, the Board's discretionary ac- ceptance of an arbitration award in certain cases was dependent upon the ex- istence of procedural regularity and fairness in the arbitration proceeding. Thus implicit is a precondition that the matter had been litigated before the arbitrator and impartially resolved. Here, there was no arbitration nor anything equiva- lent. In effect, no more was involved than a direct approach by the com- plainants to the Respondent in an effort to have the disciplines rescinded and a refusal by the Respondent to do so. In an analogous case," because it was "hardly a substitute for an arbitration proceeding," the Board 14 refused to accord deference to a negotiated settlement between the employer and the union at step 2 of the contract grievance procedure, reducing a disciplinary discharge to a 30-day layoff, but which was unacceptable to the employee." My conclusion here, consistent with existing precedents, is that Respondent's contention must be rejected. B. Gaff and Baker On May 17, at 3:30 p.m., toward the close of the hearing in the prior unfair labor practice case, supra, the General Counsel's attorney requested Dorothy Carter, field representative for the International Union, to pick up Betty Gaff at Respondent's 7 Purex Corporation, Limited, 123 NLRB 1507. 8 E g., Montgomery War d R Co, Incorporated, 137 NLRB 418; Hercules Motor Corpora- tion, 136 NLRB 1648; McDonnell Aircraft Corporation, 109 NLRB 930, 935; Consoli- dated Aircraft Corporation, 47 NLRB 694, 704 (concerning the Section 8(a) (5) issue). 9 E.g., Spielberg Manufacturing Company, 112 NLRB 1080 (the lead case) ;International Harvester Company, 138 NLRB 923, enfd. sub nom. Thomas D. Ramsey v N.L.R B., 327 F. 2d 784 (C.A. 7) ; Raleys, Ino. d/b/a Raley's Supermarkets, 143 NLRB 256 (applied in Board representation cases). And see The Youngstown Cartage Company, 146 NLRB 305, footnote 4 10 E.g , Dube Manufacturing Corporation, 142 NLRB 431; Pacific Tile and Porcelain Company, 137 NLRB 1358, 1365 (involving a representation case issue) ; Consolidated Aircraft Corporation, 47 NLRB 694, 704 (dismissal without prejudice of the Section 8(a) (3) issue). "It does not appear that the same contention was advanced by Respondent or ruled upon by the Trial Examiner in the prior proceeding, supra, as to the issues there of the reprimands and warnings to employees which were also the subject of grievances under the contract. 111 do not find a clear and unequivocal waiver in the contract of the right to file charges with the Board. It is unnecessary to pass upon whether such an express waiver, if made, would be binding upon all parties. 13 Pontiac Motors Division, General Motors Corporation, 132 NLRB 413. 14 Member Leedom dissenting. 15 See also Greenwood Farms, Inc., 140 NLRB 649, footnote 1. 138 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD plant for testimony to be given on rebuttal. Carter drove a few blocks to the plant and went in through the employees' entrance at Hamsher Street." No one ap- peared to be in the offices near the entrance and, from the threshold , Carter called out and beckoned to an employee, Grace Baker, at work about 12 feet away. (Baker, who was not a union member, did not know Carter or Gaff , nor did they know her. ) Baker walked over. Carter said that she wanted to speak to someone in charge . Baker took Carter a few steps to the office of Jon Buckles , a tool de- signer, explaining to him that "this lady" wanted someone with authority . Carter told Buckles she came to get Betty Gaff and had a car waiting . Baker, as she testi- fied, thought there was a personal emergency , and immediately undertook herself 17 to seek out Betty Gaff." Proceeding through several departments in the plant and making inquiries along the way, Baker found Gaff, and told her-"There is a lady in the office that has a car waiting for you." Baker then returned to her work station, having been gone about 3 to 5 minutes . Gaff, on receiving the information, took her coat and promptly came to where Carter was waiting. In the meantime , Buckles had gone through the plant looking for one of the executives and returned to tell Carter that he could not find anyone just then." Shortly thereafter , Plant Superintendent Noel Muhn returned to his office located near the entrance where Carter was standing. Carter approached him and related that she had come to take Gaff to the hearing. At the moment he could observe Gaff walking toward the door holding her coat . Carter testified that after stating her purpose to Muhn , she asked, "Do I have your permission"; and Muhn replied, "Well, I suppose so, if you need her, take her." Gaff testified that as she came by she saw Carter and Muhn at his office door, that when Carter came over to her she asked if it was all right for her to go, and that Carter said, "Yes, I have per- mission." i" They then left the plant "l Gaff was brought to the hearing , learned that she was no longer needed , and was returned to the plant . She had been away from her work about 45 minutes Later in the day, she approached Muhn and told him she had forgotten to check out. Muhn said that it was all right and that her supervisor had taken care of her timecard . Also that day, Muhn questioned Baker whether Carter had come over to talk to her . Baker indicated that her at- tention had been called by "that lady" and that she had walked over to Carter. Bearing the date of May 21, Carter received from William J. Morrill (called "Jerry"), an official of Respondent , and son of the company president, a letter which stated in part: Mrs. Carter : On Friday May 17, 1963 , Mrs. Carter while assisting in the Union's presentation at a NLRB hearing ... left the building in a great hurry at approximately 4 P.M. It should be noted in exiting the building that she passed most of the members of management who were attending the hearing. A few moments later she presented herself at the employees' entrance of the plant. From this entry way she summoned an employee from the floor who escorted Mrs. Carter to the entrance of Mr. Jon Buckles ' office who is a tool designer in our employment . Mr. Buckles left his office to contact our Personnel Office and returned to tell Mrs. Carter that he didn 't know the lo- 10 Carter testified this was the only entrance she knew (although the main entrance to the plant was on King Street) ; that she had entered the same way that morning to call for another witness; that upon entering then she had seen Personnel Manager Chester Ludwig in a nearby office, related her mission, and asked him if she was in the right place ; and that Ludwig had said it was all right, left, and returned with the witness she sought 17 Without stopping to consult her supervisor who was available in her department. 1" Carter testified that upon first speaking to Baker, she indicated that she had been sent by the Board to pick up Betty Gaff and take her back to the hearing. While this appears to conflict with Baker's testimony, it is not of material import. I credit Carter and also believe that Baker was confused and honestly gave the impression she received. 19 Many of the plant officials were at the Board hearing. =0 Malin testified that in talking to Carter he merely remark, "Oh," and that he as- sumed Gaff had received permission from her immediate supervisor to leave the plant It is fully corroborated that from the outset Carter was seeking permission from someone in authority to secure Gaff for the Board hearing. It is also shown that Gaff herself in- quired and was told by Carter that permission was obtained. In all the circumstances, I find Carter's version the more plausible, and credit her as against Muhn. 21 Buckles testified, inaccurately, that Carter and Gaff had left the plant before Muhn had returned to his office. ELECTRIC MOTORS AND SPECIALTIES, INC. 139 cation of the management personnel. . . . [H]owever, at this time Betty Gaff escorted by the aforementioned employee appeared at the door and Mrs. Carter left immediately with Betty. It should be noted that henceforth we wish International Representatives who have business in our plant to make their entry to our plant from the King Street entrance and to present their request to the secretary in the Personnel Office who will contact the proper authority to approve or disapprove the Union Representative's request. We feel that the Union's individual Representative had some cause to be agitated, however, even common courtesy would be expected to allow sufficient time for Mr. Buckles to secure the highest authority in the plant, Mr. Muhn. Untortunately as a result of this incident, management is forced to repri- mand Grace Baker and Betty Gaff under the posted plant regulations 13 and 12 respectively. Gaff, on May 21, received a formal notice of reprimand, which stated: "Viola- tion of Company Regulation No. 12 leaving plant during working hours without peimission on Friday, May 17, 1963." Thereafter, she filed a written grievance, to which Superintendent Muhn sent the following reply: TO: Betty Gaff SUBJECT: Grievance of Reprimand You failed to check out with your supervisor Mr. Joe Severin, and also neglected to punch your timecard out before leaving the plant. Leaving the plant during working hours without permission is in violation of Company regulation No. 12 and wariants as first offense, a reprimand. The writer did not grant permission to Betty Gaff for purpose of leaving the plant. Relief denied. On May 16, before leaving the plant to testify, Gaff showed her subpena from the Board to her supervisor, Cramer, who made no comment, and she left.22 On May 17, when notified by Baker, she left her department without attempting to speak to her immediate supervisor. However, as I find, it was perfectly reasonable for Gaff to assume that she was permitted to leave. A company employee, Baker, whom she did not know, had come to summon her. Muhn later saw her and knew she was going to testify. She inquired and was told by Carter that she had permis- sion, presumably of Muhn with whom she had seen Carter talking. And she had specifically obtained approval to respond to the subpena from her foreman the day before. While Respondent's reply to her grievance states that she failed to check out with her supervisor, Joe Severin, it may be noted that there was apparently no supervisor present in the department at the time." Also mentioned in the grievance reply was Gaff's "neglect to punch her timecard out," although Muhn had told her the same day that it was "all right." Gaff has 10 years' service with Respondent. Her job security would obviously be affected by the reprimand. It is evident, under any view of the facts, that Re- spondent was applying its plant rule to Gaff in a highly technical manner and with- out regard to ordinary fairness from the employee's standpoint. However, as I have found, Gaff did have permission to leave from "the highest authority in the plant," Muhn, so that the reason given for the reprimand, in company regulation 12, was unwarranted. Gaff was an officer in the Local Union. She was directly involved in the com- plaint and had testified against Respondent the day before her alleged misconduct on May 17. As revealed in its May 21 letter to Carter and similarly reflected in its brief, Respondent was resentful of the manner in which this union agent entered the plant and undertook to secure Gaff for the Board hearing. It stated that "as a result of this incident, management is forced to reprimand Grace Baker and Betty Gaff under posted plant regulation 13 and 12 respectively." The criticism of Car- ter that she did not allow sufficient time "to secure the highest authority in the plant, Mr. Muhn" is without foundation and plainly contrary to the evidence. But even under Respondent's version of the facts, there is no reasonable ground to attribute to Gaff any degree of responsibility for Carter's conduct. 21Prior to that hearing, she had been permitted, upon request, to take time off to dis- cuss her testimony with the General Counsel's attorney. 23 Crnmer was not there, and her other supervisor, Severin, was out of the department and was told when lie returned that Gaff had already left. 140 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD In responding to the subpena and the General Counsel's request to appear and testify at the Board hearing in the afternoon on May 17, Gaff was unquestionably engaging in an activity within the protection of Section 7 of the Act" Yet it can- not be said that she had an absolute right to leave the plant at will for such pur- pose during working hours. The problem, as recently stated by the Board," is one of "accommodating the rights of employees in exercising rights guaranteed in the Act . . . with rights of an employer to regulate his production requirements and maintain discipline over his employees.". Here there is no contention or evidence that Gaff's presence in the plant was then required for production or other reasons. And the fact that Gaff did have Respondent's permission to leave also eliminated any question of a disciplinary ground. In the circumstances, it is clear that Gaff's right to attend the Board's hearing must prevail and be accorded the statutory pro- tection" However, even assuming, for argument's sake, that Respondent had a good-faith but mistaken belief that Gaff had left the plant without permission and had infringed the plant rule, the result would be the same. Such a good-faith be- lief would not be an adequate defense where, as here, it affirmatively appears that Gaff's asserted infraction of the plant rule did not in fact occur. Consequently, the effect of the reprimand was to penalize Gaff for engaging in a protected activity. Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.' However, I cannot find that, in reprimanding Gaff, Respondent had such a good- faith belief or that it was legitimately concerned with the alleged breach of a plant rule. On all the evidence, the inference is reasonable that the reprimand would not have been issued but for Gaff's direct participation and testimony in the Board proceeding against Respondent, her leadership in the Union,28 and her involvement with Union Representative Carter, of whose actions on May 17 Respondent was sharply critical. Accordingly, I conclude that Respondent also violated Section 8 (a)(3) and (4) of the Act" Baker received a formal reprimand on May 27,30 as follows: "Violation of Com- pany regulation No. 13 leaving place of work during working hours 91 on Friday, May 17, 1963, to summon Betty Gaff from the Punch Press Department." She testified she was "very upset" about it, and spoke to Buckles, the tool designer, with whom she was personally acquainted. Buckles said, "Oh, if I were you I would just forget it. If it had been anybody besides the Union, they would never have said a word about it." She declined to accept a union steward's offer "to take care of the reprimand," stating that she wished to talk first to Superintendent Muhn. She approached Muhn, told him she had turned down the Union's offer, and explained that she had had no knowledge of the plant rule and had acted as she did because she thought there was an emergency. Muhn said he would see what he could do, and would talk to Jerry Morrill. Muhn later told Baker that it was "too late to do anything about it," that "the Union's lawyer had already contacted our lawyer," and that if he, Muhn, "said anything now it would make him look this tall" (gesturing the size of about a half inch). Thereafter, the Union filed a grievance for Baker, which Respondent rejected with the following reply: TO: Grace Baker SUBJECT: Grievance No. 96-Reprimand for Violation of Company Regula- tion No. 13 Infraction of Company regulation No. 13 for reason of escorting Mrs. Carter to someone of Management might have been considered excusable. However, the second infraction of the same regulation by calling from -the floor at a 24 Eugene Pederson (Modern Linen & Laundry Service, Inc.) v. N.L R B., 234 F. 2d 417 (C.A 2) ; English Mica Company, 92 NLRB 766, enfd 195 F 2d 986 ( C.A 4) ; Chautauqua Hardware Corporation, 103 NLRB 723, enfd. 208 F. 2d 750 ( C A. 2) ; Pearson Corpora- tion, X138 NLRB 910, 918. 25 Standard Packaging Corporation, Royal Lace Paper Division, 140 NLRB 628, 629. 20 E g., Duralite Co., Inc., 128 NLRB 648 n Id.; Burnup and Sims, Inc., 137 NLRB 766, 772. 28 It appears that the relations then .between Respondent and the Union were in a state of contention, as shown by the existence of the prior proceeding and the nature of the issues therein , and by Respondent's assertions in its answer to the present complaint. 29 See, a g., Pacemaker Corporation, 120 NLRB 987, enfd 260 F. 2d 880 (C.A. 7). 30 From May 17 to 27 she had been away on a planned vacation in Florida. 32 As quoted supra, the regulation continues by stating-"except for reasonable time spent in going to restroom and drinking facilities." ELECTRIC MOTORS AND SPECIALTIES, INC. 141 great distance from your own work station an employee of Electric Motors and Specialties Inc., without approval to do so from someone in Management is not excusable. Relief denied. The testimony adduced by the General Counsel that employees frequently left their work stations for up to 15 minutes to go the restroom to smoke falls short of establishing that Respondent condoned breaches of the plant rule or applied it disparately. Baker was not a member or adherent of the Union, and General Counsel's con- tention that Respondent "believed" she engaged in union activities is devoid of any support. She was in no way directly involved with the Board proceeding. By her account, she was unaware that Gaff was being called to testify at the Board hear- ing, or that she was assisting in this purpose when she undertook to find Gaff for Carter. While she undoubtedly felt justified that, because of the personal emer- gency she imagined, she was performing a kind and considerate act, her unusual errand through various departments across the plant was in fact unauthorized and contrary to a plant rule. Buckles was not shown to be a supervisor or manage- ment agent in this connection. His remark to Baker to the effect that she would not have been reprimanded but for the fact that the Union, i.e., Carter, was in- volved, can be taken as no more than an expression of his own opinion and not attributable to Respondent. Nor was Baker's unknowing involvement with a union agent, Carter, sufficient to establish an unlawful motive by Respondent. In sum, I find the evidence fails to sustain the General Counsel on this issue, and shall dismiss the complaint as to Baker. C. The warning to Hirschbiel Hirschbiel had held the elected office of chief steward in the plant since the com- mencement of contract relations with the Union in March 1962. During this period, she personally processed about half of the 100 grievances filed under the contract. About September 3, she approached the foreman of her department, Gene Berghorn, concerning a possible contract violation by Respondent, allegedly in assigning certain work to a new, probationary employee instead of recalling regular employees on layoff status. On Berghorn's apparent explanation that the assignment was experimental and would not continue, Hirschbiel decided not to file a grievance. On September 10 it appeared that the probationer was still being used in the same work. Hirschbiel again broached the subject with Berghorn on the plant floor. She gave the following credible account of the discussion in sub- stance: Berghorn became angry and ordered her to leave the floor. She replied that she was "trying to take the first step grievance with him" and asked if he was "go- ing along." He directed her to the front office, where both proceeded and the conversation continued. Superintendent Muhn and Foreman Cramer were then oc- cupied in the front office listening to an interplant radio; at one point they told Hirschbiel not to talk so loudly. In the office, among other things, Berghorn chal- lenged her, "Are you the Union?" He also remarked that-"Everything went along out here all right until you started throwing your weight around." Finally, Berg- horn agreed to look into the matter and let her know. Later in the day he in- formed her, after quoting from the contract, that the complaint was rejected. The same day, September 10, Hirschbiel filed for the Union a written grievance (step 2), indicating that Foreman Berghorn had denied the oral complaint. She had not raised her voice on the plant floor; and in the front office she was only trying to talk above the noise of the radio. The former conversation lasted 3 minutes, and the latter 3 to 5 minutes. Berghorn's version was not materially in conflict with that of Hirschbiel. Essen- tially, he indicated that they were both "a little belligerent," "getting riled" and talking loudly, that on the plant floor about six employees were within hearing range, 10 to 15 feet 3' and that he ordered her off the floor because "it was embar- rassing to him to have someone tell him how to run [his] line," especially a sub- ordinate employee. Jerry Morrill became acquainted with the incident "within several hours after it occurred" when he heard Muhn, Cramer, and Lester Prifogle talking about it "in a humorous vein." Morrill then decided to investigate "to find out what hap- 32 None of these employees was called to testify ; there is no evidence that they actually heard the conversation or were disturbed. 142 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD pened." He questioned Muhn, Cramer, and Berghorn, but not Hirschbiel. On September 11 he sent a "written warning" to Hirschbiel, a copy of which was placed in her personnel file, as follows: Subject: Written warning with regard to your discussion on floor with supervisor I do not know what provoked your ire yesterday, regarding Gene Berghorn, however, I cto feel it was not evidence of the proper respect an employee should exeicise with regard to a supervisor. This is doubly so when it can be shown that it was necessary to request that you leave the production area because the discussion was, to say the least, a disruption of the attention of the other employees to the respective jobs on the production line. It is with some regret that I view the action of our supervisor in becoming equally belligerent, and for that I want to offer my apologies, however, tem- pering this with my belief, that you did provoke this action on his part. This is to be considered as a written warning in this matter and as such has been placed in your personnel file. It would be wise if you would control your temper because I believe that we do not have to tolerate such actions on your part indefinately [sic]. Mori ill gave testimony as to the "basic reason" for the "reprimand" of Hirschbiel: Well, the insubordination of the employee to the supervisor, the fact that they had interrupted the department and ... I wasn't going to tolerate condi- tions which bordered on anarchy in our plant.... There was no respect for the supervisor. Morrill also gave Berghorn a copy of the written warning to Hirschbiel and told him "to understand" that it was a reprimand to him." On September 13, Hirschbiel filed a formal grievance protesting the warning she received "for performing her duties as Chief Steward of Local 997." On the same date, Morrill replied to the grievance, viz: SUBJECT: Grievance No. 104 in regard to written warning Your waining was not unwarranted and had you been the least bit apologetic about your conduct, I would have considered removing it. I absolutely do not believe that your action in the matter upon which I wrote the waining could be considered as proper decorum of a person filling the office of Union Steward much less her "duty." Grievance denied. There is no dispute, and it is plain, that Hirschbiel's conduct in question on Sep- tember 10 involved the presentation of a grievance for the Union, as specifically provided under steps 1 and 2 of the contract procedures, supra. It is basic in the law that she was thus directly engaged in a protected activity " As described, the evidence fails to substantiate any of Respondent's charges against her of insubordination, "bordering on anarchy," disrespect for a supervisor, or disruption of pioduction." Even accepting Berghorn's testimony in its entirety, e.g., that both were "a little belligerent" and spoke in loud tones, there is scarce justification for the serious criticisms of Hirschbiel, and no ground for depriving her of statutory protection in her grievance activity. Berghorn did not complain of disrespect or insubordination by Hirschbiel, and himself undertook no action against her. Nor did Muhn or Cramer, who were exposed to part of the conver- sation. In the investigation, by Morrill, a report from Hirschbiel was not sought. The record reveals, inter alia, that Respondent resented generally the number of grievances filed and the manner of their presentation by Hirschbiel. It was not in Respondent's sphere to regulate her "proper decorum" in filling her office of chief steward for the Union, apart from flagrant abuses of conduct not present here. Indeed, if the prosecution of grievances or other representative functions of the Union were subjected to the peril of discipline for such conduct as raising voices or "improper decorum" in the judgment of an employer, it should be obvious that the essential process of collective bargaining would be measurably frustrated. In any case, I find that Morrill seized upon the incident between Hirschbiel and Berghorn on September 10 as a vehicle for hampering Hirschbiel's legitimate activities as a union steward. The formal warning issued to her, including the language "that we do not have to tolerate such activities on your part indefinitely," was clearly preju- •13 Nothing was placed In Berghorn's personnel file on the matter. 3' E.g., Farmers Union Cooperative Marketing Ass'n., 145 NLRB 1; Ryder Tank, Lines, Ine, 135 NLRB 936; Monsanto Chemical Company, 130 NLRB 1097. ELECTRIC MOTORS AND SPECIALTIES , INC.. 143 dicial to her job security . I conclude that Respondent thus discriminated against Hirschbiel for engaging in conduct protected under Section 7, and that it thereby violated Section 8(a)(1), as alleged." D. The reduction -of Hirschbiel's wage rate From January 1951 until November 1952, Hirschbiel worked for Respondent in the department called the SP-25 line. Thereafter, for a period of 10 years, she was a turret lathe operator in the machine shop. She was rated by Respondent as a "good worker" and one who "did a pretty good job" in most jobs.' She received the premium pay under the contract of $1.671/2 an hour for her classification in wage group IV; only 5 of some 100 to 150 women in the plant were given such top pay. In November 1962, she was involuntarily transferred out of the machine shop to the punch press department because of her alleged incompatibility with the supervisor and other people in the department .37 However, she was expressly in- formed that she would continue to receive the same pay of $1 .67/, although her classification in the punch press department was lower rated , in wage group VI, under the contract. She was also told that she would not ever be transferred back to the machine shop. A formal grievance relating to the transfer was,processed through final arbitra- tion, heard on June 22, 1963. The arbitrator, noting specifically that Hirschbiel was transferred "with the same rate of pay," found "no tangible evidence that the said action was discriminatory." 33 In addition, although Hirschbiel's seniority status in light of the transfer was not formally made an issue before him, the arbitrator specially held that Respondent "shall maintain . . . Hirschbiel's full seniority as heretofore required in the machine department." Thereafter, for about 8 months, Hirschbiel worked in the punch press department, and no question was raised as to her $1 .671/2 rate , even though she was unable to make production on this job. On June 24, she was transferred to the SP-25 de- partment and assigned to hub turning . In a written memorandum, she was told that her "wages will be kept at the same rate as at present- which is over the stand- ard rate for the hub turning job . This is subject to reconsideration later." On August 22, Hirschbiel 's wage rate was reduced from $1.671/2 to $1 .50," for the assigned reason, as stated in Respondent's letter to her: Since you are now demonstrating that you are capable of exceeding the min- imum requirements on your present job and while not up to the standard for that job - we now consider you to be qualified in your present job assignment. As you well know you have carried ' a rate substantially above those of the jobs in which we have allowed you to attempt to qualify. The reason we did this is that we did not consider any of these to be more than temporary assign- ments until you could qualify on one of them . Now that you have qualified we do not consider your old rate to be proper and are forced to reduce your rate to that of the standard for the job which you are now performing. Since the beginning of her employment , Hirschbiel has been a member of the Union and a participant in organizational campaigns at Respondent's plant. She was active in the campaign which resulted in the Union's certification in October 1961 , was elected to chief steward in March 1963 , and thereafter processed nu- merous ' grievances, as previously noted. In connection with the prior proceeding against Respondent, she was named in- the complaint and gave testimony at the hearing. 3' Ibid And see N L.IL B. v. Symons Mannifacturing Co., 328 - F. 2d 835 (,CA. 7), enfg. 141 NLRB 558. 36 As late as June 24 , 1963, in ,a letter to Hirschblel , Respondent stated that "obviously" she is "a skilled machinist." 37 The underlying reason for the friction is not clearly shown. Respondent's brief herein asserts that Hirschbiel 's "conduct and attitude " then made it "impossible to keep her longer" in that department As noted, her functions as chief steward began in March 1962. 38 In the earlier stages of the grievance procedure , Respondent defended the tiansfer on the basis , inter alas, that the "problem was resolved , with fairness and to the best interests of all involved , especially since there was no action taken with regard to lowering Vir- ginia's rate to be in line with her new job." And also, significantly, it stated. "It was with regard to the long service that Virginia was transferred to the lower rated job with- out a reduction in pay " 11 The standard rate in wage group VI is $1.50 and the premium rate $1 57. 144 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The General Counsel alleges in violation only the wage reduction, and not any of the transfers. Respondent's position is that since the original transfer had been finally resolved by the arbitrator as nondiscriminatory, Hirschbiel was entitled only to the standard pay rate under the contract in her present job for which she quali- fied. More specifically, it explains that Hirschbiel continued to receive the $1.671/2 wage on lower rated jobs during the 10 months since her transfer from the machine shop only because she -had not until August 22 qualified on a different job. I do not find as conclusive on either side of the question the evidence taken of Respondent's practices concerning other employees who were transferred from higher to lower rated wage groups. It has not been convincingly shown that Re- spondent was in any way precluded, by reason of the contract or demonstrated past practices, from continuing to pay Hirschbiel the $1 .671/2 rate in lower rated jobs `° The reason advanced by Respondent for the rate reduction, that this was the first occasion since the original transfer that Hirschbiel qualified on a particular job, is rejected as wholly implausible and artificial. Hirschbiel was virtually promised upon being transferred that her pay rate would remain the same. Indeed, as a good and skilled worker, she was concededly capable of earning this wage in the machine shop where she had spent 10 years. Following the original transfer, for a period of some 10 months, she was in fact paid such rate, even though for the time she was unable to "make production." She was never told that the $1.671/2 wage was temporary or would be reduced when she qualified on a new (lower rated) job- which, conceivably, could have been accomplished within days of the first transfer. Nor was there any inkling of such purpose indicated by Respondent to the Union or the arbitrator while her grievance on the transfer was being processed through the successive steps of the contract procedures. As shown, the information Re- spondent gave out was much to the contrary." It is seriously questionable whether the arbitrator's decision would have been the same had the factor of a wage re- duction been present before him." In light of the entire record, and in particular view of the fallacious and dis- credited ground Respondent advanced for Hirschbiel's pay reduction, its demon- strated hostility toward the zealous manner in which Hirschbiel fulfilled her office as chief steward in presenting and prosecuting grievances , and in general her mili- tancy on behalf of the Union, I find and conclude that Respondent, in reducing her pay, discriminated against her because of her union and protected activities , in vio- lation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act" While I have considered as part of Respondent's motivation Hirschbiel 's participation in the prior proceeding in the posture of a strong proponent of the Union, I cannot find on the evidence pre- sented" that Respondent was also particularly motivated by reason of Hirschbiel's 40 The $1 673/2 wage was in excess even of the premium rate for wage group VI (see footnote 39), which classification she carried since her original transfer in November 1962. 41 These parties may have been deliberately misled by Respondent. For example, on cross-examination, Personnel Director Ludwig admitted that Respondent "held up doing anything about permanent transfer and wages until such time as this matter had been completely settled." To the same effect, Jerry Morrill testified that Respondent did not wish "to muddy the water in this area when we went through grievance procedures " In any event, this testimony clearly contradicts Respondent's essential defense that Hirsch- biel's pay rate was not reduced prior to August 22 because until then she had not qualified on a new job 42 The validity of the arbitrator's decision Is not directly in issue, and therefore no determination need be made whether in the circumstances revealed herein it would be honored under Board doctrine , as discussed supra. 43 Evidence was adduced concerning the subject of Hirschbiel's eyesight which, I find, need not be'discussed at any length A single item of testimony is recorded in which Personnel Director Ludwig appears to state that a doctor's report, solicited and received by Respondent, played a part in the decision to reduce Hirschblel's pay. The docu- mented fact is that the doctor's report was not given until September, after the wage reduction on August 22. Considering the context, the wording of the question to which Ludwig replied, and other evidence on the subject, I am of the opinion that Ludwig was confused and this testimony was not intended While it was shown that, allegedly be- cause of her poor eyesight, Hirschbiel was again reassigned on the SP-25 line from hub turning to insulating stators, a job involving no moving machinery, there is no issue here concerning that transfer. It is undisputed that the condition of Hirschbiel's eyes, as she testified, has been the same during all the years since 1951 in which she had been employed on moving machinery, e g., the turret lathe 44 As the hearing took place in May and the wage reduction in late August, the alleged element of timing is not established. ELECTRIC MOTORS AND SPECIALTIES, INC. 145 attendance and giving testimony at the hearing . In any event, the remedy would be the same I shall therefore dismiss the allegation of a Section 8(a)(4) violation as to her. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above , occurring in con- nection with the operations of Respondent described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com- merce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I will recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative ac- tion designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. It has been found that Respondent unlawfully issued a formal reprimand to Betty Gaff for attending a Board hearing to give testimony, and a written warning to Virginia Hirschbiel for her activity in presenting a grievance as chief steward, in both instances substantially affecting their future job security. It will therefore be recommended that Respondent fully rescind such actions, expunge from their per- sonnel files any adverse matter relating thereto, and directly notify these employees accordingly. It has also been found that Respondent discriminatorily reduced the wage rate of Hirschbiel (from $1.671/2 to $1.50 per hour). It will therefore be recommended that Respondent restore Hirschbiel to the wage rate she received prior to the discrimination, and make her whole for any loss of earnings she suf- fered by reason of the discrimination by payment to her of a sum of money equal to that which she normally would have earned, absent the discrimination. Such pay loss shall be computed with interest at the rate of 6 percent per annum, in the manner set forth in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the cases, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By discriminating against Betty Gaff and Virginia Hirschbiel in regard to their hire and tenure of employment , thereby discouraging membership in the Union, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 4. By discriminating against Betty Gaff because she appeared at a Board hearing to give testimony under the Act, Respondent engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a) (4) of the Act. 5. By the foregoing conduct, and by issuing a written warning to Virginia Hirsch- biel because she was engaging in a protected activity of presenting a grievance, Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and thereby has engaged in and is en- gaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a)(1) of the Act. 6. fhe aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in the cases, I recommend that Respondent , Electric Motors and Specialties, Inc., Garrett, Indiana, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: ta) Discouraging membership in International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers , AFL-CIO, and its Local 997 , or in any other labor organiza- tion, by issuing reprimands or warnings to employees affecting their job security, by reducing their wages, or in any other manner discriminating in regard to their hire or tenure of employment or any term of condition of employment. 770-07G--65- -vol 149 11 146 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (b) Discriminating against employees because they have filed charges , appeared at a Board hearing to testify , or have given testimony under the Act. (c) Issuing reprimands or warnings to employees affecting their job security be- cause they engaged in protected activities under the Act. (d) In any like or related manner interfering with , restraining, or coercing em- ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Restore Virginia Hirschbiel to the wage rate she received prior to the dis- crimination against her, without prejudice to her seniority or other rights or privi- leges, and make her whole for any loss of earnings , in the manner set forth in the section entitled "The Remedy." (b) Rescind the reprimand issued to Betty Gaff and the warning issued to Vir- ginia Hirschbiel , expunge from their personnel files any matter relating thereto ad- versely affecting their job security, and directly notify these employees that such actions have been taken by Respondent. (c) Post at its Gariett, Indiana, plant, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." ''G Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 13, shall, atter being duly signed by Respondent, be posted immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained for a period of 60 consecutive days there- after, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that said notices are not alteied, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 13, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Trial Examiner's Decision , what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith .' It is further recommended that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found herein. 96 If this Recommended Order Is adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" In the notice If the Board's Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the notice will be further amended by the substitution of the words "a decree of the United States Court of Appeals, enforcing an Order" for the words "a Decision and Order " 16 If this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read. "Notify the Regional Director for Ilegion 13, in writing within 10 days from the date of this Order, what step,, the Respondent hab taken to comply herewith. APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that: WE WILL NOT discourage membership in International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, and its Local 997, or in any other labor organization , by reducing wages, or issuing reprimands or warnings affecting the job security of employees, or in any other manner discriminating in regard to their hire of tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment. WE WILL NOT discriminate against employees because they have filed charges, appeared at a Board hearing to testify, or have given testimony under the Act. WE WILL NOT issue reprimands or warnings affecting the job security of em- ployees because they engaged in protected activities under the Act. WI: WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form labor organizations , to join or assist the above-named or any other labor or- ganization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos- ing, and to engage in any other concerted activities for the purpose of collec- tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities. WE WILL restore Virginia Hirschbiel to her former wage rate prior to the discrimination against her , and make her whole for any loss of earnings she may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against her. SARKES TARZIAN, INC. 147 WE WILL rescind the reprimand issued to Betty Gaff for appearing at a Board hearing to testify, and the warning issued to Virginia Hirschbiel for presenting a grievance, expunge from their personnel files any matter relating thereto adversely affecting their job security, and directly notify these employ- ees that we have taken such action. All our employees are free to become or remain, or refrain from becoming or remaining, members of International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Work- ers, AFL-CIO, and its Local 997, or of any other labor organization. ELECTRIC MOTORS AND SPECIALTIES, INC., Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 176 West Adams Street, Chicago, Illinois, Telephone No. Central 6-9660, if they have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions. Sarkes Tarzian , Inc. and International Brotherhood of Electri- cal Workers, AFL-CIO, Local Union 1424. Case No. 25-CA- 1875. October 26, 1964 DECISION AND ORDER On July 30, 1964, Trial Examiner George A. Downing issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond- ent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor prac- tices within the meaning of the Act, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respond- ent filed exceptions to the Decision and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Members Leedom, Fanning, and Brown]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Ex- aminer's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommen- dations of the Trial Examiner with the. modifications hereinafter noted. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Board hereby adopts as its Order, the Order recom- mended by the Trial Examiner, and orders that Respondent, Sarkes 149 NLRB No. 17.