Cadillac Steel Products Corp.

CADILLAC STEEL PRODUCTS CORPORATION 1045 Cooper & Boond Plumbing Company , F. Jenny & Sons Plumb- ing, or any other employer , where an object thereof is to force or require Leipzig to cease doing business with Modern Electric Service. Los ANGELES BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION TRADES COUNCIL, Labor Organization. Dated------ ---------- By------------------------------------- (Representative ) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date of post- ing, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Eastern Columbia Building, 849 South Broadway, Los Angeles, California , Telephone No. 688-5204, if they have any ques- tions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions. Cadillac Steel Products Corporation and United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO. Case No. 21-CA-5759. November 1964 DECISION AND ORDER 24, On July 30, 1964, Trial Examiner James R. Webster issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond- ent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor prac- tices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Decision and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed cross-excep- tions. Both the Respondent and the General Counsel filed answer- ing briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act , the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three- member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Fanning and Jenkins]. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs , and the entire record 149 NLRB No. 103. 1046 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions,' and recom- mendations of the Trial Examiner, with the additions noted below. - The General Counsel excepts to the failure of the Trial Examiner to find that the Respondent's refusal to furnish the Union a list of existing job classifications and corresponding hourly rates of pay, as requested by the Union, constituted a separate violation of Section 8(a) (5), and to the Trial Examiner's failure to recommend, as a remedy, that the Respondent furnish the Union the above informa- tion upon request. We find merit in these exceptions. The record shows that proper allegations dealing with the subject matter were set forth in the General Counsel's complaint. In its answer, the Respondent admitted its failure to furnish the requested information. In view of its objections to conduct affecting the results of the elec- tion, the Respondent denied that such failure constituted an'unlawful refusal to bargain., However, it did not challenge the relevancy of the information sought by the Union. Accordingly, we sustain the General Counsel's exceptions and find that the Respondent's refusal to furnish the Union a list of existing job classifications and corre- sponding hourly rates of pay, as requested, constitutes a refusal to bargain in violation of Section 8 (a) (5) and (1) of the Act. We shall therefore include in our order a provision directing the Respondent, upon request, to furnish the Union the aforementioned information. See Morganton Full Fashioned Hosiery Company, 115 NLRB 1267. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Board hereby adopts as its Order the Order -recom- mended by the Trial Examiner and orders that the Respondent, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order, with the following modifications : 1. Add the following as a new paragraph 1(b) and renumber the former paragraph 1(b) as 1(c) : "Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union as,the exclusive representative of all employees in the appropriate unit by refusing to furnish the Union a list of existing job classifications and corresponding hourly rates of pay, as requested by said labor organization." 1 We do not place reliance upon any implication in the Trial Examiner's Decision that, in determining whether or not the Regional Director acted arbitrarily and capriciously under the consent-election agreement in overruling the Respondent 's objections to the elec- tion without a hearing, it was necessary for him to determine whether the Respondent's objections and proffered evidence raised substantial and material issues of fact General Tube Company, 141 NLRB 441; Howard Rippee et al., d/b/a Pacific Multi forms com- pany, 138 NLRB 796; Summer Sand & Gravel Company, 128 NLRB 1368 , affd. 293 F. 2d 754 (C.A. 9). CADILLAC STEEL PRODUCTS CORPORATION 1047 2. Delete the period and insert a comma at the end of paragraph 2(a), and add: "and if an agreement is reached, embody such agree- ment in a signed contract." 3. Add the following paragraph as paragraph 2(b) : "Upon request, promptly furnish the Union a list of existing job classifications and corresponding hourly rates of pay." And reletter former paragraphs 2(b) and (c) as 2(c) and (d) respectively. 4. Add the following to the Appendix to the Trial Examiner's Decision as its second indented paragraph : WE WILL, upon request, promptly furnish United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, a list of existing job classifications and corresponding hourly rates' of pay. TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION - STATEMENT OF THE CASE This proceeding, with all parties represented, was heard before Trial Examiner James R. Webster in Los Angeles, California, on April 22, 1964, on complaint of the General Counsel and answer of Cadillac Steel Products Corporation, herein called the- Respondent. The complaint, issued March 6, 1964, on charges filed February 4, 1964, alleges that Respondent refused to bargain collectively with the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. In his answer Respondent admits that he has refused to recognize and bargain with the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the Union, but alleges that because of election irregularities, the Union has not been selected as the bargaining representative of a majority of his employees in the unit involved, and that he had and now has a good-faith doubt that the Union at any time materially herein represented or now represents a majority of employees in the bargaining unit. On June 18, 1964, Respondent, with his brief herein, filed with the Trial Examiner a motion to amend answer to allege as an affirmative defense, in addition to that alleged in the original answer, that the certification by the Regional Director of the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees is invalid and of no legal force or effect in that the Regional Director failed to act in conformity with the Board's policy and the requirements of the Act by overruling, without a hearing, Respondent's objections in paragraphs Nos. VI and VIII of his objections to conduct of election, and by failing to find that said objections furnish sufficient grounds to set the election aside. Copy of the motion to amend the answer was duly served on the counsel for the General Counsel and the Charging Party. Since the motion is based on facts already of record and constitutes primarily a position or defense with refer- ence to these facts, and there being no objections to the motion, I therefore and hereby grant the motion to amend Respondent's answer, pursuant to Section 102.25 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, as amended. Upon consideration of the entire record in this case, including the briefs of the parties, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER The Respondent is a corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing steel products. In the course and conduct of this business, Respondent annually purchases and receives goods, materials, and supplies valued in excess of $50,000 at its plant in Huntington Park, California, which goods, materials, and supplies are transported to the Respondent's Huntington Park plant directly from States outside the State of California. I find that Respondent is engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 1048 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED I find that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The representation proceedings On August 30, 1963, Respondent and the Union entered into an agreement for consent election in Case No. 21-RC-8523, providing for an election in a bargaining unit including all production and maintenance employees including shipping and receiving employees and truckdrivers and excluding office clerical employees, guards, professional employees, and supervisors as defined in the Act. The election'was con- ducted on September 6, 1963, from 3:15 to 3:45 p.m., with 24 votes being cast for the Union and 23 votes being cast against the Union. There were no challenged ballots. On September 11, 1963, Respondent filed objections to the conduct of the election and request for a new election; on October 8, 1963, the Regional Director for Region 21 issued his report on objections and certification of representatives, over- ruling the objections of .Respondent and certifying the Union as the bargaining representative of the employees in the above-named appropriate unit. Respondent then filed with the Board in Washington; D.C., exceptions to Regional Director's report on Employer's objections. On October 31, 1963, George A. Leet, Associate Executive Secretary of the Board, notified the parties that the Board would not con- sider the exceptions to the Regional Director's report and would not intervene for the reason that the election was held pursuant to an agreement for consent election pro- viding that "The determination of the Regional Director shall be final and binding upon any question . . . raised by any party hereto relating in any manner to the election...." B. The refusal to bargain By letters dated October 31, 1963, and January 8, 1964, the Union requested Respondent to meet for bargaining negotiations, and by letter dated January 10, 1964, the Union requested the Respondent to submit a list of the various job classifications in existence and the hourly rates of pay for these classifications for use in negotiations. By letter dated February 3, 1964, the Respondent declined to engage in bargaining negotiations with the Union, and declined to furnish the requested list of job classifica- tions and hourly rates of pay. The Respondent asserted as grounds for this position that the Union is not the properly certified bargaining agent of the employees as the election was improperly conducted, and that the Union does not represent a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit involved. C. Issues Was the Regional Director's action arbitrary and capricious in overruling Respond- ent's objections to the conduct of the election without a hearing thereon, in determin- ing that the election was properly conducted and in certifying the Union as the collective-bargaining representative? There is no statutory authority for any claim that a party is entitled, as a matter of right, to a postelection hearing. Under the Board's Rules, and consistent with its longstanding practice, as is stated by the Respondent herein, postelection hearings on objections are conducted where "substantial and material factual issues exist which can be resolved only after a hearing." 1 This policy offers the obvious advantage of avoiding lengthy and unnecessary hearings, thereby comporting with the requirement that questions preliminary to the establishment of the bargaining relation by expedi- tiously resolved, while at the same time safeguarding the basic constitutional require- ment of due process. Where a party, seeking to overturn a representation determina- tion, fails to raise substantial and material issues of fact, he "has no cause or complaint when and if [his] demand for a hearing is denied." 2 In determining in the instant case whether the Regional Director acted arbitrarily and capriciously in overruling Respondent's objections without a hearing, it will be necessary to determine whether or not Respondent's objections and proffered evidence raise "substantial and material issues of fact." Respondent contends that they do.3 1 Section 102.69(c), Rules and Regulations of the Board, Series 8, as amended. See also J. R Simplot Company, 138 NLRB 172, 176. 2 N.L R B. v. O.S. Van Storage, Inc, 297 F. 2d 74, 76 (C A. 5). 3 A fact is substantial and material if it could change or modify a decision in a case. As stated by the Board in J. it. Simplot Company (supra), "the party excepting to the 'Report on Objections' must supply specific evidence which prima facie would warrant the Board rejecting the Report." CADILLAC STEEL PRODUCTS CORPORATION' 1049 The Respondent contends, and the Regional Director's report on objections shows, that one employee, Ray Patino, did not vote in the election. Since the vote was 24 for the Union and 23 against the Union, the vote of Ray Patino could have changed the result of the election by causing a tie vote; with a tie vote the Union would not have received a majority of the votes and therefore could not have been certified as the representative of the employees. The Respondent contends that Patino did not vote in the election due to an inadvertence or mistake caused wholly or in part by the manner in which the Board's agent conducted the election. The Regional Director concluded that there was no irregularity in the conduct of the election which raised a material issue as to the integrity and secrecy of the election, and he concluded that the election was fairly conducted and that it produced a repre- sentative vote. Did the Regional Director, in reaching these conclusions, resolve any substantial and material factual issues; in other words, has the Respondent presented any evidence which, if credited, would warrant a determination contrary to that made by the Regional Director? To properly consider this issue, it will be necessary to consider and evaluate the evidence contained in Respondent's offer of proof. Respondent offered evidence that the election was improperly conducted; the counsel for General Counsel objected to this evidence on the grounds that the Respondent was attempting to relitigate in this complaint proceeding, matters foreclosed by the Regional Director's final determina- tion in the related representation case; the Trial Examiner sustained the objection and Respondent made an offer of proof. As I see the issue now, it is not primarily whether the election was properly or improperly conducted, but it is whether the Regional Director acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying Respondent a hearing on allegedly substantial and material factual issues. I therefore reverse my ruling denying the offer of proof and now accept Respondent's offer of proof which consists of the affidavits of Ray Patino and the two election observers, Augustine Crespin and Frank Yeo, which are a part of Respondent's Exhibit No. 1.4 D. Respondent's objections to the conduct of the election The objections raised by Respondent to the conduct of the election are as follows: (1) Respondent objected to the conduct of the election on the ground that four employees could not read, write or understand the English language contained in the notices and on the ballot, and that said employees were therefore not duly notified of the election or apprised of its nature. (2) Respondent objected to the conduct of the election on the ground that three employees were not able to vote because of illness. (3) Respondent objected to the conduct of the election on the ground that: The observer appointed by the Company was not able to ascertain who voted and who did not vote; said observer was prevented from observing the ballot box at all times during the course of the voting; insufficient time was allotted for the votes to be cast; during the course of the balloting and at the instance and request of the Board agent, said observer went into the factory, and away from the voting area, to request that the employees cast their votes; during these absences of the company observer from the voting area, the Board agent did not know the men who were voting and could not adequately observe the entire voting area including the polls and the ballot box. (4) Respondent objected to the conduct of the election on the ground that one employee did not receive notice of the election by reason of the fact that he was on vacation. (5) Respondent objected to the conduct of the election on the ground that: One employee (Patino) did not vote due to his own inadvertence and mistake and also that of the observers present and of the Board agent; said employee was under the impres- sion that he was not entitled to vote because he held a supervisory position, although in fact he does not hold such a position; the observers noted his presence around the polling area but did not request that he vote because they did not know whether or not he had voted. In his brief Respondent urges impropriety only as to objections (3) and (5) as listed above (being paragraphs VI and VIII of Respondent's objections). 4I realize that by accepting this offer of proof at this time, the counsel for the General Counsel is denied the opportunity of cross-examination of these witnesses and of offering evidence to refute their testimony; but in view of the fact that I hereinafter find that this proffered testimony does not raise a substantial and material factual issue, the counsel for the General Counsel is not prejudiced by this ruling. 1050 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD E. Regional Director's report on objections The Regional Director in his report overruled each of the five objections of Respondent to the conduct of the election. As to objections Nos. (1), (2), and (4), there is no dispute as to the facts, and in his brief Respondent does not charge that a hearing should be conducted on these objections. Furthermore, he does not contend that the Regional Director's decision in overruling these three objections was arbitrary or capricious. Objections Nos. (3) and (5) (paragraph VI and VIII of Respondent's objections) were overruled by the Regional Director based on the following findings of facts and conclusions. The Regional Director's report indicates that the observers were not away from the polling place while any of the employees were voting. It states that "a few minutes before the polls opened, the observers walked through the shop and announced that the polls were open and were back at 3:15 p m., when the polling of employees com- menced, as scheduled Approximately 5 minutes before the polls were scheduled to close, there were no employees waiting to vote, although several names had not been checked. It was agreed that it would be a good idea for the observers to make a final announcement that the polls were still open. The observers walked into the shop and called out that the polls were still open. No voters appeared to vote while they were gone, and the observers on their return, cast their own ballots which appeared to be the only votes cast during the closing minutes of the election." As to Patino, the Regional Director stated in his report that "Even if, as stated in the objection, Patino may have failed to vote on the mistaken belief that he was not on the list of eligibles, it would not raise any material issue because, if interested in voting, it would have been incumbent on him at least to check with the Board Agent ... In fact, the evidence shows and Patino admits that during the election he even got in line to vote but left " The Regional Director presumed in his report that Patino left because he became impatient at having to wait his turn, and he concluded that Patino's failure to vote was occasioned by his own lack of diligence and interest, and that his failure to vote therefore raised no issue. The Regional Director also concluded that the election schedule, which was in accordance with the agreement of the parties, did allow sufficient time for all eligible voters who wished to vote to present themselves at the polls and do so. It was pointed out that no employees were waiting in line to vote at the time of the closing of the polls nor showed up shortly thereafter in an attempt to vote. The ballot box was at all times under the observation and in the care of the Board agent although at the begin- ning and at the conclusion of the balloting, the observers were not present. F. Testimony contained in Respondent's offer of proof Patino's affidavit sets forth that on the day of the election he waited in line for about 30 minutes. He also states that "I was waiting to be called and saw Augie Crespin and Frank Yeo [the election observers] running in and out of the plant during the election and each of them saw me. While waiting to be called, as they were calling all the others, I did not hear my name called and went to talk to Augie about my vote and he then told me that the election was over and that it was too late for me to vote " He also stated that he was going to vote against the Union. The affidavits of the two observers at the election are the same, and as set forth in Respondent's brief, state that: (1) "All of the voters that were in the plant had to be rounded up"; that the two observers "would go back and forth to the plant and send out men to the voting booth and when we got back we would not be certain as to who voted or not." (2) That the checkoff of voters was incomplete; that the Board Agent, not being familiar with the men, was not in a position to identify the voters; and that towards the end of the election the checkoff of names was completely abandoned; (3) That they saw Ray Patino with a group of men who were standing in line to vote; and that "from time to time, we were calling off names to vote"; that neither of the observers called Mr. Patino's name, that shortly after the election the observers spoke to Patino, and he asked them why they had not called his name to vote. They replied that they thought he had voted while they were in the factory looking for eligible voters. The affidavits of the two observers were apparently furnished to the Regional Director since he quotes from these affidavits in his report on objections. He makes no reference to the affidavit of Patino which was taken on the same date as the affidavit of the two observers; and this affidavit may not have been furnished to the Regional Director, since in Respondent's objections to conduct of election in paragraph VIII, CADILLAC STEEL PRODUCTS CORPORATION 1051 Respondent objected to the election on the ground that one employee "whose name will be furnished on request," did not vote "due to his own inadvertence and mistake and also that of the observers present and the AGENT." In any regard, the Regional Director's report makes reference to an affidavit of Patino; therefore information was obtained from him.5 G. Conclusions The affidavits of the observers suggest that it was possible that some employees may have voted while they (the observers) were absent from the polling place; G but there is no evidence that any did, and the report of the Regional Director (section E herein) states that none did. Assuming (1) that some had voted while the observers were absent, and (2) that, therefore, the Board agent, not being familiar with the men, was not in a position to identify the voters, and (3) that names of voters were not checked off the voting list, this conduct is certainly not proper election procedure; but in the absence of proof that an ineligible person voted, or that an ineligible employee's name (whom one of the parties may have wanted to challenge) was on the voting list, then these irregu- larities would not affect the results of the election and would not warrant setting an election aside.? As to Patino, Respondent's offer of proof shows that (1) the observers from time to time were calling off names to vote and did not call Patino; (2) Patino was waiting to be called to vote as he apparently thought "they were calling all the others"; and (3) the checkoff of voters on the voting list was incomplete and later abandoned and that therefore the observers did not know exactly which employees voted and which had not (particularly Patino). There is no obligation on the part of the agent or the observer to call any employee to vote, although employees may be informed that the polls are open. Whether or not an employee votes is his own choice, although an election is representative of the desires of the employees in proportion to the number of eligible employees that participate. The purpose of the election is to permit all eligible voters to cast their ballot in secret if they choose to vote. This was done, and certainly Patino had the opportunity to vote. No doubt if an accurate checklist of voters had been kept, as is normally done, the observers would have noted that Patino had not voted. But to vote or not to vote is his privilege. The law does not require all eligible voters to vote. Even if Patino did not vote under the belief that he thought he was to be called to vote, based on the fact that he thought "they were calling all the others," I do not believe this his misconception or misunderstanding in this regard would warrant a new election. It was a misunderstanding on his part; he was standing in line and could have voted had he remained in line. I cannot help but conclude, in agreement with the Regional Director, and after fully considering Respondent's offer of proof, that Patino's lack of interest and diligence contributed significantly to his failure to vote. I find that Respondent's objections to the conduct of the election and his offer of proof in connection therewith do not raise substantial and material factual issues, and I therefore conclude that the Regional Director's action in issuing a report on Respond- ent's objections, denying the objections without a hearing thereon, does not constitute conduct that is arbitrary and capricious. Therefore, the Union being the certified bar- 6 In his objections to the conduct of the election, Respondent also claims that Patino was under the impression that lie was not entitled to vote because he held a supervisory position There is no evidence to support this assertion in Respondent's offer of proof. The Regional Director deals with this assertion in his report and quotes from an affidavit of Patino wherein he stated he was told by a foreman, Johnnie Galea, that he was eligible to vote and that he saw the'notice of election before the election and "knew what time the voting was taking place." According to Respondent's objection, his name was on the eligibility list. 6 The observers stated that they "would go back and forth to the plant and send out men to the voting booth and when we got back we would not be certain as to who voted or not " 7In the Holmes d Barnes, Ltd. case, 114 NLRB 630, the investigation of objections to an election disclosed that "some voters had their names checked off the eligibility list in groups of 2 and 3 before receiving their ballots and without their names being asked by the agent, and that one picked up his own ballot." The Board held that the election should not be set aside and stated that "This, of course, is not in strict accordance with the Board's instructions to its election agents and the decorum it strives to enforce. But the investigation also disclosed that this informal method of identification . . did not result in any ineligible voter receiving a ballot and participating in the election." 1052 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD gaining representative of an appropriate unit of employees of Respondent, and Respondent having on February 3, 1964, refused to recognize or bargain with the Union as the bargaining representative of employees of Respondent in an appropriate unit, I find that by this conduct the Respondent has violated Section 8 (a)(5) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent, set forth in section III of this Decision, occurring in connection with its business operations as set forth in section I of this Decision, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes, burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY It having been found that Respondent refused to bargain collectively with the Union, it will be recommended that Respondent be ordered to bargain with the Union upon request as the exclusive representative of its employees in the appropriate unit concerning rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, and if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. All production and maintenance employees including shipping and receiving employees and truckdrivers at Respondent's Huntington Park plant, exclusive of office clerical employees, guards, professional employees, and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute at all times material herein, a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. The Union at all times since October 8, 1963, and at all times material herein, has been and is now the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in the appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 5. By refusing to bargain collectively, and by interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees thereby, in the exercise of their right under Section 7 of the Act, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. RECOMMENDED ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and upon the entire record in this case and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, it is recom- mended that the Respondent, Cadillac Steel Products Corporation, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of all its employees in the appropriate unit. (b) In any manner interfering with the efforts of the above-named Union to bar- gain collectively with Respondent. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request bargain collectively with United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all the employees in the appropriate unit, including all production and maintenance employees including shipping and receiving employees and truckdrivers at Respondent's Huntington Park plant, exclusive of office clerical employees, guards, professional employees, and supervisors as defined in the Act. (b) Post at its plant in Huntington Park, California, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 8 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director 8In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further event that the Board's Order be enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order" TELESERVICE CO. OF WYOMING VALLEY, ETC. 1053 for Region 21, shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent's representative be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for at least 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.9 It is finally recommended that unless on or before 20 days from the date of receipt of this Decision the Respondent notify said Regional Director in writing that it will comply with the terms hereof, the Board issue an order requiring it to take such action. 9 In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, In writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith." APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all employees in the bar- gaining unit described below: All production and maintenance employees including shipping and receiv- ing employees and truckdrivers at our Huntington Park plant , exclusive of office clerical employees , eua;ds, professional employees , and supervisors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act. WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with the efforts of the above-named Union to bargain collectively on behalf of the employees in the above-described unit. CADILLAC STEEL PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Employer. Dated------------------- By------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 849 S. Broadway, Los Angeles, California, Telephone No. 688-5206, if they have any ques- tions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions. Teleservice Co. of Wyoming Valley, John Walsonavich t/a Serv- ice Electric Company, Service Electric TV Cable Company, Inc., Tamaqua TV Cable Company , Inc., and Service Electric Cable T.V. Inc.' and United Industrial Workers of North America of the Seafarers International Union of North Amer- ica, Atlantic, Gulf, Lakes and Inland Waters District, AFL- CIO. Case No. 4-CA-3150. November 24, 1964 DECISION AND ORDER On May 28, 1964, Trial Examiner George L. Powell issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond- 1 The name of Respondent appears as amended at the hearing. 149 NLRB No. 101.